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Grounds publishedDecided 12 May 2023
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General Division of the High Court

Public Prosecutor v Tan Yew Sin

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[2023] SGHC 136Case no. Criminal Case No 36 of 2019

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] The accused was a private hire vehicle driver at the material time. In the early hours of 19 May 2018, he drove the complainant home after she went drinking at a bar with friends. Certain sexual acts occurred between the accused and the complainant in the car after they arrived at the complainant’s condominium (the “Condominium”). These acts formed the basis of the three charges against the accused, as follows:

  3. (a) one charge of sexual assault by digital-vaginal penetration under s 376(2)(a) of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed) (“PC”), punishable under s 376(3) PC (the “first charge”);

  4. (b) one charge of attempted rape under s 375(1)(a) PC, punishable under s 375(2) read with s 511 PC (the “second charge”); and

  5. (c) one charge of outrage of modesty under s 354(1) PC (the “third charge”).

  6. [2] The accused claimed trial to all three charges. He admitted to committing the sexual acts which formed the physical elements of these offences (the “Sexual Acts”), but claimed that the Sexual Acts had been consensual.

  7. [3] I acquitted the accused of all charges and provided brief oral grounds. The Prosecution has since appealed against my decision. These are my full grounds.

  8. The facts

  9. [4] On 18 May 2018, the complainant had been drinking at a bar (the “Bar”) with two friends, PW18 Yong Sern (“LYS”) and PW19 Vanessa Tam (“VT”) from about 10:30pm. LYS was the complainant’s friend, and VT was LYS’s girlfriend at the material time. The complainant had taken dinner earlier that evening and, whilst at the Bar, she consumed five pints of beer over a period of approximately three hours.

  10. The complainant was visibly intoxicated

  11. [5] The complainant left the Bar at around 2.30am on 19 May 2018. By then, she was visibly intoxicated. Her steps were unsteady. She also made a number of trips to the toilet to attempt to vomit. At trial, she explained to the court that this was not because she was nauseous or felt like vomiting, but because she was deliberately trying to make herself vomit so that she would feel more comfortable. She also started crying at about the time of her final visit to the toilet. At trial, the complainant told the court that she remembered crying but could not remember why she was crying.

  12. The complainant declined her friend’s offer to send her home

  13. [6] LYS offered a few times to send the complainant home, but she persistently declined and repeatedly reassured LYS that she was okay. At trial, the complainant explained to the court that she responded to LYS’s offers in this way because she did not want LYS to worry and also did not want to trouble LYS and VT.

  14. The accused ferried the complainant home

  15. [7] LYS booked a private-hire car for the complainant. The accused’s car (the “Car”) responded to the booking. As the complainant and LYS exited the Bar to walk towards the Car, LYS held the complainant’s arm to steady her. They let go of each other when they were about ten metres away from the Car. The complainant continued walking to the Car on her own, unassisted. She also had the awareness to collect her belongings from VT without prompting as she walked past VT on the way to the Car.

  16. [8] LYS informed the accused that the complainant was a “a little drunk” and asked the accused if he was okay with sending the complainant home. Upon hearing this, the accused initially declined. He eventually relented after LYS repeatedly reassured the accused that the complainant was okay, she would not vomit and that LYS would give her a plastic bag for the car journey just in case. At trial, the accused also explained that he would normally not ferry people who were drunk, but had agreed to ferry the complainant because he had assessed from her demeanour and her conversation with LYS that she was not “really drunk”.

  17. [9] Upon entering the Car, the complainant confirmed her address with the accused. As the Car left the Bar’s carpark, the accused reminded the complainant to let him know if she wanted to vomit, to which the complainant was alert enough to answer “it’s okay”.

  18. [10] After arriving at her destination, the complainant exited the Car and attempted to enter the Condominium through its side gate. After a few minutes, seeing that the complainant still had not entered the Condominium, the accused approached the complainant and suggested that if she did not wish to go home yet, she could return to the Car and rest. They then walked back to the Car together.

  19. [11] When they returned to the Car, the complainant got into the back seat on her own while the accused went to the driver’s seat. After a while, the complainant began behaving in an agitated manner. This behaviour included sobbing, thumping her chest, and knocking her head against the car window.

  20. [12] According to the accused, he initially tried to calm the complainant down by speaking to her from the driver’s seat. After this met with limited success, he went to the back seat to calm her down. When she stopped, he would return to the driver’s seat again. But she would then start behaving in an agitated manner again and he would return to the back seat again to calm her down. This cycle was repeated three or four times. Getting impatient, the accused decided to look through the complainant’s bag to search for her handphone and/or her identity card in the hope that he could then get hold of someone to come get her. As he was searching through her bag, the complainant was resting her head on his left shoulder. He was also holding her hand, which he explained was to calm her down as well as to stop her from thumping her chest. After locating the complainant’s identity card, the accused turned around. By his account, it was at this time that the complainant began kissing him, and they started touching each other.

  21. The two episodes of sexual activity

  22. [13] The complainant’s moaning associated with sexual activity was captured by the Car’s in-car camera from 3.34am onwards. (This meant that the sexual activity must have commenced sometime between 3.20am and 3.34am, as there was a 14-minute gap in the in-car camera’s recording from 3.20am to 3.34am.) At one point, the accused could be heard saying “I can’t put it in” to the complainant and this was followed by the sound of some movement. The accused explained that this was the sound of the complainant shifting her position in response to what he had said. The accused was also heard saying “quiet” a couple of times to the complainant as her moaning grew louder. At one point, the complainant’s moan grew so loud that it sounded like she was reaching orgasm, although the complainant did not agree with this characterisation at trial. During this period, the accused inserted his right finger into the complainant’s vagina and fingered her (which formed the subject of the first charge), and attempted to penetrate her vagina with his penis (which formed the subject of the second charge).

  23. [14] There was then a pause in the sexual activity, during which the accused went back to the driver’s seat, drove the Car down the road, made a three-point turn and drove back towards the Condominium. During this drive, the accused could be heard saying “I just take a round, okay?” to the complainant. After stopping the Car on the road opposite the Condominium, the accused joined the complainant in the back seat to resume the Sexual Acts. During this time, he inserted his right hand beneath the complainant’s bra, fondled her breasts and sucked on her left nipple, and also attempted to insert his finger into her vagina (these formed the subject of the third charge). According to the accused, after a few minutes, he felt the complainant disengaging herself from the sexual activity. He then stopped and moved away from her towards the other end of the backseat.

  24. [15] Independently of the accused’s testimony, the complainant’s moans associated with this second episode of sexual activity was also captured by the in-car camera. After a few minutes, the complainant was heard saying “no”, after which no further moans from the complainant were heard. This was at about 3.53am.

  25. The aftermath

  26. [16] The accused and the complainant then engaged in a brief conversation. Thereafter, the accused moved back to the driver’s seat. The complainant was heard saying “go” to the accused. When the accused sought clarification, the complainant told him to “just drive”. The accused then drove around the neighbourhood without incident and arrived back at the Condominium at about 4.05am. The complainant exited the Car unassisted, taking her handbag with her but leaving a paper bag behind in the Car. The accused noticed this and went after her to return the paper bag to her. By the time he caught up with her, she had already arrived unassisted at the Condominium gate. She told the accused that she could not find her access card. The accused found the access card in her bag and used it to tap open the gate for her. The complainant walked in unassisted. The accused drove off in the Car after seeing that the complainant had entered the Condominium.

  27. [17] About five minutes later, the complainant was seen on the Condominium’s CCTV leaving the Condominium and walking along the road. At about 4.44am a passer-by, PW21 Muhammad Yazid Bin Umar found the complainant lying on the road a few hundred metres from the Condominium. He lodged the first information report via a ‘999’ call.

  28. [18] The accused was arrested on 19 May 2018 at around 12.30pm for attempted rape. The following statements under s 22 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) were recorded and the accused has not challenged the admissibility of these statements before the court:

  29. (a) one statement recorded by ASP Dan Dunstan Cheang (“IO Cheang”) at about 7.15pm on 19 May 2018 (“First Long Statement”); and

  30. (b) one further statement recorded by IO Cheang at about 4.15pm on 23 May 2018 (“Second Long Statement”).

  31. [19] At around 10.05am to 11.40am on the same day, the complainant was examined by PW27 Dr Foo Anqi Sharon (“Dr Foo”) at KK Women’s and Children’s Hospital SingHealth (“KK Hospital”). Her blood and urine samples were taken sometime during this period and sent to the Health Sciences Authority (“HSA") for analysis. According to HSA’s analysis, 26mg/100ml of ethanol was found in the complainant’s blood sample and 102mg/100ml of ethanol was found in her urine sample.

  32. [20] Evidence was also seized from the recordings of the accused’s in-car camera, from which the court could hear certain interactions between the accused and the complainant before, during and after the Sexual Acts. There was also CCTV footage from the Bar and the Condominium, from which the court could observe the complainant’s demeanour and assess her state of intoxication.

  33. Parties’ cases

  34. [21] The only disputed element across the three offences was that of consent. As alluded to above (at [2]), the accused admitted to the physical acts constituting the actus reus of the offences.

  35. [22] The Prosecution’s case was that the complainant did not consent to the Sexual Acts and that, in any event, she did not have capacity to consent to the same as she was significantly intoxicated and impaired in her judgement.

  36. [23] The Defence’s case was chiefly that the Prosecution had failed to meet its legal burden of proving lack of consent or lack of capacity to consent beyond a reasonable doubt. Alternatively, the Defence relied on the defence of mistake of fact under s 79 PC, namely, that the accused in good faith believed that the complainant had the capacity to consent and did in fact consent to the Sexual Acts.

  37. Issues to be determined

  38. [24] In light of the statutory requirements and the parties’ cases, the issues that arose for my consideration were:

  39. (a) whether the complainant did not consent to the Sexual Acts, in particular:

  40. (i) whether the complainant lacked the capacity to consent, by virtue of s 90(b) PC;

  41. (ii) if the complainant had the capacity to consent, whether no consent was in fact given; and

  42. (b) if the complainant lacked the capacity to consent and/or did not in fact consent, whether the accused could nevertheless rely on the defence of mistake of fact under s 79(1) PC.

  43. Preliminary evidential issues

  44. Transcription of the in-car audio recordings

  45. [25] Part of the evidence relied on by the Prosecution were video clips from the accused’s in-car camera (or, more accurately, the audio tracks of those video clips, since the in-car camera was outward facing and did not capture video images of what occurred inside the Car). For instance, the Prosecution relied on the absence of audio recording of any “verbalised … express consent” to infer that the complainant did not in fact consent. For brevity, I shall refer to these audio tracks as the “in-car audio recordings”.

  46. [26] These video clips were tendered in an SD card, but the Prosecution also tendered a transcription and translation alongside the video clips. PW17 Tan See Hua (“Ms Tan”), an interpreter with the Criminal Investigation Department (“CID”) of the Singapore Police Force, had been asked to transcribe the 17 clips. She produced a 21-page report (the “Transcription Report”) that: (a) transcribed the English words that she heard, and (b) translated the Mandarin and Hokkien words that she heard from the audio recordings.

  47. [27] Owing to justifiable concerns raised by the Defence about the accuracy of the Transcription Report as well as its inability to capture crucial nuances, I found it unsafe to place reliance on the Transcription Report. I indicated to the parties that I would be open to the Prosecution or Defence providing a better set of transcripts. Failing this, the trial would proceed without transcripts being used as evidence; this meant that the trial would proceed on the basis of what the witnesses and I could make out of the audio recordings. Both the Prosecution and Defence responded that they would endeavour to have the audio quality enhanced and obtain a better transcription. However, neither side sought to admit any further transcript into evidence. In the end, the lack of a replacement transcription did not hinder the trial, as parties were able to present all relevant evidence to the court by having the relevant portions of the in-car audio recording played in court and commented on by the relevant witnesses.

  48. Completeness of the in-car camera recordings

  49. [28] A related difficulty was that the in-car camera recordings were an incomplete record of what transpired in the Car that day. In the first place, the in-car camera was, by design, programmed to pause recording at certain points in time (eg, after the car had been idling for more than five minutes or once the car engine had been turned off). Furthermore, speech and sounds that were captured were not always clearly audible, despite the best efforts of the court and counsel to discern what had been said. The court’s reliance on such evidence thus had to be tempered by an appropriate appreciation of its limitations.

  50. The complainant’s non-recollection of the alleged offences

  51. [29] A key evidential feature of this case was that during the period when the Sexual Acts took place, the complainant had been experiencing an alcohol-induced blackout and was substantially unable to recall what she did, said or heard during this period. Consequently, she was also unable to explain to the court why she acted the way she did at the material time. Much of her evidence at trial was therefore limited to confirming what she heard in the audio recordings that were played in court and providing, at the time of the trial, her best explanation and reconstruction of what had occurred.

  52. [30] As a result of the complainant having no independent recollection of what occurred during the period that the Sexual Acts took place, the only evidence available to the court concerning what occurred during this period were the accused’s testimony and the objective evidence derived from the in-car audio recording.

  53. Role of the factual witnesses in relation to the in-car camera and CCTV recordings

  54. [31] The complainant’s behaviour at the material time was evidenced in three ways: (a) contemporaneous CCTV footages from the Bar and the Condominium, (b) contemporaneous in-car camera recordings from the Car, and (c) eyewitness evidence from various factual witnesses (including the complainant’s own recollections, where available, and the accused’s police statements). There were no challenges to their admissibility or authenticity.

  55. [32] The recordings (ie, (a) and (b) in [31] above) constituted real evidence that the court was competent and well-placed to assess. Nevertheless, a court must always be alive to the dangers of assuming that these presented a complete and unambiguous picture. Such dangers stemmed from potential incompleteness (eg, visual blindspots, audio without visual footage, stretches of time that went unrecorded) and lack of context (eg, situational cues, the manner in which a particular witness would normally speak).

  56. [33] This was why the evidence referred to at [31(c)] above was important, because it enabled those who witnessed or participated in these events to supply the relevant context. This explained why the key factual witnesses (ie, the complainant, the accused, LYS and VT) were asked both about:

  57. (a) their own recollection of events independent of the recordings – eg, what they saw and heard, how they acted or reacted, and why they chose to act or react in the way they did; and

  58. (b) how their evidence of the events (based on their recollection) matched up against what was shown on the recordings – eg, when and where a particular event took place and how this was situated in the overall chronology of events. This was achieved through the witnesses being shown relevant portions of the recordings in court and being asked questions about what they could see or hear from the footage.

  59. [34] At the same time, the dual function performed by these witnesses, and the manner in which this was performed, created its own challenges.

  60. [35] Chief among these was that the line between the two functions was not always scrupulously maintained by counsel. The cleanest way to separate both functions would have been to elicit a witness’ entire testimony from recollection before exposing them to any of the footage. However, based on how parties ran their case, witnesses were sometimes exposed to footage before they were asked for their recollection. A related concern was that questions were not always framed to clearly and exclusively relate to one function or the other. For instance, witnesses were sometimes asked to explain why they acted or reacted in a certain way. Yet the answers to these questions did not always specify whether these reflected the contemporaneous reasons that operated on their minds at the material time (ie, statements as to past belief, on a past act), or their present rationalisations or afterthoughts for why they might have acted that way (ie, statements as to present belief, on a past act). In most cases only the former would be relevant.

  61. [36] It was understandable that footage could sometimes be used to jog a witness’ memory as to a particular event that took place in the entire sequence. Such an approach, however, posed an obvious risk—that evidence purportedly originating from a witness’ recollection was in fact the product of his or her memory influenced by or reconstructed from the footage itself. Memories lost may now be “recalled”, when in fact the source of this “memory” was really the footage. If so, a witness might appear less forgetful and more reliable than he otherwise would, inflating his credibility and the weight given to his evidence. Additionally, memories inconsistent with the footage may be downplayed or repackaged to present a more coherent and consistent narrative. These potentially undermined two key objectives of witness testimony: one, forensically testing a witness’ credibility (through the completeness, credibility and accuracy of his evidence), and two, elucidating the evidence that a witness is capable of providing to the fullest extent possible.

  62. [37] An example that illustrated both these concerns was that on the complainant saying “Yah, yah, yah” in response to LYS asking her to text him when she reached home, LYS initially testified that at that point in time, the complainant’s reply “didn’t stood out so much to me”. It “just sounded like a yes to me. Like an acknowledgement”. But after hearing the footage, he added that “now when I hear it, it sounded … like she was pretty damn drunk” [emphasis added]. Fortunately, this was an instance where the witness was transparent as to how his memory and interpretation of the footage diverged. This might not always be the case.

  63. [38] None of this was meant to suggest that any of the witnesses were deliberately lying. Rather, it raised a warning that such choices might have been subconsciously made by the witnesses.

  64. [39] As to the second function specifically (see [33(b)] above) (ie, explaining how their recollection matched up with the footage), there was also a concern that some of the questions asked of the witnesses exceeded the scope of what they were called to testify on.

  65. [40] These were witnesses of fact called for their observations and, where relevant, their impressions of the events at the material time. These observations and impressions were relevant because of the witness’ presence at and participation in those incidents. Thus, to illustrate, a witness asked to describe how the complainant’s speech was at the time might permissibly answer “she sounded like she was pretty damn drunk”. This was because it was his description of what he heard at the time.

  66. [41] By contrast, these factual witnesses were not being called to explain what they thought they could see or hear from the audio recordings and footages, except in so far as to relate these observations to their own recollection. The court did not need to be told what a witness heard or thought a footage being played in court showed. That constituted real evidence, and the court viewing or hearing it in real time was competent to discern what it showed. If a CCTV clip showed a red car, and a witness claimed to see a blue car in the clip, it could not be the case that the court was expected to give weight to that. Thus, for instance, the evidence that LYS gave (ie, that upon hearing the audio recording in court, he thought that “she sounded like she was pretty damn drunk”) was but an inference derived from the footage.

  67. A note about the timestamps on the video recordings

  68. [42] As noted at [20] above, the evidence in this case included video recordings from the Car’s in-car camera, from the Bar’s CCTV and from the Condominium’s CCTV. These video footages bore timestamps based on the time kept by the internal clocks of the respective recording devices. Unfortunately, the internal clocks of these devices did not all keep the same time. The time recorded by the Bar’s CCTV was about 15 minutes ahead of the time recorded by the Car’s in-car camera, while the time recorded by the Condominium’s CCTV was about ten minutes ahead of the time recorded by the in-car camera. Further, by comparing the time recorded by the in-car camera with the time recorded by the car park gantry at the Bar, it appears that the time recorded by the in-car camera was about five minutes behind the official or correct time. This also implies that the time recorded by the Bar’s CCTV was about ten minutes ahead of the correct time while the time recorded by the Condominium’s CCTV was about five minutes ahead of the correct time.

  69. [43] In its closing submission, the Prosecution referred to the events captured in the in-car camera recording using the correct time, by adding five minutes to the time shown on the video footage’s timestamp. In contrast, the Defence’s closing submission referred to those events by the time shown on the video footage’s timestamp. In these grounds, where the time of an event is specified without qualification, it refers to the correct time. Conversely, where the time of an event captured in a video recording is given in these grounds by reference to the timestamp on the video recording, this will be indicated.

  70. Preliminary observations on the law

  71. [44] The law places the legal burden on the Prosecution to prove the complainant’s lack of consent beyond a reasonable doubt. In all three offences (see [1] above), the lack of consent would be a requisite element. (The lack of consent is also a requisite element of the outrage of modesty charge as s 354(1) PC refers to the use of “criminal force” which is defined in s 350 PC as the intentional use of force without consent.)

  72. [45] The lack of consent may be established in two ways. The first is by proving that the complainant did not in fact consent; in other words, that consent to the acts in question was never manifested. The second way is statutorily codified in s 90(b) PC and involves proving that the complainant was incapable of giving consent at the material time. Section 90(b) PC reads:

  73. [46] The effect of s 90(b) PC is that where the absence of consent is an element of the offence, and it is shown that the complainant was incapable of giving consent, then it would not matter whether she ostensibly consented since such a consent would not be valid (Pram Nair v Public Prosecutor [2017] 2 SLR 1015 (“Pram Nair”) at [62]).

  74. [47] Regardless of which of the two ways the Prosecution relies on to establish lack of consent, the legal burden and standard of proof remain on the Prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that there was no valid consent to the respective Sexual Acts (Pram Nair at [45]).

  75. [48] It is trite, but bears repeating, that not all doubts about the Prosecution’s case are reasonable doubts. What is required is a qualitative appreciation of whether a reasonable doubt has arisen (Jagatheesan s/o Krishnasamy v PP [2006] 4 SLR(R) 45 (“Jagatheesan”)). A “reasonable” doubt, as opposed to a “merely fanciful” doubt, is “a doubt for which one can give a reason, so long as the reason given is logically connected to the evidence” (Jagatheesan at [53], affirming the dictum of Wood JA in R v Brydon (1995) 2 BCLR (3d) 243). Although the observations in Jagatheesan were made in the context of the reasons that a judge must supply to support a conviction, these observations are equally apposite if a judge should instead decide to acquit as a reasonable doubt is a necessary condition for an acquittal (Public Prosecutor v GCK and another matter [2020] 1 SLR 486 (“GCK”) (at [131])). The Court of Appeal in GCK further gave guidance on how the principle of proof beyond a reasonable doubt could be conceptualised in two ways. One, a reasonable doubt could arise from within the Prosecution’s case. Two, a reasonable doubt could arise on an assessment of the totality of the evidence, which includes a holistic assessment of both the Prosecution’s and the Defence’s cases and the interactions between the two.

  76. [49] It would be vital to appreciate that the principle of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is grounded in the presumption of innocence. In a passage affirmed by the Court of Appeal in AOF v Public Prosecutor [2012] 3 SLR 34 (at [315]), V K Rajah J (as he then was) observed in Jagatheesan (at [59]):

  77. [50] He further observed (at [61]):

  78. [51] Accordingly, the court’s task of assessing whether the Prosecution has proven its case beyond reasonable doubt naturally involved assessing whether sufficient doubt had been cast on the Prosecution’s case by the Defence. Should a reasonable doubt arise from within the Prosecution’s case or on the totality of the evidence as to capacity or consent in fact, the accused would be entitled to an acquittal.

  79. [52] The Prosecution’s primary case was that the complainant did not consent to each of the Sexual Acts referred to in the charges and, in the alternative, that she did not have the capacity to consent to the same. I would, however, first discuss the issue of whether the complainant had capacity to consent, before moving on to discuss whether she did in fact consent. This was the more logical sequence, as recognised by the Court of Appeal in Pram Nair (at [62]), since a negative finding on the first issue would necessarily negate any ostensible consent that the complainant had given. If, however, the complainant was not intoxicated to such degree, the Prosecution could still make out the offences by proving that she did not in fact consent (Pram Nair at [62]).

  80. The parties’ arguments

  81. [53] It was undisputed that the complainant had consumed five pints of beer while at the Bar and that she had stopped drinking at around 1.30am, or shortly before the staff switched off the lights in the Bar. The Prosecution submitted that the complainant did not have capacity to consent to the Sexual Acts as she was significantly intoxicated and impaired in her judgement at the material time. She did not understand or could not have understood the nature and consequence of what she was consenting to.

  82. [54] The Defence’s response was to point to instances across the night where the complainant demonstrated an awareness of context and ability to judge and decide, despite her intoxication. The Defence thus submitted that a reasonable doubt was raised as to the complainant’s capacity to consent at the material time.

  83. [55] Both the Prosecution and the Defence cited Pram Nair on the question of how intoxication affects the ability to consent to sexual activity. The Court of Appeal in Pram Nair noted (at [93]) that the court’s attention had been drawn to Public Prosecutor v Iryan bin Abdul Karim and others [2010] 2 SLR 15 (“Iryan”) where (at [123]) Tay Yong Kwang J (as he then was) cited the following passage from Ratanlal & Dhirajlal’s Law of Crimes: A Commentary on the Indian Penal Code 1860 vol 2 (C K Thakker & M C Thakker eds) (Bharat Law House, 26th Ed, 2007) at p 2061:

  84. [56] After noting that Iryan was a case where consent was vitiated because of the complainant’s fear of injury, the court went on to cite various observations from Rook & Ward on Sexual Offences Law and Practice (Sweet & Maxwell, 5th Ed, 2016) at para 1.252 (at [95]), which it synthesised as five general principles (at [96]) as follows:

  85. [57] Of particular relevance to the facts of the present case are the second and the fourth principles, namely:

  86. (a) the fact that a complainant has drunk a substantial amount of alcohol, appears disinhibited, or behaves differently than usual, does not indicate lack of capacity to consent. Consent to sexual activity, even when made while intoxicated, is still consent as long as there is a voluntary and conscious acceptance of what is being done; and

  87. (b) capacity to consent requires the capacity to make decisions or choices. A person, though having limited awareness of what is happening, may have such impaired understanding or knowledge as to lack the ability to make any decisions, much less the particular decision whether to have sexual intercourse or engage in any sexual act.

  88. The expert evidence

  89. [58] Both sides called expert witnesses to assist the court.

  90. [59] The Prosecution’s expert was PW35 Dr Christopher Cheok Cheng Soon (“Dr Cheok”), a Senior Consultant at the Department of General and Forensic Psychiatry of the Institute of Mental Health (“IMH”). He obtained his medical degree in 1995 and a Masters of Medicine (Psychiatry) degree in 2000. Prior to joining IMH in 2014, Dr Cheok headed the Department of Psychological Medicine in Khoo Teck Puat Hospital. He has appeared as an expert witness in court on about five previous occasions to provide evidence on a person’s blood alcohol content.

  91. [60] The Defence’s expert was DW2 Dr Lim Yun Chin (“Dr Lim”), a consultant psychiatrist at Raffles Hospital. He obtained his medical degree in 1976 and a Masters of Medicine (Psychiatry) degree in 1986. He has served as a consultant psychiatrist at Woodbridge Hospital for 15 years, and has also served as a forensic psychiatrist at Changi Prison Hospital and as a psychiatrist at the Singapore Prisons and Drug Rehabilitation Centre. He has previously appeared as an expert witness in court both for the Prosecution and for the defence.

  92. [61] Dr Cheok prepared a report dated 25 January 2019 at IO Cheang’s request, which was tendered by the Prosecution in evidence. Dr Lim prepared two reports, one dated 20 September 2020 and one dated 16 August 2021.

  93. [62] At trial, Dr Cheok tendered and referred to the following academic articles:

  94. (a) Paul J Perry, Shadi Doroudgar & Priscilla Van Dyke, “Ethanol Forensic Toxicology” (2017) 45 Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law 429 (“Exhibit P189”);

  95. (b) Mary Connell, “Expert Testimony in Sexual Assault Cases: Alcohol Intoxication and Memory” (2015) 42-43 International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 98 (“Exhibit P190”);

  96. (c) Alan W Jones, “Alcohol, Its Absoroption, Distribution, Metabolism, and Excretion in the Body and Pharmacokinetic Calculations” (2019) 1 Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews Forensic Science e1340 (“Exhibit P191”) and

  97. (d) Alan W Jones, “Evidence-Based Survey of the Elimination Rates of Ethanol from Blood with Applications in Forensic Casework” (2010) 200 Forensic Science International 1 (“Exhibit P192”)

  98. [63] In addition, during Dr Cheok’s cross-examination, Defence counsel referred Dr Cheok to the following articles:

  99. (a) Aaron M White, “What Happened? Alcohol, Memory Blackouts, and the Brain” (2003) 27 Alcohol Research & Health 186 (“Exhibit D1”); and

  100. (b) Alicia N Justus, Peter R Finn & Joseph E Steinmetz, “The Influence of Traits of Disinhibition on the Association Between Alcohol Use and Risky Sexual Behaviour” (2000) 24 Alcoholism: Clinical and Experimental Research 1028 (“Exhibit D2”).

  101. (1) The complainant’s alcohol-induced blackout

  102. [64] The experts gave evidence of the significance of the complainant’s alcohol-induced blackout on the question of her capacity to consent. Both experts agreed that, while a person in an alcohol-induced blackout would be unable to form memories due to alcohol intoxication, this did not necessarily mean that the person would not be able to perform cognitive functions and understand the nature and consequences of his or her actions. Alcohol-induced blackout was not the same as passing out – a person experiencing an alcohol-induced blackout remained conscious and might even continue to talk and socialise. Dr Cheok pointed the court to the following passage from Exhibit P189:

  103. [65] The experts also agreed that a person experiencing an alcohol-induced blackout might behave in a way that does not appear intoxicated to those around them or does not cause to those around them to suspect that he or she was so intoxicated to the point of having a blackout. The significance of this second feature will be explored under third issue (ie, the defence of mistake) (see [170] below).

  104. (2) The complainant’s blood alcohol level

  105. [66] As noted by the Court of Appeal in Pram Nair (at [96(e)]), expert evidence, such as that showing the complainant’s blood alcohol level, may assist the court in determining whether the complainant had the capacity to consent. I first deal with the experts’ evidence as to the calculation of the complainant’s blood alcohol level, before turning to their evidence as to the implications of the same.

  106. (A) Dr Cheok’s estimates as to the complainant’s blood alcohol level

  107. [67] Dr Cheok’s report estimated the complainant’s blood alcohol concentration (“BAC”) at 3.00am to be between 132.2 and 155.9mg/100ml. Dr Cheok explained that he gave the BAC as a range because he was not provided with the exact time that the Complainant’s blood sample had been taken. He was only informed by IO Cheang that the blood sample was taken sometime between 10.05am and 11.40am on 19 May 2018. Applying an average rate of 15mg/100ml/hour at which the human body metabolises alcohol to the BAC of 26mg/100ml in the blood sample and then extrapolating backwards in time, Dr Cheok calculated that:

  108. (a) if the blood sample had been taken at 10.05am, the Complainant’s estimated BAC at 3.00am would be 132.2mg/100ml; and

  109. (b) if the blood sample had been taken at 11.40am, the Complainant’s estimated BAC at 3.00am would be 155.9mg/100ml.

  110. [68] During examination-in-chief, Dr Cheok was informed that it had been ascertained that the blood sample was taken at 11.40am. The examination-in-chief then proceeded on the basis that 155.9mg/100ml would be the applicable estimate at 3.00am based on an alcohol elimination rate of 15mg/100ml/hour. Dr Cheok also calculated that, using the same alcohol elimination rate, the estimated BAC at 3.30am and 4.00am would be 148.4 and 140.9mg/100ml respectively.

  111. [69] As for why he adopted the alcohol elimination rate of 15mg/100ml/hour, Dr Cheok explained that, for 95% of the population, the alcohol elimination rate would range from 10mg/100ml/hour to 22mg/100ml/hour. In previous court cases where he appeared as expert witness, both the defence and prosecution expert witnesses were in agreement that 15mg/100ml/hour was a reasonable elimination rate to use for someone who is healthy and not alcohol dependent. By way of background, I note that this was also the alcohol elimination rate adopted by the experts in Ong Mingwee (alias Wang Mingwei) v Public Prosecutor [2013] 1 SLR 1217 (“Ong Mingwee”) and in Pram Nair for the purpose of estimating BAC by backward extrapolation.

  112. [70] Dr Cheok’s report was prepared on the basis of the complainant’s self-reporting that she did not drink alcohol regularly. At trial, Dr Cheok was informed that the complainant had given evidence in court that she had spent three months in Korea shortly before the incident, and that she would go out about two to three times a week during which she would drink two bottles of soju on each occasion. Dr Cheok responded that, based on this new information, he would treat the complainant as a fairly regular alcohol drinker and would use an alcohol elimination rate of 18mg/100ml/hour instead. He then recalculated the estimated BAC at 3.00am, 3.30am and 4.00am to be 182 mg/100ml, 173 mg/100ml and 164 mg/100ml respectively. (To recapitulate, the significance of these three timings are: 3.00am corresponded to roughly when the Car arrived at the Condominium, 3.30am corresponded to roughly when the first episode of sexual activity commenced, and 4.00am corresponded to roughly when the complainant entered the Condominium.)

  113. [71] Dr Lim did not challenge either Dr Cheok’s original estimate or his revised estimate.

  114. [72] Dr Cheok was also asked during examination-in-chief whether the complainant’s BAC at 2.30am would have been higher or lower than at 3.00am. He answered that it would have been higher at 2.30am. Prior to arriving at this conclusion, Dr Cheok was informed that the complainant took her last drink at around 1.30am. Dr Cheok also explained that alcohol is absorbed into the blood stream mainly through the small intestines, and eliminated from the body mainly through the liver. He also stated that maximum absorption typically occurs between 60 to 120 minutes after consumption. Dr Lim’s evidence was that BAC would reach its peak about 30 to 120 minutes after drinking.

  115. [73] For completeness, I should mention that during a later part of Dr Cheok’s examination-in-chief, while addressing a series of questions concerning alcohol-induced blackout, Dr Cheok suggested that two hours after the last drink (ie, around 3.30am) would roughly correspond to the time when the complainant’s BAC was peaking. However, during cross-examination, Dr Cheok’s attention was brought to a passage from Exhibit P191 which reads:

  116. After considering this passage, Dr Cheok opined that it would be fair and reasonable to assume that BAC levels would peak at around 60 minutes after drinking. Dr Cheok also agreed that (a) the reference in the passage to “pyloric spasm” refers to a situation where the muscle connecting the stomach to the small intestines has cramped up such that the stomach is not releasing its contents into the small intestines, and (b) this meant that the situation of BAC peaking at two hours would be an outlying situation.

  117. [74] To wrap up this point, I would also note that Dr Cheok’s opinion that the complainant’s BAC would have been higher at 2.30am compared to at 3.00am was corroborated by Dr Lim’s observation that the complainant appeared less intoxicated in the CCTV footages from the Condominium than in the CCTV footages from the Bar.

  118. [75] Given the lack of dispute between the experts on the following two points, I accepted that:

  119. (a) the complainant’s estimated BAC at 3.00am to 4.00am would have been between 164 and 182 mg/100ml; and

  120. (b) the complainant’s BAC at 2.30am would have been higher than at 3.00am.

  121. (B) The experts’ evidence on the implications of the complainant’s blood alcohol level

  122. [76] The first question to be answered was whether the complainant’s estimated BAC of 164 to 182 mg/100ml at the material time was consistent with the complainant having experienced alcohol-induced blackout. Dr Cheok gave evidence that memory impairment would begin at about 130 to 170 mg/100ml. According to Dr Lim, it was believed that alcohol-induced blackout would occur when the BAC exceeded 140 mg/100ml. The article tendered by Dr Cheok as Exhibit P190 also stated that “fragmentary blackouts” occur at BACs of 150 mg/100ml or higher. It may therefore be safely concluded that the complainant’s estimated BAC was consistent with her having experienced alcohol-induced blackout at the material time. Consequently, I accepted the expert witnesses’ assessment that it was due to alcohol-induced blackout (and not any other reasons) that the complainant had no recollection of what had occurred during the time that the Sexual Acts took place.

  123. [77] As for the impact of the complainant’s BAC on her behaviour and capacity, Dr Cheok referred to a number of tables in Exhibit P190 setting forth typical behavioural and cognitive impairments at different BAC levels. Dr Cheok then informed the court that, at the complainant’s estimated BAC, there would have been impairment of judgement as well as incoordination in her movements. However, during cross-examination, Dr Cheok’s attention was drawn to a passage from Exhibit P190 which stated: “It should be noted, however, that individuals may differ considerably in what symptoms of intoxication are exhibited at various levels. It is speculative what symptoms of intoxication any specific person would exhibit at BAC levels” [emphasis added]. I set out the exchange as follows:

  124. [78] Dr Cheok also accepted that there was a need to correlate the complainant’s BAC to her observed behaviour at that time:

  125. (C) The experts’ comments on the complainant’s capacity to consent

  126. [80] Before turning to consider the complainant’s observed behaviour, there was one other aspect of the experts’ evidence to be considered. When IO Cheang wrote to IMH on 7 December 2018 to request an expert opinion, he stated that he needed an expert “to comment on the victim’s state of intoxication and whether she would have been able to give her consent given the state she was in”. Dr Cheok’s report of 25 January 2019 responded directly to this request by stating the following in its concluding paragraph:

  127. [81] My first observation would be that this conclusion was premised on a number of factual errors. First, although the complainant told Dr Cheok that she did not drink alcohol regularly, the evidence adduced at trial showed otherwise (see [70] above). As a result, Dr Cheok decided during his examination-in-chief to reclassify the complainant as a “fairly regular drinker” (as opposed to a person who did not drink regularly). Second, the statement “[a]fter sometime [sic], seeing that the victim was not responding, the accused sat at the back seat with her to wake her” was taken from the part of IO Cheang’s summary of facts relating to the period after the complainant had returned to the Car after failing to open the Condominium’s side gate. The evidence adduced at trial showed that the complainant was not asleep during this period and there was no evidence that the accused woke her up. Third, it was clear from the Condominium’s CCTV footage that, contrary to what the complainant told Dr Cheok about her recollection, she did not fall down at the side gate.

  128. [82] Second, it appeared that, when preparing the report, Dr Cheok was operating under a misapprehension of what constituted capacity to consent at law, as demonstrated by the following exchange during Dr Cheok’s cross-examination:

  129. [83] Even though Dr Cheok subsequently clarified that he was not equating “valid consent” to the concept of informed consent to a medical procedure, it would appear that his understanding was influenced by the latter. This was evident from his explanation that “I don’t think … she would understand … what she was getting herself into fully” [emphasis added]. His understanding of “valid consent” thus required the complainant to appreciate the full risks or consequences of her actions. This was also evident from the distinction he drew, between consenting to something simple like crossing the road with someone or getting into a car, versus consenting to something “more sophisticated” such as “buying a car, for example, and to have to sign a loan agreement, a sales and purchase agreement”.

  130. [84] Dr Cheok also appeared to conflate the concept of disinhibition (which he referred to as a person “acting in ways that they wouldn’t be when they are sober”) with the inability to comprehend the nature and consequences of one’s actions. He was unable to accept that there was a meaningful distinction between the two:

  131. This failure to distinguish the two concepts does not accord with the principles enunciated in Pram Nair, which drew a clear distinction between mere disinhibition and lack of capacity to consent (at [96(b)]).

  132. [85] I was thus not satisfied that Dr Cheok’s understanding of capacity to consent was consistent with the applicable legal principles (see [56] above).

  133. [86] Dr Lim was similarly asked by the Defence to comment on the complainant’s capacity to consent in his second report, but he did not do so. When asked about this during cross-examination, Dr Lim candidly acknowledged that he was not able to give a conclusive opinion on the complainant’s capacity to consent.

  134. [87] At this point, it would be useful to recall the following dictum of G P Selvam J from Gunapathy Muniandy v James Khoo and others [2001] SGHC 165 (at [12.3]):

  135. This dictum was cited with approval by Chan Sek Keong CJ in George Abraham Vadakathu v Jacob George [2009] 3 SLR(R) 631, a case concerning testamentary capacity, when he commented (at [66]) that:

  136. [88] With these principles in mind, I would pay less attention to the experts’ conclusions on the ultimate issue of whether the complainant had capacity to consent, and focus my analysis on evaluating the complainant’s observed behaviour with the assistance of the experts’ comments on those behaviour. This was also the approach adopted in the Prosecution’s Closing Submission, where no reliance was placed by the Prosecution on Dr Cheok’s conclusion on the ultimate issue.

  137. The complainant’s observed behaviour

  138. (1) At the Bar

  139. [89] The Prosecution contended that the complainant had already been intoxicated for some time before she boarded the accused’s Car. The complainant was feeling physically unwell after the Bar closed for the night, had tried (and failed) to vomit three to four times in the Bar’s toilet and had been stumbling as she walked out of the toilet. Reliance was placed by the Prosecution on the CCTV footage and the testimonies of LYS and VT, to corroborate the victim’s account of her physical and emotional state.

  140. [90] I broadly set out the evidence on the complainant’s observed behaviour at the Bar as follows.

  141. [91] Before the Bar’s lights were switched off for the night, LYS described the complainant’s behaviour at about 1.18am (according to the timestamp on the Bar’s CCTV footage) as “perfectly fine” and recalled that she was able to converse with a waitress in the Korean language. VT similarly described the complainant as “sober” even after drinking a few pints of beer, and “still very chatty” and “laughing and smiling with [LYS]” and “did not seem like out of the ordinary at all”.

  142. [92] After the Bar closed and the lights of the Bar were switched off at around 1.45am or 2.00am, some deterioration in the complainant’s motor control began to emerge. The complainant described herself as feeling “very lightheaded and giddy” and “a bit unwell” during this period. . She was, however, able to key in her address on her phone to book a private hire car by herself (the “first private hire car”).

  143. [93] When shown a CCTV video clip of her gait from this period, the complainant described herself as taking “very heavy steps” in the first video, and then stumbling to the left and right in the second video. On the other hand, LYS described that her gait “didn’t seem wobbly yet”.

  144. [94] When the first private hire car arrived, the complainant was in the toilet trying to vomit and LYS went to check on her. She then handed her phone over to LYS and told him to cancel the booking on her behalf (which she could not do as she was busy trying to vomit). This suggested to me that she was, at the very least, sufficiently aware of her surroundings and able to make decisions despite her intoxication and the impairment in her motor skills.

  145. [95] After cancelling the first private hire car booking, LYS returned to the toilet to check on the complainant. She told him that she “needed some time to—to puke”. What followed was a brief exchange between LYS and the complainant, which showed some lucidity on the latter’s part: LYS testified that he waited outside the female toilet for about five to ten minutes, periodically asking her “Are you okay?”. She occasionally replied with either “I’m okay” or “I need more time” or “I’m trying to puke, so give me a while”.

  146. [96] It was also relevant that the complainant had decided to reject LYS’s offers to send her home and repeatedly emphasised that she was okay. The complainant testified that she did this to avoid worrying him, whom she knew to be a very anxious person. She had the presence of mind to recognise that “[s]o if like I tell him like a little bit I’m not okay, he will be very worried and paranoid”. She also did not want to trouble both LYS and VT to send her home as she was concerned that they would have to “go a long way before they went back … home” if they did so. Dr Cheok agreed that this decision demonstrated her ability to look beyond her immediate means and to consider the impact of her words on her friend.

  147. [97] During this time, the complainant’s motor control was observed to be impaired and unsteady. When she came out of the toilet after the first unsuccessful attempt at vomiting, LYS described her as appearing “a bit lightheaded”, by which he meant that she was “a bit dizzy” and “a bit wobbly” and “like, she needed some help when she was walking”. After yet another unsuccessful attempt at vomiting, LYS testified that the complainant seemed “very unstable, she needed help” and that she “clearly couldn’t walk on her own”. CCTV footage showed LYS placing his hands on the complainant’s shoulders to help her walk straight. Afterwards, she returned again to the toilet to try to vomit. The complainant testified that she was feeling “lightheaded and giddy” throughout this time.

  148. [98] At about 2.30am, LYS helped the complainant book a second private hire car. The accused responded to this booking, and the Car arrived at the Bar within a few minutes. The evidence showed that the complainant was still unsteady in gait and had started crying and sobbing. When shown a CCTV footage of herself returning to and exiting the toilet for the last time, the complainant described that she had been crying and sobbing, as evidenced by her rubbing her face with both hands, but testified that she was unsure why. She also described, based on the CCTV footage, that she “couldn’t stand properly” as her knees “went a bit wobbly”. She “almost … fell down” and “almost tripped”. LYS helped her by “[h]olding [her] hand and bringing [her]---walk straight.” Similarly, VT recalled that she had gone to check on the complainant after the Car arrived, and found her crying and squatting down beside a pillar with LYS for about ten minutes. She was non-responsive to questions such as VT asking her “Are you okay? What happened?” and LYS’s query as to her home address. After getting up, she could not walk straight and was swaying unsteadily, and needed to hold onto LYS when walking to the Car.

  149. [99] LYS testified that the complainant’s demeanour at this time was “very light-headed, like very lost” and “like very blur”. VT testified that the complainant did not look “sober” because “firstly of her walking, and then … it’s her facial expression … [i]t was a very sleepy look” [emphasis added] at the time she reached out to grab her bags from VT while walking past.

  150. [100] It was clear that the alcohol was having some effect on the complainant. The most obvious effect was on the complainant’s motor control (see [92], [93], [97] and [98] above). The complainant remembered stumbling after her visits to the toilet, before squatting by a pillar and drain. She was feeling lightheaded at the point in time. It also impacted her emotional state. She was crying. According to her, her light-headedness and giddiness had gotten “worse a little bit” by the time she was about to board the Car.

  151. [101] However, the complainant was also not completely oblivious of her surroundings or incapable of reacting to others in contextually-relevant ways. LYS accepted that she would have been able to “react to normal conversation or to make decisions as a normal person would … [except] maybe [with a] slightly slower reaction” [emphasis added]. He also accepted that she had been responsive to his questions, except that he sometimes had to repeat the questions. For instance, once LYS told her that the Car had arrived, she “just stood up by [herself] and walked down back to the car” (albeit with some stumbling). Both LYS and VT also accepted that the complainant had initiated the collection of her bags and that she had the presence of mind to turn to VT and collect her bags. It was also undisputed that the complainant walked to VT unassisted, to collect her bags, and boarded the Car on her own.

  152. [103] Overall, the evidence supported a finding that the complainant was intoxicated. But the relevant inquiry was not whether the complainant was intoxicated per se but whether she was so intoxicated that she was unable to understand the nature and consequence of what she was consenting to. There was sufficient evidence indicating her situational awareness and judgement (see [96] and [101] above), which suggested that, at this stage, she could not be described fairly as being unable to understand the nature and consequences of her choices.

  153. (2) When boarding the Car at the Bar

  154. [104] The Prosecution relied on VT’s evidence as to the complainant’s demeanour when she boarded the accused’s car. According to VT, the complainant was conscious and not lying down on the seat. But VT also described the complainant’s state as “not responsive”, meaning that “she just [sat] down there and just stare[d] into space” and like “she’s in her own daydream kind of thing”.

  155. [105] Non-responsive was, however, not an accurate description of the complainant’s state at the time. The evidence showed that the complainant did respond to some of the exchanges that were taking place around her. For instance, to LYS’s request that she text him after reaching home, the complainant replied “yah yah yah”. The complainant also completed the accused’s sentence “193, ah?” by stating her address. Further, as the Car was exiting the Bar’s carpark, the accused said to the complainant “If you want to puke, just let me know”, to which the complainant respond with “It’s okay, it’s okay”.

  156. [106] The Prosecution submitted that the complainant’s ability to state her address hardly had any bearing on her state of intoxication, relying on Dr Cheok’s evidence. Dr Cheok postulated that the complainant was able to understand and respond because this was a “very basic” and “nothing … sophisticated” type of question. In his view, a person with similar blood alcohol level to the complainant would be able to understand and respond to such basic questions, such as being asked their name, NRIC or address. Dr Lim disagreed and opined that, at the very least, this exchange showed that the complainant’s retrieval process was working to be able to retrieve information such as her address. On this issue, I preferred Dr Lim’s evidence. However, I would note that, even if the Prosecution was right that not much reliance could be placed by the Defence on this exchange, it did not change the fact that, about 20 seconds after this exchange, the complainant was able to respond with “It’s ok, it’s okay” when the accused said “If you want to puke, just let me know”. When this latter exchange was played to the complainant in court, she agreed that she was responding appropriately to the accused and that she sounded alert when responding.

  157. [107] For the reasons above, I was not persuaded that the evidence relating to this period demonstrated lack of capacity to consent.

  158. (3) During the car ride from the Bar to the Condominium

  159. [108] After boarding the Car, the complainant testified that she continued to feel lightheaded and thus closed her eyes, while continuing to cry. Her evidence was that she remembered just closing her eyes and sleeping after the Car left the Bar, and that she fell asleep the moment he started driving. In her conditioned statement and at trial, she maintained that she had only been awoken by the accused when the Car reached her destination. At trial, she further testified that she was not aware of her surroundings throughout the car journey, including the Car reversing towards the fire engine gate of her condominium. When asked “When were you crying?”, her answer was that she could not remember. She also could not remember anything else being said by her or the accused during the journey. For instance, she did not remember hearing the accused ask “Are you okay?” several times, some of which were captured by the in-car audio recording.

  160. [109] The in-car audio recordings captured crying and sniffling sounds from the complainant at various junctures, but did not capture any replies from the complainant to the accused’s questions of “Are you okay?”. At trial, the complainant described the “sniffling” sounds as “like my nose got blocked by all the crying earlier on”. The fact that she was sniffling or crying at various times meant that she would have been awake at those times, and therefore she could not have been asleep throughout the entire car journey.

  161. [110] Overall, the available evidence of the complainant’s behaviour during this period did not support a finding of lack of capacity to consent, especially when this evidence was considered in the context of the evidence concerning what had occurred immediately before she boarded the Car and immediately after the Car arrived at the Condominium.

  162. (4) Arrival at the Condominium for the first time

  163. [111] Upon arrival at the Condominium, the complainant was heard rummaging through her things. The in-car audio recording also captured the accused asking “Do you need my help?” a number of times, but the complainant did not respond. She testified at trial that she had not heard these questions. The accused then said “I can park my car one side first. Is it okay?” and the complainant replied, “sorry”. At trial, the complainant agreed that this showed that she knew what he was saying and that she knew that she was inconveniencing him. She further explained that she had “kept saying sorry” because she heard herself crying and “wanted to faster get down the car”.

  164. [112] After the accused moved the Car to park just past the entrance of the Condominium, the complainant was heard telling the accused that she was “not ready”, to which the accused replied “yah, no problem, don’t worry”. At trial, the complainant agreed that this likely meant that she was not ready to leave the Car. She also suggested an alternative explanation that she had been “not ready” because she was in the process of collecting all her belongings before alighting. According to Dr Cheok, it would be reasonable to infer that the complainant had been aware of her circumstances and of whether she was ready to leave the Car.

  165. [113] In fact, she was at that point searching for her wallet, intending to pay for the ride. The Prosecution contended that the fact that the complainant attempted to pay for the ride indicated that she was intoxicated at that time, as she had previously seen LYS passing cash to the accused at the Bar’s carpark, but did not recall that fact until the accused returned the change to her and told her that LYS had paid for the ride. The Prosecution also relied on the fact that, despite her difficulty finding her wallet in the dark, the complainant did not ask the accused to switch on the lights inside the Car because she “wasn’t thinking at that point in time”. However, as set out above at [57], what was relevant was not whether the complainant was intoxicated per se, but the extent to which this impacted her ability to appreciate her surroundings and understand the nature and consequences of her actions.

  166. [114] While the complainant not remembering that LYS had paid for the ride could be a sign of intoxication, I did not regard it as an indication that she was not able to appreciate her surroundings. The complainant testified that, when the accused informed her that the ride had already been paid for, this prompted her to remember that she had seen LYS passing the accused cash at the Bar. This meant that, firstly, she understood what the accused told her and, secondly, she was able to correlate what the accused said with her own memory of an event she had witnessed earlier (but which had momentarily slipped her mind). As for the complainant not asking the accused to switch on the lights, this did not detract from the fact that she actually asked the accused for help with finding her wallet. She testified that when she said “[my] wallet is over there” instead of taking the wallet herself, it was a request for help in response to the accused asking her whether she needed help. This meant that she understood what the accused was saying when he offered to help, and she was able to make the decision to ask for help.

  167. [115] The next relevant period concerned the complainant’s observed behaviour as she attempted to access the Condominium by the side gate.

  168. [116] The Prosecution relied on the complainant’s unsteady gait and feeling “giddy and lightheaded” as evidence of her continued intoxication. She testified that she was stumbling as she walked to the side gate and was feeling “very tired” at this point of the night. The Condominium’s CCTV footage also captured her movements while waiting at the side gate which she described as “very unstable” and “cannot stand straight”, after dialling the telecom and waiting for someone to pick up. That the complainant’s motor control continued to be impaired was corroborated by the CCTV footage which also showed that the accused had placed his hands on the complainant’s shoulders to support her as she later walked back to the Car.

  169. [117] At one point, the complainant squatted down outside the side gate. She explained that she was “a bit tired” and was trying to find her access card with both her hands. However, she also explained that she had stood a little further away from the gate “because…usually there’s a cat on the top of the gate. So it will jump down any time”. Dr Cheok agreed that the complainant’s ability to remember that there might be a cat at the gate, despite not seeing it at that time, indicated that she had been aware that she was home and that her ability to determine the nature and consequences of her actions was not severely impaired.

  170. [118] Overall, I was not convinced that the evidence of the complainant’s behaviour during this period pointed to the conclusion that she was unable to understand the nature and consequences of her actions. While I accepted that her motor impairment and certain actions were indicative of continued intoxication, the evidence on a whole also suggested that she retained the ability to understand and decide.

  171. (5) After returning to the Car

  172. [119] The complainant remembered the accused asking her if she wanted to go back to the Car and take a seat first after she failed to enter the Condominium. She believed that he did so because he saw that she was still crying. She remembered that she agreed to go back to the Car “because [she] was feeling very tired”.

  173. [120] After returning to the Car, the complainant not only continued crying but also knocked her head against the window and repeatedly “thumped” herself on her chest. The Prosecution relied on this evidence of the complainant’s heightened “emotional lability” and “emotional instability” as a “clear and unambiguous sign” that she was severely intoxicated, citing Dr Cheok’s evidence.

  174. [121] However, it was also relevant that the complainant had, several times, stopped such behaviour momentarily when the accused verbally urged her to stop. This largely took place in the 14 minutes where there was a gap in the in-car video recording. Hence, the sole account was from the accused, whom I found to be a credible witness and whose evidence I accepted (see [154]–[159] below). I set out the relevant portions of the accused’s evidence as follows:

  175. [122] The complainant’s actions thus demonstrated an awareness of what the accused was communicating to her, and her ability to process and accept his suggestion. As the Defence pointed out, the fact that she would resume these actions thereafter was not, in itself, an indicator that she was unable to understand her actions.

  176. [123] In another brief exchange, the accused asked the complainant whether she was okay. The complainant replied that she was okay, before continuing to cry. At trial, she explained that she had responded in this way because she did not know the accused and thus did not wish to say much to him. Dr Cheok agreed that this explanation showed an awareness of her surroundings (ie, she was aware that she was with a stranger), and of the differences in sharing “personal” information with different people.

  177. [124] I deal with the evidence of the complainant’s behaviour during the sexual activities in greater detail below when considering the issue of consent in fact. What was significant to the question of capacity was that towards the end of the sexual activities, the complainant started saying “no” and pushed the accused’s hands away. This “no” was verbalised as the accused was trying to move his hand up her thigh and towards her vagina (see [145] below). On cross-examination, the complainant accepted that the “no” indicated that she did not want to be touched anymore but was slow to agree that it evidenced her ability to convey such an intention. The basis of her hesitation to this question, however, was that she thought that she might have been asleep at that time and was capable of making noises while asleep. But the evidence showed that she was in fact awake and neither was it the Prosecution’s case that she had been asleep during the sexual activities. By process of elimination, it must be taken that the complainant’s verbalised “no” evidenced an ability to convey the intention that she did not want to be touched anymore. Dr Cheok, too, accepted as much during cross-examination:

  178. [125] Similarly, Dr Lim suggested that the complainant’s reaction showed an awareness of what was happening and an ability to give or refuse consent at that point.

  179. [126] After the sexual activities, the accused asked the complainant if she was okay. She responded by saying yes, before asking him to “just drive” despite the Car having been parked right opposite her Condominium. Dr Lim opined that this showed that she wanted to process something in her head, which substantiated his opinion above that she was able to give consent:

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