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Grounds publishedDecided 28 Jan 2022

General Division of the High Court

Uday Mehra v L Capital Asia Advisors and others

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[2022] SGHC 23Case no. Suit No 242 of 2016

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  1. Introduction

  2. [2] The plaintiff now brings this action against the defendants seeking damages for: (a) failing to pay him his profit share in breach of his employment contract; (b) inducing him to enter into his employment contract by fraudulent misrepresentation; (c) terminating his employment in breach of contract; (d) conspiring to injure him by unlawful means, ie by terminating his employment in breach of contract; (e) failing to pay him a post-termination monthly indemnity in breach of contract; and (f) the stigma loss he has suffered arising from the manner in which his employment contract was terminated.

  3. [3] I dismiss all of the plaintiff’s claims. The first claim is dismissed because it is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the relevant provision of his employment contract. The second claim is dismissed: (a) because the plaintiff has either fabricated or misunderstood the misrepresentations he alleges were made to him; and (b) because even the plaintiff does not believe the allegations of fraud on which this claim rests. The third claim is dismissed because the plaintiff was indeed guilty of insubordination and misconduct justifying summary termination of his employment. The fourth claim is dismissed because it is bereft of particulars and evidence and is completely baseless. The fifth claim is dismissed because the plaintiff failed to comply with an express contractual condition precedent for him to receive the post-termination monthly indemnity. The sixth and final claim is dismissed because there was no breach of any implied term of mutual trust and confidence in the plaintiff’s employment contract.

  4. [5] I now set out my reasons in full.

  5. The parties

  6. [6] The plaintiff was born in India, is a citizen of the Netherlands and resides in the United Kingdom.

  7. [7] The first defendant is the holding company of a group of companies in the business of raising, investing and managing private equity funds. I shall refer to that group of companies as “the LCA Group”. The LCA Group has its head office in Singapore and is managed from Singapore. Member companies of the LCA Group are incorporated in several other jurisdictions, including Mauritius and Hong Kong. The first defendant is incorporated in Mauritius.

  8. [8] The second defendant is a wholly owned subsidiary of the first defendant and therefore a member of the LCA Group. The second defendant is incorporated in Hong Kong.

  9. [9] The third defendant is the founder of the LCA Group. He was, at all material times, the managing partner and chairman of the LCA Group and the managing partner of the first defendant.

  10. [10] The fourth defendant was, at all material times, a senior human resources executive in LVMH Moët Hennessy Louis Vuitton SE (“LVMH”). LVMH is a very large and very successful multinational luxury goods conglomerate headquartered in France.

  11. LVMH and the LCA Group

  12. [11] LVMH is the sole shareholder of the first defendant. It is therefore the ultimate holding company of the LCA Group and its ultimate owner. LVMH is also a sponsor of the LCA Group’s private equity funds and an investor in those funds. LVMH therefore has a multi-tiered economic interest in the performance of the LCA Group and its funds.

  13. [12] LVMH therefore has significant involvement in the LCA Group’s management. That is how the fourth defendant finds himself a defendant in this action. He was never a director or even an employee of the LCA Group. But as a senior human resources executive at LVMH, he participated in the LCA Group’s decision to terminate the plaintiff’s employment. The plaintiff therefore claims that the fourth defendant is a conspirator who participated in a plot to injure the plaintiff by terminating his employment in breach of contract.

  14. Discussions with the LCA Group in June 2011

  15. [13] The possibility of the LCA Group employing the plaintiff arose for the first time in June 2011. That was when an executive search consulting firm known as Spencer Stuart & Associates (Singapore) Pte Ltd (“Spencer Stuart”) approached the LCA Group on behalf of the plaintiff. The plaintiff and the third defendant already knew each other as former colleagues. Spencer Stuart’s approach led to a meeting between the plaintiff and the third defendant in Mumbai.

  16. [14] As a consequence of this meeting, the plaintiff met a senior LVMH executive, also in Mumbai. This senior executive was Mr Daniel Piette, a member of LVMH’s Executive Committee. Part of Mr Piette’s role at LVMH was to oversee LVMH’s direct investment in funds, including those managed by the LCA Group. Mr Piette was therefore the LVMH executive to whom the third defendant then reported. The third defendant then held a position in LVMH concurrently with his position in the LCA Group, as LVMH’s Group President for Southeast Asia.

  17. [15] These meetings led to the LCA Group making a formal offer in June 2011 to employ the plaintiff as its Regional Managing Director of Operations. The plaintiff did not ultimately accept this offer. Instead, in July 2011, he accepted an offer of employment in India with a men’s fashion internet start-up called Zovi.com.

  18. Discussions with the LCA Group in February 2012

  19. [16] Discussions about the plaintiff’s possible employment with the LCA Group resumed in January and February 2012, while plaintiff was still employed by Zovi.com. The result of these discussions was that the LCA Group once again made a formal offer to employ the plaintiff. This time, the plaintiff accepted.

  20. [17] In February 2012, the plaintiff ceased to be an employee of Zovi.com and became an employee of the LCA Group. He remained employed by the LCA Group until June 2015 when, as I have mentioned, his employment was terminated summarily.

  21. [18] Three different members of the LCA Group employed the plaintiff in turn from February 2012 to June 2015 under three different contractual arrangements. Apart from his primary place of work, the material terms of the plaintiff’s employment, including his remuneration package, remained unchanged despite these changes of employer. Given that I have dismissed all of the plaintiff’s claims, it is immaterial which company in the LCA Group was his employer at any given time. For convenience, therefore, I shall refer to the plaintiff’s employer throughout the entire period from February 2012 to June 2015 simply as “the LCA Group”.

  22. The employer/employee relationship breaks down

  23. [19] The third defendant was the plaintiff’s immediate superior officer throughout the plaintiff’s employment by the LCA Group. Their relationship was initially uneventful, apart from the inevitable minor issues.

  24. [20] In August 2014, their relationship came under serious strain. That was when a dispute arose between the plaintiff and the LCA Group about the correct construction of the formula in the plaintiff’s employment contract by which to calculate his entitlement to a share of the profit on the next fund which the LCA Group raised. The dispute festered from August 2014 to May 2015. By June 2015, there had been a complete breakdown in the relationship between employer and employee and between immediate superior and subordinate.

  25. [21] As a result, the LCA Group terminated the plaintiff’s employment summarily for insubordination and misconduct on 29 June 2015. The LCA Group took this step with the knowledge and support of LVMH.

  26. The plaintiff commences this action

  27. [22] The plaintiff now brings this action seeking the following relief against the defendants:

  28. (a) Damages for the LCA Group’s breach of contract in failing to pay him his share of the next fund which it raised. The plaintiff values this claim at US$37.5m.

  29. (c) Damages for terminating the plaintiff’s employment in breach of contract. The plaintiff values this claim at just under US$112,000, being the salary he would have earned during his six-month notice period.

  30. (d) Damages for conspiring to injure the plaintiff by unlawful means, ie by terminating the plaintiff’s employment in breach of contract. The plaintiff values this claim at US$80.99m, being the total of the sums claimed under[22(a)] and [22(c)] above and [22(e)] and [22(f)] below.

  31. (e) Damages for failing to pay the plaintiff a post-termination monthly indemnity due to him under his employment contract. The plaintiff values this claim at just over US$78,000.

  32. (f) Damages for the stigma which is now attached to the plaintiff in the employment market by reason of the LCA Group’s termination of his employment in breach of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence. The plaintiff values this claim at US$43.3m.

  33. [23] The LCA Group rejects all of the plaintiff’s claims in their entirety. I now deal with each of the plaintiff’s claims in turn.

  34. Claim 1: the plaintiff’s profit share

  35. [24] The plaintiff’s first claim is that the LCA Group has failed to pay him his share of the profit on the next fund raised by the first defendant, calculated in accordance with the formula set out in his employment contract. The parties have referred to that next fund as “Fund II”. I shall do the same.

  36. [25] I note in passing that the plaintiff commenced this action even before the LCA Group was obliged to calculate and pay to him his share of Fund II’s profit. In that sense, although the plaintiff does not plead it in this way, his first claim is in substance a claim that the LCA Group committed an anticipatory breach of his employment contract when it refused to accept his construction of the contractual formula. As nothing turns on this point, I need not analyse it further.

  37. Factual background

  38. [26] When the plaintiff commenced his employment in February 2012, the LCA Group had just started raising funds from investors for Fund II. Fund II closed in June 2014 with US$980m raised.

  39. [27] In August 2014, the plaintiff queried the construction of the formula by which his share of the profit on Fund II was to be calculated. The dispute over the proper construction of that formula is the root cause of all of the unhappy events which followed, including this litigation. It is therefore necessary to consider now in more detail the three sets of contractual arrangements under which the LCA Group employed the plaintiff.

  40. [28] From February 2012 to May 2012, the first defendant employed the plaintiff as its Managing Director. I shall refer to this employment contract as “the February 2012 Contract”. From May 2012 to June 2014, the LCA Group’s member company in Mumbai employed the plaintiff. Concurrently, the LCA Group’s member company in Mauritius paid the plaintiff part of his remuneration package under a consultancy agreement with him. I shall refer to these contracts collectively as “the May 2012 Contract”. From June 2014 to June 2015, the second defendant employed the plaintiff as its Managing Director, Operations. I shall refer to this employment contract as “the June 2014 Contract”.

  41. [29] The formula by which the plaintiff’s share of the profit on Fund II was to be calculated was set out expressly in cl 3.1 of the February 2012 Contract.

  42. It is not disputed that Fund II is “the next fund raised by [the first defendant]” within the meaning this clause.

  43. [30] From May 2012, the contractual formula by which the plaintiff’s share of the profit on Fund II was to be calculated is set out in a letter (“the May 2012 Letter”) which accompanied the May 2012 Contract. The language of the May 2012 Letter is identical in all material respects to cl 3.1 of the February 2012 Contract:

  44. [31] The June 2014 Contract is silent on the plaintiff’s entitlement to a share of the profit on Fund II. However, the LCA Group does not argue that the June 2014 Contract extinguished whatever contractual effect the May 2012 Letter might have had with regard to the plaintiff’s share of the profit on Fund II. I therefore proceed on the basis that the May 2012 Letter remained in force as a term of the plaintiff’s employment contract throughout his employment under the June 2014 Contract.

  45. The parties’ cases

  46. [32] The critical phrase in both the February 2012 Contract and the May 2012 Letter is the phrase “2.5% carry”. The plaintiff’s case is that this phrase must be construed in the context of the parties’ prior negotiations and shared understanding at the material time to “represent 2.5% of gross profits”.

  47. [33] In response, the LCA Group raises three broad points:

  48. (a) The May 2012 Letter is not enforceable: (i) because it was at most a mere agreement to agree; (ii) because it lacks sufficient certainty; or (iii) because it was subject to conditions precedent which were never fulfilled.

  49. (b) Even if the May 2012 Letter is enforceable, the plaintiff’s construction of its contractual effect is wrong. The phrase “2.5% carry” refers to 2.5% of the LCA Group’s share of the profit on Fund II and not to 2.5% of what the plaintiff calls the “gross profits” of Fund II.

  50. (c) Even if the plaintiff’s construction is correct, Fund II failed to generate sufficient returns over its lifetime to yield any profit at all, thereby leaving the plaintiff with at best only a claim for nominal damages for breach of contract.

  51. [34] It is convenient to take the final point first.

  52. Fund II did not yield a profit

  53. [35] The plaintiff and his expert both accept that Fund II lost substantial money for its investors. Its net internal rate of return from inception to September 2020, just a few months before trial, was negative 11% per annum. As things stand, it is virtually impossible for Fund II, given the limited time remaining of its lifespan, to recover these losses and generate a profit for investors and the LCA Group. The plaintiff and his expert all but accept this.

  54. [36] I therefore take it that the plaintiff’s share of the profit on Fund II, by whatever formula it may be calculated, is zero. As such, even if I were to decide this first claim entirely in the plaintiff’s favour, he would be entitled only to nominal damages. In that sense, determining the first claim could be said to be of little substantive importance.

  55. The contextual approach

  56. [39] The parties are in agreement that I must construe the phrase “2.5% carry” using the contextual approach. The contextual approach requires me to ascertain the parties’ objective intention at the time they entered into the contract, taking as my starting point the parties’ text and construing that text in light of its context, provided that that context is clear, obvious and known to both parties: Zurich Insurance (Singapore) Pte Ltd v B-Gold Interior Design & Construction Pte Ltd [2008] 3 SLR(R) 1029 at [125], [128]–[129]; Crescendas Bionics Pte Ltd v Jurong Primewide Pte Ltd [2019] SGHC 4 at [104].

  57. The text

  58. [40] I start with the text, ie the phrase “2.5% carry”. Construing this phrase requires me to construe its three aspects: (a) the meaning of “2.5%”; (b) the meaning of “carry”; and (c) the arithmetic relationship between “2.5%” and “carry”.

  59. 2.5%

  60. [41] There can be no dispute as to the meaning of “2.5%”. It is a fraction expressed as a percentage. Expressing a fraction as a percentage is a device to make it easier to compare fractions with different denominators. The symbol “%” indicates merely that the figure preceding it must be divided by one hundred to arrive at the decimal equivalent of the fraction. Expressing 2.5% as a decimal therefore simply requires dividing 2.5 by 100. Thus, 2.5% can be expressed as a decimal and then as an irreducible fraction as follows:

  61. Carry

  62. [43] To make the analysis which follows easier to understand, it is useful now to postulate a highly simplified example adopting the customs and practices in the private equity industry as established at trial by the expert evidence on both sides.

  63. [44] Assume the following. A fund manager proposes a private equity fund to investors. The fund is to have a lifespan of exactly one year. The fund manager is entitled to retain 20% of the fund’s profit at the end of that year. But the fund manager will have no right to retain that 20% unless investors are first repaid 100% of their capital plus a rate of return on that capital at 8% per annum over the lifespan of the fund.

  64. [47] In this example, the total amount which investors receive from the fund on 1 January 2023 is $188 ($100 + $8 + $80). That is equivalent to investors earning a return of 0.88 times their initial investment of $100. This fund would then be said to have generated a multiple of 1.88x for investors. That means that its investors’ total pay-out at the end of the fund’s lifespan ($188) is 1.88 times the capital they paid in on the fund’s inception ($100).

  65. [49] The fund in this example would be said to have generated a carry of $20 for the fund manager. It is customary in the industry in certain contexts to view and refer to the carry as a “carried interest pool” comprising 20 points. In my example, therefore $1 of carry in the fund manager’s hands represents $1 out of $100 or 1% of the fund’s profit. The same $1 is also viewed as representing one point out of 20 points in the carried interest pool, or 5% of the carry. This is what gives rise to the factor of five between the parties’ competing constructions of the phrase “2.5% carry”.

  66. Arithmetic relationship between “2.5%” and “carry”

  67. [50] All that remains now is to construe the arithmetic relationship between “2.5%” and “carry” expressed by the phrase “2.5% carry”. The plaintiff submits that the relationship is one of division. The LCA Group submits that the relationship is one of multiplication. The plaintiff’s construction would, in my example, entitle him to $2.50, leaving $17.50 in the carried interest pool. The LCA Group’s construction, in my example, would entitle him only to $0.50, leaving $19.50 in the carried interest pool.

  68. [51] I have no hesitation in rejecting the plaintiff’s submission. It is a disingenuous and contrived submission, completely divorced from basic arithmetic.

  69. [52] Expressing the plaintiff’s construction as an arithmetic formula yields the following: . On this basis, the plaintiff claims that the phrase “2.5% carry” entitles him to 12.5% of the carry on Fund II. Going back to my example, $2.50 is 2.5% of $100, but is 12.5% of $20.

  70. [53] The LCA Group submits that the plaintiff’s arithmetic is fundamentally flawed in that it is meaningless to calculate the plaintiff’s share by using a ratio of percentages, ie, or . I accept this submission. In fact, the plaintiff’s arithmetic contains three fundamental and related errors, which amount in combination to arithmetic sleight of hand. The first fundamental error is that the operation of multiplication is associative but the operation of division is not. The second fundamental error is that the 20% or by which the plaintiff divides 2.5% or in his arithmetic is not an abstract figure but is a percentage of another number. That in turn implies a multiplication operation which is missing in the plaintiff’s arithmetic. Because division is not associative, that missing multiplication operation means that it is arithmetically wrong as a first step to divide by . The third fundamental error is that that missing number which is to be multiplied by is Fund II’s profit (P), and not Fund II’s carry (C).

  71. [54] Therefore, even if I were to accept the plaintiff’s submission that the phrase “2.5% carry” implies the arithmetical relationship of division between “2.5%” and “carry”, the correct formula to express that construction (bearing in mind that division is not associative and that “carry” is 20% of profit) is As the LCA Group submits, this is arithmetic nonsense. This is also commercial and contractual nonsense. More importantly, this is not the result which the plaintiff himself advocates: or

  72. [55] The plaintiff’s submission in fact amounts to equating the industry term “carry” ($20 in my example) with what he calls “gross profits” (GP) ($100 in my example). That would be expressed arithmetically as follows: But that is not how the plaintiff puts his case: his case is that the arithmetic operation between “2.5%” and “carry” (which he construes to mean “gross profits”) is division, not multiplication. Further, insofar as this submission construes “carry” as being equivalent to “gross profits”, or what I have called simply profit, the expert evidence on both sides is consistent that that is not the meaning of “carry” in the private equity industry. “Carry” means the fund manager’s share of a fund’s profit, customarily 20%, and not the entirety of the fund’s profit.

  73. [56] The alternative is that the plaintiff’s submission amounts to construing the symbol “%” as meaning “points of” such that “2.5% carry” means “2.5 points of carry”. There is no basis for construing the symbol “%” in this way. It denotes, without any ambiguity, a fraction or a ratio and not an absolute number.

  74. [57] In my view, “2.5% carry” is the linguistic equivalent of “2.5% of carry”. The natural reading of the phrase “2.5% carry” is that it holds the word “of”, unstated but understood, between “2.5%” and “carry”. That unstated preposition indicates to me nothing but the arithmetic relationship of multiplication. Thus, in my view, the phrase “2.5% carry” properly construed means that the plaintiff was entitled contractually to 2.5% of the carry on Fund II. That is the arithmetic equivalent of 0.5% of Fund II’s profit: . Thus, in my example, the plaintiff’s share of the carry on this construction would indeed be $0.50, as the LCA Group submits, and not $2.50 as the plaintiff submits.

  75. The expert evidence

  76. [58] The plaintiff called two expert witnesses on different aspects of the private equity industry: Mr Peter Goodson and Mr Frank Carr. Although both experts claimed to support the plaintiff’s arithmetic, both were unable to justify that support under cross-examination. Mr Goodson agreed that, in my example, the phrase “50% carry” would mean $10 and that the phrase “10% carry” would mean $2. He then had to accept that the phrase “2.5% carry” had to mean $0.50 and not $2.50 because “2.5% carry” had to be less than “10% carry”. Mr Carr accepted that, in my example, “2.5% carry” would be $0.50 out of the $20 and that $2.50 out of the $20 would be “2.5 points of carry” and not “2.5% carry”.

  77. [59] The plaintiff’s case amounts to construing the phrase “2.5% carry” as meaning “2.5% of the profit” or “2.5 points out of the carry”. For the reasons I have given, I am satisfied that the text of that phrase construed in accordance with the customs and practices of the private equity industry does not support the plaintiff’s construction. I therefore now turn to consider the context.

  78. The context

  79. [60] There is equally nothing in the context which supports the plaintiff’s construction. Indeed, in my view, the context in fact supports the LCA Group’s construction.

  80. The June 2011 estimate

  81. [61] The LCA Group’s construction of the phrase “2.5% carry” is consistent with an estimate of the plaintiff’s share of the carry of Fund II which Mr Gilbert Ong sent to Spencer Stuart by email in late June 2011. Mr Ong was the LCA Group’s Chief Financial Officer at the material time. Mr Ong’s email is the earliest occasion in the evidence before me on which any of the parties used the phrase “2.5% carry”.

  82. [62] In his estimate, Mr Ong assumed that Fund II, like its predecessor Fund I, would raise US$635.5m from investors and would generate a multiple of 2.5x or 250%. That means that Fund II would earn enough to return 100% of the investors’ capital to them plus an additional 150% of their capital. On those assumptions, he projected that “2.5% carry” would translate to US$4.77m for the plaintiff:

  83. [64] The plaintiff’s own expert, Mr Carr, accepted that, on these assumptions, the estimate of US$4.77m in Mr Ong’s email was an estimate of 2.5% of the carry on Fund II and not an estimate of 2.5% of the “gross profit” or the profit of Fund II.

  84. [65] Mr Ong’s email legitimately forms part of the context against which the phrase “2.5% carry” is to be construed. Although this email was not addressed to the plaintiff, he accepts that he saw this email at that time. It was therefore known to both parties. I further accept that the plaintiff knew Fund I’s size in or around June 2011. The third defendant testified at trial that he had told the plaintiff of Fund I’s size. I accept also that third defendant gave the plaintiff the “full background” on Fund I before the meeting between the plaintiff and Mr Piette in June 2011.

  85. [66] Mr Ong’s estimate of “2.5% carry” and the assumptions underlying it were therefore known to both the LCA Group and to the plaintiff as early as June 2011. All of this is inconsistent with the plaintiff’s case as to context and a “shared understanding” of the meaning of the phrase “2.5% carry” in the May 2012 Letter.

  86. Industry norms

  87. [68] The plaintiff had no private equity experience when he accepted employment with the LCA Group. It is true that he is highly educated and holds a Masters in Business Administration from Insead, a leading international business school. It is also true that he had held very senior executive positions before joining the LCA Group. But it is equally true that his exposure to the private equity industry before then was either purely academic (as part of his business school curriculum) or from the other side (as a senior executive of a private equity fund’s investee company). Further, he had no experience in investing and deal-making.

  88. [69] Further, once the joined the LCA Group, the plaintiff was primarily an operations professional, albeit the most senior one. He had only limited involvement in portfolio management. He was not a sponsor, a founder or an investment professional.

  89. Mr Goodson’s evidence is consistent with this.

  90. [73] I also accept the LCA Group’s submission that the plaintiff’s claim of a 12.5% share of the carry is extremely high, given that three sponsors and 14 or 15 executives in recipient classes higher than the plaintiff’s were all awarded a share of Fund II’s carry. This makes it implausible that the LCA Group would have awarded the plaintiff as much as 12.5% of the carry on Fund II.

  91. The plaintiff’s preference for security over risk

  92. [75] Finally, it is not in dispute that the plaintiff told the third defendant during the precontractual negotiations over his remuneration package that he valued security of future income most. He therefore preferred a higher base salary and a higher bonus target over a higher share of carry. That is why cl 3.1 of the February 2012 Contract weighted the plaintiff’s remuneration package towards salary and bonus rather than carry, giving him a fixed salary of US$400,000 per annum and an annual performance bonus targeting 100% of his fixed salary (see [29] above). The evidence at trial established that the plaintiff’s base remuneration placed him as high as the 75th percentile for executives in the private equity industry in the Asia Pacific region.

  93. [76] All of this is entirely consistent with an award of 2.5% of the carry on Fund II and entirely inconsistent with an award of 12.5% of the carry on Fund II.

  94. No shared understanding

  95. [77] Part of the plaintiff’s case as to the context for interpreting the phrase “2.5% carry” rests on an understanding said to be shared by him and the LCA Group that that phrase would mean “2.5% of the gross profits” of Fund II. As evidence of that shared understanding, the plaintiff points to four representations which the LCA Group made to the plaintiff in 2011 and 2012.

  96. [78] These representations are also central to the plaintiff’s claim in fraudulent misrepresentation. For the reasons set out at [87]–[121] below, I find that the plaintiff misunderstood two of the representations and has testified falsely that the other two representations were made. As those representations were either misunderstood or never made, they are incapable of giving rise to any shared understanding between the plaintiff and the LCA Group which forms any part of the context for construing the phrase “2.5% carry”.

  97. Conclusion on the first claim

  98. [79] For all of these reasons, I reject the plaintiff’s case on the proper construction of the phrase “2.5% carry”. The construction which the LCA Group advances is the correct construction, being consistent with both the text and the context and with industry usages and norms. That being so, there is no scope for the plaintiff to rely on the contra proferentem rule.

  99. [80] The plaintiff had no entitlement under his employment contract to 2.5% of the “gross profits” of Fund II, to 12.5% of the carry on Fund II or to 2.5 points out of the carried interest pool generated by Fund II. That finding suffices to dismiss the plaintiff’s first claim entirely. I therefore need not analyse or determine the first and third of the LCA Group’s three broad points (see [33] above).

  100. Claim 2: fraudulent misrepresentation

  101. [81] The plaintiff’s second claim is that the LCA Group induced him to enter into his employment contract by making fraudulent misrepresentations to him. For the plaintiff to succeed in this claim, he must establish: (a) that the LCA Group made representations to him of fact; (b) that the LCA Group made the representations intending that the plaintiff should act upon them by accepting the LCA Group’s offer of employment; (c) the representations actually induced the plaintiff to accept the LCA Group’s offer of employment; (d) the plaintiff suffered loss and damage as a result of accepting the LCA Group’s offer of employment; and (e) the LCA Group made the representations fraudulently, ie, knowing that they were false or in the absence of genuine belief that they were true: Panatron Pte Ltd and another v Lee Cheow Lee and another [2001] 2 SLR(R) 435 at [14].

  102. The parties’ cases

  103. [82] The plaintiff’s case on fraudulent misrepresentation is as follows. The LCA Group made four representations to him while he was still employed by Zovi.com that, if he accepted employment with the LCA Group, he would be awarded “2.5% of the gross profits of Fund II”. Two of these representations were made in writing and two were made orally:

  104. (a) First, in a phone call in or around June 2011, the third defendant: (i) told the plaintiff that Mr Ong’s email projecting the plaintiff’s share of the profit as US$4.77m (see [62] above) had “misunderstood the plaintiff’s carried interest entitlement”; and (ii) “confirmed that the plaintiff’s carry interest entitlement was 2.5% of the gross profits of Fund II”.

  105. (b) Second, in an email in July 2011, the third defendant told the plaintiff that “[a]nyone joining [Fund II] prior [to the second half of 2012] will get entitled to carry interest from [the] very beginning.” The plaintiff “took this to mean that his carry interest entitlement would be a percentage of gross profits of Fund II”.

  106. (c) Third, in February 2012, the LCA Group sent the first defendant a draft of his employment contract containing a term providing that he would be “awarded 2.5% carry for the next fund raised by the company”. The plaintiff “took this to mean that his carry interest entitlement would be 2.5% of the gross profits of Fund II”.

  107. (d) Finally, when Mr Piette interviewed the plaintiff in February 2012, he represented orally to the plaintiff “that the carried interest would be 2.5% of the gross profit, which on his calculation would amount to USD 37.5 million”.

  108. [84] In response, the LCA Group’s case is as follows. The representations are not actionable, being statements of future intent rather than representations of past or present fact. Even if they are actionable, the representations were never made or are true. Even if the representations were made and are false, the representations did not induce the plaintiff to give up his employment with Zovi.com and to accept employment with the LCA Group. And, even if the representations did induce the plaintiff to do so, he did not suffer any loss or damage as a result, because his share options at Zovi.com were and are worthless.

  109. [85] For the reasons which follow, I reject the plaintiff’s case in fraudulent misrepresentation in its entirety for the following reasons: (a) the written representations were made but are not false; (b) the oral representations were never made, the plaintiff’s account of them being false; (c) the plaintiff’s claim that the LCA Group was fraudulent is contrary to facts he believes to be true; (d) the representations did not induce the plaintiff to give up employment with Zovi.com and to accept employment with the LCA Group; and (e) the plaintiff has failed to establish that he suffered any loss as a result of giving up his employment with Zovi.com to accept employment with the LCA Group.

  110. The representations are either true or were not made

  111. [86] I start by analysing the plaintiff’s pleaded case that the LCA Group made the four representations to him (see [82] above). I deal with the two written representations first before dealing with the two oral representations.

  112. The plaintiff fundamentally misunderstood the two written representations

  113. [87] Given that they are in writing, there can be no doubt that the LCA Group made the two written representations to the plaintiff. But I accept the LCA Group’s submission that the plaintiff fundamentally misunderstood the written representations. Correctly understood, the written representations are not false.

  114. [88] The first written representation simply refers to the plaintiff’s entitlement to “carry” on Fund II from its inception. This representation says nothing about the quantum of his share of the carry. The second written representation says simply that the plaintiff will be “awarded 2.5% carry” on Fund II. It says nothing about what “2.5% carry” means or how it is to be calculated.

  115. [89] The plaintiff claims that he understood both written representations to mean that the LCA Group would award him some part of the “gross profits” of Fund II, not of its “net profits”. According to the plaintiff’s use of the terms “gross profits” and “net profits”, the fund in my example (see [44]–[46] above) generated “gross profits” of $100 and “net profits” of $20. The plaintiff’s case is therefore that he understood the two written representations to mean that he was entitled to 2.5% of the $100 ($2.50) and not to 2.5% of the $20 ($0.50).

  116. [90] But neither of the written representations uses the words “gross” or “profits” or the phrase “gross profits”. This is an objective fact. The plaintiff had no alternative but to accept this fact in cross-examination. He further accepted: (a) that the LCA Group never used any of these words at the material time, whether orally or in writing; and (b) that his pleaded term “gross profits” is merely his own ex post facto subjective and self-engendered understanding of the words which the LCA Group did use, which were “carry” or “carried interest entitlement”:

  117. [91] The phrase “gross profits” is crucial to the plaintiff’s case both in contract and misrepresentation. But his cross-examination revealed the phrase to have no basis in the facts. It is merely a self-serving term which the plaintiff has adopted after the fact for the purposes of pleading and presenting his case.

  118. [92] Further, the concept of “gross profits” was not something which the plaintiff himself understood during the pre-contractual discussions, whether in the sense which he now claims to understand it or in any other sense. As the plaintiff himself candidly accepts, he had no understanding of the deductions that are made by a private equity fund manager “in arriving from gross to net” profits. The plaintiff further accepts that his state of ignorance continued even up to the point when he sat down to draft his affidavit of evidence in chief for this action.

  119. [93] The plaintiff’s use of “gross profits” in pleading and presenting his case is contrived and incorrect. The experts are agreed that it is customary in the private equity industry to refer to what the fund manager retains after he has paid 80% of a fund’s profits to investors as “the carry” or “the carried interest”. These were the only terms which the LCA Group used in its written representations to the plaintiff.

  120. [94] At best, all that the LCA Group represented to the plaintiff in the two written representations is that he would be entitled to 2.5% of the carry on Fund II. At best, and correctly understood, the two representations did not mean that the plaintiff would be entitled to 2.5% of the “gross profits” on Fund II, as the plaintiff has pleaded. Given the plaintiff’s concessions in cross-examination (see [90] and [92] above), he had no basis at that time to understand the written representations as meaning that the LCA Group would pay him 2.5% of Fund II’s profit ($2.50 in my example) and not merely 2.5% of the carry ($0.50 in my example).

  121. [95] I therefore accept the LCA Group’s submission that it was the plaintiff’s own ex post facto misunderstanding of the content of the written representations which has led him to take from these written representations the meaning that he now pleads. That is not the meaning which the representations objectively bear. That objective meaning is the only meaning which the LCA Group intended at the time.

  122. [96] The two written representations, correctly understood, are consistent with my finding as to the proper construction of the phrase “2.5% carry”. The two written representations were therefore not false. They are not misrepresentations.

  123. The LCA Group did not make the oral representations

  124. [97] The plaintiff’s case is that the LCA Group represented to him orally on two occasions that he would be entitled to 2.5% of Fund II’s “gross profits”. The first occasion was allegedly in a phone call with the third defendant which took place in or around June 2011. The second occasion was allegedly at a meeting with Mr Piette in February 2012.

  125. [98] Both the phone call with the third defendant and the meeting with Mr Piette did take place. But both the third defendant and Mr Piette categorically deny making any such representation to the plaintiff on those occasions, or indeed on any other occasion. The third defendant’s evidence is that it is commercial nonsense to promise anyone a share of a private equity fund’s “gross profits”.

  126. [99] I accept the LCA Group’s evidence. For the reasons which follow, I find that neither of them made the alleged oral representations to the plaintiff.

  127. (1) The third defendant did not make the oral representation

  128. [100] In his statement of claim, the plaintiff’s pleaded account of the third defendant’s oral representation is as follows:

  129. [101] In his affidavit of evidence in chief, the plaintiff’s account of this oral representation is as follows:

  130. [102] I reject the plaintiff’s evidence. The third defendant did not make this representation. I arrive at that finding for five reasons.

  131. [103] First, in connection with the oral representations, the plaintiff accepted in cross-examination once again (see [90] above) that the third defendant, as well as Mr Piette for that matter, had never spoken to him of “gross profits”. The plaintiff also accepted once again that the term “gross profits” is merely his own subjective and self-engendered understanding of what the third defendant had actually said:

  132. [104] Second, this alleged oral representation is of critical importance, not only to the plaintiff’s case in misrepresentation but also to his case in contract. That is because he relies on it not only as a fraudulent misrepresentation but also as evidence of a shared understanding forming part of the admissible context for construing the phrase “2.5% carry”. On the plaintiff’s case, this phone call was the earliest time that anybody on behalf of the LCA Group made the specific representation to the plaintiff on which his entire misrepresentation case rests. One would expect it to be the cornerstone of the plaintiff’s positive case on both misrepresentation and breach of contract.

  133. [105] Despite this, the plaintiff did not plead this representation anywhere in his original statement of claim. The plaintiff pleaded it belatedly in his reply, and even then only to meet the LCA Group’s plea in its defence and counterclaim that Mr Ong’s June 2011 email and other contemporaneous documentary evidence showed that the first defendant promised the plaintiff nothing more than “2.5% carry”. It was only then that the plaintiff incorporated this alleged representation by amendment into his statement of claim as part of his positive case.

  134. [106] Indeed, if the third defendant had in fact made this representation, one would have expected the plaintiff to have drawn it to the LCA Group’s attention as soon as the dispute arose in August 2014, long before he commenced this action in March 2016. He did nothing of the sort. From in or around June 2011 (when the third defendant allegedly made this representation) to June 2015 (when the plaintiff’s employment was terminated) all the way up to July 2016 (when the plaintiff first pleaded this representation in his reply and then incorporated it by amendment into his statement of claim), he had made no reference whatsoever to this representation, whether by himself, through his solicitors or through Spencer Stuart, his interface with the LCA Group in 2011, and whether informally in correspondence or formally in his pleadings.

  135. [107] Third, the plaintiff’s account of this representation shifted significantly and materially. His pleading asserts that the third defendant “confirmed that the plaintiff’s carry entitlement was 2.5% of the gross profits of Fund II”. The plaintiff embellished this account in his affidavit of evidence in chief. His evidence was that the third defendant positively “reassured [the plaintiff] that… “‘2.5% carry’ referred to 2.5 points out of 20 points” and clarified that the plaintiff’s share of Fund II’s profit was to be “12.5% of the total carried interest pool available to management”.

  136. [109] Fourth, the plaintiff’s account is contrary to the inherent probabilities. The plaintiff’s case is that he relied on the oral representation which the third defendant made in or around June 2011 when he accepted the first defendant’s written offer of employment in February 2012. That would mean that the plaintiff accepted the remuneration package in that offer – including the award of “2.5% carry” in those very words – even though he knew: (a) that the third defendant had, more than six months earlier, expressly disavowed Mr Ong’s written representation that the plaintiff would be entitled to “2.5% carry” estimated to be worth US$4.77m; and (b) that that disavowal was purely oral and was not in writing or even evidenced by writing. There is no record of the plaintiff making any attempt to have the third defendant’s earlier representation recorded in the LCA Group’s written offer of February 2012 or indeed anywhere else in writing before he accepted the offer. There is also no record of the plaintiff himself restating the third defendant’s representation in any pre-contractual correspondence.

  137. [110] In fact, in July 2011, the plaintiff informed Spencer Stuart that the first defendant’s package was acceptable, making no mention whatsoever of this alleged oral representation. It appears therefore that the plaintiff would have been happy, if he had been minded to accept the LCA Group’s offer in July 2011, to proceed on the basis that Mr Ong’s July 2011 email was the definitive word on the plaintiff’s share of Fund II’s carry.

  138. [111] If the third defendant had indeed made the representation, these failures and omissions would be entirely contrary to the inherent probabilities. As I have mentioned, the difference between the parties’ positions is not trivial: it is a factor of five.

  139. [114] For all of these reasons, I find that the third defendant did not make the alleged oral representation as alleged or at all.

  140. (2) Mr Piette did not make the oral representation

  141. [115] The plaintiff also alleges that Mr Piette represented orally to the plaintiff at an interview in February 2012 “that the carried interest would be 2.5% of the gross profit, which on his calculation would amount to USD 37.5 million”.

  142. [116] I reject the plaintiff’s evidence. I find that Mr Piette did not make this representation for four reasons.

  143. [117] Once again, the plaintiff’s case on this representation is contrary to the inherent probabilities. After Mr Piette interviewed the plaintiff in Delhi in February 2012, Mr Ong send a revised draft employment contract to the plaintiff. The draft continued to provide that the plaintiff would be entitled to “2.5% carry” on Fund II. The plaintiff signed the employment contract without demur. That would be contrary to the inherent probabilities if Mr Piette had indeed made this oral representation to the plaintiff.

  144. [119] Once again, the plaintiff’s account of this representation shifted significantly and materially. His statement of claim pleads that Mr Piette represented to the plaintiff that: “The carried interest allocated to the plaintiff would be 2.5% of the gross profit, or 2.5 carry points, which would amount to USD 37.5 million…, or 12.5% of the carried interest pool...”. This is consistent with an email which the plaintiff sent in or around August 2014, soon after the dispute first arose. The plaintiff’s affidavit of evidence in chief confirms this account in two places.

  145. [120] In cross-examination, however, the plaintiff resiled from this account in two critical respects. First, he conceded that Mr Piette had never used the phrase “gross profits”. He therefore conceded that Mr Piette did not tell the plaintiff that he would be entitled to “2.5% of gross profits” as the plaintiff had pleaded and affirmed. Second, he conceded that Mr Piette did not tell the plaintiff that he would be entitled to “12.5% of the carried interest pool”.

  146. [121] The plaintiff accepted in cross-examination the possibility that he had added to his account in this way self-servingly and with the benefit of hindsight. Thus, the plaintiff accepted that he might have inserted the word “gross” before “profits” even though nobody had used the word “gross” at the time “on his own behalf because, in two or three years of being in the business…it might have been something [he] had heard”. Particularly egregious is the plaintiff’s attempt in his pleading to put the words “12.5% carried interest pool” into Mr Piette’s mouth. When asked why he pleaded and affirmed in his affidavit of evidence in chief that Mr Piette had used those words when Mr Piette had not, the plaintiff said that “it’s meant to signal an inference that [Mr Piette’s] explanation was aligning with [the third defendant’s] explanation”. I do not accept the plaintiff’s explanation for putting words into Mr Piette’s mouth that the plaintiff himself accepts Mr Piette did not say. It is a clear attempt to tailor his evidence to advance his case.

  147. [122] For all of these reasons, I find that Mr Piette did not make the oral representation as alleged or at all.

  148. Conclusion

  149. [123] I am satisfied that the plaintiff subjectively misunderstood the written representations, and that they were objectively true. I am also satisfied that the third defendant and Mr Piette did not make the oral representations as alleged or at all. I am also driven to the conclusion that the plaintiff’s evidence of the oral representations is not the result of a mistake. It is deliberately false, contrived in hindsight and deliberately tailored to advance his case rather than to speak the truth.

  150. The LCA Group was not fraudulent

  151. [124] In any event, I find also that the plaintiff’s case on fraud is entirely without basis. I explain first why fraud is of fundamental importance to the plaintiff’s claim before explaining why there is no basis for fraud.

  152. A representation as to future intent is actionable only if fraudulently made

  153. [125] To be actionable, a misrepresentation must be a false statement of a past or present fact (Tan Chin Seng and others v Raffles Town Club Pte Ltd [2003] 3 SLR(R) 307 at [20]-[21]). This excludes statements as to the future. A representor’s statement that a state of affairs will come about in the future is either a promise or a prediction. It is a promise when that state of affairs is within the promisor’s control. It is a prediction when that state of affairs is outside the promisor’s control. Neither a promise nor a prediction is a statement of past or present fact. Therefore, neither a broken promise nor a failed prediction is actionable as a misrepresentation.

  154. [126] The plaintiff’s case is that the LCA Group represented to him that, if he became an employee of the LCA Group, the LCA Group would award him “2.5% of the gross profits of Fund II”. For the purposes of this section of my analysis, I will assume, contrary to the plaintiff’s concession and my findings, that the LCA Group actually did make this representation to him in writing and orally.

  155. [127] This representation is not a statement of fact. It is in substance a promise. That is because it is a statement by the LCA Group that it would bring about in the future a state of affairs. That state of affairs is that the LCA Group would pay the plaintiff “2.5% of the gross profits of Fund II”. If falsified, this representation will amount to broken promise. It cannot be a failed prediction. That is because what the LCA Group pays to the plaintiff out of the profits of Fund II in the future is not outside the control of the LCA Group. I therefore need say nothing further about failed predictions.

  156. [128] A broken promise gives rise to a viable claim in fraudulent misrepresentation only if the representor had no intention of fulfilling the promise at the time he made it. This is not an exception to the rule that an actionable misrepresentation must be a statement of fact. That is because, in truth, it is not the broken promise which is the actionable misrepresentation. The actionable misrepresentation is the implicit representation which accompanies every promise: that the promisor genuinely intends to honour his promise. If the promisor has no such intent, the promise is made fraudulently. That is because the implicit representation which accompanies the promise is false. That is so even if, by some happenstance, the subject of the promise ultimately eventuates. Another way of putting the same point, albeit somewhat inaccurately, is that a broken promise is actionable in misrepresentation if and only if the representor makes the promise having no intention of fulfilling it, and the representor is in that sense fraudulent.

  157. [129] Therefore, contrary to the LCA Group’s submission, classifying the alleged representation as a promise rather than a statement of fact is not in itself a ground on which to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim in fraudulent misrepresentation. All that that means is that this claim cannot succeed simply by the plaintiff showing that the LCA Group has broken its promise. The plaintiff can nevertheless succeed by proving fraud, ie that the LCA Group represented to the plaintiff that it would pay him“2.5% of the gross profits of Fund II” with no intention of keeping the promise.

  158. The plaintiff’s own case is that the first defendant was not fraudulent

  159. [130] The plaintiff’s own evidence is fatal to his plea of fraud. He readily accepted in cross-examination that the third defendant and Mr Piette fully intended that the LCA Group would keep its promise to pay the plaintiff “2.5% of the gross profits of Fund II” when they made the representations to him in June 2011 and February 2012. That necessarily means that he accepts that the implicit representation which accompanied this alleged promise (see [128] above) was true at the time the LCA Group made this promise.

  160. [133] The plaintiff’s answers in cross-examination are not admissible evidence on whether the third defendant and Mr Piette made the pleaded representation fraudulently. That question turns on whether the third defendant and Mr Piette intended at that time to cause the LCA Group to keep its promise to pay the plaintiff “2.5% of the gross profits of Fund II”. The plaintiff is not, of course, a mind reader. He can therefore have no personal knowledge of their state of mind at the material time. He is therefore incapable of giving direct evidence as to the third defendant’s and Mr Piette’s state of mind at the material time within the meaning of s 62(1) of the Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed).

  161. [134] But the plaintiff is not merely a witness in this litigation. He is also one of the litigants. I must take it that he presents his case to the court as an honest litigant. It is therefore not open to the plaintiff to advance a position in this action – whether in his pleadings, in his affidavit of evidence in chief, in his counsel’s cross-examination of the defendants’ witnesses or in his submissions – which is contrary to facts which the plaintiff accepts to be true. That is so even if the plaintiff himself is unable to give admissible evidence as to the truth of those facts, for example, as in this case, because they are outside his personal knowledge.

  162. [135] The passages from the plaintiff’s cross-examination which I have cited at [131] and [132] above show that the plaintiff believes to this day that the third defendant and Mr Piette made the representation to him honestly, not fraudulently. The plaintiff therefore could not have hoped to succeed in his plea of fraud. He should have never made the plea, let alone pursued it at trial in an attempt to secure judgment.

  163. The plaintiff was not induced by the representation

  164. [136] I also do not accept that the first defendant’s alleged representation induced the plaintiff to leave his employment with Zovi.com and take up employment with the first defendant. Again, for the purpose of this analysis, I assume that the LCA Group did make a misrepresentation to the plaintiff as alleged.

  165. [137] First of all, in the passage from his cross-examination which I have cited at [132] above, the plaintiff himself accepted that he was not induced to accept employment with the LCA Group by any pre-contractual deception by the LCA Group. That is fatal to the plaintiff’s case in inducement.

  166. [138] Second, I accept LCA Group’s case that the plaintiff was asked to leave Zovi.com in early 2012 and that that was why he reinitiated the discussions with the LCA Group about potential employment. The evidence before me shows that the plaintiff was, by early 2012, in “settlement” negotiations with Zovi.com. The negotiations were over a “severance package” of six months’ salary with the possibility of extension if he had been unable within those six months to find employment or to start a business of his own. The plaintiff accepted in cross-examination that a “severance” package implies an involuntary termination of employment and is rarely offered to an employee who resigns voluntarily. Further, the plaintiff expressed concern in contemporaneous emails to Zovi.com about how his departure would be publicised. That would have been an unlikely concern if he were leaving voluntarily for a better employment opportunity.

  167. [139] I therefore find that the plaintiff accepted the LCA Group’s offer of employment in February 2012 because that was the best alternative he then had, after having been asked to leave Zovi.com. As such, I find that he would have accepted the LCA Group’s offer of employment with or without the alleged representation.

  168. [140] Finally, returning to my actual findings thus far, insofar as the plaintiff was induced by anything to accept the first defendant’s offer of employment, the true and operative inducement was, at best, his own misunderstanding of what the phrase “2.5% carry” meant. That misunderstanding did not originate from any act or omission on the part of the LCA Group or its representatives. Nor was it a reasonable misunderstanding of the representations which the LCA Group actually made to him. His misunderstanding was entirely subjective, entirely self-engendered and entirely unreasonable. The LCA Group cannot bear any responsibility in fact or in law if the plaintiff was induced to accept the LCA Group’s offer of employment by his own subjective, self-engendered and unreasonable misunderstanding of the terms of his remuneration.

  169. [141] For all of these reasons, I find that the plaintiff has failed to establish the element of inducement.

  170. The plaintiff has not proven that he suffered any loss

  171. [142] Finally, I accept the LCA Group’s submission that the plaintiff has failed to prove that he suffered any loss as a result of the alleged misrepresentations.

  172. [143] The plaintiff claims that his reliance on the first defendant’s misrepresentation caused him to suffer loss of US$75m or US$3m. That is the value which the plaintiff ascribes to the shares in Zovi.com which he would have received under its employee stock option plan (“ESOP”) if he had remained with Zovi.com instead of accepting employment with the LCA Group in February 2012.

  173. [144] I reject the plaintiff’s case on loss for three reasons.

  174. [145] First, I have already accepted that the plaintiff was asked to leave Zovi.com in early 2012 (see [138] above). Therefore, with or without the first defendant’s alleged misrepresentation, and with or without his alleged reliance on it to accept employment with the LCA Group, the plaintiff was going to lose any entitlement to participate in Zovi.com’s ESOP.

  175. [146] Second, the plaintiff has failed to prove that he in fact lost any ESOP shares or that he even had a chance to be allotted ESOP shares. As the LCA Group points out, the plaintiff accepted that he was not a participant in any ESOP at Zovi.com. He also confirmed that Zovi.com had not allotted any shares to him under its ESOP, vested or unvested, when he accepted employment with the LCA Group.

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