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Grounds publishedDecided 19 Jul 2023

General Division of the High Court

Tey Leng Yen v Mai Xun Yao

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[2023] SGHC 194Case no. Originating Application No 391 of 202324 paragraphs

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Grounds of decision

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  1. Introduction

  2. [3] The Applicant now makes this application for permission to appeal against the decision of the DJ and to set aside the DJ’s decision which rejected the Applicant’s application for permission to appeal in SUM 706. Having considered the parties’ submissions, I find that the application is unmeritorious as the threshold for permission to appeal to be granted has not been met.

  3. [4] I shall set out below the brief facts and procedural history of the case before explaining my views on why the application for permission to appeal against the decision of the DJ is unmeritorious.

  4. Background facts and the proceedings below

  5. Background facts

  6. [5] The Applicant and the Respondent were business partners in two companies (the “two companies”). One of the two companies was Sheenway Exhibition and Projects Pte Ltd (“SE&P”). The Applicant held 40% of the shares in SE&P and the Respondent held 60% of the shares in SE&P. As a result of differences which arose, the parties entered into a settlement agreement (the “SA”). As part of the SA, the parties had agreed that SE&P would cease all operations except the collection of outstanding debts. Further, the receivables were to be distributed between the Applicant and the Respondent in accordance with the proportion of shares they each held. The parties also appended their signatures to a document which stated that SE&P’s receivables were in excess of $530,000 (see Tey Leng Yen v Mai Xun Yao [2021] SGDC 65 (the “Trial Judgment”) at [1]–[6]).

  7. [6] The Applicant subsequently commenced a suit in the District Court, DC/DC 45/2018 (“DC 45”), against the Respondent on 5 January 2018 on the basis that the Respondent had breached various terms of the SA (see the Trial Judgment at [3]).

  8. [7] On 17 March 2020, the Respondent made an offer to settle (the “OTS”) which included the following terms:

  9. (a) The Respondent shall make available to the Applicant the accounts of the two companies after March 2013; and

  10. (b) Any net balance in the accounts of the two companies (after deducting the expenses, taxes, etc) shall be split between the Applicant and the Respondent in accordance with their respective shareholdings in the two companies.

  11. [8] The Applicant did not accept the OTS.

  12. The trial

  13. [9] The trial was bifurcated. The first tranche dealt with the liability of the parties. There were two issues to be decided at the first tranche: (a) whether the Respondent had breached the SA by allowing SE&P to continue operating; and (b) whether the Respondent had breached the SA by failing to distribute the receivables of SE&P in accordance with the proportion of the shares held by the parties (see the Trial Judgment at [14]).

  14. [11] In the second tranche of the trial, the Applicant submitted that she was entitled to 40% of SE&P’s receivables which was determined as at March 2013, being what she was entitled to under the SA in accordance with the proportion of the shares she held in SE&P. The DR, however, found that the Applicant had failed to prove the loss she suffered and the quantum of that loss as a result of the Respondent’s breach which allowed SE&P to continue operating because the company was in operation and the Applicant’s share of SE&P’s receivables could only be determined after SE&P’s liabilities were settled. The DR thus awarded nominal damages of $1,000 to the Applicant with interest.

  15. The DR’s costs award

  16. The DJ’s decision on costs in RA 85

  17. [14] In RA 85, the Respondent made the following arguments:

  18. (b) In the event the DJ disagreed that O 22A r 9(3) of the ROC 2014 applied, the Applicant should still have not been awarded costs. The Applicant cannot be regarded as the successful party since she had only been awarded nominal damages in the second tranche of the trial.

  19. (a) The OTS remained valid at the time the DR made an assessment on damages. Further, the Applicant did not obtain a judgment that was more favourable than the OTS. Although the Applicant had won on the first liability issue of the Respondent’s breach of the SA by allowing SE&P to continue operating, the Applicant was awarded only nominal damages as the Applicant could not prove the damages suffered. The Applicant had to wait until after SE&P’s liabilities had been settled and its operations ceased before she could ascertain her share of SE&P’s receivables. This was akin to what was offered in the OTS. If the Applicant had accepted the OTS, she would have been in no worse a position than she was after the decision on assessment of damages was made by the DR. Therefore, the judgment obtained by the Applicant was not more favourable than the terms of the OTS.

  20. (b) The OTS was a serious and genuine attempt at settlement. Therefore, the costs consequences provided for in O 22A r 9(3) of the ROC 2014 should have applied. In other words, the Applicant was entitled to costs on the standard basis until 17 March 2020 which was when the OTS was served, and the Respondent was entitled to costs on the indemnity basis from the date the OTS was served to 18 November 2022 when the DR made her decision on damages.

  21. The DJ’s decision to dismiss the Applicant’s application for permission to appeal against the DJ’s costs award

  22. [17] In SUM 706, the Applicant submitted the following grounds to support her application:

  23. (a) The DJ had not given due weight to the DR’s decision when deciding to overturn the DR’s decision on costs in RA 85.

  24. (b) The DJ had considered the OTS when it was not brought up to the DR at the hearing on costs.

  25. (c) The DJ had considered the OTS when the DR had already taken it into account after the request for further arguments was denied.

  26. (d) The DJ erred in her conclusion that the judgment obtained by the Applicant was not more favourable than the terms of the OTS.

  27. (e) There was a procedural irregularity in RA 85 as the Respondent had been labouring under the misapprehension that the Rules of Court 2021 applied instead of the ROC 2014.

  28. [18] The DJ dismissed SUM 706. The DJ’s decision can be summarised as follows:

  29. (a) The Applicant’s position appeared to be inconsistent. On the one hand, the Applicant took issue that the DJ had considered the OTS in RA 85 when it had not been brought up to the DR during the hearing on costs before the DR. On the other hand, the Applicant took issue that the DJ had considered the OTS in RA 85 when the DR had already considered the OTS when it was brought to the attention of the DR by way of the Respondent’s 21 November 2022 Letter. The Applicant’s counsel also accepted that these were contradictory positions.

  30. (b) The hearing of RA 85 operated as a de novo hearing and the DJ was allowed to consider the OTS. The DJ also gave due weight to the DR’s decision when evaluating whether the DR had erred in deciding on the award of costs. The DR had not indicated that she had considered the OTS, or provided reasons to support the DR’s award of costs in light of the OTS. In view of the facts of the case, the DR’s award of costs could not be sustained.

  31. (c) While the Respondent may have taken the erroneous position that the Rules of Court 2021 applied to the RA 85 instead of the ROC 2014, the court clearly recognised that it was the ROC 2014 which applied. Further, the substantive law was the same in both the ROC 2014 and the Rules of Court 2021.

  32. (d) The Applicant was dissatisfied with the outcome of RA 85 but could not point to any prima facie case of error of law for which permission to appeal ought to be granted.

  33. [20] The Applicant now seeks this Court’s permission to appeal against the DJ’s decision. This is pursuant to O 19 r 15(2) of the Rules of Court 2021 which states that where the lower court does not grant permission to appeal, a party may apply to the General Division of the High Court.

  34. My decision

  35. The law on permission to appeal

  36. [21] The applicable legal principles for permission to appeal are set out in Lee Kuan Yew v Tang Liang Hong and another [1997] 2 SLR(R) 862 (“Lee Kuan Yew”) at [16]. For permission to appeal to be granted, there must be: (a) a prima facie case of error; (b) a question of general principle decided for the first time; or (c) a question of importance upon which further argument and a decision of a higher tribunal would be to the public advantage. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Lin Jianwei v Tung Yu-Lien Margaret and another [2021] 2 SLR 683 at [85].

  37. [22] For there to be a prima facie case of error, the general rule is that it must be an error of law and not of fact, though permission to appeal may be granted in exceptional circumstances where the error is one of fact which is obvious from the record (see Rodeo Power Pte Ltd and others v Tong Seak Kan and another [2022] SGHC(A) 16 at [10]).

  38. [23] In light of the above, and having heard the parties’ submissions, I am of the view that the arguments raised by the Applicant are unmeritorious. I fully agree with the DJ’s decision to dismiss SUM 706 which I have summarised at [18] above. None of the three grounds laid down in Lee Kuan Yew were made out to allow for the granting of permission to appeal. I shall briefly set out below my views on the Applicant’s arguments.

  39. There was no prima facie case of error

  40. [24] The Applicant alleges that there were four prima facie cases of error:

  41. (a) the DJ wrongly disturbed the DR’s costs award which should not ordinarily be tampered with;

  42. (b) the DJ failed to give due weight to the DR’s costs award;

  43. (c) the DJ conducted a detailed examination of matters relating to the OTS and the determination of nominal damages which she should not have done; and

  44. (d) the Rules of Court 2021 had been wrongly applied in RA 85.

  45. [28] In my view, the DJ’s purportedly “detailed examination” of the DR’s decision does not raise a prima facie case of error in and of itself. The relevant passage in Hoddle (at 550–551) merits reproduction in full:

  46. From the passage above, it can be seen that while the court in Hoddle had cautioned against going into too detailed an examination of the matters below, the court nonetheless accepted that appeals against costs awards can be allowed where the award made was unreasonable, resulted from an error of law or resulted from the failure to take into account proper matters or from the taking into account of matters which should not have been taken into account.

  47. [31] In her affidavit, the Applicant also alludes to a potential error by the DJ in arriving at her decision that the judgment obtained by the Applicant was one which was not more favourable than the terms of the OTS. The Applicant asserts that there were reasons to reject the OTS. Further, the Applicant argues that she had won in DC 45 as there was a finding that the Respondent had breached the SA and the Applicant was awarded nominal damages.

  48. [32] I am unable to see how there was a prima facie case of error in this regard. The DJ had taken into consideration that the Applicant had won on the issue of liability as the Respondent had breached the SA and the Applicant was awarded nominal damages. On the issue of whether the judgment obtained by the Applicant was one which was not more favourable than the terms of the OTS, the DJ applied the well-settled principles which include the following:

  49. (b) The monetary sum offered in an offer to settle is only one factor to be taken into account in determining whether the judgment obtained by the plaintiff is more favourable than an offer to settle (see CCM Industrial Pte Ltd v Uniquetech Pte Ltd [2009] 2 SLR(R) 20 at [40]).

  50. (d) What is important in assessing an offer to settle is whether it is a serious and genuine offer to settle (see Ram Das at [46]).

  51. (e) While the plaintiff may derive some non-monetary value from obtaining a judgment, this is subjective and incapable of precise quantification. Therefore, as a matter of principle, the non-monetary value that the plaintiff may obtain from a judgment should not be accounted for when analysing whether the judgment obtained by the plaintiff is one which was not more favourable than the terms of the offer to settle (see Michael Vaz Lorrain v Singapore Rifle Association [2021] 1 SLR 513 at [56]–[57]).

  52. [33] When applying the principles above, it is clear that the DJ’s position that the judgment obtained by the Applicant was not more favourable than the terms of the OTS is correct. I would add that whatever the Applicant’s subjective intentions may have been in rejecting the OTS, this would have no bearing per se on the objective inquiry of whether the judgment obtained by the Applicant was one which was or was not more favourable than the terms of the OTS. Considering the terms of the OTS with the judgment ultimately obtained by the Applicant, I am unable to agree with the Applicant that there was a prima facie case of error in the DJ’s finding that the judgment was not more favourable than the terms of the OTS.

  53. [34] Finally, on the fourth and last alleged error, the Applicant argues that the Respondent had wrongly applied the Rules of Court 2021 instead of the ROC 2014 in mounting his appeal in RA 85. However, as the DJ had noted (see [18(c)] above), the DJ was fully aware that it was the ROC 2014 which applied in RA 85. Further, the substantive law was the same in both the ROC 2014 and the Rules of Court 2021, a point accepted by the Applicant’s counsel at the hearing of SUM 706. Therefore, it is again unclear how this amounts to a prima facie case of error.

  54. [35] For the above reasons, I find that there was no prima facie case of error committed by the DJ which would allow this Court to grant the Applicant’s application for permission to appeal against the DJ’s decision.

  55. There was no question of general principle which was decided for the first time

  56. [36] The Applicant makes a passing assertion in her affidavit that “there are general principles to be addressed”. However, I note that the Applicant appears not to be pursuing this point as her written submissions do not elaborate on the general principles which were decided, much less which general principles were decided for the first time.

  57. [38] Therefore, in the absence of any further argument or elaboration by the Applicant, I am unable to accept the bare assertion by the Applicant that there are general principles to be addressed for the first time.

  58. Conclusion