General Division of the High Court · Decided 10 October 2023
Tan Meow Hiang (trading as Chip Huat) v Ong Kay Yong (trading as Wee Wee Laundry Service)
Feedback & support[2023] SGHC 286 · Case no. District Court Appeal No 1 of 2023 · 15 paragraphs
✱ What happened, in plain English
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Grounds of decision
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Procedural history
- [2]
[2] I begin with the brief procedural history. The underlying suit involved a dispute between relatives over the ownership of one Wee Wee Laundry Service (“WWLS”). The plaintiff claimed for: (a) a sum of $140,000, which the defendant allegedly agreed to pay her; or, in the alternative, (b) the defendant to transfer the ownership of WWLS to her. The defendant counterclaimed for: (a) a sum of $127,500, which the plaintiff allegedly agreed to pay pursuant to a consultancy agreement; and (b) a sum of $72,200, which the defendant expended on employing additional labour to carry out the plaintiff’s duties.
What is the appropriate costs order?
The parties’ submissions
My decision on the appropriate costs order
(a) First, in line with O 59 r 3(2) of the ROC 2014, costs will generally follow the event. As Tan Siong Thye SJ observed in the High Court decision of Crescendas Bionics Pte Ltd v Jurong Primewide Pte Ltd [2023] SGHC 209 (at [32]), citing Vinodh Coomaraswamy J’s views in the High Court decision of Comfort Management Pte Ltd v OGSP Engineering Pte Ltd and another [2022] 5 SLR 525 (“Comfort Management”) (at [27]–[28]), this requires the court to “ascertain the overall outcome of the litigation as well as which party in substance and reality won the litigation, looking at its outcome in a realistic and commercially sensible way”.
(b) Second, in line with O 59 r 5 of the ROC 2014, a court, in exercising its discretion as to costs, shall consider the following matters: (i) any payment of money into court and the amount of such payment; (ii) the conduct of all the parties, including conduct before and during the proceedings; (iii) the parties’ conduct in relation to any attempt at resolving the cause or matter by mediation or any other means of dispute resolution; and (iv) the extent to which the parties have followed any relevant pre-action protocol or practice direction for the time being issued by the Registrar.
In the present case, the plaintiff successfully established one of her two heads of claim. In contrast, the defendant not only failed to defend against that head of claim, but also failed in his counterclaim. Accordingly, even if the plaintiff failed in one of her heads of claim, this does not make the defendant – who failed to defend against the plaintiff’s successful claim and failed to establish any counterclaim at all – the more successful party. The upshot of this must be that the plaintiff is the successful – or at the very least, more successful – party in these proceedings.
Is this an appropriate case to make instalment orders in respect of the costs order and the judgment sum?
The parties’ submissions
My decision on the appropriateness of making instalment orders
The General Division does not have the power to make instalment orders generally but can do so on appeal from the State Courts
(1) The General Division does not have the power to make instalment orders generally
- [14]
[14] In contrast, s 43(1)(b) of the SCA sets out the State Courts’ power to make instalment orders in respect of judgments and orders for the payment of money generally (see also Jeffrey Pinsler, Singapore Civil Practice, Vol 1 (LexisNexis, 2022) at para 35-117):
- [15]
[15] The absence of an express provision like s 43(1)(b) of the SCA in the SCJA raises the question of whether the General Division has the power to make instalment orders generally, that is, with respect to all monetary awards.
- [16]
[16] As a starting point, it is unclear why s 43(1)(b) is not replicated similarly in the SCJA. This appears to be a long-standing situation. As summarised by Deputy Registrar Chua Wei Yuan (“DR Chua”) in Aver Asia (S) Pte Ltd v RJS Engineering and Marine Services Pte Ltd [2017] SGMC 24 (“Aver Asia”) (at [24]–[27]), the predecessors to s 43 of the SCA: (a) provided that instalment orders can be made only in judgments for the payment of money where the amount sued for does not exceed $500; or (b) were expressed to apply only to judgments of the District Court. Indeed, Soh Kee Bun had noted in an academic commentary published in 1994 that “[t]he reason for the absence of the power in the High Court is not clear” and suggested that this may be because the power “was originally intended for poor judgment debtors who could not pay in full, and for whom proceedings like seizure and sale or bankruptcy were not considered meaningful” (see Soh Kee Bun, “The Powers of the Supreme Court of Singapore in Awarding Damages and Interest” [1994] Sing JLS 91 at 99). However, apart from this suggestion, there is nothing in the legislative material to explain why there is no equivalent of s 43(1)(b) of the SCA in the SCJA.
(2) The General Division, however, has the power to make instalment orders on appeal from the State Courts
- [18]
[18] However, the General Division has the power to make instalment orders when it is exercising its appellate jurisdiction in relation to an appeal from the State Courts. In this regard, I agree with the plaintiff that the appropriate provision is s 22(2) of the SCJA. This section provides that “[i]n hearing and deciding an appeal, the General Division has all the powers and duties, as to amendment or otherwise, of the court from which the appeal was brought”. As such, if s 43(1)(b) of the SCA applies to the lower court, then, by virtue of s 22(2) of the SCJA, the General Division hearing an appeal from the State Courts would possess the power to make instalment orders generally with respect to all monetary awards.
(3) Parliament may wish to consider giving the General Division the power to make instalment orders generally
- [20]
[20] I would respectfully suggest that Parliament may wish to consider giving the General Division the power to make instalment orders generally with respect to all monetary awards. This is principally because the General Division has the power to make instalment orders in certain specific situations. There does not appear to be any cogent reason why the General Division’s power to make instalment orders should be restricted to these situations, when the State Courts have an unrestricted power to make such orders pursuant to s 43(1) of the SCA.
- [21]
[21] First, as I already alluded to above, paragraph 17 of the First Schedule provides that the General Division can make instalment orders in relation to monetary damages, albeit in the specific situation concerning the assessment of damages from an action for personal injuries. As I have suggested above, there does not appear to be any cogent policy reason for the General Division to be vested with such a power for a particular type of case but not for others. Indeed, there is also no clear policy reason why this power should be granted especially for the assessment of damages from an action for personal injuries.
- [26]
[26] In sum, given the inconsistency between the presence of s 43(1) of the SCA in relation to the State Courts, and the absence of an equivalent provision in the SCJA in relation to the General Division, I would respectfully suggest that Parliament considers an amendment to bring the two statutes in line with each other on this issue. Indeed, there does not appear to be any sensible policy reason why the State Courts should have this power but not the General Division. This inconsistency is exacerbated by the presence of other legislative provisions that confer on the General Division the power to make instalment orders in specific areas. There is, once again, no sensible policy for restricting the General Division’s power in this manner when, as a matter of principle, the General Division is not precluded from making instalment orders in certain prescribed situations.
The relevant factors in deciding whether to make instalment orders
- [27]
[27] Having decided that the General Division has the power in the present case to make instalment orders (because it is on appeal from the State Courts), I come now to the relevant factors that should inform the court in deciding whether to exercise that power. In this regard, I can do no better than to refer to the comprehensive and articulate judgment in Aver Asia, where DR Chua referred to the equally important decision of Magistrate Earnest Lau Chee Chong in Khoo Wai Keong Ronnie v Hanam Andrew J [2003] SGMC 41 (“Ronnie Khoo”).
- [28]
[28] For present purposes, it is not necessary to repeat the comprehensive analysis that DR Chua undertook in Aver Asia. It suffices for me to reproduce three key paragraphs from Aver Asia that capture the essence of his analysis (at [5]–[7]):
- [30]
[30] In summary, the power to make instalment orders must be exercised with extreme caution. This accords with the trite principle that the successful litigant should not be deprived of the fruits of litigation. Thus, in the context of an application for a stay of execution, the starting point is that, as the Court of Appeal held in Lian Soon Construction Pte Ltd v Guan Qian Realty Pte Ltd [1999] 1 SLR(R) 1053 (at [13]), an appeal does not operate as a stay of execution. The same applies in relation to the grant of instalment orders, which would indeed constitute “a definite derogation from the legal right of the decree holder to immediate execution, and must only be made in exceptional circumstances” (see Aver Asia at [6], citing Muthupalaniappa Chettiar v Mohamed Yusof bin Haji Ahmad Ee Tin [1931-1932] FMSLR 231 at 232). As such, a court should only make instalment orders when it can be shown that a judgment debtor is at risk of being “pauperised”, in the sense of being stripped of all means of livelihood. There must, in other words, be special circumstances of hardship on the part of the judgment debtor. However, it is not enough that a judgment debtor is in a state of poverty. In this regard, the factors that DR Chua raised in Aver Asia (at [7]) are helpful in guiding a court in its decision whether to make instalment orders, although the court will need to consider all the facts and circumstances of the case before it.
It is not appropriate to make instalment orders in the present case
- [33]
[33] In my judgment, even taking these assertions as true despite the lack of a supporting affidavit attesting to the same, they do not justify the making of instalment orders in the present case. First, the fact that the defendant is a businessman does not mean he suffers from greater financial hardship than others in different jobs. Instead, precedent suggests that the court should consider whether the defendant, in his present job, is in a position to pay the judgment debt. Other than asserting that he is “unshielded from the risks of poor economic conditions”, the defendant has not explained how this prevents him from paying the judgment debt. To my mind, the defendant must point to a particular instance of economic hardship, rather than the general risk of economic volatility.
- [34]
[34] Second, while the defendant’s income has been “severely diminished”, I do not read that to mean that the defendant is without means. Indeed, this suggests that the defendant is still earning income, and therefore he should have explained why his diminished income will not allow him to pay the judgment debt immediately.
- [35]
[35] Third, the fact that he has other creditors in addition to the plaintiff does not mean that the plaintiff should be disadvantaged by the instalment orders. This is especially so when the other creditors are apparently being paid off by the defendant’s sale of his personal residence. This suggests that the other creditors will not pursue the judgment debt.
- [37]
[37] I therefore conclude that it is not appropriate to make instalment orders in the present case.
Conclusion