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Grounds publishedDecided 30 Aug 2022

General Division of the High Court

PNG Sustainable Development Program Ltd v Rex Lam Paki and others

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[2022] SGHC 188Case no. Suit No 865 of 2018 (Summons No 3731 of 2021)

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  1. [1] The first defendant applies under O 32 r 6 of the Rules of Court (Rev Ed 2014) (“the Rules”) to set aside a final judgment which I entered against him on 4 March 2020 under O 27 r 3 of the Rules (“the Judgment”).

  2. [2] I have dismissed the application. The first defendant has appealed against my decision. I now set out the grounds for my decision. In these grounds of decision, unless otherwise specified, all references to Orders and to rules are references to the Orders and the rules of the Rules.

  3. Background

  4. The parties

  5. [3] The plaintiff is a company limited by guarantee. It was incorporated in Singapore in 2001 with the principal objective of promoting sustainable development within Papua New Guinea and of advancing the general welfare of the people of Papua New Guinea, including but not limited to the people of the Western Province of Papua New Guinea.

  6. [4] The plaintiff has, in the past ten years or so, been embroiled in a series of proceedings to enforce against it certain contractual, fiduciary and other obligations which it is alleged to owe arising from the circumstances in which it was incorporated in 2001. The plaintiff is represented in this action as well as in those other proceedings by Dentons Rodyk & Davidson LLP (“Dentons”). The subject matter of this action has only an incidental connection to the subject matter of the other proceedings in which Dentons has represented the plaintiff. It is not, therefore, necessary to describe those proceedings further.

  7. [5] Although there are six defendants to this action, only the first, second and fourth defendants are central to this application. I shall therefore use the term “the Defendants” to refer only to these three defendants collectively.

  8. [6] The first defendant is an accountant by training. He was a director of the plaintiff from September 2011 until he was removed from office by a resolution of the plaintiff’s members in September 2017.

  9. [7] The second defendant is the first defendant’s wife. She has no other connection to the plaintiff.

  10. [8] The fourth defendant is a company incorporated in Papua New Guinea. The second defendant is the sole registered shareholder and director of the fourth defendant. The Defendants’ case is that this represents the true position, ie, that the second defendant is the sole ultimate beneficial owner and the real controller of the fourth defendant. The plaintiff’s case is that it is in fact the first defendant who is the sole ultimate beneficial owner and the real controller of the fourth defendant and that the second defendant acts in the affairs of the fourth defendant on the first defendant’s instructions.

  11. [9] The three remaining defendants in this action are the third, fifth and sixth defendants. These three defendants extricated themselves from this action at an early stage, in July 2019. That was when they succeeded in having service of process in this action on them outside Singapore set aside on the grounds that the Singapore courts lack personal jurisdiction over them. I will, where necessary, refer to these three defendants collectively as “the remaining defendants”. The remaining defendants were represented in this action by Rajah & Tann Singapore LLP (“R&T”).

  12. The plaintiff’s claims against the Defendants

  13. [10] The plaintiff commenced this action in 2018. Its claim arises out of its sale in 2014 of a wholly owned subsidiary known as Cloudy Bay Sustainable Forestry Ltd (“Cloudy Bay”) jointly to: (a) a company known as Lifese Engineering (PNG) Limited (“Lifese”); and (b) the third defendant (collectively “the Purchasers”).

  14. [11] At the time of the sale, the first defendant was a director of Cloudy Bay and also the Chairman of its board of directors.

  15. [12] The plaintiff’s claim against the first defendant is that he breached his fiduciary duties to the plaintiff in the following ways:

  16. [13] The plaintiff’s claim against the second and fourth defendants is that they are liable to the plaintiff for dishonestly assisting the first defendant’s breaches of fiduciary duty or for knowingly receiving the benefits of those breaches.

  17. [14] As a result, the plaintiff claimed the following seven heads of principal relief against the Defendants:

  18. (a) A declaration that the first defendant had breached his fiduciary duties to the plaintiff.

  19. (b) A declaration that the first defendant is liable to account to the plaintiff for the A$6.6m and PGK 1.7m or such other sum as the court thinks fit as a constructive trustee by reason of his breaches of fiduciary duty and/or breaches of trust.

  20. (d) Further and/or in the alternative, a declaration that the plaintiff is entitled to trace the A$6.6m and PGK 1.7m into any property which the first defendant acquired using any part of that money and to claim equitable title to that property on the basis that he holds that property on trust for the plaintiff.

  21. (g) An account of the profits which the second defendant had made.

  22. The plaintiff enters the Judgment

  23. [15] I set out the procedural history of this action in detail at [109]–[162] below. For the time being, it suffices to note only the following procedural events leading up to the entry of judgment against the Defendants.

  24. [16] The plaintiff served the writ on the Defendants in Papua New Guinea in March 2019. The Defendants jointly appointed Eldan Law LLP (“Eldan”) to represent them. Eldan duly entered an appearance for the Defendants, also in March 2019.

  25. [17] Eldan discharged itself from acting for the Defendants in July 2019. The Defendants were obliged to file their defences in December 2019. They failed to do so.

  26. [18] As a result, the plaintiff applied ex parte under O 19 r 7(1) for leave to enter judgment against the Defendants in default of defence in the following terms:

  27. The terms of the judgment which the plaintiff sought to enter against the Defendants are drawn from the statement of claim (see [14(b)]–[14(d)] and [14(f)] above).

  28. [19] The plaintiff’s O 19 application came on for hearing before me in January 2020. The Defendants had notice of the hearing but were unrepresented and were absent. I declined to enter judgment in default of defence and directed the plaintiff to apply inter partes to enter judgment on admissions of fact under O 27 r 3 instead. My reasons for doing so are set out at [137]–[146] below. The hearing was accordingly adjourned.

  29. [20] In early February 2020, the plaintiff filed its application under O 27 r 3. The plaintiff’s O 19 and O 27 applications came up for hearing together before me in March 2020. Once again, the Defendants had notice of the hearing but were unrepresented and absent.

  30. [22] The Judgment which I entered was in the following terms:

  31. (a) I adjudged the first defendant liable to account to the plaintiff for and to pay to the plaintiff A$6.6m and PGK 1.7m together with simple interest on those sums at the rate of 5.33% per annum from the date of the writ to the date of judgment.

  32. (b) I adjudged the plaintiff entitled to trace the sums under paragraph (a) above into any property, real or immovable, which the first defendant acquired using any part of the said sums.

  33. (c) I adjudged the second and fourth defendants jointly and severally liable to pay the plaintiff the sum of A$0.4m together with simple interest on that sum at the rate of 5.33% per annum from the date of the writ to the date of judgment.

  34. This is the Judgment which the first defendant now seeks to set aside.

  35. The procedural nature of the Judgment

  36. [23] I make three points about the procedural nature of the Judgment.

  37. [24] First, the Judgment is a regular judgment. The first defendant accepts this point. He therefore accepts that the plaintiff complied with all of the applicable provisions of the Rules in applying for and entering the Judgment. There is therefore no basis to set this judgment aside under O 2 r 1(2) on grounds of procedural irregularity.

  38. [27] Third, the Judgment is a judgment on the merits. It is true that the Defendants failed to file a defence to the plaintiff’s claim. It is also true that the Defendants were absent at the hearing of the plaintiff’s O 27 application. But it would be wrong to characterise a judgment under O 27 r 3 as a default judgment. A default judgment is one entered purely by reason of a procedural default such as a failure to file a defence. A judgment entered under O 27 r 3 is entered after a consideration of the merits of the plaintiff’s case in light of the defendant’s admission of facts. I put it to the first defendant’s counsel in the course of arguments that O 27 r 3 requires the court to consider the merits of the plaintiff’s claim before it enters judgment. Counsel quite rightly conceded that that is correct.

  39. [28] Indeed, on an application under O 27 r 3, the plaintiff must satisfy the court that the facts which the defendant has admitted establish all the elements of the plaintiff’s pleaded cause of action, failing which the court will refuse to enter judgment under O 27 r 3 (Mycitydeal Ltd v Villas International Property Pte Ltd [2014] 4 SLR 1077 at [69]). It is thus open to the court to decline to enter judgment under O 27 r 3 on the basis that the plaintiff is not entitled to judgment, even on the facts as admitted by the defendant. Furthermore, it is open to a court hearing an application under O 27 r 3 to enter judgment in the plaintiff’s favour on the basis of the admissions, but to reject or modify some of the heads of relief which the plaintiff claims. The court has that power whether the admissions are historical admissions or are made in the course of the proceedings. It also has that power whether the admissions are made expressly or are deemed by the Rules to have been made.

  40. [29] The admissions on which the plaintiff relied on its O 27 application were deemed admissions. Under O 18 r 13, the Defendants’ failure to traverse the facts alleged in the plaintiff’s statement of claim constituted a deemed admission of those facts (see Zulkifli Baharudin v Koh Lam Son [1999] 2 SLR(R) 369). I entered the Judgment because, in light of those deemed admissions, the plaintiff satisfied me that it had established all of the elements of the causes of action it had pleaded against the Defendants and that it was entitled to enter judgment against the Defendants in terms of the prayers in its O 27 application.

  41. [30] I reiterate that the Judgment was a regular judgment, a final judgment and a judgment entered against the first defendant on the merits. It was not a judgment entered upon a default, nor was it in any sense a judgment entered only provisionally. The Judgment adjudicated the plaintiff’s claim against the Defendants and rendered the subject matter of this action res judicata, at least in Singapore (see Neptune Capital Group Ltd and others v Sunmax Global Capital Fund 1 Pte Ltd and another [2016] 4 SLR 1177 at [50]).

  42. The application to set aside the Judgment

  43. [31] In August 2021, the first defendant applied to set the Judgment aside as against him. That was over 16 months after I had entered the Judgment and after the first defendant had become aware of the Judgment (see [159]–[160] below).

  44. [32] The second and fourth defendants have not applied to set aside the Judgment as against them.

  45. The parties’ arguments

  46. [33] The first defendant’s submissions in support of his setting aside application make three principal points. First, the court has the power under O 32 r 6, alternatively under the inherent power of the court preserved by O 92 r 4, to set the Judgment aside. Second, all of the first defendant’s procedural lapses in this action – failing to file a defence in December 2019, failing to attend the hearing of the plaintiff’s O 27 application in March 2020 and failing to bring this setting aside application as soon as he became aware of the Judgment – are due to significant financial difficulties he experienced from 2016 to 2021 arising from personal and professional issues. These financial difficulties meant that he could not afford to engage counsel to represent him in this action. Third, the first defendant has a prima facie defence to the plaintiff’s claim on the merits.

  47. The Issues

  48. [35] The parties’ submissions require me to decide the following issues:

  49. (a) Whether I have the power under O 32 r 6 to set aside the Judgment;

  50. (b) Whether I have an inherent power preserved by O 92 r 4 to set aside the Judgment; and

  51. (c) If I have that inherent power, whether I should exercise it in the first defendant’s favour in all the circumstances of this case and set the Judgment aside.

  52. [36] I accept the plaintiff’s submissions on each of these issues. I now explain my reasons for doing so for each issue in turn.

  53. No power to set aside the Judgment under O 32 r 6

  54. A judgment is not an “order”

  55. [42] As a result of this fundamental distinction, judgments have certain legal consequences which orders do not. Only a judgment can give rise to merger. When a court of record enters judgment in litigation before it in favour of a plaintiff, the cause of action which was the subject matter of the litigation merges into the judgment, transit in rem judicatam (Republic of India v India Steamship Co [1993] AC 410 at 417H).

  56. [47] The Rules also recognise that judgments are distinct from orders: see O 42 rr 1 to 6 and O 45 (dealing only with judgments), O 42 r 9 (dealing only with orders) and O 42 rr 7, 8, 10 and 11 (dealing with both judgments and orders).

  57. [51] I accept that that is the consequence of the distinction I have drawn between judgments and orders. But there is nothing onerous about that consequence. Where a party enters judgment under any of these rules without giving the opposing party reasonable notice of the hearing at which the judgment was entered, the judgment would be irregular and would be liable to be set aside on that ground alone under O 2 r 1(2). But if a party enters a regular judgment against an opposing party under any of these rules, an appeal against the judgment is the natural and only recourse as it would be for any other type of judgment entered inter partes.

  58. [53] The first defendant cites the Malaysian case of Damai Laut Golf Resort Sdn Bhd v Sim Mee Yong (t/a Messrs Kantan Jaya) [2000] 6 MLJ 487 as authority for the proposition that O 32 r 6 applies to judgments. A close reading of that case shows that the submission is misconceived.

  59. The judgment was not made ex parte

  60. [59] An application under O 27 r 3 is not one of the classes of applications which the Rules expressly permit to be made ex parte. These are typically applications: (a) made at an early stage before the court has taken jurisdiction over a defendant (eg O 11 r 2(1) and O 16 r 2(1)); (b) made in circumstances where service is impracticable (eg O 10 r 4); (c) made in circumstances of urgency or where proceeding inter partes would defeat the purpose of the application (eg O 29 r 1(2)); (d) made in circumstances where the opposing party’s substantive rights have already been determined and therefore the applying party can be taken prima facie to be entitled to the relief it seeks (O 46 r 3(1), O 69 r 3(3) and O 69A r 3(3); or (e) which are non-controversial or administrative in nature (O 67 r 13).

  61. [61] The first defendant accepts that the plaintiff complied with these requirements in relation to its O 27 application. That is no doubt why the first defendant concedes that the plaintiff’s judgment is a regular judgment. The principle of audi alteram partem did not require the plaintiff to go beyond that and to ensure that the Defendants actually attended and opposed the O 27 application on 4 March 2020 in person or by counsel.

  62. [62] The first defendant was not deprived of a reasonable opportunity to be heard on the O 27 application. The plaintiff afforded him that reasonable opportunity. The first defendant simply failed to grasp that opportunity, even if only to ask for an adjournment. His failure to grasp the opportunity did not turn the hearing of the plaintiff’s inter partes O 27 application into an ex parte application let alone make the Judgment one which was “made ex parte” within the meaning of O 32 r 6.

  63. [64] I do not accept this submission. To explain why, it is necessary to consider the facts of UOB v CKB in greater detail. The issue before the Federal Court in UOB v CKB was which of two banks had a prior interest over the other in certain real property owned by a defendant as a result of two orders made in the two sets of proceedings against the same defendant in respect of the same real property. The first set of proceedings was commenced by United Overseas Bank Ltd (“UOB”). The second set of proceedings was commenced by Chung Khiaw Bank Ltd (“CKB”).

  64. [66] Meanwhile, in September 1966, CKB commenced the second set of proceedings by way of originating summons seeking a declaration that CKB was the legal mortgagee of the same real property that UOB would go on to attach in October 1966 (UOB v CKB at [3] and [5]). CKB duly served the originating summons on the defendant. The defendant failed to enter an appearance. In November 1966, CKB’s originating summons came up for hearing (UOB v CKB at [3]). The defendant was absent. UOB, not being a party to CKB’s application, had no notice of the hearing at all. At that hearing, CKB entered judgment against the defendant (UOB v CKB at [5]). In January 1967, CKB duly registered its judgment against the property.

  65. [67] The two banks discovered each other’s competing claims but were unable to come to any agreement as to priority. As a result, UOB applied in CKB’s originating summons to set aside CKB’s judgment against the debtor (UOB v CKB at [11(c)]). UOB brought this application under O LIII r 4(1) of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1934 (“the 1934 Rules”) as a non-party affected by the judgment in favour of CKB.

  66. [71] UOB v CKB does not assist the first defendant. The two most important points to note about the case are that: (a) the defendant was duly served with CKB’s originating summons; and (b) it was UOB who applied to set aside CKB’s judgment, not the defendant. UOB v CKB is therefore authority as to the status of CKB’s judgment as against UOB, as a non-party to the proceedings affected by the judgment. That is not the issue before me now. The issue before me now is the status of a judgment entered against a duly served but absent defendant. UOB v CKB is not authority on that issue.

  67. [72] UOB succeeded in its application because the Federal Court accepted that UOB was a non-party affected by CKB’s judgment, but who had had no notice of CKB’s application. That is the basis on which the Federal Court held that UOB had a right to apply in CKB’s proceedings to set CKB’s judgment aside under O LIII r 4(1) of the 1934 Rules. Indeed, the Federal Court went so far as to hold that that CKB’s judgment could not stand ex debito justitiae (at [29]) as against UOB. The Federal Court did not have to consider, and did not therefore consider, whether CKB’s judgment could or should stand as against the defendant.

  68. But I make two points about this dictum. First, reading it in the context of the facts of UOB v CKB, the substance of the dictum is that the hearing of CKB’s application to enter judgment against the defendant was ex parte as against UOB, not that it was ex parte as against the defendant. Second, in so far as the Federal Court did intend to characterise the hearing of CKB’s application as being ex parte as against the defendant, that characterisation was obiter and does not, with respect, bind me. As I have said, the issue before the Federal Court was whether a non-party to the proceedings, ie UOB, who was not served with CKB’s originating summons could apply in CKB’s proceedings to have CKB’s judgment set aside under the precursor of O 32 r 6. The issue before the Federal Court was not the defendant’s right to set aside CKB’s judgment under that rule. That is the issue which is now before me.

  69. [78] Sundaresh Menon JC (as the Chief Justice then was) captured this point in Karaha Bodas Co LLC v Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak dan Gas Bumi Negara [2006] 4 SLR(R) 345 (at [19]):

  70. Conclusion

  71. [80] For the foregoing reasons, I hold that I have no power to set aside the Judgment under O 32 r 6. To read O 32 r 6 as applying to the Judgment would be wholly contradictory to the sharp distinction which the Rules draw between judgments and orders and also between orders made inter partes and orders made ex partes.

  72. [82] The Judgment is a final determination on the merits of the parties’ substantive rights. It renders those rights res judicata in Singapore. It can be dissolved only by an appellate court, not by the court which made it (Jumabhoy Asad v Aw Cheok Huat Mick and others [2003] 3 SLR(R) 99 at [7]).

  73. No inherent power to set aside the Judgment

  74. [83] The first defendant’s next submission is that I have an inherent power preserved by O 92 r 4 to set the Judgment aside. I do not accept this submission either.

  75. [88] The first defendant submits that there is a lacuna in O 27 because it does not contain an express provision allowing a defendant to set aside a judgment under O 27 r 3 on the grounds that the defendant was absent at the hearing, whether or not duly served. He submits, further, that this lacuna ought to be remedied by recognising an inherent power to set aside a judgment which is entered under O 27 r 3.

  76. [89] I do not accept this submission for two reasons.

  77. [90] First, the existence of the express provisions I have listed at [84] above indicates to me that the omission of an equivalent express provision in O 27 must have been deliberate. Given that deliberate omission, recognising an inherent power to set such a judgment aside would, it appears to me, subvert the legislative intent of the Rules. Further, my interpretation of the Rules does not leave a respondent in that situation without recourse. It simply means that the respondent’s only recourse is by way of appeal to an appellate court and not to the court which entered the judgment.

  78. [91] Second, the first defendant’s submission is circular in that it assumes what it seeks to establish. It assumes that there must be a power to set aside a judgment under O 27 r 3 and then characterises the absence of that power as a lacuna to be filled by recognising the court’s inherent power to do so. That is not the correct approach. If that were the correct approach, it would have the capacity to subvert the Rules entirely.

  79. [92] For all of these reasons, it appears to me that it is not possible to recognise the inherent power which the first defendant advocates without subverting the architecture and legislative intent of the Rules.

  80. No sufficient reason for the first defendant’s absence or default

  81. [93] In any event, even if I am wrong in this and I do have an inherent power to set aside the Judgment, which power has been preserved by O 92 r 4, I would not exercise that power on the facts of this case.

  82. [94] In Mercurine Pte Ltd v Canberra Development Pte Ltd [2008] 4 SLR(R) 907 (at [32] and [35]–[36]) and in Su Sh-Hsyu v Wee Yue Chew [2007] 3 SLR(R) 673 (at [42]–[45] and [49]), the Court of Appeal set out a framework for analysing an application to set aside judgments, whether entered upon default or otherwise. In First Property Holdings Pte Ltd v U Myo Nyunt (alias Michael Nyunt) [2020] SGHC 276 (“First Property”), upheld by the Court of Appeal on appeal (see U Myo Nyunt (alias Michael Nyunt) v First Property Holdings Pte Ltd [2021] 2 SLR 816), Chua Lee Ming J synthesised those principles as follows at [58]–[60] (citations omitted):

  83. I gratefully adopt this synthesis of these principles for the purposes of the application before me.

  84. [95] Chua J speaks in his synthesis of two classes of judgments: one class entered without a trial (at [59]) and the other class entered after a trial (at [60]). The question then is whether the Judgment falls into the framework set out in [59] or in [60] of First Property. In my view, the Judgment falls into the framework set out in [60]. That is so even though the Judgment is not one which was entered against the first defendant after a trial.

  85. [97] Dividing the universe of judgments this way would not group like with like such that it is justified in the former class to have greater regard to whether there is a defence on the merits and in the latter class to have greater regard to the interest in finality in litigation, demonstrated by the greater weight accorded to the reasons for the defendant’s delay, default or absence.

  86. [98] As I pointed out to first defendant’s counsel in the course of argument, the proper conceptual dividing line between the framework set out in [59] and in [60] of First Property is between: (a) judgments entered purely by reason of a procedural default, with the defendant having had no opportunity to be heard on the merits of the claim; and (b) judgments entered after affording a defendant an opportunity to be heard on the merits of the claim, whether or not the defendant took advantage of that opportunity. In the former class of cases, the merits of the defence are the dominant feature (see Su Sh-Hsyu at [43]). That is simply because the court did not consider those merits before entering judgment against the defendant. Where the court did consider the merits before entering judgment, the merits recede into the background and the predominant consideration is the interest in finality in litigation, bringing to the fore the reasons for the defendant’s delay, absence or default when judgment was entered (Su Sh-Hsyu at [44]). That is because the merits have already been considered once.

  87. [100] As I have mentioned (see [27] above), the first defendant rightly concedes that the Judgment was entered against him on the merits of the plaintiff’s claims against the Defendants and not merely by reason of default, whether in filing a defence or failing to attend the O 27 application on 4 March 2020. I therefore consider that the appropriate framework for the first defendant’s application to set aside the Judgment is that set out in [60] of First Property.

  88. [101] As the Court of Appeal held in Su Sh-Hsyu (at [44]), the considerations in this class of judgments are as follows:

  89. [102] Further, where a party deliberately absents itself and thereby allows a judgment on the merits to be entered against it, the court’s discretion generally weighs heavily in favour of the interest in finality in litigation, despite the weight of the countervailing factors (Su Sh-Hsyu at [45]). That is simply because a party who has eschewed one opportunity afforded to it to address the court on the merits of its case will not easily persuade the court to undermine the principle of finality in litigation by affording it another such opportunity.

  90. [103] To all of these factors, I add only this gloss. Mercurine, Su Sh-Hsyu and First Property were all cases applying an express power conferred by the Rules to set aside a judgment. On this branch of my analysis, I am assuming in the first defendant’s favour, and contrary to my finding, that I have an inherent power to set aside a judgment under O 27 r 3 even though the Rules provide no express power to do so and even though the Rules provide express powers to set aside other types of judgments. That feature of this branch of the analysis, in my view, tilts the balance even further in favour of upholding the interest in finality in litigation.

  91. [104] The touchstone when it comes to exercising the court’s inherent powers is always one of necessity (Wee Soon Kim Anthony v Law Society of Singapore [2001] 2 SLR(R) 821 at [27]). The starting point is that, even when an inherent power exists, it “should only be invoked in exceptional circumstances where there is a clear need for it and the justice of the case so demands” (see Roberto Building Material Pte Ltd and others v Oversea-Chinese Banking Corp Ltd and another [2003] 2 SLR(R) 353 at [16]–[17]). In my view, therefore, the nature of an inherent power adds significantly on this branch of the analysis to the first defendant’s burden in bringing himself within the framework in [60] of First Property and in satisfying each of the factors set out at [44] of Su Sh-Hsyu (see [101] above).

  92. [105] All of this means that the starting point in the exercise this hypothetical inherent power is the sufficiency of the first defendant’s reasons for: (a) his absence at the hearing of the plaintiff’s O 27 application; and (b) his failure to apply to set aside the Judgment when he learned of it in March 2020 and, in any event, earlier than August 2021. These are the predominant considerations on the exercise of an inherent power to set aside the Judgment. The first defendant’s counsel accepts this.

  93. [107] The result is that the first defendant has failed to discharge the burden that rests on him to persuade a court to exercise an inherent power in his favour and to subvert the interest in finality in litigation.

  94. The plaintiff serves the writ on the Defendants

  95. [109] In March 2019, the plaintiff served the writ in this action on the first, second and fourth defendants in Papua New Guinea. The first and second defendants accepted service of the writ in Papua New Guinea through a solicitor practising there whom they had instructed to act on their behalf, Mr Buri Ovia (“Mr Ovia”). The three Defendants jointly appointed Eldan Law LLP (“Eldan”) as their solicitors. Eldan entered an appearance for the Defendants on 12 March 2019. At that time, the writ been served on the first and fourth defendants, but not on the second defendant. She therefore entered her appearance gratis, ie without being served with the writ (see MV Popi v SS Gniezno; The Gniezno [1968] P 418 and O 10 r 1(3)).

  96. [110] From March 2019, therefore the first defendant had access to legal advice in relation to the plaintiff’s action both from Eldan in Singapore and Mr Ovia in Papua New Guinea.

  97. The Defendants’ representation in this action

  98. [111] It is convenient at this point to set out the three firms of solicitors who have represented the Defendants in Singapore from the commencement of this action to the present date:

  99. (a) From 12 March 2019 to 26 July 2019, Eldan represented all three Defendants.

  100. (b) From 27 February 2020 to 4 March 2020, PRP Law LLP (“PRP”) represented all three Defendants.

  101. (c) From 5 July 2021 to the present day, Nicholas & Tan Partnership LLP (“N&T”) has represented only the first defendant. The first defendant was therefore unrepresented from 4 March 2020 to 5 July 2021.

  102. (d) On 10 September 2021, Tan Peng Chin LLC came on the record as representing the second defendant in this action. That firm remains on the record as the second defendant’s solicitors but have played no part in the hearing and determination of the first defendant’s setting aside application. The second defendant was therefore unrepresented from 4 March 2020 to 10 September 2021 but has been represented since that date, at least nominally.

  103. (e) The fourth defendant has been unrepresented in this action from 4 March 2020 to the present date.

  104. The defendants apply to set aside service

  105. [112] In April 2019, both Eldan (for the Defendants) and R&T (for the remaining defendants) applied to set aside service of the writ. All six defendants took the position that the Singapore courts had no personal jurisdiction over them, alternatively that the Singapore courts should decline to exercise any such jurisdiction on grounds of forum non conveniens.

  106. [113] The Defendants filed two affidavits in support of their application. The first defendant swore one affidavit on his own behalf. The second defendant swore another affidavit on behalf of herself and the fourth defendant. Both affidavits were filed on 5 April 2019. The two affidavits cover the same ground, have the same structure (including largely identical topic and sub-topic headings) take the same positions on those topics and sub-topics and are, in some parts, identical word for word. The second defendant’s affidavit has assumed a significance on this application to which I will return (see [116]–[122] below).

  107. [114] All six defendants’ applications to set aside service of the writ were heard together on 19 July 2019. The assistant registrar held that the Singapore courts did not have personal jurisdiction over any of the defendants. She accordingly set aside service of the writ on all six defendants.

  108. [115] On 23 July 2019, the plaintiff appealed to a judge in chambers against the assistant registrar’s decisions as against all six defendants. The appeals were fixed to be heard on 26 August 2019. Dentons served the appeal relating to the Defendants on Eldan on 23 July 2019. The first defendant accepts that Eldan informed him that the appeal had been filed and that it was fixed for hearing on 26 August 2019.

  109. The second defendant’s social media post

  110. [116] Meanwhile, on 1 or 2 July 2019, it matters not which, a post appeared on a public blog in Papua New Guinea. The post was then republished on the second defendant’s Facebook page.

  111. [117] The post: (a) suggested that the first defendant had indeed been involved in corrupt activities in relation to the sale of Cloudy Bay; (b) alleged that the first defendant had used the second defendant to advance those corrupt activities; (c) alleged that the first defendant had perjured himself in his affidavit filed on 5 April 2019 in support of the application to set aside service; and (d) alleged that the first defendant had forged the second defendant’s signature on her affidavit filed on 5 April 2019 in support of the application to set aside service (see [18] above).

  112. [118] The post was drawn up in the form of a newspaper article by the second defendant with the dateline 2 July 2019. There is no suggestion, however, that the post was ever published in any newspaper.

  113. [119] The headline on the post as published on the public blog was “WIFE EXPOSES CROOK BUSINESSMAN REX PAKI’S HANDS ON PNGSDP DEAL”. The headline on the post as republished on the second defendant’s Facebook page was “WIFE NOW TURNS ON CROOK ACOUNTANT AND FRAUDSTER BUSINESSMAN REX PAKI…READ”. The post started as follows:

  114. [120] The post went on to allege that the second defendant’s affidavit of 5 April 2019 was “a False Statement which was written by [the first defendant] to justify a Corrupt Deal with [the first defendant], [the sixth defendant], [the third defendant] and Lifese”. The post further alleged that “… all the 11 Paged Affidavit that [the first defendant] wrote, Forged my Signatures, Scanned and sent [the affidavit] to His Lawyers in Singapore to Justify all His Corrupt Deals with Cloudy Bay with You [the third defendant] and Lifese is TOTAL A LIE (sic)”.

  115. [121] The first defendant’s evidence on this application is that the second defendant was not the author of this post. His evidence is that the second defendant’s relatives authored the post based on a misunderstanding of the facts and without her authorisation.

  116. [122] But the first defendant did not at any time take this position, either through counsel or on affidavit, from the time the social media post was published until 6 August 2021, when he filed his affidavit in support of his application to set aside the judgment. For that period of almost two years, therefore, the available evidence established that the second defendant was taking a position on the merits of the plaintiff’s claims which not only contradicted the first defendant’s position but was hostile to his position. The second defendant was accusing the first defendant of perjuring himself in his own affidavit and, at worst, of forging the second defendant’s signature on her affidavit or, at best, of suborning her perjury in the affidavit. All of that obviously raised the issue of whether a single firm of solicitors could continue to represent the Defendants collectively without facing an irreconcilable conflict of interest.

  117. Eldan applies to discharge itself

  118. [123] On 1 July 2019, Eldan applied to discharge itself from acting for the Defendants. Eldan’s stated grounds were that the Defendants had failed to pay the agreed amount to Eldan’s account for anticipated legal fees and disbursements. There was an issue between the parties as to whether the potential conflict of interest arising from the social media post ostensibly by the second defendant did or did not also play an unstated part in Eldan’s decision to seek its discharge from acting for the Defendants. That issue is ultimately immaterial.

  119. [125] I find that, as at 26 July 2019, the first defendant took a considered decision not to participate any further in the plaintiff’s appeals on service. My reasons for that finding are as follow. Dentons continued to keep the first defendant informed of developments in the appeal. Yet, the first defendant took no steps to appoint new counsel or to represent himself to resist the plaintiff’s appeal. He saw no need to do so because, at this point, he had succeeded in having service against him set aside. He knew that the second defendant’s social media post would make it difficult for him to find counsel in Singapore to represent him. He knew that R&T were representing the remaining defendants on the plaintiff’s appeal. He believed that R&T’s submissions for the remaining defendants would suffice to persuade the court to dismiss the plaintiff’s appeals as against all six defendants, including himself.

  120. The registrar’s appeals on jurisdiction

  121. [126] On 21 August 2019, in anticipation of the hearing of the plaintiff’s registrar’s appeals on jurisdiction and forum non conveniens on 26 August 2019 (see [112] above), Dentons took it upon itself to send a letter to the first defendant: (a) reminding him and Mr Ovia that the hearing would take place on 26 August 2019; (b) asking if the first defendant had appointed Singapore solicitors to act for him in the appeal; and (c) to invite the first defendant to exchange written submissions for the appeal. Although he denies receiving this letter, the first defendant accepts that he knew that the appeal would be heard on 26 August 2019.

  122. [127] I heard the registrar’s appeals as scheduled on 26 August 2019. The Defendants did not attend the hearing by counsel or in person. The hearing nevertheless proceeded against them in their absence. R&T represented the remaining defendants and argued their appeal for them. The hearing of the appeals could not conclude on 26 August 2019 and continued on 8 October 2019 and 19 November 2019. The first defendant asserts that he did not know that the hearings were to continue on 8 October 2019 and 19 November 2019.

  123. [128] On 19 November 2019, I accepted the remaining defendants’ submissions and dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal as against them. The assistant registrar’s decision setting aside service of the writ on those three defendants therefore stood. That is how the remaining defendants successfully extricated themselves from this action.

  124. [129] But I accepted the plaintiff’s submissions as against the Defendants. I held that the Singapore courts had personal jurisdiction over the Defendants and should not decline to exercise that jurisdiction on grounds of forum non conveniens. I therefore allowed the plaintiff’s appeal and reinstated service of the writ on the Defendants.

  125. [130] It therefore became necessary to give the parties directions for this action to proceed to trial, albeit only as against the Defendants. To that end, in the usual way, a pre-trial conference was fixed for 26 November 2019. As the Defendants were still unrepresented, Dentons quite rightly took the initiative to send a letter to the first defendant by post on 19 November 2019 and by email on 20 November 2019. The letter: (a) informed the first defendant that I had allowed the plaintiff’s appeal as against the Defendants, thereby reinstating service of the writ on them; (b) informed him that a pre-trial conference had been fixed for 26 November 2019 before the senior assistant registrar; (c) asked him to attend the pre-trial conference by counsel or in person. The first defendant accepts that he received this letter by email on 20 November 2019.

  126. [131] I find that, at this point, the first defendant took a deliberate decision not to participate any further in this action at all. He decided to allow this action to proceed in the usual course and to ignore any judgment by default that might be entered against him.

  127. The Defendants fail to file a defence

  128. [132] On 25 November 2019, knowing that service had been reinstated against him, and only a day before the pre-trial conference, the first defendant telephoned Dentons and asked them to adjourn the pre-trial conference. Dentons told the first defendant that they had no instructions on an adjournment and urged him to appoint Singapore lawyers to represent him. On the same day, Mr Ovia wrote to Dentons seeking an adjournment of the pre-trial conference. Dentons replied to Mr Ovia setting out what they had told the first defendant in the phone conversation earlier that day. Dentons also indicated that they intended to seek directions at the pre-trial conference for the Defendants to file their defences.

  129. [133] The Defendants did not attend the pre-trial conference on 26 November 2019 by counsel or in person, whether to ask for it to be adjourned or otherwise. The senior assistant registrar directed the Defendants to file their Defences by 13 December 2019. Dentons duly conveyed the direction to the first defendant and to Mr Ovia on 26 November 2019. The first defendant does not deny receiving this letter.

  130. [134] Despite this, neither the Defendants nor Mr Ovia responded to Dentons. Despite this, the Defendants failed to file their Defences in this action, whether by 13 December 2019 or at all.

  131. The plaintiff tries to enter judgment in default of defence

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