Skip to content
Grounds publishedDecided 23 Apr 2021

General Division of the High Court

Re Haeusler, Thomas

Feedback & support

[2021] SGHC 93Case no. Originating Summons No 1028 of 2018

What happened, in plain English

There is no plain-English summary of this judgment yet.

Ask about this judgment

Laws this judgment relies on

Grounds of decision

Official text from eLitigation

  1. Introduction

  2. [1] Section 344 of the Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed) (“the Act”) (see [31] below) empowers the Registrar of Companies (“the Registrar”) to strike a company off the register if he has reasonable cause to believe that the company is not carrying on business or is not in operation. Section 155A of the Act (see [67] below) disqualifies a person from acting as a director of a company for five years if the Registrar has struck off three companies of which that person was a director under s 344 within the preceding five years. Section 155A(3) of the Act permits a person who is disqualified from acting as a director under s 155A(1) to apply to the court for leave to act as a director during the five-year period of disqualification.

  3. [2] The applicant is disqualified from acting as a director of any company under s 155A(1) of the Act for a period of five years with effect from 6 June 2017. He now applies under s 155A(3) of the Act for leave to act as a director during the period of his disqualification. As required by that provision, the applicant has given the Minister 14 days’ notice of this application. The Minister opposes the application.

  4. [3] Having heard submissions from the applicant and the Minister, I have dismissed the application. The applicant has appealed against my decision. I now set out the grounds for my decision.

  5. [4] These grounds will reveal that my summary of the legislative provisions at [1] above, although sufficient as an introduction, is an oversimplification. The scope of s 155A(1) is wider than my summary in two respects. First, the disqualification in s 155A(1) is not concerned merely with barring a person whose name appears on the formal register of the directors of a company from doing an act in that capacity. The disqualification extends even to taking part in or being concerned in the management of a company, whether directly or indirectly. The disqualification also applies to any person who is within the extended definition of “director” in s 4 of the Act, ie, a person who holds no formal appointment as a director but in accordance with whose directions or instructions the directors or a majority of the directors of a company are accustomed to act. Second, the disqualification in s 155A(1) is not confined to a “company” as defined in s 4 of the Act, ie, an entity incorporated under the Act. It disqualifies a person from acting as a director even of a foreign company to which Division 2 of Part XI of the Act applies. That is, in essence, a foreign company which does, or intends to, establish a place of business or carry on business in Singapore.

  6. [5] Nevertheless, for convenience, and unless the context indicates otherwise, I shall use three terms compendiously in these grounds of decision. First, I shall use the phrase “act as a director” as shorthand for any act which is prohibited by s 155A(1). Second, I shall use the word “disqualification” as shorthand for the effect of s 155A(1) on a director. Third, in the context of s 155A, I shall use the word “company” to encompass every type of corporate entity to which s 155A applies. Furthermore, as this case was decided before the Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act 2018 (Act 40 of 2018) (“the IRDA”) came into force on 30 July 2020, I refer to the Companies Act as it stood on the date on which this application was filed.

  7. Facts

  8. The applicant and his companies

  9. [6] The applicant is a Swiss national. He obtained his PhD in law from Basel University and qualified as a legal practitioner in Switzerland. He is also a full member of the Society of Trust and Estate Practitioners (“STEP”). He has provided consultancy services to high net worth individuals, family offices and highly reputable institutions on corporate finance and estate planning for over 20 years.

  10. [7] In 2006, the applicant came to live in Singapore. In 2009, he became a permanent resident of Singapore. In 2012, he set up a boutique consulting company known as Latitude 1.1 Group Pte Ltd (“Latitude”). He has been Latitude’s sole shareholder from the date it was incorporated. He was its sole director, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer from the date it was incorporated until he stepped down from those positions upon learning of his disqualification in August 2018. Latitude is the sole vehicle by which the applicant provides his services and he is its sole owner. I therefore draw no distinction between Latitude and the applicant in these grounds.

  11. [8] The applicant’s business is advising high net worth individuals, family offices and multinational corporations on setting up structures to hold investments and assets. A core part of the service which the applicant offers his clients is incorporating and administering companies. His clients then use these structures and companies to hold their assets such as bankable assets, investments in businesses, private aircraft, yachts, private equity investments and venture capital investments.

  12. [9] The applicant has decided to make Singapore the centre of his life and business. He has great confidence in Singapore as a safe and stable place to do business. Given both these factors, the applicant uses predominantly Singapore-incorporated companies in the structures he devises for his clients. The applicant accepts appointment as a director in all of these Singapore-incorporated companies. In almost all of them, the applicant is the only director. Only on very few occasions is a representative of the applicant’s client appointed alongside him as a director of one of these companies.

  13. [10] The applicant’s role as the director of each of these companies is to ensure that that company meets all its statutory, accounting and auditing obligations under Singapore law. In this way, as at 31 July 2018, the applicant came to be a director not only of Latitude but also of 35 other Singapore companies which he had incorporated for his clients. These companies hold total assets of about $1bn.

  14. [11] It is inevitable in these circumstances that the applicant’s clients must repose a high degree of trust in him. He exercises control over the company which is the legal owner of their assets and is also a signatory to the company’s bank account.

  15. [12] The applicant asserts that he is not a mere nominee director. By that, he means that he is not a mere placeholder, appointed only to fulfil the requirement in s 145(1) of the Act that every company incorporated in Singapore have at least one director who is resident in Singapore. As the applicant puts it:

  16. As this passage makes clear, the applicant’s involvement in these 35 companies is limited to services relating to the structure which he has devised, compliance with the regulatory requirements of the Act and any other specific tasks assigned by his clients. It is his clients, and not the applicant himself, who exercise ultimate executive control over the companies.

  17. The three struck-off companies

  18. [13] In May 2011, in the course of his business, the applicant accepted appointment as one of three directors of a company known as Fight Life Group Pte Ltd (“Fight Life”) and as its sole director ordinarily resident in Singapore. In December 2013, again in the course of his business, he accepted appointment as the sole director of two companies known as Shoyom Real Estate Holding Pte Ltd (“Shoyom”) and West Shore Holding Pte Ltd (“West Shore”).

  19. [14] By 2016, each of these three companies had failed to file annual returns for at least two years. As a result, the Registrar initiated proceedings under s 344 to have these companies struck off the register. The Registrar did so by issuing two sets of notices to each company by registered post to that company’s registered address. All of these notices were also sent at the same time to the applicant at his home address, in his capacity as a director of each company.

  20. [15] The Registrar sent the first set of notices in June 2016 in respect of Fight Life and in February 2017 in respect of Shoyom and West Shore. The notices informed the recipients of the following:

  21. (a) That s 344(1) of the Companies Act allows the Registrar to serve a notice on a company which he has reasonable cause to believe is not carrying on business or is not in operation giving that company 30 days to show cause to the contrary, failing which the Registrar will publish the company’s name in the Government Gazette with a view to striking the company off the register.

  22. (b) That the Registrar: (i) had reasonable cause to believe that the company in question was not carrying on business or was not in operation; and (ii) was therefore, by that notice, giving notice to the company as required by s 344(1) of the Act of his intention to strike the company’s name off the register.

  23. (c) That, if the recipient of the notice failed to show cause to the contrary within 30 days of the date of the notice, the company’s name would be published in the Government Gazette and the company’s name would be struck off the register 60 days after the date of publication.

  24. I shall call these the “30-day notices”.

  25. [16] A 30-day notice is an express statutory condition precedent to the Registrar’s power under s 344 of the Act to strike a company off the register. I set out the material provisions of s 344 in full at [31] below.

  26. [17] As foreshadowed, 30 days after serving the 30-day notices, the Registrar advertised each company’s name in the Government Gazette under s 344(2) of the Act.

  27. [18] The Registrar next issued a second set of notices in August 2016 for Fight Life and in April 2017 for Shoyom and West Shore. This notice informed each recipient of the effect of s 344(4) of the Act, ie, that the company’s name had been published in the Government Gazette and that, if the recipient did not object to the striking off within 60 days of this notice, the company would be struck off the register under s 344(4). I shall call these the “60-day notices”. A 60-day notice is not required by the Act and is not a condition precedent to striking off under s 344.

  28. [19] The applicant does not suggest that he did not receive the 30-day notices or the 60-day notices. In any event, it is undisputed that the applicant failed to show cause to the contrary within the time given in the 30-day notices and failed to object within the time given in the 60-day notices. As a result, the Registrar struck Fight Life off the register on 4 October 2016 and struck Shoyom and West Shore off the register on 5 June 2017. Under s 344(4) of the Act, each company was dissolved on the day that notice of its striking off was published in the Government Gazette.

  29. [20] The applicant accepts that, on 5 June 2017, the predicate of s 155A(1) of the Act was satisfied (cf [68]–[70] below). Three companies of which the applicant was a director had been struck off by the Registrar under s 344 of the Act within the five years preceding 5 June 2017. As a result, s 155A(1) operated automatically to disqualify the applicant from acting as a director of any company for five years “commencing after the date” of the last striking off, ie, commencing on 6 June 2017.

  30. [21] The Registrar did not serve any notice on the applicant informing him that he had been automatically disqualified under s 155A of the Act with effect from 6 June 2017. As the Minister correctly points out, the Registrar cannot be faulted for this, as s 155A does not require him to notify a director that he has been disqualified under that section.

  31. The applicant learns of his disqualification

  32. [22] Be that as it may, the Minister does not dispute the applicant’s evidence that he was unaware of his disqualification when it took effect on 6 June 2017. In his ignorance, the applicant continued to act as a director of various companies as though he was not disqualified. In addition, he accepted appointment as a sole director of six new companies which he incorporated between 4 July 2017 and 7 May 2018, during his period of disqualification. The Registrar did not block or reject the applicant’s lodgments which were necessary for all of these activities in the electronic lodgment system known as BizFile operated by the Accounting and Corporate Regulatory Authority (“ACRA”).

  33. [23] In July 2018, the applicant attempted to lodge a share transfer in BizFile for one of his clients’ companies. The system refused to permit him to do so. It appears that the Registrar had by now imposed a block, presumably as a means of enforcing the applicant’s disqualification. On 31 July 2018, the applicant had a meeting with an ACRA enforcement officer to find out the reason for the rejected lodgment. It was at this meeting that the applicant learned for the first time that he had been disqualified since 6 June 2017.

  34. This application

  35. [24] On 20 August 2018, the applicant made this application under s 155A(3) of the Act. As permitted by s 155A(4), the Minister is represented on this application by the Attorney-General. The primary facts on which the Minister relies to oppose the application are set out in an affidavit filed by Ms Chua Shiao Theng Barbara. Ms Chua is the Head of the Accountancy and Corporate Regulations Unit of the Economic Programmes Directorate under the Ministry of Finance (“MOF”). The Minister argues that the applicant’s application should be dismissed.

  36. [25] On 31 August 2018, the applicant received a letter from ACRA informing him of his disqualification. The letter incorrectly named the three companies whose striking off led to the applicant’s disqualification. The applicant takes no point on this error.

  37. Issues

  38. [27] I note at the outset that the applicant does not challenge his disqualification under s 155A(1) of the Act (cf [68]–[70] below). In other words, he accepts that s 155A(1) of the Act operated automatically on 5 June 2017 to disqualify him from acting as a director for five years after that date, ie, with effect from 6 June 2017. On that premise, the applicant’s application prays merely for leave “to act as director … during the period of [his] disqualification” under s 155A(3).

  39. [28] The applicant’s prayer for relief sets out the ultimate question which I have to determine: should the applicant be granted leave under s 155A(3) to act as a director during the period of his disqualification under s 155A(1)? To answer that ultimate question, I first consider the statutory objective of s 155A(1). That requires me to consider the statutory objective of s 344 of the Act. That is because Parliament has connected s 155A(1) directly and only to s 344. It has done this by legislating in s 155A(1) that only a striking off under s 344 will trigger a director’s disqualification under s 155A, albeit by threefold repetition. Nothing else can trigger a disqualification under s 155A(1), no matter how egregious or repeated the director’s behaviour.

  40. [29] The issues on this application, arranged in their logical sequence, are therefore as follows:

  41. (a) What is the statutory objective of s 344 of the Act?

  42. (b) What is the statutory objective of s 155A(1) of the Act bearing in mind (a) above?

  43. (c) What is the proper conceptual approach to the discretion under s 155A(3) of the Act bearing in mind (a) and (b) above?

  44. (d) Applying that conceptual approach to the facts of this case, should I exercise my discretion under s 155A(3) in the applicant’s favour?

  45. [30] I analyse each issue in turn.

  46. Section 344 of the Act

  47. [31] Section 344 of the Act gives the Registrar the power to strike a company off the register on his own initiative. To the extent that its provisions are material for present purposes, s 344 reads as follows:

  48. [32] Sections 344(1) and 344(2) remain unchanged from the original form in which they were enacted as part of the Companies Act (Act 42 of 1967) on 29 December 1967. But s 344(1A) of the Act is new. It was inserted into s 344 by the Companies (Amendment) Act 2014 (Act 36 of 2014) (“the Amendment Act”) with effect from 1 July 2015. I first consider the statutory objective of s 344 as it stood before 1 July 2015 and then consider its statutory objective as it stands after that date.

  49. Sections 344(1) and 344(2) of the Act

  50. [33] As the heading to s 344 indicates, that section empowers the “Registrar to strike [a] defunct company off [the] register”. The unique feature of s 344 is that it empowers the Registrar to do this on his own initiative. I take “defunct” in this context to mean simply the two predicates of s 344. A defunct company is therefore a company which is either: (a) not carrying on business; or (b) not in operation.

  51. [34] From the regulatory perspective, it is perfectly understandable why the Act should empower the Registrar to take the initiative in striking a defunct company off the register. Section 19(5) of the Act endows a company with separate legal personality upon registration under s 19(3) and incorporation under s 19(4). The status of being a separate legal person is a statutory privilege. A company needs this privilege only so long as it has a corporate purpose. A company which is defunct has no corporate purpose and therefore no need for this privilege. A company which has no need for this privilege should not retain it and should surrender it voluntarily. If it does not do so, s 344 empowers the Registrar to withdraw the privilege on his own initiative.

  52. [35] In my view, therefore, the statutory objective of s 344 is to allow the Registrar to ensure that only companies which have a corporate purpose remain on the register. Once again, it is perfectly understandable why this statutory objective is a desirable objective. Simply put, the register should not be cluttered with defunct companies. A register cluttered with defunct companies ceases, in a conceptual sense, to be an accurate record of companies which are making use of their status as separate legal persons for a corporate purpose. A register cluttered with defunct companies also increases the administrative burden on the Registrar of monitoring compliance with the requirements of the Act and its regulations and of imposing and enforcing the penalties for breaches of those requirements.

  53. [36] There was, however, a practical difficulty with s 344 as originally enacted. The Registrar has no way of knowing from his own records whether a company is defunct. And it is not practical for the Registrar to detect defunct companies by the brute force approach of simply serving a 30-day notice under s 344(1) on every single company on the register and striking off every company which fails to show cause to the contrary. First, the Registrar does not have the resources to conduct such an exercise even as a one-off, let alone on a periodic basis. Second, the brute force approach creates a high risk of a high number of false positives, ie the risk of striking a company off the register under s 344 which is not in fact defunct. This in turn creates a high risk of causing real disruption to real businesses. The Registrar’s power under s 344 as originally enacted was therefore beset by practical shortcomings which prevented the Registrar from using it to achieve its statutory objective. The legislative package introduced by and with the Amendment Act was enacted to address, amongst other things, these practical shortcomings.

  54. Section 344(1A) of the Act

  55. [37] The legislative package introduced by and with the Amendment Act comprised the following principal and subsidiary legislation:

  56. (a) Section 344(1A) of the Act, which came into force on 1 July 2015;

  57. (b) Regulation 89B of the Companies Regulations (Cap 50, Rg 1, 1990 Rev Ed) (“the Companies Regulations”), which came into force to support s 344(1A) of the Act, also on 1 July 2015;

  58. (c) Sections 344A and 155A of the Act, which came into force together on 3 January 2016; and

  59. (d) The Companies (Striking Off) Regulations 2015 (S 834/2015) (“the Striking Off Regulations”), which came into force to support s 344A, also on 3 January 2016.

  60. [38] This legislative package effected a sea change in the Act’s approach to defunct companies remaining on the register. Section 344(1A) of the Act allows subsidiary legislation to prescribe the circumstances to which the Registrar can have regard in determining whether there is reasonable ground to believe that a company is not carrying on business within the meaning of s 344(1). Curiously, s 344(1A) does not address the second predicate in s 344(1) (“not in operation”). Parliament presumably saw that predicate as a question of fact to be determined on a case-by-case basis. In any event, this discrepancy is immaterial for present purposes.

  61. [39] Regulation 89B of the Companies Regulations is the subsidiary legislation enacted under s 344(1A) of the Act. Regulation 89B prescribes six specific circumstances to which the Registrar may have regard in determining whether there is reasonable ground to believe that a company is not carrying on business:

  62. [40] The statutory objective of reg 89B is very clearly to address the practical shortcomings of s 344. It does this by prescribing six objective circumstances, any one of which suffices prima facie to bring a company within s 344(1) of the Act and to justify a striking off under s 344(2).

  63. [41] Regulation 89B assists the Registrar to achieve the statutory objective of s 344 in three ways. First, the Registrar can ascertain whether any of the prescribed circumstances exist by examining his own records, without any need for external factual inquiry on a company-by-company basis. Second, this first point taken together with the objective nature of these six circumstances renders the exercise of detecting and striking defunct companies off the register susceptible to algorithm and therefore to automated detection and action. Third, the publication of these six prescribed circumstances puts promoters, shareholders and directors on notice with certainty and with the degree of stability attached to subsidiary legislation as to what behaviour on their part will expose their companies to the risk of being struck off by the Registrar on his own initiative.

  64. [42] This latter point is particularly important for companies which are not defunct. The common thread running through all six prescribed circumstances is that they are closely correlated to a company being defunct. But these circumstances are not invariably correlated to a company being defunct. For that reason, even after reg 89B prescribed these six circumstances, the risk of a false positive remains. The publication of these prescribed circumstances through reg 89B therefore allows the persons who control a company which is not defunct to know what behaviour to avoid, lest they create a risk that the company is detected as a false positive under reg 89B and struck off by the Registrar on his own initiative.

  65. Section 344A of the Act

  66. [43] From the company’s perspective, a striking off under s 344 is an involuntary striking off. As part of the same legislative package, Parliament also enacted a s 344A of the Act. Section 344A sets out a procedure for a company to have itself struck off the register voluntarily. Parliament’s intent in enacting s 344A of the Act was therefore to create a new avenue by which those who control a company can avoid an involuntary striking off under s 344.

  67. [44] Section 344A of the Act allows a company, acting by its directors or a majority of them, to apply to the Registrar to be struck off the register. Subject to that sole difference, the procedure for a voluntary striking off under s 344A of the Act mirrors the procedure for involuntary striking off under s 344. Both involve a 30-day notice, publication of the company’s name in the Government Gazette and a 60-day notice before the company is struck off and dissolved.

  68. [45] The Striking Off Regulations prescribe the grounds and conditions for voluntarily striking a company off the register. In summary, the company: (a) must be defunct; (b) cannot be a party to any civil or criminal proceedings worldwide; (c) must have no assets or liabilities, current or contingent; and (d) cannot be subject to any ongoing or pending regulatory action or disciplinary proceedings (see reg 2 of the Striking Off Regulations).

  69. [46] The statutory objective of s 344A is exactly the same as the statutory objective of s 344: to ensure that only companies which have a corporate purpose remain on the register. Section 344 empowers the Registrar to strike a defunct company off on his own initiative. Section 344A empowers, for the first time, the directors of a company to apply to have their defunct company struck off the register voluntarily.

  70. [47] Where a defunct company does not meet the grounds and conditions necessary for a voluntary striking off under s 344A, the only course of action to bring its affairs voluntarily to an orderly conclusion is a dissolution following a winding up. In the case of a defunct company, this will ordinarily be a voluntary winding up, given that it will most likely have no assets and no liabilities, and therefore have no creditors or, at the very least, offer its creditors no incentive to commence a compulsory winding up.

  71. What are not the statutory objectives of s 344

  72. [48] Having set out the statutory objective of s 344, I now consider three objectives which are not in my view the statutory objective of s 344. First, it is not s 344’s objective to deter companies from being or becoming dormant. Second, it is not s 344’s objective to deter companies from breaching the Act. Third, it is not s 344’s objective to deter companies from being or becoming defunct.

  73. Not to deter or penalise dormancy

  74. [49] The statutory objective of s 344 is not to deter a company from being or becoming dormant. A dormant company, like a defunct company, can be described as a company which is not carrying on business and which is not in operation within the meaning of s 344(1). The difference is that a dormant company may awake in the future whereas a defunct company has no future. In that sense, a dormant company has some semblance of a corporate purpose while it is dormant, even though it is not carrying on business or in operation.

  75. [50] The Act expressly recognises the concept of a dormant company in ss 205B(2) and s 373(19)(a) of the Act. The Act also expressly facilitates dormancy by relieving a dormant company of the obligation to prepare its financial statements and to have its accounts audited: see ss 201A, 205B(1) and 373(9).

  76. [51] It is also notable that s 205B(3) of the Act – which makes it easier for a company to qualify as a dormant company within the meaning of s 205B(2) – was part of the very same legislative package which resulted in s 344(1A) and reg 89B. Parliament could not have intended to make dormancy easier with one set of provisions in that legislative package yet at the same time intended to deter dormancy by other provisions in the same legislative package.

  77. [52] The power under s 344 of the Act is not therefore linked to any statutory hostility to dormancy. It is the defunct company – and not the dormant company – which is the true and only target of s 344. Deterring dormancy is not the statutory objective of s 344.

  78. Not to deter a breach of the Act

  79. [53] The statutory objective of s 344 is not to deter a breach of the Act. If that were the statutory objective, a breach of the Act would be the predicate for striking off under s 344. But the sole predicate for striking off under s 344(1) is the Registrar having reasonable cause to believe that a company is defunct.

  80. [54] It is true that three of the circumstances prescribed by reg 89B involve a breach of the Act. Every time a company fails to file an annual return, it is in breach of s 197(1) of the Act (reg 89B(a)). Every time a company fails to have a registered office in Singapore to which communications and notices may be addressed it is in breach of s 142(1) of the Act (reg 89B(c)). And every time a company has not a single director who is ordinarily resident in Singapore and who is not disqualified from acting as a director, it is in breach of s 145(1) of the Act (reg 89B(f)). I shall refer to these three circumstances prescribed by reg 89B as the “breach circumstances”.

  81. [55] A company’s breach of s 197(1) and of s 142(1) of the Act also puts every director of the company in breach of the Act. Every director of a company who fails to file its annual return commits a criminal offence under s 197(6). And every director of a company which fails to have a registered office to receive communications and notices commits a criminal offence under s 142(2). Although the Act imposes these obligations on the company, every director of the company is in substance subject to these two obligations (although not perhaps in strict legal form: see Mukherjee Amitava v Dystar Global Holdings (Singapore) Pte Ltd and others [2018] 5 SLR 256 at [99]–[123]; affirmed on appeal on this point in Mukherjee Amitava v Dystar Global Holdings (Singapore) Pte Ltd and others [2018] 2 SLR 1054 at [44]–[45]).

  82. [56] However, a closer examination of reg 89B supports the conclusion that penalising a breach of the Act is not the statutory objective of s 344. Three of the six circumstances prescribed by reg 89B involve conduct which is not, in itself, a breach of the Act. First, it is not a breach of the Act for a company to fail to respond to correspondence, even if the correspondence is from the Registrar, even if the correspondence is sent by registered post and even if a response is required (reg 89B(b)). Second, it is not a breach of the Act for a company not to carry on business, let alone for a company to have credible information passed on to the Registrar indicating that it is not carrying on business (reg 89B(d)). Finally, it is not a breach of the Act for the Registrar to be unable to contact or locate the company’s locally-resident directors (reg 89B(e)). I shall refer to these three circumstances prescribed by reg 89B as the “non-breach circumstances”.

  83. [57] The very existence of the non-breach circumstances in reg 89B establishes that Parliament undoubtedly intended that the Registrar’s power under s 344 of the Act to strike a defunct company off the register on his own initiative should extend even to a company which is fully compliant with the Act. It seems to me difficult to envisage the circumstances in which the Registrar will exercise his power to do so. I say that for two reasons. First, from the regulatory perspective, a defunct company which is fully compliant is not as much of a blot on the register as a defunct company which is non-compliant. Second, from the practical perspective, invoking s 344 against a fully compliant company simply because it satisfies one of the non-breach circumstances prescribed by reg 89B runs the risk that it is a false positive. That risk exists even if the company and its directors do not respond to the 30-day notice and the 60-day notice. Even though a company which is struck off under s 344(2) can be restored to the register under s 344(5), the practical and commercial consequences of striking off a company which is not defunct are far greater than the consequences of not striking off a company which is defunct. And there is no compelling regulatory reason to run that risk when a company is fully compliant.

  84. [58] But all that is not to the point when ascertaining the statutory objective of s 344. The point is that the power which s 344 gives the Registrar is undoubtedly independent of any breach of the Act. It therefore cannot be the statutory objective of s 344 to deter or penalise a breach of the Act.

  85. [59] The only common thread running through the six circumstances prescribed by reg 89B is that they correlate strongly to a company being defunct. It is the defunct company – and not the non-compliant company – which is the true and only target of s 344.

  86. Not to deter companies from being or becoming defunct

  87. [60] The statutory objective of s 344 is not to deter a company from being or becoming defunct, to deter those who control a defunct company from allowing it to remain on the register or to deter those who control a company (whether or not defunct) from allowing the Registrar to strike it off under s 344.

  88. [61] Even after Parliament enacted the legislative package of which s 344(1A) and reg 89B are a part, it is not a breach of the Act for a company to be or become defunct or for those who control it to allow that to happen. And, although I accept (see [34] above) that it is undesirable from a regulatory perspective for a defunct company to remain on the register, it is even now not a breach of the Act for those who control a defunct company to allow that to happen. There is nothing in s 344, or indeed anywhere else in the Act, which imposes a duty on those who control a defunct company to remove it from the register. Indeed, the entirely voluntary nature of the avenue provided by s 344A confirms that there is no such duty. Finally, there is no language in s 344 at all which even hints at any penalty to be visited upon those who control a company (whether or not defunct) and allow the Registrar to strike it off under s 344. The dissolution of the company and the loss of the statutory privilege of separate legal personality which the Act confers on the company is the only conceivable penalty imposed by s 344 on the company and on those who control it.

  89. [62] It is therefore not the statutory objective of s 344 – whether before or after Parliament introduced the legislative package which includes s 344(1A) and reg 89B – to deter a company from being or becoming defunct, to deter those who control a defunct company from allowing it to remain on the register or to deter those who control a company (whether or not defunct) from allowing the Registrar to strike it off under s 344.

  90. Encouraging compliance is an incidental effect

  91. [63] This analysis reinforces my conclusion that the sole statutory objective of s 344 is to empower the Registrar to ensure that only companies which have a corporate purpose remain on the register. That is why dormancy is not, in itself, grounds for striking off. Those who control a company which is dormant may yet keep it compliant and may yet have a corporate purpose for it to fulfil once they awaken it. That is also why s 344 allows a striking off even without a breach of the Act: a company may be defunct even though it continues to comply with the Act. And a company may not be defunct even though it has failed, perhaps even egregiously, to comply with the Act.

  92. [64] Having said that, it is undoubtedly one of the incidental effects of s 344 that it deters the directors of every company, whether defunct or not defunct, from permitting any of the prescribed circumstances in reg 89B from coming about. This applies equally to the three non-breach circumstances prescribed by reg 89B as it does to the three breach circumstances prescribed by reg 89B. This incidental effect is, however, not the statutory objective of s 344. But in the sense that three of the prescribed circumstances involve a breach of the Act, and in that sense only, s 344 is not wholly detached from deterring a breach of the Act. But, for the reasons I have already given, that is an incidental and partial effect of s 344 and not its statutory objective.

  93. Conclusion on s 344

  94. [65] I have thus far established that: (i) the statutory objective of s 344 of the Act is to empower the Registrar to ensure that only companies which have a corporate purpose remain on the register; (ii) the statutory objective of s 344(1A) of the Act and reg 89B is to assist the Registrar in exercising his power under s 344 by prescribing objective circumstances by which he can determine from information in his own records whether a company is likely not to be carrying on business; (iii) the policy underlying this statutory objective is to maintain the coherence and integrity of the register as an accurate record of only those companies which continue to use the privilege of separate legal personality for a corporate purpose; and (iv) an incidental and partial effect, but not a statutory objective, of s 344 is to deter breaches of certain specific provisions of the Act.

  95. [66] As I have pointed out, however, it remains the case that s 344 does not penalise those who control a company for allowing the company to be struck off under s 344. That brings me neatly to s 155A of the Act.

  96. Section 155A(1) of the Act

  97. [67] I now set out s 155A in full:

  98. A curious feature

  99. [68] A curious feature of s 155A is that s 155A(1)(a) and s 155A(1)(b)(i) are predicated on Company A (as defined in s 155A(1)) being struck off on a particular date and two other companies being struck off “within a period of 5 years immediately before the date on which … Company A was struck off” [emphasis added].

  100. [69] This wording is curious. The use of the phrase “immediately before the date” [emphasis added] in s 155A(1)(b) makes it at least arguable that s 155A(1) is not triggered if Company A is struck off on the very same day as one of the two other companies referred to in s 155A(1)(b)(i). If s 155A(1)(b)(i) were instead predicated on the two other companies being struck off within a period of five years immediately “on or before the date” on which Company A is struck off, or immediately “before the time” on which Company A is struck off, it would be clear that the second of the three companies and Company A can be struck off on the same day. But that is not how s 155A(1) has been drafted.

  101. [70] So, to take the facts of this case, both Shoyom and West Shore were struck off on 5 June 2017. On that date, 5 June 2017, there were no two companies which had been struck off in the five years before 5 June 2017. Instead, there was only one company – Fight Life – which had been struck off in the five years before 5 June 2017. There were, of course, two companies which were struck off “on or before” 5 June 2017 or “before the time” on which the last of the three companies was struck off. But, as I have mentioned, that is not how s 155A(1) is drafted.

  102. [72] It is not necessary for me to resolve this curious feature of s 155A. That is because, as I have mentioned, the applicant accepts that the predicate of s 155A(1) has been satisfied and that the section therefore operated to disqualify him from acting as a director with effect from 6 June 2017. That leaves the exercise of the discretion under s 155A(3) as the applicant’s only avenue to act as a director during the period of his disqualification.

  103. [73] I therefore turn to consider the second issue before me: the statutory objective of s 155A.

  104. The statutory objective of s 155A

  105. [74] I accept the Minister’s submission that I can derive the statutory objective of s 155A of the Act from the public consultation paper on the second part of the draft Companies (Amendment) Bill 2013 which the Minister released in late 2013. This draft Bill eventually became the Amendment Act.

  106. [75] This consultation paper notes that that there was at that time no provision in the Act which disqualified a director of a struck-off company. Thus, it proposed a new s 155A “which disqualifies a person from acting as a director, if three or more companies in which he was a director of [sic], are struck off as a result of ACRA-initiated review within a period of five years”. Importantly, the consultation paper also states that the proposed s 155A was “intended to prompt directors of the company to take active steps to wind-up a defunct company on their own accord” [emphasis added] (MOF and ACRA, Public Consultation on Second Part of Draft Companies (Amendment) Bill 2013 (23 October 2013) at Annex C, p 9).

  107. [76] I accept that the statutory objective of s 155A is to deter the directors of a defunct company from leaving it to the Registrar to strike it off the register under s 344 of the Act. That is a perfectly understandable objective. It is undoubtedly desirable from a regulatory perspective for the directors of a defunct company, and not the Registrar, to take the initiative to bring the affairs of the company to an orderly conclusion. That is why s 344A was enacted as part of the same legislative package as s 155A. Its enactment gave the directors of a defunct company, for the first time, two avenues to bring its affairs to an orderly conclusion: through a voluntary striking off and through a voluntary liquidation.

  108. [77] It is preferable for the directors of a defunct company, and not the Registrar, to take the initiative in bringing its affairs to an orderly conclusion for three reasons. First, action initiated by the directors reduces significantly the risk of a false positive, ie, the risk that the Registrar will strike a company off which is not defunct. Second, even if the company is defunct, the directors are in a far better position than the Registrar to know whether a striking off is the appropriate way to bring its affairs to an orderly conclusion, ie, without prejudicing the interests of creditors, shareholders and other stakeholders. If a striking off is not appropriate, the directors should instead initiate a voluntary liquidation. Third, the Registrar’s administrative burden would be greatly and intolerably increased if he had to detect and strike off every defunct company on his own initiative under s 344.

  109. [78] Section 155A achieves its statutory objective by imposing a penalty on the directors of defunct companies who repeatedly leave it to the Registrar to strike the companies off under s 344. In so doing, the incidental effect of s 155A is to impose an indirect penalty on directors who permit any of the six circumstances prescribed by reg 89B from becoming true in respect of a company. That indirect penalty is imposed regardless of whether the prescribed circumstance engaged entails a breach of the Act. This indirect penalty in turn creates a de facto duty on a director to prevent these six prescribed circumstances from becoming true even though there is no de jure duty to that effect in the Act. It does this by setting up these six circumstances as triggers which can set a director down a path leading to a five-year disqualification. But once again, that is not the statutory objective of s 155A but merely one of its incidental effects.

  110. [80] The Minister also submits that one of the statutory objectives of s 155A is to discourage persons from taking up directorships of multiple companies without exercising any supervision over those companies. The Minister cites no authority for this submission. I do not accept it. A person can be a director of 100 companies. If he exercises no supervision over any of them, but they all ensure that none of the circumstances prescribed by reg 89B come about because their company secretarial services are competently provided, the companies will never be struck off under s 344 and the director will never be disqualified under s 155A. By the same token, if a person is a director of just three companies, all of which are fully compliant with the Act, and exercises close day-to-day supervision of those companies in accordance with his duties under the Act, the companies could nevertheless be struck off under s 344 on one of the non-breach circumstances prescribed by reg 89B. The director would then find himself disqualified and possibly deprived of his livelihood. I cannot accept that such an arbitrary outcome is a statutory objective of s 155A.

  111. [81] I therefore conclude that the statutory objective of s 155A is, and is only, to deter a director of a defunct company from leaving it to the Registrar to strike the company off the register under s 344 of the Act. As I have said, that is an entirely understandable and desirable objective. What causes difficulty is the manner in which s 155A achieves this statutory objective.

  112. A blunt instrument

  113. [82] The disqualification which s 155A(1) imposes is the bluntest of blunt instruments. I say that for six reasons.

  114. Always automatic

  115. [83] First, the disqualification is always automatic. The disqualification does not require any administrative act by the Registrar or any judicial act by the court. It is automatic regardless of whether the companies were struck off by reason of one of the three breach circumstances prescribed by reg 89B or one of the three non-breach circumstances prescribed by reg 89B. It is automatic regardless of whether the director bore any personal fault at all for the prescribed circumstance coming about. It is automatic regardless of when the director was appointed a director of the three companies: whether it was from the time the company was incorporated or just one day before the company was struck off.

  116. Fixed five-year period

  117. [84] Second, the disqualification is for a fixed five-year period. Section 155A(3) does not give the court the power to cut the five-year period short in a deserving case, for example where the three companies were all struck off on the non-breach circumstances prescribed by reg 89B. Section 155A(3) empowers the court only to grant leave to the applicant “to act as director of … a company … during the period of disqualification” [emphasis added].

  118. [85] Section 155A(3) thereby contemplates a fixed five-year term of disqualification which arises automatically and which must remain intact until it expires. The court’s only power under s 155A(3) is to carve out of that five-year period a limited liberty for the applicant to act as a director of “a company”. This does not, of course, mean that an application under s 155A(3) must be made in respect of one and only one company. After all, under s 2(1) of the Interpretation Act (Cap 1, 2002 Rev Ed), “words in the singular include the plural”. But it does mean that an application under s 155A(3) cannot be a blanket application, seeking to relieve a director entirely of his disqualification under s 155A(1). That would amount to cutting short the fixed five-year period of disqualification. That is contrary to Parliament’s intent in enacting s 155A(1). That is also outside the power which Parliament has given the court in s 155A(3). The application must instead name one or more specific companies which the applicant is seeking leave to act as a director of “during the period of [his] disqualification”.

  119. Always immediate

  120. [86] Third, the disqualification must commence immediately, “after the date on which” the third company is struck off. Section 155A thus gives the Registrar no power to allow a disqualified director a grace period within which he can lawfully continue to act as a director, no matter how compelling the reason or how exigent the circumstances. A director who acts in breach of the disqualification commits a crime and is liable to be fined $10,000 or imprisoned for two years. The only comfort which the Registrar can give a director is an indication that the director will not be prosecuted for the crime.

  121. Applies to directors who have already accepted appointment

  122. [88] Fourth, disqualification under s 155A can befall a director who accepted appointment as a director before s 155A came into force. It is true that s 155A(5) provides that a director cannot be disqualified under s 155A unless all three companies were struck off under s 344 on or after s 155A came into force on 3 January 2016. This prevents the unfairness which would arise if a company which was struck off under s 344 before s 155A came into force counted towards a director’s limit of three companies struck off within five years under s 155A(1).

  123. [89] But that is not the only unfairness which can arise under s 155A. It can also give rise to unfairness in the sense that a director is, on and after 3 January 2016, exposed to a risk of disqualification under s 155A(1) even though he accepted appointment as a director of any one of the struck-off companies when s 155A did not exist. The unfairness arises because the director will have lost the opportunity to bargain ex ante for contractual or other protection in the terms of his appointment as a director to mitigate the risk of any of the prescribed circumstances coming about in respect of the company, and thereby to mitigate the risk that he could find himself disqualified in the future, and quite possibly lose his livelihood, as a result of that company being one of three companies struck off under s 344.

  124. [90] Certainly in the first few years of its operation, s 155A will operate to disqualify many directors – the applicant amongst them – who accepted appointment as a director at a time when the Registrar striking a company off under s 344 carried no possible personal consequence for a director whatsoever.

  125. Total disqualification

  126. [91] Fifth, the disqualification under s 155A(1) is total. The disqualified director cannot “in any way (whether directly or indirectly) take part in or be concerned in the management of, any company”. The premise of s 155A(1) is therefore that merely holding office as a director of three companies which are struck off under s 344 within five years renders a director wholly unfit even to participate in the management of a company, eg, as an employee, and even to do so indirectly, eg, as a consultant.

  127. [92] While the phrase “take part in or be concerned in the management of” has not been judicially defined, it is evident that it is widely phrased to encompass the full gamut of management tasks and activities. It has been suggested that what this same phrase proscribes in the context of s 154(3) of the Act is the “element of decision-making which … affect[s] the company and the conduct of its affairs” and that “it is not necessary that this should be at the highest corporate echelons” (Hans Tjio, Pearlie Koh & Lee Pey Woan, Corporate Law (Academy Publishing, 2015) at para 08.077).

  128. [93] This total disqualification is imposed on every director caught by s 155A(1) even though all three companies may have been struck off on the three non-breach circumstances prescribed by reg 89B. This total disqualification is imposed even though the director may bear no personal responsibility at all for any of the circumstances prescribed by reg 89B coming about in respect of the three struck-off companies. This total disqualification is imposed even if the director depends for his livelihood on his directorship of or management of companies other than the three struck-off companies. This total disqualification is imposed even though the director merely taking part in the management of another company during the fixed five-year period of disqualification means that he holds no office recognised by the Act in that company and bears no statutory responsibility for that company’s compliance obligations under the Act.

  129. No notice

  130. [94] Sixth, s 155A does not require the Registrar to notify a director that he has been disqualified under s 155A(1).The Minister’s response is simply that s 155A does not require the Registrar to notify a director that he has been disqualified under that section. That is undoubtedly true.

  131. [95] But it is the case that the Registrar gives notice to directors on a number of compliance matters even though there is no statutory obligation to do so. The 60-day notice is just one example. The Registrar gives these notices voluntarily, presumably to meet the expectations of the commercial community, to avoid creating a trap for the unwary and to ensure or encourage compliance by pre-empting breaches which may arise from ignorance.

  132. Conclusion on s 155A

  133. [96] The disqualification of a director has a significant impact on his livelihood and constitutes a “substantial interference with the freedom of the individual” (In re Lo-Line Electric Motors Ltd and others [1988] 1 Ch 477 at 486). Despite this, under s 155A, a director whose companies are in breach of no provision of the Act whatsoever may yet find himself automatically and totally disqualified with immediate effect for a fixed five-year period from even being an executive employee of a company and without even knowing of the disqualification. That fate will befall the director even if it destroys his livelihood. That fate will befall the director even if it was impossible for him, for reasons entirely beyond his control, to satisfy the grounds and conditions for initiating a voluntary striking off or a voluntary winding up of the company. All of this makes the disqualification imposed by s 155A a most draconian penalty. I must assume that it is draconian by design and not through inadvertence.

  134. [97] It is of course true that the office of a director is a serious one and that any person who acts as a director ought to know, at the very least, the primary and subsidiary legislation which govern the rights, privileges and duties of that office. The ideal director will ensure that he strikes off his defunct companies voluntarily or winds them up voluntarily. He will ensure that none of the circumstances prescribed by reg 89B ever come about in respect of any of his companies, whether or not defunct. He will understand upon receipt the regulatory significance of a 30-day notice under s 344(1) and a 60-day notice foreshadowing a striking off. He will understand upon receipt the regulatory significance of a striking-off notice which the Registrar issues when a company is struck off. He will count these notices and ensure that the count never reaches three. If he fails to do that, he will know that he has been automatically disqualified under s 155A(1) if he receives three such notices within a five-year period. All of that is especially true of a director such as the applicant, who accepts appointment as a director in the course of his business and for the purpose of ensuring a company’s compliance with the Act and its subsidiary legislation. But not every director is the ideal director. The fact remains that s 155A(1) has created a significant trap for the unwary and ordinary director.

  135. [98] The critical issue then is whether the approach to exercising the discretion under s 155A(3) gives the court sufficient latitude to alleviate the draconian effects of the penalty imposed by s 155A(1) in a deserving case and, if so, how to recognise a deserving case. It is to that critical third issue that I turn next.

  136. The conceptual approach to s 155A(3) of the Act

  137. Ong Chow Hong

  138. [100] In Ong Chow Hong, VK Rajah JA sitting as a High Court judge examined the statutory objective of the Act’s regime for disqualifying directors.

  139. [103] After examining the genesis and development of the directors’ disqualification regime in Singapore, Australia and England, Rajah JA held that the essential statutory objective of our regime has been and continues to be to protect the public from the risk posed by an errant director and not to punish the errant director (at [20]):

  140. [104] Rajah JA further held that the protective objective of s 154 consists of two intertwined strands (at [22]–[23]):

  141. (a) First, the thin definition of protection. This is concerned with protecting the public from the risk of harm posed by the specific director who is the subject of the disqualification.

  142. (b) Second, the thick definition of protection. This concerns the wider need to protect the public from the risk of harm by all errant directors by an “uncompromising reaffirmation of the expected exemplary standards of corporate governance”.

  143. [105] Rajah JA also observed that local jurisprudence on s 154 of the Act had largely focused on the thin definition of protection without appreciating the thick definition of protection. He held that, when the grounds for disqualification under s 154(2) arise from an inadequate disclosure to the market in a disclosure-based regime such as we have in Singapore, the thick definition is of particular significance because of the need to deter other errant directors and to preserve investor confidence in Singapore’s capital markets (at [23]–[24]).

  144. The statutory objective of s 155A is deterrence

  145. [107] I accept that Ong Chow Hong is authority that the statutory objective of s 154 of the Act is predominantly protective. I also accept, with respect, that it is correct in that regard. But Ong Chow Hong was decided before the legislative package which includes s 155A was enacted. I do not accept that Ong Chow Hong is authority that the statutory objective of s 155A is protective, at least not in the same sense as it is for s 154.

  146. [109] What triggers a disqualification under s 154 is the director’s personal criminal wrongdoing which has been the subject of a judicial determination. The only exception is a disqualification under s 154(1)(b) of the Act which results from a civil penalty imposed under s 232 of the SFA. Even then, establishing liability for a civil penalty under s 232 of the SFA requires proving all of the elements of a criminal offence under the SFA. In that sense, the imposition of a civil penalty under s 232 of the SFA is also based on personal criminal wrongdoing by the director which has been the subject of judicial determination, albeit by a civil court rather than a criminal court. Where a director is disqualified under s 154, therefore, it is the very fact of the judicial determination of personal criminal wrongdoing which both attracts the disqualification and engages the protective objective which the disqualification serves.

  147. [110] A disqualification under s 155A arises without any need for any wrongdoing whatsoever, let alone criminal wrongdoing, let alone personal criminal wrongdoing, let alone criminal wrongdoing which has been the subject of judicial determination. It is not a crime to allow a company to become defunct or to cease operation. It is not a crime to leave a defunct company on the register for the Registrar to strike off under s 344. It is not a crime to allow a company to be struck off under s 344. Going back to reg 89B, it is not always a crime to allow one of the circumstances prescribed by reg 89B to come about. And even when one or more of the three strikings off are based on one of the breach circumstances prescribed by reg 89B (ie, which amount to a crime), a director may find himself disqualified under s 155A not because of his personal criminal wrongdoing but by a form of collective responsibility, simply because he had the misfortune to hold office as a director at the time of the striking off.

  148. [111] Because a disqualification under s 155A(1) can arise without any wrongdoing by anyone, it seems to me that the disqualification does not engage the protection of the public in any way. In other words, the penalty of disqualification imposed by s 155A is designed to support the statutory objective of s 344, and is therefore directed at protecting the register from being cluttered with defunct companies and is not directed at protecting the public from a director who has been judicially determined to have engaged personally in criminal wrongdoing.

  149. [112] Furthermore, even where at least one of the strikings off which leads to a director’s disqualification arises from one of the breach circumstances prescribed by reg 89B, it is a nonsense to say that the public needs to be protected from that director in the same way as it does from a director who has been disqualified under s 154(2). A director who is disqualified because he permitted an inaccurate disclosure (Ong Chow Hong) or because he engaged in insider trading (Madhavan Peter v Public Prosecutor and other appeals [2012] 4 SLR 613) poses an obvious risk to the public. A director who has failed to file a company’s annual returns may pose a risk to the coherence of the register and undoubtedly imposes an administrative burden on the Registrar. But he poses no risk to the public from which the public ought to be protected. A fortiori where a director is disqualified with no personal fault on his part but simply through collective responsibility.

  150. [113] To my mind what underlies the statutory objective of s 155A is neither punishment nor protection but deterrence. It cannot be punishment because it is not a breach of the Act to allow a defunct company to remain on the register. It cannot be protection because it is a nonsense to say that public needs to be protected from every single director who attracts the automatic fixed five-year total disqualification under s 155A. Section 155A exists as a blunt instrument to support the statutory objective of s 344. It simply imposes a draconian penalty to act as a deterrent for every director against allowing a defunct company to remain on the register and gives every director of a defunct company a powerful incentive voluntarily to strike off or wind up the company instead of leaving it to the Registrar to strike it off. Where neither of those courses of action is possible, typically because of the failure or refusal of the shareholders or remaining directors to cooperate, the draconian penalty imposed on the hapless director is nevertheless the intended effect of s 155A.

  151. The Huang Sheng Chang factors

  152. [114] In considering the exercise of the court’s discretion under s 154(6) of the Act to grant leave to act as a director after an automatic disqualification under the equivalent of s 154(1) of the Act, Ong Chow Hong cited (at [18]) the five factors listed by Wee Chong Jin CJ sitting as a High Court judge in Huang Sheng Chang and others v Attorney-General [1983–1984] SLR(R) 182 (“Huang Sheng Chang”). Rajah JA expressed the view (at [18]) that these factors remain relevant under our current regime for the disqualification of directors. The five factors (which I shall refer to as “the Huang Sheng Chang factors”) are:

  153. (a) the nature of the offence of which the director has been convicted;

  154. (b) the nature of the director’s involvement;

  155. (c) the director’s general character;

  156. (d) the structure and the nature of the business of each of the companies which the director seeks the leave of the court to become a director of or to take part in the management of; and

  157. (e) the interests of the general public, the shareholders, the creditors and the employees of these companies and the risks to the public and to those persons should the applicant be permitted to be a director of those companies or to take part in their management.

  158. [115] The Minister submits that the Huang Sheng Chang factors are an appropriate starting point for considering the factors which should go towards the exercise of the discretion under s 155A(3) of the Act. I do not accept that submission for two reasons.

The judgment continues past this page. Read the rest at eLitigation.