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Grounds publishedDecided 17 May 2023

General Division of the High Court

Carlos Manuel De São Vicente v Public Prosecutor

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[2023] SGHC 143Case no. Criminal Motion No 50 of 202256 paragraphs

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] The Applicant is, or at least was, a man of considerable means. At the peak of his wealth, he had amassed a fortune of more than a billion US dollars. He was the majority shareholder of the leading co-insurance firm in the oil industry of Angola, the second largest oil producer in Africa. He was the largest Angolan investor in the country. He owned and controlled multiple companies incorporated in Angola, the United Kingdom, Bermuda, and Portugal. He opened bank accounts across the world, including Singapore and Switzerland. Then, he was arrested. His funds in Switzerland were frozen. He was convicted of tax offences and money laundering by the Angolan courts. His assets in Angola were confiscated, along with those of his family. The Applicant describes this as a politically motivated prosecution. He claims that his family is being targeted because of his wife’s outspoken criticism of alleged corruption in Angola. The Angolan courts, however, had made findings of fact concerning the Applicant’s transfers of hundreds of millions of US dollars from companies under his control into his personal bank account. They found that he had unlawfully amassed profit from monopolies over the Angolan oil insurance sector, and had embezzled more than 1.2 billion US dollars from the country. The Applicant has filed an appeal, which is now pending, in the apex court in Angola.

  3. [2] The truth behind these transactions is not the subject of these proceedings. What is accepted as true by all parties, however, is that some of the money transferred into the Applicant’s personal bank account in Angola found its way to the Applicant’s Bank of Singapore account (“his BOS account”). On 19 February 2021, the Commercial Affairs Department (“CAD”) seized that account, which contained more than USD$558 million. The Applicant now seeks the release, under s 35(8)(b)(i) of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (“CPC”), of S$2,635,865.55 from his BOS account (the “Seized Funds”). He contends that he presently lacks the funds to pay for his legal expenses in Singapore, Switzerland, and Angola, as well as to pay for representations to various international organisations. He thus seeks the release of the Seized Funds as that is the only way that he claims he will have access to justice.

  4. [3] Having heard and considered both parties’ submissions, I dismiss the application. I set out below the reasons for my decision.

  5. Background facts

  6. [4] The Applicant, Carlos Manuel De São Vicente, was employed by Sonangol E.P. (“Sonangol”), an Angolan state-owned oil enterprise, during the early 2000s. During this time, Sonangol incorporated the company AAA Seguros SA (“AAA Seguros”) to implement an insurance risk management strategy in the oil sector and was granted a leading position in handling insurance for the oil industry nationwide in Angola in 2001. This risk management strategy was implemented through not just AAA Seguros, but also through several reinsurance companies controlled by the Applicant. These include AAA Reinsurance Ltd and AAA Risk Solutions Ltd, both based in Bermuda, and AAA Insurance & Reinsurance Broker Ltd, based in the United Kingdom. The Applicant also managed to acquire a majority stake in AAA Seguros. Over time, he acquired, in the words of his wife, Irene Alexandra Da Silva Neto (“Irene”), a “considerable fortune”.

  7. Proceedings in Angola

  8. (a) The Applicant controlled and was the sole signatory of multiple companies, including AAA Insurance & Reinsurance Brokers Ltd, AAA Servicos Financeiros, and AAA Investors Ltd.

  9. (b) The bank accounts of the following companies, held by the Applicant, were to be forfeited: AAA Seguros Sa, AAA Activos Lda, AAA Insurance & Reinsurance Ltd, AAA Insurance & Reinsurance Brokers Limited, AAA International Limited (“AAA International”), Global One Ltd, Global Net Training Solutions, African Reinsurance Corporate, Empresa Ofanda, Okiru Unipessoal Lda, Okuso Unipessoal Lda, Bear Stearns Securities Corp, Companhia Portuguesa De Resseguros, Munica Mauritius Reinsurance, Swiss Reinsurance Company Li, Reinsurance Solutions Brokers and Swiss Re Africa Limited.

  10. [6] The Applicant was unsuccessful in his appeal before the Court of Appeal of Luanda against this decision. The findings of the District Court of Luanda were also undisturbed. A further appeal to the Supreme Court of Angola is pending. It is the Applicant’s position that such proceedings in Angola are a show trial targeting him, his wife, and their family of three children.

  11. Proceedings in Switzerland

  12. [10] In addition to proceedings over the freezing orders, the Applicant has also been engaged in legal proceedings in Switzerland related to mutual legal assistance proceedings between Switzerland and Angola, in which he was similarly represented by Schellenberg Wittmer Ltd. Multiple requests for information were exchanged between the respective government prosecutors in both countries between March and June 2020, concerning the assets of the Applicant, his family, and the companies AAA International, AAA Activos LDA and AAA Seguros. The Angolan Public Prosecutor sought for these assets to be blocked. The final decision by the Geneva PPO on 14 October 2021, after considering parties’ submissions, granted the mutual legal assistance sought by Angolan authorities. The Applicant and the three aforementioned companies filed appeals against the decision of the Geneva PPO, which were dismissed by the Swiss Federal Criminal Tribunal on 23 May 2022. The Applicant filed a further appeal to the Swiss Federal Tribunal against the dismissal of the appeal, which is pending as of the time of this hearing.

  13. [11] The Applicant had also filed an application to the Geneva Court of Justice to request that the Geneva PPO transmit several questions regarding inconsistencies between Angolan criminal proceedings and a report issued by the Angolan PP on 7 August 2020. This application was dismissed on 10 August 2021.

  14. Representations to international organisations

  15. [12] In relation to his incarceration in Angola, the Applicant, through his counsel, filed a Communication and an Urgent Appeal for release on medical grounds with the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention. He also filed a Communication with the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. He was represented in both matters by François Zimeray and Jessica Finelle of Zimeray Finelle Avocats (France).

  16. Proceedings in Bermuda and Portugal

  17. [14] The Applicant also has an undisclosed number of companies that he owns or is involved with in Portugal. The Applicant is facing mutual legal assistance proceedings between Portugal and Angola in relation to both himself and these companies, along with other civil, labour, taxation, and insolvency proceedings. The Applicant maintains that both his personal bank account and the bank accounts of all his Portuguese companies have been frozen. Applications to unfreeze them are pending.

  18. Proceedings in Singapore

  19. [15] Following investigations, the CAD found that 18 separate transfers of funds from the BOS bank account of AAA International were made into the Applicant’s BOS bank account from 28 November 2018 to 26 September 2019. The value of these transfers total €12,500,000.00 and USD$103,334,155.70, and are in addition to the money transferred from the Applicant’s Banque Syz account. According to the CAD, no reasonable explanation has been given by the Applicant as to why funds held by AAA International were transferred to his personal bank account. There has likewise been no explanation given to the court in the current set of proceedings, beyond the assertion that the source of these funds is irrelevant to the present application.

  20. [16] On 19 February 2021, the following properties connected with the Applicant and his family were seized by the CAD:

  21. S/N

  22. Account Holder

  23. Bank Name

  24. Account Balance as of 2 November 2022

  25. 1

  26. Carlos Manuel De São Vicente

  27. Bank of Singapore Limited

  28. USD$558,389,833.74

  29. 2

  30. Irene Alexandra Da Silva Neto

  31. Bank of Singapore Limited

  32. USD$5,174,168.23

  33. 3

  34. Ivo Emanuel Neto De São Vicente (“Ivo”)

  35. Bank of Singapore Limited

  36. USD$10,501,233.09

  37. [17] On 3 March 2021, the Applicant was informed in writing of the above seizures.

  38. [18] Before the seizure of the BOS accounts, the Applicant had made several transfers out of his BOS account. On 30 November 2018, a total of €750,000 was transferred to Portuguese bank accounts belonging to his sons Ivo and Antonino Neto De São Vicente (“Antonino”), his daughter Felicia Neto De São Vicente (“Felicia”), and his wife Irene. On 12 December 2018, a further €4,500,000.00 was transferred to Ivo’s Portuguese bank account. Finally, between July and August 2020, a further €925,174.00 was transferred in total to the Portuguese bank accounts of Ivo, Antonino, Felicia, and Irene.

  39. [19] On 21 January 2022, the CAD posed several questions to the Applicant through his Singapore law firm, TSMP Law Corporation (“TSMP”). The CAD asserts that the written replies provided on 28 February 2022 were brief and provided very little useful information. For example, when asked about the source of the funds for his bank accounts in Singapore, the response given by the Applicant was merely that they were from “investment”. Further questions were posed by the CAD on 10 May 2022, and a further reply was given on 2 June 2022. However, no estimate of the Applicant’s salaried income was provided, nor were there any supporting documents furnished by the Applicant in relation to his investments or the source of the funds in the Singapore bank accounts.

  40. [20] On 13 July 2021, the CAD was informed by TSMP, acting for Irene and Ivo, that both were willing to extend their full cooperation, although they were unwilling to travel to Singapore. On 23 August 2021, the CAD wrote to Irene and Ivo, through TSMP, proposing an interview with both of them via remote communication technology. This letter went unanswered, and a reminder letter was sent by the CAD on 21 January 2022, but no response was received either. It was only on 30 December 2022, some ten months after the reminder letter, that a reply to the CAD through Irene and Ivo’s Singapore counsel TSMP was finally sent.

  41. The present proceedings

  42. [22] On 28 September 2022, the Applicant applied under s 35(8)(b)(i) of the CPC for the release of USD$4,900,591.27 from his BOS account that had been frozen by the CAD.

  43. [24] The Applicant has since amended his application and has revised the amount of funds sought from USD$4,900,591.27 to S$2,635,865.55. He now states that he will not be seeking the release of funds for legal fees in respect of his companies. The basis of his application for the release of funds has been revised to only be for expenses for personal legal services rendered toward the Applicant.

  44. [25] The legal fees for which Applicant now seeks the release of funds involve expenses for legal representation across multiple jurisdictions, namely, Singapore, Switzerland, and Angola, as well as for making legal representations to international organisations. I summarise the legal proceedings and fees underlying the Applicant’s claims in the present application:

  45. (a) S$219,482.67 to the firm TSMP in respect of mutual legal assistance proceedings in Singapore from 4 October 2021 to 7 November 2022;

  46. (b) USD$778,857.10 to the firm FBL Advogados in respect of criminal proceedings against the Applicant in Angola from 1 January 2021 to 30 September 2022;

  47. (c) €189,941.44 to Mr Fernando Fario de Bastos of the firm FBL Advaogados in respect of criminal proceedings against the Applicant in Angola from October 2021 to September 2022;

  48. (d) €638,522.86 to the firm Queiroz e Marinho in respect of criminal proceedings against the Applicant in Angola from November 2021 to October 2022;

  49. (e) CHF$59.062.40 to Schellenberg Wittmer in respect of proceedings in Switzerland related to the freezing of the Applicant’s bank accounts and mutual legal assistance proceedings;

  50. (f) CHF$7041.65 to Reiser Avocats in respect of proceedings in Switzerland related to the freezing of the Applicant’s bank accounts and mutual legal assistance proceedings; and

  51. (g) €48,600.00 to Zimeray Finelle Avocats in respect of representations made to the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention and the African Commission on Human People’s Rights.

  52. The applicable law

  53. [26] Section 35(7) of the CPC provides:

  54. [27] Section 35(8)(b) of the CPC provides:

  55. [30] I pause briefly to note that there is some degree of apparent textual ambiguity as to whether the clauses of “payment of reasonable professional fees” and “reimbursement of any expenses incurred” are to be read disjunctively or conjunctively in relation to the modifier “in connection with the provision of legal services”. That is, it is unclear as to whether only incurred expenses have to be connected with the provision of legal services, or whether both professional fees and expenses have to be so connected. In my view, both clauses should be read as subject to that modifier. Were the modifier not to apply to the first clause, the scope of “professional fees” would be overly ambiguous, since the adjective “professional” can apply to a wide range of different services and skills. This is at odds with the specific nature of the other subsections under s 35(8) of the CPC, which relate to well-delimited areas of expenses such as payment for foodstuff, rent, the discharge of a mortgage, or fees imposed for the routine holding or maintenance of property which the Applicant is prevented from dealing in. It also would be anomalous for reimbursement of expenses to be limited to legal services, but for professional fees to not be subject to such a limitation. Further, as I outline at [42] below, such a reading better accords with the legislative history of the provision.

  56. [31] I now consider the legislative intent of the statute. The remarks of the Minister for Law in Parliament during the Second Reading of the Criminal Procedure Code Bill (No. 11 of 2010) are instructive (Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (18 May 2010), vol 87 at col 412):

  57. [32] The legislative purpose of s 35(8) of the CPC, which includes 35(8)(b)(i), is to regulate what would otherwise be an absolute power of the police to freeze bank accounts, and guard against “unduly harsh” consequences for persons affected by police seizure of property. The concern, in contrast to s 370 of the CPC, is not about legal entitlement to the seized property, but merely whether the Applicant can satisfy one of the criteria under s 35(8): see Mustafa Ahunbay v Public Prosecutor [2013] 4 SLR 1049 at [14] (“Mustafa Ahunbay”).

  58. [33] Importantly, the above remarks contextualise the criteria under s 35(8)(a)–(e) of the CPC as bearing the common denominator of being “legitimate” expenses. The meaning of “legitimate” expenses is best understood by reference to the qualifiers chosen by the Minister to preface examples of expenses, which include “basic”, “reasonable”, and “day-to-day”. These terms are directly drawn from the wording of the statute, and they point towards the nature of the expenses as being ordinarily recognised as capable of causing hardship should the payee be unable to obtain funds to make payment for them. A consideration of the broader provision of s 35(8) of the CPC reinforces this conclusion. Apart from s 35(8)(c), which covers extraordinary expenses, each of the subsections outlines a category of expenses for which non-payment will result in hardship—whether in the form of an adverse impact on a basic standard of living (s 35(8)(a)), an inability to satisfy a judicial, administrative or arbitral lien or judgment (s 35(8)(c)), or the cessation of a company’s operations (s 35(8)(e)).

  59. [34] Having found that the legislative purpose of s 35(8) of the CPC is to prevent undue hardship from arising from police seizure of property, I briefly comment on the overall nature of the assessment under s 35(8) before elaborating on the five requirements of s 35(8)(b)(i) outlined above at [29].

  60. [35] As suggested in the Minister’s remarks above, the release of seized property under s 35(8) is subject to a balancing exercise between the competing concerns of ensuring the efficacy of police investigations, and prejudice to those potentially affected by police seizures. As set out in Mustafa Ahunbay at [13]–[14]:

  61. [36] This was further elaborated on in Vivosant Corp SA v Public Prosecutor (HC/CM 37/2017) (“Vivosant”) at [13]:

  62. [37] I agree with the remarks as framed in Vivosant, which align with the general common law principle that the police’s entitlement to retain lawfully seized evidence for as long as is reasonably necessary is subject to regard for the interests of justice (Goldring Timothy Nicholas and others v Public Prosecutor [2013] 3 SLR 487 at [27], citing Keith Tronc, Cliff Crawford and Doug Smith, Search and Seizure in Australia and New Zealand (LBC Information Services, 1996) at p 21).

  63. [38] I now consider the requirements that are apparent from the wording of s 35(8)(b)(i). I first consider the requirement of necessity. An applicant under s 35(8) must show that no funds within their possession are otherwise available. Were this not the case, release of seized property would not be necessary. This raises the question as to whether the applicant has any alternative sources of funding, as noted in the unreported case of OCAP Management Pte. Ltd. v Public Prosecutor (CM 41/2020) (“OCAP”) at [9]. There, the applicant had alleged that it had no sources of funds in seeking the partial release of seized funds to make payments to the Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore and for legal fees. The court dismissed the application. It held, inter alia, that despite the applicant’s assertions to the contrary there was evidence of significant incoming funds on a monthly and quarterly basis from external entities, which would provide a resource for addressing many of the applicant’s alleged expenses: OCAP at [9]. This illustrates the need for the court to be alive to the possibility that alternative sources of funds are available to an applicant, despite apparent assertions to the contrary. The exact level of scrutiny that is appropriate for each case may differ, having regard to the whether there is evidence of the means of the applicant and their circumstances.

  64. [39] I next consider the requirement of exclusivity. The basic meaning of this requirement, as the text of the provision provides, is that the release of funds should be used only for the payment of the fees and expenses under s 35(8)(b)(i) or (ii). However, in addition to this basic meaning, the interpretation of exclusivity should be guided by the legislative intention of safeguarding the affected person whose property has been frozen. Accordingly, it follows that any funds released should be used exclusively for legal fees and expenses of the Applicant. For example, in Vivosant, See Kee Oon J declined to release funds from the applicant’s seized bank account to pay for legal expenses incurred for matters that pertained to his company Tacla. He held that the applicant and Tacla were separate legal entities, and that there was no reason why the applicant had to be liable for such payments: Vivosant at [5].

  65. [42] I also note that the wording of rule 6 also supports the interpretation of s 35(8)(b)(i) as being, as a whole, concerned with legal expenses, rather than with a broad range of professional fees. This supports the analysis at [30] above that both the professional fees and expenses mentioned in the subsection should be in connection with the provision of legal services.

  66. [44] Two further points on the reasonableness of fees and expenses claimed under s 35(8)(b)(i) should be made. First, given that the court must be satisfied of the reasonableness of the fees, the onus should be on an applicant seeking the release of funds under this provision to adduce sufficient information for the court to undertake an assessment of the reasonableness of the amount claimed. Second, in assessing reasonableness, the court should consider whether the amount claimed is traceable and proportionate to the reason for incurring such expenses. The release of funds under s 35(8)(b)(i) is thus not, as the Applicant claims, an “unfettered right” to, for example, “engage as many lawyers as [the Applicant] requires”, but a decision subject to considerations of the nature and complexity of the proceedings at hand.

  67. [45] I now consider the fourth requirement that reimbursement must be of expenses already incurred. Again, there is linguistic ambiguity from the syntax of the statute. It is not clear whether the word “incurred” refers only to expenses, or to both professional fees and expenses. I am of the view that the word should apply to both. For one, there is no immediately appreciable distinction between legal professional fees and expenses incurred in connection with legal services which would suggest that the former should be able to be claimed prospectively while the latter should be restricted to claims for work already done. I also echo the reasoning of See J in Vivosant at [7] that effective supervision of the requirement of reasonableness necessitates restricting the release of funds for both professional fees and expenses to those which have been already incurred:

  68. [46] Finally, I reiterate that the above requirements must be cumulatively shown to the satisfaction of the court as a precondition to the release of property under s 35(7) of the CPC. The burden is on the Applicant to adduce sufficient evidence in this regard.

  69. The Singapore proceedings

  70. [47] The expenses claimed in respect of the Singapore proceedings involve TSMP’s representation of the Applicant in liaising with the CAD and Attorney-General’s Chambers, appearing at a hearing to oppose the continued seizure of the funds in the Applicant’s BOS account under s 370 of the CPC, drafting documents for the same, and corresponding with other institutions and law firms.

  71. Necessity

  72. [48] I agree that it is important for the Applicant to have the ability to pay for his legal representation in respect of the proceedings in Singapore. The relevant question is whether he in fact has the funds to do so. If he does, release of the Seized Funds would not be necessary. The Applicant asserts that he has no access to alternative sources of funds besides the funds frozen in Singapore. The veracity of this assertion must be assessed in the light of the overwhelming evidence that the Applicant controlled and had access to a vast amount of wealth (of more than a billion USD) prior to the proceedings in Angola and Switzerland from 2018 onwards. Given these exceptional circumstances a greater degree of scrutiny of this assertion is apropos.

  73. [51] However, there are other transfers after 18 April 2019 that the Applicant does not seem to have offered any explanation for. For example, on 12 June 2019, €18,005,762.19 was transferred from the Banque Syz account to an account with Barclays Bank PLC in London under the Applicant’s name. No evidence has been led by the Applicant of any freezing orders within the United Kingdom that he is subject to, nor any other reason why the funds transferred to that account would be unavailable to him.

  74. [52] Second, even though the Applicant maintains that his accounts in Switzerland, Portugal, and Singapore are frozen at present, there are glaring omissions in the documentation of these accounts. In relation to the Applicant’s undisclosed number of Portuguese bank accounts, counsel conceded during the hearing that they did not have any available documentation for these accounts or for the freezing orders, nor any information on the balance of money in the accounts when they were frozen. Even the identities of his companies in Portugal were not known to counsel for the Applicant, Mr Thio Shen Yi, S.C (“Mr Thio”).

  75. [54] I thus note that there is some degree of uncertainty as to whether the Applicant does in fact have other assets which he can access. This is not to say that an applicant under s 35(8) of the CPC must exhaustively produce comprehensive documentation of every financial interest and bank account that he or she owns. I am also cognisant of the Applicant’s circumstances in this specific case and the potential difficulties he faces in obtaining documentation, particularly for his Angolan assets. Yet, this must be balanced against the Applicant’s wealth, the numerous cross-jurisdictional transfers of large amounts of money that the Applicant has instructed between his bank accounts in the past, and the international nature of the Applicant’s assets which make it difficult to survey the true extent of the Applicant’s wealth (as illustrated by the presence of more than €18 million in a personal bank account in the United Kingdom which was not disclosed or explained in any affidavit). In the circumstances, I am unable to find as a fact that the Applicant is unable to access funds which represent less than a fraction of a percentage of his wealth solely based on his bare assertions. Some degree of documentation, or at the very least the ability to identify, for example, the companies that are subject to alleged freezing orders in Portugal for which no documentation exists, would be necessary to sustain a finding that he is indeed unable to obtain alternative sources of funding.

  76. [55] The Prosecution also submits that there have been significant outflows from the Applicant’s BOS account to the Portuguese bank accounts of his immediate family members, the sum of which exceeds the sum sought in the present application (see [18] above). The Prosecution argues that these funds should be used to pay for the Applicant’s legal fees. The question thus arises as to whether the assets of the Applicant’s family members can be considered part of the pool of assets available to him.

  77. [56] The Applicant argues that the funds in the Portuguese bank accounts belong solely to the Applicant’s family members, were legitimately transferred for payment of their living expenses, investment purposes and savings, and in any event are no longer accessible as these accounts have been frozen. Relying on the reasoning of See J in Vivosant at [5], he argues that in the same way that Tacla and the applicant in that case were separate legal entities such that the applicant could not be liable for Tacla’s legal expenses, the Applicant’s immediate family members are separate legal persons from the Applicant and should not be liable for his legal expenses.

  78. [57] I disagree with the reasoning of the Applicant. The holding in Vivosant pertained to the use of released funds needing to be exclusively for the Applicant (see [39] above). This should be distinguished from the present case, which involves asking whether the source of alternative funds has to be exclusively from the Applicant. This distinction is important. The concept of exclusivity of use of released funds can be readily inferred from the legislative intention behind s 35(8)(b)(i) of the CPC, and from the history of that provision. Conversely, there is no suggestion from the plain wording and context of the provision that assessment of an applicant’s alternative sources of funding must be restricted to assets over which the applicant has legal title. In fact, there are compelling reasons why such an assessment should in some circumstances extend to other external sources of funding. For example, an applicant seeking release of funds for payment of basic expenses for foodstuff and medicine might very well have access to government subsidies or grants. The fact that this source of funding comes from an external party should not be a barrier to the court taking this into account, as long as such subsidies or grants can be accessed without undue hardship to the applicant. It might also be the case that an applicant has insufficient funds in his own bank account to pay for legal services at the time of making an application but may have impending transfers of money from third parties in the near future. It would not be inappropriate for a court to consider that an alternative source of funding could come from lines of credit from a financial institution, if there is evidence that such lines of credit are available, the impending transfers of money are of a sufficient quantum to pay off his liabilities, and no undue hardship would befall the applicant as a result of such an arrangement. I thus find that an assessment of an applicant’s alternative sources of funding can encompass the availability of capital (or credit) from separate legal entities.

  79. [58] In my view, it would be appropriate to consider the availability of funding from the Applicant’s family members as a potential alternative source of funds. I reach this conclusion for several reasons.

  80. [59] First, there is evidence that the Applicant’s family members have access to large sums of money in other jurisdictions. The Applicant himself notes that his son Antonino possesses more than USD$10 million, transferred from Antonino’s BOS account to an account with Bank Sinarmas, which is not frozen nor subject to any investigations. Similarly, Irene states that the reason for the transfers made by the Applicant from his BOS account to Ivo’s Portuguese bank account in 2018 and 2020, totalling approximately €5 million, is that “Ivo required a reinforcement of additional funds to invest as at that time, Ivo’s own funds were already in investments and he did not have any liquid cash available to make further investments [emphasis added]”. This suggests that even prior to the transfer of €5 million, Ivo already had investments of his own. Moreover, even though the Applicant asserts that his family’s Portuguese bank accounts have been frozen, it is not clear whether the freezing orders would have any actual effect on the family’s ability to access the sum of more than €6 million transferred in total by the Applicant. No information has been provided as to how much money remained in the Portuguese bank accounts at the time they were frozen. No information has been provided as to when the freezing orders were made, which could very well have been a significant amount of time after the original transfers. No information has been provided as to whether the Applicant’s family members have bank accounts in other jurisdictions. Mr Thio was also unable to confirm or deny whether there were any outgoing transactions from the Portuguese bank accounts between the time of these injections and their alleged freezing. There is a considerable possibility that substantial sums had been transferred out of the Portuguese bank accounts prior to the freezing orders being made. Thus, I consider there is sufficient evidence that the Applicant’s family has access to funds which would be more than sufficient to cover the legal expenses that the Applicant is seeking reimbursement for.

  81. [60] Second, there is a high likelihood that the assets of the Applicant’s family would be made available to the Applicant should he require access to funds. Given that the source of much of the wealth of the Applicant’s family came from transfers from the Applicant himself for their own investments and savings, it would be unlikely that they would be unwilling to extend the same charity back to the Applicant in his time of need. This is all the more so given the Applicant and Irene’s view that the proceedings they face around the world are the result of targeted persecution against their family as a whole. In fact, Irene labels these as “proceedings against the São Vicente family” in her affidavit.

  82. [62] In the circumstances, it would not be unreasonable to expect the Applicant to explore the possibility of seeking funds from his family. They have access to sufficient assets to pay his legal fees without undue hardship to themselves. These assets were gifted by the Applicant himself. There is good reason for them to be inclined to extend funding to him. There is no evidence that they are unable or unwilling to do so. I thus find that requesting for funds from his family should be considered one of the alternative sources of funding that the Applicant ought to exhaust before release of the Seized Funds be deemed necessary. There is no evidence that he has exhausted that option. Making such a request would not cause undue hardship to the Applicant.

  83. [63] For the reasons above, I find that there is a significant degree of uncertainty as to whether the Applicant has other assets of his own that are available to him for the purposes of funding his legal expenses. Even if he does not, the Applicant has failed to show that alternative sources of funding from his family are unavailable. It is thus unnecessary for the Seized Funds to be released to pay for legal expenses in Singapore to prevent undue hardship to the Applicant.

  84. Exclusivity

  85. [64] My conclusion that the release of the Seized Funds is unnecessary is further strengthened by the fact that the legal fees for which release is sought are not incurred exclusively by the Applicant. A striking feature of the invoices issued by TSMP in respect of the Singapore proceedings is that they were addressed, not to the Applicant personally, but to the Applicant’s family. The invoice was titled “Advice in relation to the bank accounts of Carlos Manuel De Sao Vicente, Irene Alexandra Da Silva Neto, Ivo Emanuel Neto De Sao Vicente, Antonino Neto De Sao Vicente and Felicia Neto De Sao Vicente”. That the work done is not exclusive to the Applicant is further shown by statements of the Applicant’s own family and examination of the work done by TSMP. I illustrate by way of two examples:

  86. (a) Irene describes the correspondence between TSMP and counsel for BOS as concerning “various issues in respect of the bank accounts held by my family with the BOS [emphasis added]”.

  87. (b) The timesheets submitted by TSMP include internal discussions and drafting in respect of letters to the CAD for Irene and Ivo on multiple occasions. It is clear that the references to Irene and Ivo extend beyond their assistance in the Applicant’s matter, to matters where they are the client. This is clear from the fact that legal services rendered to Irene and Ivo are billed separately from the Applicant, although these services both involve correspondence with the CAD.

  88. [65] Mr Thio quite reasonably conceded during the hearing that reductions in the quantum could be made where work had been done for clients other than the Applicant. He submitted that the larger point was that the bulk of the work was primarily done for the Applicant. Only a small percentage of work had been done for the Applicant’s family, most of which was duplicative of work that had already been done for the Applicant as the nature of proceedings was similar. However, this submission overlooks the distinction between who work was done for, and who would be expected to make payment for that work. The two are not the same, and often may involve different individuals within a familial context. In the absence of any submissions or evidence led as to how the payment was to be divided between the five named individuals on the invoice, the most natural inference would be that the invoice was intended to bill the family as a collective unit, rather than the Applicant specifically. Given my conclusion at [59] that the Applicant’s family has more than sufficient assets for this purpose, this provides a further reason why it would be not be unjust for the funds of the Applicant’s family as a whole to be considered part of the alternative sources of funding available for the Applicant to pay for the legal fees of TSMP.

  89. Conclusion on Singapore proceedings

  90. [66] Having found that the release of funds is unnecessary, it is not necessary for me to further consider the reasonableness of the quantum being claimed in respect of the Singapore proceedings.

  91. [67] Having regard to the interests of justice, I am strengthened in this conclusion by the presence of strong reasons as to why the release of the seized funds should not be taken lightly. There has been a determination by the Angolan courts that the Applicant has misappropriated state funds. These funds are traceable in part to the sums currently in his BOS account. He was not forthcoming in his answers to the CAD when explaining the source of his funds, even taking into account his limited access to information while incarcerated.

  92. [68] I also agree with the Prosecution that Irene and Ivo showed a lack of cooperation with the CAD through their delayed responses. The fact that they have been engaged with litigation in other jurisdictions is insufficient to explain their delay of more than a year to respond to the CAD’s offer to conduct an interview via remote communication technology. Although the nature of their conduct should not in itself prejudice the assessment of the Applicant’s case, it is nevertheless relevant in pointing towards more time being needed for investigations due to a lack of information. A greater degree of caution would thus be appropriate before a decision to release the seized funds is made.

  93. [69] In the round, I am satisfied that denying the Applicant access to the funds sought for legal expenses arising from the Singapore proceedings would not cause undue hardship or injustice.

  94. Proceedings in other jurisdictions

  95. [70] Given my finding that the Applicant has alternative sources of funding which he has failed to exhaust, I find that release of the Seized Funds is unnecessary for payment of legal expenses incurred in the Swiss and Angolan proceedings and in making representations to international organisations.

  96. [73] Lastly, although rendered irrelevant by my conclusion that release of the Seized Funds is unnecessary, I note for completeness that the scope of s 35(8)(b)(i) of the CPC ought to include legal services rendered for proceedings out of jurisdiction. Observing the plain wording of s 35(8), there does not appear to be any reason for limiting the release of property under s 35(8)(b)(i) to fees or expenses that are incurred in Singapore. Various kinds of expenses listed under s 35(8)(a) are capable of being incurred in multiple jurisdictions, such as where release is sought for payment of taxes or insurance premiums. Extraordinary expenses under s 35(8)(c) similarly do not seem amenable to such a geographical limitation. Even though s 35(8)(e) limits the release of funds for day-to-day operations to companies incorporated in Singapore, this seems to be a particular feature of that specific subsection, as evidenced by the absence of similar wording elsewhere in s 35(8). Moreover, there are plausible reasons for the operations of Singaporean-incorporated companies to be regarded differently from foreign-incorporated companies, as information about these companies is more accessible to local courts, and cessation of their operations is more likely to have adverse effect on local supply chains, businesses, and employees.

  97. Conclusion

  98. [74] I therefore dismiss the application.