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Grounds publishedDecided 17 Jan 2023

General Division of the High Court

B High House International Pte Ltd v MCDP Phoenix Services Pte Ltd and another

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[2023] SGHC 12Case no. Suit No 371 of 2020

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] Where contractual obligations are concerned, it is trite that only parties to the contract have the standing to sue and enforce those contractual obligations: see Timothy Liau, “Privity: Rights, Standing, and the Road Not Taken” (2021) 41(3) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 803; The “Dolphina” [2012] 1 SLR 992 at [185]. In any contractual dispute, it is therefore prudent to ask, as a starting point, who the parties to the contract are – or if there is indeed a contract between the parties – if one seeks to base their cause of action in contract; and this is especially pertinent in the context of modern contracts, where parties often deal through intermediaries (see eg: B2C2 Ltd v Quoine Pte Ltd [2019] 4 SLR 17 at [127] and [131]. See also Paul S Davies and Tan Cheng-Han, Intermediaries in Commercial Law (Hart Publishing, 2022) (“Intermediaries in Commercial Law”)).

  3. [2] This was, more or less, the crux of the dispute in the present case notwithstanding the multitude of ways in which the Plaintiff chose to frame its case in its pleadings. In gist, the Plaintiff claimed that it had entered into a contract with the 1st Defendant for the provision of payment processing services, and that the 1st Defendant had breached its contractual obligations. The Plaintiff’s case against the 2nd Defendant was that he had induced the 1st Defendant to breach its contractual obligations. In response, the Defendants claimed that there was no contract between the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant. They contended that the action should have been brought against a Mr Daniel Berger (“Mr Berger”) who was actually the contracting party to the contract with the Plaintiff. The 1st Defendant denied that Mr Berger was its agent and/or that he had the authority to enter into the contract with the Plaintiff on their behalf.

  4. [3] After considering the evidence adduced at trial and parties’ written submissions, I dismissed the Plaintiff’s claim. These are the reasons for my decision.

  5. Facts

  6. The parties

  7. [4] The Plaintiff is B High House International Pte Ltd – a company incorporated in Singapore. The Plaintiff is in the business of managing and collecting payments for the group of companies to which it belongs. To that end, the Plaintiff processes payment transactions and manages, collects and recovers payments from customers (“third party customers”) of its principal affiliates. Specifically, in respect of the monies claimed by the Plaintiff in these proceedings, it is not disputed that these monies were from payments made by customers of the Plaintiff’s principal, Blue High House SA (“Blue SA”) on the latter’s website BetOnline.ag. To facilitate the collection and processing of payments from third party customers, the Plaintiff maintains a worldwide network of third-party processing agents.

  8. [5] The 1st Defendant is MCDP Phoenix Services Pte Ltd – a company incorporated in Singapore. It is a full service global financial services provider, and provides, amongst other things, payment processing services, software solutions in respect of financial services and remittance services. The 2nd Defendant is Mr Michael Carbonara (“Mr Carbonara”), an American national. He is the sole shareholder, Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) as well as the Managing Director of the 1st Defendant. While the Plaintiff alleged that Mr Carbonara was the alter ego of MCDP, both the Defendants denied this.

  9. [6] The parties presented starkly different accounts of their relationships, as well as their relationship with the Third Party to this suit, Mr Berger, during the period 2019 to 2020. Mr Berger did not appear in these proceedings. As I will explain in these written grounds, whether the Plaintiff could succeed in its claim ultimately turned on whether it could adduce sufficient evidence to support its account of the relationships between the parties and the obligations they owed each other.

  10. [7] Before I set out the parties’ respective accounts of events, I outline briefly below how payment processing works in general.

  11. A brief explanation of payment processing

  12. [9] These are the basic stages of payment processing:

  13. (a) The customer purchases goods or services from the merchant by either entering his card details into a point-of-sale terminal or an online payment gateway, or tapping his credit or debit card on the card reader.

  14. (b) The payment information will be sent to the acquiring bank. The acquiring bank processes the payment transaction for the merchant. It does so by sending the payment information to the respective card networks (ie, Visa or Mastercard) who in turn sends the information on to the issuing bank (ie, the bank which issued the credit or debit card to the customer).

  15. (c) The acquiring bank identifies which transactions belong to a particular merchant, or payment processor, through the issuance of a Merchant Identification Number (“MID”) to the relevant merchant or payment processor. This MID is associated with a merchant account.

  16. (d) The issuing bank decides whether to approve or decline a particular transaction based on its own parameters. The card networks, the acquiring bank, the merchant and the customer are eventually notified as to whether the transaction has been approved or declined.

  17. (e) If the payment transaction is approved, the issuing bank then sends the funds to the acquiring bank which then remits these funds (less any fees charged) to the merchant.

  18. (f) The role of the payment processor is to act as the intermediary between the merchant and the acquiring bank.

  19. Plaintiff’s account of events

  20. Mr Berger’s role

  21. [10] The Plaintiff claimed that Mr Berger was a sales representative who would match, arrange or refer online merchant clients to the Defendants in return for a commission. The Plaintiff claimed to have been approached by Mr Berger on or around 15 August 2019 and to have been told by him that he was the representative of various interrelated companies which provided payment processing services. Mr Berger said he could procure one of these entities to provide payment processing services to BHH. This arrangement would involve the use of merchant accounts with an acquirer bank in Mexico. This Mexican bank was Banco Ahorro Famsa SA (“Famsa Bank”), and it was used to collect and receive customers’ credit and debit card payments.

  22. How MCDP came to be appointed as the Plaintiff’s payment processing entity

  23. [11] On the same day, 15 August 2019, Mr Berger and the Plaintiff’s representative, Ms Vanessa Meza (“Ms Meza”, who appears to have gone by the alias “Sloane Stone” in all the communications relevant to this suit), held a Skype teleconference in which they discussed and agreed on the terms of the engagement (“the Payment Processing Agreement”). According to the Plaintiff, the essential terms of the Payment Processing Agreement were as follows:

  24. (a) Mr Berger was to procure a company (“the Processing Entity”) to process payments for and on behalf of the Plaintiff. It was understood by the parties that the identity of the Processing Entity was to be confirmed subsequently.

  25. (b) The processing entity would be responsible for providing the Plaintiff with payment processing services through MIDs which would be made available to the Plaintiff. That said, the Plaintiff was not informed at the time whether the MIDs provided would be maintained by the Processing Entity itself, or whether sub-processing agents which maintained the MIDs would be engaged.

  26. (c) The Plaintiff would pay the Processing Entity the following:

  27. (i) A set-up fee of US$2,500 in respect of each MID and a weekly maintenance fee of US$25 for each MID;

  28. (ii) A “merchant discount rate” equivalent to 7.5% of the value of each processed transaction;

  29. (iii) An additional flat charge of US$0.75 for each transaction;

  30. (iv) A flat charge of US$2.00 for each refund;

  31. (v) A flat charge of US$35.00 for each chargeback (While this was the fee agreed on for each chargeback, the Plaintiff alleged that the 1st Defendant charged a higher sum of US$55.00 for each chargeback from 30 August 2019 to 4 February 2020).

  32. (d) The processing entity was entitled to retain a “rolling reserve” amounting to 10% of the total volume of transactions processed for a period of 180 days, as security to ensure that the processing entity would have sufficient liquidity to return payments to customers in the event of a high number of chargebacks;

  33. (e) Settlement was to be conducted for each MID on a weekly basis. This process involved the following:

  34. (i) On a weekly basis, the Processing Entity was to post all data processed through the MID for the week on a web portal (“the Merchant Control Panel”), to which the Plaintiff was to be given access. The Merchant Control Panel was to contain information concerning all relevant payment transactions.

  35. (ii) The Processing Entity was to issue weekly settlement reports which set out its applicable fees and charges as well as the sums to be paid to the Plaintiff.

  36. (iii) The Processing Entity would then collect all payments made by third party customers and processed through the relevant MIDs for the week and pay the Plaintiff within seven days after deducting its applicable fees and charges.

  37. [12] The Plaintiff claimed that in reliance on Mr Berger’s representations, the 1st Defendant was engaged as the abovementioned Processing Entity under the Payment Processing Agreement. Between 30 August 2019 and 4 February 2020, the 1st Defendant processed payments made by third party customers.

  38. [14] On 29 August 2019, Mr Berger introduced Daphne Alfaro (“Ms Alfaro”) to the Plaintiff’s representatives via their Skype Group Chat and stated that she would be assisting him. On the Plaintiff’s version of events (which the Defendants disputed), Ms Alfaro was at all material times an employee and authorised representative of the 1st Defendant. She was the person in charge of setting up the MIDs and making them available for use by the Plaintiff’s affiliated merchants. She also informed the Plaintiff, on the 1st Defendant’s behalf, of the corresponding descriptors (which were basically a means of identifying all transactions processed through a particular MID).

  39. [15] On 30 April 2019, Ms Alfaro provided Ms Meza with access to a Merchant Control Panel (with the URL “merchants.txpmnt.com/Website/”). The Merchant Control Panel had been procured by the 1st Defendant from a third-party vendor and “rebranded” to appear as a service offering by the 1st Defendant. In particular, the Plaintiff claimed that the Merchant Control Panel bore features indicating that it was the 1st Defendant’s platform: specifically, its URL and the fact that it showed the 1st Defendant’s sailboat emblem on its web interface.

  40. [16] On Mr Berger’s instructions, Ms Alfaro set up the following MIDs for the Plaintiff:

  41. (a) The PeakPay MID was set up and payment processing commenced through it on 30 August 2019. Payments channelled through the PeakPay MID initially bore the descriptor “FEE%2AMHSERVICE”. Shortly after the Plaintiff had begun to channel payments through the PeakPay MID, Ms Alfaro informed Ms Meza on 31 August 2019 via Skype group chat that a new descriptor, “FEE*GERSON HDZ MARTINE” would be used.

  42. (b) The House MID was set up and payment processing commenced through it on 3 September 2019. Payments processed through this MID bore the following descriptors: “FEE%2AMHSERVICE”, “FEE%2AMHSERVI” or “FEE*MHSERVI”.

  43. (c) The IPTV MID was set up and payment processing commenced through it on 28 November 2019. There was, however, a hiccup. Mr Berger informed Ms Meza that the IPTV MID was disabled on or around 7 December 2019 and that he was trying to find a solution. A few days later, on or around 13 December 2019, Mr Berger informed the Plaintiff’s representatives that the Plaintiff could resume channelling payments through the IPTV MID, and payments through this MID would bear the descriptor “connectapp*IPTV”.

  44. [17] Mr Berger, Ms Alfaro and Ms Meza communicated mainly via Skype Group Chat. In between setting up the various MIDs, on 27 September 2019, Ms Alfaro added two individuals, Elliot and Mario Alvarez, to their Skype Group Chat and stated that they would be assisting her. The Plaintiff claimed that both Mario Alvarez and Elliot were employees and/or representatives of the 1st Defendant at the material time (though the Defendants denied this).

  45. [18] Ms Alfaro oversaw the payment processing on the 1st Defendant’s behalf. To that end, she had access to the backend of the 1st Defendant’s payment processing gateway and system. The Plaintiff cited two examples of the control exerted by Ms Alfaro over the payment processing system. First, when Ms Meza highlighted that there were technical issues relating to payments which were being processed via the PeakPay MID, Mr Berger directed the issue to Ms Alfaro who proceeded to follow up and to resolve it. Second, when Mr Berger requested that Ms Alfaro increase the processing capacity for the PeakPay and House MIDs to USD 1m per month, Ms Alfaro confirmed a mere three minutes later that this had been done.

  46. [19] Apart from the 1st Defendant, there were other entities involved in the process which had been set up to facilitate the processing of payments on the Plaintiff’s behalf. According to the Plaintiff, the 1st Defendant used the sub-processing agents Feenicia and ConectApp when processing payments for the Plaintiff through the PeakPay MID, the House MID and the IPTV MID. Payments made by customers were processed by the 1st Defendant in the following manner:

  47. (a) The electronic gateway (ie, API) of the Plaintiff’s principal affiliates was integrated with that used by the 1st Defendant.

  48. (b) Credit and debit card payments made by customers were transmitted through these integrated gateways to merchant accounts maintained by the sub-processing agents engaged by the 1st Defendant, Feenecia and ConectApp.

  49. (c) The settlement proceeds would be remitted by the acquirer bank either directly to the 1st Defendant, or to the sub-processing agents engaged by the 1st Defendant who would then remit these sums to the 1st Defendant.

  50. (d) The 1st Defendant was responsible for ensuring that the nett settlement proceeds (less any fees or charges due to them) were remitted to the Plaintiff’s bank account, the details of which were provided to Mr Berger in an email dated 5 September 2019.

  51. [20] The Plaintiff received its weekly settlement payments in respect of the PeakPay and House MIDs from a remittance company called WorldFirst Singapore (“WorldFirst”), which made these remittances on the 1st Defendant’s behalf. The Plaintiff received 38 settlement payments from WorldFirst between 12 September 2019 to 6 January 2020.

  52. [21] The Plaintiff claimed that the Processing Entity under the Payment Processing Agreement was indeed the 1st Defendant because the latter was mainly responsible for carrying out the payment processing services – and also because of various representations which the 1st Defendant allegedly made.

  53. Late and deficient payments by the 1st Defendant

  54. [22] According to the Plaintiff, from as early as 12 September 2019, the 1st Defendant began making late and deficient settlement payments in respect of the PeakPay and the House MIDs. When confronted about this, Mr Berger and Ms Alfaro gave several reasons for the delay and shortfall in payments. Amongst other things, they told the Plaintiff that the payment might not have reached the Plaintiff’s bank account, and that the settlement reports had not been accurately updated. Ms Alfaro also claimed that Famsa Bank had withheld these funds from the 1st Defendant and closed the bank account. However, neither Mr Berger, nor Ms Alfaro was able to provide any documentation or details to support their explanations as to why the payments of sums due to the Plaintiff were late.

  55. [23] On 10 January 2020, Mr Berger sent Ms Meza a report prepared by the 1st Defendant which indicated that it had fallen behind on its payment obligations in respect of the PeakPay and House MIDs to the tune of at least €821,534.46. Ms Meza responded to the email on the same day, seeking clarification as to why these funds had not been paid. When no response was forthcoming from Mr Berger, Ms Meza sent another email on 13 of January 2020. Mr Berger was evasive and said that he would forward Ms Meza’s email to Ms Alfaro. No further details were provided in relation to the missing funds.

  56. [24] A day later, on 14 January 2020, Ms Meza emailed Mr Berger seeking clarification as to when Famsa Bank had closed the 1st Defendant’s merchant account. She requested a copy of the notification from Famsa bank which stated that the account had been closed and inquired when the funds would be released. However, Mr Berger and Ms Alfaro continued to ignore Ms Meza’s requests. On 29 January 2020, Ms Meza followed up with another email to Mr Berger, repeating her request for information concerning the Famsa bank account. Mr Berger continued to ignore her emails. Later, on 4 February, the Plaintiff ceased all payment processing through the 1st Defendant.

  57. [25] In its amended Statement of Claim, the Plaintiff pleaded that the total outstanding sum owed to it by the 1st Defendant stood at US$2,680.535.21. This comprised the sum of US$1,735,949.69 which was due in respect of the PeakPay and House MIDs, and the sum of US$944,585.52 which was due in respect of the IPTV MID (the “Trust Monies”).

  58. Fraud and misappropriation or diversion of the Outstanding Settlement Payments

  59. [26] Concerned as to where its funds had gone, the Plaintiff conducted its own investigations. According to the narrative which the Plaintiff put forward in this suit, it was the 1st Defendant who – through Mr Berger and Ms Alfaro – had misappropriated or diverted the funds. Based on a company profile search, the Plaintiff learnt that the 2nd Defendant was the sole owner of the 1st Defendant, as well as one of its directors (specifically the Managing Director) and Chief Executive Officer. The Plaintiff claimed that this was bad news for it as it knew the 2nd Defendant to be a fraudster. On the Plaintiff’s telling, the 2nd Defendant had in 2014 utilised an entity known as SecCom or Kreysha to defraud the Plaintiff’s principal affiliate, BetOnline, and had misappropriated some US$1,139,056.45 in a similar fashion.

  60. [27] On the Plaintiff’s version of events, it had once again been defrauded by the 2nd Defendant, who had utilised the 1st Defendant this time as a vehicle to defraud and dishonestly misappropriate or divert monies belonging to the Plaintiff. Contrary to Ms Alfaro’s representation that Famsa Bank had withheld the Plaintiff’s payments, the Plaintiff alleged that Famsa Bank had released these payments to Feenicia (one of the sub-processing agents engaged by the 1st Defendant) and that Feenicia had duly transferred the Plaintiff’s funds to the 1st Defendant. Instead of transferring these funds to the Plaintiff, the 1st Defendant had squirreled them away. Further, in respect of a portion of the payments amounting to MXN 12,450,876.14 which had been held back by Feenicia as a reserve to settle any disputed payments, chargebacks or fines, this portion of the funds had also been paid by Feenicia into the 1st Defendant’s account with the First Finance International Bank (“FFIB”) on or around 13 April 2020 (“FFIB funds”). Instead of paying the FFIB funds to the Plaintiff, the 2nd Defendant had attempted to have these funds transferred to an account with JP Morgan London, UK which the Plaintiff alleged was his personal bank account. The Plaintiff claimed that the FFIB funds were traceable to payments by the third party customers, which had been processed and/or received by the 1st Defendant for and on behalf of the Plaintiff, and that the Plaintiff therefore had a proprietary interest in these funds. Finally, the Plaintiff also alleged that payments channelled through the IPTV MID had been released by the relevant acquirer bank and/or the sub-processing agent, ConectApp, to the 1st Defendant as well; and that the latter had similarly failed to pay these sums to the Plaintiff.

  61. The Defendants’ account of events

  62. Mr Berger’s role

  63. [28] In contrast, the Defendants took the position that it was Mr Berger who had been the 1st Defendant’s client. The 1st Defendant had provided Mr Berger with remittance services, and allowed him to set up and use its software platform and payment management system. However, it was understood between the Defendants and Mr Berger that he would not transact or make any representation on behalf of the 1st Defendant. To that end, Mr Berger had his own portfolio of clients and managed them on his own. At no point in time did Mr Berger act as the 1st Defendant’s employee or agent.

  64. [29] In 2019, the professional and business relationship between the Defendants and Mr Berger took a turn for the worse: Mr Berger appeared to be plagued by personal issues: he was intoxicated and belligerent when communicating with the Defendants and colleagues, proclaimed he had taken on a mistress, and sent sexually harassing messages to female colleagues. At the end of 2019, the 1st Defendant and Mr Berger parted ways professionally. Notwithstanding their professional differences, as Mr Berger was at this point not yet able to continue doing business without the 1st Defendant’s software platform and payment management system, the latter continued to allow him to use the software platform and payment management system.

  65. [30] Despite the 1st Defendant’s goodwill, Mr Berger continued to harass their employees (including the 2nd Defendant). In the aftermath of the breakdown of their professional and business relationship, he even threatened to cause damage to the Defendants. According to the Defendants, they had come to realise that Mr Berger was working in concert with the Plaintiff in this action to cause damage to the Defendants after receiving inter alia text messages from Mr Berger demonstrating his possession of information about the present proceedings which he could only have obtained from the Plaintiff.

  66. The 1st Defendant was not engaged as the Plaintiff’s processing entity

  67. [31] The Defendants denied that the 1st Defendant had been engaged by the Plaintiff as its payment processing agent or that it had processed on the Plaintiff’s behalf those payments made by third-party customers. They contended that the 1st Defendant was not bound by the acts of Mr Berger insofar as it was alleged that he had acted on the 1st Defendant’s behalf in entering into contracts or in making representations. The Defendants further contended that they had no knowledge of, and did not agree to the terms of engagement allegedly discussed via Skype teleconference on 15 August 2019.

  68. [32] The Defendants also took the position that the Plaintiff either knew, or must reasonably have known that Mr Berger was not the 1st Defendant’s authorised representative for the following reasons. First, Mr Berger had not communicated with the Plaintiff using any account or email address belonging to the 1st Defendant. In fact, Mr Berger, who owned an independent business by the name of “MCC Code”, would communicate with the Plaintiff through an email address with the domain name “mcccode.com”, and he would also use the MCC Code logo as his profile picture in his communications with the Plaintiff. Second, Mr Berger did not purport to be acting on the 1st Defendant’s behalf in his communications with the Plaintiff: that much was clear from the fact that other entities such as “SM Marketing” and “Kings Road Capital Corp Private Limited” had been named as the contracting party in the draft contracts which Mr Berger sent to the Plaintiff. Third, there was no mention of or reference to the 1st Defendant in any of the terms reached between Mr Berger and the Plaintiff under the alleged Payment Processing Agreement, or in any of the emails, text messages, group chats and draft contracts exchanged between Mr Berger and the Plaintiff. Finally, on the Plaintiff’s own case, there was no suggestion that the Plaintiff itself was even aware of the 1st Defendant’s existence and/or identity when it allegedly entered into the Payment Processing Agreement.

  69. Ms Alfaro was not the 1st Defendant’s employee or authorized representative

  70. [33] As for Ms Alfaro, the Defendants asserted that she was not an employee and authorised representative of the 1st Defendant at all material times in the dealings with the Plaintiff. Instead, Ms Alfaro was an employee of a different company, SecureTeller, which was owned by her husband, one Oscar Bermuda. SecureTeller had, on previous occasions, provided other services to the 1st Defendant and had done the same in relation to Mr Berger’s dealings with the Plaintiff. Insofar as Ms Alfaro had communicated with the Plaintiff, she had done so on Mr Berger’s behalf and not the 1st Defendant.

  71. The Merchant Control Panel

  72. [34] The Merchant Control Panel was a software procured by the 1st Defendant from a third-party vendor, Coriunder. Mr Berger was the one who had introduced the 1st Defendant to Coriunder. The Merchant Control Panel was a piece of software which enabled merchants to track and view the transactions being processed through MIDs by payment processors on a single webpage – in other words, an informational tool. The Merchant Control Panel could be provided to the 1st Defendant’s various clients for their use, but ultimately, the 1st Defendant had no control over how their clients actually used it. The Merchant Control Panel which was set up and operated by Mr Berger had the following URL: “merchants.txpmnt.com/Website/”.

  73. The 1st Defendant played no part in setting up the MIDs, payment processing and transfers

  74. [35] In relation to the PeakPay, House and IPTV MIDs, the Defendants claimed that the 1st Defendant was not involved in processing the payments through these MIDs. The 1st Defendant did not own or control any of the merchant accounts or MIDs. Instead, it was Mr Berger who had set up these MIDs – and he was able to do so because the 1st Defendant had allowed him to set up and use its software platform and payment management system. Following from this, insofar as Ms Alfaro appeared to have access to the 1st Defendant’s system, this was premised on the fact that the 1st Defendant had actually granted Mr Berger permission to use their systems. This, however, did not mean that Ms Alfaro was either the 1st Defendant’s employee or representative. The Defendants also asserted that Elliot and Mario Alvarez were not the 1st Defendant’s employees or representatives.

  75. The 1st Defendant was not responsible for the missing sums which were owed to the Plaintiff

  76. [36] The Defendants gave several explanations as to why it was not responsible for the sums which the Plaintiff alleged had gone missing. First, in relation to the remittances made by WorldFirst to the Plaintiff, the 1st Defendant had acted on Mr Berger’s instructions and made these payments on his behalf. The 1st Defendant had only provided Mr Berger with remittance services at the material time, and this included using WorldFirst’s services to remit funds.

  77. [37] Second, the 1st Defendant denied that it had prepared a report on 10 January 2020 indicating that it had fallen behind on its payment obligations in respect of the PeakPay and House MIDs (see above at [23]). The 1st Defendant denied that it was liable to the Plaintiff for the sum of at least €821,534.46 in respect of the “PeakPay MID” and the “House MID”.

  78. [38] Third, the Defendants denied that the 1st Defendant had received any of the Trust Monies owed to the Plaintiff, or that the 1st Defendant had misappropriated and/or diverted funds received from Feenicia or ConectApp which were meant for the Plaintiff. Specifically, in relation to the FFIB funds, the 1st Defendant had used Feenicia as a sub-processor to process payments made in Mexico on behalf of the 1st Defendant’s own clients (who did not include the Plaintiff). While the 1st Defendant would receive the funds in Mexican Peso (“MXN”), it had to remit the funds to its clients in United States Dollars (“USD”). As part of the sub-processing services provided to the 1st Defendant, Feenicia was entitled to maintain a portion of the processed transactions as a reserve to settle any disputed payments, chargebacks and/or fines.

  79. [39] In or around April 2020, Feenicia was obliged to release these reserves to the 1st Defendant in respect of transactions processed for the 1st Defendant’s clients. To mitigate against currency exchange loss, given that the MXN had devalued against the USD in or around March 2020, the 1st Defendant directed Feenicia to transfer the reserves to an account with FFIB. This was done to take advantage of FFIB’s offer of a USD loan using the received MXN as collateral. The 1st Defendant could then use the USD loan to fulfil its obligations to its clients and vendors, and repay the loan when MXN increased in value.

  80. [40] After FFIB received the funds from Feenicia, the 1st Defendant discovered that FFIB was in fact unwilling to extend the USD loan. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC (“Morgan Stanley”), with which the 2nd Defendant had an account at the material time, indicated its willingness to grant the 1st Defendant such a loan to hedge against currency exchange fluctuations between the MXN and USD. As such, the 1st Defendant instructed FFIB to transfer the same funds to Morgan Stanley. Instead of doing so, however, FFIB froze the FFIB funds, claiming that it had received a complaint against the 1st Defendant regarding the source of the funds, and that it needed to investigate .

  81. [41] In the circumstances, the Defendants denied that the FFIB funds were traceable to payments from the Plaintiff’s third-party customers which had been processed and/or received by the 1st Defendant for and on behalf of the Plaintiff. The Defendants also denied that the Plaintiff had a proprietary interest in these funds.

  82. The Parties’ Cases

  83. [42] Having set out each side’s account of events, I summarise below their respective cases.

  84. The Plaintiff’s case

  85. [43] The Plaintiff’s case was that it had entered into the Payment Processing Agreement with the 1st Defendant. Flowing from this, the 1st Defendant was said to owe the Plaintiff a duty to transfer payments received on a timely basis, and to render a true and complete account of all funds payable to the Plaintiff (including outstanding unpaid sums). Further and in the alternative, the 1st Defendant was said to also owe fiduciary duties to the Plaintiff in relation to all payments processed and received on behalf of the Plaintiff in its capacity as the Plaintiff’s payment processing agent, or as the party who had power and control over funds that were meant to be allocated to and/or that belonged beneficially to the Plaintiff. The 1st Defendant was thus obliged to act bona fide in the Plaintiff’s interests and for the proper purposes of the Plaintiff in relation to funds paid by third party customers, by duly transferring these payments to the Plaintiff (subject to the deduction of fees and charges owed to it).

  86. [44] The Plaintiff claimed that in failing to pay over the Trust Monies of US$2,680,535.21, the 1st Defendant had acted in breach of its contractual duties under the Payment Processing Agreement. The Plaintiff also claimed that the 2nd Defendant had knowingly induced or procured the 1st Defendant’s breach of its contractual duties.

  87. [45] Further or in the alternative, the Plaintiff claimed that as the 1st Defendant owed it fiduciary duties in relation to all payments processed and received on its behalf, the 1st Defendant’s failure to pay over the US$2,680,535.21, and/or to account for these Trust Monies, constituted a breach of the 1st Defendant’s fiduciary duties. The 2nd Defendant was alleged to have knowingly assisted in the 1st Defendant’s breach of fiduciary duties.

  88. [46] Further or in the alternative, the Plaintiff claimed that regardless of whether it had entered into the Payment Processing Agreement with the 1st Defendant, the 1st Defendant had clearly received the payments processed through the PeakPay, House and IPTV MIDs with full knowledge that the payments were meant to be allocated to and/or belonged beneficially to the Plaintiff (subject to the deduction of processing fees and charges). However, the Defendants had misappropriated and/or diverted the Trust Monies from the Plaintiff. In the circumstances, the Plaintiff contended that the Defendants must have held the payments processed through the PeakPay, House and IPTV MIDs and/or their traceable proceeds on constructive trust for the Plaintiff.

  89. [47] In addition and/or alternatively, the Plaintiff made the following other claims:

  90. (a) That the Defendants had wrongfully and with intent to injure the Plaintiff by unlawful means, conspired and combined to misappropriate the Trust Monies, and to defraud and conceal such fraud from the Plaintiff; and/or

  91. (b) That the Defendants had jointly defrauded the Plaintiff by falsely representing that the 1st Defendant would provide payment processing services to the Plaintiff in accordance with the Payment Processing Agreement, knowing that this representation was false and with the intention that the Plaintiff would, in reliance on such representation, enter into the Payment Processing Agreement and cause payments from third party customers to be channelled through the MIDs ;

  92. (c) That the Defendants had benefited from and/or been enriched as a result of the misappropriation and/or diversion of the Trust Monies, at the expense of the Plaintiff, and that this benefit or enrichment was unjust because the misappropriation and/or diversion of the Trust Monies had been done without the Plaintiff’s consent, there had been a total failure of consideration, and/or the Defendants knew that the Trust Monies rightfully belonged to the Plaintiff.

  93. [48] The Plaintiff sought the following reliefs:

  94. (a) A declaration that the alleged Trust Monies in the sum of US$2,680,535,21 are held on trust by the 1st Defendant for the Plaintiff, including but not limited to the FFIB funds;

  95. (c) A declaration that the Plaintiff would be entitled to trace the Outstanding Settlement Payments and Assets held on constructive trust for the Plaintiff into whose hands they may be found, wherever located;

  96. (e) Further or alternatively, damages to be assessed;

  97. (f) Compound interest at a commercial rate from the date of the defendants’ wrongful actions and/or breaches of fiduciary duties to the date of judgment;

  98. (g) Alternatively, interest pursuant to the Civil Law Act 1909 (2020 Rev Ed) (“CLA”) from the date of commencement of these proceedings to the date of judgment;

  99. (h) Costs; and

  100. (i) Such further and/or other relief as this Court deemed fit.

  101. The Defendants’ case

  102. [49] The Defendants, on the other hand, contended that the Plaintiff’s claim should have been properly brought against Mr Berger and not the Defendants. Because the 1st Defendant was never a party to the Payment Processing Agreement and did not owe the Plaintiff any contractual duties, it could not be said to have breached any such duties. The corollary of this was that the Plaintiff’s claim against the 2nd Defendant for inducing breach of contract must also fail.

  103. [50] Even assuming for the sake of argument that the 1st Defendant was a party to the Payment Processing Agreement, the Defendants argued that the Payment Processing Agreement was unenforceable as the payments processed by the Plaintiff were paid by customers of online gambling websites, and this made the agreement an illegal contract under the Remote Gambling Act 2014 (No. 34 of 2014) (“RGA”).

  104. [51] In the alternative, the Defendants sought to characterise the Plaintiff’s claim for the recovery of the Trust Monies as being an action brought to recover monies won on a wager – and thus unenforceable under s 5(2) CLA.

  105. [52] Apart from the above, the Defendants contended that the 1st Defendant did not owe the Plaintiff any fiduciary duties and could not be said to have breached such duties; and that the 2nd Defendant did not knowingly assist the 1st Defendant’s alleged breach of fiduciary duties. Finally, the 1st Defendant denied that it had received the payments processed through the three MIDs on behalf of the Plaintiff and/or with full knowledge that the payments were meant to be allocated to and/or belonged beneficially to the Plaintiff.

  106. Some procedural history:

  107. Applications pertaining to documents from US deposition of Ms Alfaro

  108. [53] On or about 22 December 2021, the Plaintiff commenced an Application for Judicial Assistance against Ms Alfaro in the United States, purportedly to obtain “documentary and testimonial evidence for use” in this Suit. Ms Alfaro eventually disclosed over 18,000 documents to the Plaintiff. The Defendants made the following applications to restrain the production of some of these documents at the main trial.

  109. HC/SUM 1386/2022

  110. HC/SUM/1514/2022

  111. Issues to be determined

  112. [56] The following issues arose for my determination:

  113. (a) Whether the Plaintiff’s claim was statutorily barred under the CLA and/or the Remote Gaming Act;

  114. (b) Whether the Plaintiff and 1st Defendant had entered into a contract for the provision of payment processing services by the latter to the former; and if so, whether the 1st Defendant had breached its contractual duties to the Plaintiff, and whether the 2nd Defendant had knowingly induced or procured such breach;

  115. (c) Whether, in addition or alternatively, the 1st Defendant owed fiduciary duties to the Plaintiff in respect of the processing of the latter’s funds; and if so, whether the 1st Defendant had breached such fiduciary duties, and whether the 2nd Defendant had knowingly assisted in such breach;

  116. (d) Whether the Plaintiff could make out its other alternative claims in respect of unlawful means conspiracy, fraudulent misrepresentation, constructive trust, and/or unjust enrichment.

  117. [57] In the paragraphs that follow, I address these issues seriatim.

  118. My Decision

  119. Whether the Plaintiff’s claims are statutorily barred under either the CLA

  120. s 5(2) CLA

  121. [58] I address first the Defendants’ submission that the Plaintiff’s action in S 371/2020 was barred under s 5 of the CLA. The Defendants argued, firstly, that s 5(2) CLA applied to the present case because this was an action brought to “recover money won on a wager”.

  122. [59] In response, the Plaintiff contended that the Defendants’ submission must fail as the claims in the present suit were not for any sum of money or valuable thing alleged to be won upon any wager: rather, the present claims were for sums due to the Plaintiff from the 1st Defendant under a contract for payment processing services.

  123. [60] For ease of reference, I set out below s 5(2) CLA:

  124. [61] Having considered the parties’ submissions and the authorities relied on, I was not persuaded by the Defendants’ submissions on the application of s 5(2) CLA to the facts of this case.

  125. [62] In their written submissions, the Defendants placed great emphasis on the fact that the payments which the Plaintiff alleged were received by the 1st Defendant for processing were “deposits into customer accounts” of the website of the Plaintiff’s affiliate Blue SA. The Defendants argued that the customers were crediting their accounts on BetOnline.ag with the intention of using such credit for gaming and wagering transactions on BetOnline.ag: ergo, the “core of the transactions were the gaming contracts entered into on BetOnline.ag and the funds paid in respect thereof thus fall within the ambit of section 5(2) of the CLA”.

  126. [63] It is not disputed that ss 5(1) and 5(2) CLA are in pari materia with s 18 of the UK Gaming Act 1845 which provided:

  127. All contracts or agreements, whether by parole or in writing, by way of gaming or wagering, shall be null and void; and ... no suit shall be brought or maintained in any court of law and equity for recovering any sum of money or valuable thing alleged to be won upon any wager, or which shall have been deposited in the hands of any person to abide the event on which any wager shall have been made.

  128. [64] In Star Cruise Services Ltd v Overseas Union Bank Ltd [1999] 2 SLR(R) 183 (“Star Cruise”), Selvam J noted that s 18 of the UK Gaming Act 1845 was split into three limbs: (a) Contracts of gaming and wagering are null and void (“the first limb”); (b) the winner is prevented from bringing an action to recover his winnings (“the second limb”); and (c) the winner is prevented from suing the stakeholder (“the third limb”). Section 5(2) CLA corresponds to the second and third limbs of s 18 of the UK Gaming Act 1845. What the Defendants had to show, therefore, was that the Plaintiff’s action was a suit brought by the winner in a gaming or wagering contract, either to recover his winnings or to sue the stakeholder.

  129. [65] It will be recalled that in its amended statement of claim, the Plaintiff pleaded a number of claims in the alternative. Based on the 1st Defendant’s alleged failure to pay over the Trust Monies, the Plaintiff claimed – alternatively – breach of contract by the 1st Defendant; breach of fiduciary duties to the Plaintiff; a constructive trust over the monies; unlawful means conspiracy; fraudulent misrepresentation; and unjust enrichment. The Defendants’ submissions appeared to assume that all of the Plaintiff’s pleaded claims were caught by s 5(2) CLA. However, there was no real attempt to analyze the language of s 5(2) and to demonstrate why it applied to each of the Plaintiff’s claims. Instead, the Defendants’ submissions appeared to consist of a series of sweeping generalizations which paid no regard to the actual wording of s 5(2). This was, with respect, unfortunate, because on a plain reading of s 5(2), it was not at all apparent that any of the Plaintiff’s pleaded claims could be characterized as an action “for recovering any sum of money… alleged to be won upon any wager”. The very words used in s 5(2) make it clear that the provision is concerned with actions to recover gaming or wagering debts. None of the Plaintiff’s pleaded claims could be described as such without violence being done to the language of s 5(2). None of its claims was concerned with recovering gaming debts due on the gaming contracts between Blue SA and its customers.

  130. [66] Nor could the monies paid by Blue SA’s customers be properly described as monies “deposited in the hands of any person to abide the event on which any wager has been made”. The fact that the monies allegedly received by the 1st Defendant for processing originated from customers of Blue SA intending to credit their BetOnline accounts for gaming purposes was really incidental to the Plaintiff’s claims. While the Defendants contended that the customers making these payments must have intended to utilize the credit in their BetOnline accounts to gamble on the website, this did not change the fact that the 1st Defendant’s role in the entire process was (on the Plaintiff’s pleaded case) that of the intermediary between the acquiring banks who received the funds from customers’ credit card payments on the one hand, and the Plaintiff who collected the funds paid on behalf of Blue SA on the other hand. In this context, it would make no sense at all to say that the customers’ payments had been “deposited” in the 1st Defendant’s hands for the 1st Defendant to act in effect as a stakeholder (“to abide the event on which any wager has been made”).

  131. [67] Apparently eschewing the plain meaning of the words of s 5(2), the Defendants sought to persuade me instead that our courts have “interpreted section 5 of the CLA widely and purposefully”; and that based on this “wide” and “purposeful” interpretation, the scope of s 5(2) extended to the Payment Processing Agreement relied on by the Plaintiff in this action. Having reviewed the authorities, however, I agreed with the Plaintiff that none of them provided any support for the Defendants’ submissions.

  132. [68] In Star City Pty Ltd v Tan Hong Wan [2002] 1 SLR(R) 306 (“Star City”), the appellant had attempted to recover what they alleged were unpaid loans given to the respondent for the purpose of gambling. The respondent had signed, and handed over to the appellant, five cheques for a total of A$250,000 in exchange for chip purchase vouchers. These vouchers were used to purchase chips for gambling. The respondent proceeded to lose the entire sum. When the appellant attempted to cash in the cheques, all five were dishonoured. The respondent repaid some A$55,160 – leaving the sum of A$194,840 unpaid. The appellant sought to recover this sum as unpaid loans made to the respondent. The trial judge had disallowed the claim on the basis that this was in fact a gaming contract, and thus irrecoverable under s 5 CLA. The Court of Appeal (“CA”) held that s 5(2) CLA was procedural in nature and that the court was bound to apply it as part of the lex fori. As to whether the appellant’s claim was barred by s 5(2) CLA, the court noted that the principle enshrined in s 5 CLA was that a wagering contract which “was valid by its governing law is valid in Singapore”, but no action would lie in Singapore to recover any sum of money won on such a contract. Whether the appellant’s claim ran afoul of s 5(2) CLA turned, therefore, on the characterisation of the transaction in question (Star City at [15]).

  133. [69] Applying the lex fori (which was Singapore law) to determine the true substance of the transaction in this case, the CA was of the view that the transaction in question was a wagering contract and not a genuine loan: Star City at [29] and [37]. It was a claim by the casino operator to recover debts owed to it by a losing punter under the wagering contract between them. The whole point of allowing customers to deposit cheques in exchange for chip purchase vouchers which could then be used to obtain chips for gambling was to enable these customers to gamble on credit. In contrast, in the present case, the Plaintiff’s claim was not concerned with enforcing the wagering contracts entered into between its affiliate Blue SA and the third-party customers of Blue SA’s BetOnline website. As the Plaintiff pointed out in its closing submissions, the Plaintiff’s claims “are not for any sum of money or valuable thing alleged to be won upon any wager”: its claims “are for sums due to it from [the 1st Defendant] under a contract for payment processing services”.

  134. [71] Selvam J dismissed the plaintiff’s claim, holding that the three cashier’s orders were not bills of exchange as claimed. Instead, the “final effect of the transactions taken in their totality” was that the amounts represented by the cashier’s orders were “moneys won by way of gaming”; and by reason of ss 6(1), 6(2) and 6(5) of the CLA (our present ss 5(1), 5(2) and 5(6) CLA), the entire transaction was void (Star Cruise at [105] and [108]). As Selvam J explained (at [68]):

  135. [72] Selvam J’s decision in Star Cruise was cited again in Poh Soon Kiat v Desert Palace Inc (t/a Caesars Palace) [2010] 1 SLR 1129 (“Desert Palace”), this time by a differently constituted CA from the court which had issued the judgment in Star City. In Desert Palace, the CA was primarily concerned with whether a foreign judgment obtained in 2001 by the respondent in the Superior Court of the State of California was enforceable in Singapore by way of a common law action. The CA held that the 2001 California judgment was not a foreign money judgment. In the course of its judgment, the CA also examined s 5(2) CLA and made a number of observations about the provision. Noting that the earlier coram in Star City had asserted that “gambling per se is no longer considered to be contrary to the public interest [of Singapore]” (which assertion was repeated in the judgment issued in Liao Eng Kiat v Burswood Nominees Ltd [2004] 4 SLR(R) 690), the CA in Desert Palace demurred. The CA referenced the judgment in Star Cruise for its helpful review of the history and public policy of the gaming legislation in the UK which, together with the gaming statutes in India, had been responsible for influencing the shape which ss 5(1) and 5(2) CLA took in Singapore. At [83] of its judgment, the CA noted that Selvam J had correctly highlighted that the public policy underlying the UK gaming legislation leading to (and including) the 1845 UK Gaming Act was two-fold: to suppress gambling on credit (and not gambling per se) and protect property from capture by gamblers; and to declare that courts of justice were closed to gamblers and that the courts would not help to settle or collect gambling debts. The CA noted that the 1848 Indian Act was based on and had the same substantive effect as s 18 of the 1845 UK Gaming Act: the public policy encapsulated in the Indian Act was identical to the public policy of the 1845 UK Gaming Act. The current ss 5(1) and 5(2) of our CLA were collectively a re-enactment of s 7(1) of the Civil Law Ordinance which was itself a combination of the 1848 Indian Act with part of s 18 of the 1845 UK Gaming Act. In the CA’s view, the public policy encapsulated in s 5(2) of the CLA had subsisted for more than 160 years (from the time of the 1848 Indian Act) and still subsists today, as is evident from the continued existence of s 5(2) itself. The CA cited the remarks by Selvam J on the purpose of the then s 6 CLA (now s 5 CLA, as reproduced above in [60]) and stressed that it disagreed with the previous CA’s statement in Star City that “gambling per se is no longer considered to be contrary to the public interest [of Singapore]”. In the CA’s view (at [112]):

  136. [73] At [127(b)] of its judgment, the CA stated the provisional view that s 5(2) CLA would bar a common law action on a foreign judgment (whether emanating from a Commonwealth country or non-Commonwealth foreign country) whose underlying cause of action is a gambling debt.

  137. [74] The decisions in Star City, Desert Palace and Star Cruise were discussed in Cooke IJ’s decision in The Star Entertainment QLD Ltd v Wong Yew Choy and another matter [2020] 5 SLR 1 (“The Star Entertainment”). In that case, the plaintiff operated a casino – The Star Gold Coast – and provided gaming services. The defendant was a patron at that casino. According to the plaintiff, the defendant had agreed to the use of a “blank replacement cheque” – which he had previously provided to The Star Sydney but which had not been utilised there – as a means of paying for any losses he suffered at The Star Gold Coast. However, the cheque was subsequently dishonoured when completed by the plaintiff. The plaintiff sued to recover a sum of some A$43m and applied for summary judgment. In response, the defendant applied to strike out the claim on the ground (inter alia) that s 5(2) CLA precluded the plaintiff from bringing an action to recover money won on a wager. The plaintiff argued that the public policy of Singapore did not require s 5(2) to be applied in its case because (inter alia) the gaming had taken place in Queensland under effective regulation and licence and was therefore controlled; the contract under which the suit was brought was governed by the law of Queensland where the contract was valid and enforceable; and the cheque was a valid negotiable instrument in and of itself.

  138. [75] Cooke IJ dismissed the application for summary judgment and struck out the plaintiff’s claim. In so deciding, Cooke IJ acknowledged (at [48]) that the CA’s comments on ss 5(1) and 5(2) CLA in Desert Palace were strictly obiter – but noted that nevertheless, those comments had been forcefully and clearly expressed with full consideration of the public policy which was said to underlie the Act. Cooke IJ summarized the elements of public policy to which the CA in Desert Palace had drawn attention as follows: (a) to suppress gambling on credit as opposed to gambling per se; (b) to protect property from capture by gamblers; (c) to declare that the courts of justice were closed to gamblers and the courts would not help to settle or collect gambling debts; and (d) the need to distinguish between social gambling as part of a leisure activity, state-sponsored lotteries and sweepstakes and the like, on the one hand, and what the public regarded as effectively “hard-core gambling” on the other. As the CA in Desert Palace had also made clear, the legislation has created specific exceptions to the application of ss 5(1) and 5(2) CLA: these exceptions were drawn in specific terms which did not allow for casinos operating abroad, as opposed to casinos falling within the provisions of the Casino Control Act.

  139. [76] In the light of the CA’s discussion in Desert Palace of the public policy underlying ss 5(1) and 5(2) CLA, therefore, Cooke IJ held that the plaintiff’s reasons for contending that public policy in Singapore did not require the application of s 5(2) to its case must fail. The result was that the clear words of s 5(2) must take effect in the manner that the Star City and Star Cruise decisions required: the court was not able to countenance a claim brought for sums allegedly won on a wager. The defendant was entitled to have the claim struck out under O 18 r 19 of the Rules of Court because it was a claim that fell afoul of s 5(2) CLA and thus disclosed no reasonable cause of action ([53]-[57] of The Star Entertainment).

  140. [77] To sum up, therefore, the facts of the present case were clearly not on all fours with those in the authorities examined above. In each of these cases, the claimant was the casino operator, and the nature of its claim was an action to recover a debt owed to it by a losing punter – ie, to enforce the payment obligations under the wagering contract between itself and the punter. This was found to be so even in a case where the casino operator’s claim was framed as a claim for monies due on bills of exchange (Star Cruise). In contrast, in the present case, none of the litigants were parties to the gaming contracts entered into between the operator of the BetOnline gaming site (Blue SA) and the punters who engaged in gaming transactions on this gaming site. Instead, the Plaintiff – who was in the business of managing and collecting payments on affiliates such as Blue SA – was suing the Defendants for the alleged misappropriation of payments allegedly received by the 1st Defendant for processing pursuant to the Payment Processing Agreement. While these payments might have been made by the online punters in relation to gaming activities on BetOnline.ag, to describe the Plaintiff’s claim against the Defendants as being (somehow) a claim to recover gambling debts would require unbearable contortion of the language of s 5 CLA as well as severe distortion of the facts. Further, while the Defendants have tried to surmount such obstacles by urging a “wide” and “purposeful” interpretation of ss 5(1) and 5(2) CLA, they have not been able to explain – in the light of the CA’s observations in Desert Palace on the public policy underlying these provisions – the “wide purpose” to be served by bringing contracts such as the Payment Processing Agreement within the scope of these provisions.

  141. [78] For the reasons set out above at [61] to [77], I rejected the defendant’s argument that the Plaintiff’s action should be barred under s 5(2) CLA.

  142. s 5(6) CLA

  143. [79] I next address the Defendants’ alternative argument that the Plaintiff’s action should be barred under s 5(6) CLA because it was for payments made in respect of contracts or agreements rendered null and void under s 5(1) CLA; specifically, agreements for the customers to pay Blue SA for credit in their BetOnline.ag accounts. In particular, the Defendants pointed to the fact that Ms Meza had confirmed in cross-examination that payments were made to Blue SA by its customers “pursuant to agreements between the same parties whereby Blue High House SA would credit customer accounts on Betonline.ag in exchange for payment of the same sum by its customers. The customers would then be able to use the credit in their accounts for gaming transactions or wagering”. The Defendants argued that these agreements between Blue SA and its customers fell within s 5(1) of the CLA as they were contracts by way of gaming or wagering; and that it followed that insofar as the gaming transactions arose “as a result of and in the process by which such agreements for gaming and wagering are effected, the gaming transactions also fall within section 5(1) of the CLA”.

  144. [80] Sections 5(1) and 5(6) of the CLA state:

  145. [83] As Selvam J noted in Star Cruise, the UK Parliament subsequently intervened to set the law right by enacting s 1 of the UK Gaming Act 1892, which effectively reversed the majority decision in Read v Anderson. In subsequent decisions, the English courts elucidated the scope of this provision.

  146. [84] In Tatam v Reeve [1893] 1 QB 44 (“Tatam”), the defendant was indebted to four persons for bets on horse races which the defendant had made and lost. At the defendant’s request, the plaintiff paid off these debts. The defendant then refused to repay the plaintiff the amounts paid off, and the plaintiff brought an action to recover the amount paid. Before the Divisional Court (Lord Coleridge, CJ and Wills J), the plaintiff argued that his claim did not fall afoul of s 1 of the UK Gaming Act 1892 because that Act had been passed to strike at transactions in which the person who paid money was a party, as agent, to the gaming contract – ie, “to get rid of the decision in Read v Anderson”. This argument did not find favour with the Divisional Court. The court held that the plaintiff’s claim for repayment was caught by s 1 of the UK Gaming Act 1892 as the plaintiff was suing upon an implied promise by the defendant to repay monies paid by the plaintiff in respect of contracts or agreements rendered null and void by the Gaming Act 1845. In dealing with the 1892 Act, Wills J held that the words “in respect of” must have been put in purposely by the legislature and must mean something different from “under”: in his view, if the words were to be given any meaning at all, they must have been intended to strike at transactions such as the one between the plaintiff and the defendant.

  147. [85] In Saffery v Meyer [1901] 1 KB 11 (“Saffery”), the defendant claimed to have “invented” a system for backing horses at races. A bankrupt paid the defendant £500 to be applied to putting in operation this system for “backing horses”. All of the money was lost by the defendant on bets made pursuant to the arrangement he had with the bankrupt. The defendant was subsequently sued by the trustee in bankruptcy upon three promissory notes made previously in favour of the bankrupt by the defendant. In bringing the action, the trustee in bankruptcy alleged that it had been agreed between the bankrupt and the defendant that profits and losses were to be shared equally. In defending the claim, the defendant asserted that there was no consideration for the making of the promissory notes, these having been given in respect of gaming transactions which were void under the 1845 and the 1892 Gaming Acts.

  148. [86] The defendant’s argument was accepted by the court. Referencing Tatam, the court held that the case really involved an implied promise by the defendant to pay to the bankrupt a sum of money in respect of contracts or agreements made by way of gaming or wagering – ie, in respect of contracts rendered null and void by the 1845 Gaming Act; and as such, the case came exactly within the words of s 1 of the 1892 Act.

  149. [87] In De Mattos v Benjamin [1894] 42 WR 284 (“De Mattos”), the question was whether, when an agent had received the amount of a bet placed by him on behalf of a principal, the principal could recover from the agent the amount so received by him. The plaintiff, De Mattos, had employed the defendant Benjamin as his agent to make bets for him. The account provided by the defendant showed a balance due to the plaintiff, which the former failed to pay. The plaintiff brought an action against the defendant for monies had and received. At first instance, it was held that the plaintiff was deprived by the operation of the 1845 and the 1892 Gaming Acts of his right to recover the monies. On appeal, this decision was reversed. The appellate court (Lord Coleridge, CJ and Day J) accepted that the 1892 Act made illegal all parts of the transaction included in its scope, including the act of a person who, as a commission agent, effected an illegal contract. However, it “did not enact that, if a sum of money is paid by A to C to pay over to B, B may set them both at defiance, and put the money into his own pocket”.

  150. [88] De Mattos and the various cases that came after it (eg, Thomas Cheshire & Co v Vaughan Brothers & Co [1920] 3 KB 240) were cited and followed in Close v Wilson [2010] EWCA Civ 5 (“Close”). In Close, the plaintiff claimed that he had paid the defendant £20,000 for the purpose of the defendant placing bets on horses to lose certain races. According to the plaintiff, it was agreed that his “capital investment” of £20,000 was guaranteed to be paid back no matter what happened to the bets placed, and that he would also receive a set percentage return on the value of his investment. No money was repaid by the defendant, and the plaintiff sued for the recovery of his £20,000. The plaintiff asserted that a large part of the £20,000 had gone into the defendant’s personal bank account and had been used for his personal benefit. At first instance, the court held that the plaintiff could not sue to recover the £20,000 because his dispute with the defendant was really “a squabble about betting and gaming”, and their arrangement was null and void under the two Gaming Acts of the 1800s.

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