General Division of the High Court · Decided 30 August 2023
Blomberg, Johan Daniel v Khan Zhi Yan
Feedback & support[2023] SGHC 238 · Case no. Registrar’s Appeal (State Courts) No 4 of 2023 · 10 paragraphs
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Introduction
- [2]
[2] The appellant, Mr Johan Daniel Blomberg (“Mr Blomberg”), and the respondent, Ms Khan Zhi Yan (“Ms Khan”) are ex-spouses. They are involved in ongoing court proceedings in Singapore and Sweden, including proceedings under the Guardianship of Infants Act 1934 (2020 Rev Ed) in the Family Justice Courts (“FJC”).
Procedural history
The Consent Order
The application to set aside the Consent Order
Ms Khan’s case
Mr Blomberg’s case
The decision below
Grounds of the appeal
- [17]
[17] On 10 October 2022, Mr Blomberg filed an appeal against the entirety of the DJ’s decision given on 3 October 2022, for the following reasons:
The parties’ cases on appeal
Mr Blomberg’s case
Ms Khan’s case
The Young Independent Counsel’s Submissions
- [22]
[22] The court appointed a Young Independent Counsel, Mr Benny Santoso (“Mr Santoso”), to assist with the appeal. Mr Santoso was invited to address the following questions.
(b) Where an agreement is recorded in the form of a judgment, is the validity of that judgment to be assessed according to contractual principles that might apply to the underlying agreement?
Issues to be determined
- [28]
[28] The appeal gives rise to two key issues for determination:
My decision
Preliminary point: the Consent Order is a protection order under s 12 of the POHA
The court can set aside a contractual consent order ab initio in limited circumstances
Circumstances in which a contractual consent order may be set aside
- [36]
[36] Mr Blomberg and Mr Santoso agree that case law concerning contractual consent orders shows that such orders may be set aside where there are vitiating factors which undermine the contract formed between the consenting parties. The DJ’s reasoning was similar. Ms Khan does not address this point in her submissions on appeal. Thus, the parties proceeded with their arguments before me on the basis that the point was uncontroversial.
- [42]
[42] Mr Santoso raises a concern as to the foregoing analysis concerning the court’s residual discretion to set aside substantive contractual consent orders. He points out that Turf Club Auto Emporium was decided when the inherent powers of the court resided in O 92 r 4 of the ROC 2014, but this provision is not replicated in its exact terms in the ROC 2021. In my view, this concern does not affect my conclusion that the court does not have such a residual discretion (although I offer my provisional views on his point at [43]–[45] below). The reasoning of the Court of Appeal (which led them to find that the court did not have a residual discretion not to enforce, much less set aside, substantive contractual consent orders) was not predicated on O 92 r 4 of the ROC 2014. Instead, the Court of Appeal had regard to: (a) the principle of finality; (b) the fact that parties entered into consent orders not to enable the court to exercise supervisory jurisdiction but rather to be able to enforce the judgment; (c) consistency in how the law regards consent; and (d) the demands of fairness (Turf Club Auto Emporium at [163]). These reasons continue to be relevant today. I therefore find that Turf Club Auto Emporium remains authoritative and supports my finding above.
- [43]
[43] The parties did not make substantive arguments on the juridical basis to set aside consent orders. Only Mr Santoso did so in his written submissions. The existing case law on the court’s inherent power is predicated on O 92 r 4 of the ROC 2014, which provided as follows:
- [44]
[44] In my view, O 92 r 4 of the ROC 2014 can be considered to be subsumed under O 3 r 2(2) of the ROC 2021, which provides as follows:
The POHA regime
- [49]
[49] I also note that, in contrast, s 36 of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Protection from Harassment) Rules 2021 (the “POHA Rules”) expressly provides for orders made by the PHC to be set aside in limited circumstances. The rules governing the variation, suspension or cancellation of orders as provided for under s 12(7) of the POHA are separately contained in s 37 of the POHA Rules.
The Consent Order should not have been set aside ab initio
Varying the Consent Order
Conclusion
- [59]
[59] Finally, I would like to express my thanks to Mr Santoso for his thorough and thoughtful submissions pursuant to his appointment as Young Independent Counsel. I found the submissions to be of considerable assistance to my analysis and determination of the issues raised in this appeal.