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Grounds publishedDecided 12 May 2023
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General Division of the High Court

Government of the City of Buenos Aires v HN Singapore Pte Ltd and another

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[2023] SGHC 139Case no. Suit No 160 of 2021

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] At the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, governments across the world went into action to control the spread of the novel coronavirus, minimise morbidity and mortality, as well as keep their public health systems afloat. Testing and detection of the virus were par for the course, and consequently, demand for rapid virus detection test kits surged. Correspondingly, there was much business to be made by manufacturers, middlemen and suppliers. This case concerns a transaction between the Government of the City of Buenos Aires and a Singapore company for the supply of Covid-19 test kits. The plaintiff government sought to acquire test kits for its people and the defendant company sought to make a profit. The subsequent non-delivery of the test kits gave rise to the present dispute.

  3. Facts

  4. The parties

  5. [2] The plaintiff is the Government of the City of Buenos Aires, Argentina. Buenos Aires is the capital of Argentina and an autonomous city with a population of about 15 million.

  6. [3] The first defendant, HN Singapore Pte Ltd (“HN Singapore”), is a company incorporated by Mr Nicholas Eng Teng Cheng (“Mr Eng”) in Singapore on 9 September 2016. According to Mr Eng, HN Singapore was incorporated as a vehicle to carry out the business of import and export of goods, and to provide consultancy services. Since its incorporation, HN Singapore had only imported goods, and did not successfully export goods.

  7. [4] The second defendant is Mr Eng, a Singapore citizen. At all times, Mr Eng has been the sole director and shareholder of HN Singapore.

  8. Background to the dispute

  9. The Covid-19 epidemic in Argentina

  10. [5] In March 2020, a health emergency was declared in Argentina due to the unfolding Covid-19 pandemic. On or about 19 March 2020, a nationwide lockdown was imposed in Argentina.

  11. [6] By the end of March 2020, the Ministry of Health of the plaintiff proposed a health strategy to stop the spread of Covid-19 quickly. A key pillar of this strategy was to acquire rapid virus detection test kits. As there was a global shortage of supplies, the plaintiff publicly sourced test kits by informally contacting manufacturers and distributors of these test kits, both nationally and internationally, and requested them to present their proposals for the supply of test kits. This Health Emergency framework was established by Urgent Necessity Decrees under Argentine law and termed the “[p]rocurement of rapid test kits for the identification of antibodies to the new coronavirus (COVID-19)”.

  12. Contract formation and the parties’ contractual relationship

  13. [7] Parties dispute whether the plaintiff or Mr Eng and/or HN Singapore initiated contact with the other party. However, it is undisputed that on 23 March 2020, Mr Borja Seward (“Mr Seward”), a contact of Mr Eng, sent an email to Mr Guido Sirna (“Mr Sirna”). Mr Seward introduced Mr Eng as “working with commodities and supplies (Medicine, is one of them) [sic]”. Subsequently, Mr Sirna passed Mr Eng’s contact to Mr Juan Manuel Paleo (“Mr Juan”), an employee of the plaintiff. On 27 March 2020, Mr Juan sent a message to Mr Eng via Whatsapp, expressing the plaintiff’s interest in purchasing 500,000 units of Covid-19 test kits manufactured by Guangzhou Wondfo Biotech Co., Ltd (“Wondfo”), a company in the People’s Republic of China (“China”).

  14. [8] On 27 March 2020, Mr Eng sent a letter of offer for the sale of Covid-19 test kits to the plaintiff through Mr Juan and Ms Marisa Andrea Tojo (“Ms Tojo”). Ms Tojo is employed by the plaintiff as the General Director of Purchasing and Contracting.

  15. (a) 500,000 Covid-19 test kits would be sold.

  16. (b) The test kits would be of Chinese origin, from a specific Wondfo factory in China and of the Wondfo brand.

  17. (c) The cost per unit of each test kit varied depending on: (i) whether the test kits were “CIF” or “FOB”; and (ii) whether the test kits were in Chinese or English packaging.

  18. (d) The delivery time would be 10(+10) days upon payment.

  19. [10] On 31 March 2020, the plaintiff signed an administrative act, Administrative Resolution No. RESOL-2020-88-GCABA-SSASS (the “Administrative Act”), to award HN Singapore the contract for the procurement of rapid test kits for Covid-19. This award was pursuant to Law No 2095, Article 28 Section 8 of Argentine law, and its Regulatory Decree No 168-GCABA/19, as amended by Decree No. 207-GCABA/19. The Administrative Act was based on the terms set out in the Proposed SPA.

  20. [11] On 2 April 2020, the plaintiff informed the defendants by email that HN Singapore was awarded the contract to supply the plaintiff with Covid-19 test kits. The plaintiff specified the details of the test kits to be provided:

  21. [13] That same day, Mr Eng issued a pro forma invoice to the plaintiff (“the Invoice”). The Invoice states the following:

  22. (a) HN Singapore would deliver 300,000 test kits to the plaintiff in exchange for a total price of US$1,770,000 (“the Purchase Price”).

  23. (b) The test kits would be in “Chinese packaging”, with a unit price of US$5.90.

  24. (c) The test kits would be of “China” origin and of the Wondfo brand.

  25. (d) The “[e]stimated date of arrival in Buenos Aires” would be “15(+5) days upon receiving of [sic] payment”.

  26. [14] On 6 April 2020, the plaintiff paid the Purchase Price in full. This was the first and only transaction between the plaintiff and HN Singapore.

  27. [15] On 9 April 2020, the defendants sent a letter of proposal to the plaintiff to request a variation of the original agreement (“the Letter of Proposal”). The terms and conditions, as varied, were set out in the Letter of Proposal. On 12 April 2020, the plaintiff accepted the variation of the original agreement by way of an email. The relevant terms of the varied sale and purchase agreement (“Varied SPA”) are as follows:

  28. (a) HN Singapore would deliver 182,475 test kits (“the Test Kits”) to the plaintiff in exchange for the same Purchase Price of US$1,770,000 (which the plaintiff had already paid).

  29. (b) The Test Kits would be of “China” origin, of the Wondfo brand, and from a specific Wondfo factory in China.

  30. (c) The Test Kits would be in “English packaging”, with a unit price of US$9.40.

  31. (d) The delivery time would be “15(+5) days upon payment”, ie, by 26 April 2020.

  32. [16] On 20 April 2020, HN Singapore entered into a sale and purchase agreement with Wondfo for the purchase of the Test Kits at a total price of US$821,137.50. Subsequently, Wondfo issued a pro forma invoice dated 28 April 2020 for the said purchase (“the Wondfo Invoice”).

  33. [17] It is undisputed that HN Singapore failed to deliver the Test Kits to the plaintiff by the agreed delivery date of 26 April 2020.

  34. Events after the non-delivery on 26 April 2020

  35. [18] After the non-delivery of the Test Kits on 26 April 2020, the parties continued to liaise and correspond with each other for the delivery of the Test Kits. For example, at the request of the defendants, the plaintiff nominated a technician or health professional to be professionally trained to use the Test Kits.

  36. [19] There was also correspondence where the defendants sought a letter of commitment from the plaintiff, claiming that this was a requirement by the Chinese government for the export of the Test Kits. Eventually, on 12 May 2020, the defendants informed the plaintiff that the letter of commitment was no longer necessary. In the parties’ correspondence, the plaintiff disputed that the letter of commitment was a requirement under Chinese law.

  37. [20] The defendants also provided information to the plaintiff about Chinese regulations concerning the export of the Test Kits (elaborated below at [30]).

  38. [21] On the defendants’ request, the plaintiff provided information relating to the delivery of the Test Kits, such as the details of the customs broker who would receive the Test Kits at the Buenos Aires airport.

  39. [22] On 13 May 2020, the plaintiff also reminded the defendants to send the plaintiff a commercial invoice and packing list to move forward with the import customs procedure in Argentina. On the same day, the defendants informed the plaintiff that Wondfo would provide the documents between approximately 15 May 2020 and 19 May 2020.

  40. [23] Crucially, during this period, the plaintiff repeatedly sought confirmation of the delivery date of the Test Kits. On 27 April 2020, Mr Luis Oscar Ricardo (“Mr Ricardo”), another employee of the plaintiff, asked Mr Eng about the arrival date of the Test Kits. Again, on 28 April 2020, Mr Ricardo asked Mr Eng when the production of the Test Kits would be finalised. On 2 May 2020, Mr Eng informed Mr Ricardo that production of the Test Kits was underway, that the goods were expected to be available on 15 May 2020 and that the defendants were working on freight sourcing. Subsequently, on 5 May 2020, Mr Eng informed Mr Ricardo that the estimated arrival date “should be” between 24 May 2020 and 28 May 2020, barring any unforeseen delays. The next day, on 6 May 2020, Mr Ricardo again asked for an exact delivery date for the Test Kits. On 9 May 2020, Mr Ricardo reiterated that the plaintiff needed to know the arrival date of the Test Kits. On 10 May 2020, Mr Eng informed Mr Ricardo and Ms Tojo that they had received indicative information that the goods would arrive at the airport in Buenos Aires on 22 May 2020 if there were no delays. However, on 15 May 2020, Mr Eng informed the plaintiff that Wondfo had informed them that delivery was delayed due to the implementation of a new policy in China. The estimated delay was up to seven days. On 16 May 2020, the plaintiff responded by expressing that it was very disappointed by the delay and that the plaintiff expected urgent communication of the official delivery date. On the same day, the plaintiff informed the defendants that the “absolutely [sic] top priority (and your contractual obligation) is to deliver the tests in [sic] the date agreed upon” and that the plaintiff expected an urgent response on the matter. Mr Eng responded by stating that the defendants maintained the utmost dedication to seeing the deal through.

  41. [24] On 23 May 2020, Mr Eng informed the plaintiff that the Chinese government did not award the new required export approval to Wondfo, and that the Test Kits were, therefore, not cleared for delivery to the plaintiff.

  42. [25] On 27 May 2020 (Singapore time), on the basis that the non-delivery on 26 April 2020 constituted a repudiatory breach by HN Singapore of the Varied SPA, the plaintiff terminated the Varied SPA by email.

  43. [26] On the same day, Mr Eng informed the plaintiff that Wondfo had stocks of the test kits (in English packaging) in its warehouse in Chicago, US and stated that they would be able to supply the shipment to the plaintiff from the US in approximately seven working days, including freight.

  44. Events after termination of the Varied SPA by the plaintiff

  45. [27] Subsequently, the plaintiff requested a refund of the Purchase Price. It is undisputed that on 15 June 2020, 17 June 2020 and 16 July 2020, HN Singapore transferred the sums of US$1,203,600, US$306,780.65 and US$22,000, respectively, to the plaintiff. This aggregated to a sum of US$1,532,380.65, which is approximately 86.6% of the Purchase Price.

  46. [28] The plaintiff later received a letter dated 20 July 2020 from the former solicitors of Mr Eng (“the 20 July Letter”). The 20 July Letter stated that HN Singapore could not refund the balance sum of US$237,619.35 (“the Balance Purchase Price”) to the plaintiff as that had been spent on “non-refundable charges, expenses and fees”. According to Mr Eng, the breakdown of charges is as follows:

  47. (a) A payment of US$1,200 to GuangZhou Nuodong Biotech Co Ltd (“Nuodong”), a Chinese middleman company, on or about 10 April 2020. This was allegedly for the purchase of sample test kits from Wondfo.

  48. (b) A payment of US$136,856.25 to Nuodong on or about 8 May 2020 for part-payment of the purchase price.

  49. (c) A payment of US$81,552.07 to GuangZhou QG International Shipping Co Ltd on or about 8 May 2020 for shipping and insurance charges.

  50. [29] On 22 October 2020, HN Singapore claimed to rescind the Varied SPA. This was on the basis that the plaintiff’s termination of the Varied SPA on 27 May 2020 was “unlawful” and amounted to a “repudiation of its contractual obligations”.

  51. The Chinese Regulations

  52. [30] On 31 March 2020, 25 April 2020 and 13 May 2020, the Chinese government imposed three sets of restrictions on the export requirements for medical equipment (“the Chinese Regulations”):

  53. (a) On 31 March 2020, the Chinese government issued Announcement No 5 of 2020 on the “Orderly Export of Medical Supplies” (the “31 March Regulations”). This came into effect on 1 April 2020. Companies exporting medical supplies, including test kits, had to “provide a … declaration … promising that the exported product has obtained the Chinese medical devices & products registration certificate … and meets the quality standards of the importing country” [emphasis added]. Chinese customs would “inspect and release the products according to the medical device product registration certificate approved by [the Chinese government]”.

  54. (b) On 25 April 2020, the Chinese government issued Announcement No 12 of 2020 on “Further Strengthening the Quality Supervision on the Exported Pandemic Prevention Supplies” (the “25 April Regulations”). This came into effect on 26 April 2020. Companies exporting medical supplies (including test kits) “that have obtained foreign quality certification or registration, must submit [a] … statement for customs declaration … to undertake that the products meet the quality standards and safety requirements of the importing country (region) … and the customs shall rely on the list of manufacturers that have obtained foreign standard certification or registration provided by the Ministry of Commerce … for the release of products”.

  55. The performance guarantee

  56. [31] On 4 April 2020, Ms Tojo, on behalf of the plaintiff, sent an email to Mr Eng to request that HN Singapore provide a performance guarantee for the performance of the contract, to ensure the fulfilment of the contract between the plaintiff and HN Singapore. Ms Tojo conveyed that the guarantee should cover the Purchase Price and an additional 10% of the Purchase Price.

  57. [32] On 7 April 2020, Mr Eng replied to Ms Tojo’s email, linking her up with the defendants’ lawyer in Argentina to coordinate the provision of the performance guarantee. On 8 April 2020, Mr Ricardo informed Mr Eng that the plaintiff contacted Mr Eng’s Argentinian lawyer and that the plaintiff would “continue this guarantee procedure with him”.

  58. [33] Subsequently, in the Letter of Proposal dated 9 April 2020, Mr Eng included an additional term on insurance, which stated that “[u]pon mutual agreement between the seller and the insurance company, we will provide an insurance policy as guarantee [sic] for the fulfilment of this agreement.” Mr Eng stated that he did so in light of his conversation with Ms Tojo on 4 April 2020 regarding the provision of a guarantee.

  59. [34] No performance guarantee was eventually provided by HN Singapore to the plaintiff.

  60. Summary of the plaintiff’s claim

  61. Governing law of the contract

  62. [35] As a preliminary point, the plaintiff pleads that “[t]he governing law of the [Varied] SPA is the law of the Argentine Republic (Argentina), as the [p]laintiff is a government entity and can only contract under the laws of Argentina”. In contrast, the defendants submit that the contract was governed by Singapore law.

  63. [36] Both parties rely on the three-stage framework set out by the Court of Appeal in Pacific Recreation Pte Ltd v S Y Technology Inc and another appeal [2008] 2 SLR(R) 491 (“Pacific Recreation”). The plaintiff submits that the form of the documents involved in the transaction and the commercial purpose of the transaction militate towards a finding that the parties intended for Argentine law to apply. Alternatively, Argentine law objectively has the closest connection to the contract. Therefore, Argentine law governs the plaintiff’s right to: (a) terminate the Varied SPA; (b) claim damages; and (c) lift the corporate veil.

  64. [37] The defendants submit that Mr Eng could not have intended for HN Singapore to enter into a contract with the plaintiff that is governed by Argentine law, given that he is a layperson with no understanding of Spanish and no prior dealings with Argentine entities. Further, the final contract was prepared solely by Mr Eng without the plaintiff’s input. Additionally, the Administrative Act authorising the plaintiff to contract with HN Singapore affected only the plaintiff’s capacity to enter into the contract and did not alter the character of the contract. Alternatively, the defendants submit that Singapore law has the closest connection with the Varied SPA, as: (a) the contract was prepared in Singapore by a Singapore citizen; (b) the Varied SPA lacked the hallmarks of typical Argentine contracts; and (c) payment was made to a Singapore bank account.

  65. Repudiatory breach of contract

  66. [38] The plaintiff’s first claim is that the failure of HN Singapore and/or Mr Eng to deliver the Test Kits by 26 April 2020 amounted to a repudiatory breach of the Varied SPA. The plaintiff then accepted this breach by way of an email sent on 27 May 2020.

  67. [39] In response, the defendants plead that although they failed to deliver the Test Kits by 26 April 2020, the plaintiff “waived the non-delivery, did not treat the non-delivery as a breach or [did not treat the non-delivery as] amounting to a repudiation of the [Varied SPA], and affirmed the [Varied SPA], until 27 May 2020”. The defendants submit that even after the non-delivery of the Test Kits on 26 April 2020, the plaintiff continued to work with HN Singapore for the delivery of the Test Kits. In particular, the plaintiff was kept informed by HN Singapore “of the progress of the production of the Test Kits”, “of fresh regulations in China”, and “of [Wondfo’s] efforts to expedite the export and delivery”. The plaintiff also liaised with HN Singapore for the provision of “a letter of commitment that … [Wondfo] had requested to enable the Test Kits to be exported”, “for the fresh delivery date of the Test Kits”, “on [Wondfo’s] request for the details of one technician/health professional from the [p]laintiff to implement the Test Kits”, “on the logistics of the delivery” and “on providing a guarantee for the fulfilment of the [Varied SPA]”. Therefore, these actions constituted a waiver by election of the plaintiff’s right to terminate the contract.

  68. [40] In the alternative, the defendants submit that the Varied SPA had been frustrated. The defendants plead that the Chinese Regulations “constituted an event of frustration” that made the Varied SPA “impossible to perform without any fault on the part of [HN Singapore]”. Therefore, this “terminated the [Varied SPA] and released both the [p]laintiff and [HN Singapore] from any further performance thereunder”.

  69. Misrepresentation

  70. [41] The plaintiff’s second claim against the defendants is for: (a) misrepresentation under s 2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act (Cap 390, 1994 Rev Ed) (“the MA”); or (b) fraudulent misrepresentation.

  71. The alleged representation

  72. [42] The plaintiff pleads that HN Singapore and/or Mr Eng, “knowing that time was of the essence to the [p]laintiff for the delivery of the Test Kits, represented to the [p]laintiff that they would be able to deliver the Test Kits within [20] days of receipt of payment from the [p]laintiff” (“the Representation”). The Representation is contained in the letter of offer issued by Mr Eng on 27 March 2020, on behalf of HN Singapore, stating a delivery time of “10(+10) days upon payment”. According to Mr Eng, “10(+10)” means that the Test Kits would be delivered within ten days upon payment, with an additional flexible period of extension of up to another ten days, such that the total time allowed for delivery would be 20 days. I note that the Varied SPA eventually provided for a delivery time of “15(+5) days upon payment”. Regardless, as acknowledged by Mr Eng, the total delivery time remained as 20 days.

  73. [43] The defendants plead that they only “represented that the Test Kits would be delivered within an estimated period of 15(+5) days from receipt of payment” [emphasis added]. In contrast, the plaintiff avers that “[t]he delivery date … was fixed … at 15(+5) days upon payment”.

  74. The plaintiff’s reliance on the Representation

  75. [44] The plaintiff avers that in reliance of the Representation, it paid the Purchase Price. However, contrary to the Representation, the defendants failed to deliver the Test Kits by 26 April 2020.

  76. [45] The defendants aver that the plaintiff failed to prove that in remitting the Purchase Price to HN Singapore, the plaintiff relied on the alleged Representation. On the other hand, the plaintiff submits that it is clear from the outset that the timing of delivery was a core consideration for the plaintiff when it decided to contract with HN Singapore.

  77. The fraudulence of the Representation

  78. [46] The plaintiff avers that the Representation as to the delivery date was made fraudulently. Additionally, the plaintiff argues that Mr Eng has evinced a pattern of fraudulent conduct. This is illustrated by the alleged falsification of the Wondfo Invoice. Mr Eng received the Wondfo Invoice on 28 April 2020. The Wondfo Invoice was dated 20 April 2020, and stated a purchase price of US$821,137.50. However, when the Wondfo Invoice was forwarded to the plaintiff on 29 April 2020, the purchase price, date and other information had been removed. The invoice sent to the plaintiff also contained an endorsement of “HN Singapore Pte Ltd” at the corner of the page. The plaintiff argue that Mr Eng removed the purchase price and date from the Wondfo Invoice to mislead the plaintiff as to HN Singapore’s profit arising from the Varied SPA, as well as to obscure the fact that the invoice was only issued two days after the intended delivery date.

  79. [47] The defendants deny having made the representation fraudulently.

  80. The defendants had reasonable grounds to believe that their representations were true

  81. [48] Further, the defendants plead that “[a]t the time of making the [R]epresentation, the [d]efendants honestly believed that the Test Kits would be delivered within the estimated period of 15(+5) days from the receipt of payment”. In response, the plaintiff argues that the defendants have no basis for asserting that Mr Eng held an honest belief that the delivery date could be met.

  82. Lifting the corporate veil

  83. [49] Additionally, the plaintiff claims the corporate veil should be lifted against Mr Eng. The plaintiff pleads that:

  84. [50] The plaintiff relies on the following as evidence: (a) Mr Eng is the sole director and sole shareholder of HN Singapore; (b) HN Singapore has a nominal paid-up capital of S$1; (c) HN Singapore has no employees; (d) HN Singapore’s registered address is the address of a residential property owned by Mr Eng’s mother; (e) HN Singapore had no prior experience providing test kits and no track record in the subject matter of the Varied SPA; (f) the Varied SPA required the Purchase Price to be paid in full before delivery was made (which was an “unusual feature”); and (g) the Letter of Proposal included an “unusual feature” that HN Singapore would provide an insurance policy as a guarantee for the Varied SPA, which was never eventually provided.

  85. [51] Alternatively, the plaintiff submits that under Argentine law, HN Singapore was undercapitalised, which would justify lifting the corporate veil. In this respect, the plaintiff relies on the export report prepared by its expert witness, Dr Ezequiel Cassagne (“Dr Cassagne”) (“the Expert Report”).

  86. [52] Accordingly, the plaintiff pleads that by reason of the lifting of the corporate veil, Mr Eng is liable to the plaintiff for the Balance Purchase Price, arising from HN Singapore’s breach(es) of the Varied SPA.

  87. [53] The defendants deny that the corporate veil should be lifted. The defendants argue that the defendants made no attempt to conceal the corporate structure of HN Singapore and that the plaintiff has provided no authority that such a structure is problematic under Singapore law. Additionally, given that the Covid-19 pandemic only began at the start of 2020, HN Singapore’s lack of experience in supplying test kits is expected. Further, the alleged “unusual features” of the Varied SPA were accepted by the plaintiff, and simply amount to “a difference in practice”.

  88. [54] Additionally, the defendants submit that Dr Cassagne has not shown the definition of undercapitalisation and authority supporting the proposition that mere undercapitalisation alone would entitle the court to disregard the corporate veil. The defendants also submit that it is unclear whether the Argentine courts have any discretion in deciding whether to lift the corporate veil or if this is an automatic process. Lastly, it is not clear whether the Argentine courts will readily disregard corporate legal personality.

  89. Remedies sought by the plaintiff

  90. [55] Based on the foregoing, the plaintiff seeks the following remedies:

  91. (a) a declaration that the Varied SPA has been validly rescinded;

  92. (b) damages against Mr Eng and/or HN Singapore in the sum of US$237,619.35, being the Balance Purchase Price;

  93. (c) damages against Mr Eng and/or HN Singapore in the sum of US$177,000 or such other sum as may be determined by the Court;

  94. (d) alternatively, damages for misrepresentation pursuant to s 2 of the Misrepresentation Act;

  95. (e) interest;

  96. (f) costs; and

  97. (g) such further or other relief as the Court deems fit.

  98. [56] The plaintiff also relies on the Expert Report to argue that, under Argentine law, it is entitled to claim against Mr Eng and/or HN Singapore for:

  99. (a) the Balance Purchase Price;

  100. (b) additional damages equivalent to 10% of the Purchase Price, ie, US$177,000, arising from the breach of contract; and

  101. (c) “the time of the delay in which the seller incurred in to reimburse the monies paid by the buyer for a purchase finally frustrated”.

  102. [57] On the assumption that the Varied SPA is governed by Argentine law, the defendants submit that Dr Cassagne “has not shown the basis for his view that [the plaintiff] is entitled … to be reimbursed the [P]urchase [P]rice”. Further, the authorities cited by Dr Cassagne do not support his view that the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages equivalent to 10% of the purchase price. With regard to the third head of compensation, Dr Cassagne failed to explain its nature, and the plaintiff failed to evidence any loss that has resulted from the delay in reimbursement of the Purchase Price.

  103. [58] Alternatively, on the assumption that the Varied SPA is governed by Singapore law, the defendants aver that the plaintiff has not adduced evidence of its losses arising from HN Singapore’s failure to deliver the Test Kits on time. Therefore, the plaintiff should be awarded only nominal damages.

  104. Summary of HN Singapore’s counterclaim

  105. Unlawful termination

  106. [59] HN Singapore claims that the plaintiff’s termination of the Varied SPA on 27 May 2020 amounted to an unlawful repudiation of the Varied SPA. This is because the plaintiff waived HN Singapore’s breach of failing to deliver the Test Kits by 26 April 2020 (as elaborated above at [39]). Consequently, on 22 October 2020, by way of a letter from HN Singapore’s solicitors to the plaintiff’s solicitors, HN Singapore accepted the plaintiff’s repudiation and terminated the Varied SPA.

  107. Issues to be determined

  108. [61] I will consider each of the following issues in turn:

  109. (a) whether the governing law of the Varied SPA is Argentine law or Singapore law;

  110. (b) whether the plaintiff was entitled to terminate the Varied SPA on 27 May 2020;

  111. (i) whether there was a repudiatory breach of the Varied SPA by HN Singapore for non-delivery of the Test Kits on 26 April 2020; and

  112. (ii) if so, whether the plaintiff waived HN Singapore’s breach through its conduct vis-à-vis HN Singapore; or

  113. (iii) whether, in any event, the Varied SPA had been frustrated by the Chinese Regulations;

  114. (c) whether Mr Eng and/or HN Singapore are liable for misrepresentation;

  115. (i) whether the alleged Representation was a false statement of existing or past fact;

  116. (ii) whether the plaintiffs relied on the Representation;

  117. (iii) whether Mr Eng and/or HN Singapore made the Representation fraudulently;

  118. (iv) whether Mr Eng and/or HN Singapore believed and had a reasonable belief that the Representation was true; and

  119. (v) whether the defendants had properly pleaded its case for misrepresentation;

  120. (d) whether the corporate veil should be lifted such that Mr Eng be made liable for HN Singapore’s breach of contract;

  121. (e) whether the plaintiff had unlawfully terminated the Varied SPA on 27 May 2020; and

  122. (f) the quantum of damages, if any.

  123. Issue 1: The law governing the Varied SPA

  124. [62] I begin the analysis with the issue of the law governing the Varied SPA. After reviewing the relevant evidence, I find that the governing law of the Varied SPA is Argentine law, as the plaintiff contends.

  125. The applicable law

  126. [63] As set out by the Court of Appeal in Pacific Recreation, the governing law of a contract is determined in three stages. The first stage is to determine if there is an express choice of governing law. In the absence of an express provision in the contract, one moves to the second stage, which is whether a common intention of the parties to choose a governing law can be inferred. If the court is faced with a multiplicity of factors, each pointing to a different governing law, one then moves to the third stage, which is to determine the law with the closest and most real connection with the contract. That law would be taken, objectively, as the governing law of the contract (Pacific Recreation at [36], [37], [46] and [47]; Halsbury’s Laws of Singapore vol 6(2) (LexisNexis, 2020 Reissue) at para 75.343).

  127. The decision

  128. [64] In this case, as there is no express provision in the Varied SPA for a governing law, the first stage is inapplicable. Therefore, I move to the second stage. In Pacific Recreation at [37], the Court of Appeal set out a non-exhaustive list of factors from which an inference of the parties’ intention can be drawn. These include the language or terminology used in the contract, the form of the documents involved in the transaction, the currency of the contract, the places of residence or business of the parties and the commercial purpose of the transaction.

  129. [65] In my view, a factor of great significance in the present case is the commercial purpose underlying the Varied SPA. The case of Recovery Vehicle 1 Pte Ltd v Industries Chimiques Du Senegal and another appeal and another matter [2021] 1 SLR 342 (“Recovery Vehicle 1”) provides some guidance. There, the Court of Appeal decided that six contracts for the sale of sulphur cargo (the “Sulphur Contracts”) were governed by Senegalese law. The Court of Appeal found that the common commercial purpose underpinning the Sulphur Contracts pointed to Senegal. This was because the respondent, a Senegal-incorporated company, had entered into the Sulphur Contracts to use the shipped sulphur for manufacturing fertiliser in Senegal. Further, approximately one-third of the respondent’s shares were held by the State of Senegal, the Government of India and the Indian Farmers Fertilisers Collective. Therefore, the Sulphur Contracts were not mere trading contracts (Recovery Vehicle 1 at [9] and [68]).

  130. [66] It is imperative to note that the Varied SPA was also not a mere trading contract (Recovery Vehicle 1 at [68]). Instead, there was a public dimension to the Varied SPA. HN Singapore contracted with the plaintiff, which was a public entity that had instituted a public procurement tendering process for the supply of Covid-19 test kits intended for the people of Buenos Aires. Through this process, the plaintiff would receive contracting proposals from distributors and manufacturers in and outside of Argentina, and award contracts to entities whose proposals met the necessary economic and technical requirements. These actions were taken by a government seeking to prevent the further spread of Covid-19 for the preservation of public health in its city. Mr Eng himself was aware of the public dimension to the contract. Over correspondence on Whatsapp with Mr Juan on 27 March 2020, Mr Eng stated that he was “looking forward to helping buenos aires with the covid situation [sic]”. Therefore, it was not that the Varied SPA was intended, at the outset, to be between the plaintiff and HN Singapore. Instead, HN Singapore was awarded the Varied SPA because it simply happened to be the party that conformed to the requirements set by the plaintiff. The plaintiff may well have awarded the Varied SPA to any other tendering company. Thus, in so far as the contract was entered into by an Argentine authority with the intention of curbing the spread of Covid-19 in an Argentine city, and it was by chance that the counterparty was HN Singapore, it is more probable that parties intended for the contract to be governed by Argentine law.

  131. [69] Another relevant factor is the place of performance. Under the Varied SPA, HN Singapore was obliged to deliver the Test Kits to the plaintiff in Buenos Aires, Argentina. This is another reason why the governing law should be Argentine law. To conclude the analysis, I find that the parties intended for Argentine law to apply to the Varied SPA, chiefly because this was a contract for the benefit of an Argentine city, entered into by an Argentine public authority and to be performed in Argentina. That HN Singapore is a Singapore company is not a relevant consideration to my assessment of the governing law of the contract because it was purely incidental that HN Singapore was a party to the contract.

  132. [70] Even if I am wrong on this and the governing law of the contract between the parties must be objectively determined under the third stage of the Pacific Recreation analysis instead, I again find that this points to Argentine law as the governing law. Between the second and third stages, the court generally considers the same factors, but accords differing weight to those factors. At the third stage, “[e]qual weight ought to be placed on all factors, even those which would not, under the second stage, have been strongly inferential of any intention as to the governing law” (Pacific Recreation at [48]). The court “look[s] at all the circumstances and seek[s] to find what just and reasonable persons ought to have intended if they had thought about the matter at the time when they made the contract” (Pacific Recreation at [49]).

  133. [71] On an analysis of the factors discussed earlier (at [65]–[68]) above), I find that Argentine law has the closest and most real connection with the Varied SPA. The only relevant factors suggesting a connection to Singapore is that HN Singapore is a Singapore company and the Purchase Price was remitted to Mr Eng’s Singapore bank account. The Test Kits were of Chinese origin, manufactured in a factory in China, and of a Chinese brand. HN Singapore was effectively a middleman for the delivery of Test Kits from China to Buenos Aires. Therefore, if I were to place equal weight on all the factors, I find that the Varied SPA is governed by Argentine law.

  134. [72] For completeness, I will briefly comment on some other features of the Varied SPA. The language of the Varied SPA is English, but this is not strongly indicative of any choice of law, as English is the lingua franca of international business (Pacific Recreation at [38]). In the present case, Mr Eng neither spoke nor understood Spanish, so the plaintiff’s employees frequently communicated with him in English. The use of English was a matter of convenience. In the same vein, that the Varied SPA used the currency of the US dollar was a neutral factor, as the “universality of the US dollar undermines any inferential value which one might obtain from it” (Pacific Recreation at [44]). Additionally, the requirement for payment before delivery did not undermine my conclusion that the Varied SPA was governed by Argentine law. Even though the plaintiff’s usual practice was to make full payment after delivery, the plaintiff had received approval to depart from its usual practice and ostensibly did so in light of the emergency Covid-19 situation, where test kits had been in short supply.

  135. Pleadings

  136. [73] The plaintiff, in its closing submissions, submits that the defendants failed to plead any law which may govern the Varied SPA and therefore the sole pleaded governing law of the Varied SPA is Argentine law. It was only at trial that the defendants took the position that the Varied SPA was governed by Singapore law.

  137. [74] For the avoidance of doubt, the defendants’ failure to specifically plead Singapore law is not material to my decision. It is trite that a Singapore court will apply Singapore law unless a litigant establishes that a foreign law applies, in which case the party asserting this must plead and prove the foreign law as an issue of fact (Singapore Civil Procedure 2021: Volume 1 (Cavinder Bull SC gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 2021) (“Singapore Civil Procedure”) at para 18/11/3; The “Chem Orchid” [2015] 2 SLR 1020 at [157]). Contracts are incapable of existing in a legal vacuum, and so Singapore law applies until and unless it is displaced (EFT Holdings, Inc and another v Marinteknik Shipbuilders (S) Pte Ltd and another [2014] 1 SLR 860 at [58]). Further, the defendants included a general traverse in its pleadings, “[denying] each and every allegation in the SOC as if the same had been separately set out and specifically traversed” (Singapore Civil Procedure at para 18/13/6) and have thus denied that the Varied SPA is governed by Argentine law. Therefore, there was no need for the defendants to plead specifically that Singapore law governed the contract.

  138. Issue 2: Termination of the Varied SPA

  139. Formation of the contract

  140. [75] As a preliminary point, I set out my findings for the formation of the contractual relationship between HN Singapore and the plaintiff.

  141. [76] It is trite that an invitation to tender is, without more, an invitation to treat and not an offer (UOL Development (Novena) Pte Ltd v Commissioner of Stamp Duties [2008] 1 SLR(R) 126 at [11]). Therefore, Mr Santiago’s request on 29 March 2020 for a formal offer from HN Singapore only amounted to an invitation to treat. The Proposed SPA that Mr Eng sent to the plaintiff subsequently on 29 March 2020 constituted an offer to contract. The plaintiff accepted this on 2 April 2020, when the plaintiff informed Mr Eng that HN Singapore had been awarded the procurement contract (The Law of Contract in Singapore (Andrew Phang Boon Leong gen ed) (Academy Publishing, 2nd Ed, 2022) (“The Law of Contract in Singapore”) at para 03.150).

  142. [78] Subsequently, on 12 April 2020, the terms of the agreement were varied. The Varied SPA captures the final terms of the agreement between parties.

  143. Whether the plaintiff was entitled to terminate the Varied SPA under Argentine law

  144. The applicable principles on proof of foreign law

  145. [79] The principles relating to proof of foreign law are well established. In the recent decision of Kuvera Resources Pte Ltd v JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA [2022] SGHC 213 (“Kuvera Resources”), the Honourable Judge of the High Court Vinodh Coomaraswamy J succinctly summarised the relevant principles at [144]|:

  146. [80] The defendants chose not to call an expert witness on Argentine law. Therefore, the sole expert witness on Argentine law was the plaintiff’s expert witness, Dr Cassagne.

  147. [81] Dr Cassagne is a partner at an Argentine law firm, Cassagne Abogados, where he has practised law for 20 years. He has experience advising Chinese companies. Additionally, Dr Cassagne is a member of the Argentine Chinese Chamber of Commerce and president of the Argentine Association of Friendship with the People of China. He is also a university professor of Administrative Law at the University of Buenos Aires, the Pontifical Catholic University of Argentina, and the National University of Lomas de Zamora.

  148. Application of the law

  149. [82] Dr Cassagne gave evidence that HN Singapore’s failure to deliver the Test Kits within the time stipulated in the Varied SPA would, if proven in court, entitle the plaintiff to terminate the Varied SPA. According to s 122 of the Government of the City of Buenos Aires’ (“GCBA”) Law 2075 on Government Procurement, “once verified the expiration of the term agreed without having the seller performed its obligations under the contract (in the case of procurement … deliverance of purchased goods at buyer’s domicile) [sic]”, the plaintiff is entitled to terminate the contract without further ado.

  150. [83] The substance and content of Dr Cassagne’s expert evidence in relation to the plaintiff’s entitlement to terminate the Varied SPA are uncontradicted and unchallenged. At trial, the defendants elected not to put any questions by way of cross-examination to Dr Cassagne, about the applicability and effect of s 122 of GCBA’s Law 2075 on Government Procurement. The defendants also do not make any submissions on the plaintiff’s entitlement to terminate the Varied SPA under Argentine law.

  151. [84] Given that Dr Cassagne’s evidence on this matter is uncontradicted and not obviously false, obscure, extravagant, lacking in obvious objectivity and impartiality or patently absurd (Kuvera Resources at [144(f)]), I accept it and find that the plaintiff was entitled to terminate the Varied SPA under Argentine law.

  152. [85] However, in the event that I have erred in deciding that the Varied SPA is governed by Argentine law, I consider whether the plaintiff was entitled to terminate the Varied SPA under the law of Singapore.

  153. Whether HN Singapore was in repudiatory breach of contract under Singapore law

  154. [86] Both parties agree that it was a term of the Varied SPA that HN Singapore was obliged to deliver the Test Kits to the plaintiff within 15(+5) days upon payment, ie, by 26 April 2020. It is also undisputed that HN Singapore failed to deliver the Test Kits to the plaintiff by 26 April 2020. It appears on first glance that HN Singapore breached the Varied SPA for the non-delivery of the Test Kits on 26 April 2020.

  155. [87] I note that the defendants did not dispute that the non-delivery of the Test Kits on 26 April 2020 constituted a repudiatory breach of the Varied SPA. The analytical structure set out by the Court of Appeal in RDC Concrete Pte Ltd v Sato Kogyo (S) Pte Ltd and another appeal [2007] 4 SLR(R) 413 (“RDC Concrete”) is instructive. There are three scenarios where an innocent party is entitled to terminate a contract in the absence of an express provision to do so (RDC Concrete at [93], [97] and [99], as summarised in iVenture Card Ltd and others v Big Bus Singapore City Sightseeing Pte Ltd and others [2022] 1 SLR 302 (“iVenture Card”) at [63]):

  156. (a) “Scenario 1”: Where the party in breach renounces its contract inasmuch as it clearly conveys to the innocent party that it will not perform its contractual obligations at all. … This amounts to a repudiation of the contract by the party in breach.

  157. (b) “Scenario 2”: Where the party in breach breaches a condition of the contract that the parties had contemplated was so important that a breach would give rise to a right of termination …

  158. (c) “Scenario 3”: Where the breach in question would deprive the innocent party of substantially the whole benefit it intended to obtain from the contract … This is the approach laid down in Hongkong Fir Shipping Co Ltd v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd [1962] 2 QB 26 at 70, under which an innocent party will be entitled to terminate the contract if the nature and consequences of the breach are so serious as to “go to the root of the contract” (otherwise termed a fundamental breach of the contract).

  159. I note that the terminology used in iVenture Card to describe the scenarios differ from that in RDC Concrete at [113]. To be clear, I will adopt the terminology used in iVenture Card.

  160. [88] In this case, there was no renunciation of contract by HN Singapore (ie, Scenario 1). Even after the non-delivery of the Test Kits on 26 April 2020, the defendants submit that HN Singapore continued to work with the plaintiff for the delivery of the Test Kits. Mr Eng even conveyed to the plaintiff that the defendants “maintained utmost dedication to seeing the deal through” and that they “remained committed … to ensure that the goods get … delivered as soon as possible”. A reasonable person would not conclude that HN Singapore no longer intended to be bound by the Varied SPA (San International Pte Ltd (formerly known as San Ho Huat Construction Pte Ltd) v Keppel Engineering Pte Ltd [1998] 3 SLR(R) 447 at [20]).

  161. [89] I am also of the view that the delivery date of 20 days upon receipt of payment was not a condition of the Varied SPA. For a term in a contract to be a condition, the parties must intend that the term be so important to the parties that any breach would entitle the innocent party to terminate the contract, irrespective of the consequences of the breach (The Law of Contract in Singapore at para 17.060; RDC Concrete at [97]). It must be borne in mind that the events in this case took place during a time of great uncertainty and urgency. The plaintiff was well aware of the difficulty faced by local and international markets in providing critical supplies to combat the pandemic. This was precisely why the plaintiff instituted its public procurement tendering process. Therefore, although time was of the essence to the plaintiff for the delivery of the Test Kits, the plaintiff’s primary objective was to secure the Test Kits. It is implausible that the plaintiff would intend to terminate the Varied SPA just because the defendant delivered the Test Kits to the plaintiff one day late. Likewise, I find that HN Singapore did not intend that non-delivery of the Test Kits by 26 April 2020 would entitle the plaintiff to terminate the Varied SPA. Therefore, this was not a case of a Scenario 2 breach.

  162. [90] Lastly, I consider whether HN Singapore’s breach of non-delivery was a Scenario 3 breach. The analytical approach comprises two steps. First, I must identify what exactly constituted the benefit that the parties intended the innocent party to derive from the contract. Second, I must examine the actual consequences of the breach that occurred at the time that the innocent party terminated the contract (Sports Connection Pte Ltd v Deuter Sports GmbH [2009] 3 SLR(R) 883 at [62]).

  163. Defence 1: Whether the plaintiff waived of its right to terminate the contract

  164. [92] The next issue is whether, even if HN Singapore was in repudiatory breach for non-delivery of the Test Kits on 26 April 2020, the plaintiff subsequently affirmed the Varied SPA and waived its right to terminate the Varied SPA. As elaborated above at [39], the defendants submit that the plaintiff elected to waive its right to terminate the Varied SPA.

  165. The applicable law

  166. [93] Under Singapore law, waiver by election refers to the abandonment of a right which arises by virtue of a party making an election (Halsbury’s Laws of Singapore vol 7 (LexisNexis, 2021 Reissue) at para 80.467). According to Audi Construction Pte Ltd v Kian Hiap Construction Pte Ltd [2018] 1 SLR 317 at [54]:

  167. [94] In the present case, the repudiatory breach of contract by HN Singapore, ie, the failure by HN Singapore to deliver the Test Kits by 26 April 2020, gives the plaintiff, the innocent party, a right to elect between terminating the contract and affirming it. If the plaintiff elects to affirm the contract, he abandons and thereby waives the right to later terminate the contract on the grounds of the same breach (Aero-Gate at [41]).

  168. [95] There are three requirements for the doctrine of waiver by election to operate (Aero-Gate at [42]):

  169. (a) First, the innocent party must have acted in a manner consistent only with affirming the contract, ie, treating the contract as still alive.

  170. (b) Second, the innocent party must have communicated his election, ie, his choice to affirm the contract, to the party in breach in clear and unequivocal terms.

  171. (c) Third, there must be sufficient knowledge on the part of the innocent party. At minimum, the innocent party must be aware of the facts giving rise to his right to terminate the contract. Beyond this, the Court of Appeal has left open the question of the extent of knowledge required (Chai Cher Watt (trading as Chuang Aik Engineering Works) v SDL Technologies Pte Ltd and another apeal [2012] 1 SLR 152 at [34]).

  172. The decision

  173. [96] With regard to the first requirement, the defendants rely on the fact that parties continued to liaise on matters relating to the Varied SPA between 27 April 2020 and 27 May 2020 to show that the plaintiff continued to treat the Varied SPA as existing (as elaborated above at [39]). Additionally, the defendants submit that between 27 April 2020 and 27 May 2020, the plaintiff failed to reserve its right to terminate the contract.

  174. [97] In my view, the evidence supports the defendants’ submission that the plaintiff continued to treat the contract as alive after the delivery deadline had lapsed on 26 April 2020. Ms Tojo admitted that the plaintiff “wanted to keep [the Varied SPA] alive so the person who had the responsibility to deliver those kits actually delivered those kits”. The plaintiff also does not deny the defendants’ submission that it continued to liaise with the defendants on matters relating to the Varied SPA between 27 April 2020 and 27 May 2020. In particular, the plaintiff repeatedly asked the defendants for the arrival date of the Test Kits (see above at [23]) . Nonetheless, I find that the plaintiff did not waive HN Singapore’s repudiatory breach.

  175. [99] At [124], the High Court in Aero-Gate remarked:

  176. [100] This reasoning is apposite and in accordance with commercial reality. The plaintiff was entitled to treat the Varied SPA as alive to assess whether it had been deprived of substantially the whole benefit it intended to obtain from the Varied SPA. The fact that the plaintiff treated the Varied SPA as alive between 27 April 2020 and 27 May 2020 was, at best, an election to affirm the contract for the time being and not an election to affirm the contract for an indefinite period of time. Subsequently, when HN Singapore repeatedly postponed its estimated deadlines for delivery by a month, and given the climate of uncertainty and urgency, the plaintiff was entitled to terminate the Varied SPA.

  177. [101] This analysis is sufficient to dispose of the defendants’ defence of waiver by election.

  178. Defence 2: Whether the Varied SPA was frustrated

  179. [102] The next issue is whether the Varied SPA was frustrated by a supervening event under the common law doctrine of frustration. As no evidence was led by either party to prove the Argentine law on the issue of frustration, it is presumed that Argentine law is the same as Singapore law.

  180. The applicable law

  181. [103] The law on frustration in Singapore is well-established. Under the doctrine of frustration, both parties are automatically discharged from their contract by operation of law when, without the default of either party, a supervening event that occurred after the formation of the contract renders a contractual obligation radically or fundamentally different from what had been agreed in the contract (Alliance Concrete Singapore Pte Ltd v Sato Kogyo (S) Pte Ltd [2014] 3 SLR 857 (“Alliance Concrete”) at [33]; RDC Concrete at [59]). Subsequently, thereto, relief is determined under the Frustrated Contracts Act (Cap 115, 2014 Rev Ed).

  182. [104] The Court of Appeal has stressed that the doctrine is only to be applied to discharge parties from their contract in truly exceptional circumstances, such that the courts have been careful to apply the doctrine strictly. In light of this, “the precise facts become of the first importance” [emphasis in original] (Alliance Concrete at [39]–[40]).

  183. The decision

  184. [105] I reject the defendants’ submission that the Chinese Regulations frustrated the Varied SPA. I say this for a number of reasons.

  185. [106] Firstly, I do not consider the 31 March Regulations to have occurred after the formation of the contract. The parties contracted with each other on 2 April 2020 when the plaintiff informed HN Singapore that it had been awarded the contract to supply the Test Kits. Subsequently, the Varied SPA was entered into on 12 April 2020. On Mr Eng’s own evidence, he proposed to vary the original agreement because he had learnt of the “recent changes of China’s export policy with regard to test kits”, ie, the 31 March Regulations. These policy changes gave him reason to believe that “it might be difficult for Wondfo to export test kits in Chinese packaging”. In fact, he communicated to the plaintiff that “[t]he Wondfo kit with Chinese packaging can no longer be exported”. Therefore, to overcome difficulties in delivering the Test Kits to the plaintiff, the Proposed SPA was amended to provide for test kits in English packaging instead, which were “meant for international exports”. It is thus clear that the Varied SPA had been entered into after the 31 March Regulations came into effect. In fact, Mr Eng and/or HN Singapore were aware of the 31 March Regulations, and the Varied SPA was intended to accommodate its effects on the delivery of the Test Kits.

  186. [108] The content of these Chinese Regulations is a question of fact which must be proved (Kuvera Resources at [144]) (as was elaborated above at [78]). In this case, the defendants have adduced only the raw sources of Chinese Regulations in evidence. However, the court is not obliged to accord raw sources of foreign law any evidentiary weight, as its content, when approached on its own, may mislead persons unfamiliar with the system of law (Pacific Recreation at [60] and [78]). Therefore, in Pacific Recreation, the Court of Appeal opined that raw sources of foreign law should be accompanied by expert evidence on the foreign law. This will allow the court to obtain the expert’s opinion as to the law’s effect (at [78]). For instance, in this case, it is unclear how, pursuant to the 13 May Regulations, the Chinese government would “[c]omprehensively strengthen the supervision of pandemic prevention materials for export”. The defendants have failed to call an expert witness on Chinese law. Aside from the Chinese legislation, the defendants have failed to exhibit any further evidence of how the Chinese Regulations rendered the delivery impossible. The text of the 25 April Regulations suggests that manufacturers must have obtained “foreign standard certification” from the Chinese Ministry of Commerce. Again, no documentation is provided regarding the approval process for Wondfo to acquire the necessary certifications, the actual steps taken by Wondfo to apply for this certification, and the response of the Chinese government to such an application. It is also not known when the 13 May Regulations came into effect. Therefore, I find that the defendants did not sufficiently prove that the Chinese Regulations have made it impossible to perform the Varied SPA and constituted a supervening event. Accordingly, the defendant’s defence of frustration must fail.

  187. [109] Furthermore, the plaintiff submits that HN Singapore’s offer to perform the contract by obtaining the Test Kits from Wondfo’s warehouse in Chicago confirms that the performance of the Varied SPA was not rendered impossible by the Chinese Regulations. I agree that this indicates that the contract was not impossible of execution.

  188. Issue 3: Misrepresentation

  189. [110] I hold that the HN Singapore and/or Mr Eng are not liable for misrepresentation.

  190. The applicable law

  191. Actionable misrepresentation

  192. [111] To ascertain whether an operative misrepresentation has been made, there must be a false statement of existing or past fact made by the representor before or at the time of making the contract to the other party, the representee, and the representee must have been induced to enter into the contract (Lim Koon Park and another v Yap Jin Meng Bryan and another [2013] 4 SLR 150 at [38]).

  193. [112] In Ernest Ferdinand Perez De La Sala v Compañia de Navegación Palomar, SA and others and other appeals [2018] 1 SLR 894 (“Ernest Ferdinand Perez”) at [172]–[173], the Court of Appeal stated that a representation as to the future is not, in itself, actionable. It can, however, imply an actionable representation. For example, a person who makes a statement as to the future may make an implied representation of an existing fact. Alternatively, a person who states an intention as to the future may also implicitly represent that he, in fact, has that intention at the time of making the statement.

  194. [113] Additionally, a representation must be shown to be false at the time it was acted upon ie, when the contract is concluded (The Law of Contract in Singapore at para 11.059).

  195. [114] To establish the element of reliance, the representation must have a real and substantial effect on the representee’s mind such that it can be said to be an inducing cause which led him to act as he did. However, it need not be the inducing cause. Therefore, it only needs to have played some causative part in inducing the contract (The Law of Contract in Singapore at paras 11.074–11.076; Alwie Handoyo v Tjong Very Sumito and another and another appeal [2013] 4 SLR 308 (“Alwie”) at [187]).

  196. Fraudulent misrepresentation

  197. [115] Where the plaintiff alleges fraudulent misrepresentation, the plaintiff must prove five elements (Panatron Pte Ltd and another v Lee Cheow Lee and another [2001] 2 SLR(R) 435 at [14], as recently applied in Ma Hongjin v Sim Eng Tong [2021] SGHC 84 at [19] and Yong Khong Yoong Mark and others v Ting Choon Meng and another [2021] SGHC 246 at [90]):

  198. (a) a false representation of fact was made by words or conduct by the representor;

  199. (b) the representation was made with the intention that it should be acted upon by the representee (or by a class of persons which includes the representee);

  200. (c) the representee acted upon the false statement;

  201. (d) the representee suffered damage by so doing; and

  202. (e) the representation was made with knowledge that it is false; it must be wilfully false, or at least made in the absence of any genuine belief that it is true.

  203. [116] I stress at the outset that the plaintiff must satisfy a relatively high standard of proof before a fraudulent misrepresentation can be established successfully against the representor, ie, Mr Eng and/or HN Singapore, because it imports the idea of dishonesty (Wee Chiaw Sek Anna v Ng Li-Ann Genevieve (sole executrix of the estate of Ng Hock Seng, deceased) and another [2013] 3 SLR 801 at [30], affirmed in Shanghai Afute Food and Beverage Management Co Ltd v Tan Swee Meng and others [2023] SGHC 34 at [135]). Whilst the standard of proof is one of a balance of probabilities, the more serious the allegation, the more evidence that might have to be adduced (Liberty Sky Investments Ltd v Goh Seng Heng and another [2020] 3 SLR 335 at [63]).

  204. Section 2(1) of the MA

  205. [117] Section 2(1) of the MA is premised on the representee entering into a contract with the representor. It reads as follows:

  206. [118] Under s 2(1) of the MA, the plaintiff must show that the false representation made by the defendant induced the plaintiff to enter into a contract with the defendant, and the plaintiff suffered a loss as a result thereof (Tan Kian Seng v Venture Corp Ltd [2022] 4 SLR 643 at [101]). If the plaintiff has established that, the defendant then bears the burden of proving that it had reasonable grounds to believe and did believe up to the time the contract was made that its representation was true. If the defendant fails to discharge its burden of proof, the defendant will be liable to pay damages to the plaintiff.

  207. [119] For the avoidance of doubt, s 2(1) of the MA is an action in contract and therefore only available to one contracting party against another contracting party (RBC Properties Pte Ltd v Defu Furniture Pte Ltd [2015] 1 SLR 997 at [66]). Therefore, the plaintiff’s claim in statutory misrepresentation can be brought only against HN Singapore, with whom the plaintiff entered into the contract. I find that it is immaterial that any alleged misrepresentation was made by Mr Eng. This is because Mr Eng is the sole shareholder and director of HN Singapore and any alleged misrepresentation would have been made by Mr Eng, not on behalf of himself, but on behalf of HN Singapore. A party to a contract may be liable for damages under s 2(1) of the MA by the representations of his agent, acting within the scope of his authority and on behalf of the contracting party (The Law of Contract at para 11.217).

  208. Whether the defendants made a false representation of fact to the plaintiff

  209. [120] In the letter of offer dated 27 March 2020, HN Singapore stated that the delivery time for the Test Kits would be “10(+10) days upon payment”, ie, HN Singapore would deliver the Test Kits within 20 days of receipt of payment. The Representation is therefore not one of present or past fact because it relates, at the time it was made, to a matter that would occur in the future.

  210. [122] In this case, one possible implied representation was that HN Singapore had the ability to effect the delivery of the Test Kits within 20 days of receipt of payment. The plaintiff has not adduced any positive evidence to show that, at the time that parties contracted with each other, ie, 2 April 2020, HN Singapore could not deliver the Test Kits. The plaintiff points to the fact that the Test Kits were ultimately not delivered on 26 April 2020 to show the falsity of the Representation. However, the non-delivery of the Test Kits on 26 April 2020 does not necessarily mean that HN Singapore was unable to deliver the Test Kits as at 2 April 2020. Additionally, the fact that HN Singapore only contracted with Wondfo on 20 April 2020 does not mean that as at 2 April 2020, HN Singapore was unable to procure the Test Kits and deliver them to the plaintiff by 26 April 2020. Therefore, I find that the plaintiff has not proven that Mr Eng and/or HN Singapore made a false representation.

  211. [123] However, there is no evidence that Mr Eng and/or HN Singapore lacked such an intention at the material time. Therefore, the defendants’ alleged implied representation as to their intentions was not proven false either. On this basis, I find that there was no actionable misrepresentation.

  212. [124] Additionally, I find that the delivery time stated in the letter of offer was a fixed period, and not an estimated period, as contended by the defendants. Nothing in the letter of offer suggests that the “10(+10) days” stated was an estimated period.

  213. Whether the plaintiff relied on the defendants’ Representation

  214. [125] If I am wrong and the defendants did make a false representation of fact to the plaintiff, I am satisfied that the Representation induced the plaintiff to contract with HN Singapore.

  215. [126] The defendants sent the Letter of Proposal to Mr Juan and Ms Tojo, who were acting on behalf of the plaintiff, pursuant to a request made by Mr Juan via Whatsapp on the same date, 27 March 2020. The request is as follows:

  216. [127] The background to this request was that Mr Juan had enquired with Mr Eng whether HN Singapore could supply test kits to the plaintiff. After some initial discussion, Mr Juan informed Mr Eng that the plaintiff required a formal offer. This was so that parties could “move forward”. Given that the plaintiff specifically requested for the “time” (which most probably referred to the time of the delivery) to be included in the letter of offer that the plaintiff would consider in deciding whether to contract with HN Singapore, I find that the timing of delivery played a causative role in the plaintiff contracting with HN Singapore. Further, I consider the urgency with which the plaintiff sought to procure Covid-19 test kits. It is clear that a suitable time frame for delivery would be a relevant consideration that would affect the decision to enter into contract.

  217. Fraudulent misrepresentation

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