General Division of the High Court · Decided 11 October 2022
Dai Yi Ting v Chuang Fu Yuan (Grabcycle (SG) Pte Ltd and another, third parties)
Feedback & support[2022] SGHC 253 · Case no. Suit No 1041 of 2021 (Summons No 1644 of 2022) · 17 paragraphs
✱ What happened, in plain English
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Official text from eLitigation
Background
- [1]
[1] This summons was the defendant’s application to bifurcate the trial in HC/S 1041/2021 (“Suit 1041”), pursuant to O 33 r 2 of the Rules of Court (2014 Rev Ed) (“ROC 2014”). In Suit 1041, the plaintiff, Ms Dai Yi Ting, is claiming against the defendant, Mr Chuang Fu Yuan, in negligence for personal injuries arising from an accident on 27 February 2019. Broadly, Suit 1041 involves an e-scooter rented from the first third party, Grabcycle (SG) Pte Ltd, that was driven within the premises of the second third party, the National University of Singapore. The defendant was operating the e-scooter and the plaintiff was a pillion rider.
The parties’ arguments
- [3]
[3] At the hearing before me, Ms Istyana Putri Ibrahim (“Ms Ibrahim”) submitted on behalf of the defendant that it was just and convenient to bifurcate the trial. To begin with, Ms Ibrahim suggested that there are broadly three issues for determination at trial:
- [4]
[4] With these broad issues in mind, Ms Ibrahim advanced three reasons for the trial to be bifurcated:
- [5]
[5] The plaintiff was against bifurcation. Ms Michelle Kaur (“Ms Kaur”) submitted on behalf of the plaintiff that the plaintiff is a “sensitive” plaintiff. Specifically, the plaintiff has sustained multiple injuries that have impaired her brain’s functioning. As such, it would be unjust and unfair for the plaintiff to attend court twice: she would be faced with the strain of being on the stand twice and would also have to re-live the accident while struggling with the impairments caused by her brain injuries.
- [6]
[6] To substantiate this point, Ms Kaur showed me a report from the plaintiff’s psychiatrist, Dr Calvin Fones, which stated that “protracted litigation has been a major source of stress and serves as a maintaining factor of her depression”. However, I attached little or no weight to the report as it was not exhibited by way of an affidavit. Instead, the letter was attached as an annex to the plaintiff’s submissions for the hearing. In gist, however, the plaintiff’s case was that she dreads seeing the defendant twice over, as she would have to, should the trial be bifurcated.
- [8]
[8] Finally, Ms Kaur suggested that the defendant’s application for bifurcation was premature as the parties may reach a resolution at mediation and there would therefore be no need for further litigation in court.
The applicable law
The power to order bifurcation
General principles on the power to order bifurcation
Precedent
- [17]
[17] In the subsequent High Court decision of Scintronix Corp Ltd v Ho Kang Peng and another [2011] SGHC 28 (“Scintronix”), Kan Ting Chiu J similarly had to decide whether the hearing of the plaintiff’s action against the two defendants should be bifurcated. The plaintiff’s action against the first defendant was for breaches of his contractual, fiduciary and/or statutory duties, and the action against the second defendant was for breaches of his contractual duties.
Principle
Policy
Summary of the general principles
(1) Degree of demarcation between issues of liability and of damages
(2) The complexity of the issues of liability and of damages
(3) The prevailing policies on case management
- [33]
[33] Indeed, the changing sentiments on case management were also considered in Gibney. McFarland J said this at [6]:
It was emphasised that Coenen heralded a movement away from the earlier practice of shying away from split trials (ie, bifurcating the trial) save in exceptional circumstances, and instead, the modern approach is that the courts should be more ready to grant separate trials when just and convenient to do so.
(4) Effect of bifurcation on party opposing bifurcation
- [36]
[36] More importantly, Templeman LJ considered that the trial in Abbey Life Assurance from the defendant’s perspective would become distorted. This is because, if the defendant failed to convince the trial judge that the plaintiff had not suffered any loss, then there would remain the trial for damages. However, by then, because of the way it would have run its case, the defendant would have “fired off all [its] artillery in the form of [its] evidence on quantum”. This would give the plaintiff an unfair benefit because, in the time between judgment for liability and trial for damages, the plaintiff would be able to prepare itself extensively, having already had prior knowledge of the defendant’s evidence on damages. The defendant would be caught in a difficult position of deciding between recalling the same witnesses who may have already given evidence on quantum during the trial for liability and duplicating them by calling other witnesses. Whichever course the defendant ended up choosing, its evidence would be of a less profound effect than if it had been able to wait until after the plaintiff had shown its hand on the question of damages.
Specific principles on the power to order bifurcation in personal injury cases
Particular concerns in personal injury cases
- [39]
[39] In this regard, I considered that there had been some debate in the United States (“US”) concerning the bifurcation of personal injury cases. Although the US system is markedly different from ours, I regarded the debate in that jurisdiction as potentially relevant, if only to conceptualise the concerns particular to personal injury cases.
Particular factors to personal injury cases
(1) Two general considerations
(A) No general concern against bifurcation in personal injury cases
(B) The general irrelevance of any tactical advantage accruing to the plaintiff
- [44]
[44] Second, the tactical advantage that might accrue to a plaintiff in a personal injury case by not ordering bifurcation should not be a relevant consideration. In Millar, the plaintiff suffered severe injuries when he was hit by a car driven by the first defendant while crossing a road to attend a fete (an outdoor public function usually organised for charity) at his school. Traffic was heavy on that day. Furthermore, a line of stationary vehicles had built up behind a fire engine, which was one of the attractions at the fete. The plaintiff sued the first defendant for negligent driving. He also sued the North Eastern Education and Library Board (“the Board”) in negligence for failing to take steps to protect children who might be at risk from traffic around the fete. On the Board’s application, the Master granted an application for bifurcation. On appeal, a judge reversed the Master’s decision. The Board then appealed to the Court of Appeal. The plaintiff’s primary argument before the Court of Appeal was that it would be hard on him to give evidence twice, and that if the trial were not split, there would be a greater incentive for the defendants to settle.
- [46]
[46] Similarly, McFarland J in Gibney was confronted with the defendant’s argument that the plaintiff’s application for bifurcation was merely a tactical device to ground an interim payment application. In response, the learned judge pithily noted that it was his experience that “most applications, of whatever type, made by parties tend to be motivated to gain tactical advantage”. This is the self-evident essence of adversarial proceedings. However, McFarland J maintained that each case must be dealt with on its own facts and appeared to discount the primary relevance of any supposed tactical advantage accruing to the plaintiff.
(2) Four particular factors
(A) Degree of uncertainty in plaintiff’s future
(B) The point at which firm prognosis of the plaintiff can be made
(C) The complexity of the facts and availability of evidence
- [50]
[50] Third, depending on the complexity of the facts, as well as the existence of video or other documentary evidence, it may be better for the trial for liability to take place before damages. This will be especially the case if an earlier determination on liability is made easier because the facts are fresher in everyone’s memory (see White Book at para 33/3/5).
(D) Possibility for consolidation of several actions
My decision: this was an appropriate case for bifurcation
- [52]
[52] With the principles discussed in mind, I decided that this was an apt case for bifurcation. The onus was on the defendant to show why it was necessary to bifurcate the matter. Applying the “just and convenient” test, I agreed that this was an apt case for bifurcation for the following reasons that were advanced before me.
The defendant’s reasons for bifurcation
- [54]
[54] Second, I agreed with the defendant that there are potentially difficult issues arising from the multiplicity of parties involved. This is especially the case since the defendant, as he is entitled to do, has brought in the two relevant third parties in the action. In particular, I also agreed with the defendant that the issues of damages might be inherently complex. They may potentially require a rather involved process. It would therefore be more efficient and in the interests of justice for issues of liability to be decided first.
The plaintiff’s reasons against bifurcation
- [56]
[56] First, as important as they are, the plaintiff’s difficulties, such as having to attend trial twice over, were personal in nature. As with the case in Millar, these were therefore not strictly relevant to the determination on bifurcation, which is more focused on the broader questions of efficiency (which is in the public interest) and whether substantive justice can be better achieved for all parties (including the plaintiff but also the defendant).
- [58]
[58] Third, the plaintiff also alluded to the fact that the third parties had already been asking for a quantification of her claims so that they could take instructions on mediation. I did not think that this assisted the plaintiff. Whether proceedings are bifurcated (or not) should not stop her or her solicitors from providing this information, which would necessarily be tentative prior to the final judicial disposition of the matter, to the third parties.
Conclusion