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Grounds publishedDecided 8 Sep 2023

General Division of the High Court

How Soo Feng v Public Prosecutor and another appeal

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[2023] SGHC 252Case no. Magistrates’ Appeal No 9173 of 2022

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] The multiplication of a negative integer by a positive integer, no matter how large, results in a negative product. The same is true in finance. Entering into a loss-making contract many times over does not make that contract any less loss-making. The appellants, Mr Iseli Rudolf James Maitland (“James”) and Ms How Soo Feng (“Sue”), were the directors and majority shareholders of The Gold Label Pte Ltd (“TGL PL”). TGL PL was the sort of company which started its Frequently Asked Questions in its sales pitches with the question: “Is this a Ponzi?” It sold gold buyback contracts which the appellants now do not dispute were loss-making for the company. In terms of having an effect on its balance sheet, TGL PL’s product was undoubtedly negative.

  3. [2] TGL PL managed to accumulate more than $120 million in revenue over 10 months of operation between 16 December 2009 and 7 October 2010, rewarding its directors handsomely in the process. It did this through a combination of slick salesmanship and the timeless “business model” of using revenue from new gold contracts to fund its payouts under previous contracts. This, perhaps, explains the need for the question “Is this a Ponzi scheme?” in TGL PL’s sales materials. It had charts and graphs showing that its business operations were complex – but this was just to hide the fact that even though the gold sold was real, TGL PL’s means of generating a profit were entirely imaginary.

  4. [3] Of course, such a scheme was ultimately unsustainable. By the time the appellants initiated TGL PL’s winding up on 7 October 2010, its liabilities had multiplied and it had accumulated unfulfilled contractual obligations to clients amounting to more than $76 million, with less than $500,000 left in its accounts. The appellants were both charged for fraudulent trading under s 340(5) read with s 340(1) of the Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed) (the “Companies Act”). They were convicted after trial, and each sentenced to three years’ and 10 months’ imprisonment. The appellants now appeal against their convictions and sentences. On appeal, they effectively concede that TGL PL was carried on for a fraudulent purpose. They raise a whole number of arguments, however, to show that they were not knowingly parties to the carrying on of its business for such a fraudulent purpose.

  5. [4] Having heard parties and considered their submissions, I dismiss the appeals against conviction and sentence.

  6. [5] In sum, I find that the appellants’ explanations for what they knew of TGL PL’s business model do not add up when weighed against the objective documentary evidence and their admissions in their statements. As they knew that each buyback contract was inherently loss-making, their understanding of TGL PL’s business model as using cashflow from loss-making contracts to enter into yet more loss-making contracts fundamentally revealed that they knew TGL PL’s business model was unsustainable.

  7. Background facts

  8. [6] TGL PL was incorporated in Singapore on 28 April 2009 and was in the business of selling gold bars under a buyback scheme (the “Gold Buyback Scheme”). Both Sue and James were directors and majority shareholders of TGL PL from 7 July 2009 to 15 November 2010. For much of this time, they held 627,000 of the 1,227,000 ordinary shares in TGL PL between them, with James holding 27,000 shares and Sue holding the other 600,000.

  9. [7] Wong Kwan Sing (“Gary”) was TGL PL’s other director from 20 November 2009 to 3 September 2010. FTEG Pte Ltd (“FTEG PL”), of which Gary was a director and a major shareholder, owned the remaining 600,000 shares in TGL PL from 24 February 2010 to 3 September 2010.

  10. The Gold Buyback Scheme

  11. [8] On 16 December 2009, TGL PL began to sell gold bars under the Gold Buyback Scheme promising guaranteed profits for participating clients. The integral features of the scheme’s function were as follows:

  12. (a) TGL PL would purchase gold bars from retail sources at retail prices.

  13. (b) TGL PL would then contract to sell these gold bars to its clients at an average mark-up of 24% above retail price (the “TGL PL Selling Price”).

  14. (c) During and/or after the contract term, TGL PL would make pay-outs to its clients equivalent to a percentage of the TGL PL Selling Price.

  15. (d) At the end of the contract term, TGL PL clients had two options. First, they could exercise a contractual sell-back option (the “Sell-Back Option”) requiring TGL PL to buy back the gold bars at the TGL PL Selling Price. Second, in the alternative, they could opt to keep the gold bars.

  16. [9] TGL PL sold these gold bars under two different types of plans, namely, Gold Delivery (“GD”) and Gold Secured Storage (“GSS”) plans, with durations of 3 months and 6 months respectively. Under the GD plan, clients would take physical delivery of the gold bars after entering into the contract with TGL PL and paying the TGL PL Selling Price. Under the GSS plan, the gold bars would be kept in Certis CISCO’s bonded warehouse for the duration of the contract. Further details about TGL PL’s various plans are set out below:

  17. (a) 3-month GD plan: Clients would receive an initial 1.5% discount on the TGL PL Selling Price. In addition, they would receive a pay-out equivalent to 2% of the TGL PL Selling Price after 3 months. At the end of the contract term of three months, clients could exercise the Sell-Back Option or keep the gold bars. If they exercised the Sell-Back Option, TGL PL would pay the TGL PL Selling Price.

  18. (b) 6-month GD plan: Clients would receive an initial 3% discount on the TGL PL Selling Price but would be charged Goods and Services Tax (“GST”) amounting to 7% of the discounted price. In addition, they would receive a first pay-out equivalent to 3% of the TGL PL Selling Price after three months, and a second pay-out equivalent to 3% of the TGL PL Selling Price after six months. At the end of the contract term of six months, clients could exercise the Sell-Back Option or keep the gold bars. If they exercised the Sell-Back Option, TGL PL would pay the TGL PL Selling Price plus the amount in GST earlier paid by the client.

  19. (c) 3-month GSS plan: Clients would receive an initial 2.5% discount on the TGL PL Selling Price but would be charged a Storage Service Fee (“SSF”), and GST on this SSF, amounting to 7% of the discounted price. In addition, they would receive a pay-out equivalent to 3% of the TGL PL Selling Price after three months. At the end of the contract term of three months, clients could exercise the Sell-Back Option or keep the gold bars. If they exercised the Sell-Back Option, TGL PL would pay the TGL PL Selling Price plus the amount in SSF and GST earlier paid by the client.

  20. (d) 6-month GSS plan: Clients would receive an initial 3% discount on the TGL PL Selling Price but would be charged a Storage Service Fee (“SSF”), and GST on this SSF, amounting to 7% of the discounted price. In addition, they would receive a first pay-out equivalent to 3% of the TGL PL Selling Price after three months, and a second pay-out equivalent to 6% of the TGL PL Selling Price after three months. At the end of the contract term of three months, clients could exercise the Sell-Back Option or keep the gold bars. If they exercised the Sell-Back Option, TGL PL would pay the TGL PL Selling Price plus the amount in SSF and GST earlier paid by the client.

  21. [10] The details of the various plans are summarised below:

  22. TGL PL’s expenses

  23. [12] In addition, TGL PL engaged SWM Investment Pte Ltd (“SWM PL”) to market the Gold Buyback Scheme on its behalf. For every contract sold, TGL PL would pay SWM PL a sales commission of 1.5% of the contract value each month over the contract’s duration. Sue and James each owned one of the four ordinary shares in SWM PL, while James was also SWM PL’s Managing Director.

  24. [13] TGL PL also paid directors’ fees to the appellants (estimated by Sue to be an average of $50,000 a month to each appellant) and to FTEG PL from December 2009 to March 2010. These were based on a percentage of TGL PL’s revenue and denominated in Singapore dollars. For every contract sold, TGL PL would pay the appellants 0.5% of the total value of all contracts sold to clients for the first month, and 0.25% of the total contract value for each subsequent month of the remaining contract duration. TGL PL would also pay FTEG PL 1% of the total contract value for the first month, and 0.5% of the total contract value for each subsequent month of the remaining contract duration.

  25. TGL PL’s investing activity

  26. [14] TGL PL did not engage in any investing activity except a time deposit of $1.9 million placed with Standard Chartered Bank on 29 June 2010. However, TGL PL fully withdrew the monies by 13 August 2010, before the maturity date of 29 September 2010. As a result, the 0.6% per annum interest under the time deposit was not earned.

  27. Developments

  28. [15] Following disputes between the appellants and Gary, Gary decided to leave TGL PL. On 3 September 2010, FTEG PL sold 300,000 of its TGL PL shares to Sue and James each for the sum of $250,000. Gary also resigned as a director of TGL PL on the same date. On 7 October 2010, James and Sue initiated a winding up of TGL PL.

  29. [16] On 15 November 2010, Goldvine Investment Pte Ltd (“Goldvine Investment PL”) acquired all of the appellants’ shares in TGL PL. Goldmine Investment PL was a company formed by PW1 Aw Chye Yen Gordon (“Gordon”), a former employee of TGL PL, along with two other investors for the purpose of acquiring TGL PL. The appellants resigned as directors of TGL PL on the same date. TGL PL was eventually wound up through a creditors’ voluntary winding up on 8 February 2011.

  30. [17] Gary was charged, alongside the appellants, under s 340(5) read with s 340(1) of the Companies Act. His charge was framed in identical terms to the appellants’ charges, save that the offending period was between 16 December 2009 and 3 September 2010 (instead of between 16 December 2009 and 7 October 2010). He would have been tried alongside the appellants in the same joint trial but he absconded to Malaysia before trial commenced. By the time he was apprehended, the appellants’ trial had already been underway for 8 days. Gary pleaded guilty to his charge and was sentenced by a different court to two years’ and 10 months’ imprisonment before the conclusion of the appellants’ trial below. A second charge under s 103(5)(c) of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed), for failing to attend court, was taken into consideration.

  31. The decision below

  32. [18] Both appellants claimed trial in the District Court to the following identical charge:

  33. [19] The decisions of the District Judge (“DJ”) in respect of the appellants’ convictions and sentences are reported in Public Prosecutor v Iseli Rudolf James Maitland and another [2022] SGDC 204 and Public Prosecutor v Iseli Rudolf James Maitland and another [2022] SGDC 211 respectively.

  34. [20] The DJ observed that the charges under s 340(5) read with s 340(1) of the Companies Act required proof of the following two elements:

  35. (a) First, that the business of TGL PL was carried on for the fraudulent purpose of selling gold bars under a buyback scheme promising returns when in fact TGL PL did not operate any substantive profit generating business and had no sustainable means to honour its payment and buyback obligations (the “Fraudulent Purpose”). This constituted the actus reus of the offence.

  36. (b) Second, that the appellants were knowingly parties to the carrying on of the business of TGL PL for the Fraudulent Purpose. This constituted the mens rea of the offence.

  37. [21] The DJ was satisfied that both elements were present in the set of offences committed by the appellants. First, the DJ noted that the term “fraudulent purpose” connoted an intention to go beyond the bounds of what ordinary decent people engaged in business would regard as honest, or actions deserving real moral blame according to the current notions of fair trading amongst commercial men (see Phang Wah v Public Prosecutor [2012] 1 SLR 64 (“Phang Wah”) at [24]). In the DJ’s view, the actus reus of the offence was made out for the following reasons:

  38. (a) The Gold Buyback Scheme was inherently unprofitable. Even if only 50% of clients had exercised the Sell-Back Option under the gold buyback contracts, TGL PL’s own accounting department projected a loss of over $5.8 million for the period of December 2009 to 30 June 2010, with more than double those losses should all the clients have exercised the option.

  39. (b) TGL PL had no other profit-generating business or investments by which it could meet its obligations under the Gold Buyback Scheme. Not only was no interest earned on the investment of $1.9 million placed with Standard Chartered Bank (see [14] above), the other sources of cash inflows such as liquidating its gold inventory to the market amounted to a total of only 8% of total fund inflow. The DJ further rejected the evidence of PW5 Lim Pei Sze (“Joanne”) that TGL PL did investment through the purchase of excess gold bars, as this was contradicted by admissions in her own statement to the Commercial Affairs Department (“CAD”), her own emails to Gary, and the fact that excess gold bars were of insufficient quantity and were retained for too short a time for them to generate returns.

  40. (c) In particular, TGL PL did not run any profit-generating formula (“the Formula”). TGL had hinged its sales pitch on its agents being able to explain that the Formula allowed it to be profitable and thus not a Ponzi scheme. Despite this, multiple witnesses attested that either the Formula did not exist, or that it was merely a series of monetary transfers that did nothing to generate profits. Neither was there satisfactory documentary evidence of how the Formula worked to generate profits.

  41. [22] Key to these findings as to the financial viability of TGL PL was an unopposed expert report (the “Expert Report”) prepared by PW6 Ng Chun Chun, a chartered accountant, which the DJ accepted. The DJ agreed with the findings of the Expert Report that TGL PL was essentially running a Ponzi scheme and was thus carried on for the Fraudulent Purpose.

  42. [23] Second, turning to the mens rea of the offence, the DJ observed that a finding of dishonesty was required, but noted that the relevant knowledge encompassed a situation where a person had turned a blind eye to the obvious (Phang Wah at [25]). The DJ was satisfied that the mens rea was also made out for the following reasons:

  43. (a) The Gold Buyback Scheme was modelled on similar gold buyback schemes operated by Genneva Sdn Bhd (“Genneva SB”) and The Gold Label Sdn Bhd (“TGL SB”) in Malaysia. Prior to the commencement of the Gold Buyback Scheme, the appellants were aware that Bank Negara had commenced criminal investigations into Genneva SB. TGL SB’s manager Joseph Goh (“Joseph”) had also informed them that TGL SB’s gold buyback scheme was unsustainable.

  44. (b) The appellants were aware, while the Gold Buyback Scheme was in operation, that TGL PL was using monies earned from the sale of new contracts to satisfy its obligations under older contracts. The appellants were also aware at the same time that TGL PL had no other profit-generating business or investments.

  45. (c) The appellants had learnt in May or June 2010 that Gary and FTEG PL had stopped running the Formula and that TGL PL was suffering significant losses. Yet, they continued operating the Gold Buyback Scheme. This indifference to whether the Formula was being run belied the appellants’ claim that it was crucial to the generation of profits for TGL PL and suggested that they had been aware from the outset of its non-existence.

  46. (d) The appellants’ subsequent conduct, in buying out FTEG PL’s shares and initiating a winding up of TGL PL, suggested a desperation on their part to cover up their fraudulent scheme.

  47. [24] In reaching this conclusion, the DJ considered that the Prosecution had run a consistent case in relation to both the appellants regarding the times at which they acquired the requisite mens rea, and that the evidence of the appellants was both internally contradictory to their contemporaneous conduct and externally inconsistent with the objective documentary records. The DJ also placed little to no weight on the evidence of Joanne to the extent that it was materially inconsistent with the documentary evidence. This was mostly material which tended to exculpate the appellants. The DJ also considered that though Gary was an uncooperative witness, his statements that were substituted into evidence under s 147(3) of the Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed) (the “EA”) did corroborate the other evidence led by the Prosecution that there was no investment activity in TGL PL to invest the proceeds of the gold buyback business.

  48. [25] The DJ thus found the appellants guilty and convicted them on the charges. Having done so, the DJ imposed a sentence of three years’ and 10 months’ imprisonment on each of the appellants for the following reasons:

  49. (a) The foremost sentencing consideration was that of deterrence and retribution. A strong signal had to be sent to deter dishonest practices that profited at the expense of unwitting customers.

  50. (b) In terms of harm, the Gold Buyback Scheme took place on a massive scale and resulted in substantial losses. TGL PL had sold 3,510 contracts to 2,247 unique clients and generated about $121 million in revenue. The total amount of loss caused was $12,918,185. This figure was arrived at by deducting, from the aggregate value of unfulfilled contracts as at 7 October 2010 ($76,632,440), the aggregate value of the affected gold bars ($63,714,255).

  51. (c) In terms of culpability:

  52. (i) The appellants exercised overriding control over TGL PL as its directors and majority shareholders.

  53. (ii) The appellants’ sales and marketing efforts were crucial to the sale of contracts under the Gold Buyback Scheme.

  54. (iii) The appellants personally profited from their involvement in the Gold Buyback Scheme. They had received a total of $598,223.65 in directors’ fees. SWM PL had also earned a net profit of $448,215.85, while Sue’s agency received almost $200,000 in sales commission.

  55. (iv) The Gold Buyback Scheme was operated under a deliberate guise of legitimacy. TGL PL had represented itself as a legitimate business which abided by the laws of Singapore.

  56. (d) An uplift from the sentence imposed on Gary would not offend the principle of parity. The appellants had played a greater role than Gary within TGL PL. In addition, Gary’s decision to plead guilty had saved significant judicial and prosecutorial resources, especially because it averted the need of a re-trial of the appellants’ ongoing case.

  57. (e) The sentence imposed on the appellants was in line with precedents, particularly that of Lim Hong Boon v Public Prosecutor [2022] SGHC 200.

  58. The parties’ cases

  59. The Appellants’ cases

  60. [26] The appellants raise several areas of appeal against their conviction, which I summarise below. I set out the parties’ submissions in further detail where appropriate. The appellants broadly contend that the DJ erred in making the following two findings.

  61. [27] First, they contend that the DJ erred in finding that the business of TGL PL was carried on for the Fraudulent Purpose. The DJ was wrong to find that the Gold Buyback Scheme was inherently unprofitable and that TGL PL had no other profit-generating business or investments by which it could meet its obligations under the Gold Buyback Scheme.

  62. [28] Second, they contend that the DJ erred in finding that the appellants were knowingly parties to the carrying on of the business of TGL PL for the Fraudulent Purpose. The DJ was wrong to reject the appellants’ defence that they had honestly relied on Gary and FTEG PL to run the Formula for TGL PL.

  63. [29] In particular, James argues, inter alia, the following:

  64. (a) the DJ erred in finding that James had been concerned about the legitimacy of Genneva SB’s business model, when in fact he had been concerned about their being investigated for illegal deposit taking and money laundering activities;

  65. (b) James’ financial commitments to TGL PL demonstrate an honest intention to deal responsibly with the business;

  66. (c) the DJ erred in finding that TGL PL seeking a legal opinion on their licensing requirements was meant to superficially lend support to its claim of being a legitimate business;

  67. (d) James did not know of the unprofitability and/or non-existence of the Formula, and had been deceived by Gary into thinking there in fact was one;

  68. (e) the DJ erred in finding that Gary’s statements had corroborative value despite making clear that he placed little weight on them; and

  69. (f) the DJ erred in failing to consider James’ actions that were inconsistent with someone who knew he was running a company with no legitimate business, such as requesting for financial reports, contributing his own money, being prepared to stop sales permanently in May 2010, and forgoing his own money to buy over FTEG PL’s shares in TGL PL.

  70. [30] Sue argues, inter alia, the following:

  71. (a) the DJ misconstrued Sue’s knowledge and involvement in TGL’s business;

  72. (b) the DJ erred in finding that Sue was a knowing party to running TGL PL for the Fraudulent Purpose, as she did not possess this knowledge at the material time, and various Prosecution witnesses gave corroborating evidence that she did subjectively believe that the Formula existed;

  73. (c) the DJ erred in believing portions of Gary’s CAD statements despite finding Gary to be an uncooperative witness; and

  74. (d) the DJ erred in rejecting portions of Joanne’s evidence, despite her evidence being corroborated by objective evidence and the testimony of other Prosecution witnesses.

  75. [31] In relation to the appeal against sentence, the appellants raise the following issues:

  76. (a) the DJ violated the principle of parity in imposing on the appellants sentences that were higher than the two years’ and 10 months’ imprisonment imposed on Gary. The appellants should instead have received substantially lower sentences than Gary; and

  77. (b) the DJ failed to credit Sue for her strict compliance with her bail conditions.

  78. The Prosecution’s case

  79. [32] The Prosecution submits that the appeals should be dismissed. It argues that none of the DJ’s findings can be said to be wrong or against the weight of the evidence, and further, that the sentences imposed cannot be said to be manifestly excessive.

  80. [33] In relation to the first area of the DJ’s decision as to TGL PL’s viability, the Prosecution submits that the DJ rightly found that TGL PL’s sole business was inherently unprofitable, based on the unopposed analysis of its business model by the accounting expert Ng Chun Chun and the admissions of the appellants. There were also no other sources of profit that TGL PL could rely on, whether in the form of investment activity, cash inflows, or the Formula.

  81. [34] As for the DJ’s conclusion that the appellants had knowledge of TGL PL’s business being carried on for the Fraudulent Purpose, the Prosecution takes the angle that the DJ’s ruling in this second area was squarely justified for the following reasons:

  82. (a) There is overwhelming evidence of the appellants’ knowledge that there was no such Formula from the very start. Not only did they admit in statements to the CAD that they knew that TGL PL’s business model amounted to a mere money circulation scheme, the reports that they would have received and read from PW4 Choy Mee Young (“Janet”), TGL PL’s finance manager, would have made it obvious that no investment or profit-generating business was being conducted.

  83. (b) The appellants must have had reason to doubt the viability of the Formula after what had happened with Genneva SB;

  84. (c) The appellants’ continuation of operations even after it had been expressly brought to their attention that the Formula did not exist shows that they knew of its non-existence from the start;

  85. (d) The timing and circumstances of the appellants’ purchase of FTEG PL’s shares in TGL supports the finding that they knew that TGL PL was operating a fraudulent business.

  86. [35] As to the appellants’ sentences, the Prosecution argues that the sentences are not manifestly excessive as the DJ was correct to consider and place weight on the various aggravating factors present, namely the substantial losses caused by the scheme, the large amount of profit made by the appellants, their role in masterminding the scheme, and the sophistication of their scheme.

  87. CM 33

  88. [36] On 3 May 2023, James filed two criminal motions in the form of HC/CM 33/2023 (“CM 33”) and HC/CM 34/2023 (“CM 34”). This was one day before his appeal was scheduled to be heard.

  89. [37] CM 33 was an application to adduce further evidence in the form of statements given to the CAD by one Shirley Tan (“Shirley”), who was a lawyer from WongPartnership LLP (“Wong Partnership”) whom James had met with in 2009. James claimed the Prosecution had withheld from disclosing these statements in breach of its obligations under Muhammad Nabill bin Mohd Fuad v Public Prosecutor [2020] 1 SLR 984 (“Nabill”) and sought both disclosure of the statements and their admission as fresh evidence on appeal. After hearing from parties on this matter, I dismissed CM 33 on 4 May 2023. I briefly recapitulate my reasons for dismissing CM 33, as they may be helpful in clarifying the extent of the Prosecution’s disclosure obligations under Nabill.

  90. [38] The central issue in CM 33 was whether the Prosecution owed a duty to disclose Shirley’s statements to the CAD. Nabill sets out the Prosecution’s duty in relation to material witnesses, who are defined as “witnesses who can be expected to confirm or, conversely, contradict an accused person’s defence in material respects” (Nabill at [4]). Where there are material witnesses to a case, the Prosecution owes a duty to disclose their statements to the Defence (Nabill at [39]) regardless of whether they are favourable, neutral, or adverse to the accused person (Nabill at [41(a)]).

  91. [39] James argued that the statements ought to have been disclosed to him under the Prosecution’s Nabill disclosure obligations. He submitted that Nabill had made clear that “witness statements which would have either materially confirmed or contradicted events raised by the accused were disclosable to the accused even before the Trial began”. According to James, there was a possibility that Shirley’s statements would be able to corroborate James’ defence that (a) he genuinely intended to run TGL PL sustainably, (b) did not understand the business model for TGL PL and explained what he could to WongPartnership, and (c) he was concerned about Genneva SB because of potentially licensing and money laundering issues.

  92. [40] In my view, this submission by James was a mischaracterisation of the holding of Nabill in two ways. First, Nabill pertains to disclosure of statements of material witnesses, not disclosure of material statements. This distinction is important. In a trial, there may be statements by various witnesses which contradict the accused’s defence in material ways. But the Nabill disclosure obligations do not apply to these statements by virtue of that fact. They are limited to statements of material witnesses. Second, James’ submissions conveniently omitted the requirement that the statements had to be from a witness who can be expected to confirm or contradict an accused person’s defence. It is not sufficient that there is a mere possibility that a witness could confirm or contradict an accused person’s defence; they must be in a position where they “can be expected” to do so.

  93. [41] On the facts, I was not convinced that Shirley was a material witness. It was telling that James himself did not attempt to call Shirley as a witness on his behalf. Given that Shirley’s evidence would almost entirely pertain to what James would have personally told her, this was not a situation where James would have been prejudiced by the non-disclosure of her statements such that he would not have able to make an informed decision as to whether to call her. This served as strong evidence that James himself did not consider Shirley to be a material witness.

  94. [42] I further found that it was unlikely that Shirley would be in a position where she could be expected to confirm or contradict James’ defence in showing that he had either a genuine intention to run TGL PL sustainably, or to illustrate that he never fully understood the business model of TGL PL. The ambit of WongPartnership’s engagement by TGL PL was limited to advice on licensing requirements. This was an entirely separate issue from whether the business would be financially sustainable. There was no reason Shirley would be expected to have knowledge of James’ intention in this regard.

  95. [43] Shirley would also not be in a position to confirm or contradict James’ defence as to his state of knowledge of TGL PL’s business model, as what he knew at the time of meeting with Shirley prior to the drafting of letters by WongPartnership was irrelevant to his defence. This is because a draft memorandum by WongPartnership outlining TGL PL’s business model was emailed to James on 22 June 2009, with the final letter from WongPartnership being sent to International Enterprise Singapore (“IE Singapore”) on 23 September 2009. Regardless of what James believed TGL PL’s business model to be before that, or what he represented to Shirley during their meeting, the fact that were no corrections to the business model of TGL PL outlined in the memorandum and letter showed that James thought the version of the business model outlined in them to be true by the time TGL PL began selling gold bars on 16 December 2009.

  96. [44] Shirley was also not in a position where she would be expected to confirm or contradict James’ defence in relation to his knowledge or understanding of what had transpired with Genneva SB. This is mostly because it was never his defence at trial that he had explained his understanding of what transpired with Genneva SB to WongPartnership. This particular aspect of the meeting was not posed to James in examination-in-chief by his own counsel, nor covered in their closing submissions at trial.

  97. [45] I thus found that Shirley was not a material witness as she could not be expected to confirm or contradict James’ defence in material respects. The Nabill disclosure obligations did not apply to her statements to the CAD.

  98. CM 34

  99. [46] CM 34 was an application to amend the petition of appeal filed by James to include further points of appeal. The further points of appeal raised by James were as follows:

  100. [47] I allowed CM 34 for reasons detailed in Iseli Rudolf James Maitland v Public Prosecutor [2023] SGHC 145 on 16 May 2023. Counsel for James subsequently amended their Petition of Appeal to include these further points.

  101. Decision on conviction

  102. [48] Two issues arise for determination on appeal in relation to the appellants’ conviction. The first issue is whether the business of TGL PL was carried on for the Fraudulent Purpose. The second issue is whether the appellants were knowingly parties to the carrying on of the business of TGL PL for the Fraudulent Purpose.

  103. Whether the business of TGL PL was carried on for the Fraudulent Purpose

  104. [49] As endorsed in Phang Wah at [24], the term “fraudulent purpose” connotes an intention to go “beyond the bounds of what ordinary decent people engaged in business would regard as honest” (R v Grantham [1984] QB 675) or involving “according to the current notions of fair trading among commercial men, real moral blame” (Re Patrick Lyon Ltd [1933] Ch 786 at 790). Based on the appellants’ charges, the Fraudulent Purpose that TGL PL had been purportedly carrying on was that it had sold gold bars under a buyback scheme promising returns when in fact it did not operate any substantive profit-generating business and had no sustainable means to honour its payment and buyback obligations. It was not disputed that the Fraudulent Purpose, if true, went beyond the bounds of what ordinary decent people engaged in business would regard as honest.

  105. [50] The appellants do not appear to seriously deny that the business of TGL PL had been carried on for the Fraudulent Purpose. This is despite Sue’s Petition of Appeal stating that the DJ had erred in accepting the Expert Report’s finding that the gold buyback contracts were not profitable and that TGL PL had no substantive profit-generating activities.

  106. [51] During the trial, both appellants had conceded under cross-examination that the Gold Buyback Scheme was inherently unprofitable. The Agreed Statement of Facts further stated that TGL PL did not engage in any other investing activity except for the aforementioned time deposit, on which no interest was ultimately earned. James ultimately conceded in his closing submissions that “TGL [PL] did not operate any substantive profit generating business and had no sustainable means to honour its payback and buyback obligations to its customers”.

  107. [52] On appeal, James continues to accept that that the business of TGL PL had been carried on for the Fraudulent Purpose. In his written submissions, James states: “It is not disputed that the business operations of TGL were fundamentally unprofitable. The issue has always been whether James had known of this unprofitability such that James can be said to be dishonest in carrying on the business of TGL PL.”

  108. [53] Sue’s position, however, is harder to discern. In her Petition of Appeal, Sue disputes the DJ’s finding that the business of TGL PL was carried on for the Fraudulent Purpose. Specifically, she takes issue with the DJ’s acceptance of the Expert Report, which she says failed to account for Gary’s profit-generating “formula”. However, these objections are not expanded upon in Sue’s written submissions. On the contrary, Sue appears to concede that the business of TGL PL was carried on for the Fraudulent Purpose: “With the benefit of hindsight, while it may seem obvious now that there was no real profit-generating formula to begin with, it is the Appellant’s knowledge at the material time that should be considered.”

  109. [54] In any event, I am of the view that the DJ’s finding was amply supported by the evidence. There are a limited number of ways in which the business model of TGL PL could conceivably have made a profit. None of these were successful.

  110. The Gold Buyback Scheme was inherently unprofitable

  111. [56] I do note that there were conceivable scenarios under which TGL PL could have turned a profit. As noted in the Expert Report, if gold prices appreciated significantly, it would become rational for clients not to exercise the Sell-Back Option as the value of selling their gold bars on the open market would exceed their returns from exercising the option. This would allow TGL PL to retain the profit from the marked-up TGL PL Selling Price. Even if clients did exercise the Sell-Back Option, TGL PL would then be able to liquidate the gold for a higher price on the open market and make a profit. However, the amount by which gold prices needed to appreciate for this to happen was substantial. For a three-month GSS plan, for example, gold prices needed to rise by more than 17.9% over a three-month period. This was several times higher than the average gold price appreciation during the Material Period, which was only 2.91%. There was thus no way that TGL PL could have turned a profit from an appreciation in gold prices during the Material Period. Even without the benefit of hindsight, it was highly improbable that such a drastic appreciation in prices would have occurred, let alone sustainably so. It is telling that there is no evidence in the appellants’ internal correspondence between themselves and others in TGL PL that they had (a) possessed any evidence for future gold prices increasing, (b) evaluated for themselves the likelihood of gold prices appreciating, (c) possessed any subjective opinion on the price of gold increasing, or (d) otherwise approached TGL PL’s business on the basis that gold price appreciation was fundamental to their business model, despite bullishly touting the prospect of gold as an asset in their sales materials.

  112. TGL PL did not profit from buying gold at wholesale prices and selling it at retail prices

  113. [57] A second possibility is that TGL PL could have profited from arbitrage based on an ability to buy gold at lower prices and sell it at higher prices. TGL PL’s representations of its business model in this regard were inconsistent.

  114. [58] An initial version of TGL PL’s business model was explained in a letter drafted by WongPartnership to the Monetary Authority of Singapore (“MAS”) dated 31 August 2009 titled “Proposed Business of The Gold Label Pte. Ltd.”. This involved TGL PL purchasing gold from gold factories, and selling it in the wholesale market:

  115. [59] Another version of TGL PL’s business model was outlined in a draft letter to IE Singapore dated 23 September. This described TGL PL as sourcing its gold bars from the wholesale market, and selling them at retail prices:

  116. [60] This second version was how TGL PL claimed to make money in its sales presentations, stating that “every sale of a gold bar creates a spread due to wholesale purchase versus retail sales”. TGL PL also made this representation in its compilation of Frequently Asked Questions, stating that how it made a profit “is like any other trade business, we made from a percentage between the retail and wholesale price”.

  117. [61] Of course, in reality neither version was true. TGL PL had no ability to buy gold at wholesale prices and was forced to buy gold at retail price. It bought gold at retail prices from local retailers such as the United Overseas Bank and the Bank of China. It thus could not profit from any difference between wholesale and retail prices. Moreover, to the extent that TGL PL did charge clients at a mark-up averaging 24% above the prevailing gold market price, this was not sufficient to allow it to turn a profit in individual contracts based on the findings of the Expert Report, as clients could always elect to have TGL PL buy back the gold bars at the marked-up price.

  118. TGL PL did not profit through other sources of investment

  119. [62] A third possibility is that TGL PL could have made a profit, despite the inherent unprofitability of the Gold Buyback Scheme, by investing the liquid funds it received from selling gold with a rate of return higher than the loss it would make through the scheme.

  120. TGL PL did not profit from investments with external parties

  121. [63] The DJ was right to find that TGL PL did not have any other sources of cash inflows, or any other investing activities with external parties besides a time deposit for $1.9 million placed with Standard Chartered Bank on 29 June 2010. This was plain from the Agreed Statement of Facts. TGL PL’s Income Statements from 1 July 2009 to 30 November 2010 also documented negligible revenue of less than $2,800 a month coming from “other income” outside the GD and GSS contracts. The Expert Report, after examination of TGL PL’s internal documents, concluded that TGL PL had no other investments that could have generated additional income. PW7 Norman Lee Jia Yi (“Norman”) and Janet similarly testified that based on their knowledge of TGL PL’s activities during their period of employment, there were no other investments made besides the purchase of gold. There was thus a wealth of evidence to prove that no investments with external parties were made by TGL PL.

  122. TGL PL could not profit from the Formula as it consisted of internal transfers of money

  123. [64] The DJ was similarly right to find that the Formula could not have been a form of investment for TGL PL. The admissions at trial of various TGL PL employees, namely Janet, Norman, Joanne, and Gordon, cumulatively showed that there was simply no Formula guiding the making of investments for profit. All there was to the Formula was the mere internal transfer of monies amongst TGL PL’s bank accounts. To the extent that the Formula was just a series of internal transfers, this could not generate profits for TGL PL.

  124. [65] It is convenient at this juncture to discuss the weight assigned by the DJ to Gary’s statements to the CAD. As Gary was an uncooperative witness at trial, the Prosecution had applied to treat him as a hostile witness and cross-examine him under section 156 of the EA. After cross-examination, the Prosecution also applied under section 147(3) of the EA to admit Gary’s CAD statements into evidence in substitution of his oral evidence, and under section 157(c) of the EA to impeach his credit as a witness. Although the DJ admitted these statements, he was “ultimately hesitant to place any significant weight on these statements as Gary was wholly unhelpful in assisting the court to understand the contents of those statements”. At the same time, however, the DJ “[agreed] that Gary’s statements corroborate the other evidence led by the Prosecution that there was no investment activity in [TGL PL] to invest the proceeds of the gold buyback business”.

  125. [66] The appellants contend that the DJ erred in regarding Gary’s CAD statements as corroborating evidence. For example, James argues that the DJ alternately “[chose] to disregard” Gary’s statement and to “[place] weight on” them as “corroborative evidence”. However, in my view, this objection mischaracterises the DJ’s approach. The DJ was hesitant to “place any significant weight” (emphasis added) on Gary’s statements but did not, contrary to James’ characterisation, “disregard” them. There was therefore no inconsistency in assigning the same statements some, albeit limited, weight as corroborating evidence.

  126. [67] In any event, I am satisfied that there is sufficient evidence from the testimony of the other Prosecution witnesses and the available documentary evidence such that even without the corroborative weight of Gary’s statements, the Prosecution had succeeded in proving beyond reasonable doubt that TGL PL had no investments with external parties that would allow it to profit from any interim proceeds from the gold buyback business, nor any ability to profit from the alleged Formula (see above at [63]). For the same reason, it is unnecessary to consider Sue’s arguments on appeal regarding the DJ’s treatment of Norman’s evidence on the Formula.

  127. TGL PL did not profit from buying gold as an investment

  128. [68] The DJ rightly found that TGL PL did not profit from accumulating additional gold bars as a form of investment, as claimed by Sue. No purchase of gold bars for investment was in fact made. Not only was this attested to by Norman, such a claim was contradicted by the documentary evidence. The amount of excess gold bars TGL had in stock was barely sufficient to cover daily sales and could not have been an alternative source of investment. James alleges that there are documents that show that a significant amount of gold was in fact stockpiled by TGL PL. However, as the Prosecution notes, it is not clear if any of this gold was meant for investment. In any case, these documents only show the amount of gold stock on 1 February 2010. By May 2010, this stock had all been whittled down to a marginal amount. This indicates that the gold stock, even if it had been originally earmarked for investment in February, was no longer being used for that purpose by May.

  129. [69] James further argues on appeal that the documentary evidence produced by the Prosecution only relates to gold stock between 17 May 2010 to 21 May 2010, which leaves open the possibility that gold was being purchased at an earlier stage. This is unconvincing. Even if gold stock had been accumulated for investment at the outset of TGL PL’s business, this stock would have been liquidated by May 2010, which would have registered as incoming funds in the Daily Reports. But no significant incoming proceeds from the sale of gold outside of the buyback contracts were ever recorded in the Daily Reports. This indicates that no accumulation of gold for investment was ever made to begin with.

  130. TGL PL could not profit from buying additional gold bars to sell under the Gold Buyback Scheme

  131. [70] Finally, I consider that TGL PL could not have turned a profit by using the money from the Gold Buyback Scheme to purchase yet more gold bars to generate more sales. This was how both James and Sue understood the business to work, as recorded in their CAD statements. However, I reiterate my conclusion above at [55] that the gold buyback contracts were all inherently unprofitable. Buying more gold to enter into yet more unprofitable contracts could not have helped TGL PL turn a profit no matter how many clients it had.

  132. [71] More specifically, the Expert Report noted that the only way that TGL PL would be able to make a profit was if the price of gold appreciated at an “extreme” rate. As explained at [56] above, this did not happen during the Material Period, nor was such a price appreciation probable.

  133. [72] At best, entering into a succession of unprofitable contracts could have created temporary access to cashflow before the gold buyback contracts became due. However, it is clear from the above analysis that even if there was liquidity generated, the resulting funds were not invested in any way that could have offset or exceeded the losses from the Gold Buyback Scheme.

  134. TGL PL was carried on for the Fraudulent Purpose

  135. [73] Having considered that there was no conceivable way by which TGL PL could have been profitable, the only way that TGL PL would have access to fresh funds to make contractual payouts to existing clients would have to be through the sales generated from new clients. It was, effectively, a money circulation scheme. The unsustainability of this enterprise was eventually shown by its financial situation by the end of the offending period. As of 7 October 2010, TGL PL’s unfulfilled contractual obligations to clients amounted to more than $76 million but it only had $452,364.28 in its bank accounts. The DJ did not err in finding that the business of TGL PL was carried on for the Fraudulent Purpose.

  136. Whether the appellants were knowingly parties to the carrying on of the business of TGL PL for the Fraudulent Purpose

  137. [74] Actual knowledge is required before a person can be said to be knowingly a party to carrying on business for a fraudulent purpose under s 340 of the CA (Tan Hung Yeoh v Public Prosecutor [1999] 2 SLR(R) 262 (“Tan Hung Yeoh”) at [26] and [27]). This would also encompass turning a blind eye to the obvious (Phang Wah at [25], see also R v Hunter (Peter) and another [2022] 3 WLR 485 at [129] in the context of the similarly worded s 993(1) of the UK Companies Act 2006 (c 46)).

  138. [75] On appeal the appellants maintain their defence, which the DJ rejected at trial, that they lacked any fraudulent intention and had honestly relied on Gary and FTEG PL to run the Formula for TGL PL. For completeness, I note that they are not disputing that they were parties to the carrying on of the business of TGL PL, which involves participation in, concurrence with, or the taking of some positive steps in the carrying on business (Tan Hung Yeoh at [30]).

  139. [76] It is important to note that the Fraudulent Purpose, as specified in the charges against the appellants, was that TGL PL did not operate any substantive profit generating business and had no sustainable means to honour its payment and buyback obligations. This is a distinct question from whether TGL PL did in fact honour its payment obligations during the time the appellants were involved in its business. It is therefore irrelevant, as argued by counsel for Sue in oral submissions, that she always believed the company was solvent. A belief in solvency would not necessarily equate to a belief that TGL PL’s business model was sustainable. For example, if Sue had thought that TGL PL would be able to pay off its debts as they fell due because it had sufficient revenue from new contracts to pay off its liabilities under old ones (ie, a successful Ponzi scheme), this would constitute a belief that TGL PL would be solvent in the short-medium term, but not necessary a belief that TGL PL’s business was sustainable.. In this regard, I note that it is crucial for James and Sue’s defence that they had to have in mind at least one plausible mechanism by which they believed TGL PL would generate profit – carrying on its business without any such belief would necessarily entail knowing that TGL did not operate any substantive profit generating business and had no sustainable means to honour its payment and buyback obligations. Put another way, one cannot operate a business with a genuine belief as to its financial viability if they have no answer to the question “how is your business profitable?”.

  140. The appellants harboured doubts from the outset about the viability of TGL PL’s business model

  141. [77] Even before the commencement of TGL PL’s business, there is good reason to believe that the appellants were aware of problems with TGL PL’s business model.

  142. Bank Negara’s raid on Genneva SB

  143. [78] On 21 July 2009, Bank Negara announced that it had raided and commenced investigations into Genneva SB for suspected deposit-taking and money-laundering activities. As TGL PL’s business model had originated from Genneva SB, the DJ was of the view that this news would have raised sufficient cause for concern for the appellants.

  144. [79] On appeal, the appellants argue that the DJ erred in so finding. According to them, as Bank Negara’s investigations into Genneva SB were for suspected deposit-taking and money-laundering activities, and not for fraudulent trading, they had no reason to doubt the viability of its underlying business model.

  145. [80] This claim is inconsistent with the appellants’ admissions in their CAD statements and at trial. In his statements, James confessed to advising his clients to “get out of Genneva [SB]” after learning about the raid. He admitted under cross-examination that this was because he was concerned that Genneva SB was not going to fulfil its obligations under its Gold Buyback Scheme, Specifically, James heard rumours that Genneva SB’s scheme inherently involved not paying client rebates because its directors would be able to escape their obligations to pay these rebates to clients, whilst simultaneously repeating the benefit of revenue collected from clients. This shows that James’ concerns about Genneva SB at the time he started TGL PL were not limited to illegal deposit-taking or money laundering activities, but extended to whether its business model even involved paying back its clients’ rebates.

  146. [81] Sue also admitted at trial to being concerned that Genneva SB was under investigation by Bank Negara. However, she asserted that she had received confirmation from Bank Negara that Genneva SB’s business model was not illegal. The Prosecution invited Sue to produce and admit evidence of this confirmation but Sue did not do so, leading the DJ to reject Sue’s “bare allegation”. Although Sue contends in her POA that the DJ erred in so doing, I am unable to find any reasonable basis to accept this convenient confirmation in the absence of any evidence for her claim.

  147. [82] In my view, both the appellants would have had good reason to doubt whether Genneva SB had been running a viable business model, and would have been aware that the same formula in Genneva SB was being run in TGL PL.

  148. Joseph’s assessment of the viability of TGL SB’s business model

  149. [83] Sometime in December 2009, Joseph informed James and Sue that, in the long-run, TGL SB would not be able to pay clients their returns. The DJ found that this would have raised doubts in the appellants’ minds as to the sustainability of TGL PL’s business model which, like that of TGL SB, had originated from Genneva SB.

  150. [84] On appeal, the appellants rely on a meeting between TGL SB and Bank Negara representatives which took place sometime around August or September 2009. Representatives of TGL SB presented its business model during this meeting and asked if it was in violation of any law. As they were not told that it was, the appellants were satisfied that TGL SB’s business model was not unlawful.

  151. [85] However, James conceded under cross-examination that Bank Negara never communicated any express approval of TGL SB’s business model. He had merely inferred from the general atmosphere at the meeting, which he described as “pretty okay”, that TGL SB’s business model was not unlawful. I am unconvinced that James could have reached a conclusion on the legality of TGL SB’s business model from, in modern parlance, what could at best be described as “vibes”. It is therefore implausible that this meeting could have displaced the appellants’ doubts as to the sustainability of TGL PL’s business model arising from Joseph’s negative assessment.

  152. The Sheng & Co Document

  153. [86] James argues that Gary had, during their initial meeting in a coffeeshop in 2009, brought out a document setting out the Formula for TGL PL. This document (“the Sheng & Co document”) apparently was sufficient to convince the appellants that Gary indeed possessed a formula that would allow TGL PL to generate returns. I disagree with James’ argument that a plain reading of the Sheng & Co document shows that it sets out a means of generating returns that the appellants would have believed. It is apparent from the face of the document that the “Gold Concept” outlined in the document involved transfers between various entities such as “GCC”, “IF”, and GG”. These entities were clearly internal departments of TGL PL, as they were under the label “Divide to 8 departments”. To the extent that these departments were internal, transfers between them could not generate profits. The appellants knew this (see [134]–[137] below). The only other plausible mechanism outlined in the Sheng & Co document by which profits could have been made was through buying gold bars at wholesale prices and selling them at what was labelled “market price”. However, this was not the means by which the appellants actually believed TGL PL made profits (see [142]–[144] below). The appellants thus could not have come to a genuine belief of the viability of TGL PL’s business model from the information in the Sheng & Co document. Even if they had, the business model outlined in the document is inconsistent with their own explanations of how TGL PL functioned.

  154. The appellants’ inquiries with local authorities could not dispel their doubts over the viability of TGL PL’s business model

  155. [87] The appellants rely on their inquiries through WongPartnership with the MAS and IE Singapore as evidence of their honest desire to conduct TGL PL’s business in a lawful manner. However, the DJ found – and the appellants do not now deny – that these inquiries did not pertain to the viability of TGL PL’s business model but to the applicability of various licensing regimes. The inquiries thus could not assist in dispelling any doubts the appellants had as to whether TGL PL’s business model would be viable.

  156. [89] In my view, this line of argument is fairly tangential to the appellants’ case. The fact that the appellants took steps to ensure the legality of TGL PL’s business model in some respects does not evince a more general belief on their part that it was compliant with the law in all respects. Indeed, it is unsurprising that the appellants, knowing of Bank Negara’s investigations into Genneva SB, were keen to avoid liability for the same alleged deposit-taking and money-laundering activities. This does not demonstrate, however, that the appellants possessed an honest belief in the viability of TGL PL’s business model. Regardless of the appellants’ motives for carrying on the business of TGL PL, they would want to ensure that licensing requirements did not scuttle their plans before they carried out their business, fraudulent or not.

  157. [90] Further, it is not at all clear that the inquiries made by TGL PL were made in good faith. It provided no information on the back-end trades conducted by the company. It also misrepresented its ability to buy gold at wholesale prices (see [57]–[61] above). This casts doubt that TGL PL’s seeking of advice from WongPartnership was a genuine attempt to seek advice on its business model, rather than for the sake of being able to claim in its sales materials that such inquiries had been made.

  158. [91] To the extent that the appellants did seek to conform to the licencing requirements through such inquiries, I agree with the DJ that they did so to create a mere veneer of legitimacy. The appellants contend that the DJ erred in finding that TGL PL actively presented itself as a legitimate business on the basis of its inquiries with local authorities through WongPartnership. James specifically argues that the slide identified by the DJ in TGL PL’s sales materials, which states that “TGL abides by the laws of Singapore in its business operations and has sought further clarification with financial authorities”, was only the 42nd slide in the presentation, showing that little emphasis was placed on this claim. However, this fails to deal with the context of where the claim was made – it is the first answer given in response to the Frequently Asked Question “Is this a Ponzi?”, an undoubtedly important question that TGL PL would be desperate to answer in the negative. Significant weight was placed on TGL PL’s compliance with local regulation to show that it was a not a fraudulent scheme. Even though the references to TGL PL’s conformance with licensing requirements were not numerous, they were deployed at key portions of its sales materials to convince potential clients that it was indeed a legitimate business.

  159. [92] My finding above is corroborated by the fact that the inquiries with local authorities were used to persuade TGL PL’s own employees that it was not a Ponzi scheme. Sue testified of the following conversation with Joanne where she relied on the inquiries as proof of the viability of TGL PL’s business model:

  160. [93] For the above reasons, I am satisfied that the appellants’ inquiries through WongPartnership to local authorities could not dispel their doubts over the viability of TGL PL’s business model, and were in all likelihood carried out to create a veneer of legitimacy for TGL PL.

  161. The appellants had sufficient access to information that would allow them to verify the viability of TGL PL’s business model

  162. [94] The appellants dispute the DJ’s finding that they were involved in TGL PL’s business and operations. They contend that there was a clear separation of roles and responsibilities within TGL PL. Whereas they were involved in TGL PL’s sales and marketing, Gary was in exclusive control of its business and operations. This separation, according to the appellants, lends credibility to their defence that they were genuinely ignorant of the non-existence of the Formula, and thus of the unviability of TGL PL’s business model.

  163. [95] Preliminarily, it bears mentioning that it is not a condition of liability that the appellants should have been actively or exclusively involved in TGL PL’s business and operations, or that they had to have the same level of knowledge as Gary. Indeed, the DJ accepted that “[o]n a general level… there was a distinction in the roles played by James and Sue on the one hand, and Gary on the other”. In assessing whether the mens rea of the offence is made out, the question rather is whether a finding of dishonesty, including “blind-eye knowledge”, can be supported on the facts (Phang Wah at [25]). Such knowledge could have been acquired through an involvement in TGL PL’s business and operations but could equally have been acquired through other means.

  164. [96] Bearing this in mind, I find that the appellants’ involvement in TGL PL was sufficiently proximate. Though I accept they may not have been privy to the exact numbers calculated by Gary and the FTEG PL team, they had sufficient access to information that showed that TGL PL’s business model operated no substantive profit generating business and had no sustainable means to honour its payment and buyback obligations.

  165. [97] To begin with, both Sue and James were involved in portions of TGL PL’s operations where its business model was explained. Sue was involved in the following ways:

  166. (a) From the outset, Sue attended several meetings with WongPartnership where the business model of TGL PL was explained.

  167. (b) Sue was responsible, in James’ words, for the marketing and sales of gold bars. She recruited sales agents and worked with them to do TGL PL’s marketing. She vetted the Powerpoint presentations to agents done by the marketing team. She understood the contents of the presentations, which included explanations of the various gold buyback schemes offered by TGL PL.

  168. [98] James argues that his involvement was merely as a nominee director with no involvement in the day-to-day running of TGL PL. I reject this argument. Though Gary and FTEG PL may have been primarily handling the finances of TGL PL, that does not mean that James did not also possess knowledge of TGL PL’s operations. The following actions by James show that his level of involvement in TGL PL was more than that of a nominee director:

  169. (a) He attended meetings with Bank Negara before the Material Period to explain the Formula and TGL PL’s business model, as well as the meetings with WongPartnership.

  170. (b) Sue described James on multiple instances as being, along with herself, in charge of sales and marketing of TGL PL's Gold Buyback Scheme. She stated as much in her emails to Gary, describing TGL PL as a “Teamwork JV”. She also described Joanne as reporting to “the three of us, the directors”, referring to herself, James, and Gary. There is no reason why Sue would use such terms if James’ involvement had purely been nominal.

  171. (c) James also stated he had a personal interest in “checking [his] own company” and “wanted to know what Gary and Thomson were doing” through looking at the cash balances in TGL PL’s bank accounts. Importantly, he requested daily reports by email (the “Daily Reports”) to this effect, the significance of which I examine below.

  172. The Daily Reports

  173. [99] The most noteworthy evidence of the appellants’ involvement in TGL PL’s business is their receipt of the Daily Reports from Joanne and Janet from no later than 22 January 2010. These reports contained information on TGL PL’s bank balance, gold orders, and gold stock balance.

  174. [100] The appellants claim that they did not pay much attention to Daily Reports, or that the extent of their engagement with these Daily Reports was with the sales figures reported in them. They also argue that it was not obvious from the contents of the Daily Reports that no investment or substantive profit-generating business was being conducted.

  175. [101] These arguments were ventilated at trial and, in my view, rightly rejected by the DJ. It was highly unlikely that the appellants paid no attention to these Daily Reports when they were sent daily over a matter of months. Crucially, as Joanne stated in her email on 22 January 2010, the Daily Reports were sent “per James’s [sic] request”. James himself admitted that this was because he had a personal interest in wanting to know what Gary was doing. It is for this reason that I also reject the appellants’ argument that they did not pay attention to the Daily Reports as they were waiting for a separate financial report from FTEG PL to assess the performance of the Formula. Even if they had been waiting for such a report, there is no reason they would not have had recourse to the Daily Reports as an alternative form of information that James had specifically requested for. Similarly, even though Sue may not have personally requested for the Daily Reports, the suspicions she would have had (detailed at [77]–[86] above) make it highly unlikely that she was unaware of the contents of the Daily Reports which she knew were being sent to her and which she read regularly, even if only in part.

  176. [102] To the extent that the Daily Reports may have been read, James contends that they do not touch on profitability or investment plans, and only the gold orders and daily gold stock of TGL PL. I disagree with this. As James admitted under cross-examination, he was aware from the Daily Reports that the only money coming into TGL PL’s bank accounts was from cheques cleared from the sale of gold buyback contracts. By his own logic, this was illustrative of there being no other inflows of funds from other investments. The absence of granular details about the exact sources of investment inflows would not have prevented James from reaching the conclusion that no profit-generating investments were being made by TGL PL.

  177. [103] I agree with the DJ that the information available in the reports would have shown that there was no investment of TGL PL’s cashflow, and that the appellants would have read these reports. The evidence sufficiently indicates that the appellants were apprised of TGL PL’s business and operations, whatever their precise level of involvement in it.

  178. The appellants knew that TGL PL’s business model relied on using cashflow from new sales to pay for the buyback of old contracts

  179. [104] Based on the appellants’ own explanations of how they thought TGL PL’s business model worked, there is evidence that they would have known that TGL PL’s business model bore remarkable similarities to a money circulation scheme.

  180. [105] I begin by setting out Sue’s understanding of the TGL PL business model. Sue confirmed in her statement as well as under cross-examination that she understood the source of TGL PL’s profitability to be based on “rolling” the margins made from the Gold Buyback Scheme to purchase more gold bars to sell to new clients (“the rolling scheme explanation”). This explanation involved the following steps:

  181. (a) TGL PL would charge a markup of 30% to clients for its sale of gold bars.

  182. (b) TGL would need to leverage on the markup collected from selling gold buys and buy additional gold bars.

  183. (c) The additional gold bars purchased would be sold to new clients at the same markup price.

  184. (d) With the markup collected from the sale of gold bars to new clients, more gold bars would be purchased for subsequent sale.

  185. [107] Sue further confirmed this under cross examination:

  186. [108] The appellants argue that Sue’s CAD statements merely show that she believed that additional gold bars would be accumulated based on the Formula, which would allow TGL PL to generate monies to pay its clients. I do not find this to be the case. Sue’s understanding of the Formula in relation to the rolling scheme explanation was simply as a means of allocating the proportion of funds received from clients for various purposes. The only two examples she gave of these purposes were paying out rebates to clients and purchasing additional gold bars which would be used to generate more sales. Read in context, Sue’s CAD statements show that she knew that funds from sales under new contracts would be used to either pay out rebates to clients under old contracts, or to purchase more gold bars to generate more sales under new contracts. This is entirely consistent with her understanding of the rolling scheme explanation. There is no indication that she contemplated that gold bars would be accumulated for investment.

  187. [109] James in his CAD statements likewise explained that he thought TGL PL profited through the rolling scheme explanation. He related what was told to him by Thomson Lai Meng Shiong (“Thomson”), who was Gary’s partner at FTEG PL:

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