General Division of the High Court · Decided 5 September 2023
[2023] SGHC 248
Feedback & support[2023] SGHC 248 · Case no. Criminal Revision No 4 of 2023 · 19 paragraphs
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Grounds of decision
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Introduction
Background facts
- [2]
[2] I first set out below the key events which have taken place since the Applicant’s arrest on 15 August 2023:
(b) On 23 August 2023, the Applicant was produced in the District Court. Applications were made by the Prosecution as well as the Applicant through his counsel who appeared at the hearing. I set out a summary of these applications below (with the orders made by the District Court collectively referred to as the “23 August 2023 Orders”):
(i) The Prosecution made an application under s 238(3) of the CPC for the Applicant to be further remanded for a period of eight days. The Applicant’s counsel objected to the Prosecution’s application. The District Court allowed the Prosecution’s application for the Applicant to be further remanded for a period of eight days.
(c) In an email correspondence between the Applicant’s counsel and the Prosecution before 29 August 2023, the Prosecution explained that the Applicant would be allowed access to counsel on 29 August 2023. Due to operational constraints of the CAD, each of the ten suspects arrested as part of the investigation would be allowed to speak to their counsel for one hour only. Further, due to space constraints, only two persons were allowed to meet with each suspect.
(d) On 29 August 2023, the following events took place:
(i) The Applicant was allowed access to his counsel for one hour. Two solicitors attended the meeting on 29 August 2023.
(ii) The Applicant filed the present application, praying for the High Court to exercise its revisionary powers under s 401 of the CPC to revoke the 23 August 2023 Orders, and for the Applicant to be granted bail.
(e) On 30 August 2023, the Applicant was produced in the District Court. Four further charges under s 54(1)(c) of the Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act 1992 (“CDSA”) were tendered against the Applicant. Applications were made by the Prosecution as well as the Applicant through his counsel who appeared at the hearing. I set out a summary of these applications below (with the orders made by the District Court collectively referred to as the “30 August 2023 Orders”).
(i) The Prosecution made an application under s 238(3) of the CPC for the Applicant to be further remanded for a period of eight days. The Applicant’s counsel objected to the Prosecution’s application. The District Court allowed the Prosecution’s application for the Applicant to be further remanded for a period of eight days.
(f) On 1 September 2023, the Applicant’s counsel wrote to the CAD requesting that the Applicant be allowed access to counsel for two hours on 5 September 2023, and for three persons to be allowed to meet the Applicant. This request was acceded to by the CAD in an email dated 2 September 2023 by which the Applicant was allowed access to his counsel from 10.00am to 12.00pm on 5 September 2023, and with three persons allowed to be present at the meeting.
- [4]
[4] Since the filing of this application, the District Judge (“DJ”) has published his grounds of decision on 4 September 2023 (see Public Prosecutor v Vang Shuiming [2023] SGDC 201 (“the DJ’s GD”)).
The law on exercise of the High Court’s revisionary power
- [5]
[5] I begin by articulating the general principles governing the exercise of the High Court’s revisionary powers. In Ang Poh Chuan v Public Prosecutor [1995] 3 SLR(R) 929, Yong Pung How CJ (as he then was) stated at [17] that:
- [6]
[6] Similarly, Yong CJ stated in Knight Glenn Jeyasingam v Public Prosecutor [1998] 3 SLR(R) 196 at [19] that:
- [7]
[7] The above remarks were cited with approval by Sundaresh Menon CJ in Public Prosecutor v Yang Yin [2015] 2 SLR 78 (at [25]–[26]), where the High Court held that the High Court’s revisionary power under s 401 of the CPC is to be exercised sparingly and the threshold is that of serious injustice. In other words, the Applicant must show that there is something palpably wrong in the 23 August 2023 Orders and the 30 August 2023 Orders that strikes at its basis as an exercise of judicial power by the court below.
- [8]
[8] I consider each of the Applicant’s submissions in respect of the 23 August 2023 Orders and the 30 August 2023 Orders below.
My decision
The 23 August 2023 Orders
The DJ’s order on 23 August 2023 for the Applicant to be further remanded for a period of eight days
- [10]
[10] The Applicant first argues that the DJ erroneously granted the Prosecution’s application under s 238(3) of the CPC for the Applicant to be further remanded for a period of eight days on 23 August 2023. The parties’ submissions on this point can be summarised as follows:
(b) On the other hand, the Prosecution submits that the DJ correctly concluded that the threshold for ordering that the Applicant be further remanded was met. The Prosecution states that the complex investigations were at an early stage as of 23 August 2023, with the results and review of forensic extraction from the Applicant’s seized devices and information from financial institutions still pending. Further, the tracing of the Applicant’s substantial assets was ongoing. Finally, the Prosecution states that there was a risk of collusion with other suspects if the Applicant was released on bail, given a purported connection between the Applicant and other persons wanted by the Police. The Prosecution also points to the fact that further evidence was, in fact, obtained as a result of the Applicant’s further remand from 23 August 2023 to 30 August 2023 as set out in the affidavit of the lead investigator, Mr Teh Yee Liang (“Teh’s Affidavit”).
- [12]
[12] First, while the Applicant states that no evidence was adduced by the Prosecution to support its application for a further remand of eight days, it is important to recognise that the typical evidential rules do not apply in such proceedings, which are meant to be dealt with in a summary way. This was considered by the Court of Appeal in Public Prosecutor v Sollihin bin Anhar [2015] 3 SLR 447 (at [38]) when it set out the type of evidence which the court may rely upon in dealing with applications regarding the granting and revocation of bail:
- [14]
[14] As the DJ observed, the Applicant’s contention that the Prosecution was obliged to provide affidavit evidence to support its application for further remand of the Applicant is neither a requirement stipulated in s 238(3) of the CPC nor one that is supported by a careful reading of the language of s 238(3) of the CPC. Given that section 238(3) of the CPC only requires the court to consider whether it appears likely that further evidence may be obtained by a period of remand rather than for this to be proved, the Applicant’s argument that the Prosecution needed to provide affidavit evidence is untenable: see the DJ’s GD at [13]–[16].
- [15]
[15] More significantly, as the DJ highlighted, the nature of remand applications is such that there is a need for remand applications to be heard expeditiously. On this point, I fully agree with the explanation offered by the DJ on why an application of the strict rules of evidence to remand applications would be wholly incompatible with the public interest. I reproduce his explanation in full below (see the DJ’s GD at [20]):
- [16]
[16] Second, looking at the submissions of the Prosecution in support of its position for further remand, the investigations were at a preliminary stage as of 23 August 2023. In my view, the Prosecution’s application for further remand on 23 August 2023 was justified based on the need to conduct further investigations into a complex case, as well as the risk of collusion because of the purported connection between the Applicant and other persons wanted by the Police.
The DJ’s decision on 23 August 2023 to deny the Applicant’s application for an order that the Applicant be granted immediate access to counsel
(a) The Applicant argues that it was the Prosecution’s burden to prove that giving effect to the Applicant’s right to counsel would impede the Police’s investigations or the administration of justice. The Applicant states that the Prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proof by failing to adduce any evidence to discharge its burden of proof.
(b) On the other hand, the Prosecution submits that the Applicant’s right to counsel is not an immediate right to counsel. Rather, the Applicant is entitled to counsel within a reasonable time after his arrest. This is to strike a balance between an accused person’s right to legal representation and the public interest in allowing the Police to carry out effective investigations. In the present case, the Prosecution highlights that it had committed at the hearing on 23 August 2023 to allowing the Applicant access to counsel from 29 August 2023, subject to the operational constraints of the CAD. Given that the Applicant was arrested on 15 August 2023, this would have meant that the duration of non-access to counsel would have only been two weeks. The Prosecution states that its position was a reasonable one. Given the sensitive and complex nature of the investigations in the present case, the Police had to focus on following up on new leads and gathering evidence while it still remained available.
- [18]
[18] Having considered parties’ submissions, I find that that there was nothing palpably wrong with the DJ’s decision on 23 August 2023 to deny the Applicant’s application for immediate access to counsel. As set out in Jasbir Singh and another v Public Prosecutor [1994] 1 SLR(R) 782 (at [45]–[49]), while an accused person has a right to counsel, this right is not one which must be granted to him immediately. Rather, an accused person’s right to counsel needs to be granted to him only within a reasonable time after his arrest. This is due to the need to strike a balance between an accused person’s right to legal advice and the duty of the Police to protect the public by carrying out effective investigations.
- [19]
[19] In the present case, it is clear from Teh’s Affidavit that the Police needed time to conduct their investigations without distraction. Granting the Applicant access to counsel would have led to significant arrangements having to be made for all the suspects arrested as part of this investigation to similarly be granted access to counsel, whilst ensuring that the suspects did not communicate with one another. Further, at the hearing on 23 August 2023, the Prosecution had already made clear that access to counsel would be granted from 29 August 2023. In light of the above, as well as the fact that this was a complex investigation and a commitment was made that access to counsel would be granted from a date which was within two weeks of the Applicant’s arrest, I do not find that the DJ erred in denying the Applicant’s application for immediate access to counsel.
The 30 August 2023 Orders
The DJ’s order on 30 August 2023 for the Applicant to be further remanded for a period of eight days
- [21]
[21] The Applicant first argues that the DJ erroneously granted the Prosecution’s application under s 238(3) of the CPC for the Applicant to be further remanded for a period of eight days on 30 August 2023. The parties’ submissions on this point can be summarised as follows:
(b) On the other hand, the Prosecution submits that the DJ correctly concluded that the threshold for ordering that the Applicant be further remanded was met. The Prosecution highlights that four further CDSA charges had been tendered against the Applicant at the hearing on 30 August 2023. However, extensive investigations still needed to be carried out, which included the recording of further statements, the review and receipt of voluminous data and the conducting of checks with foreign authorities. Further, investigations had linked the Applicant to a suspect wanted by the Police who was out of jurisdiction. There was, in the Prosecution’s view, a real risk of collusion if the Applicant were to be released on bail on 30 August 2023.
- [23]
[23] First, it is clear that, as of 30 August 2023, there was progress in the Police’s investigations, given that four further CDSA charges had been tendered against the Applicant on that day. As the DJ had observed, this was a clear demonstration that the previous period of remand had led to further evidence being obtained (see the DJ’s GD at [33]).
- [24]
[24] Further, as set out in Teh’s Affidavit, the CAD had assessed that there were numerous parts of the investigation which were yet to be completed. This included the recording of further statements from the Applicant about information received from the other suspects and persons of interest. The CAD was also in possession of evidence showing close association between the Applicant and two suspects, Su Haijin and Su Baolin, as well as evidence showing communications between the Applicant and one Suspect X who was wanted by the Police and was out of jurisdiction. In light of the above, the CAD made the assessment that there was a real risk of collusion and contamination of evidence if the Applicant were to be released before the CAD had obtained the further evidence it required. In my view, based on the details of the pending investigation and the CAD’s reasons for its assessment that there was a real risk of collusion and contamination of evidence, there was clearly a need for the Applicant to be further remanded for a period of eight days.
- [25]
[25] Further, I wish to state that I agree with the DJ’s observations on when an application for further remand typically ought not to be granted: (a) where remand is sought merely for the investigator’s convenience; (b) where remand is sought for the improper motive of pressuring an accused person to confess to an offence; (c) where previous remand has failed to provide any further evidence; (d) where remand is sought for a minor offence which attracts a low fine even if the accused person is convicted; or (e) where remand would significantly exacerbate an accused person’s illness which cannot be remedied by changing the conditions of remand (see the DJ’s GD at [30]). In such situations, it is clear that the prejudice caused to an accused person by allowing an application for further remand would be disproportionate to the investigative benefits of his remand.
The DJ’s order on 30 August 2023 that the Applicant be granted access to counsel, subject to the operational constraints of the CAD
- [27]
[27] The Applicant further argues that the DJ erred in ordering that the Applicant be granted access to counsel with the caveat that this was subject to the operational constraints of the CAD. The Applicant argues that the Prosecution ought not to have been allowed to curtail the Applicant’s right to counsel without explaining what these operational constraints were or proving the existence of such constraints. The Prosecution argues, however, that such caveats are entirely consistent with the principle that the right of access must be balanced against the public interest. Further, access could not be expected to be entirely unfettered so long as the Applicant remained in remand.
Conclusion
- [33]
[33] For the reasons above, I do not find that the District Court’s orders of 23 August 2023 and 30 August 2023 can be described as wrong, much less palpably wrong, such as to meet the high threshold of “serious injustice” on which any exercise of the High Court’s revisionary powers is contingent. As the threshold for the High Court’s revisionary power under s 401 of the CPC to be exercised has not been met, I dismiss the Applicant’s application.