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Grounds publishedDecided 26 May 2023
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General Division of the High Court

Hector Finance Group Ltd and another v Chan Chew Keak

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[2023] SGHC 127Case no. Suit No 233 of 2020

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] In 2019, at a time when the defendant was a director of both plaintiffs, he caused the second plaintiff to enter into two loan agreements under which the second plaintiff advanced RMB 14m to a third party. The third party has refused to repay the advance and is now uncontactable.

  3. [2] The plaintiffs’ primary case in this action is that the defendant caused the second plaintiff to enter into the loan agreements in breach of the duty of fidelity and the duty of diligence that he owed to each plaintiff. The plaintiffs’ alternative case is that the defendant did so as part of a conspiracy between him and the third party who received the advance.

  4. [3] Having considered the evidence and the parties’ submissions, I accept that the defendant breached the duty of diligence that he owed to the second plaintiff by causing it to enter into the loan agreements. But I do not accept that the defendant breached the duty of fidelity that he owed to either plaintiff by doing so. I also do not accept that he did so as part of a conspiracy with the third party as the plaintiffs allege or at all.

  5. [4] I now set out my reasons for reaching these conclusions.

  6. The parties

  7. The first plaintiff

  8. [5] The first plaintiff is a company incorporated in the British Virgin Islands (“the BVI”) in May 2005. It was established to invest in corrugated paper box plants producing container packaging in the People’s Republic of China (“the PRC”) and Southeast Asia. The first plaintiff is now the ultimate holding company of a group of companies that produce and sell paper products and container packaging in the PRC and Southeast Asia (“the Group”).

  9. [6] Over 70% of the shares in the first plaintiff are owned and controlled by four men: (a) the defendant; (b) Siong Beng Seng (“Mr Siong”); (c) Edward Ching Hui Huat (“Mr Ching”); and (d) Keith Tay Ah Kee (“Mr Tay”).

  10. [7] The defendant has an interest in at least 20% of the shares in the first plaintiff. He holds this interest through a company incorporated in the BVI known as Caldicott Worldwide Ltd (“Caldicott”). Caldicott owns 40% of the shares in the first plaintiff. The defendant in turn owns 50% of the shares in Caldicott. I say that the defendant has an interest in at least 20% of the first plaintiff because there is some suggestion that he in fact owns all of the shares in Caldicott, not just 50% of those shares. If that is correct, the defendant has an interest in 40% of the shares in the first plaintiff. That would make the defendant the single largest shareholder of the first plaintiff and thereby of the Group.

  11. [8] Mr Siong owns 23% of the shares in the first plaintiff. He is an engineer by training. He has worked in the packaging industry since 1981. In that time, he has worked in a variety of roles in three corporate groups, including the Group. For the majority of his career – from 1981 to 1992 and then again from 2006 to 2019 – Mr Siong reported to the defendant either directly or indirectly.

  12. [9] Mr Ching owns 16% of the shares in the first plaintiff. He holds a masters degree in business administration. He has worked in the packaging industry since 1995 in two corporate groups, including the Group. For the entirety of his career, at least until 2019, Mr Ching reported to the defendant.

  13. [10] Mr Tay has an interest in 14% of the shares in the first plaintiff. He holds this interest through a company incorporated in Singapore known as Springfield Investments & Nominees Pte Ltd (“Springfield”). Springfield owns 14% of the shares in the first plaintiff. Mr Tay is the beneficial owner of all of the shares in Springfield. He is an accountant by training and was managing partner of the Singapore office of an international accounting practice from 1984 to 1993. He has also served as a director of several prominent public and private companies. His relationship to the first plaintiff and the Group, at least until 2020, was purely as an investor. He has no background in the packaging industry and has never reported to the defendant at any time or any capacity.

  14. [11] Six minority shareholders own the remaining 7% or so of the shares in the first plaintiff. The identity and shareholding of these shareholders is not relevant to this action. But the existence of these minority shareholders does mean that the interests of the first plaintiff as a whole are not co-extensive with the interests of its four major shareholders.

  15. The second plaintiff

  16. [12] The second plaintiff is a company incorporated in the PRC in August 2018. It is a member of the Group. Its ultimate holding company is therefore the first plaintiff.

  17. [13] There are two intermediate holding companies between the first plaintiff and the second plaintiff. A Hong Kong company, AMB Interpac Containers Guangdong Ltd (“AMBHK”), is a wholly owned subsidiary of the first plaintiff. A PRC company with almost the same name, AMB Interpac Containers (Guangdong) Ltd (“AMBDG”), is a wholly owned subsidiary of AMBHK. The second plaintiff is a wholly owned subsidiary of AMBDG.

  18. The defendant

  19. [14] The defendant is a Singapore citizen and resident. He is an engineer by training. He also holds a masters degree in business administration. He has decades of experience in the packaging industry.

  20. Background to the dispute

  21. Management of the plaintiffs

  22. [15] Mr Ching has been a director of the first plaintiff since it was incorporated in 2005. Mr Siong has been a director of the first plaintiff since 2010. Mr Tay has been a director of the first plaintiff since 2018. The defendant was a director of the first plaintiff from 2018 until he was removed from that position in 2020.

  23. [16] The defendant was the sole legal representative and director of the second plaintiff from its incorporation in 2018 until he was removed from those positions in 2019.

  24. [17] The defendant’s removal from his positions in both plaintiffs was the result of the broader dispute between the parties that led Caldicott to commence minority oppression proceedings against Mr Siong, Mr Ching, Springfield and the first plaintiff in the BVI in December 2019 and which also led to the plaintiffs commencing this action in March 2020.

  25. [18] At all material times, Mr Siong and Mr Ching have been jointly responsible for the day-to-day management of the first plaintiff and of the Group. Mr Tay has never been involved in the day-to-day management of the first plaintiff or of the Group.

  26. [19] The defendant played an anomalous role in the management of the first plaintiff and the Group. The role he played did not arise from any formal appointment. Instead, his role arose from the unique interpersonal working dynamic between the defendant on the one hand and Mr Siong and Mr Ching on the other.

  27. The interpersonal working dynamic

  28. [20] It is clear from the evidence that, at all material times and at a very high level, the defendant exercised ultimate management control over the first plaintiff and the Group. This was the position from the outset, ie, from the time the first plaintiff was incorporated in 2005, and well before the defendant was appointed a director of the first plaintiff for the first time in June 2018. It stopped only when disputes arose between the first plaintiff’s four major shareholders in July 2019. The defendant was able to arrogate this role to himself, not through any appointment to any office or any right under any contract, but through the sheer force of his own personality combined with Mr Siong’s and Mr Ching’s deference and acquiescence.

  29. [21] From the first plaintiff’s incorporation in 2005 until disputes arose between the four major shareholders in 2019, the defendant styled himself internally and held himself out externally as the Chairman of the first plaintiff and of the Group. He adopted this title even though the first plaintiff had never conferred it upon him and even when he was not a director of the first plaintiff.

  30. [23] Mr Siong and Mr Ching perceived the defendant’s conduct as domineering and oppressive. Despite this, they did not oppose him. They simply did his bidding. They accepted and acquiesced in his exercise of ultimate management control without question. They did so out of deference to the defendant, out of a desire to avoid conflict with the defendant and out of a real fear that the defendant would persuade Mr Tay to vote together with him to remove them as directors of the first plaintiff.

  31. A sheet board plant is proposed

  32. [24] It was against the background of this interpersonal working dynamic that, in late 2017, the defendant told Mr Siong, Mr Ching and Mr Tay that the Group should invest in a new sheet board plant in the PRC. An investment in a sheet board plant was a departure from the Group’s existing business, which was in box plants only. It is common ground that there is a material difference between a box plant and a sheet board plant, between the business models of the two types of plant and between the management considerations involved in setting up and running both types of plant.

  33. [25] The investment in a sheet board plant was discussed at meetings held in February 2018 in Dongguan (“the February 2018 Meeting”) and April 2018 in Singapore (“the April 2018 Meeting”). A key issue in contention between the parties is the nature and outcome of these meetings. In particular, it is hotly contested whether these meetings sufficed, both in fact and in law, to approve the steps that the defendant took to set up a sheet board plant.

  34. The defendant takes three steps to set up a sheet board plant

  35. [26] The defendant took three such steps between August 2018 and January 2019.

  36. [27] First, in August 2018, the defendant caused AMBDG to incorporate two wholly owned subsidiaries in the PRC: (a) the second plaintiff; and (b) a company known as Huizhou Shengjia Industry Co. Ltd (“Huizhou SJ”). The second plaintiff was to be the operating company for a sheet board plant. Huizhou SJ was to be the automation company for a sheet board plant.

  37. [28] Second, in September 2018, the defendant caused AMBDG to purchase equipment for a sheet board plant. AMBDG thus entered into a contract with BHS Corrugated Machinery (Shanghai) Co. Ltd (“BHS”) to purchase a corrugator at a price of RMB 31m (“the BHS Contract”). Two weeks later, on 18 September 2018, AMBDG paid RMB 9.3m to BHS as a deposit for the corrugator.

  38. [29] Third, in January 2019, the defendant caused AMBDG to transfer RMB 30m to the second plaintiff to be used to set up a sheet board plant. The defendant emailed Mr Siong and Mr Ching on 10 January 2019 (“the January 2019 Email”) to tell them that he had “more or less” identified land in Huizhou for a sheet board plant. To this end, he asked that AMBDG transfer RMB 30m to the second plaintiff for four purposes:

  39. (a) to repay AMBDG the sum of RMB 10m for the deposit it had paid to BHS for the corrugator;

  40. (b) to pay Huizhou SJ the sum of RMB 5m as a deposit for the purchase of automation equipment for the second plaintiff;

  41. (c) to pay the sum of RMB 10m as a deposit for the purchase of land in the district of Huizhou in the PRC; and

  42. (d) to leave the second plaintiff with the sum of RMB 5m for what the defendant characterised as “some minor expenses”.

  43. As a result of the January 2019 Email, AMBDG transferred RMB 30m to the second plaintiff in January 2019.

  44. The defendant causes the second plaintiff to enter into the loan agreements

  45. [30] In the first quarter of 2019, the defendant caused the second plaintiff to enter into the two loan agreements which are the subject matter of this action. Under the loan agreements, the second plaintiff transferred RMB 14m out of the RMB 30m which it had received from AMBDG in January 2019 to a third party, Li Yuanchang (“Mr Li”).

  46. [31] The second plaintiff entered into the first loan agreement with Mr Li in January 2019. Under this agreement, the second plaintiff agreed to lend Mr Li the sum of RMB 10m for “land purchase at industrial park”. The loan was at an interest rate of 3% per annum over a two-year term, from January 2019 to January 2021. On the same day, the second plaintiff transferred the RMB 10m to Mr Li.

  47. [32] The second plaintiff entered into the second loan agreement with Mr Li in March 2019. Under this agreement, the second plaintiff agreed to lend Mr Li the sum of RMB 4m, again for “land purchase at industrial park”. The loan was again at an interest rate of 3% per annum and again for a two-year term, this time from March 2019 to March 2021. On the same day, the second plaintiff transferred the RMB 4m to Mr Li.

  48. The first plaintiff votes not to proceed with any sheet board plant

  49. [33] In July 2019, the first plaintiff’s directors resolved that the Group should not proceed with any investment in a sheet board plant. The defendant voted against the resolution. In light of this resolution, the defendant asked Mr Li to repay the loans. Mr Li refused to do so.

  50. [34] In October 2019, Mr Li made two payments totalling RMB 150,000 against the interest payable under the two loan agreements. Apart from this sum of RMB 150,000, Mr Li has not paid any part of the interest due on the loans, let alone any part of the principal.

  51. The plaintiffs commence this action

  52. [35] Between August 2019 and January 2020, the first plaintiff invited the defendant to make satisfactory proposals to resolve all outstanding matters between them. These matters included recovering the RMB 14m advanced to Mr Li. The defendant did not accept that he was liable in any way for this sum.

  53. [36] In March 2020, the plaintiffs commenced this action.

  54. The parties’ cases

  55. The plaintiffs’ case

  56. [37] In this action, the plaintiffs’ case is as follows.

  57. [38] The defendant breached the fiduciary duty and the duty of diligence that he owed to the first plaintiff under BVI law when he:

  58. (a) failed to apply the RMB 30m that AMBDG transferred to the second plaintiff for the purposes set out in the January 2019 Email; and

  59. (b) caused the first plaintiff to take steps to set up a sheet board plant even though he did not have the necessary approval to do so.

  60. [39] The defendant breached the duty of fidelity and the duty of diligence that he owed to the second plaintiff under PRC law when he caused the second plaintiff to enter into the loan agreements with Mr Li.

  61. [40] In the alternative, the defendant conspired with Mr Li to injure the plaintiffs by both unlawful and lawful means. First, the defendant and Mr Li conspired by unlawful means when they agreed that the defendant would cause the second plaintiff to enter into the loan agreement with Mr Li and transfer RMB 14m to Mr Li in breach of the defendant’s duties of fidelity and diligence owed to both plaintiffs. Second, they conspired by lawful means when they agreed that the defendant would cause the second plaintiff to enter into the loan agreements with Mr Li with the predominant purpose of causing injury to the second plaintiff.

  62. [41] The plaintiffs therefore seek the following relief against the defendant:

  63. (a) RMB 14m in damages;

  64. (c) RMB 1.26m being the interest due but unpaid under both loan agreements from the date of the loans up to 30 September 2022; and

  65. (d) RMB 5.77m being expenses incurred by AMBDG in investigating and mitigating the effects of the defendant’s breaches of duty.

  66. The defendant’s case

  67. [42] The defendant’s case is as follows.

  68. [43] The first plaintiff has no cause of action against the defendant for the relief it seeks in this action (see [41] above). The first plaintiff did not advance the RMB 14m to Mr Li. The second plaintiff did. The plaintiff accordingly has suffered no loss by reason of the loans proving irrecoverable. Only the second plaintiff has suffered this loss. So too, only the second plaintiff has a cause of action which can yield an account of alleged profits which the defendant derived from the RMB 14m. The first plaintiff has no cause of action against the defendant which can yield that relief.

  69. [44] Further, both the first plaintiff and the second plaintiff have no cause of action to recover the RMB 5.77m in investigation expenses. Those expenses were incurred by AMBDG, not by either plaintiff.

  70. [45] On the substance of the first plaintiff’s claims, the defendant did not breach his fiduciary duty to the first plaintiff. The defendant caused the second plaintiff to enter into the loan agreements only after Mr Siong, Mr Ching and Mr Tay had conducted themselves in such a way that the defendant was entitled to and did honestly believe that they had agreed to set up a sheet board plant and that that was in the first plaintiff’s best interest. Further, Mr Siong and Mr Ching orally agreed with the defendant: (a) to engage Mr Li as the Group’s consultant to identify and acquire land in the PRC for a sheet board plant; and (b) to transfer money to Mr Li in advance, to ensure that he would be able to move quickly to acquire land for a sheet board plant once it had been identified.

  71. [46] The defendant also did not breach the duty of diligence that he owed the first plaintiff under BVI law. Causing the second plaintiff to enter into the loan agreements with Mr Li was a course that was open to a reasonably competent director in the defendant’s circumstances.

  72. [47] On the substance of the second plaintiff’s claims, the defendant did not breach the duty of fidelity that he owed to the second plaintiff under PRC law because: (a) he did not misappropriate the RMB 14m; and (b) he did not require consent to cause the second plaintiff to lend money to Mr Li.

  73. [48] The defendant also did not breach the duty of diligence that he owed the second plaintiff under PRC law. The plaintiffs have failed to show that a good administrator exercising reasonable care would not have caused the second plaintiff to enter into the loan agreements.

  74. [49] Finally, the plaintiffs’ claim in conspiracy fails because: (a) there is no evidence that the defendant and Mr Li “combined” to use the loan agreements to misappropriate funds from the Group; (b) there was nothing unlawful about the defendant causing the second plaintiff to enter into the loan agreements; (c) it was not the defendant’s purpose at all, let alone his predominant purpose, to injure either of the plaintiffs by causing the second plaintiff to enter into the loan agreements; and (d) the first plaintiff, at least, has not in fact suffered any loss recognisable in law arising from the second plaintiff entering into the loan agreements.

  75. Issues to be determined

  76. [50] This summary of the parties’ cases gives rise to two principal issues.

  77. [51] The first principal issue is whether the defendant breached the duties he owed as a director to either plaintiff. This principal issue raises three subsidiary issues:

  78. (a) Did the defendant breach his duty of fidelity to either plaintiff when he caused the second plaintiff to enter into the loan agreements?

  79. (b) Did the defendant breach his duty of diligence to either plaintiff when he caused the second plaintiff to enter into the loan agreements?

  80. (c) Did either plaintiff suffer loss in respect of any breach of duty found against the defendant?

  81. [52] The second principal issue is whether the defendant conspired with Mr Li to injure one or both of the plaintiffs, whether by unlawful or lawful means.

  82. [53] I take these two principal issues in turn.

  83. The first plaintiff’s claim for breach of duty

  84. [54] I start by considering the first plaintiff’s claim against the defendant for breach of the fiduciary duty and the duty of diligence that he owed the first plaintiff under BVI law.

  85. [55] I accept the defendant’s submission that the first plaintiff has no sustainable cause of action for breach of duty. This is because loss is an essential element of this cause of action. And the first plaintiff has not even alleged, let alone proven, that it suffered any loss as a result of the defendant’s alleged breach of either duty.

  86. Fiduciary duty

  87. [56] I begin with an analysis of the fiduciary duty that the defendant owed the first plaintiff.

  88. The first plaintiff must prove loss

  89. [57] For the first plaintiff to succeed in its claim for breach of fiduciary duty against the defendant, it must prove that it suffered loss by reason of the defendant’s alleged breach. That is because the first plaintiff’s claim arises from a non-custodial breach of fiduciary duty. A company who sues a director for a non-custodial breach of fiduciary duty must show that the breach caused the company loss: Sim Poh Ping v Winsta Holding Pte Ltd and another and other appeals [2020] 1 SLR 1199 (“Sim Poh Ping”) at [254(a)].

  90. [58] A non-custodial breach of fiduciary duty is a breach of fiduciary duty that does not arise from the fiduciary’s stewardship of the assets subject to the fiduciary obligation. A custodial breach of fiduciary duty, on the other hand, does arise from the fiduciary’s stewardship of such assets and is the result of “the misapplication of the principal’s funds or trust funds” (Sim Poh Ping at [105]–[106]).

  91. [59] The first plaintiff’s case against the defendant is for a non-custodial breach of fiduciary duty. The first plaintiff’s case is that the defendant breached the fiduciary duty that he owed to it when he (a) failed to apply the RMB 30m that AMBDG transferred to the second plaintiff for the purposes specified in the January 2019 Email; and (b) caused the first plaintiff to take steps to set up a sheet board plant without approval.

  92. [60] It is undisputed that the RMB 30m in question belonged to AMBDG and not to the first plaintiff. The first plaintiff’s claim against the defendant for breach of fiduciary duty does not therefore arise from the defendant’s stewardship of the first plaintiff’s assets. It arises from the defendant’s stewardship of AMBDG’s assets. The breach of fiduciary duty that the first plaintiff alleges against the defendant is therefore a non-custodial breach of the duty.

  93. No allegation that the first plaintiff suffered loss

  94. [62] Despite this, the first plaintiff has not even alleged that it suffered any loss as a result of the defendant’s alleged breach of the fiduciary duty that he owed to it, let alone proven any such loss.

  95. [63] The first plaintiff does not make any such allegation in its pleadings. Its only plea is a general plea: “As a result of the Defendant’s breaches of duties…the Plaintiffs have suffered loss and damage.” This plea does not distinguish between the first plaintiff and the second plaintiff. And it does not provide particulars as to the nature or quantum of any loss or damage that the first plaintiff may have suffered.

  96. [64] The first plaintiff does not make any such allegation in its prayer for relief. The prayer does not seek any relief for the alleged breaches of the fiduciary duty that the defendant owed to the first plaintiff. The first paragraph of the prayer simply asks for damages to be assessed for the defendant’s breaches of fiduciary duty, again without distinguishing between the first plaintiff and the second plaintiff and without particularising the damage. The remaining paragraphs of the prayer, in so far as they seek relief for breach of duty, are all directed specifically and only to relief sought by the second plaintiff.

  97. The first plaintiff cannot claim AMBDG’s loss as reflective loss

  98. [66] The first plaintiff does not even allege that it suffered loss in the form of a diminution in the value of its shareholding in AMBHK to complete its cause of action. Even if it did so, treating that as the necessary loss would be contrary to the reflective loss principle.

  99. [67] The reflective loss principle characterises a loss arising from a wrong done to a company as a loss suffered only by the company and not by the holders of shares in the company (Miao Weiguo v Tendcare Medical Group Holdings Pte Ltd (formerly known as Tian Jian Hua Xia Medical Group Holdings Pte Ltd) (in judicial management) and another [2022] 1 SLR 884 (“Miao Weiguo”) at [200]). The law does not treat the company’s shareholders as having suffered a loss even though a wrong causing loss to a company inevitably diminishes the value of the shares in the company. As the Court of Appeal said in Miao Weiguo (at [201]):

  100. AMBDG’s loss is not the first plaintiff’s loss

  101. [69] In the absence of a plea and proof of loss, the first plaintiff’s cause of action against the defendant for breach of fiduciary duty is incomplete. It must therefore be dismissed.

  102. Duty of diligence

  103. [70] The same analysis dictates the same result for the first plaintiff’s claim against the defendant for breach of his duty of diligence. Loss is equally necessary for a cause of action for breach of this duty. Equally, there is no allegation, let alone proof, that the first plaintiff suffered any loss by reason of any alleged breach of this duty.

  104. [71] In the absence of a plea and proof of loss, the first plaintiff’s cause of action against the defendant for breach of the duty of diligence is equally incomplete. It must therefore also be dismissed.

  105. The second plaintiff’s claim for breach of duty

  106. [72] I next consider the second plaintiff’s claim against the defendant for breach of the fiduciary duty and the duty of diligence that he owed the second plaintiff under PRC law.

  107. [74] I begin my analysis with the duty of fidelity.

  108. Duty of fidelity

  109. [75] Article 148 of the PRC Company Law elaborates on the general duty of fidelity imposed by Article 147 by setting out a specific list of acts which the duty of fidelity prohibits:

  110. [76] A breach of Article 148 yields for the company both a gain-based remedy and a loss-based remedy. The gain-based remedy is found in the concluding sentence of Article 148. That sentence renders a director who breaches Article 148 liable to account to the company for any income he has derived as a result of the breach. The loss-based remedy is found in Article 149 of the PRC Company Law:

  111. [77] The second plaintiff’s case is that the defendant breached three specific prohibitions in Article 148 of the PRC Company Law:

  112. (a) Article 148(a), which prohibits a director from misappropriating the company’s funds;

  113. (b) Article 148(c), which prohibits a director from lending the company’s funds to others without the consent of the company’s shareholders or directors; and

  114. (c) Article 148(h), which is a catch-all provision prohibiting a director from performing any other act which is contrary to his obligation of loyalty to the company.

  115. [78] The second plaintiff also relies on the duty prescribed by Articles 36 and 38 of the second plaintiff’s articles of association. But these two articles simply track the language of Article 148 of the PRC Company Law. Both parties’ PRC law experts therefore agree that these two articles are coextensive with Article 148 of the PRC Company Law itself. Articles 36 and 38 of the second plaintiff’s articles of association therefore add nothing of substance to the second plaintiff’s case against the defendant for breach of his duty of fidelity. I need not and do not analyse separately the second plaintiff’s claims under these two articles.

  116. [79] I now analyse in turn the three prohibitions in Article 148 of the PRC Company Law on which the plaintiff relies.

  117. Article 148(a) of the PRC Company Law

  118. [80] I begin with the plaintiffs’ case against the defendant under Article 148(a) of the PRC Company Law.

  119. (1) The defendant’s expert evidence

  120. [81] The defendant’s expert is Mr Liu Yiwu (“Mr Liu”). Mr Liu is a partner in the Beijing office of the law firm King & Wood Mallesons.

  121. [82] Mr Liu’s opinion sets out an exegesis in two limbs on the scope of a director’s duty under Article 148(a). According to him, a director misappropriates the company’s funds if:

  122. (a) the director takes advantage of his powers to operate the company by “misappropriating the company’s funds”; and

  123. (b) he does so for his own personal interests or for the interests of an “interested party” and not for the benefit of the company.

  124. According to Mr Liu, therefore, the second limb requires that the director exercise his powers both for his own personal interest or those of an “interested party” and for a purpose that is not for the benefit of the company.

  125. [83] The use of the word “misappropriation” in the first limb appears to make Mr Liu’s exegesis circular. He is attempting to explain a statutory provision which turns on the concept of misappropriation by using the concept of misappropriation itself. The meaning of Mr Liu’s exegesis is nevertheless clear. I read the first limb of the exegesis as setting out what amounts to an appropriation of the company’s funds by a director, whereas the second limb sets out the factors which Mr Liu says turn the director’s appropriation of those funds into a misappropriation of those funds contrary to the prohibition in Article 148(a).

  126. [84] Mr Liu also expresses the opinion that, in considering whether an appropriation by a director amounts to a misappropriation, a PRC court will consider as relevant factors both whether the appropriation of the funds has “a corresponding contractual, business basis or other purposes in line with common commercial sense”, as well as the nature and closeness of the relationship between the director and the transferee of the funds. As support for this, Mr Liu cites Interpretation of PRC Company Law and Report on Trial Experience and Methods of Adjudication in Similar Cases (“Interpretation of PRC Company Law”).

  127. [85] The second of these two relevant factors brings into play the concept of an “interested party” which appears in the second limb of Mr Liu’s exegesis (see [82(b)] above). The term “interested party” is not defined either in the PRC Company Law or in Interpretation of PRC Company Law. But Mr Liu cites another document, Research on Issues Concerning Disputes over Liability for Damage to Corporate Interests issued by the Shanghai No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court (“Damage to Corporate Interests”). This document asserts that in “trial practice”, the following categories of persons may be considered to be “interested parties”: (a) the spouse, relatives and friends of the director and other persons who have a close relationship to the director; (b) the partners and agents of persons in the first category; and (c) other companies or organisations in which the director or the company’s senior management also hold positions.

  128. (2) The plaintiffs’ expert evidence

  129. [86] The plaintiffs’ expert is Dr Zhang Guanglei (“Dr Zhang”). Dr Zhang is a partner in the Beijing office of the law firm Jingtian & Gongchen. There are only two material points of difference between Dr Zhang’s opinion and Mr Liu’s opinion on the scope of Article 148(a).

  130. [87] First, Dr Zhang says that Mr Liu is wrong to try to constrain the unconstrained words of Article 148(a) by reference either to Interpretation of PRC Company Law or to Damage to Corporate Interests. These two documents, Dr Zhang says, are not sources of PRC law and are therefore not enforceable as law in the PRC. At most they are merely non-exhaustive illustrations, and are therefore not capable under PRC law of constraining the statutory text.

  131. [88] Second, Dr Zhang says that Mr Liu has mistranslated the provision of Interpretation of PRC Company Law on which he relies for the second limb of his exegesis (see [82(b)] above). According to Dr Zhang, a director misappropriates the company’s funds if:

  132. (a) he appropriates (cf [83] above) the company’s funds; and

  133. (b) he does so either: (i) for his own personal interests or for those of an “interested party; or (ii) not for the benefit of the company.

  134. (3) Reconciling the expert opinions

  135. [89] It appears to me that the first material point of difference between Mr Liu and Dr Zhang’s opinions on the scope of Article 148(a) is more apparent than real. I accept that Dr Zhang is correct when he says that the deliberately unconstrained language of Article 148(a) cannot as a matter of law be constrained either by non-statutory texts such as Interpretation of PRC Company Law or by Damage to Corporate Interests. But I do not read Mr Liu’s opinion as suggesting that it should be. Mr Liu is simply using these non-statutory texts to predict how a PRC court is likely to interpret and apply Article 148(a) rather than to suggest that these texts prescribe how a PRC court must interpret and apply Article 148(a).

  136. [90] As for the second material point of difference, I do not consider it necessary to reconcile the experts’ differing opinions. Even if I were to take the second plaintiff’s case at its highest and adopt Dr Zhang’s disjunctive test (see [88(b)] above) instead of Mr Liu’s conjunctive test (see [82(b)] above), it is my view that the second plaintiff has failed to establish both elements of Dr Zhang’s disjunctive test.

  137. [91] I have arrived at that conclusion for the following reasons.

  138. (4) The loan agreements were for the second plaintiff’s benefit

  139. [92] The second plaintiff characterises the loan agreements as a “sham”. But the second plaintiff does not use the word “sham” in the legal sense. A document is a sham contract in the legal sense if it appears on its face to be a contract creating legal rights and obligations but was executed only to give the appearance of doing so and with no actual intention whatsoever of creating any legal rights or obligations. A sham contract in this sense is not a contract at all and is unenforceable as a contract given the absence of any intention to create legal relations. (see Toh Eng Tiah v Jiang Angelina and another appeal [2021] 1 SLR 1176 at [73]–[76]).

  140. [93] What the second plaintiff means by characterising the loan agreements as a “sham” is merely that the agreements are not what they purport to be on their face. They purport to be agreements by the second plaintiff to lend money to Mr Li to enable him to identify and acquire land on the second plaintiff’s behalf for a sheet board plant. But, the second plaintiff says, the agreements are in truth merely a pretence for the defendant and Mr Li to conceal their illegitimate arrangement to siphon money out of the Group and into Mr Li’s hands, contrary to the interests of the second plaintiff.

  141. [94] On the second plaintiff’s case, therefore, the two loan agreements are a sham because they in truth have nothing to do with identifying or acquiring land for a sheet board plant. The loan agreements would, of course, be a sham in the legal sense if both parties intended that Mr Li should never repay the RMB 14m to the second plaintiff. But, in the sense which the second plaintiff uses the word, the loan agreements would equally be a sham if both parties entered into them fully intending that Mr Li should be contractually obliged to repay the RMB 14m to the second plaintiff but for a purpose unconnected to identifying or acquiring land for a sheet board plant. The critical factor making it a sham, according to the second plaintiff, is that the stated purpose for the loans is not the true purpose for the loans.

  142. [96] I accept the defendant’s submission that the true purpose of the loan agreements was its stated purpose: for Mr Li to assist the second plaintiff to identify and acquire land in the PRC for a sheet board plant. It follows that I do not accept the second plaintiff’s submission that the loan agreements were a sham, in the sense that the second plaintiff uses that word. I therefore accept that the defendant caused the second plaintiff to enter into the loan agreements for the second plaintiff’s benefit for the purposes of the second limb of Mr Liu’s exegesis. I say that for three reasons.

  143. [97] First, the purpose of entering into the loan agreements is clear on their face. The loan agreements state expressly that the purpose of entering into both agreements is “[l]and purchase at industrial park”. Those words are not, of course, conclusive as to the true purpose of entering into the loan agreements. But, taken together with the defendant’s oral evidence, they do set the starting point in the inquiry. It is the second plaintiff’s burden to prove that the loan agreements are not what they purport to be on their face.

  144. [99] Following that, the defendant raised setting up a sheet board plant again at meetings on 13 December 2017, February 2018 and April 2018.

  145. [100] At the meeting on 13 December 2017, the defendant presented to Mr Siong and Mr Ching his preliminary analysis showing that a sheet board plant has better returns than a box plant. Two weeks later, on 27 December 2017, the defendant sent an email to Mr Siong saying that he “honestly” felt that the Group should “start a sheet plant” to improve corrugator efficiency and that “[r]unning a sheet plant is the most efficient way of producing sheet board”.

  146. [102] I deal with the April 2018 meeting below.

  147. [103] Third, I accept the defendant’s submission that, by the time he caused the second plaintiff to enter into the loan agreements, the first plaintiff had taken two other steps on the defendant’s instructions to advance the investment in a sheet board plant: (a) by seeking quotations for a new corrugator between December 2017 and May 2018; and (b) by exploring internal and external options for raising finance for the new sheet board plant in the first half of 2018. For the reasons which follow, I do not accept the first plaintiffs’ submission that it took these steps in connection with a new box plant.

  148. [104] The evidence shows that Mr Siong followed the defendant’s instructions and sought quotations for a new corrugator between December 2017 and May 2018 from three sources: (a) BHS; (b) a Japanese vendor; and (c) a US vendor. Mr Siong’s evidence is that he sought these quotations for the Group’s existing box plant business and not for a sheet board plant. But Mr Siong gave different explanations as to where the new corrugator was to be installed. In his affidavit of evidence in chief, he claimed that he sought the quotations to upgrade the corrugators at the Group’s existing box plant in Singapore. But in an email that he sent to a Japanese vendor of corrugators in December 2017, he said that the Group intended to install the new corrugator “in our China plant next year”. When asked to explain this discrepancy in cross-examination, Mr Siong claimed that the Group was looking for a new corrugator for both the existing box plant in Singapore and “concurrently” for a new box plant in Dongguan.

  149. [105] This claim is not pleaded and is not supported by the contemporaneous evidence. The email correspondence in December 2017 and the minutes of two meetings, one in December 2017 and another in February 2018, show that the parties were considering and discussing only a new sheet board plant in the PRC.

  150. [107] Mr Siong’s evidence is that his reference in this email to “big investments in China on new plants” was merely a reference to the Group’s general strategy for expansion which was then focused only on “acquiring or building more of the same box plants that the Hector group was already operating and managing in the PRC” and not for a sheet board plant. He goes on to say that he was seeking this financing to supplement the Group’s working capital generally.

  151. [108] I do not accept Mr Siong’s evidence. I accept instead the defendant’s evidence that he instructed Mr Siong to explore bank financing in the first half of 2018 for a new sheet board plant in the PRC. There is no contemporaneous evidence that the first plaintiff was, at that time, considering upgrading an existing box plant in Singapore or setting up a new box plant anywhere, whether in Singapore or in the PRC. Further, no such case pleaded. Quite the opposite: all of the contemporaneous evidence shows that the only new plant that was being discussed in 2018 and even in 2019 was a new sheet board plant that the defendant had proposed setting up in the PRC. The evidence also shows that Mr Siong and Mr Ching accepted, or at the very least acquiesced in, the defendant’s proposal.

  152. [109] Having regard to the totality of the evidence, I accept on the balance of probabilities that entering into the loan agreements was one more of the several steps which the second plaintiff took in 2018 and 2019 to set up a new sheet board plant in the PRC. I accept also that a sheet board plant was for the second plaintiff’s benefit.

  153. [110] I therefore find that the defendant caused the second plaintiff to enter into the loan agreements for the benefit of the second plaintiff for the purposes of Article 148(a). That finding suffices in itself to defeat the plaintiff’s claim under Article 148(a).

  154. (5) Failure to prove benefit to an interested party

  155. [111] I find also that the second plaintiff has failed to discharge its burden of proving that the defendant caused the second plaintiff to enter into the loan agreements for a purpose connected to the personal interests of the defendant or of an “interested party”. The plaintiffs accept that they have no evidence that the defendant himself derived a personal benefit from the RMB 14m or any part of it. But they point to the undisputed fact that Mr Li received the RMB 14m and rely on circumstantial evidence to submit that Mr Li is an “interested party” as against the defendant. I must therefore analyse the circumstantial evidence on which the plaintiffs rely for this submission.

  156. [112] The second plaintiff’s case is that Mr Li is a close associate of the defendant and also of one Luo Shanmei (“Ms Luo”). Both Mr Li and Ms Luo are shareholders in China Huaxia International Holdings Ltd (“China HX”), a company incorporated in Hong Kong. The plaintiffs assert that Mr Li and Ms Luo often act in the defendant’s business affairs as his nominees or at his direction. It is also the plaintiff’s case that Ms Luo is in an intimate personal relationship with the defendant.

  157. [113] In response, the defendant’s case is that he engaged Mr Li as a consultant to identify and acquire land for the second plaintiff to set up a sheet board plant and to negotiate for the land on the second plaintiff’s behalf with local authorities. The defendant further asserts that Mr Siong and Mr Ching agreed orally that the defendant could cause the second plaintiff to engage Mr Li for this purpose.

  158. (A) The defendant’s relationship with Mr Li

  159. [114] I am unable to find, on the evidence before me, that Mr Li is an “interested party” as against the defendant for the purposes of Article 148(a). The objective and contemporaneous evidence is more consistent with the defendant’s evidence that he engaged Mr Li to assist the second plaintiff to identify and acquire land for a sheet board plant. I rely on the following evidence for this finding.

  160. [115] A legal opinion on the acquisition of land in the PRC issued to AMBDG by its lawyers, Guangdong Songfang Law Firm (“GSLF”), in June 2018 records that GSLF had assigned a lawyer to accompany, among other members of AMBDG’s staff, “Land Consultant, Li Changyuan”. I accept the defendant’s submission that “Li Changyuan” is a typographical error and is a reference to Mr Li. Mr Siong, as a director of AMBDG, instructed GSLF to produce this opinion. Mr Siong and Mr Ching, as directors of AMBDG, must have received this opinion. Yet neither of them objected to the description of Mr Li or to his description as “Land Consultant”.

  161. [116] Huizhou SJ’s former General Manager, one Wu Chin Mou (“Mr Wu”), gave evidence that he met Mr Li for the first time in September 2018 at a restaurant in Dongguan together with the defendant. The defendant told Mr Wu that Mr Li was helping the Group to identify and acquire land in the PRC. Further, Mr Wu gave evidence that he met Mr Li together with the defendant in October 2018 at a potential site for acquisition. This again supports the defendant’s case that Mr Li was engaged to identify land in the PRC for acquisition.

  162. [117] In January 2018, Mr Ching met Mr Li at AMBDG’s factory in Liaobu, along with Huizhou government officials in charge of land allocation. Before this meeting, the defendant gave Mr Li’s full name to Mr Ching. Mr Ching confirms that he gave Mr Li “tax materials” and “photocopied certificates”. There would be no reason for Mr Ching to do so if Mr Li had not been engaged to identify land in the PRC for acquisition.

  163. [118] In October 2018, Mr Ching asked the defendant if it would be faster to ask “Adviser Li Changyuan” to arrange a meeting with the secretary of the town committee of Xiegang. Again, I accept that “Li Changyuan” is a reference to Mr Li. Mr Ching would not have described Mr Li as “Adviser” if Mr Li had not been engaged to identify land in the PRC for acquisition and if Mr Ching did not know that to be the case.

  164. [119] In November 2018, Mr Ching messaged the defendant that he “met Li Chanyuan in the office as he was thought to be able to settle Xiegang’s land”. Mr Ching also suggested to the defendant that they check with Mr Li if he knew of “other lands to consider”. Mr Ching would not have done this if Mr Li had not been engaged to identify land in the PRC for acquisition and if Mr Ching did not know that to be the case.

  165. [120] All of this leads me to accept the defendant’s case that he engaged Mr Li to assist the second plaintiff to identify and acquire land for a sheet board plant.

  166. [121] The circumstantial evidence does not warrant an inference that Mr Li was an “interested party” as against the defendant. The second plaintiff asserts that the engagement of Mr Li is unusual and that the unusual nature of the engagement shows the loans did not have any “purposes in line with common commercial sense” for the purposes of Article 148(a). To support this argument, the second plaintiff makes two points.

  167. [122] First, it points to the fact that the arrangement with Mr Li was structured as a loan, which is quite a different transaction from a principal putting a consultant in funds in anticipation of an acquisition. To address this point, the defendant called an expert witness on business practices in the PRC: Mr Huili Du Harry (“Mr Du”). Mr Du’s evidence was that it is common practice for foreign companies who intend to acquire land in the PRC to engage consultants to assist them in identifying and acquiring the land. Further, according to Mr Du, it is not uncommon for a foreign investor to transfer money to the consultant in advance so that the consultant can act quickly to conclude an acquisition at a favourable price by paying a deposit for the land without delay.

  168. [123] But Mr Du’s evidence was unhelpful to the defendant in two respects. First, he testified that, where a foreign investor transfers money to a consultant in advance, the consultant will usually hold the money on trust for the investor under an escrow, custody or other similar agreement. It is undisputed that the loan agreements are not a similar type of agreement. Second, the second plaintiff is not a foreign investor. It is a company incorporated in the PRC.

  169. [125] The defendant accepts this point. He admitted during cross-examination that the second plaintiff could have paid the deposit on its own. However, he maintained that transferring the money to Mr Li in advance was still necessary in the interests of time, given that the price of land was rising on a daily basis.

  170. [126] The second point that the second plaintiff relies on is that the loan agreements do not protect its interests. The loan agreements do not provide a mechanism for the second plaintiff to accelerate recovery of the RMB 14m in the event that Mr Li fails to identify land for the second plaintiff to acquire or if he does so but the transaction to acquire the land falls before it can complete. In either of those events, the loan agreements do not allow the second plaintiff to do anything to recover the RMB 14m from Mr Li. It would simply have to wait for the two-year tenor of each loan to expire. Moreover, the 3% interest rate under the loan agreements is disadvantageous to the second plaintiff in that it was lower than the prevailing rate at which commercial banks in the PRC were then lending money.

  171. [127] I accept that the arrangement to transfer the RMB 14m in advance under a loan agreement (as opposed to an escrow, custody or other similar agreement) is unusual. I accept also that the loan agreements could have gone further to protect the second plaintiff’s interests given that I have found their purpose to be to assist the second plaintiff to act quickly in identifying and acquiring land for a sheet board plant.

  172. [128] To my mind, however, these features are insufficient circumstantial evidence from which to draw an inference that Mr Li was an “interested party” as against the defendant for the purposes of Article 148(a). As Ms Yi said in cross-examination, issues of risk management – such as a buyer’s contractual recourse to recover money either from a third-party intermediary such as Mr Li or from the vendor itself if a transaction to acquire land falls through before it completes – are ultimately a matter for negotiation and agreement between the buyer (ie, the second plaintiff), the vendor and the third party (ie, Mr Li).

  173. [129] Indeed, the fact that the defendant chose to structure the second plaintiff’s transfer of the RMB 14m to Mr Li as a loan could very well be said to be circumstantial evidence in support of the defendant’s case, bearing in mind that I am here considering a duty of fidelity and not a duty of diligence. For example, the fact that it was a loan as opposed to an outright transfer at least ensured that the second plaintiff had some legally enforceable right to recover the RMB 14m from Mr Li. Even if this right was exercisable only after the two-year tenor of each loan had expired, it was better than nothing. And it may not be correct to view Mr Li’s obligation to pay interest at only 3% per annum as a discount to the market rate. As the defendant testified, he saw the obligation to pay interest as an incentive to Mr Li to identify and acquire the land faster. The defendant would be unlikely to vest these legal rights in the second plaintiff if he were so connected to Mr Li as to render Mr Li an “interested party” as against the defendant.

  174. [130] To my mind, neither the use of loan agreements (as opposed to an escrow, custody or other similar agreement) nor the terms of the loan agreements is sufficient circumstantial evidence to warrant drawing the inference that the defendant caused the second plaintiff to transfer RMB 14m to Mr Li for a purpose connected to the interests of Mr Li as an “interested party”. These features may at best suggest a lack of diligence, but that is not the case against the defendant which I am now analysing.

  175. (B) The defendant’s relationship with Ms Luo

  176. [131] As part of the circumstantial evidence connecting the defendant to Mr Li, the plaintiffs also rely on their allegation that the defendant is in an intimate personal relationship with Ms Luo. The defendant denies any such relationship. He maintains that Ms Luo is merely his personal secretary. I reject the plaintiffs’ submission on this point for three reasons.

  177. [132] First, and most importantly, there is no admissible evidence that Ms Luo received any part of the RMB 14m, either from the second plaintiff or from Mr Li. There is only hearsay evidence suggesting that Mr Li transferred RMB 1m to Ms Luo. In the absence of any admissible evidence of such a transfer, Ms Luo’s relationship to the defendant is irrelevant to whether Mr Li is an “interested party” as against the defendant.

  178. [133] Second, even if I assume in the second plaintiff’s favour that Ms Luo did receive some part of the RMB 14m loan from Mr Li, the plaintiffs have failed to discharge their burden of proving a sufficiently close relationship between the defendant and Ms Luo to render either Mr Li or Ms Luo an “interested party” as against the defendant.

  179. [134] The second plaintiff’s basis for asserting an intimate personal relationship between the defendant and Ms Luo is extremely thin. Mr Siong relies on certain photographs as evidence of a romantic relationship between the defendant and Ms Luo. But on any reasonable and objective view, these photographs show at most only that the defendant and Ms Luo sometimes stood or walked next to each other.

  180. [135] When AMBHK’s and AMBDG’s financial controller, Lock Man Pan (“Mr Lock”) was asked about the allegation that the defendant and Ms Luo were in an intimate personal relationship, he said that if he were to speak “directly” and be “candid”, these allegations were based on “rumours spreading in the company”. Even Mr Siong, the second plaintiff’s principal witness, says only that it was his “understanding” that the defendant was in an intimate personal relationship with Ms Luo. Rumours and understandings are not evidence. They are no basis on which to invite a court to make a finding of fact. The second plaintiff has failed to discharge its burden of proving that the defendant was in an intimate personal relationship with Ms Luo.

  181. [136] Finally, if I am to have regard to inadmissible evidence to accept that Ms Luo received part of the RMB 14m advanced to Mr Li, there is equally inadmissible evidence that suggests that Ms Luo was acting in assisting the second plaintiff to set up a sheet board plant in a formal capacity, ie, in her capacity as the second plaintiff’s duly appointed supervisor. For example, in August and September 2018, Ms Luo and Mr Li exchanged a number of WeChat messages discussing the most legally advantageous and tax efficient way to purchase land in Lilin Town for the second plaintiff.

  182. (C) No adverse inference

  183. [137] The plaintiffs submit that I should draw an adverse inference against the defendant under illustration (g) to s 116 of the Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed) for his failure to call Mr Li and Ms Luo as witnesses at trial. For convenience, I shall refer to this provision as s 116(g).

  184. [138] Section 116(g) of the Evidence Act provides that the court may presume “that evidence which could be and is not produced would if produced be unfavourable to the person who withholds it”. In Sudha Natrajan v The Bank of East Asia Ltd [2017] 1 SLR 141, the Court of Appeal held (at [20]) that whether to draw an adverse inference depends in the final analysis on the circumstances of each case. It is not the position that an adverse inference must be drawn against every party who fails to call a witness who can give material evidence. No adverse inference may be drawn if there is a wholly satisfactory explanation for the absence of the witness (at [20(d)]). Even if the explanation is not wholly satisfactory but is at least reasonable and credible, the adverse inference to be drawn may be reduced or annulled (at [20(e)]).

  185. [139] Even when the court draws an adverse inference under s 116(g) of the Evidence Act, the adverse inference drawn must be evidence that would have been admissible if the absent witness had in fact been present and had given that evidence; and the adverse inference drawn must also have some basis in the admissible evidence that is before the court. When drawing an adverse inference, the court must apply its mind to the manner in which the evidence that is not produced is said to be unfavourable (at [23]). Further, if the evidence that is not produced is the oral evidence of a witness who is outside the jurisdiction of the court for reasons that are not attributable to the relevant party, the presumption is either not raised or if raised, is rebutted (Halsbury’s Laws of Singapore vol 10 and 10(2) (LexisNexis) at para 120.349).

  186. [140] I decline to draw an adverse inference against the defendant that the evidence of Ms Luo and Mr Li would have been unfavourable to his case if they had been called as witnesses. I come to that conclusion for three reasons.

  187. [141] First, it is undisputed that Mr Li and Ms Luo are resident in the PRC. They are therefore outside the jurisdiction of this court. The defendant had no means by which to compel either of them to testify in person in this action. A subpoena cannot be served on any person outside Singapore (see O 38 r 18(2) of the Rules of Court (2014 Rev Ed)). I consider this in itself to be a wholly satisfactory reason for the defendant not producing evidence from Mr Li and Ms Luo at trial.

  188. [142] Second, the defendant did make attempts to secure evidence from Ms Luo and Mr Li at trial. But Ms Luo was unwilling to testify and Mr Li was uncontactable. I accept these explanations.

  189. [143] Finally, and in any case, the defendant has produced some evidence of Ms Luo’s and Mr Li’s correspondence. I have referred to some of this correspondence at [136] above. This correspondence is contemporaneous with the material events. It is therefore unlikely to have been shaped after the fact to support any party’s case. To the extent that this correspondence is admissible, it supports the defendant’s case. In the absence of any allegation that this correspondence is not authentic, I consider it legitimate to have regard to this correspondence in deciding whether to draw an adverse inference, even if the correspondence is undoubtedly inadmissible in evidence on the merits of the substantive dispute between the parties.

  190. [144] For all of these reasons, I am satisfied either that no adverse inference should be drawn against the defendant under s 116(g) of the Evidence Act to support the second plaintiff’s case that either Mr Li or Ms Luo is an interested party as against the defendant.

  191. (6) Conclusion on Article 148(a)

  192. [145] On the balance of probabilities, weighing the available evidence and bearing in mind the inherent probabilities, I find that the second plaintiff has failed to discharge its burden of proving that the defendant breached his duty under Article 148(a) by causing the second plaintiff to enter into the loan agreements. The plaintiffs have failed to satisfy me that the loan agreements were a “sham” in the sense that they were merely a pretence for the defendant and Mr Li to conceal their illegitimate arrangement to siphon money out of the Group and into Mr Li’s hands, contrary to the interests of the second plaintiff. The plaintiffs have also failed to satisfy me that the defendant caused the second plaintiff to enter into the loan agreements for a purpose which was not for the second plaintiff’s benefit or for a purpose which was for the benefit of an interested party.

  193. [146] Accordingly, I find that the defendant did not breach the duty he owed to the second plaintiff under Article 148(a).

  194. Article 148(c) of the PRC Company Law

  195. [147] I now turn to consider the plaintiffs’ case against the defendant under Article 148(c) of the PRC Company Law.

  196. [148] Article 148(c) provides as follows:

  197. The parties’ experts disagree on the proper interpretation of Article 148(c).

  198. (1) Interpretation

  199. [149] Dr Zhang, the plaintiffs’ expert, takes the position that Article 148(c) prohibits a director from lending the company’s funds to a third person unless the company’s articles of association expressly permit him to do so. Where the company’s articles are silent on such loans, the director must obtain shareholders’ or directors’ consent before making a loan. In support of his view, Dr Zhang cites the decision of the PRC courts in SUN Xiaochuan v WANG Lei (Case No.: 2020 Ji 01 Min Zhong No. 9470) (“SUN Xiaochuan”). In that case, the court held that, because a company’s articles did not provide that a director had the power to lend company funds to others, a director of the company should have obtained shareholders’ consent before doing so. As the director failed to do so, the director was held to have breached Article 148(c).

  200. [150] Mr Liu, the defendant’s expert, takes the position that Article 148(c) does not prohibit a director from lending company funds to a third person. A director breaches Article 148(c) only if the loan is not extended in accordance with the provisions of the company’s articles. Mr Liu relies on Interpretation of PRC Company Law, which provides as follows:

  201. [151] I prefer Dr Zhang’s interpretation of Article 148(c) for two reasons.

  202. [152] First, the interpretation is supported by the PRC case law that Dr Zhang cites. The PRC is, of course, a civil law jurisdiction. Cases are not precedent in a civil law jurisdiction as they are in a common law jurisdiction such as Singapore. Nevertheless, I accept that cases remain persuasive when the PRC courts interpret PRC law. In any event, and at the very least, cases are of value to a third party in predicting how the PRC courts will interpret PRC law.

  203. [153] Second, I consider that the extract in Interpretation of PRC Company Law that Mr Liu relies on in fact supports the approach in SUN Xiaochuan. The proposition set out in the extract is that a director breaches Article 148(c) if the company’s articles expressly specify a procedure for obtaining approval for a loan to a third party and the director fails to comply with that procedure. It does not follow from that proposition that, if the articles do not expressly specify any such procedure, a director has a completely free hand in lending the company’s funds to a third person without shareholders’ or directors’ consent.

  204. (2) Approval of a sheet board plant

  205. [154] I turn now to consider the substance of the second plaintiff’s claim that the defendant breached Article 148(c). It is common ground that there is a “standard operating procedure” (“SOP”) in place within the Group that requires any significant capital expenditure or disposal of monies by a company in the Group to be approved by the first plaintiff’s directors. It is the plaintiff’s case that the defendant did not follow this SOP when he caused the second plaintiff to enter into the loan agreements.

  206. [155] I am prepared to assume, in the second plaintiff’s favour, that Article 148(c) imposes upon the defendant an obligation which he owed to the second plaintiff not to cause the second plaintiff to incur capital expenditure or dispose of monies in connection with a sheet board plant without the approval of the first plaintiff’s directors. The approval of the first plaintiff’s directors means, in substance, the approval of Mr Siong and Mr Ching. Despite the changes in the composition of the first plaintiff’s board of directors during this time, no group of directors could ever have formed a majority of the first plaintiff’s directors unless Mr Siong and Mr Ching were part of that group.

  207. [156] The issue at hand, therefore, is whether Mr Siong and Mr Ching approved taking steps to set up a sheet board plant in general and the second plaintiff’s entering into the loan agreements more specifically.

  208. [157] The plaintiffs’ case on this issue is as follows. Mr Siong and Mr Ching never approved setting up a sheet board plant. All discussions about a sheet board plant (such as the discussions from February 2018 to July 2019) were informal and preliminary. Moreover, the defendant did not present any feasibility study, financial projections or capital requirements for setting up a sheet board plant. Therefore, Mr Siong and Mr Ching could not and would not have approved it.

  209. [158] The defendant’s case on this issue is that “knowledge is the same as approval”. Mr Siong and Mr Ching knew the steps that were being taken to set up a sheet board plant. They did not object to any of those steps at or even soon after the time they were taken. A sheet board plant was discussed and approved at the February 2018 Meeting. Mr Siong and Mr Ching were therefore fully aware of and approved a sheet board plant by the time of the February 2018 Meeting at the latest. The decision to set up a sheet board plant was not itself a capital expenditure or a disposal of monies within the meaning of the SOP. Setting up a sheet board plant and approving the steps necessary to do so was a “process”, not an event. And it is typical in the course of a complex investment like this that there will be many rounds or degrees of approval. Following the February 2018 Meeting, therefore, various steps necessary to set up a sheet board plant were taken in anticipation of a final directors’ meeting where the first plaintiff’s directors would give their final approval for all of the necessary capital expenditure.

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