General Division of the High Court · Decided 22 August 2022
Zaiton bte Adom v Nafsiah bte Wagiman and another
Feedback & support[2022] SGHC 189 · Case no. Originating Summons No 1014 of 2020
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Grounds of decision
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Introduction
- [2]
[2] Both the plaintiff and the second defendant have appealed against my decision. I now set out my grounds.
Background facts
The relationships between the parties
- [3]
[3] The defendants married each other in 1985. They divorced in 2018. The second defendant then married the plaintiff in 2019.
- [4]
[4] In 2002, the defendants purchased a Housing and Development Board (“HDB”) flat (“the Flat”) as joint tenants to be their matrimonial home. As is usual, the defendants paid the purchase price by borrowing money from the HDB (“the HDB Loan”) and from each of their Central Provident Fund (“CPF”) accounts. In the usual way, all three loans were secured on the Flat by charges.
- [5]
[5] The defendants purchased the Flat at a price of $298,000. The second defendant contributed the sum of just over $23,000 towards the down payment for the Flat. He borrowed this sum from his own CPF account. With the interest that has accrued on that loan over the past 20 years, he now owes about $34,000 to his CPF account. He contributed virtually nothing after 2002 towards servicing the HDB Loan. The first defendant has serviced the HDB Loan virtually alone.
- [6]
[6] In 2015, the second defendant procured $205,359.80 from the plaintiff. He then handed it to the first defendant. The first defendant used part of that money to repay the HDB Loan in full. She thereby secured the total discharge of the HDB’s charge on the Flat.
- [7]
[7] The defendants’ marriage was not a happy one, certainly in its later years. In 2010, the second defendant pronounced a first talak on the first defendant. In 2013, while the second defendant was still married to the first defendant, he entered into what is described as an “unregistered marriage” with the plaintiff. I take that to mean that they entered into a relationship akin to marriage which was not recognised as a marriage under their personal law.
- [8]
[8] In 2019, after the defendants’ divorce, the second defendant and the plaintiff “registered their marriage”. I take that to mean that they entered into a relationship of marriage which is recognised under their personal law.
- [9]
[9] All three parties are employees of the HDB. Further, the plaintiff and the first defendant have known each other since at least 2015. The plaintiff and the first defendant are therefore known to each other as colleagues and acquaintances.
The $205,359.80
- [10]
[10] In early 2015, the plaintiff came into a substantial sum of money from two sources. First, she realised a profit of a little over $163,000 when she sold her own HDB flat. Second, she withdrew a lump sum from her CPF account.
- [11]
[11] Knowing this, the second defendant told the plaintiff: (a) that the defendants had fallen into arrears in servicing the HDB Loan on the Flat; and (b) that he intended to buy the first defendant’s interest in the Flat from her, thereby making him the Flat’s sole owner. He asked the plaintiff to hand him enough money, in the plaintiff’s own words, “to allow him to deposit the same into the 1st Defendant’s CPF funds such as to allow the 2nd Defendant to buy over the Flat”. The plaintiff agreed to hand $205,359.80 to the second defendant for this purpose.
- [12]
[12] I use the neutral verb “hand” rather than “give” so as not to imply that the plaintiff made a gift of the money to the second defendant. Whether she did so is an issue in contention on this application.
- [13]
[13] The plaintiff handed the money to the second defendant in two tranches, on both occasions at the second defendant’s request.
- [14]
[14] First, in February 2015, the plaintiff procured a cheque in the sum of $7,256.68 drawn in favour of “CPF” and handed it to the second defendant. The second defendant in turn handed the cheque to the first defendant. He instructed her to deposit it into her CPF account. She did so, for the further credit of her CPF special account.
- [16]
[16] This total sum of $205,359.80 is what the plaintiff now seeks to recover from the defendants.
Two minor points
- [17]
[17] I should mention two minor points at this stage.
- [18]
[18] First, the cheque which the plaintiff handed to the second defendant in February 2015 was not drawn on an account in the plaintiff’s name. It was instead drawn on an account in the name of a company. The evidence does not make clear the plaintiff’s connection to the company. Nevertheless, the parties have treated the cheque and its proceeds as the plaintiff’s property for all purposes. I shall do the same.
The first defendant’s transactions
- [21]
[21] On the evidence before me, the first defendant withdrew no funds from her CPF account other than the sum of $125,717.15 paid to the HDB in September 2015. It therefore appears that, out of the $205,359.80 which the plaintiff handed to the second defendant, a notional $79,642.65 remains in the first defendant’s CPF account. That sum comprises: (a) $7,256.68 which remains in the first defendant’s CPF special account (see [14] above); (b) $30,002.68 which remains in her CPF investment account (see [20] above); and (c) $42,383.29 which remains in her CPF ordinary account (being $205,359.80 less the sums of $7,256.68, $125,717.15 and $30,002.68). These figures ignore the interest which will have accrued on these sums since 2015.
The first defendant discovers the truth
- [22]
[22] At some time in 2016, the plaintiff’s brothers visited the Flat demanding to see the second defendant. Their intention was to recover $205,359.80 from him. The second defendant was not present at the Flat. The first defendant was.
- [23]
[23] As a result of this visit, the first defendant questioned the second defendant about the source of the two cashier’s orders. The first defendant’s evidence is that it was only then that the second defendant revealed to her for the first time: (a) that the plaintiff was the ultimate source of the two cashier’s orders; and (b) that he had entered into an unregistered marriage (see [7] above) with the plaintiff in 2013.
- [24]
[24] The first defendant’s evidence is that, as a result of these disclosures, she assumed that the plaintiff had made a gift of the two cashier’s orders to the second defendant because he did not say anything to the contrary. I accept the first defendant’s evidence. The second defendant does not suggest that he told the first defendant anything about the origin of the two cashier’s orders before 2016 and, in particular, at the time he handed them to her. Further, it would be natural for the first defendant to assume that the plaintiff, having entered into an unregistered marriage with the second defendant three years earlier, would as a result be prepared to make a gift of such a large sum to him.
The defendants’ divorce proceedings
- [25]
[25] In May 2017, the first defendant commenced divorce proceedings against the second defendant in the Syariah Court. In April 2018, at the first hearing of the divorce proceedings, the first defendant volunteered to the court that she had used money originating from the plaintiff to repay the HDB Loan in full. The Syariah Court therefore held the divorce proceedings in abeyance to allow the plaintiff an opportunity to apply to intervene in the divorce proceedings and to assert a claim.
- [26]
[26] In September 2018, the first defendant secured directions to permit the divorce proceedings to continue on the basis that the plaintiff had failed to intervene in the divorce proceedings. The plaintiff’s submission is that she had failed to do so simply because the first defendant failed to tell her about the Syariah Court’s directions.
The property division order
- [31]
[31] The second defendant took this approach in the divorce proceedings even though he had, by then, entered into an unregistered marriage (see [7] above) with the plaintiff. He would therefore be expected to have had a natural incentive to protect if not advance the plaintiff’s interests over the first defendant’s interests. Despite this, the second defendant supplied no evidence and made no submissions to the court about the legal consequences of the first defendant having used money which originated from the plaintiff to repay the HDB Loan in full.
The variation
- [33]
[33] At the same time, the second defendant asked the plaintiff to intervene in the divorce proceedings and assert her claim. The plaintiff did so.
- [36]
[36] The plaintiff denied and continues to deny both: (a) that she is liable to the first defendant for any of the debts of the second defendant which the first defendant seeks to set off against the $205,359.80; and (b) that the first defendant has any legal basis to set these debts off against the sum of $205,359.80.
The appeal
- [44]
[44] The Appeal Board expressly stated that its decision was simply that the plaintiff had asserted her claim in the wrong court and not that her claim lacked merit. As a result, the Appeal Board said that nothing in its decision precluded her from vindicating her claim for $205,359.80 in full through an ordinary civil claim in the ordinary civil courts.
- [45]
[45] Taking her cue from the Appeal Board, the plaintiff commenced these proceedings in October 2020, claiming $205,359.80 in full from one or both of the defendants.
The plaintiff’s claims
- [47]
[47] Arising from these facts, the plaintiff seeks to recover $205,359.80 from one or both of the defendants under the following heads of substantive relief:
- [48]
[48] At the outset of his oral submissions, plaintiff’s counsel confirmed that the plaintiff’s case against the second defendant is that he is a trustee for the plaintiff only under a Quistclose trust or a remedial constructive trust, and not, therefore, under a constructive trust or a presumed resulting trust. But at a later point in his oral submissions, plaintiff’s counsel appeared to argue that the second defendant is a trustee for the plaintiff also under a constructive trust and a presumed resulting trust.
- [49]
[49] Plaintiff’s counsel also submitted that the plaintiff’s proprietary claim is aimed only at the first defendant’s CPF account or the Flat’s net proceeds of sale. The prayers in this application are therefore deliberately and carefully framed to claim no proprietary interest in the Flat, at most only an equitable lien on the Flat.
- [50]
[50] With these points in mind, the plaintiff’s 11 heads of principal substantive relief can be distilled into the following seven claims:
(a) One or both of the defendants holds $205,359.80 on constructive trust for the plaintiff.
(b) The court should impose a remedial constructive trust on one or both of the defendants in favour of the plaintiff for the sum of $205,359.80.
(c) One or both of the defendants holds $205,359.80 on a presumed resulting trust for the plaintiff.
(d) The second defendant holds $205,359.80 on a Quistclose trust for the plaintiff.
(e) One or both of the defendants is liable to the plaintiff for the sum of $205,359.80 in unjust enrichment.
(f) One or both of the defendants is liable to the plaintiff in the sum of $205,359.80 as proprietary restitution.
(g) The plaintiff is entitled to an equitable lien on the Flat.
Findings as to each party’s knowledge and intention
- [51]
[51] Before turning to a consideration of each of these seven claims, it is convenient to make my findings of fact as to each party’s knowledge and intention in February and March 2015, at the time the second defendant handed the two cashier’s orders to the first defendant.
- [52]
[52] I start by analysing the second defendant’s knowledge and intention. I start with the second defendant because I find that it was he who conceived and executed the plan which has given rise to this dispute. The plaintiff did not conceive or initiate the plan which has given rise to this dispute. Her evidence (see [63] below) is that it was the second defendant who repeatedly asked her to hand him $205,359.80, knowing that she had come into a substantial sum of money in early 2015. The second defendant does not deny this aspect of the plaintiff’s evidence. I accept the plaintiff’s evidence. Equally, the first defendant did not conceive or initiate the plan which has given rise to this dispute. Her evidence is that she did not at any time ask the second defendant to give her any part of this $205,359.80. The second defendant does not deny this aspect of the first defendant’s evidence. I accept the first defendant’s evidence.
- [53]
[53] This dispute has arisen only because of a plan conceived and executed by the second defendant. I therefore begin by analysing the second defendant’s knowledge and intention in February and March 2015.
The second defendant’s knowledge and intention
- [54]
[54] The second defendant’s evidence is that his “initial plan” was as follows:
- [55]
[55] I find that the second defendant’s “initial plan” comprised the following six steps. First, the second defendant would persuade the plaintiff to hand $205,359.80 to him. Second, he would hand the money to the first defendant and direct her to deposit it into her CPF account. Third, he would persuade the first defendant to do as he directed. Fourth, the first defendant would use part of the money to repay the HDB Loan in full and thereby discharge the HDB’s charge on the Flat. Fifth, the second defendant would persuade the first defendant to transfer her interest in the Flat to him. Finally, the first defendant would apply the remainder of the $205,359.80 in her CPF account towards purchasing a new flat to house herself and the defendants’ child.
- [57]
[57] Several points puzzled me about the second defendant’s plan. Why did the second defendant ask the plaintiff for the precise figure of $205,359.80? Why did he not just ask the plaintiff for the $125,717.15 necessary to repay the HDB Loan and instead ask for about $80,000 more? And why did the money have to be paid into the first defendant’s CPF account rather than into the second defendant’s CPF account (to fund his purchase of the first defendant’s share of the Flat in the fifth step) or directly in cash to the HDB (to repay the HDB Loan)?
- [58]
[58] None of the parties offered a direct answer to these questions in evidence or in submissions. And the answer is ultimately immaterial to the issues I have to decide. But purely by way of background, it appears that the answer to both questions is related to the fact that the first defendant’s CPF account was “depleted” in February 2015. The second defendant therefore intended the $205,359.80 to “replenish” the first defendant’s CPF account. He apparently believed that doing so was a condition precedent under the rules and regulations of the CPF Board for the first defendant to transfer her interest in the Flat to him.
- [59]
[59] It is true that $205,359.80 is very close to the total of the sums necessary to repay in full: (a) the HDB Loan; and (b) the amount which the first defendant had borrowed (ie, withdrawn with an obligation to repay with interest) from her CPF account to purchase the Flat, together with accrued interest. The actual discharge of the HDB’s charge and a credit balance in the first defendant’s CPF account of funds sufficient to discharge her CPF charge would permit her to transfer her interest in the Flat to the second defendant subject only to his existing CPF charge.
- [60]
[60] In any event, as I have said, the reason the second defendant conceived and executed this plan is ultimately immaterial because the steps of the plan are clear.
- [61]
[61] I now turn to consider the plaintiff’s knowledge and intention.
The plaintiff’s knowledge and intention
- [62]
[62] It is useful to consider the plaintiff’s knowledge and intention from two perspectives: (a) as against the first defendant; and (b) as against the second defendant.
As against the first defendant
(1) The plaintiff’s knowledge of the second defendant’s plan
- [63]
[63] I first consider the plaintiff’s knowledge and intention as against the first defendant. The plaintiff’s evidence is as follows:
- [64]
[64] I find that the plaintiff knew the second defendant’s plan when she handed the two cashier’s orders to the second defendant in 2015. I say that for two reasons. First, in the passage I have cited at [63] above, the plaintiff accepts that she knew the first to fifth steps of the second defendant’s plan (see [55] above) when she handed the two cashier’s orders to the second defendant.
- [65]
[65] As for the sixth step of the second defendant’s plan, it is true that this passage does not go so far as to accept that the plaintiff knew that step. But I find on the balance of probabilities that she also knew the sixth step. She knew each of the five preceding steps of the plan. She knew that, if these five steps were carried out, the first defendant would need a flat to house herself and the defendants’ child. It is therefore likely that the plaintiff also knew that the first defendant would have to purchase another flat for that purpose. Further, the plaintiff was in an unregistered marriage with the second defendant at that time. There was no reason for him to be candid with her about the first five steps of his plan but to withhold from her the sixth step.
- [66]
[66] I therefore find that all six steps of the plan which the second defendant conceived and executed was the common intention of both the second defendant and the plaintiff. I find that this was their common intention, at the very latest, from the time the second defendant procured the cheque from the plaintiff in February 2015.
An apparent discrepancy
- [67]
[67] At this stage, I deal with an apparent discrepancy between the plaintiff’s evidence and the second defendant’s evidence of his plan. The second defendant’s evidence is that the plan was for the plaintiff to “acquire and purchase” the Flat “through” the second defendant (see [54] above), ie, that the outcome of the plan would leave the plaintiff the sole owner of the Flat. The plaintiff’s evidence is that the plan was for the second defendant to “buy over” the Flat from the first defendant (see [63] above), ie, that the outcome of the plan would leave the second defendant the sole owner of the Flat.
- [68]
[68] The second defendant does not explain what he means by the phrase “for the Plaintiff to acquire and purchase the flat through me” (see [54] above). It could suggest that he was to hold the Flat as a nominee for the plaintiff. That would be a potential contravention of s 51 of the Housing and Development Act (Cap 129, 2004 Rev Ed). That is because the evidence shows that the plaintiff was not eligible to own an interest in an HDB flat before December 2014 (when she sold her own HDB flat) or after October 2015 (when she purchased a replacement HDB flat). The second defendant repaid the HDB Loan in full only in September 2015. That leaves only a window of only about a month, from September to October 2015, in which the plaintiff was eligible to own an interest in an HDB flat.
- [69]
[69] The discrepancy may be more apparent than real. The plaintiff’s evidence can be reconciled with the second defendant’s evidence by taking both their evidence as referring to the possibilities I identify at [75] below as ways in which the second defendant could account to the plaintiff for the $205,359.80.
- [71]
[71] Even if I am wrong on this, I consider it to be ultimately immaterial to my findings as to the parties’ knowledge and intention. Whichever account is true, it was their common intention that one or other of them was to become the sole owner of the Flat in the fifth step of the plan, in exchange for and in consideration of the plaintiff’s $205,359.80. This apparent discrepancy therefore does not alter my finding that carrying out the second defendant’s six-step plan was the common intention of the second defendant and the plaintiff from, at the latest, February 2015.
As against the second defendant
- [72]
[72] I now turn to consider the plaintiff’s knowledge and intention as against the second defendant.
- [73]
[73] I begin by finding that the second defendant and the plaintiff did not discuss what, if anything, the plaintiff was to receive from the second defendant in return for the two cashier’s orders, let alone agree or arrive at any understanding to that effect. I make that finding because the plaintiff and the second defendant give no evidence whatsoever of any contemporaneous discussion, agreement or understanding between them in February and March 2015 as to whether the two cashier’s orders: (a) were or were not a gift from the plaintiff to the second defendant; (b) were or were not a loan from the plaintiff to the second defendant; or (c) would or would not yield in favour of the plaintiff a proprietary interest in the Flat.
- [74]
[74] The plaintiff’s evidence on this point is that she did not intend $205,359.80 to be a gift to the second defendant because she “reasoned that any monies handed to 2nd Defendant by [her] would be returned to [her] in some way” (see [63] above). I make two points about this. First, this is the plaintiff’s evidence of her contemporaneous internal rationalisation to herself of her decision to hand the two cashier’s orders to the second defendant. It is not her evidence of a discussion, agreement or understanding with him that this was the basis on which she was doing so. Second, this is a self-serving statement which she now makes with the benefit of hindsight, knowing that the second defendant’s plan has gone awry at the fifth step.
- [75]
[75] On the basis of the plaintiff’s own evidence, I find that she handed the two cashier’s orders to the second defendant in total reliance on her subjective, self-engendered expectation that he would return $205,359.80 to her in some way. There are many means by which the second defendant could do this. He could become the sole owner of the Flat, sell it and pay $205,359.80 to the plaintiff out of the Flat’s net proceeds of sale. She expressly refers to this means of returning the money to her in her evidence (see [63] above). But she also expressly describes this as only one of the “means or ways” by which he could “return” $205,359.80 to her. Although she does not elaborate upon the other means, it is not difficult to posit them. He could simply pay her $205,359.80 at some point in the future. He could become the sole owner of the Flat and add her as a co-owner for no additional consideration. He could abandon the fifth step of the plan and procure the first defendant to transfer the Flat to the plaintiff and the second defendant as joint owners. He could acquire the first defendant’s interest in the Flat, discharge his own CPF charge and transfer the Flat to the plaintiff’s sole name. He could leave the Flat to the plaintiff in his will. The important point is that neither the plaintiff nor the second defendant have given any evidence that any of these ways or means was actually the subject of any discussion, agreement or even understanding between the second defendant and the plaintiff at any time.
- [76]
[76] I therefore find that the plaintiff handed the two cashier’s orders to the second defendant in 2015 relying on and induced by nothing more than: (a) his request for the money as her husband in an unregistered marriage; and (b) her faith in him, as her de facto husband, that he would do the right thing and return $205,359.80 to her by some unspecified means and at some unspecified time in the future. In that sense, she handed the two cashier’s orders to the second defendant as an advance to the second defendant to enable him to acquire the first defendant’s interest in the Flat, but with no agreement or even expectation as to the manner or time the second defendant would return it.
- [77]
[77] I find further that this subjective and self-engendered expectation is all that the plaintiff means when she says that she did not intend the two cashier’s orders to be a gift to the second defendant (see [63] above).
- [78]
[78] I turn now to consider the knowledge and intention of the first defendant.
The first defendant’s knowledge and intention
- [79]
[79] The first defendant’s evidence is that: (a) she did not know until 2016 that the plaintiff was the source of the two cashier’s orders; (b) she never knew the second defendant’s “initial plan” (see [54] above); and (c) the second defendant told her that the money was his unpaid share of the monthly payments to service the HDB Loan. Her evidence is as follows:
- [80]
[80] In an affidavit filed in a failed attempt to strike out the plaintiff’s application, the first defendant said this:
- [81]
[81] I accept the first defendant’s evidence. In particular, I accept that the first defendant did not know until 2016 at the earliest: (a) that the second defendant had entered into an unregistered marriage with the plaintiff; (b) that the plaintiff was the ultimate source of the two cashier’s orders; (c) that the second defendant had conceived and was executing his six-step plan; and (d) that executing that plan was the common intention of the second defendant and the plaintiff.
- [82]
[82] I accept also that the second defendant told the first defendant that: (a) the two cashier’s orders were to make up to the first defendant for the second defendant’s failure to make any substantial contribution to servicing the HDB Loan; and (b) he had borrowed the money from friends and that she should not ask him any further questions.
The consequences of these findings
- [83]
[83] These findings have four important consequences.
- [84]
[84] The first consequence is that the plaintiff’s intention in handing the two cashier’s orders to the second defendant was not vitiated or defective in any way. She was not induced to hand the two cashier’s orders to him by a fraud which he perpetrated on her. Plaintiff’s counsel confirmed several times that the plaintiff makes no allegation of fraud against the second defendant. Further, she was not induced to hand the two cashier’s orders to him by any kind of mistake. Neither of these points form any part of the plaintiff’s case.
- [85]
[85] As I have found, the second defendant was honest with the plaintiff about his plan. The plaintiff knew all six steps of his plan. The second defendant and the plaintiff formed a common intention to execute the plan. And she handed the two cashier’s orders to him with that knowledge and intention. She was labouring under no deception or mistake.
- [86]
[86] The second consequence is the plaintiff did not intend to make a loan of the $205,359.80 to the second defendant. A loan entails a legal obligation on the second defendant to repay the money to the plaintiff. On my findings, neither the plaintiff nor the second defendant intended any such legal obligation. When the plaintiff handed the two cashier’s orders to the second defendant, she was induced by and relied on only her own subjective, self-engendered expectation that the second defendant would return $205,359.80 in some unspecified way and at some unspecified time. She did not do so induced by, in reliance on or in exchange for his undertaking to repay $205,359.80 to her.
- [87]
[87] The third consequence is that the plaintiff intended to part with her property in the two cashier’s orders and their proceeds when she handed them to the second defendant. I say that for two reasons. First, the third, fourth and fifth steps of the plan (see [55] above) could be carried out only if the plaintiff parted with her property in the two cashier’s orders and their proceeds. Second, as I have found, the plaintiff’s evidence that she did not intend the two cashier’s orders to be a gift to the second defendant means only that she had a subjective, self-engendered expectation that he would return $205,359.80 to her in some unspecified way and at some unspecified time. Her evidence that the two cashier’s orders were not a gift does not suggest that she intended in some way to retain property in the two cashier’s orders or their proceeds.
- [88]
[88] The fourth consequence of these findings is that what the first defendant did with the two cashier’s orders and their proceeds did not in any way deceive the second defendant or in any way defeat the common intention of the second defendant and the plaintiff. What the first defendant did with the two cashier’s orders and their proceeds was exactly what the second defendant and the plaintiff intended her to do with them: she paid them into her CPF account and used the proceeds in part to repay the HDB Loan and secure the total discharge of the HDB’s charge on the Flat.
- [90]
[90] I now turn to consider each of the plaintiff’s claims against the defendants.
Issue 1: Institutional constructive trust
- [91]
[91] I deal first with the plaintiff’s claim that the first defendant holds $205,359.80 on an institutional constructive trust for the plaintiff.
Parties’ cases
The plaintiff’s case
- [92]
[92] The plaintiff rests her case on this claim on four submissions:
(a) The foundation of an institutional constructive trust lies in unconscionability. The general principle which underpins when an institutional constructive trust arises in equity is therefore a recipient of property behaving unconscionably in relation to that property.
(b) The knowledge which a recipient of property must have to make her conduct unconscionable and to give rise to an institutional constructive trust can be knowledge acquired either before or after the recipient receives the property.
(c) In 2018 (see [25] above), in the course of her divorce proceedings against the second defendant, the first defendant: (i) acknowledged that the two cashier’s orders and their proceeds were the plaintiff’s property; and (ii) confirmed her intention to return $205,359.80 in full to the plaintiff.
(d) In 2019, the first defendant behaved unconscionably in one of two ways, thereby constituting her a trustee of $205,359.80 for the plaintiff under an institutional constructive trust:
(i) the first defendant asserted in her May 2019 affidavit that she would not return the $205,359.80 in full to the plaintiff but would instead return only $53,653.80, thereby resiling from her earlier acknowledgments and confirmations (see [35] above);
(ii) Alternatively, the first defendant refused in her May 2019 affidavit to return $205,359.80 to the plaintiff knowing full well that the plaintiff was the source of the two cashier’s orders.
The first defendant’s case
- [93]
[93] The first defendant submits that no institutional constructive trust arose in the plaintiff’s favour for three reasons.
(a) First, the allegedly unconscionable conduct on which the plaintiff relies does not fall into any of the categories which equity has recognised as being capable of giving rise to an institutional constructive trust (see [104] below).
(b) Second, an institutional constructive trust arises only if the recipient of property behaves unconscionably at or before the time she receives the property. It is not the plaintiff’s case that the first defendant behaved unconscionably when she received the two cashier’s orders from the second defendant.
(c) Third, what the first defendant did with the two cashier’s orders was precisely what the second defendant and the plaintiff intended the first defendant to do with them.
- [94]
[94] For the reasons which follow, I accept each of the first defendant’s submissions.
Two assumptions
- [95]
[95] In the analysis which follows, I make two assumptions.
- [96]
[96] First, I assume that equity treats the balance standing to the credit of the first defendant in her CPF account in the same way as it would treat the balance standing to her credit in an ordinary bank account, ie, as a debt which the CPF Board owes her. That is not, however, the true legal relationship between the CPF Board and its members. In law, the CPF Board holds the credit balances in all of its members’ accounts as a single fund on a single trust for all members (see s 6(2) of the Central Provident Fund Act 1953 (2020 Rev Ed) (“the CPF Act”)).
- [97]
[97] The trust on which the CPF Board holds the credit balance in a member’s account is a sui generis trust in two fundamental respects. First, it is established by statute, not by the voluntary act of a settlor. Second, Parliament has heavily modified the duties of the CPF Board as trustee and the rights of a CPF member as the cestui que trust by the provisions of the CPF Act and the regulations made under it. But the fact remains that the CPF Board is not the debtor of a CPF member for the credit balance in her account.
- [98]
[98] I consider this assumption to be immaterial to the analysis. If the plaintiff cannot succeed if the two cashier’s orders are assumed to have increased a debt which the CPF Board owed to the first defendant at common law, a fortiori the plaintiff cannot succeed if the two cashier’s orders are treated as an accretion to a single trust fund which the CPF Board holds on an express sui generis trust for all members, including but not limited to the first defendant, in equity.
- [99]
[99] The second assumption I make is that the proceeds of the two cashier’s orders remain somehow sufficiently identifiable in the CPF Board’s hands as to be capable of being the subject matter of any sort of trust, whether express or implied and whether institutional or remedial. That assumption operates in the plaintiff’s favour in two senses.
- [100]
[100] First, on the available evidence, only $79,642.65 out of the proceeds of the two cashier’s orders remains even notionally identifiable in the first defendant’s CPF account (see [21] above). The remainder of the $205,359.80 (being $125,717.15) was paid out of the first defendant’s CPF ordinary account to the HDB to repay the HDB Loan in full. That sum is no longer capable of being the subject matter of a trust. The plaintiff’s repeated reference to the “traceable proceeds” of the two cashier’s orders do not assist her. That sum was not used to acquire the Flat in 2002 but was used instead to repay the HDB Loan in full in 2015. Plaintiff’s counsel confirmed that she does not rely on backwards tracing.
- [101]
[101] Second, even the $79,642.65 which remains in the first defendant’s CPF account is only notionally identifiable in that account. It is in fact held by the CPF Board together with the credit balances of all other CPF members commingled in a single fund on trust for all CPF members. It is not held as a discrete or identifiable chose in action vested in the first defendant and enforceable at her instance against the CPF Board.
- [102]
[102] With those two assumptions in mind, I now set out my reasons for accepting the first defendant’s three submissions at [93] above.
No unconscionability in any recognised sense
The plaintiff’s foundational proposition is misconceived
- [103]
[103] The plaintiff’s foundational proposition is that an institutional constructive trust arises whenever a recipient of property (T) behaves unconscionably in relation to that property as against the beneficiary (B). As authority for this proposition, the plaintiff relies on the dictum of Millett LJ (as he then was) in Paragon Finance plc v DB Thakerar & Co [1999] 1 All ER 400, cited in Guy Neale and others v Nine Squares Pty Ltd [2015] 1 SLR 1097 (“Guy Neale (CA)”) at [124]–[125]:
- [104]
[104] The plaintiff’s foundational proposition is fundamentally misconceived. A constructive trust is not equity’s response to conduct by T which is unconscionable only in the general sense of being conduct which is either not right or reasonable or which is contrary to good conscience. Unconscionability in that general sense is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a constructive rust to arise. The Court of Appeal made that clear in Guy Neale (CA) (at [124]) by framing Millett LJ’s dictum as merely a general definition of an institutional constructive trust rather than a comprehensive definition. It is significant that the Court of Appeal went on to situate the facts of Guy Neale (CA) within one of the specific categories and circumstances in which an institutional constructive trust arises, ie, a person making a profit in breach of his fiduciary duty (at [126]).
- [105]
[105] In my view, T holds her rights in property on constructive trust for B if, and only if, a set of circumstances have transpired in relation to those rights which equity recognises by accretion of judicial decision are sufficient to render it unconscionable for T to exercise those rights as she sees fit, disregarding B. Equity responds to the unconscionability by burdening T’s rights in the property with a set of equitable duties to B. This set of duties includes, at the very least, the core duties of a fiduciary, ie, the duty not to make a profit out of his fiduciary position and duty not to put himself in a position where his own interests and his duty to his principal are in conflict (Ho Yew Kong v Sakae Holdings Ltd and other appeals and other matters [2018] 2 SLR 333 (“Ho Yew Kong”) at [135]).
- [106]
[106] The reciprocal of this set of equitable duties is a set of reflected equitable rights vested in B. This set of rights is persistent in the sense that it is capable in equity of following T’s rights in the property as she transfers those rights to third parties. As a result, lawyers and judges are accustomed to thinking of B’s rights under an institutional constructive trust as being proprietary rights against a particular asset enforceable against the world at large. That serves as a useful model for most practical purposes, although it is not entirely accurate conceptually. The more accurate conceptual model is to think of B’s equitable rights as personal rights which burden T’s rights in the property in a manner which is capable in equity of surviving T’s transfer of those rights to a third party.
- [107]
[107] The specific categories of unconscionability which equity recognises as being capable of giving rise to an institutional constructive trust were helpfully enumerated in Low Heng Leon Andy v Low Kian Beng Lawrence (administrator of the estate of Tan Ah Kng, deceased) [2011] SGHC 184 (at [53], cited with approval in Guy Neale and others v Nine Squares Pty Ltd [2013] SGHC 249 at [141]):
- [108]
[108] This list of categories is not of course closed. And each category in this list is not of course so rigid as to be incapable of development. But there is a very strong policy imperative, both at common law and in equity, for rights in property to be stable and for the law to allocate and alter those rights only in a manner which is transparent, consistent and predictable. Equity therefore develops each category within this list incrementally, by analogy to existing cases within the category. Equally, it adds categories to this list incrementally, by analogy to the existing categories. And this development and addition is done in the usual way: by accretion of judicial decision. Equity does not develop or add to these categories in an unprincipled and ad hoc way, turning on a particular judge’s subjective opinion in a particular case as to whether T has engaged in conduct which is or is not unconscionable in some general sense of the word.
- [109]
[109] Two consequences follow from this conception of an institutional constructive trust.
- [110]
[110] First, an institutional constructive trust arises in real time, without any need for B to have resort to a court of equity. Thus, T will hold her rights in particular property on institutional constructive trust for B by reason of and upon the requirements of that specific category of unconscionability being satisfied. An institutional constructive trust is not imposed by the court, ie, it is not created by judicial decree following litigation (as opposed to a remedial constructive trust). The court’s function is merely to declare that an institutional constructive trust arose at a specific time in the past: Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council [1996] AC 669 (“Westdeutsche") at 714–715, cited in Ching Mun Fong (executrix of the estate of Tan Geok Tee, deceased) v Liu Cho Chit [2001] 1 SLR(R) 856 (“Ching Mun Fong”) at [35].
- [111]
[111] Second, an institutional constructive trust arises independently of any intention on B’s or T’s part to create a trust or to constitute T a fiduciary for B. That is so whether the intention is approached from the perspective of: (a) a bilateral or unilateral intention held subjectively by T and B ex ante; (b) an intention which the court can ascertain objectively from T’s and B’s conduct; and even (c) an intention which the court is prepared to impute to T or B ex post facto. Their intention is relevant only in so far as it goes towards establishing the specific head of unconscionability at [107(g)] above, ie, what is commonly referred to as the common intention constructive trust.
The first defendant’s conduct is not within any recognised category of unconscionability
- [112]
[112] The plaintiff’s case is that an institutional constructive trust arose in her favour only in May 2019, when the first defendant filed her affidavit in the variation proceedings, and at no other time. That is when the first defendant either: (a) unconscionably claimed to be entitled to return only $53,653.80 to the plaintiff after having earlier indicated her intention to return $205,359.80 to the plaintiff in full; or (b) unconscionably refused to return $205,359.80 in full to the plaintiff despite knowing that the plaintiff was the source of the two cashier’s orders.
- [114]
[114] In any event, the first defendant’s conduct at any point in time cannot conceivably fall within categories (b), (d) or (e) at [107] above. It does not require any analysis to come to that conclusion. That leaves only categories (a), (c), (f) and (g) which require further analysis.
- [115]
[115] Category (a) simply cannot apply. A transfer of property procured by fraud gives rise to an institutional constructive trust as against the fraudulent transferee: Westdeutsche at 716; Snell’s Equity (John McGhee & Steven Elliott eds) (Sweet & Maxwell, 34th Ed, 2020) (“Snell’s Equity”) at paras 26-011 and 26-013. But, as I have mentioned, the plaintiff disavows any allegation of fraud as against the second defendant. The position must be a fortiori as against the first defendant. There is no suggestion of any direct dealing between the plaintiff and the first defendant at the time the second defendant handed the two cashier’s orders to the first defendant in 2015.
- [116]
[116] In any event, on the plaintiff’s own case, the time to assess whether the first defendant’s intent was fraudulent is May 2019 (see [112] above). The first defendant made no fraudulent statement to the plaintiff in May 2019. Even if I go beyond the plaintiff’s case and assume that the first defendant was fraudulent before May 2019 (ie in April 2018) in falsely acknowledging and confirming her intention to return $205,359.80 to the plaintiff in full, there is still no fraud. The elements of inducement, reliance and detriment are all absent. The first defendant did not induce the plaintiff to do anything to her own detriment at any time.
- [117]
[117] Category (c) simply cannot apply. This category requires a fiduciary relationship between T and B which pre-dates and is independent of the institutional constructive trust which is now said to have arisen. The plaintiff does not allege that the first defendant owed fiduciary duties to her before May 2019 or in some way independently of the first defendant’s conduct in May 2019.
- [118]
[118] Category (f) simply cannot apply. The first defendant did not acquire any interest in land which was subject to the plaintiff’s interests. The only interest in land which the first defendant acquired arose upon, and by termination of, the HDB’s charge on the Flat, leaving the Flat unencumbered. Neither the Flat nor the charge was at any time subject to any interest of the plaintiff. The Flat was owned at all times only by the first defendant and the second defendant, both at law and in equity.
- [119]
[119] Category (g) requires the following conditions to be satisfied: (a) that T and B share a common intention that the beneficial interest in a property is to be shared; and (b) B relies to his detriment on this common intention (see Lai Hoon Woon (executor and trustee of the estate of Lai Thai Lok, deceased) v Lai Foong Sin and another [2016] SGHC 113 at [141]; Sumoi Paramesvaeri v Fleury, Jeffrey Gerard and another [2016] 5 SLR 302 (“Sumoi”) at [62]). The common intention in (a) may be express or inferred (Chan Yuen Lan v See Fong Mun [2014] 3 SLR 1048 at [160(b)] and [160(f)]). If these conditions are satisfied, equity will not permit T to exercise her rights in the property in a manner which is inconsistent with T’s and B’s common intention. The plaintiff does not allege that there was any common intention as between her and the first defendant. The plaintiff did not at any time act in reliance on any common intention as between her and the first defendant. The plaintiff relied only on (as I have found) her faith in the second defendant as her de facto husband. There being no common intention, the issue of detriment does not even arise.
- [120]
[120] The first defendant’s conduct at any time, including in May 2019, does not come within any of the categories of unconscionability which equity has recognised by accretion of judicial decision as giving rise to an institutional constructive trust. Further, none of these categories can be developed incrementally or by analogy to encompass the first defendant’s conduct in a way which is consistent with the policy imperative for rights in property to be stable and for the law to allocate and alter those rights only in a manner which is transparent, consistent and predictable.
- [121]
[121] I therefore hold that the first defendant did not become an institutional constructive trustee for the plaintiff as the plaintiff alleges or at all.
No unconscionability in the general sense
- [122]
[122] In case I am wrong in this, I find also that the first defendant did not behave in any way which was unconscionable in the general sense.
No unconscionability in resiling from statements
- [123]
[123] The plaintiff’s case on her first ground of unconscionability in the general sense proceeds as follows. On five occasions the first defendant made statements expressly: (a) acknowledging that the two cashier’s orders were the plaintiff’s property; (b) confirming either that she was not entitled to retain $205,359.80 out of the net proceeds of sale or that she was obliged to return $205,359.80 to the plaintiff out of the net proceeds of sale.
(a) First, when the first defendant commenced the divorce proceedings, she filed a Case Statement in the Syariah Court under r 9(3) of the Muslim Marriage and Divorce Rules (2001 Rev Ed). In the Case Statement, she proposed that the Flat be sold and that second defendant be “refunded” $205,359.80 out of the net proceeds of sale. The plaintiff and the second defendant rely on this as an admission by the first defendant that she was not entitled to retain $205,359.80 out of the net proceeds of sale and was obliged to return it, albeit to the second defendant instead of to the plaintiff.
(b) Second, the first defendant asked the plaintiff directly in 2017 if she had given the two cashier’s orders to the second defendant. The plaintiff confirmed that she had. The plaintiff’s case is that the first defendant then told the plaintiff that the first defendant intended to return $205,359.80 to the plaintiff, albeit without specifying the manner or time it would be returned. The first defendant’s account is consistent with this but adds that the first defendant also told the plaintiff that, before returning the money, she would deduct certain sums which she claimed that the second defendant owed to her.
(c) Third, in April 2018, at the first hearing in the divorce proceedings, the first defendant volunteered to the Syariah Court that the money she had used to discharge the HDB’s charge on the Flat had in fact come from the plaintiff.
(d) Fourth, in May 2019, after the plaintiff had secured leave to intervene in the divorce proceedings by consent, the first defendant filed an affidavit opposing the second defendant’s variation application. In that affidavit, the first defendant acknowledged that the $205,359.80 did not belong to the first defendant and confirmed her intention to return $205,359.80 to the plaintiff:
- [124]
[124] Despite making these express statements, including in the first defendant’s May 2019 affidavit, she claimed in that very same affidavit to be entitled to set off substantial sums against the $205,359.80 (see [123(b)] above) leaving only $53,653.80 to be returned to the plaintiff. This, the plaintiff submits, is unconscionable in the general sense and constitutes the first defendant an institutional constructive trustee of $205,359.80 for the plaintiff.
- [125]
[125] I do not accept that the first defendant behaved unconscionably in taking the position that she did in May 2019. I say that for three reasons.
- [126]
[126] First, the plaintiff does not allege that any of statements on any of these five occasions was made fraudulently. The plaintiff therefore accepts that each statement was made honestly in the sense that the statement reflected accurately the first defendant’s true intention at the time she made the statement.
- [127]
[127] Second, none of these statements rises to the level of a promise to the plaintiff. A promise is a bilateral statement of intention as to future conduct expressed by a promisor to a promisee: see The Law of Contract in Singapore (Andrew Phang Boon Leong gen ed) (Academy Publishing, 2012) at paras 03.021 and 04.001. None of these statements satisfies that test. None of them is: (a) an express or implied representation that the first defendant’s intention would never change; or (b) an express or implied undertaking to carry out that intention in the future. It cannot be unconscionable in a general sense, and thereby give rise to an institutional constructive trust, for T to act contrary to a statement of intent which was not made fraudulently, and which does not rise to the level of a promise. To hold otherwise would subvert the entire fabric of the law of obligations.
- [128]
[128] Third, the result is the same even if I take the plaintiff’s case at its highest and construe these statements as the first defendant’s irrevocable and unqualified promises to return $205,359.80 to the plaintiff in full. First of all, the plaintiff did not in any way rely on these presumed promises to her detriment. The only detriment which the plaintiff ever suffered was suffered in 2015, when she handed the two cashier’s orders to the second defendant. In suffering that detriment, as I have found, she was induced by and relied only on her faith in the second defendant as her de facto husband. The plaintiff could not, in 2015, have relied to her detriment in any way on these presumed promises made in 2019. Nor did the plaintiff give any consideration in 2019 for these presumed promises. A breach of a promise made by T which is unsupported by consideration, or at the very least which does not induce detrimental reliance, cannot be sufficient unconscionability to constitute T a constructive trustee for B. Once again, to hold otherwise would subvert the entire fabric of the law of obligations.
- [129]
[129] Separately, the first defendant’s breach in May 2019 of a promise to return $205,359.80 to the plaintiff cannot give rise to a constructive trust. The plaintiff handed the two cashier’s orders to the second defendant in 2015. He handed them to the first defendant in 2015. She deposited them into her CPF account in accordance with the common intention of the second defendant and the plaintiff. There is no unconscionability in the general sense in the first defendant claiming to be entitled to return only $53,653.80 in May 2019 even if I assume that she promised to return $205,359.80 in full to the plaintiff at some time before that.
No unconscionability after the first defendant learned the truth
- [130]
[130] The alternative way in which the plaintiff puts her case on unconscionability is that the first defendant acted unconscionably when she insisted in May 2019 on retaining $205,359.80, even in part, with knowledge that the plaintiff was the source of the two cashier’s orders.
- [131]
[131] The plaintiff relies on the case of Chase Manhattan Bank NA v Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd [1981] 1 Ch 105 (“Chase Manhattan") as authority for the proposition that equity will impose a constructive trust where: (a) property is transferred absent a mistake by the transferor or fraud by the transferee; and (b) the transferee later makes a gratuitous promise to return said property but reneges. The plaintiff’s submission is entirely misconceived. In my judgment, Chase Manhattan (assuming it is good law, a point which I explore later), stands for the more limited proposition that if B transfers property to T under a factual mistake and T knows of the mistake but retains the property, T will be a constructive trustee of the property for B: see Lynton Tucker, Nicholas Le Poidevin & James Brightwell, Lewin on Trusts (Sweet & Maxwell, 20th Ed, 2020) (“Lewin”) at para 8-028.
- [132]
[132] In Chase Manhattan, B made a duplicate payment to T by mistake. T became aware of or ought to have become aware of the mistake but took no steps to return the duplicate payment to B (at 115). T then went into insolvent liquidation. B brought an action against T seeking to trace and recover the duplicate payment. On these facts, Goulding J held that T was a constructive trustee of the duplicate payment for B on the basis that “a person who pays money to another under a factual mistake retains an equitable property in it and the conscience of that other is subjected to a fiduciary duty to respect his proprietary right” (at 119).
- [133]
[133] Chase Manhattan does not support the plaintiff’s case for two reasons.
- [134]
[134] First, the plaintiff did not make any payment to the first defendant. She handed the cashier’s orders to the second defendant. In that sense, she made a payment to the second defendant and only to the second defendant. It was the second defendant who made the payment to the first defendant. It cannot be said that the second defendant was acting as the plaintiff’s agent in procuring the two cashier’s orders and handing them to the first defendant. It was the second defendant who conceived the entire plan which has led to this dispute. He was at all times acting as principal, not agent.
- [135]
[135] Second, even if I were to treat the second defendant as being merely the plaintiff’s agent, the fact remains that the plaintiff was not labouring under any mistake when she handed the cashier’s orders to the second defendant. Whether B is labouring under a mistake must be determined by reference to B’s state of mind and the state of facts or the law at the time at which B made the transfer (see also Tang Hang Wu, Principles of the Law of Restitution in Singapore (Academy Publishing, 2019) (“Law of Restitution in Singapore”) at para 04.011). Lord Hope made this very point in Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council [1999] 2 AC 349 at 409:
Although Lord Hope made these remarks in analysing mistake as an unjust factor in the law of unjust enrichment, this must also be the basis for analysing mistake for the purpose of establishing a constructive trust. If unjust enrichment does not afford B a personal remedy for a mistake, it would be surprising if equity were to provide B a proprietary remedy for the very same mistake.
- [136]
[136] I have found that the plaintiff knew the second defendant’s plan when she handed the two cashier’s orders to him. And the second defendant acted entirely in accordance with that plan in handing the two cashier’s orders to the first defendant. And the first defendant acted entirely in accordance with that plan by depositing the two cashier’s orders into her CPF account and by using part of the proceeds to repay the HDB Loan in full. What motivated the plaintiff to hand the two cashier’s orders to the second defendant was her faith in the second defendant, that he would do the right thing and return $205,359.80 to her by some unspecified means and at some unspecified time in the future.
- [137]
[137] Chase Manhattan does not support the plaintiff’s submission that the first defendant holds $205,359.80 for her as an institutional constructive trustee, because she behaved unconscionably after learning that the plaintiff was the true source of the two cashier’s orders.
No admission
- [138]
[138] Finally, I do not accept that any of the statements made by the first defendant and which I have summarised above amounts to an admission that either: (a) the two cashier’s orders and their proceeds were not the first defendant’s property when she received and used them in 2015; or (b) the two cashier’s orders or their proceeds (or indeed, their traceable proceeds) were the plaintiff’s property in 2018 or today.
- [139]
[139] The proprietary consequences of the second defendant’s plan are all questions of law. No “admission” on this question of law by either party carries any weight in the purely legal analysis which is necessary to determine these questions of law.
Conclusion
- [140]
[140] For all of these reasons, I reject the plaintiff’s submission that the first defendant holds $205,359.80, or any part of it, on an institutional constructive trust for the plaintiff. This claim is dismissed.
Issue 2: Remedial constructive trust
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