General Division of the High Court · Decided 12 September 2023
CXG and another v CXI and others
Feedback & support[2023] SGHC 244 · Case no. Originating Application No 710 of 2022 (Summonses Nos 4335 and 4336 of 2022) · 84 paragraphs
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Grounds of decision
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Introduction
- [2]
[2] After hearing parties’ submissions, I dismissed the applications, providing brief grounds then. These are my detailed grounds of decision.
Background
- [4]
[4] The claimants, [CXG] and [CXH], are the founders and minority shareholders of [CXK], a financial technology company incorporated in Singapore which runs an e-wallet open-loop payment method (“the [CXK] App”). The claimants are also the claimants in the Arbitration.
- [5]
[5] The defendants, who are the respondents in the Arbitration, are [CXI], [CXJ] and [CXK]. The claimants and [CXJ] were the three shareholders of [CXK] at the time of its incorporation.
- [6]
[6] In the Arbitration, the claimants are, in the main, pursuing a claim for minority oppression under s 216 of the Companies Act 1967 and seeking a buyout of their shares in [CXK]. The dispute centred on two agreements – a Shareholders Agreement dated 17 March 2017 (“the SHA”) and an Investment Agreement dated 17 March 2017 (“the IA”) – which the claimants, [CXJ] and [CXK] were originally party to. [CXI] later became a party to the SHA and IA after [CXJ] transferred its entire shareholding in [CXK] to [CXI]. The SHA and IA are governed by Singapore law.
- [7]
[7] The claimants applied to the arbitral tribunal (“the Tribunal”) for interim relief on 19 July 2022 (“the Interim Relief Application”). In the Interim Relief Application, the claimants complained about an allegedly competitive product known as “[PXH]” and sought to restrain the defendants from operating and offering [PXH].
- [8]
[8] [PXH] is an e-wallet that is used as a closed-loop payment solution for the [MB] App. The [MB] App is owned and operated by [MBX] (a subsidiary of [CXI]) and connects users to merchants who list their products and services on the [MB] App, including flights, hotels, food, and ride-hailing, among others. The [MB] App is available across the ASEAN region, but [PXH] itself is only available to users of the [MB] App in Malaysia.
- [9]
[9] [PXH] relies on the technology and licence of the payment platform provided by [FXN], under a contract (“the [FXN] Contract”) between [FXN] and [MBX]’s wholly-owned subsidiary, [GHX]. The [FXN] Contract is governed by Malaysian law.
- [10]
[10] Both [FXN] and [GHX] are companies registered in Malaysia. [FXN] is regulated by [LX] bank (“[LX] Bank”) as [FXN] is an e-money issuer with an e-money licence granted by [LX] Bank. [PXH] is also regulated by [LX] Bank.
(a) to ensure that payments by [PXH] remain closed-loop and accepted only in the [MB] App;
(b) to ensure that the only methods available for top-ups to [PXH] are via a user’s [CXK] App account or via refunds from any products and services on the [MB] App, and in this regard, to disable the online banking top-up to [PXH];
(c) to disable the peer-to-peer transfer function;
(d) to cease all discounts and promotions offered to [PXH] users;
(e) for management of [PXH] to be transferred to one of [CXK]’s subsidiaries on the contractual and operational arrangements to be mutually agreed between [MBX] and [CXK];
(f) for [PXH] to be renamed to “[UMD]” or another name to be mutually agreed between [MBX] and [CXK] (“the Renaming Commitment”); and
(g) to undertake not to expand the services or geographical reach of [PXH].
- [12]
[12] I note that based on their affidavits, the defendants maintained that they had complied with all the Commitments, save for the Renaming Commitment which could only be completed pending approval by [LX] Bank and [FXN].
The parties’ cases
The defendants’ case
- [13]
[13] By the Stay Applications, the defendants argued that pursuant to O 6 r 12(4)(b) of the Rules of Court 2021 (“ROC 2021”), this court should not exercise its jurisdiction to hear the Leave Application because it was not appropriate for it to do so. To be clear, the defendants did not contend that this court lacked jurisdiction to hear the Leave Application; instead, they argued that it should decline to exercise such jurisdiction.
- [14]
[14] The defendants argued that in determining whether it was appropriate for this court to exercise jurisdiction, the court should apply FNC principles for two reasons.
- [15]
[15] First, O 28 r 2A(2) of the Rules of Court (2014 Rev Ed) (“ROC 2014”) (which concerned a stay of proceedings commenced by originating summons) is the predecessor to O 6 r 12(4) of the ROC 2021 and reflected materially the same operative language as O 12 r 7(2) of the ROC 2014 (which concerned a stay of proceedings commenced by writ). Since O 12 r 7(2) of the ROC 2014 had been held in Grains and Industrial Products Trading Pte Ltd and another v State Bank of India and others [2019] SGHC 292 (at [66]) to require a FNC analysis, this requirement similarly applied to O 6 r 12(4) of the ROC 2021.
- [16]
[16] Second, under O 48 r 4(2) of the ROC 2021, which governs service out of Singapore for originating applications under the IAA (including applications for permission to enforce domestic interim measures under s 12(6) of the IAA), no permission for service out is to be granted unless it is made sufficiently to appear to the court that the case is a “proper one for service out of Singapore”.
- [17]
[17] The defendants argued that the phrase “case is a proper one for service out” imported into O 48 r 4(2) a requirement for the applicant to show that the Singapore court is forum conveniens. In support of this, they cited the High Court’s decision in Swift-Fortune v Magnifica Marine SA [2006] 2 SLR(R) 323 (“Swift-Fortune”), where FNC considerations were taken into account in the court’s assessment of whether to grant permission for service out of an application for the grant of interim relief in support of a foreign-seated arbitration under s 12(7) of the International Arbitration Act (Cap 143A, 2002 Rev Ed) (presently s 12A of the current IAA).
- [18]
[18] Turning to the application of the FNC doctrine itself, the defendants relied on the principles as set out in Spiliada Maritime Corporation v Cansulex Ltd [1987] AC 460 (“Spiliada”) and applied in Rickshaw Investments Ltd v Nicolai Baron von Uexkull [2007] 1 SLR(R) 377 (“Rickshaw Investments”). The FNC analysis under Spiliada involves two stages (Rickshaw Investments at [14]):
(a) first, whether, prima facie, there is some other available forum which is more appropriate for the case to be tried, which requires a consideration of factors connecting the dispute to a particular forum; and
(b) second, if the court concludes that there is prima facie a more appropriate forum, the court will ordinarily grant a stay unless there are circumstances by reason of which justice requires that a stay should nonetheless not be granted.
(e) Fifth, the location and ease of obtaining evidence. Several of the documents that were exchanged between [FXN] and [LX] Bank were in Malay, and additional costs would be incurred in having to translate these documents.
- [22]
[22] Thus, the defendants submitted that this court ought not to exercise its jurisdiction to hear the Leave Application because it was not the appropriate court to do so.
The claimants’ case
- [23]
[23] The claimants argued that as a matter of principle, precedent, and policy, FNC considerations were irrelevant to an application under s 12(6) of the IAA.
- [26]
[26] Third, as a matter of policy, FNC considerations were irrelevant to s 12(6) of the IAA. It would also undermine the attractiveness of Singapore as a preferred arbitral seat, defeating Parliament’s intention to empower the Singapore court to enforce tribunals’ interim orders and rendering the parties’ autonomous choice in choosing Singapore as the arbitral seat nugatory. Furthermore, the nature of international arbitration was that many Singapore-seated arbitrations often had no connection with Singapore apart from it being chosen as the arbitral seat. This meant that in many Singapore-seated international arbitrations, the connecting factors under FNC principles would often point away from Singapore as the proper forum. To allow such connecting factors to oust the supervisory jurisdiction of the Singapore courts to enforce a tribunal’s interim orders would be to deprive many Singapore-seated international arbitrations of the curial assistance under s 12(6) of the IAA that Parliament intended them to have, and that parties themselves reasonably expected to be available to them.
My decision
The statutory framework
- [30]
[30] The Leave Application is brought pursuant to s 12(6) of the IAA (read with s 12(1)(i) of the IAA) and O 48 r 3(1)(b) of the ROC 2021. These provisions are set out below:
- [32]
[32] Further, the choice of seat embodies parties’ submission to the curial jurisdiction of the seat’s courts. As observed by the English Court of Appeal in Enka Insaat Ve Sanayi A S v OOO “Insurance Company Chubb” and others [2020] EWCA Civ 574 (“Enka EWCA”) at [46]:
- [33]
[33] Thus, where parties have chosen Singapore as the seat of the arbitration, as they have here, they agree to submit to the curial law and jurisdiction of Singapore. It follows that the IAA, as part of our curial law, applies to govern the Arbitration (see Sanum Investments Ltd v Government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic [2016] 5 SLR 536 (“Sanum Investments”) at [38]). This includes the power of the Singapore courts (specifically, the General Division of the High Court) under s 12(6) of the IAA to enforce interim orders or directions made or given by a Singapore-seated arbitral tribunal.
- [34]
[34] The Stay Applications are brought pursuant to O 6 rr 12(3) and 12(4)(b), which provide:
- [35]
[35] The defendants maintain that notwithstanding the jurisdiction of the Singapore courts to hear the Leave Application, this court should nevertheless decline to hear it as it is not the appropriate court to do so under O 6 r 12(4)(b).
- [36]
[36] In the Stay Applications, the defendants also relied on O 48 r 4(2) of the ROC 2021, which addresses service out of Singapore for originating applications under the IAA. O 48 rr 4(1) and 4(2) read as follows:
The defendants argued that since FNC principles are considered under the requirement of an IAA application being a “proper one for service out” under O 48 r 4(2) (pursuant to Swift-Fortune), FNC principles should similarly be considered in assessing the appropriate court under O 6 r 12(4)(b) to hear applications for the enforcement of domestic interim measures.
- [37]
[37] As a starting point, I observe that by virtue of the parties’ choice of Singapore as the arbitral seat, it would ordinarily be appropriate for the Singapore courts to hear an application made pursuant to our curial law. By agreeing to a Singapore-seated arbitration, the parties have accepted that the IAA governs the arbitration, and the claimant would be entitled to apply under s 12(6) of the IAA to this court to enforce domestic interim measures. Hence, the Singapore courts would prima facie be an appropriate forum to hear the Leave Application. It was therefore incumbent on the defendants to show why FNC principles should additionally feature in this assessment of the appropriate forum.
- [38]
[38] In this regard, it is apposite to consider the specific nature of the Leave Application and how the statutory framework relating to it sheds light on the way the assessment of the appropriate forum is to be conducted.
- [40]
[40] Section 12(6) of the IAA is the operative provision under which parties apply for permission to enforce interim measures issued in a Singapore-seated arbitration. Section 12(6) was introduced to address a “lacuna” in the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (“the Model Law”) (which has the force of law in Singapore under s 3(1) of the IAA) in that the Model Law did not expressly provide that an interim measure could be enforced as an award: see the Report on Review of Arbitration Laws (August 1993) prepared by the Law Reform Committee’s Sub-Committee on Review of Arbitration Laws (“the LRC Report”) at para 32. Lee Seiu Kin J observed this point in PT Pukuafu Indah and others v Newmont Indonesia Ltd and another [2012] 4 SLR 1157 (“Pukuafu”) (at [21]):
- [41]
[41] The need to seek the court’s permission under s 12(6) necessarily means that the court has the discretion whether to grant permission. Therefore, the court’s role cannot be to simply “rubber-stamp” its approval. But the IAA does not prescribe how that discretion is to be exercised. The IAA provisions addressing domestic interim measures and their enforcement sheds some, but insufficient, light on this question.
- [43]
[43] The significance of this statutory distinction is that procedural and interim measures issued by a tribunal under s 12(1) are exempt from the usual judicial oversight which applies to awards under the IAA and the Model Law. In particular, the grounds for setting aside an award under Art 34(2) of the Model Law do not apply to domestic interim measures under s 12(6) of the IAA. Neither does s 24 of the IAA, which provides two additional grounds for the setting aside of a Singapore-seated award – if (a) the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption; or (b) a breach of the rules of natural justice occurred in connection with the making of the award by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.
- [44]
[44] Thus, Lee J in Pukuafu noted (at [21]) that by introducing s 12(6) of the IAA, Parliament had instituted “a sui generis enforcement mechanism [for orders under s 12] without broadening the definition of “award” to allow the court to set aside these orders”. This approach reflected Parliament’s decision to insulate these orders from judicial challenge while lending the coercive powers of the court to their enforcement: Pukuafu at [22]. Thus, the court has no jurisdiction under the IAA to set aside or review interim measures made by an arbitral tribunal. Limiting challenges only to awards that decide the substantive merits of the case would reduce the risk of delay and prevent tactical attempts to obstruct the arbitration process by bringing challenges on interim orders: Pukuafu at [25]. It also reflected the principle that procedural issues fall directly within the province of the arbitral tribunal and should be decided solely by the tribunal: Pukuafu at [23].
- [45]
[45] Indeed, at the drafting stage, the regime for enforcement of interim measures was envisioned to be largely free from judicial interference. The LRC Report, which was adopted by Parliament, recommended (at para 35) that “curial assistance should be available such that the interim orders and/or directions may be registered with the courts for enforcement as an administrative process” [emphasis added].
- [46]
[46] The only express condition is found in O 48 r 5(2) of the ROC 2021, which reads as follows:
- [47]
[47] However, the imposition of this condition for interim injunctions under ss 12(1)(e) and 12(1)(f) of the IAA does not mean that the court must grant enforcement in all other cases – as stated above at [41], enforcement is an exercise of the court’s discretion. Nor does it inform how the discretion under s 12(6) of the IAA should be exercised.
- [48]
[48] Nevertheless, drawing on the background and context of s 12(6) of the IAA as explored above, the threshold to obtain the court’s permission must necessarily be a low one:
(a) as stated above, it was envisaged that the obtaining of the court’s permission under s 12(6) would be “administrative”;
(b) an interim measure, by definition, does not determine the merits of the dispute between the parties but seeks to preserve the parties’ rights pending the final determination of the dispute by the tribunal;
(c) the clear policy and intent of the IAA is for minimal curial intervention, and for the court to assist arbitral proceedings, which includes the enforcement of interim measures, directions and, ultimately, awards;
(d) the court is not concerned with the merits of the interim measure; indeed, unlike the case of an award, the IAA does not give the court power to even set aside or review interim measures made by the arbitral tribunal; and
(e) as previously observed, the court should eschew any principle or approach which risks delay or allows tactical attempts to obstruct the arbitration process (Pukuafu at [25]).
Do FNC principles apply?
- [49]
[49] I now turn to the thrust of the defendant’s case, namely that FNC principles are relevant to the question of whether it is appropriate for the court to exercise jurisdiction over an application to enforce a domestic interim measure.
- [50]
[50] As a preliminary point, I note that the claimants went beyond arguing that it was appropriate for the court to exercise jurisdiction in respect of the Leave Application. Relying on Sanum Investments, they argued that because this was a Singapore-seated arbitration, the court was in fact obliged to hear the Leave Application.
- [51]
[51] The claimants’ submission in this respect goes too far. In Sanum Investments, the application before the court challenged the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal. It was in this context that Sundaresh Menon CJ held at [38]:
- [52]
[52] Where the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal is concerned, the court of the seat is exclusively charged with the duty to pronounce on the matter (following an appeal against the tribunal’s own decision on jurisdiction): see s 10(3) IAA. This is a crucial component of supervisory jurisdiction, and parties would be left with no recourse against the tribunal’s decision on jurisdiction if the court of the seat were to abdicate this duty. Hence, the court of the seat is obliged to consider issues such as the jurisdiction of the tribunal. On the other hand, the enforcement of domestic interim measures is not an issue which the court of the seat has exclusive jurisdiction to hear.
Judicial authority
- [53]
[53] Returning to the issue of the relevance of FNC principles, the claimants relied on the UK Supreme Court’s decision in Enka Insaat Ve Sanayi AS v OOO Insurance Company Chubb and others [2020] UKSC 38 (“Enka UKSC”) for the proposition that FNC principles are not relevant to the court’s exercise of jurisdiction over an application to enforce a local interim measure. The court in Enka UKSC held as follows (at [179]):
The claimants contended that the enforcement of domestic interim measures was also part of the supervisory jurisdiction of the Singapore courts, and hence in line with the holding in Enka UKSC, FNC principles were not relevant.
- [54]
[54] In response, the defendants argued that the powers that are exclusive to a supervisory court are listed at Art 6 of the Model Law, which does not include the enforcement of a domestic interim measure; accordingly, the enforcement of a domestic interim measure was not a power exclusive to the seat court and hence Singapore being the seat court did not ipso facto mean that the Singapore court is the appropriate enforcement court.
- [55]
[55] The scope of supervisory jurisdiction is not founded on Art 6 of the Model Law. The provision reads:
- [56]
[56] This provision was meant to allow the legislature of a State to designate the relevant court which would perform the functions referred to in the specified articles. The title of Art 6 itself, which reads “certain functions of arbitration assistance and supervision” [emphasis added] indicates that the provision was not meant to exhaustively list the supervisory powers of the national courts. Thus, it has been observed that (Howard Holtzmann and Joseph Neuhaus, A Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (Wolters Kluwer, 2015) at p 240):
Clearly, Art 6 does not delineate the scope of supervisory jurisdiction.
- [58]
[58] Overall, the authorities do not appear to address specifically the issue of whether FNC principles apply to the enforcement of domestic interim measures. Hence, I turn to consider the nature and purpose of the FNC doctrine and if or how it maps onto the enforcement of domestic interim measures under s 12(6) of the IAA. For reasons discussed below, I find that FNC principles do not apply to the enforcement of domestic interim measures.
FNC considerations are irrelevant to the enforcement paradigm
- [59]
[59] The defendants’ argument fundamentally misunderstands and misapplies FNC principles. In essence, they wrongly conflate a “proper” and an “appropriate” forum.
- [60]
[60] The court will only grant a stay on FNC grounds where it is satisfied that there is some other available and appropriate forum for the trial of the action: Rickshaw Investments at [14], citing Eng Liat Kiang v Eng Bak Hern [1995] 2 SLR(R) 851 at [19]. Thus, the purpose of the FNC analysis is to identify the most appropriate forum (ie, the proper forum) to hear the substantive dispute: Siemens AG v Holdrich Investment Ltd [2010] 3 SLR 1007 (“Siemens AG”) at [19]. The court therefore considers which forum the material elements of the dispute (eg, the parties, governing law, evidence, and witnesses) are most closely connected to, such that the case may be tried more suitably in that forum for the interest of all the parties and the ends of justice: Rickshaw Investments at [13], citing Brinkerhoff Maritime Drilling Corp v PT Airfast Services Indonesia [1992] 2 SLR(R) 345 at [35].
- [61]
[61] However, the nature and purpose of a FNC inquiry is simply ill-suited to applications for the enforcement of domestic interim measures. First, FNC principles are concerned with the substantive dispute at hand – hence the focus on the factors connecting the substantive dispute to a particular jurisdiction, such as the availability of witnesses and evidence. This focus on the substantive dispute is necessary to ascertain the single, most appropriate forum for determining the dispute: Siemens AG at [4].
- [62]
[62] Where the enforcement of domestic interim measures is concerned, the court is not concerned with adjudicating the substantive merits of the dispute or the interim measure itself. The court is therefore not concerned with the typical connecting factors which a particular forum has to the dispute. Further, the aim of the FNC doctrine – ie, to identify the single, most appropriate forum for determining the substantive dispute – makes little sense in the enforcement paradigm, since an enforcement application can be brought in multiple jurisdictions.
Application of FNC principles contradicts party autonomy and certainty
- [64]
[64] The application of FNC principles is also antithetical, in a practical sense, to the question of whether it is appropriate for this court to exercise jurisdiction over the enforcement of domestic interim measures under s 12(6) of the IAA.
- [65]
[65] The common practice, and reality, in international arbitrations is that the chosen seat may have little or even no connection with the parties or the dispute; its choice may turn on, or reflect the parties’ confidence in, the legal infrastructure of the seat, the national curial law and willingness of the courts to support and facilitate the arbitration. Indeed, the lack of connecting factors to, and the neutrality of, the seat may be the precise reason why the parties chose that very seat: see Westbridge at [92]. Applying FNC principles to enforcement would be contrary to party autonomy and the expectations of the parties.
- [66]
[66] Applying FNC principles would also introduce uncertainty. The application of FNC, which involves multi-factorial considerations, is often a complicated and unpredictable exercise. If the defendants are correct, the “appropriate” jurisdiction to enforce an interim measure would not only be unclear from the outset, it may also engage different jurisdictions depending on the nature and terms of the interim measure to be enforced. It therefore presents ample opportunity for a respondent to engage in delay and tactical attempts to obstruct the arbitration process, which is the very mischief s 12(6) seeks to avoid: see Pukuafu at [25]. Such an outcome would potentially make Singapore a less attractive seat for international arbitrations: see Gary B Born, International Commercial Arbitration (3rd Ed, Wolters Kluwer, 2012) at para 14.02[A][6].
Legitimate reasons and practical benefits for seeking enforcement at the seat
- [67]
[67] Further, there may be legitimate reasons and practical benefits for seeking enforcement at the court of the seat. First, parties may have chosen the arbitral seat for the very reason of the seat jurisdiction’s approach toward enforcing awards (used in the loose sense of the term and including interim measures). The court in Enka EWCA stated at [48] that “preferences for seats are predominantly based on users’ appraisal of the seat’s established formal legal infrastructure: the neutrality and impartiality of the legal system; the national arbitration law; and its track record for enforcing agreements to arbitrate and arbitral awards” [emphasis added].
- [68]
[68] Second, the seat court’s grant of enforcement dispels any potential for a future challenge to the award on procedural grounds. As observed by the court in Shell Energy Europe Ltd v Meta Energia SpA [2020] EWHC 1799 (Comm) at [17]:
This inherent value in seeking and obtaining enforcement at the court of the seat makes it practical and reasonable for parties to do so, irrespective of considerations such as the ease of enforcement at the seat jurisdiction.
Foreign interim measures
- [73]
[73] In contrast, Parliament did not see fit to prescribe any grounds to refuse the enforcement of domestic interim measures.
- [74]
[74] Logically, Parliament could not have intended that the court’s discretion to refuse enforcement of a domestic interim measure would be wider than that for a foreign interim measure. Singapore-seated international arbitrations are subject to the curial jurisdiction of the Singapore courts and the accompanying supervision which the Singapore courts are empowered to impose on such arbitrations pursuant to the IAA. In contrast, foreign-seated international arbitrations are not subject to the supervision of the Singapore courts at all. Given this, it is reasonable to expect that the statutory position toward the enforcement of foreign interim measures would be more restrictive than that toward the enforcement of domestic interim measures. This expectation is indeed borne out by the actual structure of the IAA, which, as noted above, provides various grounds for refusing the enforcement of a foreign interim measure but none for the enforcement of a domestic interim measure. The imposition of more judicial scrutiny on the enforcement of domestic interim measures would also be inconsistent with the general policy of making such enforcement an expeditious, “administrative” process, as evidenced by the carving out of domestic interim measures from the setting-aside regime for domestic awards under the IAA as well as the LRC Report’s comments (noted above at [44]–[45]).
- [75]
[75] In the circumstances, in so far as FNC considerations are irrelevant in the context of the enforcement of foreign interim measures, which they plainly are, there is no good reason for applying such considerations to the court’s exercise of jurisdiction in respect of domestic interim measures.
- [76]
[76] The only limb that could possibly assist the defendants is s 31(4)(b) of the IAA – ie, where the enforcement of the foreign award would be contrary to the public policy of Singapore. The ambit of “public policy” will be discussed later at [112]–[116]. It suffices to say for now that this doctrine is a strict and narrow one, including, for example, the situation where enforcement “shocks the conscience” or “violates Singapore’s most basic notion of justice”: BAZ v BBA and others and other matters [2020] 5 SLR 266 (“BAZ”) at [180]. No authority was cited to support the proposition that FNC considerations engage the public policy of Singapore. They plainly do not.
Other arguments by the defendants
The 2006 Model Law
- [77]
[77] The defendants also urged me to consider Art 17I of the Model Law with amendments as adopted in 2006 (the “2006 Model Law”), which provides instances where the recognition or enforcement of an interim measure may be refused. Art 17I reads as follows:
- [78]
[78] The defendants accept that Art 17I is not part of Singapore law, but say it represents “international consensus” which is persuasive. I decline to adopt Art 17I as authoritative. It is for Parliament to amend the IAA to adopt the 2006 Model Law or Art 17I if it sees fit.
- [79]
[79] In any event, Art 17I of the 2006 Model Law does not assist the defendants. It does not provide for the refusal of enforcement, much less to decline the exercise of jurisdiction over an application to enforce, on FNC principles. The only possibly relevant provision is Art 17I(1)(b)(i), under which the court may decline enforcement if “the interim measure is incompatible with the powers conferred upon the court unless the court decides to reformulate the interim measure to the extent necessary to adapt it to its own powers and procedures for the purposes of enforcing that interim measure and without modifying its substance”. However, the travaux for the 2006 Model Law make clear that this provision is only concerned with orders that might be beyond the power of the national court: see UNCITRAL Working Group on Arbitration, Report on the work of its Thirty-Third Session (A/CN.9/485, 20 December 2000) at paras 79 and 100; UNCITRAL Working Group on Arbitration, Report on the work of its Thirty-fourth Session (A/CN.9/487, 15 June 2001) at para 76; UNCITRAL Working Group on Arbitration, Report on the work of its Thirty-eighth Session (A/CN.9/524, 2 June 2003) at para 48. This is entirely different from the defendants’ arguments on FNC principles, which relate to orders that might more appropriately be enforced in the courts of another jurisdiction.
Case law
(1) Swift-Fortune
- [80]
[80] The defendants relied on the decision in Swift-Fortune for the proposition that under O 69A r 4 of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, 2004 Rev Ed) (what is now O 48 r 4(2) of the ROC 2021), the phrase “case is a proper one for service out” required the applicant to show that the Singapore court is forum conveniens. However, Swift-Fortune does not apply here.
- [82]
[82] Further, it is not the case that the Spiliada test applies in all applications for service out. For example, where there is an exclusive jurisdiction clause in the contract, the “strong cause” test applies instead – ie, a party seeking to bring proceedings in breach of that clause must show “exceptional circumstances amounting to strong cause”: Trisuryo Garuda Nusa Pte Ltd v SKP Pradiksi (North) Sdn Bhd and another and another appeal [2017] 2 SLR 814 at [83]–[85].
- [83]
[83] An altogether different assessment applies in the context of applications for the enforcement of domestic interim measures. As noted above at [62], for such applications, there is no need to ascertain the single, most appropriate forum for enforcement. For the reasons set out above, FNC principles are irrelevant. In fact, the question of whether a case involving such an application “is a proper one for service out of Singapore” is presumptively answered in the affirmative by the fact that Singapore is the seat jurisdiction.
- [84]
[84] Swift-Fortune therefore does not aid the defendants’ case. Further, I note that the discussion on the Spiliada connecting factors under the FNC analysis was ultimately irrelevant as the court in Swift-Fortune concluded that it did not have the power, under the IAA, to grant a Mareva injunction in aid of a foreign-seated arbitration: Swift-Fortune at [49]–[50] and [60].
- [85]
[85] For completeness, and in any case, the issue of service out of jurisdiction under O 48 r 4(2) of the ROC is not engaged in this case. The defendants have, through their Singapore solicitors, accepted service of the Leave Application.
(2) Margulies and Tridon
- [88]
[88] Second, they involved the application of English and Australian arbitration statutes (the Arbitration Act 1950 in Margulies and the Commercial Arbitration Act 1984 in Tridon) which did not incorporate the Model Law. In contrast, the enforcement provisions in the IAA and the Model Law do not differentiate between declaratory and other awards, with the result that the same limited grounds for refusal of enforcement apply to all awards. Thus, the court in Meydan Group LLC v Banyan Tree Corporate Pte Ltd [2014] DIFC CA 005 (“Meydan”) (at [25] and [33]–[34]) observed that the Model Law does not afford the court discretion to refuse a declaratory award on grounds that it would serve no useful purpose – that coram included Roger Giles J, who decided Tridon.
- [89]
[89] Further, the apparent prohibition in Margulies against the enforcement of declaratory awards was subsequently rejected in The Front Comor [2011] 2 All ER (Comm) 1, where the court held (at [28]) that a declaratory award will be enforced if to do so would make a positive contribution to the securing of the material benefit of the award.
- [90]
[90] Third, neither Margulies nor Tridon cited FNC principles as a ground for refusing to enforce an award. Overall, these cases do not advance the defendants’ argument that this court should refuse to hear the Leave Application.
Sufficient safeguards on the enforcement of interim measures in Singapore
- [91]
[91] The defendants argued that unless FNC considerations are imposed, the Singapore courts will become “the policemen of the world” as far as the enforcement of interim measures are concerned. I disagree:
(a) s 12(6) of the IAA only applies to Singapore-seated international arbitrations; and
(b) there are safeguards with respect to applications to enforce foreign interim measures, since they are subject to the same grounds for refusal of enforcement under the IAA as all other foreign arbitral awards (see [72] above).
- [92]
[92] In any event, the defendants’ concerns are overstated. It is highly unlikely that commercial parties will want to incur time and financial resources enforcing interim awards in Singapore unless there are practical benefits.
Appropriate for the court to hear the Leave Application
- [93]
[93] Overall, I find that under O 6 r 12(4)(b) of the ROC 2021, this court is the appropriate court to hear the Leave Application and it should not decline to exercise its jurisdiction to do so.
Committal proceedings
- [101]
[101] In any event, the difficulties cited by the defendants would similarly exist in respect of committal proceedings arising from foreign awards or interim measures, but, as discussed above at [72], that is not a ground to oppose their enforcement. Thus, the defendants’ concerns relating to committal proceedings are not relevant in determining the appropriate court under O 6 r 12(4)(b), whether as part of their FNC arguments or as a standalone factor.
- [103]
[103] Maldives Airports dealt with the merits of granting an injunction. It was in that context that the court considered whether the balance of convenience lay in favour of granting the Injunction. However, the issue before me was a jurisdictional one – ie, whether the court should decline to exercise jurisdiction to hear the Leave Application. The balance of convenience considerations do not apply since the court is simply concerned with whether the application should even be heard at all. In fact, the court in Maldives Airports did consider at length, prior to its assessment of the balance of convenience, whether it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal: see Maldives Airports at [14]–[31]. It found that it did, and no balance of convenience considerations featured in that analysis.
- [107]
[107] For completeness, and for the same reasons above, I reject the defendants’ alternative arguments that the Leave Application be stayed under s 18(2) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (2020 Rev Ed) (read with para 9 of the First Schedule) and the inherent jurisdiction of the court.
Possible limitations to the court’s discretion under s 12(6) of the IAA
- [108]
[108] The court’s exercise of its discretion to grant permission to enforce under s 12(6) of the IAA was not before me. It is to be addressed at the merits hearing for the Leave Application. However, given the dearth of both statutory and judicial guidance on this issue, I make some brief observations on the issue. For clarity, the possible limitations on the court’s exercise of discretion under s 12(6) of the IAA discussed below are not jurisdictional factors to be considered under O 6 r 12(4)(b) of the ROC 2021. Rather, they are arguments for resisting enforcement of domestic interim measures under s 12(6) of the IAA and O 48 of the ROC 2021.
- [109]
[109] Given Parliament’s exclusion of the s 12(6) regime from the setting aside and refusal of enforcement mechanisms under the IAA (see [44] and [73] above), the bar for the court to refuse to grant permission to enforce a domestic interim measure must necessarily be a high one. In my view, if there are any limits to the court’s discretion to grant permission to enforce a domestic interim measure, they are where:
Excess of the court’s powers
- [110]
[110] Logically, the court cannot grant permission to enforce an interim measure which it could not itself have granted. Hence, where the granting of the interim measure would have been in excess of the court’s powers, the court must refuse permission to enforce it. An example is where the interim measure calls for the exercise of police powers.
Public policy
- [111]
[111] Public policy is included as a ground for setting aside under Art 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Model Law and refusal of enforcement of awards under s 31(4)(b) of the IAA and Art 36(1)(b)(ii) of the Model Law. I note the court’s observation in AJU v AJT [2011] 4 SLR 739 at [37] that there is no difference between the setting aside and the enforcement regime where the ground of public policy is concerned. Thus, the case law on public policy in the enforcement regime is likewise relevant to the setting aside regime: AJU at [38].
- [112]
[112] In my view, the public policy ground and that same body of case law are also applicable to the enforcement of domestic interim measures. The travaux for the Model Law makes clear that the public policy ground is concerned with “fundamental notions and principles of justice”, rather than state politics or policies. As the court in PT Asuransi Jasa Indonesia (Persero) v Dexia Bank SA [2007] 1 SLR(R) 597 (“PT Asuransi”) observed at [59]:
- [113]
[113] I see no reason why such contravention of “fundamental notions and principles of justice”, and the body of case law outlining its ambit, should not also feature in the court’s exercise of its discretion to permit the enforcement of domestic interim measures.
- [114]
[114] In this regard, the prevailing approach is that the public policy objection must involve either “exceptional circumstances … which would justify the court in refusing to enforce the award”, or be a violation of “the most basic notions of morality and justice: Bloomberry Resorts at [162], citing AJU at [38]. Similarly, the court in PT Asuransi noted at [59] that:
- [115]
[115] In CEB v CEC and another matter [2020] 4 SLR 183 at [50], the Court of Appeal commented on this holding in PT Asuransi, noting that “[t]hese are strong words which give effect to the underlying objective that it is only in circumstances where the effect of an award comes into conflict with accepted norms of public decency, behaviour, morality and/or justice that the court should intervene”. The court in CEB noted further that “[t]his will seldom be the case in commercial disputes”.
- [116]
[116] An example of when the enforcement of an award would be contrary to public policy would be where the enforcement of the award would mean ignoring the underlying contract’s “palpable and indisputable illegality”: Westacre Investments Inc v Jugoimport-SPDR Holding Co Ltd [1999] QB 740 at 767 (cited in CBX and another v CBZ and others [2020] 5 SLR 184 at [56]). Another (more specific) example may be found in BAZ. There, the court held (at [180]) that “it violates Singapore’s most basic notion of justice” to find minors liable under a contract that was entered into when they were only between three to eight years old. Thus, the court set aside the arbitral award as it related to the minors.
Abuse of process
- [118]
[118] I note that it is difficult to map the conventional understanding of an abuse of process onto the enforcement of domestic interim measures. The court in Gabriel Peter & Partners (suing as a firm) v Wee Chong Jin and others [1997] 3 SLR(R) 649 (“Gabriel Peter”) explained (at [22]) that the term “abuse of process” signifies that the process of the court must be used bona fide and properly and must not be abused – in this regard, the court would prevent the improper use of its machinery and prevent the judicial process from being used as a means of vexation and oppression in the process of litigation. A type of conduct which constituted an abuse of process was the bringing of an action for a collateral purpose: Gabriel Peter at [22].
Conclusion
- [122]
[122] I thank counsel for their detailed and helpful submissions.