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Grounds publishedDecided 21 Sep 2022
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General Division of the High Court

Kroll, Daniel v Cyberdyne Tech Exchange Pte Ltd and others

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[2022] SGHC 231Case no. HC/S 915/2021 (Summons No 1507 of 2022 and Registrar’s Appeal No 169 of 2022)

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Grounds of decision

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  1. Introduction

  2. [2] Suit 915 is a claim of minority oppression under s 216 of the Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed) (“CA”) brought by the plaintiff Mr Daniel Kroll (“Mr Kroll”). In Suit 915, Mr Kroll asserts that the second, third and fourth defendants have conducted the affairs of the company (“CTX”, the first defendant) “as they pleased and in a manner that prioritised their own interests in relation to CTX, and that was oppressive and prejudicial to [the plaintiff]” ; and also that these three defendants acted so as to cause his (Mr Kroll’s) shareholding in the company to be wrongfully and severely diluted .

  3. [3] In the first prayer in Summons 1507, the second to fourth defendants ask that the SOC be struck out in its entirety. The crux of their argument is that the plaintiff has rejected a reasonable buyout offer made by the second and fourth defendants, and this offer essentially delivers “everything that the plaintiff is seeking in the suit” such that the continuance of the suit constitutes an abuse of process. In their second and third prayers, the second to fourth defendants ask (in the alternative) that specific paragraphs in the SOC be struck out, either on the ground that they are frivolous or vexatious, or that they would prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the action.

  4. [4] I heard parties on 5 July 2022. After the hearing, parties wrote in on 8 July (the plaintiff), 15 July (the second to fourth defendants) and 18 July (the first defendant), to make what essentially amounted to further submissions. Having considered the oral and written submissions of parties, I decline to allow the application for striking out. While the buyout offer is reasonable, there is no abuse of process as the offer has not covered all the disputed issues and / or all reliefs sought in Suit 915; and it was reasonable for Mr Kroll to have proceeded with the action in the circumstances.

  5. [5] In respect of paragraphs 57 to 59 of the SOC (Amendment No. 1), I am of the view that the pleadings therein are somewhat clumsily drafted, but that the defects are not such as to warrant my striking them out at this interlocutory stage.

  6. [6] In respect of paragraphs 55 and 56 of the SOC (Amendment No. 1), I find the pleadings therein to be legally unsustainable, and the defects are such that I do not think they can be improved with amendment. I am of the view that these two paragraphs should be struck out

  7. [7] In the paragraphs that follow, I set out the detailed grounds for my decision.

  8. Facts

  9. Parties to the dispute

  10. [9] The plaintiff Mr Kroll has been a shareholder of the first defendant (“CTX”) since 31 March 2019. He was appointed as a director of CTX on or around 3 June 2020 and resigned on 22 February 2021.

  11. [10] The first defendant CTX is a private limited company incorporated in Singapore on 30 July 2018. Mr Kroll claims that CTX is principally in the business of providing corporate finance advisory services and/or is a holding company. The second to fourth defendants claim that following the Extraordinary General Meeting (“EGM”) held on 30 April 2021, CTX pivoted towards a fresh business concept spearheaded by the third defendant Dr Bai Bo (“Dr Bai”) to operate a green carbon exchange.

  12. [11] The second defendant Mr Wong Yoke Qieu, Gabriel (“Mr Wong”) is reflected in CTX’s ACRA records as having been a director from 30 July 2018 to 8 May 2020. Mr Kroll claims that from 8 May 2020 onwards, Mr Wong was a shadow director of CTX, which Mr Wong denies.

  13. [12] The third defendant Dr Bai has been the Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) of CTX since around 5 May 2021. He is reflected in CTX’s ACRA records as having been a shareholder since 29 April 2021 and a director since 4 May 2021. Mr Wong claims that Dr Bai became involved with CTX in or around the second half of 2020 and was at all times aware of CTX’s affairs. Dr Bai avers that he first became involved in CTX from the fourth quarter of 2020.

  14. [13] The fourth defendant Ms Lily Hong Yingli (“Ms Hong”) was, along with Mr Wong, a co-founder of CTX. Mr Kroll claims that Ms Hong was at all material times a shadow director of CTX. Ms Hong denies this and avers that she was merely CTX’s technology consultant and assisted in fundraising efforts.

  15. Background to the dispute

  16. Set-up of CTX

  17. [14] Mr Wong incorporated CTX on 30 July 2018. By March 2019, Mr Wong had secured (with Ms Hong’s help) investor funding in the form of:

  18. (a) An equity investment of SGD10 million from Xiamen Anne Corporation Limited (“Xiamen Anne”), a company incorporated in the People’s Republic of China, for a 10% shareholding in CTX; and

  19. (b) An investment of approximately SGD810,000 (or EUR533,000) from Mr Kroll for 81,000 shares (or a 1.40% shareholding) in CTX pursuant to a Subscription Agreement dated 31 March 2019 (“Subscription Agreement”).

  20. First unsuccessful MAS license application in May 2019

  21. [15] CTX required two licenses from MAS: a Capital Markets Services (“CMS”) license and a Recognised Market Operator (“RMO”) license (“the MAS licenses”). The first license application, made on 31 May 2019, was unsuccessful. MAS did not approve of Mr Wong holding the position of director or CEO of CTX, nor of his holding more than 5% of CTX’s shares. According to Mr Kroll, MAS was concerned about Wong’s association with the Chinese Communist Party, and did not wish for Wong to be the CEO of CTX, or a director of CTX, or to hold a controlling shareholding stake in CTX, or to hold more than 5% of CTX’s shares. According to Mr Wong, this was because Mr Wong’s previous employment had been subject to a disputed termination.

  22. [16] Subsequently, several changes were made within CTX, which CTX avers were to facilitate its second application to MAS. On 8 May 2020, Mr Wong resigned as director and transferred 4,605,953 of his CTX shares to Mr Kroll. Mr Wong’s position is that Mr Kroll agreed orally to hold these shares on trust for Mr Wong while Mr Wong sourced for a buyer to purchase these shares.

  23. [17] Both Mr Kroll and Mr Wong entered into a Share Trust Agreement dated 12 May 2020, under which the former held 4,605,938 of the latter’s 4,887,566 shares in CTX on trust for him (“the Trust Shares”). Following the share transfer, Mr Hong and Mr Kroll’s respective legal shareholdings were reflected in ACRA’s records as follows:

  24. Number of CTX shares

  25. Percentage of shares in CTX

  26. Mr Hong

  27. 281,613

  28. 4.85%

  29. Mr Kroll

  30. 4,686,953

  31. 80.72%

  32. [18] On Mr Hong’s request, Mr Chong (who had been COO and director of CTX since May 2019) was appointed as CEO in place of Mr Hong on 23 May 2020. Mr Kroll and Ms Chan Mei Ling (“Ms Chan”) were subsequently appointed as directors.

  33. Second MAS license application in 2020

  34. [20] On 5 June 2020, CTX made its second licence application to MAS. On 14 December 2020, MAS informed CTX that it would be prepared to grant approval (“in-principle approval”) for the license application subject to the fulfilment of certain requirements within 3 months by 13 March 2021 (“IPA deadline”), including (inter alia) requirements that:

  35. (a) CTX give an undertaking to maintain a sound financial position and high level of professional expertise at all times; and

  36. (b) CTX meet the financial requirements applicable to CMS licence-holders under the relevant subsidiary legislation.

  37. [21] The IPA deadline was later extended to 30 April 2021 on CTX’s request.

  38. Events of December 2020 to March 2021

  39. (1) Involvement of Dr Bai

  40. [22] As for the involvement of Dr Bai in CTX, according to Dr Bai, his friend Ms Hong, had told him in early 2020 that she was offering her technical expertise to CTX. In November 2020, Ms Hong told Dr Bai that CTX was in financial need and seeking investment. He was informally agreeable to investing and participating in CTX, and negotiated with Mr Wong to purchase 290,322 of the CTX shares registered to Dr Kroll for SGD1.25 million. Dr Bai states that he signed a share purchase agreement dated 29 November 2020, which was not completed as Mr Kroll was not agreeable to the share transfer.

  41. [23] In December 2020, Dr Bai was informed that MAS had granted CTX an in-principle approval for its license applications, and that CTX was facing cash flow issues and required investors and funding to meet the required conditions by the IPA deadline. Dr Bai extended to CTX an interest-free loan of USD140,000, repayable by 31 March 2021 (later extended to 30 June 2021) , under a convertible loan agreement dated 29 December 2020 (“1st CLA”).

  42. (2) Resignation of Mr Chong and appointment of new director

  43. [24] On or around 30 December 2020, Mr Chong resigned as CEO of CTX. Mr Wong and Ms Hong initially decided to present Mr Kroll as the replacement CEO but eventually proposed Dr Bai instead. According to Dr Bai, he was agreeable to being the proposed CEO candidate on the condition that he would have full control over CTX’s business and corporate governance.

  44. [25] Dr Bai’s account of how he came to be involved in CTX is disputed by Mr Kroll .

  45. (3) 2021 Shareholding Adjustments

  46. [26] According to Mr Kroll, on 18 January 2021, he learnt from Ms Hong that Dr Bai, Asia Green Fund (of which Dr Bai was CEO) and Ms Chan had purchased CTX shares at much lower valuations than he had under the Subscription Agreement. Mr Wong and Ms Hong subsequently agreed that Mr Kroll’s shareholding percentage would be adjusted upwards. On 10 February 2021, Mr Wong also agreed to give Mr Kroll additional shares in return for Mr Kroll’s past contributions to and involvement in CTX. In total, Mr Kroll’s total shareholding was to be adjusted to 7.67%. On 11 February 2021, Mr Kroll and Mr Wong entered into a Share Trust Termination Agreement and a Deed for Transfer of Additional Shares to put the above arrangements into place.

  47. [27] Again, Mr Wong has a different narrative. According to Mr Wong, he succumbed to pressure “tactics” applied by Mr Kroll, shortly before the 12 May 2020 Share Trust Agreement was due to expire, and in circumstances where much time and effort had already been expended to obtain MAS’ in-principle approval and to meet the conditions by the (then) 31 March 2021 IPA deadline: Mr Wong avers that it was only due to the pressure placed on him by Mr Kroll that he gave in to the latter’s demands to be given shares and an uplift in his shareholding for no payment.

  48. (4) Debts incurred by CTX

  49. [28] As stated above at [23], Dr Bai extended a loan of USD140,000 to CTX under the 1st CLA. In 2021, Dr Bai extended two more loans to CTX:

  50. (a) Under the 2nd CLA dated 28 January 2021, an interest-free loan of USD200,000 repayable by 30 April 2021;

  51. (b) Under the 3rd CLA dated 28 February 2021, an interest-free loan of USD75,000 repayable by 31 May 2021.

  52. [29] On 23 March 2021, two companies managed/controlled by Dr Bai (“the AGF entities”) entered into an Investment Agreement with CTX to invest up to USD15 million in CTX (“the AGF IA”). Asia Green Fund remitted the sums of USD1 million on 26 March 2021, and USD300,000 on 31 March 2021 to CTX as part of the investment sum under the AGF IA.

  53. [30] On 16 April 2021, Asia Green Fund extended an interest-free loan of USD1.2 million to CTX (“the 16 April Loan Agreement”). The maturity date of the loan was 15 May 2021, and the loan of USD1.2 million was to form part of the USD15 million investment sum under the AGF IA.

  54. [31] Mr Kroll’s position is that all of the above loans were part of an illicit scheme between the second to fourth defendants, whereby Dr Bai would take over the appearance of control of CTX from Mr Wong and Ms Hong, along with the risks posed by their improper conduct, in return for as close to 100% shareholding in CTX as possible.

  55. (5) Repurchase of Xiamen Anne’s shares

  56. [32] It will be recalled that one of the CTX’s shareholders was a company named Xiamen Anne. According to Mr Kroll, he was informed by Mr Wong and Ms Hong of the following matters by way of various WeChat conversations between 8 April and 20 April 2021: that CTX was “insolvent” and faced “cashflow difficulties”; that there was a “legacy problem” with Xiamen Anne which necessitated CT “clear[ing] the deck of shareholders in CTX by getting rid of all shareholdings including Mr Kroll’s, failing which CTX would be shut down”; that Xiamen Anne was “facing problems with China’s security regulators”; that CTX’s potential investors had doubts about investing in CTX because of Xiamen Anne’s regulatory issues; and that CTX “had no choice but to ‘buy back’ all of Xiamen Anne’s shares” for its initial investment amount of SGD10 million . Further, CTX had to resubmit its MAS application by the IPA deadline of 30 April 2021. Mr Kroll was told by Mr Wong and Ms Hong that they had found an investor – Dr Bai Bo – who would inject cash into CTX.

  57. [33] CTX agreed to repurchase Xiamen Anne’s 10% shareholding in CTX (580,645 shares) in 2 instalments payable on 31 March 2021 and 31 May 2021.

  58. [34] According to Mr Kroll, on 15 April 2021, he was given two options by Ms Hong. The first was for CTX to buy back 3.24% of his 7.6% shareholding for EUR500,000 (which was less than his initial investment of EUR533,000), while the remaining 4.43% would be transferred to an “equity pool” (of which Mr Kroll was given no details). The second option was for Ms Hong personally to buy back Mr Kroll’s entire 7.67% shareholding for SGD1.6 million. Mr Kroll was told that he had to relinquish his shareholding before Dr Bai would agree to inject funds into CTX. However, as he did not wish to exit CTX, he did not agree to either option.

  59. 30 April 2021 EGM

  60. [35] By way of an email dated 29 April 2021, a notice of an EGM of CTX to be held on 30 April 2021 (“30 April 2021 EGM”) and a form of consent for shorter notice was circulated by Ms Chan to Mr Kroll, Mr Wong, Dr Bai, Mr Yang and Ms Hong as proxy for Xiamen Anne. Mr Kroll claims that he did not consent to the shorter notice – but he did attend the meeting on 30 April 2021.

  61. [36] At the 30 April 2021 EGM, the resolutions passed included, inter alia, the following:

  62. (a) To issue and allot to Dr Bai 55,693,957 ordinary shares in CTX, the consideration for which was fully settled by offsetting the 1st, 2nd and 3rd CLAs;

  63. (b) To appoint Dr Bai the CEO, Executive Director, and Chairman of the Board of CTX; and

  64. (c) To “irrevocably and unconditionally” waive each of CTX’s shareholders “pre-emptive rights”, “rights of first refusal, right of co-sale, put or call rights, rights to require adjustments in conversion price for dilutive issuance, other rights of consent, and any other similar rights (as applicable) whether arising at contract or in law, and any notice period or requirement”; and that

  65. (d) Dr Bai would provide personal guarantees as to CTX’s other debt repayment obligations and indemnify the directors and existing shareholders of CTX against any liabilities out of the existing debts.

  66. [37] As a result of the above event, Mr Kroll’s shareholding was reduced from 7.67% to 0.72%.

  67. Events after the 30 April 2021 EGM

  68. [38] According to Mr Wong, CTX entered into an amended Restated Investment Agreement (“ARIA”) on 9 May 2021 with the AGF entities to amend the AGF IA. Under the ARIA, the AGF entities confirmed investment of a full USD15 million in CTX. As with previous loan and/or investment agreements between CTX and Dr Bai or his entities (see above at [31]), Mr Kroll takes the position that the ARIA is part of an illicit scheme between the second to fourth defendants, whereby Dr Bai would take over the appearance of control of CTX from Mr Wong and Ms Hong, along with the risks posed by their improper conduct, in return for as close to 100% shareholding in CTX as possible.

  69. [39] On or about 12 May 2021, an additional 5,125,934 shares were issued by CTX, causing Mr Kroll’s shareholding to be further reduced from 0.72% to 0.67%. Additional new shareholders connected to Dr Bai – the AGF entities – were reflected in CTX’s ACRA records as holding a total of 7.69% of CTX’s shares.

  70. [40] On 17 May 2021, CTX obtained the CMS licence. On 16 July 2021, CTX was recognised as an RMO by MAS.

  71. [41] Mr Kroll alleged that he had a tele-conversation with Mr Wong on 21 May 2021, during which the latter informed him that on or around 19 May 2021, Dr Bai and/or Asia Green Fund had invested a further USD12.5 million in CTX, based on a valuation of CTX at USD180 million (“the USD180 million valuation”). According to Mr Kroll, this was a far cry from the valuation of approximately USD458,266 reflected in the issuance of the 55,693,957 shares to Dr Bai at the 30 April EGM. It should be noted that this valuation figure of USD458,266 came about because on Mr Kroll’s version of events, at the 30 April EGM, the 55,693,957 shares were allotted to Dr Bai “in exchange for the loans to CTX under the 1st, 2nd and 3rd CLAs, which totalled only USD415,000” .

  72. [42] Mr Wong denies Mr Kroll’s version of the tele-conversation. According to Mr Wong, during the tele-conversation, he had explained inter alia that Dr Bai had injected USD12.5 million into CTX under the ARIA which had contained a valuation benchmark re-stated at USD180 million (adjusted for the corresponding reduction of shares caused by the Xiamen Anne share buyback, which had been agreed to after the AGF IA was entered into). Mr Wong’s position is that the valuation of USD458,266 referred to by Mr Kroll was “nonsensical and misconceived” because the 55,693,957 shares were actually allotted to Dr Bai in exchange for the entirety of his financial assistance – which included the introduction of a new business opportunity, viz the Green Carbon Exchange – and not just for forgiving debts of USD415,000.

  73. Summary of Pleadings

  74. Mr Kroll’s Statement of Claim

  75. [43] Mr Kroll claims that he has been oppressed by Mr Wong, Dr Bai and Ms Hong conducting CTX’s affairs in an oppressive, unfair, discriminatory and prejudicial manner in disregard of his minority shareholder interests. In particular, Mr Kroll claims that his shareholding in CTX was wrongfully and severely diluted from 7.67% as of 29 April 2021 to 0.67% by way of:

  76. (a) The resolutions passed at the 30 April 2021 EGM convened on only a day’s notice which diluted his shareholding to 0.72%; and

  77. (b) The 12 May 2021 issuance of additional CTX shares which diluted his shareholding to 0.67%.

  78. [44] Mr Kroll claims that apart from CTX’s Constitution, the other key written agreements and documents relating to his rights and obligations as a shareholder of CTX include the Subscription Agreement, Share Trust Agreement, Share Trust Termination Agreement and Deed for Transfer of Additional Shares. He alleges that as a minority shareholder, he had the following legitimate expectations:

  79. (a) His shareholding would not be diluted in a prejudicial or unfair manner, and that the affairs of CTX would be conducted by Relevant Directors and Majority Shareholders in accordance with the CA, CTX’s Constitution, the key written agreements and documents relating to Mr Kroll’s rights and obligations as a shareholder of CTX, and the law

  80. (b) The Relevant Directors and Majority Shareholders would deal with him fairly as a minority shareholder.

  81. (c) CTX and/or its directors were prohibited from “exercis[ing] any power of [CTX] to issue shares” “without the prior approval of” CTX in a “general meeting” (per s 161 CA);

  82. (d) A meeting of CTX, “other than a meeting for the passing of a special resolution, shall be called by notice in writing of not less than 14 days or such longer period as is provided in [CTX’s] constitution” (per s 177(2) CA); and

  83. (e) A meeting of CTX that is not its annual general meeting, which is called by notice in writing of less than 14 days, is “deemed to be duly called if it is so agreed … by a majority in number of the members having a right to attend and vote thereat, being a majority which together holds not less than 95% of the total voting rights of all the members having a right to vote at that meeting” (per s 177(3)(b) CA).

  84. (f) Under CTX’s Constitution: Pursuant to Article 45(1), “subject to any direction to the contrary that may be given by [CTX] in [a] general meeting, all new shares must, before issue, be offered to all persons who, as at the date of the offer, are entitled to receive notices from the company of general meetings, in proportion, or as nearly as the circumstances admit, to the amount of the existing shares to which they are entitled”; and

  85. (g) Under CTX’s Constitution: Pursuant to Article 49(1), “at least 14 days’ notice … must be given to persons entitled to receive notices of general meetings from [CTX]”.

  86. (h) Under the Subscription Agreement: Pursuant to Clause 3.8, in the event CTX decides “to allocate and issue people or entities (either consultants, advisors, employees etc.) option or shares of [CTX] against their services/work or others and not against investment consideration, within the period of 5 years following the Completion date of the [Subscription] Agreement” (i.e., 5 years after 31 March 2019, or until 30 March 2024), such allocation and issuance of options or shares “will not dilute in any way” Mr Kroll’s holdings in CTX (see paragraph 23 herein); and

  87. (i) Under the Subscription Agreement: Pursuant to Clause 10.1 of Schedule 3, CTX had warranted to “[conduct] its business in all material respects in accordance with all applicable laws”.

  88. [45] Mr Kroll has pleaded that Mr Wong, Ms Hong and Dr Bai breached these legitimate expectations, understandings and provisions as follows:

  89. (a) Sometime in May 2020, Mr Wong had forged Mr Kroll’s signature on MAS Form 11 (Appointment of CEO or Director), which form was submitted by CTX to MAS in the course of its second licence application (“the MAS Form 11 Forgery Pleadings”).

  90. (b) Mr Wong and/or Ms Hong caused CTX to enter into questionable contracts involving large sums of money which benefitted two companies linked to Ms Hong and another shareholder, Mr Yang (“Mr Yang”), namely Zeepson Technology Co., Ltd (“Zeepson”) and Saibotan Beijing Co., Ltd (“Saibotan”) (“the Zeepson and Saibotan pleadings”).

  91. (c) Mr Wong and/or Ms Hong failed to cause CTX to promptly and accurately update ACRA and/or the MAS of the true and accurate shareholdings and directorships within CTX;

  92. (d) Mr Wong, Ms Hong and Dr Bai contrived an illicit scheme to manipulate CTX’s internal affairs so that CTX could maintain the appearance that Mr Wong held no more than 5% of CTX shares, thus avoiding the possibility that MAS would reject CTX’s second licence application.

  93. (e) Mr Wong and Ms Hong pressured Mr Kroll to exit CTX at a low price. Mr Wong, Ms Hong and Dr Bai did not give him any option that assured him that his shareholding in CTX would not be reduced or diluted, and there were no discussions about whether Mr Kroll could remain a 7.67% shareholder of CTX. Mr Kroll also believes that the issuance of 55,693,957 shares to Dr Bai at the 30 April EGM was not based on the applicable contractual valuation and was designed to further this illicit scheme.

  94. (f) The 30 April EGM and the resolutions purportedly passed at the meeting were invalid. It did not meet the requirement of at least 14 days’ notice under Art 49(1) of CTX’s Constitutions and s 177(2) CA. Also, as Mr Kroll had not given his consent to short notice, CTX failed to obtain the requisite consent to short notice from not less than 95% of the total voting rights of all shareholders having a right to vote at the EGM, under s 177(3)(b) CA.

  95. (g) The 12 May 2021 issuance of shares was also invalid as it was in breach of s 161 CA. CTX failed to call a general meeting and pass the required resolutions to authorise the issuance of shares.

  96. [46] Mr Kroll seeks the following reliefs:

  97. (a) A declaration that the 30 April EGM and all resolutions passed thereat are invalid;

  98. (d) Damages to be assessed and/or equitable compensation be paid to Mr Kroll;

  99. (e) Costs; and

  100. (f) Such further or other relief as this Honourable Court deems fit.

  101. CTX’s Defence

  102. [47] In its defence, the company CTX avers that the contracts with Zeepson and Saibotan are genuine contracts. As Mr Kroll was only a shareholder and not a director of CTX at the time when the Zeepson and Saibotan contracts were concluded, Mr Kroll was not entitled to be informed of CTX’s affairs and day-to-day operations. While CTX acknowledges that ACRA was not immediately updated about certain changes to CTX’s directorships, shareholders and their shareholdings, it denies that this was done to falsely reflect CTX’s directorships, shareholders and shareholdings. There was no illicit scheme to manipulate its internal affairs. CTX avers that the 30 April 2021 EGM and the resolutions passed thereat are valid. CTX also avers that s 161 CA imposes an obligation on company directors, and not the company itself, to obtain the prior approval of the company in general meeting before issuing new shares.

  103. Mr Wong’s Defence and Counter-claim

  104. [48] Mr Wong claims that the 30 April 2021 EGM was called on urgent notice because of matters that shareholders had to resolve by the 30 April 2021 IPA deadline; that Mr Kroll was aware of the nature of the discussions; and that he had agreed to participate in them. The dilution of shares was uniform across all existing shareholdings and was in the best interest of all shareholders, as CTX was insolvent or doubtfully solvent at that stage and needed the financial rescue package that Dr Bai could bring.

  105. [49] Mr Wong also claims that Mr Kroll’s complaints were made as part of an opportunistic move to enrich himself personally. According to Mr Wong, this included pressuring Mr Wong to transfer additional shares to him without consideration. Mr Kroll had procured these shares by inter alia refusing to transfer back all of Mr Wong’s shares which he had hitherto held in trust, and also by threatening to report to MAS various alleged misrepresentations which would have compromised CTX’s ability to obtain the MAS licenses. While Mr Kroll had tried to rationalise the transfer of the additional shares as a revaluation of his initial investment sum, this went far beyond any such revaluation, as he also wanted more free shares to match the “sweat equity” allocated to a senior employee in February 2021 – and this despite promptly resigning as director at end-February 2021 without having provided any “sweat” for the additional free shares. The additional shares transferred to Mr Kroll raised his legal and beneficial pre-EGM shareholding in CTX from 1.40% to 7.67%.

  106. [50] In his pleadings, Mr Wong also counterclaims for the vitiation of the unsealed Deed for the transfer of additional shares dated 11 February 2021 and the full return of the additional 364,369 shares (then 6.27% of CTX), on the basis of economic duress. In the alternative, Mr Wong seeks specific performance by way of the transfer back to him of 257,240 such shares (then 4.43% of CTX) from Mr Kroll. According to Mr Wong, these additional shares were transferred to Mr Kroll on the basis that they constituted “sweat equity”, and were subject to the condition subsequent that Mr Kroll would actively participate in and contribute towards the development of CTX’s service offerings and the sourcing of additional funding and capital. Since Mr Kroll failed to do any of these things after receiving the shares, he became disentitled to these shares. As a further alternative, even if there were an agreement between Mr Wong and Mr Kroll for the latter to receive the 257,240 “sweat equity” shares, Mr Wong says there was no consideration provided by Mr Kroll for any such alleged agreement.

  107. Dr Bai’s Defence

  108. [51] Dr Bai’s position is that he has been wrongfully dragged into this dispute by Mr Kroll as part of the latter’s attempts to procure a buy-out of his CTX shareholding at a price beyond its reasonable value. It is not disputed that Dr Bai did not vote at the 30 April 2021 EGM. Accordingly, Dr Bai asserts that it is an abuse of process by Mr Kroll to claim that Dr Bai bears any liability arising from resolutions passed at the EGM. Dr Bai also denies any illicit scheme to manipulate CTX’s internal affairs.

  109. [52] As for the shareholding dilution approved at the 30 April 2021 EGM by a majority of shareholders, this affected all shareholders uniformly. At the same time, Dr Bai and his companies took on 100% of CTX’s business risk and up to around SGD15 million of financial liabilities. This arrangement was the only option that would have allowed CTX to meet MAS’ requirements and to address its financial situation. As for the short notice given in respect of the 30 April 2021 EGM, Dr Bai claims that the short notice was necessary due to the urgency arising from the IPA deadline, and that the omission to give 14 days’ notice of the EGM was a mere procedural irregularity capable of re-validation by the court under s 392(4)(a) Companies Act. No direct valuation was fixed for the shares issued to Dr Bai at was fixed at the 30 April 2021 EGM, nor can such a valuation be derived from the outcome of the EGM.

  110. [53] In respect of the 12 May 2021 issuance of shares, Dr Bai alleges that this was done pursuant to the ARIA. It was initially agreed and contemplated under the AGF IA in March 2021, pre-dating the 30 April 2021 EGM.

  111. [54] In respect of the MAS Form 11 Forgery Pleadings, Dr Bai says he has no knowledge of matters pertaining to the allegedly forged signature.

  112. [55] In respect of the Zeepson and Saibotan Pleadings, Dr Bai asserts that Mr Kroll’s allegations are based on incomplete information. Seven contractual arrangements were entered into with Zeepson between April 2019 to January 2020 with a total contract value of RMB14,056,860, while the two contracts entered into with Saibotan between May to September 2019 had a total contract value of RMB 7,000,000. To Dr Bai’s understanding, the contracts were to develop platform and security services from which CTX’s exchanges would operate and which would form the backbone of its commercial operations. Dr Bai further points out that the contracts were entered into between April 2019 to January 2020, when Mr Kroll was only a shareholder: it is unclear, therefore, on what basis Mr Kroll derives an expectation to be informed of transactions relating to CTX’s operations.

  113. Ms Hong’s Defence

  114. [56] Ms Hong claims that she has never participated in any registration of CTX shareholdings on ACRA and that she does not know how accurate ACRA records of legal shareholding may give rise to a “false impression”.

  115. [57] According to Ms Hong, Mr Kroll was upset about a late 2020 sale of CTX shares by Mr Wong at a valuation of SGD25 million valuation, because he (Mr Kroll) had purchased his shares at a higher valuation in March 2019. It was proposed to Mr Kroll on 18 January 2021 that his initial investment be revalued so as to give him a 3.24% stake instead of 1.4%. Mr Kroll was still not satisfied. On 24 January 2021, Mr Wong proposed raising Mr Kroll’s shareholding to around 5% and provided paperwork to Mr Kroll to reflect this. Mr Kroll responded with amendments from his lawyer on 2 February 2021, which Mr Wong agreed to on 3 February 2021.

  116. [58] Later, on 3 February 2021, Mr Kroll suddenly declared that he wanted his 1.4% shareholding sold at the initial investment sum of EUR533,000, and to retain the same quantity of shares as Mr Yang, who had 4.43% shares registered to him as “sweat equity”. Mr Kroll wanted to sell his 1.4% shares to Dr Bai but Dr Bai was not keen.

  117. [59] On 10 February 2021, Mr Wong asked Mr Kroll for the signed paperwork. At that point, Mr Kroll came up with a new position which involved combining family shares with his shares to match Mr Yang’s shareholding. Ms Hong explained to Mr Kroll that Mr Yang’s shares were from an equity pool (for shares meant to be held as “sweat equity”) and that Mr Kroll should consider joining the existing equity pool instead. The discussion then ceased on WeChat. Mr Wong subsequently came up with amendments to the paperwork aimed at restoring the trust shares originally due to Mr Wong.

  118. [60] In the end, however, Mr Wong gave in to the pressure from Mr Kroll; and the Deed for the transfer of additional shares as well as the Trust Termination Agreement were executed. Under the Deed for the transfer of additional shares, Mr Wong agreed to transfer beneficial ownership of 364,369 shares to Mr Kroll as a “supplement” intended to achieve the re-valuation of Mr Kroll’s initial investment. Under the Trust Termination Agreement, because of the additional shares given to Mr Kroll by virtue of the Deed for Transfer of Additional Shares, Mr Kroll would only transfer 2,731,907 Trust Shares back to Mr Wong, instead of all 3,096,276 Trust Shares.

  119. [61] Ms Hong alleges that the increase in Mr Kroll’s shareholding from 1.4% to 7.67%, pursuant to the terms of the Trust Termination Agreement and the Deed for transfer of additional shares, was not based on re-valuation, which could only have furnished an uplift from 1.4% to 3.24%. What happened instead was a revaluation and an addition of a further 4.43% (matching what Mr Yang was holding for the equity pool), all coming from Mr Wong’s shares and none of which Mr Kroll paid for. This was unfair to Mr Wong who had succumbed to Mr Kroll’s pressure tactics. In relation to the 4.43% shareholding given to Mr Kroll, Mr Kroll was intended to earn the “sweat equity”, but instead, he tendered his resignation shortly thereafter on 22 February 2021 and did not provide any genuine assistance to CTX in its efforts to seek investment and/or financing.

  120. [62] In respect of CTX’s contracts with Zeepson (of which Ms Hong is the founder, CEO and majority shareholder), seven contracts were entered into by CTX and Zeepson for software development work to develop the platform and security services from which CTX’s exchanges would operate. According to Ms Hong, Zeepson had offered CTX a preferential rate and had not obtained any improper benefit.

  121. [63] In respect of the 30 April 2021 EGM, Ms Hong asserts that she knows nothing of the amendments made to CTX’s ACRA records on 29 April 2021. Her position is that notwithstanding the share dilution, the resolutions passed at the EGM were in the best interest of CTX and all existing shareholders, as these resolutions brought about an arrangement which resolved all of CTX’s issues. Ms Hong also asserts that all of CTX’s affairs (including the passing of shareholder resolutions at the 30 April 2021 EGM) were conducted in a manner that satisfied the requirements of commercial fairness. It was Mr Kroll who persisted in the wholly misconceived allegation post 30 April 2021 that Dr Bai had been allocated a substantial shareholding simply for forgiving USD415,000 in loans.

  122. [64] In respect of the 12 May 2021 issuance of shares, Ms Hong claims that to the best of her knowledge, this was in line with the resolutions passed at the 30 April 2021 EGM which approved Dr Bai’s rescue package; and that Dr Bai had in fact injected a further USD12.5 million into CTX not long after the EGM.

  123. HC/SUM 1507/2022: The striking-out application

  124. [65] The second to fourth defendants have applied for the SOC to be struck out entirely (“Prayer 1”); alternatively, for paragraphs 57 to 59 of the pleadings (which relate to the Zeepson and Saibotan contracts, “Prayer 2”) and paragraphs 55 to 56 of the pleadings (which relate to the alleged forgery of MAS Form 11, “Prayer 3”) to be struck out.

  125. [66] The grounds of the application are stated to be as follows:

  126. (a) Prayer 1 is premised on the Plaintiff having rejected a "reasonable offer" for buyout by independent third-party assessment, therefore amounting to an abuse of process. Prayer 1 is sought pursuant to O 18 r 19(1)(d) ROC 2014 and/or pursuant to the Court's inherent jurisdiction/powers (as may be applicable and/or pursuant to O 92 r 4 ROC 2014).

  127. (b) Prayer 2 is premised on the Plaintiff having pleaded to a matter on which the express/implied allegation of "overpayment" is factually unsupportable, and, in any event, the allegation even if true (which is denied) is a "corporate wrong" and not a "personal wrong". Prayer 2 is sought pursuant to O 18 r 19 (1)(a), (b), (c) and/or (d) ROC 2014 and/or pursuant to the Court's inherent jurisdiction/powers (as may be applicable and/or pursuant to O 92 r 4 ROC 2014).

  128. (c) Prayer 3 is premised on the Plaintiff having pleaded to a matter on which the allegation even if true (which is denied) is a "corporate wrong" and not a "personal wrong". Prayer 2 is sought pursuant to O 18 r 19(1)(a), (b), (c) and/or (d) ROC 2014 and/or pursuant to the Court's inherent jurisdiction/powers (as may be applicable and/or pursuant to O 92 r 4 ROC 2014)

  129. The law relating to Order 18 r 19 applications

  130. [67] It is not disputed that the power granted to the court under O 18 r 19 is a draconian one (Gabriel Peter & Partners (suing as a firm) v Wee Chong Jin and others [1997] 3 SLR(R) 649 (“Gabriel Peter”) at [39]; Harun bin Syed Hussain Aljunied and another v Abdul Samad bin O K Mohamed Haniffa and others [2017] SGHC 248 (“Harun”) at [28]), which peremptorily prevents plaintiffs from even going to trial to attempt to prove their case (Chee Siok Chin and others v Minister for Home Affairs and another [2006] 1 SLR(R) 582 (“Chee Siok Chin”) at [36]; Harun at [28].) The threshold for striking out is therefore a high one: the court will exercise its power to strike out where it is plain and obvious that the plaintiff does not have a cause of action (Trinity Construction Development Pte Ltd v Sinohydro Corp Ltd (Singapore Branch) [2021] 3 SLR 1039 (“Trinity Construction”) at [12]; Chee Siok Chin at [36]; Singapore Civil Procedure 2021 (Volume 1) (Sweet & Maxwell, 2021) (“Singapore Civil Procedure”) at 18/19/6).

  131. [68] The first ground for striking out applies if the pleading discloses no reasonable cause of action: O 18 r 19(1)(a). This is a strict requirement. The pleading itself must fail to make out a reasonable cause of action without reference to other evidence: Ng Chee Weng v Lim Jit Ming Bryan and another [2012] 1 SLR 457 (“Ng Chee Weng”) at [112].

  132. [69] The second ground for striking out applies where the pleading is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious: O 18 r 19(1)(b). The terms “frivolous” and “vexatious” have been judicially interpreted to connote obvious unsustainability (Chee Siok Chin at [37]). This can be found in two ways – firstly, if the claim is legally unsustainable in the sense that the plaintiff would not succeed in getting the relief he seeks even if all the facts he alleges are successfully proven, and secondly, if the claim is factually unsustainable such that the claim is fanciful and without substance, for example where the statement of facts is contradicted by all the documents or materials on which it is based (The “Bunga Melati 5” [2012] 4 SLR 546 (“Bunga Melati”) at [39]; Harun at [30]).

  133. [70] As for the “scandalous” limb, the question is whether the allegedly scandalous matter had a tendency to show the truth of any allegation that is material to the relief sought: Lai Swee Lin Linda v Attorney-General [2006] 2 SLR(R) 565 (“Lai Swee Lin Linda”) at [67] citing Christie v Christie (1872-1873) LR 8 Ch App 499 at p 503. If any unnecessary matter in a pleading contains any imputation on the opponent or makes any charge of misconduct or bad faith against him or anyone else, it will be struck out for being scandalous (Singapore Civil Procedure at 18/19/11).

  134. [72] The fourth ground for striking out applies if the pleading is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court: O 18 r 19(1)(d). This is the widest general ground for striking out and includes considerations of public policy and the interests of justice (Gabriel Peter at [22]; Chee Siok Chin at [34]). This ground can be organised into four categories (Chee Siok Chin at [34]):

  135. (a) proceedings which involve a deception on the court, or are fictitious or constitute a mere sham;

  136. (b) proceedings where the process of the court is not being fairly or honestly used but is employed for some ulterior or improper purpose or in an improper way;

  137. (c) proceedings which are manifestly groundless or without foundation or serve no useful purpose;

  138. (d) multiple or successive proceedings which cause or are likely to cause improper vexation or oppression.

  139. A prime example of pleadings which offend O 18 r 19(1)(d) would be the bringing of a claim for collateral purposes (Harun at [78]).

  140. [73] While the second, third and fourth Defendants purport on the face of their summons to rely on every limb under O 18 r 19, their counsel made it clear at the hearing that the “heart of the matter” was really the open offer (without admission of liability) which they had made to Mr Kroll on 14 March 2022. The second, third and fourth Defendants submit that their offer “essentially delivers everything that [Mr Kroll] is seeking in the suit”, such that the continued prosecution of the action serves no useful purpose; and that Mr Kroll’s failure to accept their offer – and his insistence on continuing with the proceedings – amount to an abuse of the process of court which warrants his action being struck out.

  141. Issues before this court

  142. [74] In respect of the striking out application in Summons 1507, the following issues are to be considered:

  143. (a) For Prayer 1: Whether the refusal of the Buyout Offer and Mr Kroll’s continued prosecution of this action constitute an abuse of process;

  144. (b) For Prayer 2: Whether the Zeepson and Saibotan Pleadings are factually and/or legally unsustainable, and whether the pleadings disclose, at most, a corporate wrong;

  145. (c) For Prayer 3: Whether the MAS Form 11 Forgery Pleadings are factually and/or legally unsustainable, and whether the pleadings disclose, at most, a corporate wrong; and

  146. Prayer 1: On striking out the entire pleading

  147. The parties’ cases

  148. The Buyout Offer of 14 March 2022

  149. [75] I will first deal with the second, third and fourth Defendants’ attempt in prayer 1 to strike out the entire Statement of Claim.

  150. [77] The alternative proposal in the second, third and fourth Defendants’ letter was for Mr Kroll’s registered shareholding of 0.67% to be bought out at the notional company valuation of USD180 million.

  151. [78] The 14 March 2022 letter requested a response by 18 March 2022 but no formal response was received by that date from Mr Kroll’s solicitors. On 19 March 2022, Mr Kroll sent Dr Bai an email stating that “I’m not selling for less than $30,680,000” and “After what you have put me through if you thought I would agree to a cent less than $13.8M you don’t understand the situation”. Mr Kroll’s formal rejection of the buyout proposal was issued through his solicitors (“WongPartnership”) on 22 March 2022. The same letter stated that “our client remains open to considering genuine and serious proposals” and that:

  152. [79] The second, third and fourth Defendants sought clarifications on this counter-proposal by way of a letter to WongPartnership on 29 March 2022 and requested a response by 1 April 2022. No response was provided by that date. Instead, on 4 April 2022, WongPartnership issued a holding response stating that instructions would be sought. On 14 April 2022, WongPartnership issued a substantive response as follows:

  153. Dr Bai’s Affidavit in support of SUM 1507

  154. [80] In an affidavit filed in support of the striking-out application, Dr Bai suggest that Mr Kroll is using the proceedings as leverage to extort a high buy-out price, by threatening and/or seeking to embarrass or scandalise the second to fourth Defendants. Dr Bai highlights the following matters which he says support his view. On 8 November 2021, Mr Kroll filed a generally-endorsed Writ of Summons without an SOC: the second to fourth Defendants contend that he did so as a “scare tactic”, to show he was prepared to go to court and to broadcast his accusations. The second to fourth Defendants take the view that Mr Kroll did not file a SOC when he filed the writ because had he done so, his allegations would be revealed in publicly accessible pleadings and the threat would be spent. Also, Mr Kroll was unable to file the SOC on time.

  155. [81] On 16 November 2021, after the second to fourth Defendants had filed their Memorandum of Appearance for Suit 915, the Plaintiff’s solicitors, WongPartnership, issued a letter to their solicitors, Salem Ibrahim LLC, stating that:

  156. Dr Bai states that since Ms Hong is resident overseas and he himself was away from Singapore at that time, Mr Kroll would have needed to expend time and costs in applying for leave to serve the Writ out of jurisdiction or for substituted service, and that Mr Kroll clearly made the complaint in the 16 November 2021 letter because he did not wish to proceed with the suit.

  157. [82] Dr Bai also highlights that as early as 3 August 2021, CTX had already offered Mr Kroll the documents he seeks in his SOC . However, Mr Kroll failed to give the undertaking requested by CTX (that he would not provide these documents to third parties); and Mr Kroll also failed to respond when CTX tried to follow up on the matter.

  158. [83] Lastly, the position taken in WongPartnership’s correspondence – that there be no further discussions before the discovery stage – is said by the second to fourth Defendants to be proof of “further gamesmanship by Mr Kroll”. According to the second, third and fourth Defendants, Mr Kroll is hoping that the discovery process will throw up “scandal” so that he can “extort from the Defendants a buy-out price closer to the $30.6 million he mostly [sic] recently demanded.”

  159. [84] Dr Bai Bo also draws attention to CTX’s “exceptionally modest revenue generation” , which he contrasts with Mr Kroll’s alleged status as the “wealthiest shareholder of CTX”: according to Dr Bai, “it is absurd that [Mr Kroll] is making such crazy requests for buy-outs without any logic, and without even being willing to help out CTX in its time of need.”

  160. Mr Kroll’s Reply Affidavit of 9 May 2022 & the submissions made on his behalf

  161. [85] In his reply affidavit, Mr Kroll contends that the Buyout Offer was not reasonable because any valuation to be obtained from the pegging of the offer to an elusive “Company Value” would be lower than the valuation of USD180 million offered to Dr Bai after CTX obtained its licences in May 2021. In their submissions, Mr Kroll’s counsel elaborated further on this contention: according to counsel, pegging the Buyout Offer to an elusive “Company Value” creates uncertainty and is inappropriate when applied to a start-up like CTX, as this pre-dates the grant of CTX’s licences.

  162. [86] In his reply affidavit, Mr Kroll also contends that the allotment of shares to Dr Bai at the 30 April 2021 EGM is a fundamental issue of dispute which affects the share valuation and which has resulted in unfair shareholding dilution. In fact, according to Mr Kroll, the Buyout Offer will not adequately address and/or meet all reliefs sought by him because:

  163. (a) Without the Court’s directions, an independent valuer will not be able to adequately assess the valuation of shares “but for the Defendants’ oppressive breaches, conducts, acts and/or omissions”;

  164. (b) There are relevant matters pre-dating the proposed date of valuation (30 April 2021); and

  165. (c) The second to fourth Defendants’ proposal ignores past oppressive acts, which will be captured in Mr Kroll’s claims for damages and/or equitable compensation.

  166. [87] As for the Alternative Buyout Offer, Mr Kroll argues that this was not reasonable as it was similar to a previous offer made by Ms Hong, prior to the 30 April 2021 EGM and the dilution of his shareholding at that EGM.

  167. [88] In any event, Mr Kroll contends that it is only logical and sensible to consider a fair valuation procedure after the documents relevant to the company’s valuation have been disclosed and the merits litigated. In oral submissions, counsel for Mr Kroll explained that there was insufficient information for his client to meaningfully consider the offer; and that his client would only be able to do so after the discovery process had been completed, and after documents relevant to the company’s valuation or assessment - such as those relating to the contract with Xiamen Anne - had been disclosed.

  168. [89] According to Mr Kroll, he has in good faith sought to engage in without-prejudice settlement in his correspondence with the second to fourth Defendants. The statements in his emails that he seeks a buyout of USD30.68 million and /or a buyout of USD13.8 million correspond to Ms Hong’s projection of the next round of valuation and to Relief (2) of his Statement of Claim respectively – a fair value on par with what was presented to Dr Bai and/or conveyed by Ms Hong. Mr Kroll has not shut down all attempts to negotiate: indeed, he invited the defendants to counter-propose since their Open Letter was fraught with uncertainty. He is amenable to the appointment of a joint assessor, save that he reserves his rights to the appointment of an independent assessor in the event that parties are unable to assess to a joint assessor.

  169. [90] Mr Kroll asserts that he has no ulterior or improper purpose. The allegation that Suit 915 is being used to generate scandal so as to “pressure and extort cash from the Defendants” is a speculative and sweeping one. Applying the test in Chee Siok Chin at [34], he has a legitimate basis in mounting a claim in minority oppression; he has in good faith sought to engage in without-prejudice settlement discussions; and his action in Suit 915 does not constitute “multiple or successive proceedings which cause or are likely to cause improper vexation or oppression”.

  170. Dr Bai Bo’s Reply Affidavit of 30 May 2022 & the submissions made on behalf of the second to fourth defendants

  171. [91] In response, the second to fourth Defendants argue that Mr Kroll’s position appears to be that an assessment process “would not be appropriate unless (1) it is by an assessor of his choosing and (2) he knows, ahead of the assessment process, what the final valuation of his share would be” – conditions which the second to fourth Defendants reject as they create bias in Mr Kroll’s favour.

  172. [92] In oral submissions, counsel for the second to fourth Defendants highlighted the salient terms of the buyout offer, the main aim of which was to “immediately avoid further wasted time and agree for a buy-out of [Mr Kroll]’s registered 445,369 shares at a fair value to be determined by an assessor”. The Buyout Offer stipulates that a pro-rata method will be used to value the shares (ie, that the value of shares will be determined by using a percentage of shares multiplied by the company value). In computing this figure, Mr Kroll’s shareholding will be fixed at the pre-dilution level of 7.67%.

  173. [93] As for the “Company Value”, counsel for the second to fourth Defendants noted this was to be determined by the assessor, who would exclude, from the valuation, the alleged oppressive breaches, conduct, acts and/or omissions. Here, the assessor would take into account two factors in determining the company’s value: the date of valuation, and the factors to input towards a valuation. The valuation date would be fixed at 30 April 2021, which was the date of the EGM. 30 April 2021 was proposed as the valuation date since Mr Kroll himself claimed that it was the 30 April 2021 EGM which had resulted in his shares being diluted. What this implies is that a fair valuation of Mr Kroll’s shares should not take into account the events of the EGM which resulted in the share dilution.

  174. [94] While Mr Kroll complains that the allotment of shares to Dr Bai is a fundamental issue of dispute, this does not render the Buyout Offer unreasonable since its starting point is that any buyout will be premised on a shareholding percentage in Mr Kroll’s favour, ie, 7.67%. Further, in respect of Mr Kroll’s complaint that the Buyout Offer excludes the USD180 million valuation of CTX, the second to fourth Defendants contend that this is not viable, given that the USD180 million valuation was extracted from the ARIA, which is itself a direct consequence of the 30 April 2021 resolutions impugned by Mr Kroll. In any event, the second to fourth Defendants argue that the USD180 million figure is not excluded from the assessor’s consideration. As for Mr Kroll’s complaint that the Buyout Offer fails to consider his claim for damages and/or equitable compensation, the Buyout Offer already incorporates an invitation for parties to propose any matters that would impact the value of CTX as at 30 April 2021 (“post-value adjustments”).

  175. [95] In respect of Mr Kroll’s complaint that fair value can only be determined with the benefit of discovery and trial, the second to fourth Defendants submit that Mr Kroll has actually been offered the opportunity to receive the documents on numerous previous occasions. In any event, the Buyout Offer provided for an equality of arms: as noted earlier, parties are free to make submissions to the Assessor on matters which they think would affect the value of the shares; and if Mr Kroll wishes to see any documents before accepting the Buyout Offer, the second to fourth Defendants say they are open to offering the documents.

  176. The framework proposed by the second to fourth Defendants for the consideration of their striking-out application

  177. [96] The second to fourth Defendants have made it clear from the outset that their striking-out application is premised on Mr Kroll’s failure to accept their Buyout Offer. Insofar as the law is concerned, the second to fourth Defendants propose that I apply the following 3-stage framework to determine whether Mr Kroll’s action should be struck out:

  178. O’Neill v Phillips

  179. [97] In O’Neill v Phillips [1999] 1 WLR 1092 (“O’Neill”), which the second to fourth Defendants rely on, Lord Hoffmann laid down the following requirements to determine what constitutes a reasonable offer.

  180. [98] Applying their proposed 3-stage framework, the second to fourth Defendants submit that first, the Buyout Offer satisfies the O’Neill guidelines. Second, the second to fourth Defendants submit that the O’Neill guidelines having been met, there are no other factors which prevent the Buyout Offer from giving Mr Kroll all the reliefs he can reasonably expect to obtain in the proceedings; and Mr Kroll’s reasons for rejecting the offer lack merit. Third, the second to fourth Defendants take the position that in the worst-case scenario, the court is in a position to utilize its tools and procedures to resolve any impediments to Mr Kroll’s acceptance of the offer.

  181. The law on the rejection on an offer to buy the oppressed party’s shares

  182. [99] Generally, it is an abuse of process for an applicant to reject an offer that would provide him with everything sought and to continue instead with proceedings (Balk v Otkritie International Investment Management Ltd [2017] EWCA Civ 134). There is public interest that the court’s resources should not be used for a claim that had become academic in view of the offer (TMT Asia Ltd v BHP Billiton Marketing AG (Singapore Branch) [2019] 5 SLR 69 at [67]). Specifically, in the context of minority oppression claims, where there is a reasonable offer to purchase the allegedly oppressed party’s shares, an action for oppression cannot be sustained (Lim Swee Khiang and another v Borden Co (Pte) Ltd and others [2005] 4 SLR(R) 141 (“Lim Swee Khiang”) at [97], citing O’Neill) The High Court in Lim Swee Khiang cited (at [97] Lord Hoffmann’s five guidelines in determining what would be a reasonable offer (“the O’Neill guidelines”):

  183. [100] At this juncture, it is useful to consider the application of the O’Neill guidelines in caselaw. As discussed below (see [101] to [118]), the Singapore and the English courts have consistently applied the O’Neill guidelines (even if not expressly referred to as such) in considering the reasonableness of an offer. However, English cases have emphasised that the mere fact that an offer is reasonable does not mean that the courts will automatically strike out an action if the plaintiff rejects the offer. Similarly, Singapore caselaw shows that our courts do not stop at applying the O’Neill guidelines but also proceed to consider other factors in determining whether a reasonable offer renders the continued prosecution of the action an abuse of process – eg, whether the offer has addressed all reliefs sought in the suit.

  184. Local cases

  185. [101] In Lim Swee Khiang, the plaintiffs were minority shareholders of a company known as Borden. They brought a petition under s 216 of the CA, alleging that the defendants (the majority shareholders) had conducted the affairs of Borden in a manner which was oppressive to them and / or which disregarded their interests as members of Borden. While the High Court dismissed the claim on grounds that the minority oppression claim was not made out, the court took the view (at [102]) that the plaintiffs - in choosing to continue with the action instead of responding to the buyout offer - were guilty of an abuse of process. In reaching that conclusion, the court found that the offer substantially met the O’Neill guidelines. The defendants’ solicitors had written in 11 days after the commencement of the action to state that the defendants were willing to purchase the plaintiffs’ shares pursuant to a valuation by a professional valuer to be agreed upon between the parties (at [95]). The plaintiffs had declined to discuss the mechanics of valuation or any details of the valuation or offer. The court noted that if they had responded in a positive way, these issues could have formed part of the negotiations, and the court could have made a decision on the points on which parties were unable to agree (at [98]).

  186. [103] In Lim Chee Twang v Chan Shuk Kuen Helina and others [2010] 2 SLR 209 (“Lim Chee Twang”), the High Court held (at [140]) that the offer to buy out the plaintiff’s shareholding in the companies - “reasonable as it was” - did not render the continuation of the action an abuse of process, because the offer did not cover all the entities involved and also failed to address a number of contested issues such as Ms Chan’s disputed loans to BVI (at [138], [140]).

  187. [105] Further, the High Court was not satisfied that the procedure for valuation set out in both offers would suffice to determine the fair value of the plaintiff’s shares: a trial would have been required to determine various issues in dispute which affected the value of the shares. These included issues such as the validity of the allotment of some four million shares to another company, MDG, as well as the wrongful payment of legal fees. Lastly, apart from considering the O’Neill guidelines, the court noted (at [218]) that the second offer had been made at the eleventh hour, and the plaintiff “could hardly be expected to give up six years of litigation on the eve of trial on the basis of such an offer”.

  188. English cases

  189. [106] Turning to English caselaw, we find – even prior to O’Neill – a number of English authorities which dealt with applications to strike out unfair prejudice petitions on the basis that a buyout offer had been made offering the petitioner all the relief which he/she could reasonably expect to obtain at trial.

  190. [107] Re a Company No. 00836 of 1995 [1996] BCC 432 concerned a motion to strike out a petition under s 459 of the Companies Act 1985 on the basis that an offer had been made to purchase the petitioner’s shares which would give the petitioner all the relief he could realistically expect to obtain on his petition, and that it would be an abuse of the process of court for him to continue with the petition. The case arose out of a long-running dispute between a father, Mr Albert Thompson (“AT”), and one of his two sons, Julian Thompson (“JT”). The company, which was the subject matter of the application, Gippeswyk Investment Co Ltd (“GICL”), was incorporated in 1960; and in 1962, AT acquired all 200 issued shares in the company in exchange for land which he put into the company. Of the 200 shares, AT held 50 shares, with his two sons holding the remaining shares equally. The falling out between JT and his father, AT, led to JT effectively taking over GICL together with his brother, John. This also precipitated the long running feud between father and son in which numerous lawsuits were filed. Insofar as GICL was concerned, AT commenced the present action when John purported to sell his shares in GICL to JT. AT applied to set aside the purported sale, and also issued a minority shareholder’s petition under s 459 of the Companies Act 1985 alleging that GICL’s affairs were being conducted in a way that was prejudicial to his interests. In response, JT applied to strike out his father’s application under s 459 on the basis that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action and / or was an abuse of process of the court.

  191. [109] In Re a Company No. 006834 of 1988 (1989) 5 BCC 218, the company was in the business of organising ski holidays in Savoie. It was started in 1978 by the respondent, Kramer, and one Guyatt. Kramer held two-thirds of the share capital with Guyatt holding the remaining one-third. In 1986, Guyatt decided to sever his connections with the company and sold his shares to the petitioner, Kay. Unfortunately for both Kramer and Kay, the business association was unsuccessful, and they agreed that the company should be dissolved. Kay made various complaints against Kramer, alleging, amongst other things that he had charged personal expenses to the company and allowed members of his family and friends to have holidays at the company’s expense. Kramer’s solicitors wrote to Kay with an open offer to buy his shares in the company at open market value, to be determined by an independent valuer jointly appointed by the parties. This offer supposedly went further than the common form pre-emption provision in the company’s articles which provided that:

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