General Division of the High Court · Decided 12 October 2022
ICOP Construction (SG) Pte Ltd v Tiong Seng Civil Engineering Pte Ltd
Feedback & support[2022] SGHC 257 · Case no. Suit No 1086 of 2019
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Introduction
Background
- [2]
[2] The plaintiff, ICOP Construction (SG) Pte Ltd (“ICOP”), is a company incorporated in Singapore. It is in the business of constructing, amongst other things, water, gas and sewage pipelines. Tiong Seng Civil Engineering Pte Ltd (“TSCE”), the defendant, was also incorporated in Singapore, and its business is the provision of infrastructure engineering design and consultancy services, as well as the construction of civil engineering projects. TSCE belonged to a group of companies which included Tiong Seng Contractors Pte Ltd (“TSC”).
- [3]
[3] In or around June 2016, TSC was engaged by the Public Utilities Board (the “PUB”) to construct a potable water pipeline (the “Project”). TSC subcontracted the Project wholly to TSCE. Around May 2017, TSCE entered into a subcontract with ICOP for the performance of microtunnelling works which constitute part of the Project. This was done through the execution of a letter of award as amended by a supplemental letter (the “LOA”), both of which were dated 15 April 2017. The terms of their subcontract were captured in several documents set out in cl 1.1 of the LOA and, collectively, I will refer to them as the “Subcontract”. In the course of this judgment, I will reproduce the relevant terms reflected in the Subcontract, as necessary.
- [4]
[4] The Project, which was titled “Proposed 1600mm diameter pipeline from AYE/Henderson Road to River Valley Road”, was part of a larger project for the construction of potable water pipelines from Jalan Kampung Chantek to Marina South and River Valley Road. As far as the Project was concerned, ICOP was engaged to install: “124m of DN1200mm Reinforced Concrete Composite Pipe with built in Mild Steel Collar” and “2229m of DN1600mm” of the same type of pipe. The installation method was microtunnelling, and this was to be carried out in four drives: the first was for the installation of the shorter DN1200mm pipeline (the “DN1200mm Pipeline”), and the other three drives were to install the longer DN1600mm pipeline (the “DN1600mm Pipeline”). I should also add that “DN” (Diameter Nominal) refers to the internal diameter of the pipe.
- [5]
[5] Briefly, microtunnelling is a method of installing pipelines which entails “thrusting pipes through the ground as controlled excavation is undertaken at the cutter-face of the microtunnel boring machine (the “MTBM”)”. An illustration and description of a typical microtunnelling setup is assistive:
- [6]
[6] ICOP’s further description of the process, as given by their main factual witness, Cheng Ching Keong (“Dato Cheng”), is as follows:
- [8]
[8] This general description of the Project and of how microtunnelling works are carried out is sufficient, at this point, to understand the nature of the parties’ dispute. As and when further details are necessary to understand the specific issues before me, I shall then set them out.
- [9]
[9] I will not dedicate a section in this judgment to the general context and chronology of the parties’ contractual relationship. It suffices to note that in the middle of 2017, ICOP commenced the first drive to install the DN1200mm Pipeline (“Drive 1”); then in 2018, it carried out the second drive to install a section of the DN1600mm Pipeline (“Drive 2”). During Drive 2, the parties were already facing tensions and disagreements. So much so that after Drive 2 in March 2019, and before the commencement of the third drive, ICOP considered itself justified in terminating the Subcontract. Interspersed between these three key events were – obviously – many important sub-events, activities and communications. These, however, are better dealt with together with the merits of the various claims and counterclaims brought by ICOP and TSCE respectively. This is because, for the most part, the issues before me are relatively discrete.
- [10]
[10] On this note, I turn to those issues.
Overview of the issues
- [11]
[11] The issues to be determined are as follows:
(a) Issue 1: Whether there was a contractual variation which enables ICOP to recover additional costs it incurred from using hydraulic joints for the DN1200mm Pipeline instead of cheaper chipboard. On ICOP’s case, it incurred $77,004 in additional costs from the use of hydraulic joints.
(b) Issue 2: Whether there was a contractual variation to reduce the length of each pipe section for the DN1600mm Pipeline installed in Drive 2, such that ICOP is entitled to recover additional costs it incurred from having to use a greater number of hydraulic joints between each of those pipe sections. On ICOP’s case, the additional costs incurred were $95,087.98.
(c) Issue 3: Whether ICOP may recover, as damages, the additional costs it incurred as a result of TSCE’s alleged failure to construct the headwall for the launching shaft for Drive 2 (“Shaft P5-2”) in accordance with the specifications in the Subcontract or its duty of care. Specifically, it failed to construct a headwall that was capable of sustaining a maximum face pressure of 1.75 bar. Such costs – which ICOP claims amounts to $94,821.30 – include those resulting from consequent delays caused by TSCE needing to reconstruct the headwall, as well as ICOP having to demobilise its equipment from Shaft P5-2 whilst it was being reconstructed and, subsequently, remobilise its equipment back to the shaft after the reconstruction of the headwall.
(d) Issue 4: Whether ICOP may recover, as damages, the additional costs it incurred from having to extensively dismantle the MTBM before it could be extracted from the receiving shaft of Drive 2 (“Shaft P5-1”). ICOP claimed that these steps were required because TSCE failed to construct Shaft P5-1 in accordance with the specifications in the Subcontract, or its duty of care. On this, ICOP pleads that the losses it suffered amounts to $104,154.54.
(e) Issue 5: Whether TSCE is liable to pay ICOP for interim works it performed in December 2018 and January 2019 for Drive 2, pursuant to the Subcontract. In respect of the works ICOP carried out in December 2018, ICOP claims $335,376.06 and 7% goods and services tax (“GST”). As regards the works done in January 2019, ICOP claims $255,762.61 and 7% GST. It bears noting, however, that these sums include ICOP’s separate claims for: (a) the cost of additional hydraulic joints used in the installation of the DN1600mm Pipeline (see Issue 2 at [11(b)] above); and (b) monies which ICOP alleges that TSCE wrongfully retained as security (see Issue 8 at [11(h)] below). Accordingly, if ICOP does not succeed in respect of those issues, but succeeds on this issue, these sums will need to be deducted.
(f) Issue 6: Whether TSCE is liable to pay ICOP, on a quantum meruit basis, for additional works and services ICOP provided between June 2018 and May 2019 at TSCE’s request. The value of these works and services is said to amount to $54,438.66.
(g) Issue 7: Whether TSCE or ICOP is liable for various delays they each aver was caused by the other either in breach of the Subcontract or their respective duties of care in tort. On ICOP’s case, TSCE caused a 158-working day delay and, as a result, ICOP incurred $2,516,774.98 in additional overheads and expenses. It is this sum which ICOP now seeks to recover. On the opposite end, TSCE pleads that each of the delays in respect of which ICOP seeks to recover damages, was instead caused by ICOP’s own conduct. It is TSCE’s case that, in fact, ICOP had caused delays above and beyond those it seeks to attribute to TSCE. On its part, TSCE claims that ICOP was responsible for a 266-calendar day delay and, on this basis, it brings a primary counterclaim for liquidated damages for the period of the delay. In the alternative, on the basis that it is found to have delayed ICOP’s completion and time is set at large, TSCE contends that ICOP nevertheless exceeded the “reasonable time” it would have had and would still be liable for delay damages in excess of such time.
(h) Issue 8: As mentioned at [8], ICOP terminated the Subcontract in 2019 and claims to have been entitled to do so on the basis that a clause of the Subcontract conferred a right of termination in the event that it: (a) fulfilled its obligations under the Subcontract; and (b) for reasons beyond its control, it could not start or continue with its work in a timely manner. Given Issue 7, it is plainly in dispute whether ICOP had indeed “fulfilled its obligations under the [Subcontract]”. In addition to this, however, it is also in dispute whether ICOP was unable to start or continue its work in a timely manner. On the footing that it was legally entitled to terminate the Subcontract, ICOP claims $72,711.80 as the balance sum owing for work done as well as $61,517.48 which was retained as security. It is to be noted that a portion of these sums are contained within the sums claimed under Issue 5 (see [11(e)] above). Conversely, if ICOP was not entitled to terminate – and its termination was therefore wrongful – TSCE seeks to recover damages for its loss of the benefit of ICOP’s services under the Subcontract.
(i) Issue 9: This issue is connected to Issues 7 and 8. Pursuant to the Subcontract, ICOP furnished TSCE with a performance bond issued by the Singapore branch of BNP Paribas for the sum of $570,000 (the “Performance Bond”). The relevant term of the Subcontract provided that TSCE was entitled to call on this Performance Bond “to make good any cost, expense, loss or damage sustained by [it] as a result of any breach of default under the [Subcontract] by [ICOP] or in satisfaction of any sum due from [ICOP] to TSCE”. After ICOP terminated the Subcontract, TSCE called on the full sum of the Performance Bond and, to this, ICOP primarily pleads that such call was wrongful as it had not acted in breach of the Subcontract. In the alternative, ICOP avers that TSCE did not sustain any costs, expenses, losses or damages which entitled it to call on the Performance Bond. ICOP thus seeks recovery of the full sum of $570,000.
(j) Issue 10: Whether ICOP is liable to TSCE, either on a contractual or quantum meruit basis, for the cost of diesel supplied by the latter for the purposes of powering an electricity generator. It is TSCE’s case that ICOP is liable for a sum of $106,825.59.
(k) Issue 11: Whether ICOP is liable to pay backcharges for the cost of slurry disposal paid for by TSCE. On TSCE’s case, the amount owing is $96,392.40.
- [12]
[12] Before I turn to consider these 11 issues, it bears highlighting that ICOP had also furnished another bond issued by BNP Paribas for the sum of $570,000 after it received advance payment for the same sum from TSCE (the “Advance Payment Bond”). Similar to its case in respect of the Performance Bond, ICOP pleads in its statement of claim (“SOC”) that TSCE wrongfully called on this Advance Payment Bond after the Subcontract was terminated, though not for the full sum, but for $385,360.41. However, ICOP’s SOC does not include a claim for damages for such wrongful call. At trial as well as in closing submissions, ICOP confirmed that no such claim was being made. Thus, given that the bond was to secure an advance payment, the fact that the Advance Payment Bond was called on is largely inconsequential. The quantum of advance payment actually received by TSCE simply needs to be taken into account if I allow ICOP’s claims in respect of Issues 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, and 8, and thus hold TSCE liable for unpaid fees or damages.
- [13]
[13] I now deal with the 11 issues before me.
Issue 1: Hydraulic joints for DN1200mm Pipeline
- [14]
[14] This claim mostly succeeds and I award ICOP $76,538.25 (instead of the sum of $77,004 it claims in its SOC). The parties’ respective quantum experts – George Wall (“Mr Wall”) for ICOP and Alasdair Snadden (“Mr Snadden”) for TSCE – agree that $76,538.25 is the sum to which ICOP should be entitled to recover in the event that I find in its favour. I will now briefly set out the parties’ cases and explain my decision.
- [18]
[18] With TSCE’s third submission out of the way, there are to my mind, two key questions which need to be answered to resolve Issue 1. One, did the parties agree that the pipe sections for the DN1200mm Pipeline would be 3.5m or 3.0m, and, connectedly, did the parties contemplate the use of hydraulic joints on the original terms of the Subcontract as executed? Two, if the parties did not agree from the execution of the Subcontract that ICOP would use hydraulic joints in its installation of the DN1200mm Pipeline, did they subsequently agree to vary the Subcontract to provide for the use of such joints?
- [19]
[19] To determine the answer to the first question, reference needs to be made to various parts of the Subcontract:
(a) The method statement for the Project (the “Method Statement”), which constitutes a part of the Subcontract, suggests that the length of each pipe section was contemplated to be 3.0m.
(b) A section of the bill of quantities (the “BQ”), which also forms a part of the Subcontract, similarly suggests that the parties contemplated the pipe length to be 3.0m. However, it should be noted that this section of the BQ is not a priced item, but rather a description in the BQ outside the actual list of quantities, rates and prices.
(c) Yet, in the same section of the Method Statement cited above, it is stated that “V100 Chipboard Thickness 40mm” was contemplated for use in the installation of the DN1200mm Pipeline.
- [20]
[20] From these three points, it can be seen that the Subcontract is not wholly consistent. It seems that the Subcontract does expressly provide for the use of chipboard. However, the fact that it also states that pipe sections are to be 3.0m long creates a mild contradiction. The contradiction is as follows. On one hand, the Method Statement expressly provides that the parties contemplated the use of chipboard, not hydraulic joints. On the other, the evidence also shows that ICOP knew well before the execution of the Subcontract that the length of pipe sections would be 3.0m, and that such length would likely require the use of hydraulic joints. Indeed, Dato Cheng’s own evidence suggests that ICOP had such knowledge. Yet, as TSCE submits, despite having such knowledge, ICOP “did not bother to price the provision of hydraulic joints separately for the [DN1200mm Pipeline] because it [was] a short pipeline”.
- [21]
[21] The issue to which this contradiction gives rise is whether I should take the express reference to “chipboard” in the Method Statement as obliging ICOP only to use chipboard and not hydraulic joints; or, whether I should infer from the provision of 3.0m-long pipes in the Subcontract and the surrounding context, a common intention between the parties that ICOP was obliged to use hydraulic joints due to technical constraints. After consideration, I find that this contradiction should be resolved in ICOP’s favour. In my judgment, the fact that ICOP knew about the issues which could arise from the use of 3.0m-long pipe sections – even when coupled with the fact that the Method Statement and the BQ record the pipe length as 3.0m – is not enough to conclude that the parties agreed by the Subcontract that ICOP would provide hydraulic joints for the DN1200mm Pipeline as part of an “all-in” rate set out in the BQ. Put simply, I do not think there is enough evidence for me to read into S/O 2.0 of the BQ, an agreement between TSCE and ICOP that the sum quoted therein includes the provision of hydraulic joints such that ICOP’s ultimate provision of such joints was not pursuant to any “variation”, but rather the terms of the Subcontract as executed in May 2017.
- [22]
[22] I have two reasons for this view. First, ICOP’s final quotation to TSCE was issued 22 October 2016. This predates the execution of the Subcontract as well as TSCE and ICOP’s pre-contractual discussions regarding the length of pipe sections for the DN1200mm Pipeline (see [20] above). The price quoted in this document for the installation of the DN1200mm Pipeline is identical to that in the BQ. I was not referred to any evidence showing that ICOP specifically applied its mind to whether a price adjustment was necessary in light of the fact that it would likely need to, additionally, supply hydraulic joints when this was not contemplated in its earlier 22 October 2016 quotation. This suggests to me that ICOP simply did not consider the point.
- [23]
[23] Of course, if the Subcontract clearly stipulated that ICOP was obliged to supply hydraulic joints, ICOP’s lack of consideration would not be relevant. However – and this is my second reason – the Subcontract is ambiguous. It requires me to infer this intention from contextual information and the fact that pipe lengths were to be 3.0m. This is hardly a model of contractual clarity, and when coupled with the fact that the Method Statement expressly provides that chipboard was to be used, the ambiguity is even greater. This portion of the Method Statement has equal contractual force as the terms providing that the length of the pipes was to be 3.0m and there is no clear reason why one should be preferred over the other.
- [25]
[25] With this finding in mind, I can turn to the second question posed at [18]. Having reviewed the evidence placed before me, I find that ICOP supplied the hydraulic joints pursuant to a variation, not of its own volition. The earliest point at which ICOP sought payment for the hydraulic joints it used in connection with the DN1200mm Pipeline was 16 May 2018. TSCE contends that this letter has little probative value because the DN1200mm Pipeline works were completed by 14 August 2017 and ICOP made no claims at the material time. Its letter of 16 May 2018 should thus be construed as a mere “afterthought and a contrived attempt to recover more monies from TSCE”. I do not accept this.
Issue 2: Hydraulic joints for DN1600mm Pipeline
- [27]
[27] This claim mostly succeeds and I award ICOP $83,351.27 (instead of the sum of $95,087.98 it claims in its SOC). As with Issue 1, $83,351.27 is the sum to which Mr Wall and Mr Snadden agree that ICOP should be entitled to recover in the event that I find in its favour. I now briefly set out the parties’ cases and explain my decision.
- [29]
[29] TSCE disputes liability on three grounds. First, it asserts that ICOP was not merely obliged to supply the hydraulic joints necessary for the construction of the DN1600mm Pipeline using 3.5m pipe sections. Rather, as the Subcontract was a re-measurement contract, ICOP was simply obliged to supply the number of joints necessary for the total length of pipeline which it actually constructs, irrespective of the length of the pipe sections used. Second, a different section of the BQ, which TSCE asserts is “relevant”, shows that the length of pipe sections was contemplated to be 3.0m. TSCE also relies on other evidence to show that ICOP was aware – prior to executing the Subcontract – that the length of pipe sections for the DN1600mm Pipeline would be 3.0m, not 3.5m. Thus, on this basis, TSCE claims there was no “variation”. Third, and in any case, TSCE avers that it did not instruct ICOP to construct the DN1600mm Pipeline using 3.0m pipe sections; this was ICOP’s own decision.
- [30]
[30] I do not accept TSCE’s first contention. Although the Subcontract was a re-measurement contract, that does not mean – as TSCE asserts – that the sum it was liable to pay was based solely on the “length of the pipe constructed”. The BQ set out a specific rate per metre for ICOP’s supply of hydraulic joints based on a pipe length of 3.5m. One logically expects this rate to increase if the length of each pipe section was shortened, and thus, more hydraulic joints are required. It is wholly unrealistic for TSCE to suggest that ICOP would have provided the exact same per metre quotation for hydraulic joints irrespective of the number of joints which ICOP would actually need to use in the installation of the pipeline.
- [31]
[31] I also do not accept TSCE’s second contention. The BQ is not consistent, but, in my view, the priced item (on which ICOP relies) should be preferred over the fringe description of the characteristics of the DN1600mm Pipeline on which TSCE relies. On this basis alone, I am prepared to find that the Subcontract provided for 3.5m-long pipes. However, I should add that I am mindful of the cross-examination of Dato Cheng conducted by TSCE’s counsel. The point which counsel sought to establish during this segment of cross-examination was that ICOP was aware – prior to the execution of the Subcontract – that the length of pipe sections for the DN1600mm Pipeline would be 3.0m, not 3.5m. In my view, however, this is irrelevant. What ICOP subjectively knew or did not know is beside the point. The priced item in the BQ recorded that ICOP was to supply hydraulic joints at a certain rate per metre, and the item specifically states that the pipe length was to be 3.5m. Even if it can be said that ICOP subjectively knew that the DN1600mm Pipeline was to be built with 3.0m-long pipe sections, the BQ plainly shows that the rate per metre of hydraulic joints charged by ICOP was contingent on the pipe sections being 3.5m long. There is no evidence to suggest that ICOP’s knowledge caused it to adjust the pricing in the BQ prior to executing the Subcontract. There is therefore little I can make of TSCE’s cross-examination of Dato Cheng.
- [32]
[32] This brings me then to TSCE’s third contention and whether it instructed ICOP – after the execution of the Subcontract – to construct the DN1600mm Pipeline using 3.0m instead of 3.5m-long pipe sections. As would be apparent from my decision (at [27] above), I find that TSCE did so instruct. In arriving at this conclusion, I relied on two documents. First, emails were sent by TSCE to ICOP in July 2017 (after the Subcontract was executed in May 2017) with pipe jacking drawings which showed 3.0m-long pipe sections. Second, emails were sent by TSCE to ICOP in November 2017, with shop drawings showing, again, 3.0m-long pipe sections. In light of my finding that the Subcontract, as executed, provided for 3.5m-long pipe sections, these emails from TSCE are sufficient to constitute an instruction capable of effecting a variation. For completeness, I should call attention to cl 4.3 of the LOA:
Issue 3: Headwall defects in Shaft P5-2
- [34]
[34] This claim fails and may be disposed of briefly.
- [35]
[35] The thrust of ICOP’s claim is that TSCE failed to construct the headwall in Shaft P5-2 such that it was capable of withstanding 1.75 bar of pressure. On ICOP’s case, TSCE was obliged – whether by contract or tort – to ensure that the headwall could sustain this specific amount of pressure because the Qualified Person (Design)’s (“QPD”) prescribed such a specification. However, the evidence given by the QPD’s assistant, David Ng (“Mr Ng”), shows that there was no such specification, and ICOP does not contend that TSCE otherwise failed to comply with other specifications prescribed by the QPD. Thus, ICOP’s pleaded case, which relies solely on the alleged specification that the headwall must be able to sustain 1.75 bar of pressure, naturally fails.
Issue 4: Defects in Shaft P5-1
- [37]
[37] This claim fails.
- [39]
[39] It is ICOP’s primary case that TSCE was expressly obliged by the Matrix of Responsibilities (“MOR”) to the Subcontract to construct shafts “with flushed headwall/backwall and reinforced concrete base slab according to the project design and microtunnelling requirement” [emphasis added]. In the case of Shaft P5-1 as the receiving shaft, various appendices to the Subcontract provided that the shaft was to be constructed with a minimum internal diameter of 7.5m “wall to wall”. Relying on this term in the Subcontract, ICOP pleads that TSCE was obliged to construct Shaft P5-1 with 7.5m of “working space” and/or “free from any protruding objects”. As secondary legal bases for its claim, ICOP pleads that, even if TSCE was not obliged by the express terms of the Subcontract, such a term ought to be implied, or, in the further alternative, that such obligation should be imposed as a tortious duty of care.
- [41]
[41] It can be seen from this diagram which illustrates the final alignment used in Shaft P5-1 that the exit point of the MTBM is not centred. In and of itself, this misalignment does not seem to have been problematic. However, alongside the protruding pipe cap, it was one of two features of Shaft P5-1 which collectively prevented ICOP from extracting the MTBM in one piece. As ICOP submits, “if the axis of the DN1600[mm] [Pipeline] [went] directly … past the axis of the shaft, … there would have been enough clearance for the MTBM to be removed even though the [pipe cap] was present”. In this connection, ICOP also submits that it had brought this issue to TSCE’s attention prior to the commencement of Drive 2, but to no avail. Ultimately, TSCE was unable to either centre the exit point of the MTBM or remove the pipe cap.
- [42]
[42] I can appreciate the predicament ICOP found itself in. However, the fact that both features were necessary causes of the trouble ICOP faced in extracting the MTBM poses challenges for its present claim. As TSCE correctly highlights in its reply submissions, the fact of and problems caused by the misalignment were not pleaded by ICOP. Instead, as can be gleaned from [39] above, ICOP’s SOC was entirely focused on the presence of the protruding pipe cap. This being the case, there is, in my judgment, no room for this claim to succeed on any of the three bases pleaded by ICOP.
- [43]
[43] First, I reject ICOP’s attempt to interpolate the words “working space” and “free[dom] from protruding objects” into the clear terms of the Subcontract. The express words of the Subcontract simply provided that TSCE was to build Shaft P5-1 with a minimum internal diameter of 7.5m, “wall to wall”. This is a plain, clear and strict obligation which TSCE fulfilled and, if ICOP (particularly, as the microtunnelling specialist) required TSCE to adhere to more particular specifications, the onus lay on it to prescribe those specifications during the contractual negotiation and drafting process. This is not an omission properly cured by way of interpretation after the fact. Second, for the same reasons, I do not consider it appropriate to imply a term to this effect. The ordinary test for implication in Sembcorp Marine Ltd v PPL Holdings Pte Ltd and another and another appeal [2013] 4 SLR 193 applies, and there seems to me no gap which needs to be filled by the implication of such a specific duty. For completeness, I also note that ICOP does not make any submissions in respect of implication. It is simply asserted that such a term should be implied.
- [44]
[44] Third – and this is where ICOP’s failure to plead the fact of the off-centre alignment is significant – I also reject ICOP’s claim that TSCE owed it a tortious duty to ensure that Shaft P5-1 had 7.5m of “working space” and/or was “free from protruding objects”. The scope of a tortious duty depends on the particular circumstances which bring the parties into proximity with each other. Here, the parties’ proximity stems primarily from the Subcontract, which does not take ICOP further than the plain terms of the contract: Sunny Metal & Engineering Pte Ltd v Ng Khim Ming Eric [2007] 3 SLR(R) 782 at [45]. ICOP additionally claims that TSCE knew that the MTBM required a minimum amount of working space, and that the presence of the pipe cap would reduce such working space (see [40] above). I am prepared to accept that the evidence bears out ICOP’s assertion. However, even if I do, that would not aid ICOP’s claim.
- [46]
[46] I should also emphasise that I have considered ICOP’s opposing submission that it did not need to plead the facts pertaining to the issue of misalignment because: (a) these were matters of evidence; and (b) in any event, TSCE was aware of this dispute and thus not taken by surprise. I do not accept (a). As just explained, these were material facts necessary and relevant to establishing proximity for the purposes of ICOP’s tortious claim. In relation to (b), my view is that in technical disputes such as this, parties ought to be bound more strictly to their pleaded cases unless they are able to provide a satisfactory explanation for their omission. Cases of this sort tend to give rise to numerous intertwined and difficult issues, and it is not for an opponent and especially not the court to piece together unpleaded points in search of the best possible case a party may advance. As observed in V Nithia (co-administratrix of the estate of Ponnusamy Sivapakiam, deceased) v Buthmanaban s/o Vaithilingam and another [2015] 5 SLR 1422 at [40]–[41]:
- [47]
[47] I emphasise from these paragraphs that the court may allow an unpleaded point to be pursued. It is for the court to determine whether such points should be allowed and parties do not have a right to demand such consideration. ICOP offers no explanation for its omission, and I am not convinced that TSCE would not be prejudiced by my consideration of this unpleaded point. It is for these reasons that I decline to consider the point.
- [48]
[48] Before leaving this issue, I should add that ICOP’s failure to establish a breach on TSCE’s part necessarily means that it is not entitled to an extension of time for the additional days it took to dismantle and extract the MTBM. This logically follows, and I will address the issue of quantification at [127] below when I turn to consider the parties’ delay claims under Issue 7.
Issue 5: ICOP’s unpaid works
- [49]
[49] This claim succeeds and I award ICOP $612,279.25.
- [50]
[50] From the beginning of December 2018 to the end of January 2019, ICOP carried out Drive 2 and, accordingly, issued interim progress claims (“IPCs”) to TSCE. Certain sums were claimed under these IPCs and it is in dispute whether these sums have been adequately substantiated. However, the quantum experts – Mr Wall and Mr Snadden – have jointly assessed that ICOP has completed $1,451,771.38 of the DN1600mm Pipeline (excluding GST). Neither ICOP nor TSCE disputes the joint experts’ assessment, and I have not been presented with any reason to doubt the accuracy of this figure. In any event, I have also reviewed their evidence and I accept their assessment.
- [51]
[51] The parties agree that TSCE has previously certified and paid $876,360 (without GST) and thus, ICOP is entitled to a balance of $575,411.38 (also without GST) ($1,451,771.38 – $876,360). However, the parties’ agreement provided for a goodwill discount, and the quantum experts have determined that the pro rata discount rate should be 0.554%. ICOP’s prior IPCs do reflect deductions of goodwill, accordingly, the discount deductible from the $575,411.38 owing should also be pro-rated. The pro-rated goodwill discount should be 575,411.38 × 0.554%, or $3,187.78. Deducting this from the $575,411.38 owing and adding 7% GST, the sum due to ICOP is $612,279.25.
Issue 6: Additional works and services
- [52]
[52] It is ICOP’s case that between June 2018 and May 2019, TSCE requested that it provide various additional works and services, which it duly did. For the provision of these additional works and services, ICOP pleads that it is entitled to $54,438.66. In its Defence, TSCE puts ICOP to proof of its entitlement as well as quantum. However, in view of the quantum experts’ assessment, the parties agree – in their written closings – that ICOP is entitled to $29,230.05 (this sum excludes GST) for this head of claim.
Issue 7: The delay claim and counterclaim
- [54]
[54] I turn now to the parties’ delay claims. I have chosen to deal with both ICOP’s claim and TSCE’s counterclaim together because most of the delays which ICOP avers were caused by TSCE, TSCE opposingly asserts that ICOP is instead to be blamed. It is therefore more convenient to assess the parties’ cases based on each alleged delay. This avoids unnecessary repetition and, using this approach, there are only three additional delays alleged by TSCE in its counterclaim which need to be considered separately.
- [55]
[55] Before I turn to consider the applicable baseline programme as well as the individual delays, however, I address an unpleaded point raised by ICOP in its closing submissions.
Preliminary: ICOP’s unpleaded claim for 259 days of delay
- [56]
[56] At [11(g)] above, I stated that ICOP seeks to recover damages for a 158-day delay allegedly caused by TSCE. This is its pleaded case. However, in closing submissions, ICOP further claims that TSCE was responsible for another 259 days of delay prior to Drive 2. In this regard, three allegations are made. First, ICOP claims that it had to commence Drive 1 late because “TSCE changed the outer diameter of the DN1200mm Pipeline after PUB assessed that the original design would not be fit for purpose”. Second, ICOP asserts that it “encountered an area of sticky clay” whilst performing the works for Drive 1 and, as a result, progress was slowed down. This area of sticky clay was not identified prior to the commencement of Drive 1 because “neither TSCE nor One Smart carried out the necessary soil investigation works”. Third, ICOP claims that it was not obliged to commence Drive 2 unless and until TSCE issued a notice to proceed as required by cl 2.2 of the Subcontract read with Appendix D. However, TSCE issued such notice late and, furthermore, the issued notice also instructed ICOP to commence works later than scheduled.
- [57]
[57] TSCE’s primary response is that this delay was not pleaded. Counsel for ICOP conceded as much before me during the trial and, taking into account the same essential considerations set out at [46]–[47] above, I decline to consider these unpleaded, additional claims.
Applicable baseline programme
- [58]
[58] An applicable baseline programme is a construction programme which sets out the start and end dates of works, the planned duration of those works, and the sequence in which they are to be carried out. It serves as the schedule against which progress is tracked and also, conversely, the schedule against which delays are assessed.
- [59]
[59] The parties dispute the applicable baseline programme. ICOP relies on cl 2.2 of the LOA, which provides:
- [60]
[60] On 27 December 2017, ICOP wrote to TSCE to inform it that – based on the tentative schedule set out in the Subcontract (ie, “Appendix D”) – the Project was, at this point, already delayed by around six months. The next day, TSCE issued a notice to ICOP, asking that it “proceed with mobilization at shaft P5-2 from 15 January 2018 onwards”. Based on this date of 15 January 2018 and the instructions given in the notice, ICOP then prepared a revised work programme and issued it to TSCE on 8 January 2018 (the “8 January 2018 WP”). Subsequently, on 17 August 2018, ICOP sent a revised version of the 8 January 2018 WP which Dato Cheng suggests “took previous delays caused by TSCE into account and revised the completion dates for ICOP’s works for [Drives 2 to 4] accordingly”. I will refer to this as the “17 August 2018 WP”. ICOP submits that I should refer to these two work programmes “in determining ICOP’s Delay Claims”, and suggests the amendments incorporated in the 17 August 2018 WP were “accepted by TSCE”. To establish this, ICOP chiefly relies on a letter it sent to TSCE dated 18 August 2018 enclosing the 17 August 2018 WP; to this, TSCE responded that it had “generally no objection”.
- [61]
[61] On the other end, TSCE submits that the applicable baseline programme was one submitted by ICOP on 25 February 2017 (before the Subcontract had been executed in May 2017) (the “25 February 2017 WP”). TSCE suggests that this should be preferred for several reasons. First, that ICOP itself took this position in a letter dated 29 March 2019. Second, the schedule in Appendix D – which forms a part of the Subcontract – was based on the 25 February 2017 WP. By contrast, the 8 January 2018 WP and 17 August 2018 WP are not even compliant with Appendix D. Third, even ICOP’s own delay expert (Mr Wall) is of the opinion that 17 August 2018 WP is inappropriate as a baseline programme because it includes as-built data and events which occurred before the commencement of pipe jacking. His view instead is that it is most appropriate to use the 8 January 2018 WP.
- [62]
[62] Having considered these arguments, I am persuaded by ICOP that the 8 January 2018 WP should be the applicable baseline programme. First, I am not persuaded that the evidence demonstrates that TSCE accepted the new 17 August 2018 WP as ICOP submits. Having “generally no objection” (see [60] above) is not enough, in my view, to amount to agreement. If the new work programme contained meaningful differences in respect of the duration of particular tasks, those differences should have been called to TSCE’s attention and agreed upon expressly. The generally passive acquiescence on which ICOP relies is equivocal at best.
- [63]
[63] Second, I accept ICOP’s reliance on cl 2.2 of the LOA, and this seems to me to exclude the 25 February 2017 WP as the applicable baseline programme for two sub-reasons. One, cl 2.2 expressly records that Appendix D is tentative, which TSCE accepts. Thus, the fact that Appendix D was based on the 25 February 2017 WP is not probative. Two, cl 2.2 also makes reference to “actual” commencement and completion dates and obliges TSCE to issue a notice to proceed “no less than 45 days prior to the actual Commencement Date” [emphasis added]. The timing of TSCE’s notice to proceed necessitated changes to the programme set out in the 25 February 2017 WP, and this, in my view, weakens TSCE’s position that the 25 February 2017 WP should be the applicable baseline programme. Parenthetically, I am mindful of TSCE’s submission that ICOP is reneging on the position it took in its letter of 29 March 2019 (see [61] above). However, I am not persuaded that this is particularly significant. Given the parties’ dispute, the applicable baseline programme is a matter for the court to determine, and the fact that TSCE appears to have taken the position that the 25 February 2017 WP was the applicable baseline programme does not carry enough counterweight to the two points made above.
- [64]
[64] Therefore, by a process of elimination, it appears to me that the 8 January 2018 WP is the applicable baseline programme. I will therefore consider this in rendering my decision on the issues below, and for convenience, I will append the work programme to this judgment as Annex 1. It bears noting also that, in any event, TSCE accepts that the difference between the 25 February 2017 WP and the 8 January 2018 WP is not significant. Resolution of this issue was therefore more a matter of practice than necessity. With this, I turn to consider the cause of the various delays raised by the parties.
Overview of delays in issue
- [65]
[65] ICOP alleges that the following delays were caused because:
(a) TSCE failed to ensure that the worksite was in a ready-state for ICOP to mobilise and set up its equipment and deploy its personnel such that it could commence and carry out work on the various drives of the Project, without delay (the “worksite readiness and handover issue”). In respect of this issue, ICOP claims to have suffered a 23-working day delay between 24 February and 29 March 2018, and a further 13-working day delay between 18 April and 1 August 2018.
(b) TSCE failed to obtain the requisite approvals from the PUB and SP Powergrid Ltd (“SPPG”), which were necessary for ICOP to perform the Subcontract works in the vicinity of subterranean electricity cables and other pipelines (the “authority approvals issue”). As a consequence of these failures, ICOP claims it suffered a 27-working day delay felt between 23 May and 25 June 2018.
(c) TSCE failed to construct the headwall in Shaft P5-2 in accordance with the specifications in the QPD. The thrust of ICOP’s allegation in this regard has been set out at [35] above (the “headwall issue”). In respect of this issue, ICOP avers that it suffered 38 working days of delay, felt between 26 June and 13 August 2018.
(d) TSCE failed to obtain permits from the National Environmental Agency (“NEA”) for ICOP to carry out the Subcontract works 20 hours per day, from Monday to Sunday. Further, despite ICOP taking steps to mitigate the noise generated by the works, TSCE’s actions did not aid but rather exacerbated the noise generated (the “noise restriction issue”). As a consequence of not being able to work 20 hours per day, ICOP avers that it suffered 57 working days of delay, which were felt between 7 September 2018 and 14 January 2019.
(e) TSCE failed to ensure that there was a sufficient supply of jacking pipes at the worksite which ICOP was required to install the said jacking pipes as part of its work under the Subcontract (the “insufficient pipes issue”). ICOP does not plead the days of delay which accrued as a result of this issue.
(f) TSCE failed to ensure that the jacking pipes they supplied were of an acceptable quality in relation to the specifications set out in the Subcontract (the “poor-quality pipes issue”). Again, ICOP does not plead the days of delay which accrued as a result of this issue.
(g) TSCE failed to ensure that there were adequate water treatment systems at the worksite and processes for lading, removing and transporting waste material generated from ICOP’s works away from the worksite (the “waste disposal issue”). Again, ICOP does not plead the days of delay which accrued as a result of this issue.
(h) TSCE required ICOP to conduct an unplanned test and cutterhead inspection of the MTBM at a time when the MTBM was in the process of tunnelling from Shaft P5-2 to Shaft P5-1 (ie, Drive 2) at a depth of around 16 to 18m, and 230m from the closest access point at Shaft P5-2. Despite being warned that delays would result from the inspection being conducted at that time, TSCE insisted that the inspection be carried out (the “unplanned cutterhead inspection issue”). Again, ICOP does not plead the days of delay which accrued as a result of this issue.
- [66]
[66] TSCE’s denies responsibility for all of the above delays and, in respect of several, it seeks to attribute them instead to ICOP. To each of these delays, TSCE responds as follows:
(a) In respect of the worksite readiness and handover issue, TSCE avers that it handed over the slurry treatment plant (“STP”) area and Shaft P5-2 to ICOP on 28 February and 2 April 2018, respectively. However, ICOP: (i) delivered its own equipment late; (ii) had insufficient manpower; and (iii) did not set up or install its equipment in good time. As a result of these failings, ICOP had itself caused a delay.
(b) In respect of the authority approvals issue, TSCE admits that it was obliged to obtain the relevant approvals from the PUB and SPPG for ICOP to carry out the works in the vicinity of subterranean electricity cables and pipelines, and that such approvals were delayed. However, it pleads that ICOP was not, in any event, in a ready state to commence works until 18 June 2018. As such, only delays following that date may be attributed to TSCE.
(c) In respect of the headwall issue, TSCE denies liability for any delay resulting on the basis that ICOP was not entitled to request that the headwall be reconstructed in the first place. To the contrary, ICOP had itself caused delay by insisting on the reconstruction despite the fact that the QPD had approved of the original headwall design and agreed that ICOP could proceed with jacking works.
(d) In respect of the noise restriction issue, TSCE admits that it was obliged to obtain a permit for ICOP to carry out its works on the basis of two 10-hour shifts per day. TSCE claims that TSC accordingly obtained (on behalf of TSCE) a permit from the NEA which allowed ICOP to work double shifts every day of the week. This permit prescribed the condition that the volume of the works needed to be within permissible noise limits. However, ICOP persistently caused noise in excess of those limits –through no fault of TSCE – and failed to take sufficient mitigatory steps to reduce the noise generated. This resulted in the NEA prohibiting work from 10pm to 7am daily, and ICOP is thus to blame for its own inability to work 20-hour days.
(e) In respect of the insufficient pipes issue, TSCE admits that there were an insufficient number of jacking pipes on 2 November 2018. However, it denies liability primarily on the basis that ICOP has not pleaded that any days of delay followed as a consequence of this issue. TSCE arrives at this submission by demonstrating that the days of delay ICOP pleads in respect of the worksite readiness and handover issue, the authority approvals issue, the headwall issue and the noise restriction issue totals 158, the total number of days of delay it claims. This thus leaves no days of delay in respect of the insufficient pipes issue.
(f) TSCE does not specifically plead to the poor-quality pipes issue, but denies liability on the same primary basis as the insufficient pipes issue set out immediately above.
(g) In respect of the waste disposal issue, TSCE avers that ICOP bore the responsibility of operating the STP. On this premise, TSCE claims that any delay arising in connection with the waste disposal issue as pleaded by ICOP, arose as a result of its failure to operate the STP as such. More fundamentally, however, as with the insufficient pipes and poor-quality pipes issues, TSCE submits that ICOP did not plead that it suffered any days of delay as a result of TSCE’s alleged failure to provide adequate waste disposal facilities.
(h) In respect of the unplanned cutterhead inspection issue, TSCE’s case is that it was entitled under the Subcontract to request inspections to ensure the safety of the Subcontract works. TSCE also mounts several factual defences, but as with the insufficient pipes, poor-quality pipes and waste disposal issue, it also submits that ICOP is not entitled to any claim for delay because it has not pleaded that it suffered any days of delay in connection with this issue.
- [67]
[67] TSCE also avers that, in addition to the above, ICOP delayed the progress of the Subcontract works by the following:
(a) ICOP carried out the pipe jacking works at a slow rate (the “slow pipe jacking issue”).
(b) ICOP demobilised its equipment from the worksite at a slow rate (the “slow demobilisation issue”).
(c) ICOP removed the MTBM from the worksite around 28 January 2019 after Drive 2 (the “removal of the MTBM issue”).
The worksite readiness and handover issue
- [68]
[68] Preliminarily, I am mindful of certain inconsistencies between the dates of delay set out in ICOP’s pleaded case, and those set out in the affidavit of evidence-in-chief (“AEIC”) of Dato Cheng. These inconsistencies were also highlighted by TSCE in its written closing submissions. This lack of precision is unfortunate but not ultimately significant because the simple starting point is to ask what task, during this period, was on the critical path.
- [69]
[69] The parties’ delay experts, Mr Wall for ICOP and Samuel Widdowson (“Mr Widdowson”) for TSCE, broadly agree that the completion of Shaft P5-2 and its handover to ICOP were one of two possible tasks on the critical path; they also agree that the date on which TSCE was obliged to handover Shaft P5-2 was 24 February 2018. The other potential task driving the critical path was ICOP’s mobilisation of its equipment to the worksite, which was supposed to commence on 28 February 2018. Mr Widdowson makes it a point to clarify that it is not possible to establish the true driving critical path “due to a lack of evidence relat[ing] to the actual progress of ICOP’s [e]quipment [m]obilisation”.
- [70]
[70] From [65(a)] and [66(a)] above, it can be seen that ICOP and TSCE have essentially capitalised on the equivocal nature of the experts’ opinion to advance the case most advantageous to each of them. I begin with ICOP’s case. As a starting point, there is no dispute that TSCE only handed over Shaft P5-2 on 2 April 2018, and this was a delay from the expected handover of 24 February 2018. Thus, relying on this, ICOP avers that the critical delay was caused by TSCE’s failure to hand over the worksite. Indeed, ICOP goes further and claims in its closing submissions that it was only given “unfettered access” to Shaft P5-2 on 6 April 2018. I digress momentarily to deal with this argument.
- [71]
[71] On Dato Cheng’s account, ICOP was allowed to set up its equipment in Shaft P5-2 from 28 March 2018, but it was unable to do so because TSCE was still carrying out works in the shaft. For example, TSCE was rectifying defects within the shaft to address water leakages on 3 April 2018. Thus, he testifies, ICOP could only proceed to carry out works in Shaft P5-2 – the installation of the rubber ring seal on the headwall – on 4 April 2018. Even then, he claims that TSCE had left behind detritus in the shaft, and so ICOP had to spend the rest of 4 April 2018 clearing it so as to prepare it for the installation of other necessary equipment. The daily site reports exhibited by Dato Cheng in his affidavit of evidence-in-chief (“AEIC”) seem to support his account, but only to the extent that TSCE continued to carry out works on 3 April 2018. “Housekeeping” is recorded as having been done on 4 April 2018, but it is unclear to me whether this amounted to a full day of clearing out detritus as Dato Cheng suggests. In general, there is some ambiguity as to how ICOP arrived at the submission that it had only been given unfettered access of Shaft P5-2 on 6 April 2018.
- [72]
[72] I am therefore not satisfied that Shaft P5-2 was only handed over to ICOP on 6 April 2018. I am also not satisfied that the shaft was only properly handed over to ICOP on 4 April 2018, notwithstanding that the daily site report for 3 April 2018 records, “shaft inside water leaking location patch up & base slab loose conc hacking”. Under the MOR, TSCE was responsible for:
- [73]
[73] However, even if TSCE had been responsible for carrying out works in the shaft between 3 to 6 April 2018, the mere allocation of these responsibilities to TSCE does not necessarily prove a further delay in its handover of the shaft to ICOP. I further note that in an earlier amendment of ICOP’s Reply and Defence to Counterclaim, ICOP pleaded that TSCE handed over Shaft P5-2 on 2 April 2018. This pleading was subsequently removed from its Reply and Counterclaim, but ICOP has not pleaded any other handover date in its place. Given the lack of clarity in ICOP’s pleaded position and ambiguity in its submissions as to when Shaft P5-2 was handed over, I am unable to accept its submission that the handover date was 6 April 2018.
- [74]
[74] Having established that TSCE handed over Shaft P5-2 on 2 April 2018, I turn to TSCE’s opposing case. In essence, TSCE claims that, even after the worksite was handed over, ICOP was still unable to mobilise its equipment in accordance with the timelines stipulated in the applicable baseline programme. As stated at [66(a)] above, it is TSCE’s case that the STP area and Shaft P5-2 were handed over to ICOP by 28 February and 2 April 2018 respectively. However, ICOP caused several delays on its own part. First, ICOP was not ready to start assembly of the STP upon the STP area being handed over, and no such work was carried out between 6 March and 6 August 2018 due to late deliveries of ICOP’s equipment and materials, as well as a shortage of manpower. Second, ICOP was supposed to mobilise its equipment by 16 March 2018, but it failed to do so on account of late deliveries of equipment. Specifically, TSCE avers that the primary generator and MTBM only arrived on site on 27 April 2018. Third, ICOP was supposed to commission and test all of its equipment onsite (including the MTBM) by 5 April 2018, and pipe jacking was to commence on 7 April 2018. However, ICOP only commissioned and tested its equipment on 16 and 17 May 2018, and pipe jacking “only commenced on 22 May 2018”. In respect of TSCE’s pleading that pipe jacking commenced on 22 May 2018, I believe there is an error. I will deal with this in the next section, at [79] below.
- [75]
[75] In response to TSCE’s first allegation, ICOP responds that its equipment, vehicles and personnel (amongst other things) remained in the relevant areas of the worksite after the handover, such that it was unable to commence work without delay or difficulty. In response to the second, ICOP admits that the primary generator and the MTBM only arrived on the worksite on 27 April 2018. However, it avers that there was no reason to mobilise these items to the worksite earlier as TSCE only completed levelling the worksite on 26 April 2018. In response to the third, ICOP avers that the delays in respect of the commissioning and testing of its equipment, and the commencement of the pipe jacking works was a consequence of the prior delays caused by TSCE.
- [76]
[76] Having considered these back-and-forth allegations, my view is that the parties and the experts have missed the wood for the trees. The critical delay was not caused by TSCE’s late handover of the worksite, nor was it caused by ICOP’s allegedly delayed mobilisation of equipment to the worksite even after it had been handed over. As I will explain in the next section in resolution of the authority approvals issue, irrespective of how promptly TSCE handed over the worksite and ICOP mobilised its equipment, ICOP simply could not commence pipe jacking works until the necessary approvals had been obtained by TSCE from SPPG and the PUB. Such approvals were only obtained after ICOP was ready to commence pipe jacking works.
The authority approvals issue
- [77]
[77] Three crucial matters were accepted by Mr Jung Jae Hun (“Mr Jung”), a project manager for TSCE, at trial:
(a) First, until approval was obtained from SPPG and the PUB, ICOP could not commence pipe jacking works.
(b) Second, SPPG only provided its approval on 20 June 2018 and the PUB, its approval, on 25 June 2018.
(c) Third, TSCE had aimed to obtain these approvals from SPPG and the PUB by 4 April 2018.
- [78]
[78] I should add that this third point is consistent with the applicable baseline programme, which scheduled the MTBM for launch on 6 April 2018, with pipe jacking works for Drive 2 to be carried out across 66 days from 7 April 2018 to 22 June 2018.
- [79]
[79] These three points having been accepted by TSCE’s Mr Jung, it seems to me clear that so long as ICOP was ready to commence pipe jacking works before 25 June 2018, it was TSCE’s failure to obtain SPPG and the PUB’s approvals which caused the critical delays. TSCE makes extensive submissions to the end of showing that ICOP was, until 18 June 2018, itself unable to commence pipe jacking works. First of all, I do not accept this as a matter of fact. There is clear correspondence stemming from TSCE which suggests that, on 21 May 2018, ICOP was ready to commence pipe jacking subject to the requisite approvals being obtained from SPPG and the PUB. Second, as I mentioned at [74] above, I believe there is an error in TSCE’s pleaded case that pipe jacking works for Drive 2 commenced on 22 May 2018. Works could not have commenced on this date given that, as I have just stated, the approvals from SPPG and the PUB had not yet been obtained. Therefore, it appears that what TSCE meant to plead was that ICOP was ready to commence pipe jacking works on 22 May 2018. This is consistent with the correspondence showing that ICOP was ready to commence pipe jacking works on 21 May 2018.
- [80]
[80] I am mindful that TSCE does also plead elsewhere in its Defence and Counterclaim that ICOP was only ready to start works on 18 June 2018. The lack of consistency is unfortunate but ultimately, again, inconsequential. This is because, even if I accepted all of TSCE’s factual arguments and found that ICOP was also not ready until 18 June 2018, that would not – in any event – be sufficient for TSCE to avoid liability. In my view, TSCE’s failure to obtain the requisite approvals from SPPG and the PUB should properly be seen as the cause of the delay. And, even if ICOP was itself not ready before 18 June 2018 to commence pipe jacking works, that should not absolve TSCE of liability for the full delay until 25 June 2018. I will explain.
- [81]
[81] In cases involving two potential causes of a delay, the usual approach is to ask which of the causes was the “but for” cause. This is trite law, but it is equally trite that causal arguments are notoriously fluid and can be formulated in a variety of different ways, to reach opposite conclusions, some less and some more logical. In the present case, TSCE argues that, because ICOP was not ready until 18 June 2018, it is equally responsible for the delay until this date. I do not accept this. To be clear, this is not to say that I am rejecting the application of the well-established and simple “but for” view of causation. I accept that, if one views the facts through the lens of the hypothetical alternative reality which favours TSCE – that is, one in which TSCE managed to obtain the approvals from SPPG and the PUB on time – TSCE’s argument that neither party solely caused the delay of the Subcontract works would be vindicated. However, I find that, in the present case, the causal inquiry is not helpfully answered through the use of alternative hypothetical realities. Moreover, this form of causal reasoning tends only to be necessary in cases where we wish to probe the effect of a particular failure. Typically, this is necessary when such effect is either unknown or unclear. For example, where a contractor contends that an employer’s lesser delay caused the contractor’s own greater delay. In such cases, we would need to determine if, and the extent to which the employer’s delay bore on the contractor’s progress. Only after this has been determined, can the court reach a conclusion as to who is responsible for the critical, greater, delay.
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