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Grounds publishedDecided 17 Aug 2023
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General Division of the High Court

Chang Peng Hong Clarence v Public Prosecutor and other appeals

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[2023] SGHC 225Case no. Magistrate’s Appeal No 9110 of 2021/01

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] This case involved accused persons who had claimed trial to corruption charges disclosing more than $5 million paid in gratification. It raised questions concerning the Prosecution’s disclosure obligations, as well as the operation of penalty orders under s 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act (Cap 241, 1993 Rev Ed) (“PCA”).

  3. [2] Chang Peng Hong Clarence (“Chang”) and Koh Seng Lee (“Koh”) are the respective appellants in Magistrate’s Appeals 9110/2021/01 and 9111/2021/01. In this judgment, when dealing with the appeals against conviction and sentence, I refer to Chang and Koh collectively as the appellants. Chang was convicted of 19 charges under s 6(a) of the PCA and one charge under s 5(a) of the PCA. Koh was convicted of 19 charges under s 6(b) of the PCA and one charge under s 5(b) of the PCA.

  4. [3] Chang and Koh’s charges are mirrors of each other. The first 18 charges, brought under ss 6(a) and 6(b) of the PCA, relate to payments from Koh to Chang while Chang was employed by BP Singapore Pte Ltd (“BP”). These were made between 31 July 2006 and 20 January 2010. The 19th charges faced by Chang and Koh, which were brought under s 5 of the PCA, concern a payment of US$150,000 from Koh to Chang on or about 26 July 2010, which was after Chang had left the employ of BP. The 20th charges faced by Chang and Koh, which were brought under ss 6(a) or 6(b) of the PCA, pertain to Chang and Koh corruptly agreeing to accept or give gratification, being payments for Mindchamps Preschool @ City Square Pte Ltd (“Mindchamps City Square”), as an inducement for Chang to advance the business interest of Pacific Prime Trading Pte Ltd (“PPT”) with BP.

  5. [6] I set out the detailed reasons for my decision below, incorporating the oral judgments which I delivered at the hearing of the appeals.

  6. Undisputed facts

  7. [7] The detailed facts surrounding Chang and Koh’s offences can be found in the District Judge’s (“DJ”) grounds of decision (see Public Prosecutor v Koh Seng Lee and another [2022] SGDC 66). For present purposes, it suffices to note the following.

  8. Relationship between Chang and Koh

  9. [8] Chang and Koh first met in 1997. Their relationship was not purely commercial. They were friends and their families even went on holidays together.

  10. [9] Chang joined BP as a Marine Support Executive in July 1997. He was promoted to Marine Trading Manager from 1 November 1999, and to Regional Operating Unit, Manager Fuels, from 1 April 2003. In 2009, Chang was designated Regional Marine Manager Fuels of the Global Residues Unit and his team covered oil trades in the Eastern Hemisphere.

  11. [10] From 29 December 2004, Chang had the authority to decide the customers to which BP would sell its goods and services. Beginning 28 January 2008, he could commit BP to sales decisions (including the price of goods and services) for up to one year. From 2 January 2009, Chang could agree to payment terms which subjected BP to a degree of credit exposure, and he was authorised to enter into long-term contracts of up to two years’ commitment and not exceeding US$25m as of 1 April 2010.

  12. [11] Koh was the sole shareholder and executive director of PPT. PPT was incorporated on 5 April 2001, and was in the business of the wholesale and retail trade of mineral fuels and lubricants. PPT was BP’s trading counterparty (“TCP”) between 2001 and 2015.

  13. Relationship between BP and PPT

  14. [12] BP traded bunker fuel with TCPs on an “ex-wharf” or “delivered” basis. In the former circumstance, BP sold bunker fuel to the TCP at its wharf, and title to the fuel was transferred to the TCP at the load port. In the latter, BP would purchase bunker fuel from the TCP and simultaneously sell the fuel to its customer. Whilst BP did not own barges needed to deliver bunker fuel to its customer’s vessels, it had long-term charter arrangements for barges and would charge TCPs for the use of these barges when back-to-back sales took place.

  15. [13] PPT did not possess licences to sell and deliver oil to ship owners and to operate barges to transport the bunker fuel. Nor did it own storage facilities to store the fuel. It had to rely on BP’s licences to conduct trades with ship owners. PPT enjoyed a netting arrangement with BP under which each party could set off debts owed by the other.

  16. [14] Between January 2008 and July 2010, PPT was BP’s largest TCP for delivered sales by volume. On the flip side of the coin, BP was PPT’s largest trading partner between 2005 and 2010. PPT’s trades with BP constituted approximately 80% to 90% of PPT’s total traded volume.

  17. Moneys transferred from Koh to Chang or Mindchamps City Square

  18. [15] Between 31 July 2006 and 26 July 2010, over 19 occasions, Koh transferred a total of US$3.95m from his HSBC Hong Kong bank account to Chang’s HSBC Hong Kong bank account. These transfers broadly pertain to the 1st to 19th charges proffered against Chang and Koh.

  19. [16] Separately, Mindchamps City Square was incorporated on 3 September 2009. Koh and Chang’s wife were directors and equal shareholders of the company. From September 2009, Koh paid an aggregate of $525,000 to Mindchamps City Square. He was in turn paid $182,500 by Mindchamps City Square between 4 November 2014 and 17 February 2015.

  20. [17] In this regard, it is undisputed that: (a) PPT retained all of its profits during the material period of time; (b) the moneys Koh transferred to Chang during the financial years ending 31 March 2007, 31 March 2008 and 31 March 2009 exceeded the net profits earned by PPT for the corresponding years; and (c) the aggregate sum Koh transferred to Chang as of 31 March 2008 and 31 March 2009 exceeded the cumulative profits generated by PPT as of these respective dates.

  21. Messages exchanged between Koh and Chang

  22. [18] On 20 July 2009, at 2.58pm, Chang sent Koh a message stating, “Our oil coming in tomorrow. Sell as much as possible b4 premium collapses”. Koh replied, “Ok. Noted….” at 3.04pm on the same day. I shall refer to these messages as the “20/7/09 Messages”.

  23. [19] On 1 December 2009, at 8.18am, Chang sent to Chua Hwee Cheng (“Chua”), a Market Coordinator in BP Marine, the message, “Hwee cheng ,For next yr q1, pp will do about 250 kt /mth, vm about 200 kt and bhl 50 kt. Pls pass over all the term with good pricing to pp first . same goes for spot . We will stop trading . Pls try to get mops flat for 500 cst and mops + 2 for 380 cst fm our traders. For external term , pls target below these numbers otherwise we may have difficulty justifying to traders . For more details, pls check with Koh .” I will refer to this message, which Chang forwarded to Koh immediately after sending it to Chua, as the “1/12/09 Message”.

  24. Statements provided by Koh and Chang

  25. [20] Koh and Chang collectively provided 20 statements to investigating officers (“IOs”) from the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (“CPIB”) between 18 October 2011 and 5 September 2016. I will refer to these statements at the appropriate juncture.

  26. The decision below

  27. [21] Neither Koh nor Chang disputed that Koh had given, and Chang had received, the gratification subjects of the 20 charges. The DJ considered that the main issues were: (a) whether Koh gave (or agreed to give) and Chang received (or agreed to receive) gratification on account of Chang advancing the business interest of PPT with BP; (b) whether these transactions were tainted by an objective corrupt element; and (c) whether Koh and Chang acted with the requisite guilty knowledge.

  28. [22] The DJ held that the Prosecution had proved the elements of all charges beyond a reasonable doubt. She found the following arrangement to undergird Koh’s transfer of moneys to Chang. First, Chang suggested that Koh set up PPT. Second, both parties understood that Chang would facilitate the appointment of PPT as BP’s TCP and help PPT. Third, Chang regarded himself as a co-owner or shadow partner of PPT even though he did not invest any moneys in PPT. Fourth, Koh understood that Chang wielded significant influence over PPT’s success. Fifth, Chang asked for and received moneys from Koh, which Chang described as his share of PPT’s profits. Sixth, Koh gave Chang the moneys as he did not wish to offend Chang and wanted to preserve PPT’s business relationship with BP.

  29. [23] This arrangement was supported by the investigative statements Koh provided on 18 and 19 October 2011 (“P1” and “P2” respectively) and the investigative statement Chang provided on 18 October 2011 (“P23”), all of which the DJ found to be accurately recorded. The arrangement was also consistent with the evidence showing that Chang could influence PPT’s appointment as BP’s TCP, Chang was in a position to and did advance PPT’s interest in its dealings with BP, Chang shared BP’s confidential information with Koh, and PPT benefited from being BP’s TCP. In the latter regard, as BP’s TCP, PPT could trade oil with BP with greater ease, offset its payments with BP as part of a netting arrangement, and leverage BP’s customer base.

  30. [24] To the DJ’s mind, it was also significant that Chang received more moneys from Koh than from his employment with BP, the moneys were transferred surreptitiously via bank accounts in Hong Kong, and Chang and Koh both knowingly acted in breach of BP’s policies and guidelines.

  31. [25] The DJ rejected Chang and Koh’s claims that the moneys could not have constituted corrupt payments because: (a) Koh was not fearful of Chang; (b) BP benefitted from having PPT as a TCP and continued dealing with PPT long after Chang left BP; (c) the sum of the transfers exceeded PPT’s profits during the relevant period; (d) the first transfer took place long after PPT had been incorporated and appointed as a TCP; and (e) the final transfer was made after Chang left BP.

  32. [26] Dealing with each contention in turn, the DJ found that: (a) Koh was not fearful of offending Chang per se, but of offending Chang by rebuffing his requests for money; (b) whether BP benefited from having PPT as a TCP did not impinge on the corrupt nature of the arrangement; (c) PPT formed part of a network of companies that Koh had a stake in and which benefited from PPT’s relationship with BP; (d) as the commencement and continuation of payments from Koh to Chang coincided with PPT’s growth in profitability, it was not incongruous for Chang to start asking for payment from Koh when PPT’s business flourished; and (e) the timing of the final transfer did not imply that the entire series of payments was made for bona fide purposes. The DJ found that it was not illogical for Koh to continue acceding to Chang’s requests for money until there was greater clarity on where PPT stood with BP.

  33. [27] The DJ likewise rejected Chang and Koh’s contention that the moneys were made for joint investments in properties. This explanation was not mentioned in their initial investigative statements. Chang and Koh also failed to maintain a straight story on the purpose and scope of their joint investments.

  34. [28] Finally, in relation to the 20th charges faced by Koh and Chang respectively, the DJ held that the payments Koh made to Mindchamps City Square must be considered against the backdrop of the transfers which were the subjects of the other charges, as well as P2. The latter made it clear that Koh made the payments to Mindchamps City Square to avoid offending Chang and to keep PPT’s business with BP intact. Viewed in this light, the payments which were the subjects of the 20th charges also constituted a corrupt transaction.

  35. [29] In determining the sentences of the appellants, the DJ applied the sentencing framework outlined in the High Court decision of Takaaki Masui v Public Prosecutor and another appeal and other matters [2021] 4 SLR 160. Within that framework, the DJ found that the following offence-specific factors going towards harm were relevant:

  36. (a) While there was no actual harm caused to BP, there was suborning of the agent-principal relationship between BP and Chang, which exposed BP to potential harm through over-concentration of BP’s business with PPT and the sharing of BP’s confidential information with Koh.

  37. (b) Koh derived substantial benefits from the corrupt arrangement with Chang through the cultivation of Chang as an “insider” in BP.

  38. (c) The corrupt arrangement between Koh and Chang would have had a negative impact on legitimate expectations of stakeholders in the bunkering industry and society at large.

  39. [30] The DJ found that the following offence-specific factors going towards culpability were relevant:

  40. (a) Chang and Koh’s scheme involved significant deliberation, planning and careful execution on their parts.

  41. (b) Chang abused his position and betrayed the trust reposed in him by his principal, BP.

  42. (c) Both Koh and Chang were motivated by greed.

  43. (d) The quantum of gratification involved per charge was significant.

  44. [31] The DJ went on to assess the appropriate indicative starting sentence to be between 10 and 24 months’ imprisonment. After applying the totality principle, the DJ imposed the following individual sentences, with each appellant receiving a global sentence of 54 months’ imprisonment:

  45. No.

  46. DAC No.

  47. DAC No.

  48. Amount

  49. Sentence

  50. 1

  51. 927116-2017

  52. 908841-2017

  53. US$300,000

  54. [22] months

  55. 2

  56. 927117-2017

  57. 908842-2017

  58. US$350,000

  59. [24] months

  60. 3

  61. 927118-2017

  62. 908843-2017

  63. US$300,000

  64. [22] months

  65. 4

  66. 927119-2017

  67. 908844-2017

  68. US$100,000

  69. [10] months (consecutive)

  70. 5

  71. 927120-2017

  72. 908845-2017

  73. US$100,000

  74. [10] months (consecutive)

  75. 6

  76. 927121-2017

  77. 908846-2017

  78. US$350,000

  79. [24] months

  80. 7

  81. 927122-2017

  82. 908847-2017

  83. US$200,000

  84. [16] months

  85. 8

  86. 927123-2017

  87. 908848-2017

  88. US$200,000

  89. [16] months

  90. 9

  91. 927124-2017

  92. 908849-2017

  93. US$200,000

  94. [16] months

  95. 10

  96. 927125-2017

  97. 908850-2017

  98. US$150,000

  99. [13] months

  100. 11

  101. 927126-2017

  102. 908851-2017

  103. US$200,000

  104. [16] months

  105. 12

  106. 927127-2017

  107. 908852-2017

  108. US$200,000

  109. [16] months

  110. 13

  111. 927128-2017

  112. 908853-2017

  113. US$200,000

  114. [16] months

  115. 14

  116. 927129-2017

  117. 908854-2017

  118. US$200,000

  119. [16] months

  120. 15

  121. 927130-2017

  122. 908855-2017

  123. US$150,000

  124. [13] months

  125. 16

  126. 927131-2017

  127. 908856-2017

  128. US$100,000

  129. [10] months (consecutive)

  130. 17

  131. 927132-2017

  132. 908857-2017

  133. US$300,000

  134. [22] months

  135. 18

  136. 927133-2017

  137. 908858-2017

  138. US$200,000

  139. [16] months

  140. 19

  141. 927134-2017

  142. 908859-2017

  143. US$150,000

  144. [13] months

  145. 20

  146. 927135-2017

  147. 908860-2017

  148. US$388,888 ($525,000)

  149. [24] months (consecutive)

  150. Parties’ submissions

  151. [33] I outline in brief the parties’ submissions as to the appeals on conviction and sentence. I will refer to the parties’ submissions in more detail at the appropriate juncture.

  152. [34] The appellants made, inter alia, the following submissions in disputing the safety of their convictions below:

  153. (a) The evidence indicated that there was no corrupt arrangement between Chang and Koh. Chang had not given Koh any preferential treatment, and Koh knew this. The DJ also erred in rejecting the defence that the transfers were made for bona fide joint investments. There was also no evidence that the fund transfers were tainted by any corrupt intent.

  154. (b) No offence of corruption was disclosed based on the DJ’s finding that the fund transfers from Koh to Chang represented Chang’s share of PPT’s profits.

  155. (c) The DJ’s finding that Koh’s payments to Mindchamps City Square under the 20th charges were part of a corrupt scheme was against the weight of evidence, as the objective and contemporaneous evidence showed that Koh’s investments were legitimate.

  156. (d) Koh also contended that the Prosecution, by failing to disclose CPIB statements recorded from the appellants in a timely fashion, breached its disclosure obligations in a way that materially prejudiced his defence. Koh also argued that the Prosecution’s failure to call Chua as a witness was a breach of its additional disclosure obligations that justified drawing an adverse inference against the Prosecution. The most appropriate remedy for these breaches would be Koh’s acquittal.

  157. [35] In response, the Prosecution submitted that the DJ was correct to find that the fund transfers had a corrupt purpose, that the fund transfers under the 20th charges were part of a corrupt scheme, and that the joint investment defence raised by the appellants was unsupported by evidence. It also argued that it was not obliged to disclose the appellants’ statements based on its disclosure obligations, and in any event, the appellants were not prejudiced in the conduct of their defences.

  158. [36] The appellants’ submissions as to the appeals on sentence were, inter alia, as follows:

  159. (a) Both appellants contended that as there was neither intangible harm nor intangible detriment caused to BP, the level of harm should be assessed within the lower end of the “slight” category under the framework in Goh Ngak Eng v Public Prosecutor [2022] SGHC 254 (“Goh Ngak Eng”). Not only was there no evidence that Koh had made any profit from the arrangement with Chang, there was also no evidence of detriment caused to either third parties or the development of the bunkering industry in Singapore.

  160. (b) As to culpability, Koh argued that his culpability should be assessed within the lower end of the “moderate” category, as the total amount of gratification had to be placed in the context of the negligible benefit he derived over the offending period. Chang argued that his culpability should be assessed between the low and middle range of the “medium” category, as there was an absence of threats or coercion. Both appellants contended that the DJ had erred in finding that there was significant premeditation, as there was no active attempt to conceal the fund transfers. Chang contended that there was little abuse of trust as he had delegated substantively all his duties to his subordinates. Koh argued that any abuse of trust on Chang’s part should not be imputed to him, and that the DJ was wrong to find that he was motivated by greed as Chang had initiated the arrangement.

  161. (c) The appellants contended that the indicative sentences should be adjusted downwards to reflect an inordinate delay in prosecution. As the charges related to a single arrangement between Koh and Chang, only two sentences from the 1st to 18th charges under s 6 of the PCA should run consecutively with the 19th charge under s 5 of the PCA, with a total sentence of not more than 13 months’ imprisonment (Koh) or 14 months’ imprisonment (Chang).

  162. [37] The Prosecution’s submissions as to the appeals on sentence were, inter alia, as follows:

  163. (a) The DJ was right in her findings as to the offence-specific factors relating to harm. There was harm caused to BP, Koh received substantial benefit from the appellants’ arrangement, there was detriment to other TCPs, and the corruption involved a strategic industry. As to the culpability of the appellants, the DJ also rightly found that there was a high degree of planning and premeditation, there was an abuse of trust by Chang, and the appellants were motivated by greed.

  164. (b) The appellants’ charges should be assessed as falling under the categories of moderate harm and high culpability under the Goh Ngak Eng framework, with an indicative custodial term of between 28 and 36 months’ imprisonment per charge. Six sentences ought to run consecutively, for a global sentence of at least 180 months’ imprisonment for both Koh and Chang.

  165. (c) 19 penalty orders ought to be imposed on Chang for each charge of accepting gratification in contravention of the PCA. The court should impose in-default imprisonment terms for each of these penalty orders, with the total in-default sentence adding up to 400 weeks’ imprisonment.

  166. Issues to be determined

  167. [38] The issues on appeal were broadly as follows:

  168. (a) first, whether the Prosecution breached its disclosure obligations under Muhammad bin Kadar and another v Public Prosecutor [2011] 3 SLR 1205 (“Kadar”) by belatedly disclosing four of Koh’s statements (P33–P37) and Chang’s statements (all except P23) and if so, the effect of any breach;

  169. (b) second, whether the Prosecution breached its disclosure obligations under Muhammad Nabill bin Mohd Fuad v Public Prosecutor [2020] 1 SLR 984 (“Nabill”) by failing to call Chua as a witness and failing to disclose her witness statement and if so, the effect of any breach;

  170. (c) third, whether the offences under ss 5 and 6 of the PCA are made out as a matter of law if the moneys Koh paid to Chang were Chang’s share of his profits as a shadow partner of PPT;

  171. (d) fourth, whether there was a corrupt arrangement between Koh and Chang for the latter to use his position in BP to advance PPT’s business interest vis-à-vis BP;

  172. (e) fifth, whether the 20th charges, pertaining to payments made by Koh to Mindchamps City Square, formed part of the corrupt scheme;

  173. (f) sixth, whether the appellants’ sentences were manifestly excessive or manifestly inadequate based on the application of the sentencing framework in Goh Ngak Eng;

  174. (g) seventh, whether individual penalty orders under s 13(1) of the PCA should be imposed for each charge Chang faced for accepting gratification in contravention of the PCA and if so, how the resulting in-default sentences for those penalty orders should be calibrated; and

  175. Decision on conviction

  176. Whether the Prosecution breached its Kadar disclosure obligations and if so, the effect of any breach

  177. [39] I begin with Koh’s claim that the Prosecution breached its Kadar disclosure obligations by belatedly disclosing P33 to P37 to him. Chang couched his claim of tardy disclosure of his statements (apart from P23) as a breach of the Prosecution’s Nabill disclosure obligations. This was, however, misconceived. Nabill concerns the disclosure of statements provided by material witnesses and not accused persons. Nevertheless, in fairness to Chang, I likewise assessed his contention under the rubric of Kadar.

  178. [40] Counsel for Koh, Mr Lee Eng Beng SC (“Mr Lee SC”), submitted as follows. It is undisputed that the Prosecution disclosed P33–P35 to Koh on 16 April 2019 and P36–P37 on 17 April 2019. It did so while Koh was under cross-examination. In these statements, Koh provided an account of his friendship with Chang and their purported joint investments in property. More specifically, Koh claimed in these statements that:

  179. (a) Chang stated that he would use the moneys Koh transferred to him to purchase property.

  180. (b) Koh invested $500,000 in Mindchamps City Square between 17 September 2009 and 13 April 2010, and received returns of $100,000 via two cheques in September or October 2014.

  181. (c) Koh agreed to place money with Chang “for investment in property”. This followed a verbal agreement between the parties pursuant to which Chang “expect[ed] 50% of the profits from the investment”.

  182. (d) Koh kept records of the moneys he transferred to Chang for investment purposes in a book. He, however, lost this book when shifting offices in 2011.

  183. (e) The TCPs appointed by BP were required to abide by BP’s rules and regulations and to act in the best interests of BP. If they failed to do so, their partnership with BP might cease.

  184. (f) Chang sent to Koh the 20/7/09 Messages because Chang wanted to gather information from Koh. Koh understood the 20/7/09 Messages as Chang speculating on the future price of oil.

  185. (g) Chang sent to Hwee Cheng the 1/12/09 Message and told her to provide PPT the “good pricing … first” because PPT was BP’s biggest counterparty.

  186. (h) Koh had opened a bank account with HSBC Hong Kong as he travelled to Hong Kong frequently. The bank account allowed him to withdraw and spend money in Hong Kong.

  187. [41] In Kadar, the Court of Appeal held at [113] that the Prosecution must disclose to the Defence material which constitutes: (a) any unused material that is likely to be admissible and that might reasonably be regarded as credible and relevant to the guilt or innocence of the accused; and (b) any unused material that is likely to be inadmissible, but would provide a real (not fanciful) chance of pursuing a line of inquiry that leads to material that is likely to be admissible and that might reasonably be regarded as credible and relevant to the guilt or innocence of the accused.

  188. [42] This disclosure obligation does not extend to material which is neutral or adverse to an accused. It only includes material that tends to undermine the Prosecution’s case or strengthen the Defence’s case. Where, as in the present case, the statutory criminal case disclosure procedures did not apply, Kadar disclosure should take place at the latest before the trial begins (at [113]).

  189. [43] In Xu Yuanchen v Public Prosecutor and another matter [2021] 4 SLR 719 (“Xu Yuanchen”), Menon CJ held that statements provided by accused persons fall within the ambit of Kadar (at [44]). Menon CJ also clarified that “unused material” for the purpose of Kadar refers to material that forms part of the Prosecution’s affirmative, rather than responsive, case. The contrary position is inconsistent with the concerns that underlay Kadar (at [31]–[32]).

  190. [44] Against this backdrop, I accepted Mr Lee SC’s submission that the Prosecution breached its Kadar disclosure obligations by failing to disclose P33–P37 to Koh before the commencement of trial. It is undisputed that Koh claimed that he transferred the funds to Chang for joint investments in property in P33–P37 (which was the position he similarly adopted at trial) and the Prosecution only disclosed these statements to Koh while Koh was under cross-examination. I noted that the Prosecution did not dispute that it had acted in a manner inconsistent with the position set out in Xu Yuanchen. It acknowledged that it had planned to confront Chang and Koh with their undisclosed statements if they provided inconsistent testimony at trial. Rather, the Prosecution’s position was that it had acted in good faith and without the benefit of Xu Yuanchen, which was decided after the conclusion of the trial before the DJ.

  191. [45] The above is, however, not dispositive of the inquiry. The next step is to consider the consequences of a Kadar breach. In this regard, Lim Hong Liang v Public Prosecutor [2021] 5 SLR 626 (“Lim Hong Liang”) is instructive. In Lim Hong Liang, Abdullah J held that in determining the consequences of a Kadar breach, the court should assess a number of factors, including the effect of the breach on the evidence against the accused, how the breach prejudiced the accused, whether steps can be or have been taken to remedy the prejudice caused, the causes of the breach, and the conduct of the Prosecution (at [22]).

  192. [46] Having applied these factors, I was unable to accept Mr Lee SC’s submission that the Prosecution’s breach of its Kadar obligation vis-à-vis Koh demanded that Koh be acquitted of all 20 charges. Mr Lee SC submitted that the belated disclosure of P33–P37 prejudiced Koh in three respects. First, Koh’s Defence was unable to effectively cross-examine the CPIB IOs on the contents of the undisclosed statements and the circumstances under which Koh provided them. This was purportedly critical because the first four statements Koh provided (P1–P4) were central to the DJ’s decision but Koh had proffered contradictory positions across his nine statements. That the Prosecution recalled four witnesses did not cure the prejudice occasioned to Koh. The further evidence of these four witnesses was confined to the specific issues raised in P33–P35 and Koh’s cautioned statement (B1–D6). Second, Koh was denied the opportunity to explain the contents of all his statements during his evidence-in-chief. Third, Koh’s Defence did not have sight of P33–P37 when making its no-case-to-answer submissions. In this context, the Prosecution conveyed the impression that Koh had only mentioned the joint investment defence after he was charged.

  193. [47] I did not find that Koh was significantly prejudiced by the Prosecution’s late disclosure of P33–P37. While statements provided by an accused person fall within the ambit of Kadar, they stand apart from other unused material. This is given that such statements emanate entirely from an accused person and their contents would, in the ordinary course, be known to him or her. I aligned myself with Menon CJ’s observations in Xu Yuanchen that an “accused person would almost invariably have known of his earlier statements and would have known of the underlying facts that were or could have been covered in those statements, and there would almost never be a situation of such evidence being overlooked by the Defence despite its relevance as to the innocence of the accused person” (at [43]). Whilst Menon CJ made these obiter remarks in considering whether Kadar should extend to statements provided by accused persons, I found that their logic applies forcefully to the question of potential prejudice. Put another way, in the absence of exceptional circumstances such as an accused person’s loss of memory, it is difficult to envisage how the Prosecution’s failure to disclose what an accused previously stated in an investigative statement to the accused would place him or her in an invidious position.

  194. [48] That said, I appreciated the qualitatively distinct positions Mr Lee SC advanced. Mr Lee SC’s first point was that the Prosecution’s belated disclosure of P33–P37 prejudiced Koh’s Defence’s ability to cross-examine the CPIB IOs. Here, Mr Lee SC was not suggesting that the late disclosure of P33–P37 prejudiced Koh because he was completely unaware of the contents of his earlier statements, but that the minutiae might have faded in Koh’s memory, and this hindered Koh’s ability to challenge the contents of P1–P4.

  195. [49] I was not persuaded by this. Before the DJ, Koh did not dispute that he failed to mention in P1–P2 that the moneys he transferred to Chang were for investment in property. His position was that these statements were inaccurately recorded in other unrelated aspects, and he did not mention the joint investment defence because he did not think he was being investigated and the transfers had nothing to do with BP. Given this, I did not see how his lack of access to P33–P37 hindered his counsel’s ability to cross-examine the CPIB IOs on the accuracy of P1–P4.

  196. [50] Mr Lee SC’s next point was that Koh was denied the opportunity to explain the contents of all his statements during his evidence-in-chief. I was not convinced that this occasioned serious prejudice to Koh. After all, it is open to an accused person to testify to what had transpired since anything relevant in the statements recorded would have pertained to matters that were known to him (Xu Yuanchen at [38]). Whilst Koh further suggested that late disclosure hindered the DJ’s ability to “make a fair and accurate determination on the weight to be attached to the various statements made”, the fact remained that P33–P37 were eventually admitted into evidence and the DJ considered them in holistically assessing the credibility of Koh’s defence.

  197. [51] Mr Lee SC’s final point was that non-disclosure of P33–P37 hampered Koh’s Defence in making its no-case-to-answer submissions. I was unable to accept this. The threshold for calling on an accused person’s defence is a low one. It suffices that the Prosecution adduces some evidence which is not inherently incredible, and which satisfies each and every element of the charge (Haw Tua Tau and others v Public Prosecutor [1981–1982] SLR(R) 133; s 230(1)(j) of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed)). Even if Koh’s Defence was in possession of and could rely on P33–P37 in making its no-case-to-answers submissions, this would not have made a material difference to the DJ’s decision. Pertinently, P1–P4, which were adduced into evidence, were inculpatory statements in which Koh broadly admitted to providing gratification to Chang in exchange for Chang suborning his loyalties to BP and advancing the interests of PPT. These statements, along with the other evidence, would have sufficed to establish a prima facie case against Koh. Indeed, in Public Prosecutor v Tan Aik Heng [1995] 1 SLR(R) 710, the Court of Appeal observed that at the no-case-to-answer stage, the trial judge need not take great pains in examining contradictory statements and evaluating their accuracy and veracity by casting them against each other and other evidence. Such evaluation of evidence would be an appropriate exercise to be carried out at the end of the case when all the evidence has been placed before him (at [31]).

  198. [52] For completeness, I accepted the Prosecution’s submission that it did not withhold P33–P37 in bad faith. Mr Lee SC pointed to an extract of the Notes of Evidence and suggested that this showed that “the Prosecution had conducted its case in a way that was calculated and designed to give the biased impression that [P1–P4] contained admissions which completely corroborated the Prosecution’s case theory, while withholding equally important explanations made by Koh in subsequent CPIB statements”. I found that the Prosecution’s position must be understood in light of the fact that Xu Yuanchen was only decided after the conclusion of the trial. Bearing this in mind, I did not find that the Prosecution deliberately misled the DJ.

  199. [53] For these reasons, I did not consider that the Prosecution’s belated disclosure of P33–P37 warranted acquitting Koh of the 20 charges he was convicted of.

  200. [54] My findings above applied with equal, if not greater, force to Chang. It was undisputed that apart from P23, the Prosecution only disclosed Chang’s statements to him at the end of the first day of his cross-examination. To this extent, I likewise found that the Prosecution acted in breach of its Kadar disclosure obligations. Nevertheless, any prejudice occasioned to Chang was limited, and did not demand that Chang be acquitted of the charges he was convicted of. Beyond a bare assertion that the Prosecution breached its duties of disclosure under Nabill (which, as I noted earlier, was misguided), counsel for Chang, Ms Melanie Ho (“Ms Ho”), did not explain how Chang was prejudiced by the belated disclosure of his statements. I repeat my observations at [47] above.

  201. Whether the Prosecution breached its disclosure obligations under Nabill by failing to call Chua as a witness and failing to disclose her witness statement

  202. [55] I turn to Koh’s contention that the Prosecution breached its Nabill disclosure obligations by failing to disclose Chua’s witness statement to Koh and further, failed to discharge its evidential burden in respect of a material issue by failing to call Chua as a witness. Chang did not raise a similar objection.

  203. [56] In relation to the Prosecution’s duty to disclose a material witness’s statement to the Defence, material witnesses refer to witnesses who can be expected to confirm or, conversely, contradict an accused person’s defence in material aspects. The Prosecution is under a duty to disclose the statement of a material witness (who has not been called by the Prosecution as a witness) to the Defence. For the purpose of this additional disclosure obligation, it does not matter whether the statement is favourable, neutral or adverse to the accused. The additional disclosure obligation does not require the Prosecution to carry out a prior assessment of whether the statement was prima facie credible and relevant to the guilt or innocence of the accused. Where the statutory disclosure procedure does not apply, the Prosecution ought to satisfy this additional disclosure obligation, at the latest, before the trial begins (Nabill at [4], [39], [41], [50]).

  204. [57] As for the Prosecution’s duty to call a material witness, though the Prosecution has no legal duty to call any witness, its failure to do so may, in certain circumstances, mean that it has failed to discharge its evidential burden to rebut the defence advanced by an accused person. In addition, the court may draw an adverse inference that the evidence of a material witness, who could have been but was not called by the Prosecution, would have been unfavourable to the Prosecution (Nabill at [67]).

  205. [58] I deal first with whether the Prosecution breached its Nabill disclosure obligations by failing to disclose Chua’s witness statement to Koh. I noted that there was some uncertainty over whether Chua provided an investigative statement. I was prepared to assume, in Koh’s favour, that Chua did so. Notably, at the oral hearing before me, the Prosecution submitted that the Defence could have requested that the Prosecution voluntarily disclose Chua’s statement but did not do so.

  206. [59] Mr Lee SC submitted that Chua was a material witness because she was an “employee at [BP] whose scope of work involved dealing with various TCPs (including PPT) at the material time” and her evidence “would have greatly assisted the court in determining the veracity of the Prosecution’s various assertions of corrupt favours and benefits allegedly granted to PPT as well as the weight to be attached to the evidence of the material defence witnesses”. I did not accept this submission. In Roshdi bin Abdullah Altway v Public Prosecutor and another matter [2022] 1 SLR 535 (“Roshdi”), the Court of Appeal made clear that the “materiality” of a witness is assessed only by reference to the defences the accused person may have disclosed at a particular point in time (at [151], [154]). In the present case, Koh’s defence was that he transferred moneys to Chang for Chang to invest in property for their joint benefit. There was, however, no evidence that Chua could shed light on this joint investment defence.

  207. [61] Even if I was wrong and the Prosecution breached its Nabill disclosure obligations by failing to disclose Chua’s witness statement to Koh, I did not accept that Koh should be acquitted of all charges. The consequences of any Nabill breach depend on the facts at hand. The most critical question is whether, in all the circumstances, the Prosecution’s breach is so egregious that it occasions a failure of justice or otherwise renders the conviction unsafe (Roshdi at [168], [177]). I found that, at best, the Prosecution’s failure to disclose Chua’s witness statement to Koh should prompt the court to be more searching in its understanding of and reliance on the 20/7/09 Messages. Though Chua would be well placed as the recipient of the 20/7/09 Messages to shed light on their meaning and might have, as Market Coordinator in BP Marine, provided evidence on whether favours were granted to PPT, the court had other and sufficient evidence to not only discern the meaning of these messages but also ascertain whether Koh and Chang engaged in a corrupt enterprise. I will return to these points at a later juncture. It suffices to note that I did not find that the Prosecution breached its Nabill disclosure obligations by failing to disclose Chua’s witness statement and that any purported breach did not, in any event, demand acquitting Koh of all charges.

  208. [62] As for Koh’s submission that the Prosecution’s failure to call Chua as a witness meant that it failed to prove that the 20/7/09 Messages contained confidential information and that Chang granted corrupt favours or benefits to PPT, I deal with this when evaluating the safety of Koh and Chang’s convictions.

  209. Whether the offences under ss 5 and 6 of the PCA are made out as a matter of law if Koh’s payments to Chang were Chang’s share of his profits as a shadow partner of PPT

  210. [63] The third issue for my consideration was whether Koh and Chang’s offences under ss 5 and 6 of the PCA were made out as a matter of law. For ease of reference, I set out these provisions in full:

  211. [64] On the strength of the DJ’s purported finding that the transfers from Koh to Chang constituted Chang’s “share of profits” as a shadow partner in PPT, Mr Lee SC contended that the arrangement between Koh and Chang amounted to a situation where an agent created his own secret benefits and received moneys representing such benefits. On this analysis, the fund transfers could not be said to have influenced Chang to act improperly for the benefit of Koh. Rather, Chang had every incentive to ensure that PPT performed well so that he could maximise his share of the profits.

  212. [65] In this vein, Mr Lee SC relied on Leng Kah Poh v Public Prosecutor [2013] 4 SLR 878 (“Leng Kah Poh (HC)”). There, the appellant was a food and beverage manager at IKEA Singapore who was, at first instance, convicted of 80 charges under s 6(a) of the PCA read with s 34 of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed). He had received rewards for awarding food supply contracts to two companies, AT35 and FRT.

  213. [66] AT35 was a company registered under the name of one Andrew Tee Fook Boon (“Andrew”). Andrew was approached by Gary Lim Kim Seng (“Gary”) to convert AT35 into a food supply business. A plan was devised amongst the appellant, Andrew, and Gary for AT35 to supply food to IKEA Singapore. Andrew and Gary subsequently set up a second company, FRT, under the name of one of Gary’s employees. Both AT35 and FRT obtained food supplies and sold these products to IKEA Singapore at a marked-up rate. The appellant’s role in this arrangement was to give AT35 insider tips on how to make AT35 and FRT’s products palatable to IKEA Singapore. He would also exercise his influence to approve AT35 and FRT as the exclusive food suppliers of dried goods and chicken wings to IKEA Singapore.

  214. [67] On appeal, the High Court Judge held that there must be at least three parties for a transaction to be corrupt: the principal whose loss is at issue, the agent whose corrupt intention is at issue, and the person or entity inducing the agent to act dishonestly. Accordingly, an agent who has acted with dishonest intent and interfered with the affairs of his principal but has not been induced to do so by a third party is not guilty of corruption (at [8]). On the facts of the case, the High Court Judge found that “Gary and the appellant had landed on the idea together and had decided that AT35 and later FRT were the vehicles by which their scheme could be carried out”. In so far as there was “a reasonable chance that this was a situation where the appellant was effectively paying himself”, the Judge acquitted the appellant of the charges (at [12]–[14]).

  215. [68] Leng Kah Poh (HC) must, however, be read in the context of the criminal reference arising from the case. In Public Prosecutor v Leng Kah Poh [2014] 4 SLR 1264 (“Leng Kah Poh (CA)”), the Court of Appeal held that it is not necessary in every case of establishing the “gratification” of the transaction that it must be proven, as a fact, that there was an act of inducement by the third party upon the agent. Rather, a court should distinguish between inducement as an act of persuasion and inducement as a descriptor of a gratification. The inquiry in relation to an inducement in the context of s 6(a) of the PCA is not about the presence of an act of inducement by the third party. As a matter of principle, whether an objective corrupt element exists, and which is related to a finding of gratification, cannot be dependent on who initiated the promise of a gift. The contrary position would mean that the more outrageously an agent behaves in soliciting for the gift, the less likely he would be guilty of the offence of corruption (at [42]–[44], [48]).

  216. [69] Additionally, in the situation where the agent has some beneficial or legal interest in a third party, the agent’s drawing of his share of the profits obtained by that party from the benefits conferred could be considered a gratification for the purpose of s 6(a) of the PCA. Persons who have a shareholding, legal and/or beneficial ownership or entity in a legal entity are not synonymous with that legal entity. In any event, even if an agent has part ownership in the third party and obtained his share of the profits from it, it would be incorrect to assume that the agent’s share of the profits was not gratification. An inquiry into all the circumstances, such as the workings of the scheme, is called for (Leng Kah Poh (CA) at [54]–[59]). Following from this, the Court of Appeal held that the High Court erred in its assessment of the case and directed parties to address the court on the appropriate orders to be made. I took the liberty to examine the record of proceedings and noted that the Court of Appeal subsequently restored the sentences imposed by the District Judge.

  217. [70] Thus understood, I did not find Leng Kah Poh (HC) to assist Koh and Chang. First of all, it was not clear to me that the DJ found that Chang was a shadow partner in PPT and the moneys he received were his share of the company’s profits. Reading the salient portions of the DJ’s decision in context, it appeared to me that the DJ merely recounted Chang’s assertion that he considered himself to be a shadow partner in PPT without making a concomitant finding. This could be gleaned from her observations that “any risk in PPT’s business model did not reside with [Chang] as a shadow partner”, “Chang regarded himself as a co-owner or shadow partner of PPT” [emphasis added] and “Koh did not regard Chang to be his partner in PPT”. It was also consistent with Koh rejecting Chang’s assertion that he was a shadow partner of PPT in P2, P33 and P35, as well as stating that “Chang did not contribute any money to set up [PPT and] was not involved in the operations of [PPT]” in P35.

  218. [71] Second, on Koh’s own account, the moneys he transferred to Chang between 2006 and 2010 stemmed from his earnings in MaxFortune (a company incorporated in the British Virgin Islands) and Chang was not, in any way, related to this company.

  219. [72] Third, in light of Leng Kah Poh (CA), even assuming that the moneys constituted Chang’s “share of profits” as a shadow partner in PPT, this did not ipso facto render the charges proffered against Chang and Koh untenable. Whether secret profits received by an agent can be considered a gratification depends on whether there was a gratification by inducement or reward to the agent that led to a dishonest gain or advantage being conferred by the agent on the third party. It is this inquiry to which I now turn.

  220. Whether there was a corrupt arrangement between Koh and Chang for the latter to use his position in BP to advance PPT’s business interest vis-à-vis BP

  221. [73] The crux of the appeal turned on whether the DJ’s finding that there was a corrupt arrangement between Koh and Chang for the latter to use his position in BP to advance PPT’s business interest vis-à-vis BP was against the weight of the evidence. This finding underpinned the DJ’s holding that the Prosecution had proven the mens rea of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt. I assess the safety of Chang and Koh’s convictions on the first 19 charges proffered against each of them in this section, before evaluating the propriety of their convictions on the 20th charges in the next.

  222. [74] A key strand of Chang and Koh’s submissions was that there was no evidence that Chang advanced PPT’s business interest with BP because of the payments he received. On the contrary, the evidence purportedly showed that Chang could not and did not advance PPT’s business interest. For example, Mr Lee SC and Ms Ho both submitted that Chang did not facilitate PPT’s initial appointment as a TCP, Koh knew that Chang would not adversely affect PPT’s status as a TCP of BP, and Chang had no influence over the price of oil sold by BP to PPT. Ms Ho also pointed to the fact that Chang placed BP’s interests before PPT’s and BP decided to retain PPT as its TCP even after Chang left the employ of BP.

  223. [75] I was unable to accept these submissions. The fundamental obstacle that Chang and Koh faced and failed to overcome was that they had essentially admitted to the corrupt scheme in their investigative statements. I set out the salient portions of these statements:

  224. (a) In P1, Koh stated that in 2000 and 2001, he discussed “setting up a company to trade in marine fuel and to share the profits” with Chang, Chang told him “that he can get BP to appoint PPT as a Marine Bunker Counterparty to trade in marine fuel”, and being a TCP carried several advantages including being able to “buy and store the marine fuel in large volume for a term period and [being able to] sell to the petroleum com[p]any at spot price where there is a demand to support the petrol company’s position”. Koh also stated that Chang “ha[d] the power to terminate PPT’s status as a [TCP] with BP”.

  225. (b) In P2, Koh stated that in 2004, he felt that Chang “had full authority on marine fuel sales and [could] help [PPT] become [a] counterparty and if [PPT] maintain[ed] a good standard, he [could] give all BP deals to [PPT]”. Koh understood that Chang “had the power to make or break” and “controlled the fate” of PPT. Further, between 2005 and 2010, Chang periodically asked Koh for money. Koh believed that PPT “w[ould] no longer get deals from BP” if he refused Chang’s requests and would give Chang moneys “so long as the money [he made] from having this relationship with BP [was] more than what [Chang] had been asking”. Koh transferred moneys to Chang via Hong Kong bank accounts at Chang’s request and because Chang “did not want to take cash from [Koh] in Singapore”.

  226. (c) In P4, Koh reiterated that Chang had the power to choose a bunkering company other than PPT to be BP’s TCP and if Chang exercised this power, PPT “would not be able to get the counterparty netting agreement from BP and … [could not] buy marine fuel from BP anymore”.

  227. (d) In P34, Koh again stated that he transferred the moneys to Chang’s bank account under pressure from Chang and because Chang “had the power to cease the PPT’s partnership with BP”.

  228. (e) In P35, Koh elaborated on the benefits of being appointed a TCP. He stated that the trades between BP and a TCP need not be done on a “cash on delivery basis” but could be offset and “settled either on a monthly or weekly basis”. Additionally, as a TCP of BP, PPT’s “oil trading volume … is guaranteed, so that at least the costs bunker barges will be covered and [PPT] will not make a loss. If [PPT] were not a counterparty of [BP], [its] oil trading volume would not be guaranteed”. Koh also unequivocally stated that Chang had the power to influence whether PPT was appointed a TCP with BP and the quantity of oil PPT traded with BP.

  229. (f) In P23, Chang stated that he “proposed to Koh to set up a bunker company on his own”, which led Koh to set up PPT. Koh and Chang understood that Chang would help PPT: the agreement “was that [PPT would] perform its bunkering role in a legitimate manner … In return, BP [would] give business to [PPT]”. Chang was “unable to be an open partner as [he] was gainfully employed by BP and should not be seen as having a business relationship in [PPT]”. He also admitted to telling Chua to give “all the term with good pricing to [PPT]” in December 2009. Further, from 2007 or 2008, Koh would transfer money from his Hong Kong bank account to Chang’s Hong Kong bank account as Chang’s share of profits in PPT.

  230. (g) In P40, Chang admitted that he recommended PPT to be a TCP of BP and had the power to seek approval for PPT to be replaced as a TCP of BP. He also admitted to knowing that he ought not to have a business relationship with PPT whilst being employed by BP.

  231. [76] I found that these statements amply supported the DJ’s finding that Chang asked Koh to set up PPT, parties shared an understanding that Chang would facilitate the appointment of PPT as BP’s TCP, Koh understood that Chang was in a position to influence the fortunes of PPT, Chang asked for moneys for what he perceived to be his share of profits in PPT, and Koh transferred moneys to Chang to keep PPT’s business relationship with BP intact. Koh and Chang had no good answer for their respective admissions in P1–P4 and P23. Whilst they rehashed their arguments that aspects of these statements were inaccurately recorded, I upheld the DJ’s finding to the contrary. There was no merit to Koh’s claim that he lacked proficiency in English or Chang’s claim that he was in a hurry to sign the settlement agreement with BP. These flew in the face of the numerous amendments Koh made to P1–P4 of his own volition and the fact that Chang had signed the settlement agreement a few days before providing P23.

  232. [77] Against the backdrop of these admissions, I found that Koh and Chang’s submissions fell away. Whether Chang had the ability to unilaterally appoint PPT as BP’s TCP was not material. What was important was that Chang admitted to recommending PPT as a TCP of BP and did so with a view to eventually extracting bribes from Koh. Though Ms Ho submitted that there was nothing inherently nefarious about recommending that an entity become a TCP of BP, this overlooked the context in which Chang’s recommendation was made. In particular, Chang’s act had to be understood in light of Koh’s admissions that Chang had informed him that “he [could] get BP to appoint PPT [as a TCP] to trade in marine fuel”, being a TCP was advantageous to PPT, and Chang subsequently asked Koh for moneys as consideration for maintaining PPT’s advantageous relationship with BP.

  233. [78] Similarly, Koh and Chang’s submission that Koh knew that Chang would not adversely affect PPT’s status as BP’s TCP was undermined by Koh’s statements to the contrary. Pertinently, Koh stated that Chang had the power to terminate PPT’s status as BP’s TCP. Koh went so far as to state that he agreed to transfer moneys to Chang because Chang “was trying to make use of his position to pressuri[s]e [Koh] into giving the money as [Chang] had the power to cease the PPT’s partnership with BP” (see [75] above). These admissions showed up Koh’s claim to have believed that Chang would not adversely affect the interest of PPT.

  234. [80] Chang and Koh’s next contention was that Chang had no influence over the price of oil sold by BP to PPT. The short response to this point was that it did not matter. The actus reus of an offence under ss 5 or 6 of the PCA is concerned with the giving or receiving of the gratification and this is complete even if the recipient has not yet had any opportunity to show favour to the giver in relation to the recipient’s affairs (Abdul Aziz bin Mohamed Hanib v Public Prosecutor and other appeals [2022] SGHC 101 at [108]). The other elements of an offence under ss 5 or 6 of the PCA, viz, the consequential link between the gratification and the act the gratification was intended to procure, the objective corrupt element in the transaction, and that the gratification was given or received with guilty knowledge, likewise do not demand that a benefit actually be conferred. Section 9 of the PCA puts the aforesaid on a statutory footing for offences under ss 6(a) or 6(b) of the PCA.

  235. [81] In any event, I saw no reason to interfere with the DJ’s finding that Chang did in fact advance the business interests of PPT with BP and was moved to do so by the bribes he received from Koh. As I noted earlier, Koh and Chang admitted that Chang recommended that PPT become a TCP of BP, there were numerous advantages that BP’s TCPs enjoyed, and the evidence also supported that Chang did so with a view to eventually extracting bribes from Koh (see [77] above).

  236. [82] Additionally, I agreed with the DJ that the 20/7/09 Messages and the 1/12/09 Message evinced that Chang had advanced PPT’s interest vis-à-vis BP. The DJ found these messages to show that Chang had favoured PPT under the guise of business strategy and divulged BP’s confidential information to Koh.

  237. [84] The 1/12/09 Message had to be understood in light of the following. First, Koh and Chang admitted to the corrupt scheme in their investigative statements. In particular, Koh claimed that Chang could “give all BP deals to [PPT]” in P2 and Chang also claimed that he regarded himself as a “shadow partner” of BP in P23.

  238. [85] Second, Chang was unable to maintain a consistent account of why he had sent the 1/12/09 Message. It was telling that Chang did not mention that he had sent the 1/12/09 Message to resolve a crisis rooted in an oversupply of oil in his investigative statements P23, P41 or P45. Rather, his explanation of the 1/12/09 Message in P23 was that it was “normal business strategy” for a company to “take care of its biggest partner first” such as by allocating them “deals with the most competitive terms”. Chang similarly claimed that he instructed Chua to “pass all the good term pricing to Koh first because PPT did most of the term and spot deals for BP” and “had vast experience serving BP’s customers and … bought the most volume of term fuel oil from BP” in P41 and P45 respectively.

  239. [86] Third, the testimonies of PW3 Mr Christopher Lu Feng (Regional Marine Manager of BP) (“Mr Lu”) and PW5 Theresa Zapiecki (Regional Compliance Director of BP’s Integrated Supply and Trading Division (“Ms Zapiecki”) do not support Ms Ho’s submission. Mr Lu and Ms Zapiecki attested that BP’s manner of allocating trades to various TCPs was information that should not be shared with its TCPs as disclosure weakened BP’s bargaining position, and that Chang had granted “a market participant unfair advantage in the market by disclosing BP’s intended trading strategy”.

  240. [87] The above provided important context to the 1/12/09 Message and showed Chang’s in-court explanation of the message to be disingenuous. These strands of evidence also provided ample basis for the DJ to infer that Chang sent the 1/12/09 Message with the intention of favouring PPT in the absence of Chua’s testimony.

  241. [88] Turning to the 20/7/09 Messages, Koh and Chang submitted that these did not contain confidential information. Koh contended that the information in the 20/7/09 Messages was already known to the PPT employees embedded at BP’s office. Chang similarly submitted that BP would arrange for loading and delivery of oil in advance of its arrival and it was vital that PPT, as BP’s TCP, was privy to this information. However, even assuming that some of PPT’s employees were privy to such information, the 20/7/09 Messages were not restricted to BP’s imminent receipt of oil. Rather, Chang went further to advise Koh to “sell as much as possible [before the] premium collapses”. Chang had no reason to do so as an employee of BP unless he had a vested interest in PPT’s success.

  242. [89] I was also cognisant that Koh and Chang sung a different tune in their later investigative statements, P35–P37 and P39–P48. For example, Koh claimed that he transferred the moneys to Chang pursuant to an informal agreement between the parties to invest in property in P35, and said that Chang asked him for money in 2006 because the Hong Kong property market was booming at the time in P37. Likewise, Chang claimed that Koh transferred him moneys for joint property investments and that he had purchased various properties with the moneys in his HSBC Hong Kong account in P40 and P42.

  243. [90] However, I saw no reason to interfere with the DJ’s finding that Koh and Chang’s evidence “contained various glaring contradictions and inconsistencies pertaining to the joint investments, including those relating to which properties and investments formed part of the joint investment project”. I upheld the DJ’s finding that the joint investment defence was a sham. This fortified my findings above and also underscored the poor credibility of the appellants.

  244. [91] To begin, the appellants did not adequately explain their failure to mention the joint investment defence in their initial investigative statements (see [76] above). Koh and Chang first mentioned the joint investment defence in P35 and P39. These statements were recorded from Koh and Chang on 13 February 2015 and 16 January 2012 respectively, a significant time after they had provided their initial investigative statements on 18 October 2011.

  245. [92] Next, it beggared belief that Koh would transfer millions of dollars to Chang for Chang to invest in property when Koh claimed to have not considered Chang a “very close friend” but merely “business [associate]”, and their joint investments were characterised by a dearth of documentation and accounting. Chang’s claim that he recorded some of the conversations he had with Koh regarding the joint property investments and the flow of Koh’s funds in his personal notebooks that he returned to BP was not raised in his investigative statements and did not, in any event, take him very far. After all, Chang attested that the notebooks did not contain details of what was due and owing to Koh nor the capital gains from the purported investments. Rather, Chang merely noted Koh’s initial investment and Chang’s share of the loan and stamp duties in this notebook. In line with this, Koh claimed that the arrangement between him and Chang “was all verbal and [Chang] did not show [him] any documentation”. Whilst Ms Ho prepared an Annex in Chang’s closing written submissions, which purportedly showed that there was a broad 50/50 split in the moneys that were the subject of the property investments between Koh and Chang and that Chang had rolled over the moneys Koh made from one property into another, this was of limited probative value. There was no objective evidence to support Ms Ho’s claims and calculations.

  246. [93] In the round, I found the joint investment defence to be inconsistent and illogical. I provide some examples:

  247. (a) The defence was contradicted by Koh’s claim in P33 that the “joint business venture” between himself and Chang “did not materiali[s]e” and “[t]here [was] no property under [their] name[s]”.

  248. (b) Koh’s claim that he transferred the moneys for property investment to Chang at Chang’s behest and left Chang to invest the moneys in property was inconsistent with Chang’s account that “there were two to three occasions [when] Koh was the one who came up with the figures” for the investments.

  249. (c) Neither Koh nor Chang was able to adequately explain why Koh had to transfer the moneys intended for a limited number of property investments to Koh over 19 tranches. I highlight that the sums that were the subject of the charges ranged from US$100,000 to US$350,000 and were transferred over approximately 19 occasions between 31 July 2006 to 26 July 2010. Chang’s claim that when he instructed Koh to transfer money to him, he “came up with the figures based on the [anticipated] property price”, ie, before properties were identified and purchased, beggared belief.

  250. (d) Koh and Chang likewise failed to satisfactorily account for why the transfers took place via bank accounts in Hong Kong. Whereas Koh alleged that he transferred moneys to Chang’s Hong Kong bank account at Chang’s request and because Chang did not wish to take cash from him in Singapore, Chang first claimed that he opened his HSBC bank account for the purpose of the Mindchamps business, then claimed that the bank account was set up for property investment and because it would be more convenient for Koh to transfer moneys to a bank in Hong Kong, and finally claimed that Koh and himself spontaneously decided to open a bank account with HSBC while they were both in Hong Kong.

  251. (e) Koh and Chang provided irreconcilable evidence on which properties were purportedly the subject of their joint investments and the management of these properties.

  252. [94] Finally, I deal with the argument that it did not make sense for Koh to bribe Chang because the moneys Koh transferred to Chang during the financial years ending 31 March 2007, 31 March 2008 and 31 March 2009 exceeded PPT’s net profits during the corresponding period, and the aggregate sum Koh transferred to Chang as of 31 March 2008 and 31 March 2009 exceeded the cumulative profits generated by PPT as of these respective dates. In this connection, Ms Ho submitted that the DJ erred in relying on P55–P57 to find that “PPT stood at the core of a network of companies which Koh had a stake in, and which stood to benefit from PPT’s business relationship with BP”, because the trust deeds “never formed part of the Prosecution’s case”. I also concurrently deal with Koh and Chang’s submission that the timings of the first and last transfers undermined the existence of a corrupt scheme. To recap, the first and final transfers took place after PPT had been appointed as BP’s TCP and after Chang had left BP’s employ respectively.

  253. [95] I accepted that whether a corrupt arrangement is commercially beneficial to the giver of a bribe and the timing of any moneys transferred are evidence relevant to the existence of the corrupt scheme. That said, in the present case, the probative value of the quantum or timing of the bribes was outweighed by the rest of the evidence. I repeat that Koh and Chang admitted to the corrupt scheme in their investigative statements. Additionally, Chang claimed that Koh would transfer moneys to him “when [PPT] makes money” and not otherwise, Koh admitted that it made sense for him to transfer moneys to Chang “so long as the money [he] ma[d]e from having this relationship with BP [was] more than what [Chang] had been asking”, and both parties treated all the moneys that were the subject of the first 19 charges as having been transferred for the same purpose in their investigative statements.

  254. [96] For the above reasons, I upheld the DJ’s decision to convict Koh and Chang on the first 19 charges proffered against each of them. Her determination that the elements of these offences were proven beyond a reasonable doubt was not against the weight of the evidence.

  255. Whether the 20th charges were part of the corrupt scheme between Koh and Chang

  256. [97] Lastly, I considered whether the 20th charges, which pertained to payments Koh made to Mindchamps City Square, formed part of Koh and Chang’s corrupt scheme. Koh and Chang submitted that the objective and contemporaneous evidence showed that the transfers to Mindchamps City Square constituted Koh’s legitimate investment in the business. On their account, there was no reason for Koh to concern himself with the affairs of Mindchamps City Square if the business was entangled with the corrupt scheme. It was also significant that Koh made several payments to Mindchamps City Square after Chang informed Koh of his intention to leave BP.

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