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Grounds publishedDecided 31 May 2022

General Division of the High Court

Commodities Intelligence Centre Pte Ltd v Mako International Trd Pte Ltd and others

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[2022] SGHC 131Case no. Suit No 924 of 2019

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] The plaintiff’s central case is that the defendants were its agents, and, on this basis, they owed fiduciary and other duties. These duties, the plaintiff says, were breached in many different ways, causing it to suffer more than US$1.7m in losses. The plaintiff also brings other connected claims for misrepresentation, conspiracy, and dishonest assistance.

  3. The parties

  4. [2] The plaintiff is Commodities Intelligence Centre Pte Ltd (“CIC”). CIC is a Singapore-incorporated company in the business of developing e-commerce applications. It owns and operates a commodities-trading platform which offers, amongst other things, trade-matching (the “Platform”). CIC was incorporated in May 2018, as a joint venture between three parties, including Zall Smartcomm (“Zall”). Zall operates a leading business-to-business platform in China and has launched other online transaction and service platforms around the world. Two of CIC’s officers gave evidence at trial: Yu Wei (referred to as “Peter”), its chief executive officer, and Li Xiaolin (referred to as “Richard”), who held the title of “Deputy Director”.

  5. [3] The three defendants are, respectively, Mako International Trd Pte Ltd (“Mako”), Zhuang Sheng (referred to as “Jonathan”) and Chua Yi Yang (referred to as “Wayne”). Mako was incorporated in Singapore on 6 September 2018 by Jonathan and his business partner, Eddy Chandra (“Eddy”). Jonathan and Eddy are each 50% shareholders of Mako, which is in the business of commodities trading, importing and exporting. It participates in such trades both in its own capacity, as well as a procurer of trades for other parties. At the material time, Jonathan, Eddy and Wayne were the directors of Mako. However, only Jonathan and Wayne gave evidence, both for themselves and on behalf of Mako. Eddy was not called to give evidence, and, as far as the parties were concerned, he did not play any role in the events leading up to this suit.

  6. Background to the dispute

  7. [4] Jonathan and Wayne were introduced to CIC in early September 2018 by a mutual business acquaintance from a company called China Petroleum and Gas (S) Pte Ltd (“CPAG”). At this time, Mako had either been incorporated or was in the midst of being incorporated. Thereafter, between September and October 2018, Richard met with Jonathan and Wayne to discuss a potential business relationship between CIC and Mako. The parties broadly agree that the purpose of such relationship was for Mako to assist CIC in developing its business in the Indonesian market. However, on CIC’s case, the defendants were the ones who pitched the idea of assisting CIC with developing its presence in the Indonesian commodities market; on the defendants’ account, it was CIC who sought assistance with the development of its business.

  8. [5] Whichever the case, in the midst of these meetings, on 12 October 2018, the Platform was officially launched in Singapore. It is Peter’s evidence that, though the technology for the Platform was provided by Zall, CIC did not receive other forms of operational support. It therefore needed to find ways to promote usage of the Platform on its own. The key strategy it intended to employ to achieve this was, first, to network with players in the commodities trading industry. CIC would then to use this network to encourage usage of its Platform. To this end, CIC was keen on participating in physical, back-to-back trades between suppliers in the region, particularly in Indonesia, and end-buyers in China. It was of the view that such physical trades would increase its exposure in the commodities trading industry, and, accordingly, help it to market the Platform.

  9. [6] However, CIC claims that it had no experience in the area of conducting physical trades, which is where Mako, Jonathan and Wayne were supposed to come in. On CIC’s case, Jonathan and Wayne held themselves out as seasoned commodities traders with reliable contacts in Indonesia. In particular, it is Richard’s evidence that Jonathan and Wayne provided two set of documents to convince CIC that they had the necessary experience. The first was a deck of PowerPoint slides (the “Slides”), which set out the experience they (and thus, Mako) allegedly had in the Indonesian commodities market. The second was what CIC calls the “Indicative List of Deals”. On its face, this “List” contains the details of past commodities trade deals. On Richard’s evidence, Jonathan and Wayne provided them to CIC as a résumé of sorts, that is, as a list of trade deals which they claimed to have procured and carried out in the past. The purpose of the “List” is the subject of dispute, and bears substantially on the parties’ cases. I will return to it at [60]–[63] below.

  10. [7] CIC avers that these representations and documents induced it to appoint Mako as its “agent” to “source for business in Indonesia, market CIC to local Indonesian traders and customers, and develop CIC’s presence in the Indonesian commodities trading market for bauxite, nickel ore and coal”. This appointment was effected in mid-November 2018 by way of a written agreement entered into between CIC and Mako. This agreement was recorded in Chinese and it is titled “服务协议书” (fú wù xié yì shū). The parties agree that this should be read as the “Service Agreement”, but dispute the translation of the substantive terms which inform their rights and obligations. CIC’s preferred translation of the agreement, put forward by its translator, Tan Sin Ger (“Mr Tan”), is as follows:

  11. [8] The defendants’ qualified translator, Wang Rihui’s (“Mr Wang”), offered the following translation in opposition:

  12. [9] The parties’ dispute over the proper translation of the Service Agreement, however, is just an aspect of their more fundamental dispute over the nature of the relationship it created between CIC and Mako. On CIC’s case, the agreement was entered into hurriedly, and does not “exhaustively spell out all of [Mako’s] duties” which should be understood as being more fully informed by three crucial facts surrounding the formation and performance of the Service Agreement. First, the fact that Jonathan and Wayne “operated with autonomy, and were given the responsibility and discretion to source for, negotiate and procure” trade deals in Indonesia. Second, the fact that CIC “did not have any employees with experience with local Indonesian traders and customers”. Finally, the fact that CIC “relied on and reposed trust and confidence in Jonathan and Wayne and trusted their expertise to procure and carry out Indonesian commodities deals”.

  13. [10] I should add that, beyond Mako, it is CIC’s case that Jonathan and Wayne were also its agents in their personal capacities. To this end, CIC cites the same three facts above, but in lieu of the Service Agreement – to which Jonathan and Wayne were not parties – CIC relies on the fact that in November 2018, Wayne asked for name cards to be issued to him and Jonathan. More specifically, he requested that CIC print his and Jonathan’s personal email addresses on these name cards, as opposed to email addresses tied to Mako. CIC did ultimately issue such name cards, identifying Jonathan and Wayne as a “Director” and “Deputy Director” of CIC, respectively. CIC submits that this should be construed as an indication that Jonathan and Wayne agreed to act as its agents personally, beyond their less direct roles as directors of Mako.

  14. [11] In any event, whatever the nature of the legal relationship between CIC and each of the three defendants, sometime in mid-to-late November 2018, Mako procured a back-to-back trade for CIC to participate in as a middleman pursuant to the Service Agreement (the “Transaction”). It bears noting that Mako did not enter into the Transaction for and on behalf of CIC. CIC admits that Mako did not have “any authority to enter into or execute any agreement on [its] behalf”. Thus, although the trade was sourced by Mako, the contracts in the Transaction were signed by employees of CIC.

  15. [12] In the first leg of the Transaction, CIC contracted to purchase, on an FOB basis, 55,000 wet metric tonnes (“WMT”) of nickel ore containing at least 1.65% nickel. After some back-and-forth, the supplier of the nickel ore ended up being an Indonesian company called PT Toshida Indonesia (“Toshida”) (I will refer to the contract between them as the “CIC-Toshida Contract”). I pause to highlight that the parties dispute the circumstances leading up to the formation of the CIC-Toshida Contract. I will address the necessary aspects of their dispute in due course. For now, I note that prior to the formation of the CIC-Toshida Contract, the supplier that Mako recommended was one PT Integra Mining Nusantara (“Integra”). A contract between CIC and Integra was executed for the supply of the nickel ore (the “CIC-Integra Contract”), but this was later replaced with the CIC-Toshida Contract when it came to light that Integra’s export licence would expire before the date on which the cargo could likely be shipped out of Indonesia. In the second leg of the Transaction, CIC contracted on a CIF basis to sell the cargo to CPAG for a profit (the “CIC-CPAG Contract”). CPAG was also a middleman; so, in the third leg of the Transaction, CPAG was contracted to sell the cargo to the ultimate buyer, a Chinese company called Guangdong Guangqing Metal Technology Co Ltd (“GGMT”).

  16. [14] CIC seeks, by the causes of action it brings in this suit (see [1] above), to pin the responsibility for such losses on the defendants. Naturally, this begs the question as to why CIC has not taken the commercially simpler course, and sued Toshida. Indeed, most of the above losses flow directly from the failure of the cargo to meet specifications. By contrast, to hold the defendants liable for the same losses, CIC needs to rely on causes of action which are obviously more challenging to establish. On this, I should highlight that CIC did, on 15 October 2019, file a notice of arbitration against Toshida. However, CIC has concerns that any award it might be able to obtain would be unenforceable. This risk of unenforceability, CIC pleads, is also attributable to the defendants – specifically, their failure to ensure that: (a) the CIC-Toshida Contract was recorded in Bahasa Indonesia; and (b) the arbitration clause in this contract was valid. The first failing allegedly renders the contract null and void as a matter of Indonesian law. So, even if it is able to successfully obtain an arbitral award against Toshida, this would not be enforceable in Indonesia. The defendants’ second failing is also said to have a bearing on the enforceability of any arbitral award CIC might be able to obtain against Toshida.

  17. Outline of the parties’ dispute

  18. [16] As mentioned at the outset, CIC’s primary case rests on the premise that the defendants were its agents, and therefore, fiduciaries. In the first alternative, it avers that the defendants were ad hoc fiduciaries. In the second alternative, CIC argues that the duties which a fiduciary would owe should, nevertheless, be implied into the Service Agreement.

  19. [17] On whichever basis, CIC pleads that the defendants were obliged: (a) to serve CIC with good faith and loyalty; (b) not to mislead CIC or misrepresent to it matters relating to the Transaction, as well as other potential transactions; (c) to use care and skill in the performance of their duties in relation to CIC; (d) not to act in the interest of others or pursue the interests of another to the prejudice of or contrary to or in conflict with the interests of CIC; (e) not to place or allow themselves to be placed in a situation or position where their duties to CIC will or may conflict with their personal interests; (f) to disclose potential conflicts of interests in the Transaction or other transactions which they were procuring for CIC or representing CIC in; (g) to account, and to pay CIC all monies, property or other proceeds received on behalf of CIC; and (h) not to make secret profits. I emphasise that these are all the duties which CIC pleads.

  20. [18] These duties, CIC claims, were breached by the defendants in many ways. First, by causing it to enter the CIC-Integra and CIC-Toshida Contracts, which were allegedly illegal. Second, by failing to ensure that the source as well as supplier of the nickel ore were reliable. Third, by failing to ensure that the CIC-Toshida contract complied with Indonesian law. Fourth, by inducing CIC not to purchase cargo insurance. Fifth, by concealing facts about the Transaction from CIC. Lastly, by interposing CIC into the Transaction negligently and/or against its interests.

  21. [19] Apart from its primary case that the defendants owed and breached many duties as agents and fiduciaries, CIC also brings alternative causes of action for: (a) negligence; (b) fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation; (c) lawful or unlawful means conspiracy; and (d) dishonest assistance (against Jonathan and Wayne). Further, in the event a cause of action is made out against Mako but not Jonathan and Wayne, CIC submits that the Mako’s corporate veil should be pierced to hold the two directors personally liable.

  22. [20] The defendants dispute that they were CIC’s agents and fiduciaries. The essence of their defence is that Mako acted as a mere broker of deals. That is, Mako’s role was simply to introduce commodities suppliers in Indonesia to CIC, which was to decide for itself whether to participate in back-to-back trades with end-buyers it found. It was not Mako’s responsibility to procure and enter whole deals for CIC, much less to do so assiduously and loyally. As to Jonathan and Wayne, the defendants’ case is that they acted only as directors of Mako, and did not consent to being appointed as CIC’s agents personally. Therefore, the defendants deny owing any of the above duties to CIC, whether as agents, ad hoc fiduciaries, or impliedly in contract. In the alternative, on the basis that such duties are found to have been owed, the defendants say they were not breached. The defendants’ case in respect of CIC’s claim in negligence is the same. They deny owing a duty of care and skill, and, in the alternative, they submit that the duty had not been breached. They also deny liability for misrepresentation, conspiracy and dishonest assistance, and argue that there is no basis for the corporate veil of Mako to be pierced.

  23. [21] Finally, Mako brings a counterclaim for unpaid fees under the Service Agreement, and this claim comprises two parts. First, Mako avers that CIC owes four months of its monthly fee of S$18,000, ie, S$72,000 (see cl 2 of the Service Agreement set out at [7]–[8] above). Second, apart from the Transaction, Mako alleges that, it procured two other trades for CIC under the Service Agreement. It claims that the fee for one of these two trades, amounting to US$10,281.43, remains outstanding. CIC denies liability for the first claim on various grounds, and admits liability to the second. In respect of both claims, CIC also invokes the right to set-off liability against its own claim for damages.

  24. The issues before me

  25. [22] Based on the parties’ cases, the substantive issues before me are:

  26. (a) First, what was the nature of CIC’s relationship with each of the three defendants: whether the defendants were agents and thus, fiduciaries; or whether they were fiduciaries on the facts.

  27. (b) Second, taking into account my findings on the above issue, what duties did the defendants owe CIC: whether in equity as fiduciaries, in contract under the Service Agreement, or in tort?

  28. (c) Third, having regard to the duties which I find were owed, did the defendants breach any of those duties, and, if so, what losses did CIC suffer as a result?

  29. (d) Fourth, did the defendants make any false representations to CIC, and, if so, was CIC induced by any of those representations to act in a manner which caused it to suffer loss?

  30. (e) Fifth, did the defendants conspire, whether by lawful or unlawful means, to cause CIC injury? If so, what losses did CIC suffer as a result of such conspiracy?

  31. (f) Sixth, on the basis that Mako is found to have been a fiduciary – but not Jonathan and Wayne personally – did the latter two dishonestly assist Mako in breaching its fiduciary duties to CIC?

  32. (g) Seventh, on the basis that Mako is found liable to CIC – but not Jonathan and Wayne personally – should its corporate veil be pierced to hold the latter two personally liable?

  33. (h) Lastly, whether Mako’s counterclaims for unpaid fees are made out, and if so, whether any of the defences raised are also made out so as to allow CIC to avoid liability.

  34. [23] Beyond these, however, CIC raises three preliminary issues in its closing submissions which ought to be disposed of before I turn to the substantive issues before me, proper. They are:

  35. (a) Whether the defence should be struck out on the basis that the defendants have failed to comply with their discovery obligations, and have withheld documents likely to be detrimental to their case.

  36. (b) Whether Mr Wang committed perjury at trial in relation to the preparation of his translations, and, as such, whether I should disregard all of his translations and oral testimony on that basis.

  37. (c) Whether I should disregard all of Wayne’s evidence on the basis that it was not his own, but rather contrived to support Jonathan’s account of the facts.

  38. Preliminary issues

  39. Striking out the defence in toto

  40. [24] The legal basis on which CIC seeks to strike out the defence is the court’s broad power under O 24 r 16(1) of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed). Its essential complaint is that Jonathan and Wayne supressed the disclosure of their correspondence with various third parties as well as between themselves. Further, to explain their non-disclosure, they allegedly concocted unbelievable stories about how these correspondences have become irretrievable because their mobile phones have malfunctioned, were lost or damaged.

  41. [25] Putting aside the issue of whether the evidence bears out CIC’s claim, I decline even to consider this argument, raised only after the end of trial, for two reasons. First of all, I accept that it is possible for O 24 r 16(1) to be invoked at this stage of the proceedings (see Btech Engineering Pte Ltd v Novellers Pte Ltd [2019] SGHC 171 (“Btech”) at [93]–[103]). However, given that striking out a defence (or a claim) is obviously significant, it is a point which should be pleaded – as a matter of fair notice – so as to put it into issue. This, in my view, is clear from Loh J’s decision in Btech (see [97]). No such issue was placed before me, notwithstanding that CIC’s Statement of Claim was amended for a third time on 24 March 2021, after the start of trial, long after discovery.

  42. [26] My second reason for declining to consider CIC’s argument is its overly general character. On the basis that Jonathan and Wayne have refused to disclose their correspondence with third parties and between themselves, CIC submits that the whole defence should be struck out. Even if I accept its characterisation of the facts, this conclusion does not follow. CIC makes no argument as to how the lack of these correspondence bears on any of its many causes of action, and the importance of such precision can be seen from Btech. After determining that the plaintiff in Btech had deliberately suppressed certain documentary records, Loh J concluded: “Seeing as the documentary records would be relevant to [the defendant’s] counterclaim for the equipment and tools specifically, and not its other counterclaims, I do not think it would be fair to strike out [the plaintiff’s] defence to counterclaim in toto” (at [102]).

  43. [27] I am mindful from Alliance Management SA v Pendleton Lane P and another and another suit [2008] 4 SLR(R) 1 (at [6]) that the principle underlying the power in O 24 r 16(1) is the public interest in the administration of justice, specifically, ensuring that court orders are duly obeyed. This, however, needs to be weighed against the principle that a litigant should not ordinarily be denied the opportunity for his defence (or claim) to be considered on its merits. CIC’s broad argument that the entire defence should be struck out patently fails to strike this balance. I therefore dismiss its argument.

  44. Whether Mr Wang is guilty of perjury

  45. [28] I turn to the second issue. Essentially, CIC submits that I should disregard all the translations Mr Wang provided as well as his oral testimony on the basis that he has perjured himself. CIC makes four allegations in this regard. First, that Mr Wang lied in his affidavit of evidence-in-chief (“AEIC”), where he claimed to have personally translated all relevant documents. Second, that he continued to lie about this during cross-examination. Third, that he falsely testified that no translations had been provided to him together with the original documents. Lastly, that he also falsely testified that the defendants did not return any of the draft translations which he had prepared with amendments.

  46. [29] When Mr Wang took the stand for less than half a day, he was questioned only on the interpretations he put forth, and how he arrived at them. At no point did CIC’s counsel even hint at the four allegations above, much less put them to Mr Wang directly for his response. I note that the defendants argue in their reply submissions that there are no inconsistencies in Mr Wang’s evidence from which it can be concluded that he lied. This is, however, insufficient to ameliorate the concern I have with the manner in which CIC has levelled allegations. Counsel for the defendants do not represent his interests, and it is simply Mr Wang who needs, and should have a chance to respond. Since CIC failed to accord him this opportunity, I cannot even begin to assess whether he is, as CIC boldly claims, “guilty of perjury”. I therefore wholly reject CIC’s argument.

  47. Weight to be given to Wayne’s evidence

  48. [30] I turn to the final preliminary issue. In short, CIC submits that no weight can be given to Wayne’s evidence because it is contrived to support Jonathan’s position. This submission rests on the “fundamental principle that [a] witness’s evidence must remain his own and cannot be supplanted by [that] of another” (citing the Court of Appeal’s decision in Ernest Ferdinand Perez De La Sala v Compañia De Navegación Palomar, SA [2018] 1 SLR 894 at [136] and [138]), and, to show that this principle has been breached, CIC makes three allegations.

  49. [31] First, CIC submits that much of Wayne’s evidence relates to matters only included in Jonathan’s AEIC, and that there is “no reason” for Wayne to have done this given that his own involvement was not identical to Jonathan’s. On this basis, CIC argues that no weight should be attributed to his evidence. In support of this, CIC relies on Jasviderbir Sing Sethi and another v Sandeep Singh Bhatia and another [2021] SGHC 14 (“Jasviderbir Sing”). In this case, Coomaraswamy J declined to accord any corroborative weight to the evidence of three plaintiff witnesses on the grounds that their accounts were “too clear, too categorical and too consistent” (at [56]). Many passages had been replicated verbatim or almost so (at [57]). In this light, the first defendant argued that there had been collusion in the preparation of the AEICs (at [58]). However, the judge observed that this submission went much further than necessary. Instead, it appeared to him that what happened was that the first plaintiff’s AEIC was drafted on his instructions, “in the usual way”. This draft was then used as a template for the AEICs of the three witnesses (at [59]–[60]).

  50. [32] CIC submits that the impropriety which taints the preparation of Wayne’s AEIC is “far more egregious” than in Jasviderbir Sing because it does not merely replicate parts of Jonathan’s AEIC. Instead, it “purports to adopt and incorporate all matters in Jonathan’s AEIC”. He is, as such, not giving his own evidence, but rather parroting Jonathan’s evidence. I do not accept the parallel CIC seeks to draw with Jasviderbir Sing. There, the three witnesses adduced AEICs which appeared to have been prepared by each of them independently. The discovery of their replication of many passages therefore cast doubt on the implied premise that the evidence affirmed was their own. By contrast, here, right at the outset of Wayne’s AEIC, he states as follows:

  51. [33] By this, Wayne very candidly admits that he did not, without knowledge of Jonathan’s version of the facts, produce his own independent account. He had the benefit of reading Jonathan’s AEIC and recalling events through such lens. This certainly reduces the probative value which can be given to his evidence. However, the fact that Wayne prepared his AEIC in this way does not, contrary to CIC’s submission, deprive it of all evidential weight. It is wholly permissible for Wayne to have the same recollection of events as Jonathan, and the fact that his AEIC was prepared in this way does not ipso facto render it unbelievable.

  52. [34] CIC’s second point is that the circumstances surrounding the preparation of Wayne’s AEIC “cast serious doubt” as to the independence of his evidence. In essence, CIC relies on: (a) the fact that he and Jonathan prepared their AEICs together with their counsel; and (b) Wayne’s lack of familiarity, at trial, with the contents of his and Jonathan’s AEICs. I reject these submissions. One, while it is not ideal, it is not uncommon for AEICs to be prepared with some degree of proximity in time and space. As I explained above, this reduces the probative value of the evidence given, but it is not a fact which, alone, necessarily strips the evidence of any weight. Two, I accept that witnesses should be familiar with their evidence, but Jonathan and Wayne’s AEICs totalled almost 6,000 pages. I do not commend their hyper-cautious, over-inclusion of any and all documents, but I equally cannot expect Wayne to maintain a high degree of familiarity in the face of such voluminous records. This is especially so, given that the AEICs were affirmed in March 2021, and Wayne only gave evidence before me in September 2021, six months later.

  53. [36] Finally, and most importantly, CIC had clear notice of the way in which Wayne’s AEIC was prepared, and did in fact cross-examine him on the issue. I therefore reject CIC’s argument that no corroborative weight should be given to Wayne’s evidence when assessing Jonathan’s evidence. The weight to be given to his evidence turns on the extent to which CIC’s counsel was able to affect his credibility in cross-examination. In my judgment, this effect was minimal, and, in the premises, I will give Wayne’s evidence the appropriate weight in light of my observations at [33] above.

  54. The substantive issues

  55. [37] I now turn to the eight substantive issues set out at [22] above.

  56. Issue 1: Nature of the parties’ relationship

  57. [38] In summary, having considered the evidence and submissions before me, I find that Mako was not, in any legally meaningful sense, an “agent” for CIC. As such, their relationship was not one which fell within the settled categories giving rise to fiduciary obligations. Further, I also find that Mako was not CIC’s fiduciary on the facts of the case. I now explain my decision.

  58. CIC’s relationship with Mako

  59. [39] The evidence shows that the Service Agreement was probably not meant to be a comprehensive reflection of CIC and Mako’s agreement. I accept this. However, in assessing the nature of CIC and Mako’s relationship, their written agreement is still necessarily the starting point. The terms of the agreement have been set out at [7]–[8] above. In its preamble, CIC is described as “委托方” (wěi tuō fāng), and Mako is described as “受托方” (shòu tuō fāng). In Mr Tan’s view, these should be read as “principal” and “trustee” respectively. In the first clause, Mako is described as “代理商” (dài lǐ shāng), which Mr Tan suggests should be translated as “agent”. Mr Wang proposes more neutral translations of “client”, “service provider” and “broker”, respectively.

  60. [40] The parties’ reliance on these terms, however, is misplaced. It is trite that labels neither conclusively indicate nor preclude the existence of particular legal relationships, and this lack of certainty is exacerbated by the fact of the parties’ translation dispute. In fact, even if the dispute is set aside and I take CIC’s case at its highest, the labels which it prefers are still unhelpful. First, given Mr Tan’s translation of “受托方” as “trustee” as opposed to “fiduciary”, CIC only submits that it “entrusted” Mako under the Service Agreement. CIC does not claim that in entering the agreement, it and Mako specifically applied their minds to the question of whether Mako would be a fiduciary under the agreement. This being the case, the translation of “受托方” is largely unhelpful since whether or not CIC “entrusted” Mako, and the degree to which it did so, still needs to be proven by reference to the substantive terms of the Service Agreement and the full context of their relationship. Second, even if I accept that “代理商” means “agent”, the term is still notoriously broad and, as I will explain shortly, does not alone inform the actual obligations which the “agent” in question should be said to have owed. Therefore, it is not a question of whether I prefer Mr Tan or Mr Wang’s translations. Mako’s alleged status as a fiduciary is still an evaluative question.

  61. [41] To answer this evaluative question, I begin with the aspects of the Service Agreement which are clear, regardless of whether I adopt Mr Tan or Mr Wang’s translation. These aspects will shed a clearer light on the substantive nature of CIC’s relationship with Mako.

  62. (a) First, it is clear that the objective of the Service Agreement was for Mako to develop CIC’s presence in the Indonesian commodities market. This is obvious from the first portion of cl 1, and the milestones of this general objective are also clearly set out in cl 4.

  63. (b) Second, the methods by which Mako was to achieve this objective are also clear. As cll 1 and 4 of the Service Agreement shows, Mako was obliged to secure a certain number of customer registrations and matched trades on the Platform. Mako was also obliged to bring to CIC what Mr Tan calls “self-operating deals”. Mr Wang prefers the translation “actual trades involving CIC”, but the difference is not material. On either, it can be seen that the intention was to involve CIC itself in trade deals.

  64. (c) Third, it is also clear from the final sentence of cl 1 of the Service Agreement that Mako bore the responsibility for bringing suppliers into the picture, whilst CIC was responsible for finding buyers. Therefore, in carrying out a “self-operating deal” or a trade involving CIC, Mako’s job was to recommend a supplier from Indonesia, and CIC’s job was to find an end-buyer.

  65. [42] This third point contradicts CIC’s case that Mako’s function under the Service Agreement was, generally, to procure trades. Thus, CIC disputes that the last sentence of cl 1 has any significance. During the cross-examination of Richard, it was put to him that Mako was just a broker obliged to introduce sellers to CIC. Richard disagreed and it is useful to quote his response in full:

  66. [43] This response is barely comprehensible, much less a meaningful answer to why the Service Agreement stipulated at all that CIC was to provide “buyer resources”. If CIC’s intention was only to emphasise that Mako was to provide “seller resources”, this could have been said without the stipulation that CIC was responsible for the provision of “buyer resources”. These responsibilities are plainly separable. In any event, Richard’s answer is also inconsistent with the contemporaneous messages he and Wayne exchanged. These messages show that CIC had indeed been procuring buyers with a view to matching them with suppliers identified by Mako.

  67. [44] CIC does not address this glaring issue in its submissions, and this, in my view, is quite detrimental to its case that Mako was its agent, and thus, fiduciary. CIC’s obligation to procure buyers substantially minimises the scope of work which Mako was contracting to take on under the Service Agreement, and, when coupled with CIC’s admission that Mako was not granted “any authority to enter into or execute any agreement on [its] behalf”, there is very little to suggest that Mako owed fiduciary duties just by virtue of its status as an “agent”.

  68. [45] I am mindful that agents come in all shapes and sizes. A narrow scope of work, coupled with a lack of power to bind one’s principal to contracts does not necessarily mean that a person cannot be labelled an “agent”. However, as stated at [40] above, the label “agent” itself is unilluminating. CIC’s case is not that Mako was a purely ministerial agent, acting strictly on definitive instructions. Its case is that Mako was a fiduciary agent, and, given this, Mako’s lack of a power to unilaterally affect CIC’s position is salient.

  69. [46] This is because the absence of such power takes Mako’s position outside the paradigmatic definition of the term “agency”, which is best used “to connote an authority or capacity in one person to create legal relations between a person occupying the position of principal and third parties” [emphasis added] (Scott v Davis (2000) 204 CLR 333 at [227] (per Gummow J), which referenced the High Court of Australia’s earlier decision in International Harvester Co of Australia Pty Ltd v Carrigan’s Hazeldene Pastoral Co (1958) 100 CLR 644 at 652 (per Dixon J)). Both these cases are cited by Professor Tan Cheng Han SC in his work The Law of Agency (Academy Publishing, 2nd Ed, 2017) (“Tan”) (at para 1.008), as a useful working definition of “agency” because, in his view, “a person who acts on behalf of another without the ability to affect the latter’s legal position may, in relation to the latter, have contractual rights and obligations, be capable of incurring tortious liability, and may also owe fiduciary obligations[,] but these fall within the usual scope of the law of contract, tort and equity respectively[,] to which the law of agency adds little if anything” (at para 1.007).

  70. [47] This definition also mirrors article 1(1) of the leading work in this area, Peter Watts and FMB Reynolds, Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency (Sweet & Maxwell, 22nd Ed, 2021) (“Bowstead and Reynolds”) (at para 1-001) (cited with approval in Mayor and Burgesses of the London Borough of Haringey v Ahmed and another [2017] EWCA Civ 1861 (“Haringey v Ahmed”) at [27]–[28] and also see UBS AG (London Branch) v Kommunale Wasserwerke Leipzig GmbH [2017] EWCA Civ 1567 (“UBS v Kommunale”) at [91]):

  71. [48] Although this definition does not reflect the full range of persons which can fairly be described as “agents”, what it does describe is the paradigm agent, which can be presumed to owe fiduciary obligations, unless such presumption is rebutted. These are the duties of loyalty and to act bona fide in the best interests of the principal (I will simply refer to this as the “duty of good faith”) (see Snell’s Equity (John McGhee and Steven Elliott gen eds) (Sweet & Maxwell, 34th Ed, 2020) (“Snell”) at paras 7-008–7-010; Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew [1998] Ch 1 (“Mothew”) at 18A–18C; Sim Poh Ping v Winsta Holding Pte Ltd and another and other appeals [2020] 1 SLR 1199 at [253]).

  72. [49] On this, I note that the imposition of fiduciary duties on “agents” tends to be the source of some confusion. It is often assumed that “agency”, however broadly defined, is a settled category of fiduciary relationships. However, as Marcus Smith J aptly observed in Pengelly v Business Mortgage Finance 4 plc [2021] 1 All ER (Comm) 1191, “if the concept of agency is a wide-ranging and indeterminate one, then to say that all agents are fiduciaries is likely to be wrong” (at [34]). Non-paradigm agents may well be fiduciaries, but, as Tan, Bowstead and Reynolds, Haringey v Ahmed and UBS v Kommunale show, our intuitive sense that “agency” presumptively entails the imposition of fiduciary obligations relates specifically to agents with the power to change their principals’ legal position. That is, to bind the principal to contracts; to dispose of the principal’s property; and generally, to expose the principal to liability. This is not the only characteristic of a fiduciary, or even necessarily a definitive one, but it is a strong indicium because it places the party liable to have his legal position changed in a uniquely vulnerable position.

  73. [50] A party to a typical contractual relationship has to bear the risk that his counterparty might act in breach of contract and cause him loss. He also has to bear the risk that external forces outside his control may render his contractual bargain unperformable, otiose or otherwise unprofitable. These are external risks which the contracting party may ameliorate, whether by the contractual bargain itself, insurance, or simply by taking practical steps to ensure his counterparty performs. By contrast, a party who grants discretionary power to another person to legally act on his behalf has to bear an internal risk that his representative may exercise such power to bind him to a detrimental position. This risk is inherent to the very conferral of discretionary powers, and it is not easily mitigated. In fact, even if the representative exercises his powers illegitimately, doctrines such as the defence of bona fide purchaser for value without notice and ostensible authority exist specifically to secure commercial certainty and protect third parties in dealings with such representatives. And, in respect of the latter, cases like First Energy (UK) Ltd v Hungarian International Bank Ltd [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 194 show how far the law can go to prefer the interests of the third parties over those of the grantor of the power.

  74. [51] In the face of this, the imposition of onerous fiduciary obligations over the exercise of powers is justified and necessary to mitigate at least some of the internal risks the grantor faces, by deterring the grantee from abusing his powers (deterrence is a well-established purpose for imposition of fiduciary duties: see, eg, the discussion in Matthew Conaglen, Fiduciary Loyalty: Protecting the Due Performance of Non-Fiduciary Duties (Hart Publishing, 2010) (“Fiduciary Loyalty”) at pp 61–76). Conversely, absent such an internal risk (and the powers which create such risk in the first place), the impetus for the imposition of such onerous obligations is rather substantially minimised, at least in the context of representative relationships. Therefore, to use the words of the Court of Appeal in Turf Club Auto Emporium Pte Ltd v Yeo Boong Hua [2018] 2 SLR 655 at [43], I do not think there is a “strong, but rebuttable, presumption” that an “agent” who lacks the power to alter his principal’s legal position owes fiduciary duties as one of the relationships within the “settled categories”.

  75. [52] Returning to the present case, it is a clear conclusion that Mako was not a paradigm agent with the power to affect CIC’s legal relations with third parties. As such, I will not presume that Mako was a fiduciary. That said, this does not entirely preclude such a conclusion. As the authors of Bowstead and Reynolds state in their article 1(4) (at para 1-001):

  76. The authors call these “canvassing” or “introducing” agents and suggest that such agents may also owe fiduciary duties (at para 1-020). However, the last sentence of article 1(4) suggests clearly that it is not because of their “agency” that they owe fiduciary duties. But, rather, it is because they owe fiduciary duties that they are regarded as “agents” in a legally meaningful sense. For these types of “agents”, as can be gathered from Tan’s suggestion (see [46] above), we ought to turn to the applicable principles in equity directly because the law of agency adds little, if anything, to the analysis.

  77. [53] This being the case, the inquiry should be focused on whether the person is an ad hoc fiduciary on the usual metrics. The starting point for this inquiry is Tan Yok Koon v Tan Choo Suan and another and other appeals [2017] 1 SLR 654 (“Tan Yok Koon”), where the court stated that a fiduciary relationship can be said to arise if the putative fiduciary “voluntarily places himself in a position where the law can subjectively impute an intention on his … part to undertake [the fiduciary duties]” (at [194]). To lend this statement more particularity, reference can be made to Susilawati v American Express Bank Ltd [2009] 2 SLR(R) 737 (“Susilawati”). Here, the court regarded three factors set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in Frame v Smith [1987] 2 SCR 99 as “helpful” in determining whether the imputation of such an intention is appropriate (at [41]):

  78. [54] Useful and additional guidance can be found south of Frame v Smith. In Burdett v Miller, 957 F.2d 1375 (7th Cir 1992), the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit was tasked with analysing the nature of the relationship between a retail investor, one Ms Burdett, and Mr Miller, the owner and operator of an accounting firm who was also a professor of accounting. Delivering the opinion of the court, the eminent Judge Richard Posner said: “where a person solicits another to trust him in matters in which he represents himself to be expert as well as trustworthy[,] and the other is not expert and accepts the offer and reposes complete trust in him, a fiduciary relation is established” (at 1381). He then goes on to qualify this view: “We have emphasized knowledge and expertise but we do not mean to suggest that every expert is automatically a fiduciary. A fiduciary relation arises only if ‘one person has reposed trust and confidence in another who thereby gains influence and superiority over the other’” [emphasis added]. Applying this view, the judge went on to conclude that Mr Miller was a fiduciary because he “cultivated a relation of trust with Burdett over a period of years, holding himself out as an expert in a field (investments) in which she was inexperienced and unsophisticated”. Mr Miller was also aware that Ms Burdett “took his advice uncritically and unquestioningly and that she sought no ‘second opinion’… [she did not even ask for] any documentary confirmation of the investments to which he steered her”.

  79. [55] I should state that Judge Posner’s approach towards identifying ad hoc fiduciary relationships is far from definitive. Like Susilawati and Frame v Smith, it only calls to attention certain characteristics which might affect the conclusion. As Professor Conaglen observes in his chapter on fiduciaries in Snell, the courts have generally avoided pinning down the facts which justify the imposition of fiduciary duties, preferring instead to preserve some flexibility in the approach to this inquiry (see Snell at para 7-005; Tan Yok Koon at [192]). Many scholars, including Conaglen himself (see Fiduciary Loyalty, ch 9), have offered suggestions on how to assess the existence of fiduciary relationships, but none, as he admits in Snell, “[have] garnered universal support”. Therefore, the best which can be done, until an effective theory of fiduciaries is formulated and accepted, is to take into account the relevant considerations.

  80. [56] This brings me back to the present case. CIC submits that, despite Mako’s lack of authority to execute contracts on its behalf, it still had a “wide scope of authority (actual or implied) in relation to procuring, structuring and execution of the [Transaction]”. So much so that CIC relied wholly on Mako to: (a) source for, negotiate and procure the Transaction, in particular, to identify reliable upstream suppliers and downstream buyers; (b) communicate with third parties, and provide updates from those third parties; and (c) prepare and review the draft contractual documents relating to the Transaction. Further, CIC also submits that it acted entirely in accordance with Mako’s recommendations and instructions in relation to the operation and execution of the Transaction. Having examined the evidence and taken into account the considerations set out at [53]–[54] above, I find that Mako was not CIC’s ad hoc fiduciary.

  81. [57] First, the evidence does not bear out CIC’s claim that it relied entirely on Mako to source for, negotiate, and procure the Transaction. As stated at [41(c)]–[43] above, CIC has not shown that cl 1 of the Service Agreement ought not be read as an error or otherwise non-binding. By the contract CIC itself drafted, it was responsible for finding buyers for its back-to-back trades. It therefore cannot even be said that CIC relied on Mako to identify buyers, much less that it reposed trust in Mako in this exercise. Indeed, the correspondence between Richard and Wayne shows that CIC did look for buyers. Further, although it is agreed that Mako was the one who identified CPAG as the buyer in the Transaction, the evidence – in my judgment – shows that Mako did so because CIC was persistent in asking to be interposed in back-to-back trades, not because doing so was a task which CIC had “relied entirely” on Mako to carry out.

  82. [58] This just leaves Mako’s obligation to identify suppliers. I accept that CIC relied on Mako to source for reliable suppliers; however, this does very little to support the existence of a fiduciary relationship between the two. CIC’s reliance on Mako to do a good job in this regard is wholly protected by the imposition of an ordinary duty of care and skill. As stated at [5] above, the purpose of Service Agreement was to increase CIC’s exposure in the commodities trading industry so as to enable it to better market the Platform. There is nothing about this purpose that logically requires Mako to perform its functions under the Service Agreement with undivided loyalty and in good faith, beyond care and skill.

  83. [59] Further, the character of CIC’s reliance on Mako was also not indicative of any imbalance in expertise (see Burdett v Miller at [54] above) or vulnerability (see Susilawati at [53] above) which supports the imposition of fiduciary duties. CIC’s lack of expertise was not so great as to prevent it from exercising its own judgment over the suppliers recommended by Mako. I accept that CIC’s officers were not experienced with commodities trading in Indonesia. However, Richard, who was Mako’s main contact with CIC, had more than four years of experience as a “Senior Executive, Trader” in Sumitomo Corporation in Asia & Oceania, a trading and investment company, before he joined CIC. In this capacity, Richard “manage[d] existing clients’ account[s] and expand[ed] operations and sales of inorganic [and] functional chemicals (electronic chemicals) to the market”. In my view, this was sufficient experience to ask Mako the right questions, hold it to conduct the necessary checks, and to understand the nature of the Transaction. Indeed, even if not Richard personally, CIC’s chief operating officer, Li Xuhui (also known as “Mark”) (to whom Richard answered for matters relating to the Service Agreement and the Transaction) is described by CIC on its website as having “many years of experience in commodity spot market, cross-border E-commerce, strategic business planning, marketing, trading and operation”. Therefore, to the extent that CIC relied on Mako, such reliance does not disclose any vulnerability on CIC’s part, nor an inability to exercise oversight. Instead, it was a commercial risk it chose to take.

  84. [60] On this, I should add that misplacing trust in a contractual counterparty to guard one’s interests does not elevate that counterparty’s status to that of a fiduciary. There is a clear difference between choosing to trust, and having to rely on another party. On my analysis above, CIC did not need to rely on Mako, and the evidence also shows that CIC eagerly chose to trust Mako of its own informed volition, not in circumstances akin to Burdett v Miller. This then brings me back to the Slides and Indicative List of Deals.

  85. [61] As mentioned at [6] above, it is CIC’s case that Mako put forward these two documents to persuade CIC of its expertise in the Indonesian commodities market. On Richard’s evidence, Jonathan and Wayne (and by extension, Mako) overstated their experience in these documents, in particular, the Indicative List of Deals which he testifies contained trades with which the defendants had never been involved. The defendants do not dispute that they prepared the Slides, but they say that Richard misrepresents the “Indicative List of Deals”. Their case is that the documents constituting the Indicative List of Deals were produced on Richard’s request after CIC had already decided to engage Mako to provide brokering services. The purpose of this was to provide CIC with information relating to historical commodities trades, so that CIC could populate the Platform with false but believable trade deals ahead of the platform’s launch in Shanghai on 5 November 2018. Therefore, the defendants point out, a total of 19 templates were sent to Richard between 30 October and 21 November 2018, which went past the date on which the Service Agreement was executed by the parties (either 13 or 16 November 2018).

  86. [62] On balance, I find that the defendants’ account is to be preferred for two key reasons. First, the documents continued to be provided by Wayne after the Service Agreement had been signed and entered. If the Indicative List of Deals had been prepared by Jonathan and Wayne for the purpose of persuading CIC to enter into the Service Agreement, there is no reason for this. When Richard was questioned about this during cross-examination, his explanation was that even though the Service Agreement had been signed, CIC was still “assess[ing] their ability”. I find this difficult to accept on the logic of CIC’s own case. CIC was either satisfied with Mako’s credentials or it was not. If CIC was as cautious as it claims, it would have carried out all credential reviews before signing the Service Agreement. In any case, the objective evidence – in the form of the messages exchanged between Richard and Wayne – shows clearly that the information was being put up on the Platform to boost its apparent utilisation.

  87. [63] Second, Richard was not – in my judgment – a credible witness. Whilst on the stand, he was evasive, often resorting to the unbelievable claim that he “did not know” when confronted with the objective evidence. For example, when it was put to him that he had sought trade information from Jonathan and Wayne to “beef up” the numbers on the Platform ahead of its launch in Shanghai, his response was: “Beef up. I -- I can’t remember, but -- but anyway, this request is from Zhang Jun [the CIC employee in-charge of the Platform] I really -- I don’t really take -- paying too much attention to it. Anyway, this -- that was not my scope”. The incoherence of this answer to a relatively simple question, in the face of the objective evidence placed before me, casts considerable doubt in my mind as to the veracity of Richard’s evidence.

  88. [64] The analytical consequence of this finding is significant. First and most importantly, it substantially minimises the factual premises supporting the claim that Mako falsely induced CIC to enter the Service Agreement and place trust in it. Second, when coupled with the experience that Richard and Mark had (at [59] above), it becomes clear that CIC was not the babe in the woods it claims to be. It knew how to maximise its relationship with Mako to create the impression that the Platform was more actively used than it was, so as to launch the product more effectively in Shanghai. Lastly, these points suggest that CIC and Mako were on a relatively equal footing, supporting my conclusion that there was no great imbalance in expertise or any vulnerability indicative of a fiduciary relationship (see [59] above). In fact, at one point in his correspondence with Wayne, Richard describes their relationship as a “collaboration”, as does the Service Agreement on Mr Tan’s translation (see [7] above). Mr Wang’s translation similarly refers to their relationship as reflecting “cooperation” (at [8] above).

  89. [65] This analysis applies equally to the third and fourth points at [56] above.

  90. (a) In respect of the third point, CIC was not wholly reliant on Mako to prepare contractual documents as it claims. There is evidence to show that CIC did (and therefore knew how to) review its own contracts. Further, if there were were legal issues which CIC could not handle internally, the general experience of CIC’s team – as attested to by Peter – suggests that they would have had enough business acumen to know to seek legal advice as necessary. On this, I must emphasise that even if Jonathan and Wayne had experience with the Indonesian commodities trade, they were not legally trained, nor is it CIC’s case that they had made representations to such effect.

  91. (b) As regards the fourth point, even if CIC acted unquestioningly in accordance with Mako’s recommendations, I do not accept that this as an indicium which supports the existence of a fiduciary relationship. It first needs to be asked why CIC acted in this way, and, in view of my findings above, the answer to this question seems to be that CIC failed to exercise sufficient oversight of its own commercial affairs. As I suggested at [59] above, CIC was not so ill-informed of the industry such that it could not even have exercised oversight. The dynamic in this case should thus be sharply distinguished from Burdett v Miller.

  92. [66] As to the second factor at [56] above, it is clear that Mako (via Jonathan and Wayne) communicated with third parties in connection with the Transaction. The defendants do not dispute this. This fact, however, is neither here nor there in so far as it relates to Mako’s status as an ad hoc fiduciary. First, there is no evidence to show that Mako had the authority on CIC’s behalf to make binding representations, compromise matters, negotiate terms, or otherwise affect CIC’s position by its communications. And, when coupled with the fact that Mako had no authority to enter into contracts, Mako’s role seems more to be in the spirit of a messenger or coordinator than a representative of CIC. Second, it is not tenable to infer from the fact of Mako’s communications with third parties that it was in a position which justified the imposition of fiduciary duties (per the threshold in Tan Yok Koon set out at [53] above). It is not in my view uncommon for commercial parties to communicate with a new business contact through the party connecting them. Unless there is something about such intermediating that discloses any of the factors in Susilawati, this fact does not take CIC far.

  93. [67] In the round, the relationship between CIC and Mako seems to me to be one exclusively grounded in contract. While it is not impossible for a commercial counterparty to also be a fiduciary, the nature of the parties’ relationship in this case does not support that conclusion. In fact, beyond the deficiencies in CIC’s positive case, there is also strong negative argument against it. If Mako was a fiduciary pursuant to the Service Agreement, the foremost consequence is that Mako would owe a duty of undivided loyalty to CIC in connection with its job to recommend reliable buyers and sellers. It would then have been obliged to bring all available deals to CIC for it to have the opportunity to reject taking up such a deal (see, eg, Bhullar v Bhullar [2003] EWCA Civ 424). Mako would not even have been able to enter physical trades on its own part without obtaining CIC’s informed consent. This plainly goes far beyond what parties intended by their self-described “collaboration” (see [64] above), and thus also cuts against the imputation of a subjective intention on the part of Mako to assume fiduciary obligations (see Tan Yok Koon at [53] above).

  94. CIC’s relationship with Jonathan and Wayne

  95. [68] I turn next to consider CIC’s relationship with Jonathan and Wayne. As stated at [10] above, CIC’s case is that Jonathan and Wayne were also its agents in their own capacities, and thus, owed it the same fiduciary and other obligations it claims Mako owed. Having found that Mako was not CIC’s agent or fiduciary, this aspect of CIC’s case essentially falls away. However, I will briefly discuss the key factual basis on which CIC avers that Jonathan and Wayne became its agents in their personal capacity.

  96. [69] CIC’s case is basically that Jonathan and Wayne asked for, and were given CIC name cards on or around 29 November 2018. On Richard’s evidence, they requested the name cards so as to be able to represent CIC and negotiate contracts with prospective trading counterparties on CIC’s behalf. Thus, on 2 December 2018, Wayne sent the following message to a chat group which included Richard and Mark: “能帮我们印名片吗? 需要用到[.] 因为是用cic去签合同”. The translation of this message, on Mr Tan’s evidence, is “Can help us print the name cards? Need to use[.] Because we’re using [CIC] to sign the contract” [emphasis added]. Mark responded to oblige. On this basis, CIC submits that “Wayne was stating in no uncertain terms that Jonathan and Wayne needed to identify themselves as being from CIC and therefore having the authority to enter into or commit to deals on CIC’s behalf” [emphasis added].

  97. [70] I reject this submission. First of all, Mr Tan interpolates the word “we’re” into the message and this is, in my view, incorrect and unnecessary. I find Mr Wang’s translation of that series of messages as “Can you help us print the name card? We need to use it[.] Because it is [CIC] that is signing the contract”, to be both more literally and contextually accurate. On this interpretation, there is no basis for CIC to submit that Jonathan and Wayne had the “authority to enter into or commit to deals on CIC’s behalf”.

  98. [71] The question this leaves is why then Jonathan and Wayne required such name cards. CIC submits that this fact is sufficient to indicate that Jonathan and Wayne wished to identify themselves as agents of CIC. This, however, seems to stretch a minor fact into a major conclusion. During cross-examination, Jonathan explained that he had asked for CIC name cards so as to be able to distribute them to customers whom they were persuading to register with CIC Platform. I accept this explanation. As I will discuss from [145]–[146] below, Mako had business beyond CIC, and it is reasonable that Jonathan and Wayne would have wanted to bring their relevant customers’ attention specifically and separately to CIC’s business as distinct from Mako’s. After all, this was the very purpose of the Service Agreement, even on CIC’s case (see [5] above).

  99. [72] Second, and in any event, CIC’s submission that Jonathan and Wayne were empowered to enter into contracts on behalf of CIC stands in stark contrast with CIC’s admission that Mako was not empowered to contract on its behalf. CIC’s formal agreement was with Mako, yet even then, it accepts that Mako did not have any contracting powers. It is wholly unexplained why CIC would then empower Jonathan and Wayne to enter and execute contracts on its behalf, in their personal capacities without a formal agreement. Further, it is unclear how CIC intended to distinguish between Jonathan and Wayne acting as directors of Mako without the power to bind CIC, and in their personal capacities with such power. In my view, it is unlikely that CIC had such intention, and this peculiarity only arises because CIC seeks to imbue Jonathan and Wayne’s rather innocuous act of requesting for name cards with too much significance.

  100. [73] I therefore reject CIC’s claim that Jonathan and Wayne, in their personal capacities, were its “agents”. Instead, they were acting in their capacities as directors of Mako, and it therefore follows that they did not personally owe CIC duties. In this regard, I should also point out that from [139]–[152] below, I will address CIC’s submission that Mako’s corporate veil should be pierced to hold Jonathan and Wayne personally liable. My rejection of the factors on which CIC relies in making this submission further shows that its attempt to characterise Jonathan and Wayne as acting in their personal capacities is bereft of any factual basis. I will therefore only consider CIC’s case in so far as it pertains to the duties Mako owed CIC.

  101. Issue 2: Obligation(s) owed by Mako to CIC

  102. [74] With the above findings in mind, I turn to the duties owed by Mako.

  103. Duties of good faith and loyalty

  104. [75] I have found that Mako was not a fiduciary to CIC, whether by virtue of being an “agent” or on the facts. Accordingly, Mako does not owe CIC duties of good faith and loyalty in equity. However, CIC alternatively argues that such duties were implied into the Service Agreement, and therefore, owed at law. In essence, CIC submits that even if Mako is found not to have been a fiduciary, it nevertheless owed such duties because, otherwise, Mako would have been able to conduct itself as CIC’s agent without being held to any standard. This, they submit, “cannot be the case”. I do not accept this.

  105. [76] First, the Court of Appeal in Ng Giap Hon v Westcomb Securities Pte Ltd and others [2009] 2 SLR(R) 518 has rejected the existence of an implied term of good faith at law (at [41]–[60]). Although this is distinct from a duty of loyalty, my view is that the court’s reasoning applies with equal force to this duty as well. Accordingly, CIC may only argue that these duties are implied into the Service Agreement as a matter of fact. To do so, CIC would need to demonstrate that the test in Sembcorp Marine Ltd v PPL Holdings Pte Ltd and another and another appeal [2013] 4 SLR 193 (“Sembcorp Marine”) is satisfied. It has wholly failed to do so. In its closing submissions, CIC simply asserts that the test is satisfied, and in reply, its approach is to attack the defendants’ arguments that the test has not been made out. Because of this, there is simply no cogent justification for me to imply these duties into the Service Agreement.

  106. [77] Further, there is a second, more conceptually potent reason for rejecting CIC’s argument. The final step of the test in Sembcorp Marine requires the court to consider whether an officious bystander would say, “oh, of course!”, if asked whether the proposed implied terms ought to constitute a part of the contract in question. In my view, however, the hypothetical bystander could only respond in this way – in so far as the duties of good faith and loyalty are concerned – if the contract, first and foremost, obviously creates one of the “settled” categories of relationships giving rise to fiduciary obligations. For example, the relationship between a solicitor and his client, a paradigm agent and his principal, or a trustee and his beneficiary. Accepting any view less strict than this will have the effect of expanding the existence of fiduciary relationships.

  107. [78] Professor Paul Desmond Finn, in his seminal work Fiduciary Obligations (The Law Book Company, 1977), famously remarked that the conclusion that an individual is a “fiduciary” is “unimportant”. He explained, “[i]t is not because a person is a ‘fiduciary’ or a ‘confidant’ that a rule applies to him. It is because a particular rule applies to him that he is a fiduciary or confidant for its purposes” (at p 2) (an observation which the Court of Appeal approved in Tan Yok Koon at [193]). Accordingly, if – in the face of my conclusion that Mako was not a fiduciary to CIC – I nevertheless find that duties of good faith and loyalty should be implied into the Service Agreement, that would be to contradictorily conclude that Mako was in truth a fiduciary.

  108. [79] I am mindful that it is not necessarily impermissible for such duties to exist, in parallel, both or either in contract or equity. However, CIC’s basic case is that Mako was its fiduciary, and, as I mentioned at [55] above that there is no universally accepted approach, or list of considerations, for determining whether fiduciary duties exist. Given the obvious difficulty surrounding this area of law, it would be slightly foolhardy to think that the persistent challenge of identifying the existence of fiduciary relationships may be resolved simply by applying a test designed to ascertain implied terms. I therefore find that Mako did not owe CIC duties of good faith and loyalty.

  109. Duty to advise and provide information

  110. [80] In closing submissions, CIC argues that Mako had a duty “not to mislead CIC or misrepresent to CIC any matter in relation to the Transaction and to advise and provide timely and accurate information relating to all aspects of the Transaction to CIC” [emphasis added]. The emphasised text does not form part of CIC’s pleaded case, whether on the basis of Mako’s alleged status as a fiduciary, or by way of implied contractual terms. CIC only pleads that Mako was obliged “not to mislead CIC or misrepresent to CIC any matter in relation to the [Transaction] or potential transactions”. It does aver that Mako “advised” it on matters relating to the Transaction, and that Mako also kept it apprised of developments in the Transaction. However, it is one thing to say that a counterparty provided advice and information. It is entirely another to allege that it was obliged to do the same. Further, it also cannot be suggested that that these two duties are an extension of the asserted “duty not to mislead or misrepresent”. The latter is proscriptive, and the former two are prescriptive.

  111. [81] Counsel for CIC will be aware of the importance of pleadings from cases such as V Nithia (co-administratrix of the estate of Ponnusamy Sivapakiam) v Buthmanaban s/o Vaithilingam and another [2015] 5 SLR 1422 at [36]. CIC has already put forth an extensive and lengthy case, and, in the face of this, it is not in my view appropriate to allow at the end of trial, points which were not put before me. Therefore, on the basis that CIC failed to plead these distinct duties, I decline to consider its claims for Mako’s alleged breaches thereof.

  112. Duty not to mislead or misrepresent

  113. [82] As stated at [80] above, CIC avers that Mako was obliged not to mislead it or make misrepresentations as regards the Transaction. On its case, this duty was owed by virtue of: (a) Mako’s status as a fiduciary; (b) its appointment as an “agent”; or (c) a term implied in fact into the Service Agreement. As I have found that Mako was not a fiduciary, I need not consider this ground. As regards the latter two grounds, CIC’s case is confused and unnecessary.

  114. [83] I begin with the second ground, which I am prepared to consider on the basis that Mako was an “agent”, for whatever this is worth in terms of imposing consequential legal obligations. Even on this basis, however, if one consults the standard texts on agency, it will be seen that no author speaks of an agent owing – by virtue of their “status” as “agent” – a “duty not to mislead or misrepresent”: see Tan, ch 7; Bowstead and Reynolds, ch 6; Roderick Munday, Agency: Law and Principles (OUP, 4th Ed, 2022), ch 8. The reason for this is quite simple and connected to why CIC’s third ground also fails. The law of torts already offers recourse in respect of losses suffered as a result of actionable misrepresentations. This cuts across all representors, irrespective of whether they are “agents”, and so, there is no need for a “duty not to mislead or misrepresent” to be additionally imposed on “agents”, whether as a freestanding duty or by implication. Indeed, if Sembcorp Marine is applied, it is hard to see what “gap” would be filled by the implication of such a duty. Accordingly, I will only consider CIC’s case in misrepresentation on the tortious basis which it has pleaded as a separate cause of action (see [123]–[131] below).

  115. Duty to account

  116. [84] CIC pleads that Mako was under a duty to account. However, it makes no connected allegation that Mako received money or property on its behalf. As such, even if I find that Mako was under such a duty, this would be wholly superfluous. I therefore do not consider the point.

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