General Division of the High Court · Decided 14 March 2022
CNX v CNY
Feedback & support[2022] SGHC 53 · Case no. Originating Summons No 900 of 2021 (Summons Nos 5125 and 5275 of 2021) · 21 paragraphs
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Grounds of decision
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Introduction
- [3]
[3] HC/SUM 5275/2021 (“SUM 5275”) was a cross-application by the plaintiff for security to be furnished by the defendant State as a condition for granting any extension of time.
Background
- [10]
[10] I heard both SUM 5125 and SUM 5275 on 3 December 2021. After considering the submissions from both parties, I delivered brief oral grounds of my decision. I allowed SUM 5125 in part and dismissed the plaintiff’s application in SUM 5275.
The parties’ cases
Issues to be determined
- [18]
[18] Based on the background laid out above, there were four issues for my determination:
(c) Whether the defendant should be granted an extension of time under O 3 r 4(1) of the ROC (“Issue 3”);
(d) If SUM 5125 were allowed, whether the court can or should impose a condition that the defendant be required to furnish security (“Issue 4”).
Issue 1: Whether s 14(2) of the SIA applies to an application to set aside the Leave Order
- [28]
[28] I agree with Ramesh J that the reasoning of Gross J in Norsk Hydro is to be preferred over that of Burnton J in AIC. Under Singapore law, it is trite that a statute must be interpreted purposively, having regard to the text of the provision as well as the context of the provision within the written law as a whole: Tan Cheng Bock v Attorney-General [2017] 2 SLR 850 (“Tan Cheng Bock”) at [37]. In other words, the interpretation of the provision in question should be informed by other relevant provisions within the same statute (Tan Cheng Bock at [44]). To my mind, it was clear that s 14(2) of the SIA must be read together with the relevant definition in s 2(2)(b) of the SIA, which extends the definition of “entry of appearance” to include “any corresponding procedures”.
- [30]
[30] Moreover, I was of the view that such a conclusion better accorded with the legislative purpose of s 14(2) of the SIA. The fact that s 14(2) of the SIA gives States a longer timeline to enter an appearance is an explicit recognition of “the reality” that States require more time to react to proceedings, as noted in Josias Van Zyl at [45]:
- [31]
[31] I did not see any reason why the observations in Josias Van Zyl should not apply in the context of proceedings to enforce an arbitral award against a State. In its submissions, the plaintiff argued that a State does not require as much time to react to enforcement proceedings as compared to fresh claims against it, since it would be aware of the disputes and arbitral proceedings giving rise to the arbitral award, particularly in instances where the State had actively and fully participated in the underlying arbitration. I did not agree with this submission. As noted in Josias Van Zyl (at [46]), while the enforcement of an arbitral award may not take a respondent State by surprise, different considerations come into play when a State is faced with the potential enforcement of the award in a particular jurisdiction, as compared to the considerations at play in the underlying arbitral proceedings. In my judgment, this remains true even if parallel enforcement proceedings have been brought in other jurisdictions – the grounds for resisting enforcement may apply differently across different jurisdictions, and different jurisdictions may well have differing court processes for resisting enforcement of an arbitral award. Accordingly, I disagreed that the defendant should be deprived of its entitlement to the additional time allowed under s 14(2) of the SIA, simply because it had participated in the Arbitration.
- [33]
[33] In support of the plaintiff’s position, Ms Koh also drew my attention to the comments of Teare J in Gold Reserve. In discussing Burnton J’s judgment in AIC, the learned Judge stated as follows (at [63]–[64]):
- [35]
[35] Ms Koh also referred me to s 14(6) of the SIA, which provides that where a writ or other document has been served in a manner previously agreed to by a foreign State, the foreign State cannot avail itself of the two-month timeline prescribed under s 14(2) of the SIA. Ms Koh submitted that s 14(6) of the SIA shows that the procedural privileges afforded to States under s 14 are “not immutable”, and can be retracted when it is clear that the State is aware of the proceedings commenced against it and is able to respond. As such, the two-month timeline prescribed under s 14(2) of the SIA was simply a “proxy” for what was thought to be a reasonable time for a State to conduct internal consultations before meeting a fresh claim brought against it.
- [36]
[36] In my view, this argument was untenable. I did not find that s 14(6) of the SIA took anything away from the plain meaning or purpose of s 14(2). While the plaintiff may be correct to observe that s 14(6) of the SIA carves out certain circumstances under which States are not afforded the privilege of the additional time under s 14(2), the fact remains that the plain wording of s 14(2) of the SIA mandates that States be accorded a two-month timeline in all other cases.
- [39]
[39] I was not persuaded by the plaintiff’s arguments and the case authorities cited above at [38] did not assist the plaintiff. With regard to General Dynamics (CA), Ms Koh drew my attention to the following excerpt from the judgment:
Issue 2: Computation of time under s 14(2) of the SIA
- [46]
[46] With regard to the submissions at [45(a)] above, I disagreed that the appointment of D&N and the filing of SUM 5125, taken singly or together, constituted an “entry of appearance” or a corresponding procedure for the purposes of s 14(2) of the SIA. The plaintiff’s interpretation of s 14(2) of the SIA is not supported by the ordinary meaning of the words in the provision. As noted above at [29], an entry of appearance enables the defendant to officially communicate his intention to defend or challenge the action. It is a specific action as compared to some other step in the proceedings. The plaintiff’s interpretation was not, in my view, a possible interpretation having regard to the ordinary meaning of s 14(2) of the SIA. Thus, the plaintiff’s interpretation did not pass the first step of a purposive interpretation of s 14(2) of the SIA, which is to ascertain possible interpretations of the legislative provision: see Tan Cheng Bock at [37].
- [48]
[48] In any case, even if, arguendo, I accepted that the phrase “entry of appearance” in s 14(2) of the SIA encompassed any further step in the proceedings, I was not persuaded that anything done by the defendant thus far amounted to a further step in the proceedings. As held by the Court of Appeal in Carona Holdings Pte Ltd and others v Go Go Delicacy Pte Ltd [2008] 4 SLR(R) 460, a “step in the proceedings” is one that evinces a party’s “unequivocal submission” to the jurisdiction of the courts (at [95]).
- [51]
[51] Accordingly, I considered that the correct approach to computing the time that a State has under s 14(2) of the SIA to enter an appearance is as follows: (a) determine the “normal” or default time period that the State would have for entering an appearance, if not for the existence of s 14(2) of the SIA, and (b) add two months to this time period. As to how the normal time period for entering an appearance should be ascertained, s 14(2) of the SIA provides that the time period for entering an appearance may be “prescribed by Rules of Court or otherwise”. In my view, this simply makes clear that the normal time limit for entering an appearance may be contained in the ROC or elsewhere. So, for instance, in a writ action where a foreign State is the defendant, the foreign State would have the usual prescribed time period of 21 days (or such extended period as the Court may allow) under O 12 r 4(b) of the ROC, plus an additional two months by operation of s 14(2) of the SIA, to enter an appearance.
Issue 3: Whether the defendant should be granted an extension of time under O 3 r 4(1) of the ROC
- [56]
[56] If I was wrong in my interpretation of s 14(2) of the SIA, there remained the question of whether an extension of time should be afforded to the defendant pursuant to the court’s powers under O 3 r 4(1) of the ROC. The existence of this power was not disputed by the parties. For convenience, O 3 r 4(1) ROC provides that:
- [57]
[57] It was common ground that the factors that a court should consider when deciding whether to exercise its powers under O 3 r 4(1) of the ROC were summarised by Justice Belinda Ang Saw Ean in Bloomberry Resorts and Hotels Inc and another v Global Gaming Philippines LLC and another [2021] 3 SLR 725 (“Bloomberry Resorts”) at [49]:
- [59]
[59] I did not think that the defendant should be expected to react to the enforcement proceedings commenced by the plaintiff within a shorter span of time, simply because the defendant had participated in the underlying Arbitration, or because the defendant has been represented by the same international counsel in proceedings in other jurisdictions to resist enforcement of the Final Award. The fact remains that proceedings had not previously been brought to enforce the Final Award in Singapore. As I have elaborated above at [31], court processes and grounds for resisting enforcement may differ across jurisdictions; the defendant therefore cannot be expected to react more quickly simply because it is resisting enforcement in other jurisdictions.
- [60]
[60] I was not persuaded by the plaintiff’s arguments that granting an extension of time would cause the plaintiff substantial or irremediable prejudice. The plaintiff complained that the defendant was seeking an extension of time to delay enforcement of the award, and alleged that the defendant was dissipating its assets in the meantime. The plaintiff relied primarily on various news articles to support its allegations – in my view, this was clearly inadequate. At best, the articles cited by the plaintiff merely repeated accusations made by third parties. As Mr Bull pointed out during oral arguments, if the plaintiff genuinely believed that the defendant as a State party was dissipating assets in an effort to frustrate the Final Award, the appropriate remedy would have been a Mareva injunction – however, this was not sought by the plaintiff.
Issue 4: Whether the defendant should be required to furnish security
- [63]
[63] In its written submissions, the plaintiff relied on s 31(5) of the IAA as the basis for its application. Section 31(5) of the IAA provides as follows:
- [66]
[66] I disagreed that this provision had any relevance or application to the present proceedings. Section 18(3) of the SCJA provides that the court’s powers in the First Schedule to the SCJA must be exercised in accordance with, inter alia, the ROC. First, the plaintiff’s application was, essentially, for the defendant to furnish security and not for payment; an interim payment application was therefore, and by definition, a very different creature. Second, the plaintiff did not in any event bring an application for interim payment under O 29 r 10 of the ROC, which is the relevant provision governing applications for interim payment. Even assuming that an application for an interim payment was the appropriate application to make in the circumstances before me, such an application requires the applicant to show that the grounds in either O 29 r 11 or O 29 r 12 of the ROC are made out. The plaintiff did not adduce any evidence in the present proceedings that would have assisted it to advance any arguments that an interim payment was warranted, whether unconditionally or otherwise.
- [67]
[67] The second alternative basis advanced by Ms Koh was pursuant to the court’s inherent powers. I agreed with Mr Bull that the present case did not warrant an exercise of my inherent powers under O 92 r 4 of the ROC. It is well-established that the court will generally not invoke its inherent powers where there is an existing rule already covering the situation at hand, save in the most exceptional circumstances: Wellmix Organics (International) Pte Ltd v Lau Yu Man [2006] 2 SLR(R) 117 at [81]. Further, the “essential touchstone” for the court’s exercise of its discretionary inherent powers is really one of “need”: Wee Soon Kim Anthony v Law Society of Singapore [2001] 2 SLR(R) 821 at [27]. In this case, I disagreed that the present facts were sufficiently exceptional to warrant recourse to the court’s inherent powers; nor was there any need to do so. I therefore dismissed SUM 5275.
Conclusion
- [68]
[68] For the reasons set out in these grounds of decision, I allowed the defendant’s application in SUM 5125 on the terms set out above at [61] and dismissed SUM 5275.