Ma Zhen Hu Michael v Public Prosecutor

[1] Mr Ma Zhen Hu Michael (“the Appellant”) pleaded guilty to and was convicted on a charge under s 64(1) and punishable under s 64(2C)(a) of the Road Traffic Act (Cap 276, 2004 Rev Ed) (“RTA”) for an offence of dangerous driving.

[3] Briefly, the Appellant was driving a motorcar on 16 April 2021. As he drove to Clemenceau Avenue, he stopped the car behind a line of vehicles which were queuing up before a roadblock which had been set up by the Traffic Police (“TP”). The Appellant could see the blinking blue and red lights from where his car was at which had been placed by the TP to indicate that there was a roadblock ahead. The Appellant then turned on the car’s hazard lights and reversed the car against the flow of traffic for a distance of about 50 metres. While the Appellant was reversing the car, two TP officers gave chase. The Appellant could see that there was at least one TP officer running towards his direction while he was reversing. The Appellant continued reversing. He then made a U-turn at the U-turn point at the opening of the centre divider and drove off. His conduct resulted in the driver of at least one vehicle having to take evasive action by swerving to the left to avoid a collision with the Appellant’s car.

(a) For a first-time traffic offender with a clean driving record (particularly where the offender has no history of compoundable offences or speeding tickets), the disqualification period should be set at 12 months or below. This would, however, only apply where the degree of potential harm posed to other road users is relatively low.

(b) Where there is very dangerous behaviour demonstrated by the offender, or conduct showing a disregard for traffic rules, etiquette and the interests of other road users, the disqualification period should exceed 12 months and can go up to 24 months and beyond.

(a) First, the Appellant takes issue with the DJ’s assessment that the potential harm arising from the Appellant’s manner of driving was significant and that the level of danger posed by his driving was considerable. The Appellant argues that he had come to a complete stop and only proceeded to reverse the car against the flow of traffic when he had observed that there were no vehicles behind the car. Further, he had turned on the hazard lights to alert other road users and reversed at a slow speed of about 30 km/h. The fact that the Appellant stopped his vehicle, reversed only when he saw no vehicles behind the car and turned on his hazard lights and reversed at a slow speed does not, however, detract from the inherently dangerous manner of driving which the Appellant engaged in. While he may have proceeded to do the above as precautionary steps, the fact remains that he reversed against the flow of traffic on a four-lane road for a considerable distance. Regardless of the precautionary steps taken, the conduct which the Appellant engaged in while on the road was behaviour which other road users would not typically expect. This, therefore, meant that the potential harm was, as the DJ found, more than notional. Further, the Appellant drove the car in the manner which he did at a time when the traffic flow was moderate. This would have been amply clear to the Appellant given that there were a line of vehicles queuing up ahead of the Appellant’s car because of the roadblock.

(b) Second, the Appellant submits that the DJ erred in placing weight on the fact that the driver of a vehicle had to swerve to the left to avoid a collision with the Appellant’s car as a result of the Appellant reversing the car against the flow of traffic. The Appellant states that he did not see a vehicle behind his car and that the implication of this was that the vehicle could not have been in close proximity to the Appellant’s car. This, however, is a self-serving argument. The Statement of Facts makes clear that the driver of the vehicle had to swerve to the left to avoid a collision with the Appellant’s car. The Appellant admitted to the Statement of Facts without qualification. While the Appellant may not have noticed the vehicle, this does not necessarily mean that the vehicle was not in close proximity to the Appellant’s car.

[7] Finally, I consider the Appellant’s submission that the length of disqualification imposed is inconsistent with the disqualification orders imposed in Neo Chuan Sheng v Public Prosecutor [2020] 5 SLR 410 (“Neo”) and Kwan below.

(a) It is clear that the distance of 203 metres driven by the offender in Neo was significantly longer than the distance of 50 metres driven by the Appellant here. However, it is equally important to recognise that the traffic conditions in Neo were quite different from the present case. In Neo, the offence took place at about 2.10am and there were no other vehicles or pedestrians along the road. This was quite unlike the present case, where there were vehicles queuing ahead of the Appellant’s car and the traffic flow was moderate along Clemenceau Avenue. Further, the fact that the driver of a vehicle did, in fact, have to swerve to avoid colliding with the Appellant’s car shows that the traffic flow was moderate in the present case. The potential harm was, therefore, higher in the present case than in Neo.