General Division of the High Court · Decided 14 September 2022
DMX Technologies Group Ltd (in liquidation) v Deloitte & Touche LLP (George, Richard John Weir and another, non-parties)
Feedback & support[2022] SGHC 218 · Case no. Suit No 920 of 2017 (Registrar’s Appeal No 254 of 2022) · 38 paragraphs
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Official text from eLitigation
- [1]
[1] The appellants are partners of Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (“Deloitte HK”). They are the non-parties to the underlying suit commenced by the plaintiff, DMX Technologies Group Ltd, against the defendant, Deloitte & Touche LLP (“Deloitte SG”). The plaintiff is the respondent in this appeal. This is their appeal against the learned Assistant Registrar’s (“the AR”) decision not to set aside the orders granting leave to the respondent to serve applications for non-party discovery on them. This decision was made in the appellants’ earlier applications in Summons No 2153 of 2022 (“Summons 2153”) and Summons No 2154 of 2022 (“Summons 2154”).
- [2]
[2] After hearing the parties on 5 September 2022 and taking some time to consider the matter, I allow the appeal with respect to Summons 2153 but dismiss the appeal with respect to Summons 2154. As the appeal raises an unexplored question on the applicable test to determine if leave should be granted to serve a summons on a non-party out of jurisdiction pursuant to O 11 r 8 of the Rules of Court (2014 Rev Ed) (“ROC 2014”), I set out the detailed reasons for my decision in this judgment.
Background
- [3]
[3] By way of background, these are the relevant parties. The respondent is a Bermuda-incorporated company in the business of providing networking, security, and software solutions. In the underlying case, the defendant was the appointed auditor for the respondent between the financial years of 2011 and 2013 (“the Relevant Audit Years”). For each of those audit years, the defendant was engaged to audit the respondent’s and its subsidiaries’ consolidated financial statements (“the Audit”). As I mentioned above, the non-parties, who are the appellants in the present appeal, are both partners in Deloitte HK. The first non-party, Mr Richard John Weir George (“Mr George”), is a partner in Deloitte HK and the Reputation and Risk Leader of Deloitte China (including Deloitte HK). His duties include overseeing quality and risk management across Deloitte China’s multi-disciplinary practice. The second non-party, Ms Tse Fung Chun (“Ms Tse”), is also a partner in Deloitte HK. She was the audit partner having overall responsibility for the conduct of the Audit for the financial year 2011.
- [4]
[4] In October 2017, the respondent commenced Suit 920 of 2017 against the defendant for allegedly acting in breach of duties owed to the respondent in contract and in tort. These breaches had allegedly come about in the planning, preparing, and/or conducting the audit of the respondent’s consolidated financial statements for the Relevant Audit Years and/or in the making of the subsequent audit report. While Deloitte HK (which is a separate and independent firm from the defendant) was a component auditor for certain parts of the Audit, the respondent has expressly confirmed that it does not intend to assert any claim against Deloitte HK or the appellants.
- [6]
[6] In response to being served in Hong Kong, Mr George filed his reply affidavit on 4 October 2021, in which he stated that he was not involved in the Audit. The respondent then explained in its rejoinder affidavit that it thought that the partners with overall responsibility for the Audit in the Relevant Audit Years, being Mr Martin Hills and Ms Tse, were no longer partners of Deloitte HK. As such, the respondent was not able to file the discovery application against them but chose Mr George as he remains a partner of Deloitte HK.
The relevant issues
- [9]
[9] While the present appeal is by way of a rehearing, I am grateful to the AR’s clear summary of the grounds supporting her decision, from which I can discern the relevant issues before me. The AR gave the following reasons for dismissing Summons 2153 and Summons 2154:
(b) In relation to both Mr George’s and Ms Tse’s submission that the correct test which should have been applied in the First Leave Application and the Second Leave Application (collectively, “the Leave Applications”) is the “close connection test” as set out in the decision of the Court of Appeal in Burgundy Global Exploration Corp v Transocean Offshore International Ventures Ltd and another appeal [2014] 3 SLR 381 (“Burgundy”), the AR decided that that test was not applicable outside of the fact situation in Burgundy itself. However, even if the close connection test were applied in the present case, the AR held that there would be a proper basis for the court to assume jurisdiction over the appellants. As such, the AR did not set aside the Service Orders.
- [10]
[10] Accordingly, there are two issues to be decided in the present appeal:
(b) Second, which applies to both Mr George and Ms Tse, whether the Service Orders should be set aside because the applicable legal test for leave to serve the discovery applications on them in Hong Kong has not been met.
- [11]
[11] It is the second of these issues that raises the unexplored question of the applicable test to determine if leave should be granted to serve a summons on a non-party out of jurisdiction pursuant to O 11 r 8 of the ROC 2014. I turn to consider each issue in turn.
Whether the First Service Order (against Mr George) should be set aside for non-disclosure of a material fact
Overview
- [12]
[12] The first issue relating to the non-disclosure of a material fact is only relevant to Mr George’s appeal against the decision in Summons 2153. Mr George’s case is that the respondent had failed to disclose the fact that he was not involved at all in the Audit.
Whether the non-disclosure was of a material fact
The parties’ arguments
- [14]
[14] I turn to the first point of disagreement, which is whether the fact of Mr George’s non-involvement in the Audit is a material one. Mr George’s case is that this fact is material because the court deciding whether to grant leave to serve out of jurisdiction would undoubtedly have considered relevant facts such as the recipient’s connection to the underlying claim. As such, Mr George argues that his lack of involvement in the underlying dispute is something that the court would have considered to be relevant and even determinative of whether leave should be granted to serve out of jurisdiction.
My decision: the non-disclosure was of a material fact
- [16]
[16] In my judgment, the fact of Mr George’s non-involvement in the Audit is a material one. The starting point is the High Court decision of Bahtera Offshore (M) Sdn Bhd v Sim Kok Beng and another [2009] 4 SLR(R) 365, where it was held (at [23]) that material facts are those which a court should consider in making its decision. Further, whether a fact is a material one depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and the relief sought.
- [17]
[17] Applying this test, I disagree with the respondent’s argument. It seems clear that Mr George’s non-involvement in the Audit would be a fact that a court would consider relevant when making its decision whether to grant leave to serve the discovery application out of jurisdiction. While the respondent’s argument – that this fact was only relevant to the discovery application proper, but not to the application for leave to serve the application out of jurisdiction – appeared superficially attractive, it is inconsistent with a common-sense approach that the courts take in assessing materiality. Applying this approach, I find that Mr George’s non-involvement is a material fact.
Whether the First Service Order should be set aside for non-disclosure of such a material fact
The parties’ arguments
My decision: the First Service Order should be set aside for non-disclosure of such a material fact
- [23]
[23] First, while it is not necessary for me to find that the respondent’s non-disclosure was deliberate, I am of the view that the respondent should have taken care to disclose the material fact of Mr George’s non-involvement in the Audit. In other words, while I do not necessarily think that the respondent was intentionally withholding material facts from the court, I do find that it was at the very least being inadvertent in not disclosing that fact concerning Mr George. Although this may not amount to bad faith on the respondent’s part, I do not think the respondent can also claim to be wholly innocent.
- [24]
[24] The starting point in this regard is that the duty to make full and frank disclosure is an onerous one. Therefore, a party may be found to have breached this duty even if it had not acted in bad faith (see the High Court decisions of Lakshmi Anil Salgaocar v Hadley James Chilton and others [2018] 5 SLR 725 (“Lakshmi”) at [100] and 6DM (S) Pte Ltd v AE Brands Korea Ltd and others and another matter [2022] 3 SLR 1300 at [121]). Of course, if a party had deliberately withheld facts from the court, then it would certainly be found to have breached this duty. In my judgment, Mr George has not shown that the respondent’s non-disclosure was deliberate. I do not think that such a serious finding can be reached by simply comparing the two affidavits filed by the respondent in the Leave Applications. It seems a bit of a stretch to say that the respondent was deliberately withholding information just because it had disclosed favourable facts in one affidavit but not the other. Be that as it may, as cases such as Lakshmi show, there is no need for me to find that the respondent’s non-disclosure was deliberate to find that it had breached the duty to make full and frank disclosure. In my judgment, the respondent had, at the very least, been careless in not disclosing the fact of Mr George’s non-involvement in the Audit. Indeed, a reasonable applicant in the respondent’s position ought to have known that the fact of Mr George’s non-involvement in the Audit would be a highly relevant factor for the court hearing the ex parte leave application to consider. Thus, I do not think that the respondent can brush aside any responsibility by simply saying that it thought that this fact was not relevant to the First Leave Application.
Whether the Service Orders (against Mr George and Ms Tse) should be set aside for not meeting the applicable legal test for leave to serve out of jurisdiction on a non-party
The parties’ arguments
- [29]
[29] The appellants’ primary point is that the applicable test to determine if leave should be granted to serve a summons on a non-party out of jurisdiction is whether the person on whom service is sought is “so closely connected to the substantive claim that the Singapore Court is justified in taking jurisdiction over him”. The appellants derive support for this “close connection test” through the Court of Appeal decision of Burgundy. In this connection, the appellants also argue that, contrary to the respondent’s arguments before the AR, there is no legal basis to apply O 11 r 1 of the ROC 2014 in determining the leave applications, and that O 11 r 8 is the correct rule to apply as the discovery applications are summonses and not originating processes. Finally, the appellants argue that the respondent has failed the close connection test because it has not shown how the appellants are so closely connected to the substantive claim to justify the Singapore court exercising jurisdiction over them.
My decision: only the First Service Order (against Mr George) should be set aside for not meeting the close connection test for leave to serve out of jurisdiction on a non-party
The relevant provisions in the ROC 2014
- [32]
[32] I turn first to consider the relevant provisions in the ROC 2014. The respondent’s Leave Applications against the appellants were both purportedly made pursuant to O 11 r 8 of the ROC 2014, read with O 11 r 1(c), r 1(e), r 1(f)(i) and/or r 1(p). In this regard, O 11 r 8 provides as follows:
In my view, the respondent’s Leave Applications against the appellants were correctly made pursuant to O 11 r 8. This is because the discovery applications are summonses that fall within the processes referred to in O 11 r 8(1).
- [33]
[33] In Singapore Civil Procedure 2021 vol 1 (Cavinder Bull gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 2021) (“White Book”) at para 11/8/1, the learned authors explain that O 11 r 8 relates to service of processes other than notices, originating or interlocutory, “on persons, such as third parties … who are necessary respondents to proceedings or on which further proceedings are to be based, or on which jurisdiction is sought to be found over persons abroad”. The White Book continues to explain that the main thrust of O 11 r 8 is that “leave is always required for service of documents, made in the course of any proceedings out of Singapore, save that no further leave is required for service of any document for which leave to serve the originating process in that matter has already been obtained beforehand”. Indeed, the Court of Appeal in the recent case of Shee See Kuen and others v PT Trikomsel Oke Tbk and another matter [2022] SGCA 27 had occasion to consider that applications which are, in form, commenced by an originating summons but are in substance interlocutory summonses, come within the ambit of O 11 r 8(1) (at [20]).
- [34]
[34] However, what is unclear is the test to be applied in determining whether to grant such leave to serve a summons out of jurisdiction, especially in relation to non-parties. In this regard, O 11 r 8(2) does provide that “Rule 2 shall, so far as applicable, apply in relation to application for the grant of leave under this Rule”. O 11 r 2 provides as follows:
The applicable test is not based on the grounds in O 11 r 1
- [35]
[35] I pause here to address the appellants’ procedural point that the respondent had wrongly relied on the grounds contained in O 11 r 1 as being, in effect, the applicable test in determining whether to grant leave to serve a summons on a non-party out of jurisdiction pursuant to O 11 r 8(1). In this regard, a plain reading of O 11 r 2 shows it is not meant to apply wholesale to an application for leave under O 11 r 8. This is because O 11 r 2 is expressly stated to refer to O 11 r 1, which concerns the service of originating processes out of Singapore. Therefore, as the appellants rightly argue, O 11 r 1, and the grounds therein, cannot apply in the present case because O 11 r 1 deals with the service of an originating process out of jurisdiction, whereas the discovery applications are summonses.
- [36]
[36] It must follow that the respondent’s argument before the AR (which it also made before me), that the grounds in O 11 r 1 are somehow engaged in the present case by virtue of O 11 r 8(2), is misplaced. More specifically, as I understand it, the respondent argues that the “grounds” referred to in O 11 r 2(1)(a) – O 11 r 2 being made applicable by the reference to it in O 11 r 8(2) – refer to the “grounds” in O 11 r 1. However, not only does a plain reading of O 11 r 1 show that it is concerned with the service of an originating process and not a summons out of jurisdiction, a more considered reading of the grounds within O 11 r 1 shows that they cannot apply to the service of a summons out of jurisdiction. This is because these grounds are all crafted with the service of an originating process in mind.
- [37]
[37] To explain, I take as examples the very grounds that the respondent purportedly relies on. To begin with, all these grounds, r 1(c), r 1(e), r 1(f)(i), and r 1(p), commence with the words “the claim is”. This clearly shows that they are meant to apply to a substantive claim brought about by an originating process, as opposed to a mere application made through a summons. Moreover, those grounds from O 11 r 1 cannot sensibly apply to a summons. For example, r 1(e) refers to the claim being brought in respect of a breach of contract – this clearly relates to a substantive claim and cannot sensibly be thought to apply to a discovery application which, by itself, is not a claim. Finally, O 11 r 8(2) is also clear that O 11 r 2 shall apply only “so far as applicable” to an application for leave under O 11 r 8. This must mean that the drafters of the ROC 2014 recognise that O 11 r 2 cannot be taken to import wholesale the grounds in O 11 r 1 to such an application under O 11 r 8. I therefore agree with the appellants that the more sensible reading of O 11 r 8(2) is that it imports the procedural requirements of O 11 r 2 but not the grounds in O 11 r 1 (see also the Hong Kong Court of First Instance decision of A & Anor v C [2007] HKCU 1340 at [5]).
- [38]
[38] For all these reasons, I dismiss the respondent’s argument that the grounds in O 11 r 1 are engaged in an application for leave under O 11 r 8(1). In my view, the applicable test to determine if leave should be granted to serve a summons on a non-party out of jurisdiction cannot be based on the grounds set out in O 11 r 1. However, while the appellants argue that the respondent’s reliance on the grounds found in O 11 r 1 is misplaced, I do not think that the respondent’s application can be dismissed for this reason alone. This is because the respondent did correctly provide that its applications were premised on O 11 r 8. It has also advanced grounds to support its application that, while replicating the grounds in O 11 r 1 (and hence in reliance of O 11 r 1), can also be regarded as independent grounds on their own. In other words, it is possible to regard the respondent’s grounds as identical to those as described in O 11 r 1 but not pursuant to O 11 r 1. Accordingly, I disagree with the appellants that I should set aside the service orders on the procedural basis that the respondent had wrongly relied on O 11 r 1. It may well turn out these grounds premised on those in O 11 r 1 are insufficient to support the respondent’s Leave Applications. But that is a question of substance rather than procedure, and I do not set aside the Service Orders on this procedural point. Returning then to the question of the applicable test to determine if leave should be granted to serve a summons on a non-party out of jurisdiction, if it is not based on the grounds in O 11 r 1, what is it?
The applicable test is the close connection test
- [39]
[39] In my view, the applicable test to determine if leave should be granted to serve a summons on a non-party out of jurisdiction pursuant to O 11 r 8(1) is the close connection test laid down in Burgundy. For reasons that I will explain, I do not consider the Court of Appeal in Burgundy to have restricted the close connection test only to EJD orders.
(1) The Court of Appeal’s formulation of the close connection test in Burgundy
- [40]
[40] I start with the Court of Appeal’s formulation of the close connection test in Burgundy. In that case, Transocean had obtained summary judgment against Burgundy in a contractual claim for over US$105m. Transocean then obtained EJD orders against the directors of Burgundy. While the directors were resident in the Philippines, Transocean did not apply for leave under O 11 r 8(1) to serve the EJD orders out of jurisdiction. After several unsuccessful attempts to serve the EJD orders on the directors in the Philippines, Transocean obtained leave to effect substituted service of those orders by serving them on Burgundy’s Singapore lawyers. Among other arguments, Burgundy argued that the EJD orders could not be served out of jurisdiction on a foreign company director.
- [41]
[41] In this context, the Court of Appeal held that O 11 r 8(1) did not allow a party to serve EJD orders out of jurisdiction without first obtaining leave. More specifically, the court also held that the 1991 amendment which added the clause “but leave shall not be required in any proceedings in which leave for service of the originating process has already been granted” to O 11 r 8(1) was not intended to allow a party to serve summonses, notices, or orders out of jurisdiction without first obtaining leave specifically to serve the process on non-parties, even if it related to the substantive proceedings for which leave to serve on the parties had already been obtained (see Burgundy at [105]). Rather, the court explained that the 1991 amendment was meant to eliminate duplicative applications for leave (at [105]):
- [42]
[42] Importantly for present purposes, the court explained that this rationale does not apply to a non-party to the proceedings. This is because the basis for exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction against such a party has not yet been established. Thus, the court said that “[i]f leave for overseas service had not previously been granted in respect of an individual or entity that is not a party to the suit, then leave would need to be sought afresh under O 11 r 8(1) for service out of the jurisdiction on that individual” (at [107]).
- [43]
[43] The Court of Appeal then turned to the substantive question of whether leave should be retrospectively granted under O 2 r 1(2) for Transocean to serve the EJD orders out of jurisdiction. The court outlined its reasoning in two important paragraphs that warrant quotation substantively (at [111] and [112]):
The italicised words form the basis of the appellants’ submission that the applicable test to determine if leave should be granted to serve a summons on a non-party out of jurisdiction is whether the person on whom service is sought is “so closely connected to the substantive claim that the Singapore Court is justified in taking jurisdiction over him”.
(2) The Court of Appeal in Burgundy intended to lay down a test of general application
- [44]
[44] Reduced to its essence, the parties’ disagreement is whether the Court of Appeal in Burgundy intended to lay down a test of general application, or whether it intended only to state a test that specifically applied to EJD orders only. In my judgment, while the court was specifically concerned with the grant of leave to serve EJD orders out of jurisdiction, its concerns extended beyond this specific context. I say this for the following reasons.
- [45]
[45] First, the Court of Appeal was clearly setting out a general concern about the constraints that should govern the exercise of jurisdiction over a non-party overseas. In this regard, the court was concerned, in relation to EJD orders, whether invocation of the court’s personal jurisdiction over the non-party concerned is “anterior to the further question of whether this will ultimately entail the exercise of exorbitant substantive jurisdiction to an impermissible degree” (at [111]). The danger of exercising exorbitant substantive jurisdiction is not a concern that applies only to EJD orders. Rather, it applies to all or most of the processes that come under O 11 r 8(1). Thus, as Hoffmann J put it in the English High Court decision of Mackinnon v Donaldson, Lufkin and Jenrette Securities Corporation and others [1986] 2 WLR 453 (“Mackinnon”), albeit in the context of a subpoena to produce documents, “a state should refrain from demanding obedience to its sovereign authority by foreigners in respect of their conduct outside the [j]urisdiction”. As such, I am of the view that the Court of Appeal in Burgundy was setting out a general concern about an overreach in the exercise of its extraterritorial jurisdiction particularly over non-parties. This general concern was addressed by the close connection test formulated therein. As such, this shows that the close connection test is meant to apply generally to the processes (or more narrowly, summonses) referred to in O 11 r 8(1), and not restricted only to EJD orders.
- [47]
[47] Third, while the Court of Appeal in Burgundy set out two tentative points in relation to how the close connection test is to be applied to EJD orders, that did not mean it was restricting the close connection to such orders only. Rather, in my view, the court was contextualising the general close connection test to this specific situation involving EJD orders. It would otherwise be an inelegant situation if the court is taken to have established a test for EJD orders under O 11 r 8(1) but left open the formulation of different tests for different processes (or more narrowly, summonses) in relation to non-parties that can possibly come within the rule. That would be too messy and run counter to the general concern that the court in Burgundy was addressing, which was that of exorbitant substantive jurisdiction.
- [48]
[48] For all these reasons, I am of the view that the Court of Appeal in Burgundy had laid down the close connection test as a general test to be applied in an application for leave under O 11 r 8(1) in relation to non-parties. For present purposes, I do not need to decide the broader point of whether this test applies to all processes under O 11 r 8(1) since I am only concerned with its application to summonses. Accordingly, to put it more specifically, the applicable test to apply for the court to determine if leave should be granted to serve a summons on a non-party out of jurisdiction is whether the person on which service is sought is so closely connected to the substantive claim that the Singapore court is justified in taking jurisdiction over him. The application of this close connection test is context specific. This can be seen from the Court of Appeal’s careful (if tentative) outline of the relevant concerns in relation to EJD orders. Thus, the extent of the close connection required in each case will depend on the nature of the summons being served on the non-party. Above all, the overarching concern addressed by the close connection test is to avoid the over-extension of the Singapore courts’ extraterritorial jurisdiction on a non-party.
- [49]
[49] While not relevant in the present case, I should mention that the relevant test to determine if leave should be granted to serve a summons on a non-party out of jurisdiction remains relevant in O 8 r 1(4) of the new Rules of Court 2021 (“ROC 2021”). O 8 r 1(4) of the ROC 2021 contemplates that the court’s approval “is not required for service of court documents other than the originating process if the [c]ourt’s approval has been granted for service of the originating process out of Singapore”. This appears to contemplate the alternative situation where approval has not been granted, which would then raise the question of what the applicable test to govern the court’s grant of approval should be.
(3) The close connection test is consistent with the approach in other jurisdictions
- [51]
[51] The present civil procedure regime in the UK does not map neatly onto Singapore’s ROC 2014, but the closest analogue is found in r 6.38(1) of the CPR (as introduced by the Civil Procedure (Amendment) Rules 2008 (SI 2008/2178)). I reproduce the relevant portion here:
- [53]
[53] Turning then to the position in Hong Kong, in Changfeng Shipping Holdings Ltd v Sinoriches Enterprises Co Ltd [2020] HKCFI 2703 (“Changfeng Shipping”), the Hong Kong Court of First Instance laid down the principles applicable to service out of jurisdiction of examination orders on officers of corporate judgment debtors pursuant to O 48 r 1 and O 11 r 9(4) of the Rules of the High Court (Cap 4A) (HK). Deputy High Court Judge To held that Burgundy was thought to be authoritative due to similarities in the service out regimes in Hong Kong and Singapore (at [14]). The learned judge then applied the Singapore approach (at [22]–[23]) as follows:
- [55]
[55] Second, Deputy High Court Judge To did not accept that the discretion to exercise jurisdiction should be sparingly exercised (see Changfeng Shipping at [28]). In this regard, the learned judge held that while special care should be taken in exercising long-arm jurisdiction, the Hong Kong courts have always taken a robust approach. They should therefore continue to adopt a pragmatic, instead of an unnecessarily restrictive approach, given the internationalisation of commercial activities in the jurisdiction (at [31]).
- [56]
[56] From the above, the broader point is that the approach taken in Burgundy has been endorsed by the Hong Kong courts in Changfeng Shipping. Despite the presence of some differences in the formulation of the close connection test, the gist of it is that Changfeng Shipping agreed with the rationale underlying Burgundy, and this bolsters the point that the close connection test is an appropriate test to be applied.
Application to the present case
Conclusion
- [61]
[61] In summary, I allow the appeal in respect of the AR’s decision in Summons 2153 but dismiss the appeal in respect of the AR’s decision in Summons 2154.
- [62]
[62] It remains for me to thank the parties, especially Mr Koh Junxiang, who appeared for the appellants, and Mr See Chern Yang, who appeared for the respondent, for their helpful submissions on what was an unexplored point of law concerning the applicable test to determine if leave should be granted to serve a summons on a non-party out of jurisdiction pursuant to O 11 r 8.