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Grounds publishedDecided 28 Sep 2022

General Division of the High Court

Wham Kwok Han Jolovan v Public Prosecutor

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[2022] SGHC 241Case no. Magistrate’s Appeal No 9038 of 202211 paragraphs

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Grounds of decision

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  1. Background facts

  2. [4] The appellant entered the State Courts to attend the said court proceedings before leaving at approximately 9.45am.

  3. The decision below

  4. [6] The District Judge (“the DJ”) found that the appellant committed an offence under s 15(2) of the POA.

  5. [10] The DJ imposed a fine of $3,000 (in default 15 days’ imprisonment) on the appellant (“the Sentence”). The DJ found that the appellant had committed the offence with actual knowledge of its proscription. He carefully deliberated when, where and how to broadcast his opposition to the Attorney-General’s Chambers. He also took efforts to broadcast his actions by making the Post. The appellant’s antecedents for similar offences were not taken into consideration; at the time he committed the present offence, the appellant had yet to be convicted of the said antecedents. Finally, the DJ considered that the sentence broadly cohered with the sentence of a fine of $3,000 meted out in Public Prosecutor v Yan Jun [2016] SGMC 24 (“Yan Jun”).

  6. The parties’ submissions

  7. The appellant’s submissions

  8. [13] Third, the Sentence was manifestly excessive. The offender in Yan Jun was fined $3,000 for committing a far more egregious offence.

  9. The respondent’s submissions

  10. [15] Additionally, the appellant’s interpretation of “assembly” undermines the Commissioner’s discretion to grant or refuse a permit in respect of a proposed assembly under s 7(1) of the POA as well as the purpose of the permit scheme which is to pre-empt and prevent instances of public disorder.

  11. My decision

  12. Section 15(2) of the POA

  13. [19] Sections 2(1) and 15(2) of the POA respectively provide:

  14. [21] The purposive interpretation of a legislative provision involves three steps (Tan Cheng Bock v Attorney-General [2017] 2 SLR 850 (“Tan Cheng Bock”) at [37]–[53]):

  15. (a) First, the court should ascertain possible interpretations of the provision, having regard to the text of the provision as well as the context of the provision within the written law as a whole. This is done by determining the ordinary meaning of the words and could be aided by rules and canons of statutory construction.

  16. (b) Second, the court should ascertain the legislative purpose of the statute. Legislative purpose should ordinarily be gleaned from the text itself. Extraneous material may be considered in the situations set out under s 9A(2) of the Interpretation Act 1965 (2020 Rev Ed) (“IA”).

  17. (c) Third, the court should compare the possible interpretations of the text against the purpose of the statute. An interpretation which furthered the purpose of the written text was to be preferred to one which did not.

  18. [27] In this regard, the POA regulates which assemblies require a permit and the grounds for refusing to grant such a permit where a permit is required (Jolovan Wham (CA) at [16]). Section 7(2)(a) of the POA provides that upon receiving any notice and application under s 6 of the POA for a permit in respect of a proposed public assembly or public procession, the Commissioner of Police (“the Commissioner”) may refuse to grant a permit if he has reasonable ground for apprehending that the proposed assembly or procession may occasion public disorder, or damage to public or private property. The word “occasion” – particularly when deployed in conjunction with the clause “damage to public or private property” – suggests that the Commissioner has to consider whether the proposed assembly may result in public disorder. If so, then the appellant’s proposed interpretation leads to an illogical position, namely, that while an “assembly” invariably causes public disorder, the Commissioner must consider if the assembly may result in public disorder in deciding whether to refuse to grant a permit.

  19. Whether the appellant had actual knowledge that holding the assembly was prohibited by an order under s 12(1) of the POA

  20. [30] The appellant’s submissions in this regard were two-fold. It should be recalled that the Commissioner had, on 5 December 2018, denied the appellant permission to hold up placards outside the State Courts for five minutes on 9 December 2018 to mark Human Rights Day and raise awareness of human rights issues (see [9] above). The appellant first contended that his acts which formed the subject of the present charge were “a far cry” from what he planned and was denied permission to do on 9 December 2018 and he thus did not know that he required a permit to perform the former acts. Second, the appellant submitted that it was not unreasonable for him to believe that no permit was required for taking a “quick photograph” outside the State Courts.

  21. The appeal against sentence

  22. [35] It must be remembered, however, that the role of the appellate court differs from that of a court sentencing an offender at first instance. Appellate intervention on the ground that a sentence is manifestly excessive is only warranted when the sentence “requires substantial alterations rather than minute corrections to remedy the injustice” (Public Prosecutor v Siew Boon Loong [2005] 1 SLR(R) 611 at [22]). Additionally, due to the extraordinary range of possible factual circumstances, attempts to narrowly distinguish sentencing precedents are ordinarily not very helpful and may sometimes lead to missing the wood for the trees (Public Prosecutor v Leong Soon Kheong [2009] 4 SLR(R) 63 at [32]).

  23. Conclusion

  24. [37] For the above reasons, I dismissed the appeal against conviction and sentence.