General Division of the High Court · Decided 25 April 2022
Public Prosecutor v BZT
Feedback & support[2022] SGHC 91 · Case no. Criminal Case No 4 of 2022
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Introduction
- [1]
[1] The accused is [BZT], a 48-year-old male Singaporean. The Prosecution alleges that the accused had sexually abused two very young victims when he was the boyfriend of the victims’ mother (“PW1”). These sexual offences occurred when the first victim (“V1”), a female, was between seven and 13 years old and the second victim (“V2”), a male, was between 11 and 13 years old (collectively, the “Victims”). The accused faces the following 12 charges:
That you, [BZT],
- [2]
[2] The third and eleventh charges were amended by the Prosecution without objection of the Defence. The third charge was amended on the first day of trial on 13 January 2022 as the reference to paragraph (b) in s 376(2) of the Penal Code was inadvertently added when it should not have been there. The eleventh charge was amended on 26 January 2022 after V2 clarified during his in-court oral testimony that the accused was unsuccessful when attempting to insert his finger into V2’s anus. Both amended charges were read to the accused, to which the accused maintains his plea of not guilty. The original third and eleventh charges read as follows (the portions that were later amended are in italics and underlined):
- [3]
[3] The accused has admitted to the fourth, seventh, eighth and twelfth charges. The Prosecution has applied for these charges to be stood down. The accused claims trial to the remaining eight charges, which are more serious.
- [4]
[4] Before the commencement of the trial the Prosecution applied for a joinder of the remaining eight charges. The accused opposed this application. After hearing arguments from the parties, I granted this application. My reasons for allowing the joinder of charges are elaborated below (see [43]–[60] below).
Background facts
The Victims’ childhood and places of residence
- [5]
[5] The Victims’ biological father passed away in August 1991. At the time, PW1 was pregnant with V1, and V2 was nine months old. Six months after the birth of V1, around November or December 1992, PW1 married her second husband. Their divorce was finalised around 1999.
- [6]
[6] The accused knew PW1, from January 1998, when PW1 started working at a pub called Venom. She called him “Didi”. They started dating about two months after knowing each other. Approximately six months after they dated, PW1 introduced the accused to her children, V1 and V2. Her children called him “Papa”. Around March 1998 to February 2000, PW1, V1 and V2 stayed at various relatives’ houses. Altogether, PW1, V1 and V2 stayed at three different houses during this time, spending a few months at each location. The accused did not stay with PW1 and the Victims at these locations.
- [7]
[7] Around February 2000, the accused rented a flat with two bedrooms together with PW1 at Property 1, and he moved in to stay with her and the Victims. The accused registered a change of address to Property 1 on 9 October 1999.
- [8]
[8] The accused and PW1 shared the master bedroom, while V1 and V2 shared the other bedroom (“the children’s bedroom”). Aside from the four of them, there were other tenants who stayed in Property 1. They occupied the children’s bedroom at various points of time:
(a) S, an adult female, who stayed for less than three months in the first half of the year 2000; and
(b) VL, an adult female who stayed for about half a year sometime in the year 2001. She was not in the unit whenever she was working the night shift from 4.00pm to 5.00pm until 3.00pm to 4.00pm of the following day and she slept in the children’s bedroom during the daytime when she was back from work. She went out on her off days.
- [9]
[9] From 4 May 2000 to 2 June 2000, the accused was out of Singapore.
- [10]
[10] Sometime around 5 October 2001, the accused, PW1 and the Victims moved into Property 2 which had three bedrooms. The accused registered a change of address to Property 2 on 22 October 2001.
- [11]
[11] Several months before moving into Property 2, PW1 and the Victims moved out of Property 1 and lived with one of PW1’s cousins’ family. The accused did not live with them when they were living at the cousin’s house. PW1 and the accused resumed their cohabitation in October 2001 when they and the Victims moved into Property 2.
- [12]
[12] At Property 2, the accused and PW1 shared the master bedroom, while the Victims each had their own bedroom. Aside from the four of them, there was another tenant who stayed at Property 2: L, an adult female and her two children with their helper. They occupied V2’s bedroom for a three-month period between the years 2001 and 2002.
- [13]
[13] The accused was out of Singapore during the following periods:
(e) 2 November 2002;
- [14]
[14] In 2006, the accused and PW1 broke up after a dispute that was unrelated to the Victims and he moved out of Property 2. He did not change his registered address with the Immigration & Checkpoints Authority after moving out.
Discovery of the offences and arrest of the accused
- [15]
[15] On 12 December 2016, following a dispute between PW1 and V1, V2 sent text messages to PW1’s handphone:
- [16]
[16] After receiving these messages, PW1 asked V2, and V1 through V2 to lodge a police report. The Victims did so on 13 December 2016. On 19 May 2019, the accused was arrested at Tuas Checkpoint, Singapore.
- [17]
[17] On 4 June 2019, 6 June 2019 and 12 June 2019, the accused was examined by Dr Ong Jun Yan (“Dr Ong”), a psychiatrist from the Institute of Mental Health (“IMH”). The accused was assessed not to be of unsound mind at the time of the alleged offences. However, the accused was diagnosed with Pedophilic Disorder.
The parties’ cases
The Prosecution’s case
- [18]
[18] The Prosecution’s case is that the accused committed a series of sexual assaults against the Victims at Property 1 and Property 2, comprising:
(a) as against V1, one charge of attempted rape (s 376(2) r/w s 511 of the Penal Code) and four charges of outrage of modesty (s 354 of the Penal Code); and
- [19]
[19] The Prosecution submits that the accused knew the Victims were below 12 years old for the proceeded charges relating to penetration and attempted penetration, namely the third, ninth and tenth charges. Thus, the Victims were unable to give consent. The Prosecution also argues that the accused committed those offences with intent to penetrate the Victims. For the proceeded charges on outraging the modesty of the Victims, namely the first, second, fifth, sixth and eleventh charges, the Prosecution submits that the accused had the intention to outrage the modesty of the Victims.
- [20]
[20] The accused has admitted to viewing pornographic images of naked females with V1. He asked her to perform the same acts depicted in the images at Property 1 when she was at least seven years old and not older than nine years old (the stood down fourth charge). The accused also admitted to masturbating V2 on two occasions at Property 2 when he was between 11 and 13 years old (the stood down seventh and eighth charges).
- [21]
[21] The Prosecution relies on the evidence of 27 witnesses and numerous exhibits to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the accused committed the offences as charged. Their evidence is adduced by way of conditioned statements admissible under s 264(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) (“CPC”), and supplemented, where necessary, with their oral testimony. Eight witnesses testified in court for the Prosecution’s case:
- [22]
[22] The crux of the Prosecution’s case rests on the Victims’ testimonies. The Prosecution relies on the conditioned statements and oral testimonies of V1 and V2 to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the accused committed the offences in the proceeded charges. The Prosecution submits that the accused knew the young Victims would not report the physical and sexual assaults. The accused had abused the trust of PW1 and the Victims to commit the sexual acts in the proceeded charges.
V1’s evidence
- [23]
[23] V1’s account of the events is briefly stated here for context; a more detailed account will be evaluated below (at [76]–[100]).
- [24]
[24] The Prosecution relies on V1’s evidence that one of the earlier incidents happened at Property 1, between 1 February 2000 and 5 October 2001. At that time, V1 was sleeping on the bed in the master bedroom and she was awoken by the accused rubbing his penis against her buttocks over her shorts. She pretended to be asleep. The accused put his hand through one of the leg holes of her shorts and used his hand to rub her vagina directly on her skin. The accused also put his penis through one of the leg holes of her shorts and rubbed his penis against her vagina skin-on-skin until she felt a wetness. On another occasion when they were staying at Property 1, the accused told V1 to lie on the bed in the bedroom and similarly rubbed his penis near her vaginal area skin-on-skin.
- [25]
[25] On another occasion at Property 1, after school in the afternoon, V1 fell asleep after drinking a glass of water provided by the accused. When she woke up, she was naked and lying face-down on the bed in the master bedroom with her legs tucked under her in a Muslim prayer position. She pretended to be asleep. The accused, who was naked, went on top of V1 and tried to push his penis into her vagina. She clenched her legs to prevent him from doing so and he did not manage to fully penetrate her vagina.
- [26]
[26] The accused molested V1 on two other occasions at Property 2. The first took place between the years 2003 and 2004, when the accused entered V1’s bedroom while she was sleeping and grinded his penis against her vagina over her clothes. The second took place in the year 2005, in V1’s bedroom, when the accused asked V1 to pull down her shorts and inserted a cotton bud inside her anus. V1 did not disclose the sexual assaults to anyone.
V2’s evidence
- [27]
[27] V2’s account of the events is briefly stated here for context. A more detailed account will be evaluated below (at [118]–[144]).
- [28]
[28] The accused started physically and sexually abusing V2 in 2000 when he was in Primary 4. During this period of abuse, V2 suffered from fainting spells.
- [29]
[29] The Prosecution relies on V2’s evidence of the incident which he remembers most vividly. This occurred at Property 2, between 19 November 2001 and 18 November 2002, when V2 was 11 years old. V2 was sleeping in his bedroom when he was awoken by the accused who pulled down his shorts, powdered and masturbated his penis, and sucked it until it became erected. The accused squatted onto V2’s penis, causing it to penetrate his anus. The accused tried unsuccessfully to insert his penis into V2’s anus. The accused also attempted to insert his finger into V2’s anus. V2 did not disclose the sexual assaults to anyone.
- [30]
[30] The Prosecution submits that the Victims did not consent to any sexual activity with the accused at all times and that the accused intended to outrage their modesty. Further, the Victims could not consent to any of the sexual penetration or attempted sexual penetration offences by the accused as they were below 12 years of age, pursuant to s 90(c) of the Penal Code.
PW1’s evidence
- [31]
[31] The Prosecution relies on PW1’s evidence that she came to know the accused sometime in January 1998, when they were working at a pub. Thereafter, PW1 and the accused started dating. Later, she introduced the accused to the Victims. Subsequently, the accused moved in to live with them at Property 1 and Property 2. During the time the accused lived with them, PW1 held various jobs and was often at work and not at home. The accused was often at home and would help her to care for the Victims until PW1 chased him out of the house over unrelated matters sometime in 2006. PW1 did not know about the sexual assaults until 12 December 2016.
- [32]
[32] On 12 December 2016, V1 had a dispute with PW1, and PW1 complained to V2 about V1’s seemingly rebellious behaviour. The Prosecution relies on the text messages between PW1 and V2 to show that V2 revealed to PW1, for the first time, that the accused had raped them when they were young. PW1 then arranged for the Victims to lodge a police report regarding the sexual assaults at Bukit Panjang Neighbourhood Police Centre (“the police station”).
Evidence of the investigation officers
- [33]
[33] The Prosecution relies on the evidence of the investigation officers to show that the police were unable to trace the accused until the accused was arrested on 19 May 2019 at Tuas Checkpoint, as he was not residing at his stated residential address. The accused also gave his statements voluntarily to ASP Vimal Raj and the accused admitted to touching the Victims at their private parts.
Medical evidence
- [34]
[34] The Prosecution also relies on the evidence of Dr Ong, a Senior Resident at the Department of Forensic Psychiatry at the IMH, who diagnosed the accused with Pedophilic Disorder in her report dated 14 June 2019.
- [35]
[35] Based on the totality of the evidence, the Prosecution argues that the accused has committed the offences for which he stands charged.
The Defence’s case
- [36]
[36] The accused denies committing the sexual acts and he also denies that he had the intention to commit the acts on the Victims as specified in the proceeded charges. However, the accused admits to three charges of sexual assaults on the Victims. These are less serious charges and were stood down.
- [37]
[37] The primary defence of the accused in relation to the proceeded charges is a bare denial and that the Victims concocted the alleged incidents. For this, the Defence rhetorically reiterates that, for more than ten years, both the Victims did not tell anyone about the sexual abuses they suffered, ie, from the time of the alleged sexual abuses to when the abuses were reported in 2016. Their claims are, accordingly, either false memories, fabrications or exaggerations.
- [38]
[38] The Defence also seeks to cast a reasonable doubt on the Prosecution’s case by arguing that there was little opportunity for the accused to commit the alleged sexual abuses as most of the time the accused was not alone with the Victims. Further, there were other adults staying with the accused, PW1 and the Victims when they were living together in February 2000 until around 2002 (see [8] and [12] above).
- [39]
[39] The Defence also argues that the accused was a father figure to the Victims from the time the accused lived together with PW1 and the Victims in 2000 to 2006 when the accused and PW1 broke up. The Defence points to two key facts. First, the accused would share household expenses with PW1 when he lived together with PW1 and the Victims. Second, the children would call the accused “Papa”. The Defence submits that the accused played the role of a father figure as the Victims did not have a father figure in their lives since their biological father passed away when they were very young. Moreover, PW1 was not around the Victims for extended periods of time, which made the Victims turn to the accused for familial support.
- [40]
[40] Furthermore, as PW1 had to work long hours during the Victims’ childhood, she was largely absent in the Victims’ lives. The Defence submits that PW1’s neglect of her children formed the basis of her guilt, which predisposed her to assume the worst of the accused when V2 messaged her about the sexual abuses committed on the Victims (see [15] above). This led PW1 to persuade the Victims into making ostensibly false police reports against him.
- [41]
[41] Finally, the Defence takes issue with the lack of particulars as to the date and time of the offences in the proceeded charges. The Defence argues that the time ranges in the proceeded charges are not sufficiently particularised. For instance, the timeframe of the alleged offences that occurred at Property 1, namely the first, second and third charges, spans over a range of close to two years. The Defence avers that the time ranges stated in the proceeded charges do not appear to be based on any substantive information provided by the Victims, save that the stated periods corresponded with the period of time when the family lived at the particular property.
- [42]
[42] Apart from the accused himself who chose to testify in his defence, the Defence also called one witness – Dr Yak Si Mian (“Dr Yak”), the doctor from Healthway Medical Group who had examined the accused before his second statement was recorded.
Joinder of charges
- [43]
[43] On 15 November 2021 the Prosecution applied for the first to third, fifth, sixth and ninth to eleventh charges to be joined pursuant to s 133 of the CPC. The Prosecution argued that the accused would not be prejudiced or embarrassed in his defence under s 146(a) of the CPC. The Defence submitted in response that the accused would be prejudiced or embarrassed in his defence under s 146 of the CPC and such prejudice or embarrassment would arise due to similar fact evidence or evidence of propensity being led in the joint trial, contrary to s 14 of the Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed).
- [44]
[44] Section 133 of the CPC states as follows:
- [45]
[45] To begin with, the Defence conceded that the charges pertaining to both the Victims are of a similar nature because they are sexual in nature.
- [46]
[46] The Prosecution submitted that the following facts showed that a joinder of charges was warranted as the charges were proximate in time, space and purpose:
(a) the sexual assaults occurred during the same period of time when the accused was living with both the Victims and PW1 in the same houses (ie, at Property 1 and Property 2) and there was therefore a continuity of action;
(b) the circumstances leading up to the police report are the same; and
(c) the same witnesses would be testifying at the trial.
- [47]
[47] The Defence counsel in his written submission argued that the offences did not form a “series of offences” within the meaning of s 133 of the CPC because:
(a) the offences took place during an extended period of time (six years); and
(b) the victims differed in gender.
However, the Defence at the hearing of the Prosecution’s application for joinder of charges conceded that s 133 of the CPC was satisfied but urged the court not to allow joinder of charges under s 146 of the CPC as the accused would be prejudiced or embarrassed in his defence.
- [48]
[48] In Yong Yow Chee v Public Prosecutor [1997] 3 SLR(R) 243, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial judge’s decision to allow the appellant to be tried for two offences together and later for amalgamating them into one charge as there was “a nexus in terms of proximity in time and location and both the offences also arose from the same set of facts” (at [43]). Likewise, in the present case, I found that there was such a nexus on the facts.
- [49]
[49] I therefore proceeded to consider s 146(a) of the CPC.
- [50]
[50] The Prosecution submitted that under s 146(a) of the CPC the accused would neither be prejudiced nor embarrassed in his defence.
- [51]
[51] Section 146(a) of the CPC states as follows:
- [52]
[52] The Prosecution argued that the witnesses would be identical notwithstanding whether the Prosecution proceeded on one charge per trial or across multiple trials as the witnesses’ testimonies would be invariably intertwined. Hence, there was no basis to assert that the accused would suffer less prejudice or embarrassment if the charges were separately heard over multiple trials instead of one. Indeed, in reply to the consolidated Case for the Prosecution, the accused was able to file a consolidated Case for the Defence clearly setting out his defence to each charge.
- [53]
[53] The Defence submitted that the following factors were relevant to establish prejudice and embarrassment on the part of the accused:
(a) The charges concern not just alleged sexual offences, but also offences against children, which were furthermore allegedly committed over a period of years. They are of an extremely scandalous nature and likely to arouse hostility.
(b) There are no particulars as to the dates on which the offences were allegedly committed (save presumably that the accused could not have committed them on the dates on which he was out of Singapore).
(c) No adult was ever informed or knew/suspected that the alleged offences were being committed for more than ten years when PW1 and other adults were living in the same premises in which the offences were allegedly committed. Further, the Victims were attending school at the relevant time and V2 was even admitted to hospital at one point, yet they did not inform anyone of the alleged offences.
Hence, the Defence submitted that the Prosecution’s entire case rests on the complaints and uncorroborated statements of the Victims, which were first made more than ten years after the time of the alleged offences, with no physical or other objective evidence that the alleged offences had been committed. Moreover, the Defence submitted that neither V1 nor V2 are witnesses in the other Victim’s charges.
- [55]
[55] The Defence also submitted that if the charges were heard in the same trial, the Prosecution would introduce charges that are, in essence, similar fact evidence. This was because:
(a) First, the Prosecution would create a narrative that there was a “series” of continuous, ongoing offences against the Victims when the facts did not bear this out. The Defence submitted that there were no particulars of the actual dates of the alleged offences and the alleged events were spread out over a period of years such that objectively, each of the alleged offences was a distinct offence.
(b) Second, the Prosecution intended to admit the testimony of V1 into the case of the offences against V2 and vice versa, when objectively, neither of them were witnesses in their respective cases against the accused. Hence, the Defence submitted that the Victims’ respective evidence would be confused and there would accordingly be a significant risk of the court being improperly influenced.
- [56]
[56] Overall, the Defence submitted that the Prosecution was intending to use the testimonies of the two Victims in one charge “to shore up the case in the other charges” and in the process, the Prosecution would insinuate that the accused must have committed all the offences. This would thereby contravene s 14 of the Evidence Act.
- [57]
[57] On this point, the Prosecution asserted that the court should reject any argument in support of a separate trial because a joint trial would introduce similar fact evidence and thereby prejudice the accused. In Lee Kwang Peng v Public Prosecutor and another appeal [1997] 2 SLR(R) 569, the court held (at [60]) that:
- [58]
[58] In this case even if one charge was proceeded against the accused, both the Victims would have to testify. If there was a joinder of charges against the accused, it is critical that the court ensures that each of those charges is proven beyond a reasonable doubt. If the accused is convicted of one charge, it cannot necessarily follow that the accused is also guilty of the other charges, unless the evidence in the other charges is also proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
- [59]
[59] The parties agreed that s 133 of the CPC allows joinder of similar charges against the accused. The most pertinent consideration was whether the accused would be prejudiced or embarrassed in his defence by the joinder of charges. If the court was of the view that the accused would be prejudiced or embarrassed, then s 146 of the CPC empowers the court to disallow the Prosecution’s application for a joinder of charges against the accused. I was of the view that the accused would not be prejudiced or embarrassed by the Prosecution’s application to proceed on the first to third, fifth, sixth and ninth to eleventh charges against the accused. Furthermore, it would be perceived to be an abuse of the process to charge and try the accused on each of the similar charges separately and repeatedly on the basis that he has denied committing them. Besides, a joinder of charges would be an efficient and fair disposal of the charges against the accused.
- [60]
[60] For the above reasons, I allowed the Prosecution’s application for a joinder of charges made at the pre-trial conference for this case.
My decision
- [61]
[61] I shall now deal with the evidence pertaining to the proceeded charges. I am acutely aware that no one had witnessed the accused’s commission of the sexual acts on the Victims which occurred around 20 years ago. There is also no contemporaneous corroborative evidence of the Victims’ versions of the sexual events. The Prosecution’s entire case rests largely on the Victims’ testimonies of the alleged sexual abuse. In these circumstances, for the Victims’ testimonies to constitute proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the accused’s guilt, I must be completely satisfied, on a close scrutiny, that the Victims’ evidence is so “unusually convincing” as to overcome any doubts that may arise from the lack of corroboration (see AOF v Public Prosecutor [2012] 3 SLR 34 (“AOF”) at [111]).
- [62]
[62] If the Victims’ evidence is not unusually convincing, a conviction may be unsafe unless there is some corroboration of the Victims’ account (AOF at [173]).
The applicable law
- [63]
[63] In Public Prosecutor v GCK and another matter [2020] 1 SLR 486 (“GCK”), a case involving a charge of outrage of modesty, the Court of Appeal elaborated on the “unusually convincing” standard that applies where the witness’ uncorroborated testimony forms the sole basis for conviction. The Court stated at [88]–[90]:
The Court of Appeal in GCK at [144] also explained the “unusually convincing” standard:
- [64]
[64] The Court of Appeal’s pronouncements in this regard were echoed in Kunasekaran s/o Kalimuthu Somasundara v Public Prosecutor [2018] 4 SLR 580, another outrage of modesty case, where Chan Seng Onn J emphasised that all the evidence adduced by the Prosecution and the Defence have to be considered to determine if the charge has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Chan J stated at [27]:
- [65]
[65] While the evidence must be considered holistically, I reiterate Chan J’s view in Winston Lee Siew Boon v Public Prosecutor [2015] SGHC 186, at [73(a)], that “[t]he legal burden on the prosecution remains to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This is the ultimate question that the court has to determine after a holistic examination of all the relevant evidence”.
- [66]
[66] In Public Prosecutor v BLV [2020] 3 SLR 166 (“BLV”), the Court summarised at [24] the relevant considerations to assess the credibility of a witness as follows:
- [67]
[67] The law recognises that discrepancies in the evidence of a witness does not ipso facto mean that the witness should not be believed.
- [68]
[68] In Osman Bin Din v Public Prosecutor [1995] 1 SLR(R) 419 (“Osman Bin Din”), the Court of Appeal at [39] cited with approval the following observation of Abdul Hamid J in Chean Siong Guat v Public Prosecutor [1969] 2 MLJ 63 at 63 and 64:
- [69]
[69] Similarly, in Jagatheesan s/o Krishnasamy v Public Prosecutor [2006] 4 SLR(R) 45 (“Jagatheesan”) at [82], V K Rajah J (as he then was) stated that:
- [70]
[70] These principles apply especially where there has been a significant lapse of time. In Tay Wee Kiat and another v Public Prosecutor and another appeal [2018] 4 SLR 1315, the High Court with three Judges hearing Magistrate’s Appeals, affirmed at [31] (citing Public Prosecutor v Singh Kalpanath [1995] 3 SLR(R) 158 at [60]):
- [71]
[71] I wish to highlight the unique and salient features of this case. I am mindful that the alleged incidents, namely the alleged sexual assaults, occurred in the early 2000s and the offences were only revealed in 2016, many years later. Thus, out of an abundance of prudence, I approach the evidence with utmost caution, and subject the Victims’ evidence to microscopic scrutiny. This includes seeking corroborative evidence to support the Victims’ evidence. Realistically, I am aware that the Victims were made to recall events some two decades ago when they were young children. This means that their recollection of the events may suffer from some degree of imprecision at times. Accordingly, inconsistencies are to be expected in this case. Allowing some room for these inconsistencies is appropriate. However, it is critical that I evaluate each inconsistency and discrepancy and ascertain whether it is minor or serious. A minor discrepancy is acceptable. However, a serious discrepancy will cause the court to be wary and exercise careful caution in evaluating the reliability of the evidence. In my assessment, I also consider whether the inconsistencies highlighted are sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about the veracity of the Victims’ evidence and their credibility as witnesses, such that their evidence falls short of the “unusually convincing” threshold. This is consistent with Yong Pung How CJ’s pronouncement in Public Prosecutor v Annamalai Pillai Jayanthi [1998] 1 SLR(R) 305 at [12]:
- [72]
[72] I also emphasise that the Victims were told to relate their recollection of the incidents at the time they were committed, ie, based on the knowledge they would have had as a young child. This aims to minimise, as much as possible, any contamination of their evidence by the knowledge they possess now as adults.
- [73]
[73] I now turn to consider the Victims’ evidence. In my analysis of the Victims’ evidence, I also consider the Defence’s specific contentions against each of the Victims’ claims where appropriate and relevant. This analysis supplements my consideration of the Defence’s overall case theory (at [226]–[278] below).
V1’s evidence
V1’s evidence is “unusually convincing”
- [74]
[74] V1’s account was coherent, detailed and largely free from internal and external inconsistencies. She was resolute when recounting the incidents on the stand. She was able to proffer cogent and reasonable explanations when confronted with contrary evidence by the Defence during cross-examination. I find that her evidence is unusually convincing and can be relied on.
- [75]
[75] I shall set out my detailed analysis of her evidence in relation to the various charges.
Charges in relation to V1
(1) The first charge
- [76]
[76] The incident occurred sometime between 1 February 2000 and 5 October 2001 at Property 1, when V1 was between seven and nine years old. V1 was sleeping on the bed in the master bedroom. V1 awoke to the accused rubbing his penis against her buttocks over her shorts. The accused was positioned behind her, with his head behind V1’s. V1 did not know what to do and pretended to be asleep. The accused then put his hand through one of the leg holes of V1’s shorts and used his hand to rub V1’s vagina directly on her skin. The accused then pulled one leg of V1’s shorts up and put his penis through that leg hole of V1’s shorts, before rubbing his penis against V1’s vagina, skin-on-skin, until she felt a wetness. The accused left the room shortly after.
- [77]
[77] V1 was able to relate this incident with considerable detail and clarity. I agree with the Prosecution that V1’s description regarding the position of her body, the accused’s acts, along with what she saw and felt, was rich and vivid. She recalled that she was lying on her right side with her legs slightly bent when the accused entered the master bedroom and that she was wearing yellow shorts. She was able to demonstrate, with the anatomically correct dolls provided by the Prosecution, how the accused first rubbed his penis against her buttocks, before stretching his hand under her shorts to touch her vagina skin-to-skin. She could also describe vividly how the accused then rubbed his penis on her, as it had a different, softer texture from the fingers of his hand. When V1 became older and knew more about sex she realised the wetness she felt when the accused rubbed his penis against her vagina was semen, as it had a different texture from urine.
- [78]
[78] When asked about her understanding of private parts at the time of the incident, V1 testified that she called the male private part “bird” and the female private part “flower”. At the time of the incident, she believed the accused had rubbed his private part against her. She explained that she understood the difference between male and female private parts as she had seen V2’s penis when she was younger because PW1 would bathe them together. At that time, she did not feel comfortable telling anyone about the incident, and felt disgusted and ashamed as she knew that “for someone to be touching [the private parts] or putting their private parts on you is shameful”.
- [79]
[79] The Defence sought to shake V1’s credibility by asserting that she had embellished her evidence when she stated that she felt a “bulge” rubbing against her buttocks, as that was the first time she used the term. V1 gave a reasonable and sensible explanation to the Defence’s question, namely that she used the term “bulge” to explain why she felt it was unnatural when the accused’s groin rubbed against her buttocks. Thus, I find that V1’s credibility was not affected on this basis.
- [80]
[80] In the course of the cross-examination, the Defence also sought to make the point that as the accused was taller than V1 and V1 could feel his head behind hers, it was not physically possible for him to grind his groin against her buttocks. The Defence also put to V1 that it would have been natural for V1 to have protested, resisted or at least asked the accused what he was doing. The Defence also suggested to her that she had no reason to feel ashamed at the time as she did not understand the accused’s action of rubbing his penis against her. In response, V1 stated that she did not resist the accused’s advances as she felt it was unsafe to speak up at that time.
- [81]
[81] I have some discomfort with the Defence’s notion of an archetypal reaction to sexual assault as different victims react differently to sexual assault. I shall elaborate further on this argument of the Defence at [240]–[245] below. The reaction or responses of victims to sexual assault depend on the circumstances, maturity, relationship with the attacker and the state of the victim’s mind. I find V1’s explanation for her lack of protest that she felt unsafe and scared to speak up believable as she was very young and vulnerable at that time. I have also taken into consideration that the accused was her “father” at that time.
- [82]
[82] Having regard to the above, I find V1’s evidence in relation to the first charge to be “unusually convincing”. From her account, I am able to arrive at the irresistible inference that the accused intended to outrage her modesty with his acts.
(2) The second charge
- [83]
[83] On another occasion between 1 February 2000 and 5 October 2001 at Property 1, during the day, the accused told V1 to lie on the bed in the master bedroom while they were alone. The accused then removed V1’s shorts and his own pants before laying on top of V1. At the trial, when demonstrating the accused’s actions, V1 removed the bottom clothing of the male and female anatomically correct dolls. V1 demonstrated that she was lying face up while the accused lay on top facing her. In this position, the accused rubbed his penis against her vaginal area skin-on-skin.
- [84]
[84] During cross-examination, V1 could not remember the full details of the incident, such as what she did before and after the incident and whether the accused spoke to her. The Defence suggested that as V1 could not give a full account of the incident, the incident never happened. The Defence also put to V1 that it would have been natural for V1 to fight, struggle or protest when the accused removed her shorts.
- [85]
[85] Respectfully, I am unable to agree with the Defence’s submissions. Again, I highlight the unique circumstances of this case, namely that the incident occurred more than 20 years before this trial. Moreover, when the accused sexually assaulted V1 she was a very young child of seven to nine years old. Her recollection of the salient facts of the offence, namely that the accused took off her shorts and rubbed his penis on her vaginal area skin-to-skin, is intact. Further, I also highlight that she could remember the key circumstances, which include, inter alia, the location in which the incident took place and the fact that she did not put up a struggle. V1’s recollection of the incidents illustrates the Court of Appeal’s observations in GCK at [113] that rape and trauma survivors have fragmented and incomplete memories, citing the following lines from an article (James Hopper & David Lisak, “Why Rape and Trauma Survivors Have Fragmented and Incomplete Memories” (Time, 9 December 2014)): “They will remember some aspects of the experience in exquisitely painful detail. Indeed, they may spend decades trying to forget them. They will remember other aspects not at all, or only in jumbled and confused fragments”.
- [86]
[86] Finally, V1’s account that she did not protest and simply complied with the request is also internally consistent with the explanation she gave for the first incident (see [80] above). Accordingly, I find V1’s account of this incident to be unusually convincing after having considered this charge together with the other evidence of the Prosecution. I am satisfied from V1’s account of this incident that the accused intended to outrage her modesty.
(3) The third charge
- [87]
[87] This incident occurred sometime between 1 February 2000 and 5 October 2001, when V1 was in Primary 3. It was after school in the afternoon, at Property 1. The accused gave V1 a glass of water to drink, which V1 described as tasting “off” and “more bitter than usual”. Thereafter, while doing her homework, V1 fell asleep on the study table in the living room. When V1 woke up, she was naked and lying face-down on the bed in the master bedroom with her legs tucked under her, like the Muslim prayer position, with her buttocks in the air. V1 was on the left side of the bed closer to the wall. She was confused and could not recall how she arrived at that position. She reasoned that she was drugged by the accused because if she had been merely very tired, she would have woken up when she was carried to a different room and had her clothes removed.
- [88]
[88] V1 then turned her head to the left to look behind her and she saw the accused standing in front of a mirror naked. V1 pretended to be asleep. The accused, who was naked, then went on top of V1 and V1 felt the accused’s body weight pressing against her body. The accused then tried to push his penis into her vagina. V1 testified that she felt pressure against her vagina as the accused attempted to penetrate her. V1 clenched her thighs to prevent him from doing so and he did not manage to fully penetrate her vagina. Only the tip of the accused’s penis entered V1’s vagina. V1 testified that she knew the accused was trying to insert his penis into her vagina as it felt like her vagina was being “poked”. She knew the object the accused was trying to insert into her vagina was not his finger, as the object she felt was thicker than a finger and felt “like a mushroom head”. After a while, the accused stopped his attempt and left the room.
- [89]
[89] V1 testified that during the incident, she did not dare to confront the accused or struggle. She also felt ashamed after the incident, as PW1 had told her she should not let other people see her naked or touch her private area. Thus, V1 felt ashamed since she and the accused were completely undressed during the incident.
- [90]
[90] In court, the Defence counsel asked V1 to draw the position of the bed in the main bedroom at the time of the incident. The accuracy of her drawing was confirmed by the accused, rendering her evidence externally consistent.
- [91]
[91] The Defence seeks to cast doubt on V1’s account of this incident by relying on very minute and technical details relating to the position of V1’s body. The Defence raises the following points.
(a) First, the Defence alleges that because V1’s body was in a prayer position, turning her head around to look at the accused behind her would have involved a large motion of her neck. Accordingly, she could not have done so without the accused realising she was awake.
(b) Second, the Defence also argues that based on V1’s description, she could not have seen the accused behind her as her vision would have been blocked by her arm when she turned her head and she would have faced the wall on her left.
(c) Third, the Defence submits that as a certain degree of muscle control was required to maintain a prayer position, she could not have been asleep in this position and would have fallen to her side or collapsed.
(d) Fourth, the Defence argues that V1’s account is senseless as the accused would not have executed the elaborate plan of drugging and undressing her only to suddenly abandon his attempt to penetrate her after a while.
(e) Fifth, V1 testified that V2 was in the kitchen when the accused gave V1 the glass of water to drink. The fact that V1 could not recall what happened to V2 in her account diminishes its believability.
(f) Sixth, V1’s evidence that the tip of the accused’s penis felt like a “mushroom” and that she believed it was the accused’s semen were superimpositions of her adult knowledge and experience.
The Defence submits that V1’s account is improbable based on all of the above.
- [92]
[92] The Defence’s criticism of V1’s evidence for this charge is without any logical basis. With respect, the Defence’s first and second arguments are based on the assumption that V1’s movement of her neck was somehow restricted or handicapped. There is no evidence suggesting this was the case. Rather, I find V1’s explanation that there was still ample space for her to turn her head around to see behind her without the accused realising she was awake believable and that such a motion would not be as large as the Defence suggests. Her explanation is also internally consistent with her drawing that the mirror was on the left wall of the main bedroom, away from the kitchen. I also disagree with the Defence’s characterisation of the prayer position described by V1 as one which requires effort to maintain. Rather, I am of the view that the Muslim prayer position is a relaxed position. Accordingly, it does not follow that V1 would have collapsed or fallen on the side if she were asleep in that position. In any case, V1 was not asleep but was pretending to be asleep.
- [93]
[93] The Defence submits that V1’s evidence cannot be believed, as she claimed V2 was in the kitchen but she could not recall what V2 was doing. With respect, I am unable to accept this argument as the role of V2 in the kitchen is insignificant and V1 could not be expected to remember all conceivable details. Further, V1 explained that she could not account for V2’s whereabouts as subsequently she had fallen asleep and woke up in the master bedroom with only the accused.
- [94]
[94] I also reject the Defence’s fourth argument that V1’s account is senseless as the accused had allegedly made an elaborate plan to penetrate her and then abandoned it. The accused’s abandonment of his plan to penetrate V1 is entirely consistent with V1’s evidence that she had prevented him from penetrating her by clenching her legs. Thus, the accused had difficulty penetrating V1. If the accused was determined and adamant to penetrate and rape V1 this could have been done. Only the accused would know why he decided to abandon his intention to penetrate V1. The accused’s unsuccessful attempt to penetrate V1 thereafter is not beyond belief.
- [95]
[95] Finally, V1’s descriptions of the accused’s penis as a “mushroom head” and his semen as “gel-like” and not “watery” like urine were based on what she felt at the time. She might have been too young to know that the liquid from the accused was semen. This is also borne out from her conditioned statement, where she stated that “… I felt wetness at my vagina area. I did not know what it was then, but now I think it could be semen.” In court, V1 cogently explained the latter part of the statement by stating that she realised the wetness she felt was semen when she became sexually active. Therefore, I find that the Defence has failed to cast any doubt on the veracity of V1’s account of this incident.
- [96]
[96] V1’s evidence on this incident, which was the most serious of the sexual assaults, was detailed and lucid. For the above reasons, I find that the evidence V1 gave in relation to the third charge is also unusually convincing in light of the Prosecution’s other evidence. It is clear from V1’s evidence that the accused attempted and intended to penetrate V1’s vagina with his penis without her consent. As V1 was below 12 years old at the time of the incident, she could not give consent under s 90(c) of the Penal Code.
(4) The fifth charge
- [97]
[97] This incident occurred sometime between 2003 and 2004 at Property 2 after S and her children moved out. The accused, smelling of alcohol, entered V1’s bedroom while she was sleeping and he grinded his penis against her vagina over her clothes. The accused then kissed V1 on her face before leaving the room. V1 testified that she knew the accused had been drinking alcohol as the smell of the accused’s breath reminded her of antiseptic.
- [98]
[98] The Defence argues that V1 would have protested or struggled had the accused assaulted her in the way she described. Again, I find V1’s lack of protest internally consistent with her overarching explanation that she was afraid of the accused. I, therefore, find that V1’s evidence in relation to the fifth charge is also unusually convincing and it evinces the accused’s intention to outrage V1’s modesty.
(5) The sixth charge
- [99]
[99] In 2005, while in V1’s bedroom at Property 2, the accused asked V1 to pull down her shorts. V1 complied as she was afraid the accused would scold and ridicule her. The accused then told V1 he wanted to see if her anus was dirty and inserted a cotton bud inside her anus for a few seconds. V1 testified that she could not remember if she had seen the cotton bud beforehand, but she was sure the accused had inserted a cotton bud into her as it felt like one.
- [100]
[100] The Defence argues that this incident was imagined by V1 as notwithstanding that V1 was in Secondary 1 at the time, she could not remember further details of the incident, such as what happened after the incident and whether the accused remained in V1’s bedroom. I am unable to accept this submission for the same reasons as stated in [85] above, namely that it is reasonable that V1 would not be able to recall some details as the offence took place a long time ago. Moreover, V1’s testimony was uncontradicted on the salient and relevant facts of the offence. I am satisfied that V1’s evidence in relation to the sixth charge is also unusually convincing when it is considered with the Prosecution’s other evidence. From V1’s account, I am satisfied that the accused intended to outrage her modesty when he inserted the cotton bud into V1’s anus.
V1’s explanation for her silence
- [101]
[101] When asked why she kept silent for more than ten years, V1 explained that she was embarrassed, ashamed, and did not know who to turn to. She did not want others to think of her as impure. V1 did not tell her brother, V2, about the sexual abuse, as she felt embarrassed to share details about the sexual abuse with a male. When she was asked why she did not tell PW1, V1 said she did not feel safe telling her about the incidents. V1’s insecurity stemmed from a previous occasion when PW6 confronted the accused over his beatings of the Victims. PW1 defended the accused and said he was only trying to discipline the Victims. Thus, V1 did not expose the accused’s wrongdoings as she would have had to continue living with the accused and was afraid life at home with the accused would “get worse” for her. V1’s account of the incident with PW1 and PW6 is also externally consistent with PW6’s evidence. PW6 testified that she spoke to PW1 after learning that the accused had beaten the Victims, to which PW1 responded that the accused was taking care of the Victims.
- [102]
[102] When asked why she did not tell anyone about the sexual assaults when she was older and in secondary school, V1 explained that she was unsure what action could be taken. She felt that the police “couldn’t do anything about it” even if she were to make a police report, as the police would have asked her for evidence which she lacked.
- [103]
[103] V1 testified that there were two occasions when she mentioned the accused’s sexual abuse of her.
- [104]
[104] First, in 2007 or 2008, V1 posted on her blog that she was sexually abused by the accused, before deleting it shortly after. She stated that she had done so to “let out steam” at that point of time and “to see if any of [her] friends would notice what [she] wrote”. The portion on the sexual abuse was “a tiny part” of the post and she deleted it after she “cooled down”, as she did not “want anyone to know about the sexual abuse” due to her shame of what had happened to her.
- [105]
[105] Second, V1 testified that she mentioned briefly to her ex-boyfriend, Faris, that the accused had sexually assaulted her, without any details. This is externally consistent with Faris’ conditioned statement:
- [107]
[107] Respectfully, I do not agree with the Defence’s argument, which seeks to straitjacket her reaction and expects a sexual assault victim to react and behave only in one particular way. Menon CJ in GDC v Public Prosecutor [2020] 5 SLR 1130 (“GDC”) at [13] observed that in “assessing the credibility of the victim, the court must bear in mind that there is no prescribed way in which victims of sexual assault are expected to act” (citing Public Prosecutor v Wee Teong Boo and other appeal and another matter [2020] 2 SLR 533 at [55]). As explained below at [253]–[260] not all sexual assault victims behave or react the same way. The undisputed fact is that the accused admitted to showing V1 nude images of females from the laptop and then told her to perform the same acts as shown. Notwithstanding what the accused had done to her, and this is admitted by the accused, she had not disclosed the accused’s sexual acts to anyone. I find V1’s explanations for her silence (see [101] and [102] above) to be consistent with her evidence on her actions. These include her refusal to reply to the accused’s Facebook messages on 14 May 2010 and 6 August 2013 (see [168] below), which she explained was due to her disgust for the accused and her anger at the accused for “ha(ving) the cheek” to message her after the abuse he inflicted on her, which “ruined her childhood”. V1 also explained that had it not been for PW1’s insistence to pursue the sexual assaults by the accused, she would have taken her “secret”, ie, the accused’s sexual abuse of her, to the grave.
- [108]
[108] Further, V1’s actions at [106] above must be seen in context. First, the circumstances show that V1 had thrown the motorcycle helmet down from the flat in a fit of anger. This is internally consistent with her own evidence on how the accused’s sexual abuse had affected her, where she described herself as having “anger management issues”. Second, V1 was a teenager when she posted about her experiences on her blog and deleted the blog post shortly after. I do not find this to be behaviour consistent with an “attention-seeking stunt”. If V1’s intention of posting about her experiences was truly to seek attention, she would not have deleted the post. Rather, her action appears to be the act of a teenager attempting to come to terms with traumatic past events.
- [109]
[109] V1’s claim that she was afraid of being seen as impure is also consistent with her own evidence throughout the trial that she was ashamed by the incidents, and in her own response on how the accused’s sexual acts affected her:
From V1’s revelation of self-blame, it can be inferred that she viewed the accused’s sexual abuse as her dark secret, the weight of which she felt was hers to bear alone. It is clear that V1’s non-disclosure of the incidents resulted from a complex mix of trauma, insecurity and shame, all of which she was made to experience from a tender age. Her evidence paints a compelling and poignant picture of the emotional scars she suffered that stretched well into the future and caused her decades-long silence. This explains why V1 continued to maintain her silence even after the accused left the family in 2006.
- [110]
[110] Considering all of the above in totality, I find V1’s actions and evidence to be consistent with someone who wished to forget and heal from the trauma inflicted on her as a victim of sexual abuse at a very young age. Her long silence for all those years does not undermine her credibility. Moreover, her evidence on why she did not tell PW1 about the abuse and that she only mentioned the abuse briefly to Faris is externally consistent with the evidence of PW6 and Faris. I, therefore, find that the internal and external consistencies of V1’s evidence on this issue of disclosure strengthen her credibility as a witness.
V1’s act of sending a text message on the stand
- [111]
[111] On 19 January 2022, which was the second day of V1’s in-court testimony, V1 sent a text message to the Investigating Officer (“IO”) with her handphone while on the stand. V1 claimed that she was not aware that she was disallowed from doing so:
- [112]
[112] The Defence submits that V1’s act of sending a text message to the IO while on the stand “shows a certain and blatant disregard for the law and proceedings.”
- [113]
[113] It is regrettable that it was not made clear to V1 that she was not allowed to use her handphone on the stand. However, I do not think this necessarily shows a “blatant disregard for the law and proceedings”. V1 was contrite when she was questioned on her use of her handphone while on the stand as seen at [111] above. The Prosecution also apologised and admitted that it was not explained to V1 that she was not to use her handphone on the stand.
- [114]
[114] In any event, V1’s act of using her handphone to message the IO did not impact the fairness or integrity of the present proceedings for the following reasons:
(a) First, V1’s act of using her handphone was spotted immediately by the Defence.
(b) Second, V1 and the Defence both confirmed that the IO did not reply to V1’s message.
(c) Third, V1 confirmed that she did not discuss her evidence on the stand with anybody else. V1 gave evidence on 18, 19 and 20 January 2022. Apart from this message, the remaining communication between V1 and the IO was administrative in nature: it was a message from the IO after court adjourned on 18 January 2022 informing V1 that she may have to attend court on either 19 or 20 January 2022.
(d) Fourth, the subject matter of the text message, which concerned something that the accused did during a camping trip, was not relevant to this case. V1 was being questioned on meeting PW6 on a camping trip just before she sent the message. The irrelevance of the subject matter of the text message to the present proceedings was confirmed by both V1 and the Defence. The Defence gave its confirmation a day after viewing the text message that the subject matter of the text message does not “feature any weight”.
All of the above put to rest the concerns of witness-coaching or that V1’s evidence was otherwise falsified or suppressed. I, therefore, find that while this incident was highly irregular, it was because V1 lacked knowledge on court procedure. The incident has no bearing on her credibility as a witness. The Defence counsel further assured the court that he was not making an issue out of this incident. Thus, I am surprised that the Defence counsel changed his mind and now uses this incident to attack V1 in the Defence’s reply submission.
Conclusion on V1’s evidence
- [115]
[115] V1’s account of the offences and material facts was detailed, cogent and largely consistent internally and externally. She was forthcoming and not shaken on the stand when she was thoroughly cross-examined by the Defence counsel. There were no signs of exaggeration or unreasonableness in her testimony. She never sought to embellish her evidence to mount a stronger case against the accused, maintaining throughout that the accused never fully penetrated her vagina with his penis. Examining the totality of V1’s evidence together with all the circumstances of the case, I agree with the Prosecution that the “ring of truth” in her testimony peals loud and clear. I, therefore, find that V1’s evidence is unusually convincing.
V2’s evidence
V2’s evidence is “unusually convincing”
- [116]
[116] I have carefully scrutinised V2’s evidence and I find V2’s evidence detailed, coherent, and largely consistent internally and externally. Having regard to the totality of the evidence, including V2’s demeanour in court and the internal and external consistencies of his evidence, I find that V2’s evidence is also unusually convincing.
- [117]
[117] I shall set out in detail my analysis of V2’s evidence below.
(1) V2’s fainting spells and the 2016 text messages
- [118]
[118] The accused started physically and sexually abusing V2 in 2000 when he was in Primary 4. On multiple occasions, the accused touched and rubbed V2’s penis against his consent. The accused would then put V2’s penis into his own mouth and suck it. The accused also attempted to put his penis into V2’s mouth, but V2 would close his mouth tightly to prevent the accused from doing so as he thought the accused’s penis was “dirty” since it is “where your urine comes out from”.
- [119]
[119] V2 alleged that he had fainting spells as a result of the accused’s sexual and physical abuse. The Defence submits that on the face of the evidence, V2 only had one fainting spell on 27 May 2000 which is evinced by an invoice from Tan Tock Seng Hospital (“TTSH”) dated 27 May 2000. PW1 said that there were no other fainting incidents at home or in school. The Defence argues that this discrepancy, taken together with V2’s claim that his classmates and teachers teased him about his fainting spells, show that V2 has “an overdeveloped sense of drama and hyperbole and is prone to exaggeration”. To support this assertion, the Defence also refers to V2’s text messages to PW1 on 12 December 2016 where he claimed that the accused had raped him and V1 (see [15] above), without first verifying this information with V1. V2’s evidence was that he assumed the accused had raped V1 after he chanced upon her blog in 2007, where she mentioned she had been sexually abused by the accused.
- [120]
[120] Respectfully, I disagree with the Defence’s submissions that V2’s credibility is adversely affected by his evidence on these issues. It is clear on the face of the evidence that PW1 was not physically present in the Victims’ lives for a large portion of the day. In the day, PW1 would be sleeping most of the time, and at night, she would be at work for her night shift. It is PW1’s own evidence that she would not know if V2 had fainted when she was not with him. Hence, when PW1 said she was not aware of any other fainting spells, this does not mean that V2 did not have other fainting spells which are not to her knowledge. As for the messages on 12 December 2016, it can be inferred from the tone of both PW1’s and V2’s messages that they were sent under emotionally charged circumstances (see [149] below). Further, the layman’s understanding of rape may be different from the legal definition of rape. This is supported by V2’s own evidence that he felt he was raped because the accused caused V2’s penis to penetrate his anus. V2 also explained that, having come across V1’s blog, he realised that she had “gone through the same problems with [the accused]”. In these circumstances, I agree with the Prosecution’s submissions that V2 has not exaggerated his evidence, given his own experiences and what he perceived of V1’s experience having seen her blog. Accordingly, the fact that V2 messaged PW1 that he and V1 were raped without confirming the veracity of this fact with V1 does not affect his credibility.
(2) The accused’s hypnosis of V2
- [121]
[121] On two of the occasions stated at [118] above, before the accused sexually abused V2, he tried to hypnotise V2 and V1 by swinging a pocket watch left and right like a pendulum in front of them. V2 pretended to fall asleep as he was scared the accused would beat him. The accused then committed the sexual acts stated at [118].
- [122]
[122] The Defence’s closing submission states that “During cross-examination, [V2] claimed that [the accused] had learned to perform hypnosis by watching Pokemon cartoons…”. This is incorrect. V2 said that he knew what the accused was doing was hypnosis as V2 learned it from the Pokémon cartoon.
- [123]
[123] The Defence counsel raises a few points about V2’s account of this incident which he claims detract from the believability of V2’s account. I shall deal with them in turn.
- [124]
[124] First, V1 made no reference to the hypnosis incidents, which the Defence submits were “unusual enough [to] warrant V1 making reference to them”. However, V1 was never asked about whether she was also hypnotised by the accused. Thus, this is not a discrepancy, and V2’s credibility as a witness is not undermined.
- [125]
[125] Second, the Defence highlights the portion of V2’s evidence where he stated that V1 was also present in the main bedroom during the hypnosis, but did not mention about what happened to her subsequently. I agree with the Prosecution that V2 has adequately explained why he could not account for V1’s whereabouts, namely that he was brought by the accused to a different room from her after he pretended to fall asleep.
- [126]
[126] Third, I further note that V2 was able to recall the key circumstances surrounding the offence, namely whether he was on the bed of the main bedroom when the accused attempted to hypnotise him. V2 could also recall that he knew the accused was trying to hypnotise him as V2 knew about hypnosis from watching Pokémon cartoons. I, therefore, find that V2’s evidence on the hypnosis incidents remains cogent and persuasive.
(3) The ninth, tenth and eleventh charges
- [127]
[127] The ninth, tenth and eleventh charges all stem from one incident that V2 remembers most vividly. This incident occurred at Property 2, on an occasion between 19 November 2001 and 18 November 2002 when V2 was 11 years old. V2 explained that he recalled his age at the time as he had cried himself to sleep while asking himself, “Why did [the accused] do this to me? I’m only 11.”
- [128]
[128] V2 was sleeping in his bedroom when he was awoken by the accused pulling down his shorts and touching his penis. V2 pretended to be asleep. The accused put powder on V2’s penis and masturbated it. V2 knew the accused was touching his penis as he peeked and saw the accused in front of him, and could feel the accused molesting him. The accused then sucked V2’s penis until it became erect. The accused squatted over V2’s penis, causing it to penetrate his anus. The accused then moved his body up and down while V2’s penis was inside his anus. The accused subsequently turned V2 on his side and tried to insert his finger and penis separately into V2’s anus. The accused was, however, unsuccessful in his attempts as V2 clenched his buttocks to prevent the accused from doing so. Subsequently, the accused turned V2 such that V2 was lying on his back, and masturbated V2 until V2 ejaculated. The accused then wiped up V2’s semen, put V2’s shorts back on, and left the bedroom. V2 saw that there was powder residue on him after the accused left the room. V2 affirmed that he did not protest or struggle and pretended to be asleep during the entire encounter as he was afraid.
- [129]
[129] During examination-in-chief, V2 testified that the accused used an open palm to stroke his penis. V2 later testified during cross-examination that the accused held his penis in a grip when he stroked it. These were different actions carried out by the accused when he masturbated V2, ie, stroking V2’s penis with an open palm and also grabbing V2’s penis in a stroking motion. While this was happening V2 was pretending to be asleep when he felt the accused masturbating his penis. In these circumstances, V2’s eyes were closed most of the time, and he could not have fully observed the accused’s actions for the whole duration of the sexual assault. This is consistent with V2’s later clarification that he did not fully see the accused stroke his penis but he could feel what the accused was doing to him. I reproduce the relevant portion of V2’s testimony below:
- [130]
[130] I disagree with the Defence’s argument that V2 would have protested or struggled when the accused sexually assaulted him and that V2 had no reason to be afraid of the accused. On the contrary, I find V2’s reaction to be reasonable and wholly consistent with his testimony that he was afraid of the accused when they lived together. The passive and compliant reactions of V2 to the accused’s sexual assaults are also consistent with V1’s. This consistency is all the more probative of V2’s credibility when one considers that V1 and V2 did not know that the accused had separately assaulted them. They did not disclose these dark secrets to each other as they considered these sexual assaults as shameful and embarrassing.
- [131]
[131] Finally, V2 was visibly distressed in court when he gave evidence on this incident, describing that the accused had stolen his virginity. V2 had flashbacks of the incident and testified that thinking about the incident angered him greatly. The Prosecution argues that V2 was candid to the point that he admitted he wanted to hurt the accused for the sexual acts done on him and V1. I agree with this argument and V2’s candour was also evident when he clarified in his testimony that the accused did not penetrate his anus with his finger and that the accused had merely attempted it. This resulted in the amendment of the eleventh charge to one which carried a lesser punishment (see [1] and [2] above).
- [132]
[132] Overall, I find V2’s evidence bears the consistency of a credible witness who truthfully narrated the details of traumatic incidents that occurred to him when he was a very young child more than 20 years ago. Thus, having regard to the totality of the facts and circumstances, I find that V2’s evidence in relation to the ninth, tenth and eleventh charges is also unusually convincing. I am satisfied that the accused had the intent to outrage V2’s modesty and had intended and attempted to penetrate V2 without V2’s consent. V2 was unable to give consent under s 90(c) of the Penal Code as he was under 12 years of age.
(4) V2’s relationship with the accused
- [133]
[133] V2 had a nuanced view of his relationship with the accused, which, in my view, enhanced the reliability of his account and strengthened his credibility as a witness. V2 testified as follows:
- [134]
[134] V2 also testified that his view of the accused changed drastically after he discovered that the accused had also sexually abused V1 when he chanced upon V1’s blog in 2007.
- [135]
[135] V2’s account of how he viewed the accused is internally consistent with his reasons for not disclosing the sexual abuse until more than ten years later. V2 had no intention to disclose the sexual assaults as he felt that PW1 was happy with the accused and wanted to preserve her happiness. The strength of this reason had fallen away by the time the incidents came to light in 2016. I find V2’s account in this regard to be consistent with his evidence that he missed the accused in 2006 as the accused was a father to him.
- [136]
[136] It is evident from the above that V2 was willing to speak the truth about how he viewed the accused, without embellishing or fabricating evidence detrimental to the accused. V2’s account in this regard thus strengthened his credibility as a witness and gave a further ring of truth to his evidence.
(5) V2’s communication with PW1 while the trial was ongoing
- [137]
[137] On 20 January 2022, which was the first day V2 took the stand, the following exchange occurred when V2 was being examined on the circumstances surrounding the police report in 2016:
- [138]
[138] On 21 January 2022, which was the second day V2 took the stand, it came to the court’s attention that V2 was in contact with PW1 earlier that morning. V2 then gave evidence on the mode and contents of his communication with PW1.
- [139]
[139] I note that V2’s evidence on the mode of his communication with PW1 was inconsistent. V2 initially testified that he only spoke to PW1 on the phone. PW1 had initiated the contact because she was worried about V2’s emotional state. V2 told PW1 that he made a mistake as he had testified he was going to hurt the accused (see [137] above). Thereafter, it was brought to the court’s attention that V2 had also communicated with PW1 over text messages.
- [140]
[140] I am of the view that V2’s initial omission that he also communicated with PW1 over text messages is a trivial or minor inconsistency which does not affect V2’s credibility. When asked about the text messages, V2 was forthcoming, and explained cogently the sequence of events:
- [141]
[141] Weighing this minor discrepancy against the totality of V2’s evidence, including his demeanour in court, I find that V2 remains a “witness of truth” (Jagatheesan at [82]).
- [142]
[142] When asked why he thought testifying that he wanted to hurt the accused was a “mistake”, V2 explained that he was concerned this testimony would portray him as an angry person. V2, nevertheless, denied that his anger was of such an extent that would predispose him to lie against the accused. This put to rest my concern that V2 would “hurt” the accused by fabricating evidence against him.
Conclusion on V2’s evidence
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