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Grounds publishedDecided 16 May 2023

General Division of the High Court

Auto Lease (Pte) Ltd v San Hup Bee Motor LLP and o thers

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[2023] SGHC 141Case no. District Court Appeal No 29 of 2022

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  1. Facts

  2. The parties

  3. [1] The Appellant in HC/DCA 29/2022 is Auto Lease Pte Ltd (“Third Party” or “Auto Lease”), a Singapore registered finance company that is primarily in the business of granting hire-purchase loans for the financing of vehicle purchases. The Appellant was joined as third party in the proceedings before the district courts in DC/DC 679/2020. Mr Lim Woon Cheng Anthony (“Mr Lim”) is the director of Auto Lease.

  4. [2] The 1st Respondent is San Hup Bee Motor LLP (the “1st Respondent”), a Singapore registered limited liability partnership in the business of selling vehicles on a consignment basis. The partners of the 1st Respondent were one Mr. Toh See Leong and one Doris Chan Yun Zhen (“Doris”) , until the former’s death on 27 October 2017. In the trial below, the 1st Respondent was named as the 2nd Defendant.

  5. [3] The 2nd Respondent is San Hup Bee (S) Pte Ltd (the “2nd Respondent”), a Singapore-registered private limited company that carries on business as a used car dealer. The 2nd Respondent sells vehicles purchased from third parties and also sells vehicles on behalf of third parties on a consignment basis. In the trial below, the 2nd Respondent was named as the 1st Defendant. The sole director and shareholder of the 2nd Respondent is one Jaxon Toh Jun Sheng (“Jaxon”). Jaxon is the son of Mr Toh See Leong and Doris.

  6. [4] Prior to his death, Mr Toh See Leong was also the sole director and shareholder of another Singapore-registered company called San Hup Bee Motoring Pte Ltd (“SHB Motoring”). SHB Motoring is a separate entity from the 1st and 2nd Respondents.

  7. [5] The 3rd Respondent is Toh Beng Hock (Zhuo Mingfu) t/a V-Tech Auto Service (the “3rd Respondent”), a sole proprietorship in the business of the repair and maintenance of motor vehicles, and the provision of passenger land transport. In this written judgment, I use the term “3rd Respondent” to refer both to the sole proprietorship V-Tech Auto Service and to Mr Toh Beng Hock himself.

  8. Background to the dispute

  9. [6] The dispute below involved the alleged breach of two separate contracts, both relating to the sale and purchase of a Toyota HiAce Commuter GL2.7A bearing registration number SKC1131C (the “Vehicle”). The first of the two contracts was a sales agreement (the “Sales Agreement”), whereby the 3rd Respondent agreed to purchase from the 2nd Respondent the Vehicle at the price of $52,200 (the “Purchase Price”). The Vehicle was sold on a consignment basis by the 2nd Respondent on behalf of the 1st Respondent. For the purposes of the Sales Agreement, the parties and the trial judge (the “DJ”) treated the 1st and 2nd Respondents as joint sellers of the Vehicle.

  10. [7] In the trial below, the 3rd Respondent took the position that the 1st and 2nd Respondents had breached the Sales Agreement in failing to ensure that all encumbrances over the Vehicle were removed so that legal title and/or ownership of the Vehicle could be duly transferred to the 3rd Respondent. The 3rd Respondent asserted that despite having paid the full purchase price of $52,200, including a sum of $49,200.86 which he paid to the Appellant in full settlement of the hire-purchase loan outstanding on the Vehicle, he had found himself unable to register the transfer of ownership of the Vehicle on the Land Transport Authority’s (“LTA”) online system because the 1st and 2nd Respondents had “failed to obtain and present to [LTA] any evidence that the vehicle [was] not under financing”.

  11. [8] The second contract was a hire purchase agreement (the “Hire Purchase Agreement”) between the Appellant and the 1st Respondent. The Vehicle was financed by the Appellant. It was not disputed that of all the parties, the Appellant was the only one that was a member of the Hire Purchase Finance and Leasing Association of Singapore (“HPFLAS”).

  12. [9] In the trial below, the 1st and 2nd Respondents took the position that the Appellant had breached the Hire Purchase Agreement by wrongfully misapplying monies received from the 3rd Respondent in respect of the settlement of the hire-purchase loan outstanding on the Vehicle. It was not disputed that the Appellant had appropriated a sum of $13,301 out of the total sum of $49,200.86 paid by the 3rd Respondent and applied this sum of $13,301 towards partial set-off of debts owed to the Appellant by SHB Motoring. The Appellant claimed that he was entitled to do so because according to him, he had been dealing with Mr Toh See Leong for “more than ten years”, and had noted that the latter would deal with him using both SHB Motoring and the 1st Respondent.

  13. [10] The 1st and 2nd Respondents asserted that the Appellant had no right under the Hire Purchase Agreement to use monies paid to settle the outstanding hire purchase loan for the set-off of debts owed by SHB Motoring. Further, having wrongfully applied the sum of $13,301 towards partial set-off of debts owed by SHB Motoring, the Appellant had failed to take steps to lodge the HPFLAS Form B with LTA to confirm that the Vehicle was no longer under financing. This meant that the HPFLAS Form A – which indicated that the Vehicle was under financing – remained in LTA’s records. The 1st and 2nd Respondents took the position that the Appellant’s failure to lodge Form B effectively prevented the transfer of the Vehicle to the 3rd Respondent in LTA’s records. As such, the 1st and 2nd Respondents contended that they were entitled to a contribution or an indemnity from the Appellant for all losses for which the 1st and 2nd Respondents were held liable to the 3rd Respondent.

  14. The decision below

  15. [11] In respect of the 3rd Respondent’s claim against the 1st and 2nd Respondents, the DJ found that it was an implied term of the Sales Agreement that the Respondents would procure and/or ensure the transfer of legal ownership and title over the Vehicle, free of any encumbrances, to the 3rd Respondent. As there was plainly a failure to procure the transfer of legal title free of all encumbrances, the 1st and 2nd Respondents were in breach of their contractual obligations and were liable to the 3rd Respondent for damages.

  16. [12] In respect of the third party proceedings, the DJ found that the Appellant had acted in breach of the Hire Purchase Agreement with the 1st Respondent, by improperly applying part of the payment received from the 3rd Respondent to set off amounts owing from SHB Motoring, a separate entity wholly unrelated to the transaction. The Appellant had also failed to remove the encumbrance over the Vehicle despite having received full payment of the outstanding hire-purchase loan amount for the Vehicle. The DJ held that the Appellant had through his conduct caused the 1st and 2nd Respondents to breach the Sales Agreement with the 3rd Respondent, and that the Appellant must indemnify the 1st and 2nd Respondents in full for any damages awarded to the 3rd Respondent.

  17. [14] The Appellant appealed against “the whole of the decision of [the DJ]”.

  18. The parties’ cases on appeal

  19. [15] I summarise below the parties’ respective cases on appeal.

  20. Appellant’s Case

  21. [16] The Appellant contended that the DJ erred in finding that the 1st and 2nd Respondents had breached the Sales Agreement with the 3rd Respondent. Inter alia, the Appellant said that the DJ erred in finding that it was an implied term of the Sales Agreement that the 1st and 2nd Respondents should procure the transfer of legal title in the Vehicle, free of all encumbrances, to the 3rd Respondent. The Appellant contended that the 3rd Respondent had not pleaded any such implied term in its statement of claim; and that in any event, the Sales Agreement contained an entire agreement clause which precluded any implied contractual terms.

  22. [17] The Appellant also contended that the DJ erred in any event in finding that the 1st and 2nd Respondents failed to cause the 3rd Respondent to be registered as the lawful owner of the Vehicle; and in finding, moreover, that it was the Appellant’s non-lodgement of Form B (and thus the continuing existence of Form A in LTA’s records) which caused the failure of the attempts to register the 3rd Respondent’s ownership.

  23. [18] The Appellant further contended that the DJ erred in his determination of the issue of mitigation by the 3rd Respondent and of the quantum of damages to be awarded to the latter.

  24. [19] Finally, the Appellant argued that the DJ erred in holding it liable to indemnify the 1st and 2nd Respondents.

  25. 1st and 2nd Respondents’ Case

  26. [20] The 2nd Respondent limited its arguments in this appeal to a rebuttal of the Appellant’s submissions on the DJ’s alleged error in holding the Appellant liable to indemnify the 1st and 2nd Respondents. The 1st Respondent adopted the same position as the 2nd Respondent.

  27. 3rd Respondent’s Case

  28. [21] The 3rd Respondent raised, firstly, a threshold issue as to the Appellant’s locus standi to appeal the DJ’s decision insofar as that decision related to the proceedings between the 3rd Respondent (as the plaintiff below) and the 1st and 2nd Respondents (as the defendants below). In its written submissions, the 3rd Respondent contended that the 1st and 2nd Respondents had not appealed the DJ’s findings on liability and quantum in the 3rd Respondent’s claim against them on the Sales Agreement. This meant that the 1st and 2nd Respondents remained bound by the DJ’s findings; and the relevant issue in the Appellant’s appeal could therefore only be that of the Appellant’s liability to indemnify the 1st and 2nd Respondents. On this issue, the 3rd Respondent maintained that the DJ’s finding that the Appellant was liable to indemnify the 1st and 2nd Respondents should be upheld.

  29. [22] Further and in any event, the 3rd Respondent argued that the DJ was justified in finding that the 1st and 2nd Respondents had breached the Sales Agreement. The 3rd Respondent also took issue with the quantum of damages awarded to it by the DJ.

  30. Issues to be determined

  31. [23] The following seven issues arose for my determination:

  32. (a) Whether the Appellant had locus standi to appeal the DJ’s decision in respect of the 3rd Respondent’s claim against the 1st and 2nd Respondents.

  33. (b) If the Appellant did have such locus standi, whether the DJ erred in finding that it was an implied term of the Sales Agreement that the 1st and 2nd Respondents should procure the transfer of legal title in the Vehicle, free of all encumbrances, to the 3rd Respondent.

  34. (c) Whether the existence of an entire agreement clause in the Sales Agreement precluded the DJ from implying contractual terms into the Sales Agreement.

  35. (d) Whether the DJ was correct in making the following findings as to liability:

  36. (i) That the 1st and 2nd Respondents breached their contractual obligations in failing to cause the 3rd Respondent to be registered as the owner of the Vehicle.

  37. (ii) That the cause of the failed attempts to register the 3rd Respondent as owner was the continued existence of the Form A in respect of the Vehicle, which indicated that the Vehicle was under financing, and which document the Appellant wrongfully allowed to remain in the HPFLAS System by dint of his failure to lodge a Form B.

  38. (e) Whether the quantum of damages awarded to the 3rd Respondent ($2,200 a month for loss of rental income) should be revised on appeal.

  39. (f) Whether the DJ was correct in his determination of the issue of mitigation by the 3rd Respondent.

  40. (g) Whether the Appellant should be held liable to indemnify the 1st and 2nd Respondents in respect of the amounts payable by them to the 3rd Respondent.

  41. [24] In the paragraphs that follow, I address these issues seriatim.

  42. Issue 1: Whether the Appellant had locus standi to appeal the DJ’s decision in respect of the 3rd Respondent’s claim against the 1st and 2nd Respondents

  43. [25] On the threshold issue of the Appellant’s locus standi to appeal the DJ’s decision in respect of the 3rd Respondent’s claim against the 1st and 2nd Respondents, the 3rd Respondent argued that the Appellant had no such locus standi because it was not a party to the Sales Agreement on which the 3rd Respondent’s claim was based. The Appellant initially did not deal with this threshold issue in its written submissions. As this appeared to me to be a material issue, I directed all parties to put in further written submissions; and I also drew parties’ attention to the English and Australian authorities on this issue.

  44. [26] I first begin by outlining the Appellant’s and the 3rd Respondent’s further submissions on the threshold issue of locus standi.

  45. Appellant’s Case

  46. [28] Further, the Appellant argued that even if it did not have any right per se to appeal the decision on the 3rd Respondent’s claim against the 1st and 2nd Respondents, the appellate court should exercise its discretion to allow the Appellant to bring such an appeal on the basis that it was just and convenient to do so. In this connection, the Appellant cited the English case of Asphalt and Public Works Ltd. v. Indemnity Guarantee Trust Ltd. (1969) 1 QB 465 (“Asphalt”).

  47. 3rd Respondent’s Case

  48. [29] In its further submissions, the 3rd Respondent maintained that the Appellant had no locus standi to appeal the DJ’s decision on the 3rd Respondent’s action against the 1st and 2nd Respondents, because the Appellant had not sought leave to appeal that part of the decision which was in favour of the 3rd Respondent vis-à-vis the 1st and 2nd Respondents. As for the 1st and 2nd Respondents, they had not appealed the DJ’s decision in favour of the 3rd Respondent against them, and they remained bound by the decision below.

  49. [30] The 3rd Respondent argued for the following approach towards third parties’ locus standi to appeal a trial judge’s decision in favour of the plaintiff:

  50. (a) The starting point should be that ordinarily, third parties would not be able to appeal directly against a decision in favour of the plaintiff except by leave of court;

  51. (b) The court had the discretion to give such leave if it finds it just and convenient to do so.

  52. [31] In support of the above proposition, the 3rd Respondent cited the English cases of The Millwall and Asphalt, as well as the Australian case of Gracechurch Holdings Pty Ltd v Breeze and another (1992) WAR 51 (“Gracechurch”). The 3rd Respondent also submitted that the Australian cases of Insurance Exchange of Australasia v Dooley and Another [2000] NSWCA 159 (“Dooley”) and Helicopter Sales (Australia) Pty Limited v Rotor-Work Pty Limited and another (1974) 132 CLR 1 (“Helicopter Sales”) should not be followed.

  53. [32] Adopting its proposed approach, the 3rd Respondent submitted that it was not just and convenient for leave to be given to the present Appellant to appeal the DJ’s decision granting the 3rd Respondent judgment against the 1st and 2nd Respondents. This was because the 3rd Respondent was not a party to the third party proceedings below; and moreover, the Sales Agreement was a contract between the 3rd Respondent and the 2nd Respondent: the 3rd Respondent never had any relationship at all with the Appellant.

  54. My Decision

  55. [33] In considering the issue of a third party’s locus standi to appeal directly a decision on the action between the plaintiff and the defendant, I start with the provisions of O 16 r 7 ROC, which are as follows:

  56. [34] On the face of it, O 16 r 7 ROC simply provides for the relationship between the defendant and the third party – without saying anything about the relationship between the plaintiff and the third party. However, the relevant extract from the White Book suggests that notwithstanding the absence of any express provision in O 16 r 7 ROC, the third party may in certain situations appeal against a judgment for the plaintiff:

  57. [37] For completeness, I add that neither the Appellant nor the 3rd Respondent pointed me to any local caselaw on the issue of a third party’s locus standi to appeal a judgment in favour of the plaintiff. Although the 3rd Respondent has cited the case of Tan Juay Pah v Kimly Construction Pte Ltd and others [2012] 2 SLR 549 (“Tan Juay Pah”), I do not find it to be relevant to this specific issue. In Tan Juay Pah, the plaintiff Kimly was the main contractor for a project where a tower crane had collapsed onsite. Kimly sued its sub-contractor Rango, who brought in the appellant TJP as third party, claiming that TJP was obliged to indemnify Rango in the event it was found liable to Kimly. At trial, the trial judge granted Kimly judgment in its claim against Rango. TJP failed in his submission of “no case to answer” vis-à-vis Rango’s claim for an indemnity from him, with the result that Rango succeeded in its claim against him. Rango did not appeal the trial judge’s decision that it was liable to Kimly, but TJP appealed the entirety of the trial judge’s decision. On appeal, the Court of Appeal (“CA”) held that since TJP had submitted “no case to answer” vis-à-vis Rango in the court below, the determinative issue was whether Rango had established a prima facie legal basis for TJP to indemnify it in respect of its liability to Kimly. The CA ruled that even if all the evidential issues were resolved in Rango’s favour, Rango’s case against TJP would still fail as it could not establish a legal basis for TJP to indemnify it in respect of its liability to Kimly. In short, therefore, the issue of a third party’s locus standi to appeal a judgment in favour of the plaintiff was not before the CA in Tan Juay Pah. I will, however, refer to this case in the later part of this judgment, in relation to a different issue.

  58. English Position

  59. [38] I next examine the English authorities which have dealt with the issue of a third party’s locus standi to appeal a judgment in favour of the plaintiff. I start with the case of The Millwall, which was cited by the authors of the White Book.

  60. [40] In dismissing the barge-owners’ appeal, the English CA held that the barge-owners could not appeal in respect of the decision in favour of the plaintiffs against the tug-owners, because they were not parties to that judgment. Further, not having paid the amount adjudged to be due by the tug-owners to the plaintiffs, they were not subrogated to their rights; and even if subrogated, they could not avail themselves of an appeal which the tug-owners had abandoned. Nor could the barge-owners avail themselves of the third-party procedure under the Judicature Act: although the court would have had power under the said Act to put the barge-owners into the shoes of the tug-owners for the purpose of questioning the decision of the court below as between the plaintiffs and the tug-owners, the court had not been invited to do so. Consequently, in the words of Collins MR (at 164):

  61. In my view this is not a case for leave to be given. The plaintiffs ought not to be burdened by a direct appeal by [C]. He is impecunious. They have had no relations with him. Their contract was only with [A Ltd]; and they relied on the bond given by [the defendants]. In the court below they sued only [the defendants] because that was the only company who had the money to pay the claim or the costs. In this situation, I think the plaintiffs are entitled, on any appeal, to look to the defendants to pay the costs.

  62. We will direct, therefore, that the third parties can appeal and give notice of appeal as against the defendants; and the defendants in turn can give a notice of appeal as against the plaintiffs; but that the third parties cannot directly appeal against the plaintiffs.

  63. [emphasis added]

  64. [43] Agreeing with Lord Denning MR, Edmund Davies LJ also pointed out (at 973) that the third party was not bound by the judgment awarded in the plaintiff’s favour and that he was never substituted as a defendant. As he noted, it “is… not right to say that in every case where a third party has been given leave to defend he is thereby ipso facto entitled to appeal directly against a judgment awarded in the plaintiffs’ favour”.

  65. [44] From the English authorities, it would appear that the following principles may be distilled:

  66. (c) The court has a discretion to grant the third party leave to appeal against a plaintiff directly whenever the court thinks it just and convenient to do so.

  67. Australian Position

  68. [45] I next consider the Australian authorities on this issue, starting with the case of Dooley. The case arose from a baseball game in which the first defendant (one of the players) had collided with the plaintiff (another player) who was injured. The plaintiff sued the first defendant and the League (the second defendant) in charge of the conduct of these baseball tournaments, claiming damages for negligence. The second defendant joined the appellant – the Insurance Exchange of Australasia – as a third party, claiming indemnity under its policy with the appellant. The first defendant also filed a cross-claim against the appellant to seek indemnity under the policy. The trial judge gave judgment for the plaintiff against both defendants, and for both defendants against the appellant insurer. The appellant then applied for leave to appeal against the judgment given against it in favour of the defendants as well as the judgment given in favour of the plaintiff.

  69. [46] Before the New South Wales (NSW) CA, the plaintiff argued that the appellant had no standing to attack the judgment in favour of the plaintiff against the defendants. In rejecting this argument, the court held (per Handley JA, at [9]):

  70. The question of standing in a case such as this depends on the effect of a judgment in favour of a plaintiff on the liability of a third party to the defendant. If a judgment in favour of the plaintiff binds the third party as a res judicata, one would think, on first principles, that the third party would have the normal right of a litigant to be heard before that judgment was given, and to appeal against it should it be adverse.

  71. [47] Having considered the procedural framework in the District Court Rules 1973 (Australia) (“DCR”) which governed the joinder of a third party and the conduct of third party proceedings (Pt 21 rr 4 and 5), Handley JA opined (at [12]) that the object of the third party procedure was “to get the third party bound by the decision between the plaintiff and the defendant” (citing Barclays Bank v Tom [1923] 1 KB 221 at 224), that is “to make that decision a res judicata as between the defendant and the third party”. In particular, the applicable rules made the third party “a party to the action”. In the circumstances, a litigant who was a party to proceedings, and bound by a judgment which was adverse to his interests “must, in principle, have the necessary standing to appeal” (at [24]).

  72. [49] Noting that there were statements in The Millwall which suggested a contrary result, Handley JA disagreed with the reasoning of the CA in that case. Although Collins MR in The Millwall had found that the barge-owners were not parties to the decision against the tug-owners, Handley JA criticized the reasoning in that case as being unsatisfactory. In his view (at [36]-[37]), since the barge-owners and the tug-owners were both defendants in the action, a decision that one of them was liable to the plaintiff – and the other was not – bound the defendants not only against the plaintiff but also as between themselves: the barge-owners who were held not liable to the plaintiff were bound by the decision that the tug-owners were liable, quite apart from the effect of the third party proceedings. He opined (at [42]) that –

  73. If the result of the rules of court, or directions given under them, is that a third party is not bound by the decision as between the plaintiff and the defendant, the third party would lack the standing to appeal against that decision. However in that event the defendant would have to prove his liability to the plaintiff all over against as against the third party. This would defeat the purpose of the third party procedure which is to make a judgment as between plaintiff and defendant binding on the third party.

  74. [50] As noted earlier, Handley JA cited the Australian High Court’s decision in Helicopter Sales in Dooley for the purpose of applying the dicta of Barwick CJ and Mason J. It should be pointed out, though, that on the specific issue for which Handley JA cited Helicopter Sales, the views of the High Court coram were not uniform.

  75. [51] In Helicopter Sales, the plaintiff’s helicopter failed, resulting in the helicopter being lost and its occupants killed. The failure was due to a machining defect in the bolt which had occurred in its manufacture. The defendant (a wholly owned subsidiary of the plaintiff) had, under contract to the plaintiff, undertaken the servicing of the helicopter, and had fitted the defective bolt in the course of regular servicing. The defendant joined as third party the Australian distributor of helicopter parts from which it had purchased the bolt. The third party was given leave to defend and did in fact defend the plaintiff’s claim against the defendant. Judgment was entered for the plaintiff against the defendant and for the defendant against the third party. The third party appealed not only against the judgment given against it in the defendant’s favour but also against the judgment given against the defendant in the plaintiff’s favour. No appeal was brought by the defendant. It was not disputed that there were no issues as to the defendant’s judgment against the third party: it would stand or fail with the plaintiff’s judgment against the defendant.

  76. …to do otherwise, allowing only the appeal against the defendant’s judgment and that only to the extent of the damages awarded, the defendant remaining entitled to nominal damages for breach of contract, appears to be a wholly unsatisfactory alternative.

  77. [55] The fifth member of the coram, Jacobs J, did not express any views on the issue of the third party’s standing to appeal the judgment given in favour of the plaintiff.

  78. [56] I next consider the decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia in Gracechurch, a case decided after Helicopter Sales but before Dooley. In Gracechurch, the appellant leased certain premises to a company. The first respondent (Mr Breeze) and the second respondent (Mrs Breeze) were directors of the company, who guaranteed the company’s liabilities under the lease. The appellant brought two separate actions against Mr and Mrs Breeze respectively, as guarantors, for recovery of monies owing under the lease. Mr Breeze disputed the amount owing. Mrs Breeze did not, but denied liability as a guarantor on the basis of an estoppel. Mrs Breeze issued third party proceedings against Mr Breeze founded on an indemnity given to her by Mr Breeze in respect of her liability under the guarantee. This indemnity had been provided during the course of matrimonial proceedings between Mr Breeze and Mrs Breeze. At trial, Mr Breeze was not able to be present by reason of illness, for which medical certificates were tendered. The magistrate hearing the matter proceeded with the trial and entered judgment for the appellant against Mr Breeze. The magistrate also entered judgment for the appellant against Mrs Breeze as well as judgment for Mrs Breeze against Mr Breeze.

  79. [57] Mr Breeze successfully applied to set aside both the default judgments against him and also successfully appealed to the District Court for the judgment against Mrs Breeze to be set aside. The appellant in turn appealed against the District Court’s decision, contending that the court was wrong to have found Mr Breeze prejudiced by the action against Mrs Breeze proceeding in his absence.

  80. [58] In allowing the appeal and setting aside the District Court’s decision, the appellate court ruled that Mr Breeze did not have standing as a third party to appeal to the District Court against the judgment awarded in the appellant’s favour against the defendant Mrs Breeze. Citing Asphalt and The Millwall, Ipp J (with whom Seaman J and Pidgeon J agreed) held (at p 4):

  81. [60] In addition, the District Court had taken the view that because the case against Mr Breeze was determined separately, the magistrate did not hear evidence about the amount owing, this being an issue disputed by Mr Breeze but conceded by Mrs Breeze. The District Court considered that this constituted detriment to Mr Breeze. The appellate court disagreed (at pp 13-14), holding that the judgment given against Mrs Breeze would be inadmissible in the third party proceedings and that accordingly, Mr Breeze did not suffer prejudice when the magistrate proceeded, in his absence, with the trial between the appellant and Mrs Breeze.

  82. My decision on the approach to be adopted in the present case

  83. [64] Further, insofar as the court in Dooley endorsed the dicta of Barwick CJ and Mason J and sought to cast doubt on the approach taken by the court in The Millwall, I do not find Dooley to be strictly relevant to the present case. I am persuaded by the 3rd Respondent’s submissions distinguishing the case of Dooley. In gist, the 3rd Respondent pointed out that in Dooley, the third party had the benefit of the Australian DCR, Pt 21, r 4(1) and 4(2) which enabled the third party – as a cross-defendant – to contest the defendant’s liability to the plaintiff. In contrast, the procedural framework governing the conduct of third-party proceedings in Singapore is different from that in the Australian DCR: the concept of a cross-defendant does not feature in the Singapore Rules of Court. Since the decision in Dooley was mainly premised on the provisions of the Australian DCR on the conduct of third party proceedings, I agree with the 3rd Respondent that the decision in Dooley should not be followed.

  84. [65] Having regard to the approach adopted by the English courts in The Millwall and Asphalt, I am of the view that the following general principles are applicable in the present case:

  85. (a) Ordinarily, a third party will not be able to appeal directly against a judgment given in favour of the plaintiff in the principal proceedings, unless leave has been obtained from the court to do so.

  86. (c) Otherwise, the court may give a third party leave to appeal directly against a judgment in favour of the plaintiff whenever the court thinks it just and convenient to do so.

  87. Application of the above principles to the present case

  88. [67] Applying the principles established in The Millwall and Asphalt, I find that the Appellant has the requisite locus standi in the present case to appeal the judgment given in favour of the 3rd Respondent.

  89. [68] Given my finding on the Appellant’s locus standi, it is not necessary for me to make any finding on whether it would have been just and convenient to grant leave otherwise.

  90. Issues 2 to 7:

  91. General principles governing an appellate court’s review of a trial judge’s decision

  92. [69] Before dealing with the other issues in this appeal, I first summarise the principles applicable in an appellate court’s review of a trial judge’s decision. In respect of findings of fact made by a trial judge, appellate intervention is generally only warranted when the trial judge’s assessment is plainly wrong or manifestly against the weight of the evidence (Nambu PVD Pte Ltd v UBTS Pte Ltd and another appeal [2022] 1 SLR 391 at [8]; Tat Seng Machine Movers Pte Ltd v Orix Leasing Singapore Ltd [2009] 4 SLR(R) 1101 (“Tat Seng”) at [41]; Tuitiongenius Pte Ltd v Toh Yew Keat and another [2021] 1 SLR 231 at [19]; North Star (S) Capital Pte Ltd v Yip Fook Meng [2022] 1 SLR 677 at [21]). This is because the trial judge is generally better placed to assess the credibility of witnesses, especially where oral evidence is concerned. The CA in Tat Seng (at [41]) has also clarified that where a finding of fact is not based on the veracity or credibility of the witness, but is instead based on an inference drawn from the facts or from an evaluation of the facts, the appellate court is in as good a position as the trial judge to undertake the exercise. This involves the appellate court evaluating the cogency of the evidence given by the witnesses by testing it against inherent probabilities or uncontroverted facts.

  93. [70] In respect of errors of law, the CA in Ng Eng Ghee and others v Mamata Kapildev Dave and others (Horizon Partners (Pte Ltd, intervener) and another appeal [2009] 3 SLR(R) 109 (at [90]), citing Halsbury’s Laws of England vol 1(1) (Butterworths, 4th Ed Reissue, 1989) at para 70) listed the various types of errors of law which would warrant appellate intervention (see also Mu Qi and another v Management Corporation Strata Plan No 1849 [2021] 5 SLR 1401 at [34]; Wu Chiu Lin v Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No 2874 [2018] 4 SLR 966 at [31]; Axis Law Corp v Intellectual Property Office of Singapore [2016] 4 SLR 554 at [61]):

  94. Issue 2: Whether the DJ erred in implying terms into the Sales Agreement, given that implied terms were not pleaded by the 3rd Respondent

  95. [71] I consider first Issue 2, which concerns the Appellant’s argument that the DJ erred in finding that an implied term in the Sales Agreement required the 1st and/or 2nd Respondents to procure and/or ensure the transfer of legal ownership and title over the Vehicle, free of any encumbrances, to the 3rd Respondent. The Appellant’s argument was principally based on alleged defects in the 3rd Respondent’s pleadings. I summarise below the Appellant’s and the 3rd Respondent’s submissions on this issue.

  96. Appellant’s Case

  97. [72] The Appellant argued that the 3rd Respondent had failed to plead in its statement of claim that it was an implied term of the Sales Agreement that the 1st and 2nd Respondents would procure and/or transfer to it the legal ownership and title in the Vehicle free from encumbrances; and that given this defect in the 3rd Respondent’s pleadings, the DJ was precluded from finding such an implied term to be established. The Appellant claimed that the 3rd Respondent’s statement of claim failed to specify the cause of action; that based on the 3rd Respondent’s pleadings, its cause of action appeared to lie in tort rather than in contract ; and that in any event the material facts in support of the alleged implied term were not pleaded.

  98. 3rd Respondent’s Case

  99. [73] The 3rd Respondent contended that his pleadings disclosed the material facts necessary for the DJ’s finding as to the implied term requiring the 1st and 2nd Respondents to procure and/or transfer legal ownership and title in the Vehicle to the 3rd Respondent free from encumbrances. The 3rd Respondent also contended that it was not necessary for the label “implied term” to be used in its pleadings before a finding could be made that a term was “implied in law”.

  100. My Decision

  101. [74] By way of general principle, parties are bound by their pleadings and the court was precluded from deciding on matters which the parties had decided not to put into issue: see V Nithia (co-administratrix of the estate of Ponnusamy Sivapakiam, deceased) v Buthmanaban s/o Vaithilingam and another [2015] 5 SLR 1422 (“V Nithia”) at [38]. The underlying consideration of the law of pleadings is to prevent surprises arising at trial: see SIC College of Business and Technology Pte Ltd v Yeo Poh Siah and others [2016] 2 SLR 118 (“SIC College”) at [46].

  102. [75] Having considered the parties’ submissions, I reject the Appellant’s submission regarding the alleged fatal flaws in the 3rd Respondent’s pleadings. My reasons are as follows.

  103. [76] I should start by stating that I found the Appellant’s arguments about the 3rd Respondent’s alleged failure to plead the implied term in question to be somewhat beside the point. Although the DJ did not explicitly make a finding of a “term implied in law”, it is plain that a term requiring the 1st and 2nd Respondents to procure and/or transfer legal ownership and title in the Vehicle to the 3rd Respondent free from encumbrances would constitute a “term implied in law”. This is because such a term would be a statutorily implied term: see s 12(2) read with s 2(1) of the Sales of Goods Act (Cap 393, 1999 Rev Ed). Andrew Phang et al, The Law of Contract in Singapore, vol.1, Academy Publishing (“Phang on Contract vol.1”) explains that if a statutory provision “states expressly that a particular term is to be implied, then effect must, of course, be given by the court to that provision”. On the facts, given that there was an agreement for the sale and purchase of the Vehicle as between the 3rd Respondent on the one hand and the 1st and 2nd Respondents on the other, s 12(2) Sales of Goods Act provides that:

  104. [77] I note parenthetically that s 12(3) has no application in the present case as there is nothing in the Sales Agreement which states or suggests that the parties’ intention was for the 2nd Respondent to “transfer only such title as he or a third person may have”.

  105. [78] Per s 12(2) Sales of Goods Act, therefore, there was an implied warranty on the part of the seller of the Vehicle that the Vehicle “[was] free and [would] remain free until the time when the property [was] to pass, from any charge or encumbrance not disclosed or known to the buyer before the contract is made”. It was common ground that no “charge or encumbrance” over the Vehicle was made known to the 3rd Respondent prior to the Sales Agreement being entered into. Further, the absence of any express reference to such an implied term in the 3rd Respondent’s pleadings would not preclude this point being raised. In Jet Holding Ltd and others v Cooper Cameron (Singapore) Pte Ltd and another and other appeals [2006] 3 SLR(R) 769, the CA was faced with an argument that the issue of a “term implied in law” had not been pleaded. In rejecting the argument, the CA held (at [93]) that “given the very nature of such a category of implied terms…it ought to be recognized by the court as a matter of law”. In other words, even if the issue of a “term implied in law” is not pleaded, the court should still recognize such implied terms a matter of law.

  106. [79] The above should suffice to dismiss the Appellant’s arguments on Issue 2. However, in the interests of completeness, since the Appellant has put forward arguments premised on the implied term being a term implied in fact, I address below the arguments made.

  107. [80] In MK (Project Management) Ltd v Baker Marine Energy Pte Ltd [1994] 3 SLR(R) 823 (“MK (Project Management)”, at [26]), the CA made it clear that if a legal result was being relied on, the legal result did not have to be specifically pleaded, provided the pleadings disclosed at the very least the material facts which would support the cause of action relied on and gave the opponent fair notice of the substance of such a claim. In MK (Project Management), the appellants relied on an oral agreement which they claimed had varied the project agreement vis-à-vis the quantum of their commission. The trial judge held that the appellants had failed to plead any consideration for this oral agreement. On appeal, the CA reversed the trial judge’s decision. The CA held that the appellants had sufficiently set out their allegation of fact that the quantum of commission had been varied by agreement from that provided in the project agreement to an amount of US$750,000. In the CA’s view, although the appellants had not gone on to explicitly characterize this as consideration for the variation, it was clear that such explicit characterization was unnecessary. In so holding, the CA (at [26]) cited the judgment of Lord Denning MR in In re Vandervell’s Trusts (No 2), White v Vandervell Trustees Ltd [1974] Ch 269 at 321H:

  108. It is sufficient for the pleader to state the material facts. He need not state the legal result.

  109. [81] In Tian Kong Buddhist Temple v Tuan Kong Beo (Teochew) Temple [2021] 4 SLR 286 (“Tian Kong Buddhist Temple”) at [10], Choo J highlighted that there was a difference between pleading law and raising a point of law in a pleading. Choo J observed that a party need not explicitly plead the legal conclusions which a party sought to persuade the court to draw from the facts. However, if a party intended to raise a particular point of law on the facts as pleaded, he ought to plead such a point expressly, or at the very least, give the opponent fair notice of the substance of his claim.

  110. [82] In Tian Kong Buddhist Temple (at [14]-[15]), the appellant claimed that the individual who had purportedly signed the 2011 Agreement on its behalf (one Chin) did not have the actual authority to enter into the said agreement on its behalf. At first instance, the district judge made no findings on the issue of actual authority, but found that the appellant was bound by the 2011 Agreement by virtue of the doctrine of ostensible authority. On appeal, the appellant contended that the district judge had erred in making this finding because the respondent had not pleaded a claim of ostensible authority, nor had it pleaded the facts material to such a claim. In allowing the appeal, Choo J held (at [14]) that the words “ostensible authority” or “apparent authority” did not have to be specifically pleaded by the respondent so long as the latter’s pleadings as a whole disclosed the material facts which would have supported such a claim. In its reply, in responding to the appellant’s assertions in its pleadings about Chin’s lack of authority, the respondent had merely stated that it did not plead to the relevant paragraphs in the appellant’s defence and that it put the appellant “to strict proof thereof”. Having regard to the state of the respondent’s pleadings, Choo J held (at [15]) that the respondent had failed to plead any facts or particulars showing that the elements of the doctrine of ostensible authority were satisfied. Choo J further found (at [16]) that the respondent’s failure to plead its case had caused irreparable prejudice to the appellant because the appellant had been deprived of the opportunity to adduce or to challenge evidence which might have been relevant to the issue of ostensible authority, and was thus unable on appeal to mount a substantive response to the respondent’s arguments on this issue.

  111. [83] Applying the principles set out in the above authorities, I am satisfied that contrary to the Appellant’s contention, the matters pleaded by the 3rd Respondent provided sufficient basis for the DJ’s finding that an implied term in the Sales Agreement required the 1st and 2nd Respondents to procure and/or transfer legal ownership and title in the Vehicle to the 3rd Respondent free from encumbrances. Contrary to the Appellant’s submission , it was unnecessary for the 3rd Respondent to explicitly state this implied term in its statement of claim. It was sufficient that the 3rd Respondent gave fair notice of the substance of his claim. The 3rd Respondent did so by pleading the facts material to such a claim. An examination of the 3rd Respondent’s statement of claim shows that the following matters were clearly pleaded:

  112. (a) The existence of the Sale Agreement, pursuant to which it was agreed that the 3rd Respondent would purchase the Vehicle from the 2nd Respondent at the price of $52,000.

  113. (b) The fact that the 3rd Respondent had made full payment in accordance with the Sale Agreement.

  114. (c) The receipt of the Vehicle by the 3rd Respondent.

  115. (d) The fact that after receipt of the Vehicle, the 3rd Respondent had realized that legal title and/or ownership in the Vehicle remained with the 1st Respondent.

  116. (e) That the 3rd Respondent was “entitled to the legal title and/or ownership” of the Vehicle it had purchased by reason of the above matters.

  117. (f) That the 1st and 2nd Respondents had “neglected and/or refused to ensure that the legal title and/or ownership of the Vehicle [was] duly transferred to the [3rd Respondent], despite the [3rd Respondent] having performed his part of the [Sales] Agreement”.

  118. (g) That the 3rd Respondent had been deprived of “the benefit and rental of [the Vehicle]” and had “suffered loss as a result of the [1st and/or 2nd Respondents’] breach”.

  119. [84] It is plain that while the words “implied term” were not explicitly used in the 3rd Respondent’s pleadings, the material facts in support of the implied term which the DJ found were more than adequately pleaded such that the 1st and 2nd Respondents had fair notice of the substance of the 3rd Respondent’s claim against them. Indeed, I note that the 1st and 2nd Respondents were able to respond to the relevant paragraphs in the statement of claim: they pleaded in their defence that they had “fully complied with their obligations under the [Sales] Agreement”, and that they were “not the party withholding the transfer of [the Vehicle]”.

  120. [85] The views I state above are stated on the assumption that the DJ was dealing with the implied term as a term implied in fact. For the reasons explained above, even putting aside what I have said about a “term implied in law” (at [76]-[79] above), I am satisfied that there was no bar to the doctrine of an implied term being invoked in the present case, and that the DJ did not err in implying a term in the Sales Agreement to the effect that the 1st and 2nd Respondents were required to procure and/or transfer legal ownership and title in the Vehicle to the 3rd Respondent free from encumbrances.

  121. [86] In the interests of clarity, I should point out that the Appellant’s objections to the implication of the above term were based, firstly, on the argument about the 3rd Respondent’s alleged failure to plead the implied term (which I have dealt with above); and secondly, on the effect of the entire agreement clause in the Sales Agreement (which I will deal with next). The Appellant has not actually argued that business efficacy did not necessitate the implication of the said term into the Sales Agreement, nor has it sought to challenge the merits of the DJ’s decision to imply the said term on any other grounds.

  122. Issue 3: Whether the existence of an entire agreement clause in the Sales Agreement precluded the DJ from implying terms into the Sales Agreement

  123. [87] I next address the Appellant’s submission on the effect of an entire agreement clause in the Sales Agreement. I first summarise the Appellant’s and 3rd Respondent’s respective positions.

  124. Appellant’s Case

  125. [88] The Appellant submitted that the existence of an entire agreement clause in the Sales Agreement “reiterates the fact that there were no other oral or written terms in the Sales Agreement other than the ones expressly stated in writing”. Whilst the point of the submission was not entirely clear, I understood the Appellant to be saying that the entire agreement clause precluded the DJ from implying terms into the Sales Agreement.

  126. 3rd Respondent’s Case

  127. [89] The 3rd Respondent submitted that the existence of the entire agreement clause in the Sales Agreement did not preclude the DJ from implying terms into the Sales Agreement because the implied term was implied “in law”: as such a term would not have been in the contemplation of the parties at the time they entered into the agreement, it would not be excluded by an entire agreement clause (see Ng Giap Hon v Westcomb Securities Pte Ltd [2009] 3 SLR(R) 518 (“Ng Giap Hon”) at [31]-[32]).

  128. My Decision

  129. [90] I reject the Appellant’s submission on the effect of the entire agreement clause for the following reasons.

  130. [93] In this connection, it may be helpful to examine local authorities dealing with the effects of an entire agreement clause. In Ng Giap Hon, the entire agreement clause reads as follows (at [29]-[30]):

  131. The CA found (at [30]) that the above clause did not exclude the implication of terms into the contract as the clause itself contemplated the existence of implied terms: indeed, as the italicized words above showed, the clause referred expressly to implied terms.

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