General Division of the High Court · Decided 23 October 2023
Oro Negro Drilling Pte Ltd and others v Integradora de Servicios Petroleros Oro Negro SAPI de CV and others
Feedback & support[2023] SGHC 297 · Case no. Originating Summons No 126 of 2018
✱ What happened, in plain English
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Official text from eLitigation
Introduction
- [1]
[1] All six plaintiffs are companies incorporated in Singapore and have their centre of main interests in Mexico. The first plaintiff is the sole shareholder of the remaining five plaintiffs. Until September 2017, all of the plaintiffs were under the control, either directly or indirectly, of the three defendants.
- [2]
[2] All six plaintiffs and the first defendant have been insolvent since, at the latest, September 2017. In September 2017, the defendants purported to cause all six plaintiffs to commence restructuring proceedings in the courts of Mexico. Those proceedings are still pending. The objective of those proceedings is to restructure the plaintiffs as part of a broader restructuring of the first defendant and its group of companies (the “Integradora Group”).
- [3]
[3] This originating summons is, in substance, just one battle in a war that has been waged over the past six years in Singapore, Mexico, Norway and the United States between the Integradora Group’s bondholders and its shareholders for de facto control of the plaintiffs’ assets and their restructuring. A critical threshold question in the Mexican proceedings is this: who has authority to represent the plaintiffs in those proceedings? Is it the lawyers whom the plaintiffs appointed in August 2017, when the defendants still owned and controlled the plaintiffs? Or is it the lawyers whom the plaintiffs appointed in September 2017, following an event of default and after bondholders had assumed de jure ownership and control of the plaintiffs?
- [4]
[4] The plaintiffs commenced this originating summons in January 2018 seeking declarations and permanent injunctions regarding the defendants’ right to control the plaintiffs and to use that control to carry into effect the restructuring proceedings. I have now determined this originating summons in the plaintiffs’ favour and entered final judgment accordingly.
- [5]
[5] The third defendant has appealed against my decision. I therefore now set out the grounds for my decision.
A primer on Mexican insolvency law
- [6]
[6] There have already been two interlocutory appeals in this originating summons. The Court of Appeal heard those appeals together and determined them in a single judgment handed down in November 2019 (see Oro Negro Drilling Pte Ltd and others v Integradora de Servicios Petroleros Oro Negro SAPI de CV and others and another appeal (Jesus Angel Guerra Mendez, non-party) [2020] 1 SLR 226 (“Oro Negro (CA)”)).
- [7]
[7] In Oro Negro (CA) (at [5]–[34]), the Court of Appeal narrated the events in the proceedings in Mexico up to September 2018. An update on the events in Mexico since September 2018 requires some understanding of Mexican law. I therefore set out now a brief primer on Mexican law in so far as it is relevant to the issues before me.
- [8]
[8] The type of restructuring proceedings commenced in the plaintiffs’ names in Mexico in September 2017 (see [2] above) is a concurso mercantile (hereafter, “concurso”). A concurso is governed by the Mexican Business Reorganisation Act, known in Spanish as the Ley de Concursos Mercantiles (“LCM”).
- [10]
[10] A concurso is territorially limited to Mexico. Therefore, although a company incorporated outside Mexico may file a concurso petition, any reorganisation will be confined to the company’s business and assets in Mexico.
- [11]
[11] A debtor commences a concurso by filing a concurso petition with the designated Mexican court. I shall refer to that court as the “concurso court”. The concurso court deals with a concurso petition in three stages.
- [12]
[12] In the first stage, the concurso court appoints an examiner to establish that the debtor is indeed insolvent and is therefore entitled to present a concurso petition. If that is established, the concurso court formally admits the concurso petition and declares the debtor to be “in concurso”.
- [14]
[14] If the debtor and its creditors agree on a reorganisation plan by the requisite majorities and within the stipulated time, and if the plan is approved by the concurso court, the plan takes effect. Once the plan has been implemented, the concurso comes to an end.
- [15]
[15] A concurso proceeds to the third stage only if the debtor cannot be reorganised, eg, because no plan can be agreed within the time stipulated, because the concurso court does not approve the plan that has been agreed with creditors or because the plan cannot be implemented in accordance with its terms. At the third stage, the concurso court appoints a liquidator to realise the debtor’s assets and to repay creditors pari passu.
- [16]
[16] Legal issues may arise while a debtor is in concurso. A party seeks the concurso court’s decision on these legal issues by filing a motion in the concurso court. If a party is aggrieved by the decision of the concurso court on the issue, it can challenge the decision in one or both of two ways. First, the party may file a further motion to the concurso court itself. At the hearing of the motion, the concurso court has the power to reconsider or revoke its initial decision. Second, the party may bring an appeal against the decision on constitutional grounds to a separate court known as the amparo court.
- [17]
[17] The amparo court has the power to annul a concurso court’s decision but does not have the power to go further and to decide the underlying legal issue for itself. The amparo court must instead remit the issue to the concurso court for reconsideration in light of the amparo court’s reasons for annulling the concurso court’s decision.
- [18]
[18] It is also possible, in certain circumstances, to appeal from a decision of the amparo court to a division of the Mexican Federal Court.
- [19]
[19] I can now summarise the background in so far as it is relevant to these grounds of decision.
The parties
The plaintiffs
- [20]
[20] As I have mentioned, all six plaintiffs are companies incorporated in Singapore. The first plaintiff is a holding company whose only assets are all of the shares in the second to sixth plaintiffs. The second to sixth plaintiffs are each a special purpose vehicle incorporated to own a single offshore jack-up drilling rig operating in Mexico. I shall refer to them collectively as “the SPVs” and to their jack-up drilling rigs simply as “the rigs”.
- [21]
[21] As I have also mentioned, the first plaintiff was a wholly owned subsidiary of the first defendant until September 2017. The first plaintiff is now a wholly owned subsidiary of the bondholders’ nominee upon and by reason of an event of default declared in September 2017 (see [44] below).
The defendants
- [22]
[22] The first defendant is a company incorporated in Mexico. Like the plaintiffs, the first defendant also has its centre of main interests in Mexico. The first defendant’s ultimate holding company is a Mexican company known as Petróleos Mexicanos (“Pemex”). Pemex is the Mexican state-owned gas and oil monopoly. The first defendant, through the Integradora Group, provides integrated and diversified oilfield services in the oil industry to Pemex and its subsidiaries.
- [23]
[23] Although the first defendant was duly served with this originating summons in September 2018, it did not appear before me to oppose the plaintiffs’ application for final judgment. I have nevertheless considered the plaintiffs’ case against the first defendant on the merits rather than proceeding purely based on the first defendant’s default.
- [24]
[24] The second defendant was a director of all of the plaintiffs until September 2017. He is also the chief legal counsel for the first defendant and an alternate director of the first defendant.
- [26]
[26] The third defendant was a director of all of the plaintiffs until September 2017. He is also a director of the first defendant. The third defendant is the only defendant who appeared before me to oppose the plaintiffs’ application to enter final judgment on this originating summons.
Perforadora
- [27]
[27] A company that features in the background to this originating summons but who is not a party to it is a company called Perforadora Oro Negro S de RL de CV (“Perforadora”).
- [28]
[28] Perforadora is a company incorporated in Mexico. It is a subsidiary of the first defendant, who owns 99.25% of its shares. The remaining 0.75% of its shares is owned by another subsidiary of Pemex. Perforadora chartered each rig from each SPV under a bareboat charter and then sub chartered each rig to a subsidiary of Pemex for deployment in offshore oil drilling operations in Mexico.
The background
The bond agreement
- [29]
[29] To raise the funds that each SPV needed to purchase each rig, the first plaintiff issued over US$900m in bonds in January 2014. The terms on which it issued the bonds are set out in a bond agreement (as subsequently amended and restated). The third defendant signed the bond agreement in his capacity as a director of the first plaintiff.
- [30]
[30] The bond agreement is governed by Norwegian law. It appointed a reputable financial institution in Norway as the trustee for the bondholders (the “Bond Trustee”). The bond agreement also provides – but only for the benefit of the Bond Trustee – that the courts of the Kingdom of Norway are to have exclusive jurisdiction over any disputes arising under it. The bond agreement expressly gives the Bond Trustee the power to take proceedings relating to a dispute under the bond agreement in any court that has jurisdiction.
- [31]
[31] The bonds are supported by a guarantee from the first defendant and a charterer’s undertaking from Perforadora.
- [32]
[32] Clause 13.5(a) of the bond agreement requires the first plaintiff to procure that its own constitution and the constitutions of the SPVs are all amended to provide expressly that:
(a) the Bond Trustee is entitled to appoint one director of each plaintiff (the “Independent Director”);
(c) each plaintiff is obliged to give its Independent Director at least 48 hours’ written notice of any meeting at which an Insolvency Matter is to be considered;
(d) each plaintiff is obliged to give its Independent Director the board materials and such books and records of that plaintiff as are reasonably necessary for the Independent Director to evaluate all matters related to the Insolvency Matter that is to be considered at the meeting; and
(e) other than in relation to an Insolvency Matter, the Independent Director has no right to information or right of access to any plaintiff’s books and records or to attend or vote at any meetings.
- [33]
[33] As security for its obligations under the bond agreement, the first plaintiff charged all of its shares in the SPVs to the Bond Trustee for the benefit of bondholders. As security for its obligations under its guarantee, the first defendant charged all of its shares in the first plaintiff to the Bond Trustee for the benefit of bondholders. The charges oblige the first plaintiff and the first defendant to procure that all of the plaintiffs: (a) amend their constitutions to incorporate and entrench a new article (see [35] below); and (b) appoint the Bond Trustee’s nominee as Independent Director.
- [34]
[34] In September 2016, the Bond Trustee gave notice under the bond agreement and charges requiring the plaintiffs to appoint Mr Noel Cochrane Jr (“Mr Cochrane”) as the Independent Director of each plaintiff. Mr Cochrane was duly appointed. He has held office as a director of each plaintiff uninterrupted from September 2016 to the present day.
The plaintiffs’ power to commence restructuring proceedings
- [35]
[35] In compliance with cl 13.5(a) of the bond agreement and the charges, all of the plaintiffs amended their constitutions in April 2016 to insert a new article in identical wording. For convenience, I will refer to this article as “Art 115A” even though it bears a different number in three of the plaintiffs’ constitutions.
- [36]
[36] The second defendant signed the first defendant’s resolution in writing (in the first defendant’s capacity as the sole shareholder of the first plaintiff) amending the first plaintiff’s constitution to insert Art 115A. He also signed all but one of the first plaintiff’s resolutions in writing (in the first plaintiff’s capacity as the sole shareholder of each SPV) amending each SPV’s constitution to insert Art 115A.
- [37]
[37] Art 115A prohibits each plaintiff and its directors from carrying into effect an Insolvency Matter (see [32(b)] above) unless two conditions are met. First, that plaintiff’s shareholder must vote in favour of doing so by passing an ordinary resolution to that effect. Second, that plaintiff’s Independent Director must vote in favour of doing so, presumably at a duly convened meeting of the directors of that plaintiff. The full text of Art 115A is set out in Oro Negro (CA) at [18].
- [38]
[38] As required by the bond agreement and the charges, Art 115A is entrenched by a further article in each plaintiff’s constitution preventing that plaintiff from amending its constitution in a manner inconsistent with the bond agreement without first securing a resolution of the bondholders approving the amendment.
The Bond Trustee’s power to declare events of default
- [39]
[39] Clause 15.1(a) of the bond agreement gives the Bond Trustee the power to declare an event of default under the bonds if the first plaintiff fails to fulfil any payment obligation under the bond agreement.
- [40]
[40] Clause 15.1(g) of the bond agreement gives the Bond Trustee the power to declare an event of default under the bonds if any of the six plaintiffs, the first defendant or Perforadora, in any jurisdiction, takes any step in relation to an Insolvency Matter.
The litigation in Mexico
The concurso petitions
- [41]
[41] Between 2015 and 2017, Pemex took certain actions which threatened the solvency of both Perforadora and the plaintiffs and thereby risked triggering an event of default cl 15.1(a) of the bond agreement (see Oro Negro (CA) at [20]).
- [42]
[42] On 31 August 2017, the second and third defendants exercised their powers as directors (at that time) of all six plaintiffs to grant a power of attorney on behalf of each plaintiff to ten named lawyers in a Mexican firm called Guerra González y Asociados (the “Guerra Lawyers”). Each power of attorney was, by its express terms, a “General Power of Attorney for litigations … with all general authorities and even with the special authorities” empowering the Guerra Lawyers, among other things, to “file … all kinds of proceedings” on each plaintiff’s behalf. It is common ground that the scope of these powers of attorney extends to filing concurso Petitions on the plaintiffs’ behalf.
- [43]
[43] The second and third defendants intended these powers of attorney to empower the Guerra Lawyers to file a concurso petition in the plaintiffs’ names without complying with Art 115A. It was their view when they granted these powers of attorney to the Guerra Lawyers that Art 115A was ineffective both: (a) as a legal impediment to filing a concurso petition as a matter of Mexican insolvency law and public policy; and (b) as a fetter on their fiduciary duty as directors of each plaintiff to act in the best interests of that plaintiff.
- [44]
[44] On 11 September 2017, the Guerra Lawyers filed a concurso petition in Mexico on behalf of Perforadora. This constituted an event of default under cl 15.1(g) of the bond agreement (see [39] above). A declaration of an event of default would allow the Bond Trustee to displace the defendants’ ownership and control of the plaintiffs and to vest it in the bondholders’ nominee. This raised the prospect of the SPVs (under bondholders’ ownership and control) terminating Perforadora’s charters of the rigs and requiring Perforadora to deliver possession of the rigs to the SPVs. The Guerra Lawyers therefore also sought orders from the concurso court to restrain the SPVs from doing just that. At the same time, the defendants took steps to engage the Guerra Lawyers to file concurso petitions on the plaintiffs’ behalf “in the event that it became necessary to do so”, ie, in the event that it became necessary to prevent the SPVs from terminating the bareboat charters and taking possession of the rigs.
- [45]
[45] Thus, on 20 September 2017, the first defendant (in its capacity as the sole shareholder of the first plaintiff) executed a resolution in writing resolving, among other things: (a) to engage the Guerra Lawyers to file a concurso petition on behalf of the first plaintiff; and (b) to empower the Guerra Lawyers by way of a power of attorney to, among other things, seek or resist any kind of proceedings on behalf of the first plaintiff. On the same day, the first plaintiff (in its capacity as the sole shareholder of each SPV) executed resolutions in writing to the same effect for each SPV. I shall refer to these resolutions of all six plaintiffs as “the Shareholders’ Resolutions”.
- [46]
[46] On 25 September 2017, as a result of the Perforadora concurso petition (see [44] above), the Bond Trustee declared an event of default under cl 15.1(g) of the bond agreement. The Bond Trustee thereupon exercised its power under the bond agreement to submit to the plaintiffs pre-signed letters from the second and third defendants resigning as directors of each plaintiff and to appoint in their place Mr Roger Hancock (“Mr Hancock”) and Mr Roger Bartlett (“Mr Bartlett”) with effect from 25 September 2017. On May 2022, Mr Lambertus Hendrik Veldhuizen (“Mr Veldhuizen”) was appointed as a director of the SPVs.
- [47]
[47] On 29 September 2017, the Guerra Lawyers filed a concurso petition on behalf of the first defendant. Also on 29 September 2017, the Guerra Lawyers filed six concurso petitions, one in the name of each plaintiff. I shall refer to these six petitions as “the Petitions”, and to the concurso proceedings thereby commenced as “the Concursos”.
- [48]
[48] The third defendant accepts that, on the day the Guerra Lawyers filed the Petitions, the plaintiffs’ directors had failed to comply with Art 115A. It is not disputed that the Bond Trustee and the plaintiffs’ directors who were in office on 29 September 2017 (see [46] above) were entirely unaware that the Guerra Lawyers had filed the Petitions. No plaintiff could even convene a meeting of its directors to resolve to carry into effect the Shareholders’ Resolutions (see [44] above). No possibility therefore even arose of Mr Cochrane being given at least 48 hours’ prior notice in writing of any such meeting or of Mr Cochrane voting in favour of carrying the Shareholders’ Resolutions into effect at such a meeting, both as required by Art 115A.
- [49]
[49] On 3 October 2017, Pemex caused its subsidiary to terminate its contract with Perforadora. The immediate and automatic contractual consequence was to terminate each sub charter between each SPV and Perforadora for each rig.
- [50]
[50] On 4 October 2017, the Bond Trustee exercised its power to perfect its security under the charges by procuring the transfer of all of the first defendant’s shares in the first plaintiff to the bondholders’ nominee, OND Pte Ltd. On and after 4 October 2017, therefore, the bondholders, through the Bond Trustee and their nominee, assumed de jure ownership of the first plaintiff and, through the plaintiff, of all of the SPVs.
- [51]
[51] On 5 October 2017, the concurso court admitted Perforadora’s concurso petition (see [44] above).
- [52]
[52] The plaintiffs’ shareholder (OND Pte Ltd) and its directors (Mr Hancock, Mr Bartlett and Mr Cochrane) learned of the Petitions for the first time on 6 October 2017. As a result, on 9 October 2017, the directors of each plaintiff passed a directors’ resolution resolving:
(a) to revoke all authority previously given by that plaintiff to any person to represent that plaintiff, whether by way of a power of attorney or otherwise;
(b) to appoint nine named lawyers from a Mexican law firm called Cervantes Sainz Abogados S.C. (the “Sainz Lawyers”) to represent that plaintiff in all Mexican proceedings in respect of any disputes with the first defendant and Perforadora and in all negotiations with Pemex; and
(c) to grant a power of attorney to the Sainz Lawyers clothing them with the necessary authority.
- [53]
[53] From this point forward, both the Guerra Lawyers (relying on the August 2017 powers of attorney) and the Sainz Lawyers (relying on the October 2017 powers of attorney) claim to be the lawful legal representatives of the plaintiffs in the Concursos as well as in the first defendant’s and Perforadora’s concursos. It therefore avoids confusion to describe the litigation after October 2017 by reference to the lawyers who took certain steps rather than by reference to the clients they claimed to represent in taking those steps.
- [54]
[54] On 31 October 2017, the concurso court admitted the first defendant’s concurso petition (see [47] above).
The litigation in the Concursos
- [55]
[55] The admission of the plaintiffs’ Petitions was delayed for than four years by litigation in the Concursos over whether the Guerra Lawyers were entitled to file the Petitions and to maintain the Concursos in light of: (a) the plaintiffs’ directors’ undisputed failure to comply with Art 115A before carrying into effect the Shareholders’ Resolutions and authorising the Guerra Lawyers to file the Petitions; and (b) the revocation of the August 2017 powers of attorney by the plaintiffs’ new directors in October 2017.
- [56]
[56] The litigation in the Concursos took the following course.
- [57]
[57] In May 2018, on the Sainz Lawyers’ application, the concurso court dismissed the Petitions on the grounds that the plaintiffs’ directors had failed to comply with Art 115A before carrying into effect the Shareholders’ Resolution and filing the Petitions. The Guerra Lawyers filed a motion inviting the concurso court to reconsider its decision. In June 2018, the concurso court dismissed the motion. The Guerra Lawyers appealed to the amparo court. In September 2018, the amparo court annulled the concurso court’s decision and directed it to consider whether Art 115A was in conflict with principles of Mexican insolvency law.
- [58]
[58] In September 2019, the concurso court reaffirmed its decision to dismiss the Petitions for failure to comply with Art 115A. The Guerra Lawyers again appealed to the amparo court. In October 2020, the amparo court again annulled the concurso court’s decision and directed it to consider whether it had the power to disapply Art 115A for the sole purpose of considering whether to admit the Petitions on the grounds that Art 115A was in conflict with principles of Mexican insolvency law and Mexican public policy.
- [59]
[59] In December 2020, the concurso court reaffirmed its decision to dismiss the Petitions for failure to comply with Art 115A. The Guerra Lawyers again appealed to the amparo court. In June 2021, the amparo court again annulled the concurso court’s decision. It directed the concurso court to consider whether cl 15.1(g) of the bond agreement (and therefore the declaration of an event of default and the transfer of the first defendant’s shares in the first plaintiff to OND Pte Ltd) and Art 115A were nullified by Art 87 of the LCM. Art 87 of the LCM renders unenforceable any term in a contract that imposes a detriment on a merchant by the mere fact of commencing insolvency or restructuring proceedings, eg, by filing a concurso petition. Contractual terms that have this effect are commonly called ipso facto clauses.
- [60]
[60] On 1 December 2021, the concurso court finally admitted the Petitions. It held that, “for the sole and exclusive” purpose of considering whether to admit the Petitions, Art 87 of the LCM had the effect of excluding the legal impediments in Art 115A for filing a concurso petition. The concurso court rested its power to disapply Art 115A on the fact that each plaintiff, although incorporated in Singapore, had its centre of main interests in Mexico and was, until September 2017, ultimately owned by another company (ie, the first defendant) that also had its centre of main interests in Mexico and whose separate concurso had been admitted in October 2017 together with the concurso of its subsidiary Perforadora.
- [61]
[61] In January 2022, the Sainz Lawyers appealed to the amparo court against the concurso court’s decision admitting the Petitions. The decision of the amparo court is pending.
The litigation in the first defendant’s and Perforadora’s concursos
- [62]
[62] In parallel with the litigation in the Concursos, litigation took place in the first defendant’s and Perforadora’s concurso on another relevant issue. The issue there was whether the concurso court should suspend the effects of the event of default, and thereby suspend the effect of the transfer of ownership and control of the plaintiffs to the bondholders’ nominees (see [46] above), on the grounds that cl 15.1(g) of the bond agreement was nullified by Art 87 of the LCM or Mexican public policy. The outcome of this litigation would determine, as a matter of Mexican insolvency law and for all practical purposes, whether Perforadora could retain possession of the rigs or could be compelled to deliver possession of the rigs to the SPVs.
- [63]
[63] The litigation in the first defendant’s and Perforadora’s concursos took the following course.
- [64]
[64] In September 2018, the Guerra Lawyers filed a motion seeking to suspend the effects of the event of default on the basis that cl 15.1(g) of the bond agreement contravened Art 87 of the LCM and Mexican public policy. In October 2018, the concurso court dismissed the motion on the basis that it did not have jurisdiction to decide it. The concurso court pointed out that the bond agreement was governed by Norwegian law and that the Bond Trustee had the benefit of a one-sided exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of the courts of Norway.
- [66]
[66] In October 2020, the Mexican federal court held that the concurso court did indeed have the jurisdiction to determine whether Art 87 of the LCM and Mexican public policy nullified cl 15.1(g) of the bond agreement for the purposes of a concurso. The federal court’s reasoning proceeded as follows. The validity of cl 15.1(g) of the bond agreement was governed by Norwegian law and was subject to the jurisdiction of the Norwegian courts. But the effect of cl 15.1(g) was to allow Perforadora to be dispossessed of the rigs and thereby to end any prospect of a successful concurso. The issue before the concurso court was whether, in light of its effect on Perforadora’s concurso, cl 15.1(g) was unenforceable under Art 87 of the LCM and contrary to Mexican public policy. That issue is governed by Mexican law, not Norwegian law. A concurso court in Mexico seised of a concurso filed under Mexican law had the jurisdiction to decide the issue.
- [67]
[67] In February 2021, the concurso court suspended the effects of the Bond Trustee’s declaration of an event of default. It held that cl 15.1(g) of the bond agreement imposes a detriment on the first plaintiff by the mere fact of Perforadora commencing insolvency or restructuring proceedings. Art 87 of the LCM therefore empowered the concurso court to “legally disregard” cl 15.1(g) even though it was a stipulation bargained for between the Integradora Group and the bondholders. The concurso court therefore “revoked” cl 15.1(g) and “rendered invalid” all consequences flowing from the declared event of default.
- [68]
[68] By decisions in August 2022 and November 2022, the concurso court relied on its February 2021 decision to recognise the Guerra Lawyers as the “legal representatives” of the plaintiffs in filing the Petitions and in maintaining the Concursos pursuant to the Shareholders’ Resolutions and the August 2017 powers of attorney.
Conclusion
- [70]
[70] In particular, and subject only to appeal in Mexico, the current position is the Mexican courts is that:
(a) OND Pte Ltd did not become the sole shareholder of the first plaintiff with effect from 4 October 2017;
(b) the first defendant did not cease to be the sole shareholder of the first plaintiff with effect from 4 October 2017 and continues to this day to be the first plaintiff’s sole shareholder;
(c) the second and third defendants did not resign from office with effect from 25 September 2017;
(d) Mr Hancock, Mr Bartlett and Mr Cochrane were not appointed directors of the plaintiffs with effect from 25 September 2017;
(e) Mr Veldhuizen was not appointed a director of the SPVs with effect form 16 May 2022; and
(f) the plaintiffs:
(i) did not revoke the Guerra Lawyers’ authority to represent the plaintiffs in the Concursos with effect from 9 October 2017 by revoking the August 2017 powers of attorney; and
(ii) did not confer authority on the Sainz Lawyers to represent the plaintiffs in Concursos with effect from 9 October 2017 by granting the October 2017 powers of attorney.
The litigation in Singapore
- [71]
[71] The plaintiffs filed this originating summons in Singapore in January 2018. That was about four months after the Guerra Lawyers filed the Petitions and about four months before the concurso court dismissed the Petitions for the first time in May 2018.
- [72]
[72] The originating summons as filed seeks final judgment against the defendants for:
(a) a declaration that the Petitions were invalidly filed for failure to comply with Art 115A;
(b) a declaration that the defendants have no authority to maintain the Petitions on behalf of the plaintiffs or to deal with the plaintiffs’ assets; and
(c) injunctions to prevent the defendants from commencing, continuing or maintaining the Petitions or any other Insolvency Matter on behalf of any of the plaintiffs whether in reliance on the Shareholders’ Resolutions or otherwise.
- [73]
[73] In January 2018, on the plaintiffs’ ex parte application, a judge of the General Division of the High Court (the “General Division”) granted interim injunctions in terms of [72(c)] above until this originating summons had been heard and determined.
- [74]
[74] In September 2018, on the defendants’ inter partes application, the same judge discharged the interim injunctions.
- [76]
[76] In March 2020, the plaintiffs joined four of the Guerra Lawyers as defendants to this originating summons. The final hearing of this originating summon was held in abeyance while the plaintiffs attempted to serve the originating process on the named Guerra Lawyers in Mexico. For various reasons, including the Covid-19 pandemic and the fact that service had to be effected through the judicial authorities of Mexico, over two years elapsed without service being effected. On 4 May 2022, the plaintiffs elected to discontinue the proceedings against the Guerra Lawyers and to have this originating summons heard and determined on the merits.
- [77]
[77] The plaintiffs now seek final judgment against only the first and third defendants in the following substantive terms:
(a) A declaration that each of the Shareholders’ Resolutions is incapable of enabling the plaintiffs to seek a concurso or any other Insolvency Matter, without first securing Mr Cochrane’s vote in favour of doing so.
(b) A declaration that the first and third defendants have no authority to cause, and shall not cause, the plaintiffs to continue and/or maintain any concurso or any other Insolvency Matter in Mexico or elsewhere purportedly on behalf of the plaintiffs.
(c) A declaration that the first and third defendants have no authority to act for any of the plaintiffs or to deal with the plaintiffs’ assets in any matter.
(d) An injunction to restrain the first and third defendants from relying on and/or continuing to rely on the Shareholders’ Resolutions to cause the plaintiffs to continue or maintain any concurso or any other Insolvency Matter in Mexico or elsewhere purportedly on behalf of the plaintiffs.
(e) An injunction to restrain the first and third defendants from continuing or maintaining any concurso or any other Insolvency Matter or other legal action in Mexico or elsewhere purportedly on behalf of the plaintiffs.
- [78]
[78] After hearing arguments from the plaintiffs and the third defendant, I have entered final judgment in this originating summons for the plaintiffs against the first and third defendants in the following substantive terms:
(a) A declaration that none of the Shareholders’ Resolutions is sufficient in itself to authorise or empower any director of any of the plaintiffs to carry into effect any Insolvency Matter.
(b) A declaration that the only directors of the first plaintiff (as the term “director” is defined in s 4 of the Companies Act 1967 (2020 Rev Ed) (the “Companies Act”)) as at the date of my judgment are Mr Cochrane, Mr Hancock and Mr Bartlett, with effect from the dates of their respective appointment.
(c) A declaration that the only directors of each SPV (as the term “director” is defined in s 4 of the Companies Act) as at the date of my judgment are Mr Cochrane, Mr Hancock, Mr Bartlett and Mr Veldhuizen with effect from the dates of their respective appointment.
(d) A declaration that neither the first defendant nor the third defendant have the authority of, or a power conferred by, any of the plaintiffs to cause or attempt to cause any of the plaintiffs to do any of the following:
(i) to commence, continue or maintain any Insolvency Matter (as defined in Art 115A) in Mexico or elsewhere, purportedly on behalf of any the plaintiffs; or
(ii) to instruct legal representatives in Mexico or elsewhere to commence, continue or maintain any Insolvency Matter (as defined in Art 115A) in Mexico or elsewhere purportedly on behalf of any of the plaintiffs.
(e) An injunction restraining the first and third defendants from commencing, continuing or maintaining any Insolvency Matter (as defined in Art 115A) in Mexico or elsewhere purportedly on behalf of any the plaintiffs.
(f) An injunction restraining the first and third defendants from instructing legal representatives in Mexico or elsewhere to commence, continue or maintain any Insolvency Matter (as defined in Art 115A) in Mexico or elsewhere purportedly on behalf of any of the plaintiffs.
The legal basis for granting final relief
The plaintiffs’ case
- [80]
[80] Each plaintiff’s primary legal basis for judgment rests on contract and proceeds as follows. Each plaintiff asserts that it has an implied contract with the third defendant that incorporates as a term the substance of Art 115A. The plaintiffs are entitled to enter final judgment against the third defendant for declarations, injunctions and damages as prayed for because he breached Art 115A by carrying into effect the resolutions of the plaintiffs’ shareholders to file the Petitions without Mr Cochrane’s vote of approval. The plaintiffs are entitled to enter final judgment against the first defendant for declarations and injunctions as prayed for because it induced the third defendant to breach his implied contract with each plaintiff.
- [81]
[81] Each plaintiff’s alternative legal basis for relief rests on the Companies Act and proceeds as follows. The third defendant is in breach of s 157A of the Companies Act. That section requires the business of a company to be managed by its directors, ie, to the exclusion of its shareholders. The effect of s 157A of the Companies Act is therefore to put it outside the power of any shareholder to cause a company to commence legal proceedings, especially restructuring proceedings. In breach of s 157A of the Companies Act, the first defendant bypassed the plaintiffs’ directors and instructed the Guerra Lawyers to file the Petitions. As for the third defendant, he breached his duties under s 157 of the Companies Act by failing to act honestly and by failing to use reasonable diligence in the discharge of his duties. He did so by carrying into effect the Shareholders’ Resolutions without complying with Art 115A. These breaches of the Companies Act by the first and third defendants enliven the court’s general power to grant a statutory injunction under s 409A of the Companies Act to restrain the breach.
The third defendant’s case
- [83]
[83] The third defendant concedes that the plaintiffs have established a legal basis for granting the final relief that they seek. He opposes the plaintiffs’ application on grounds that are either procedural (see [130] below) or that are directed to the exercise of my discretion to grant declarations and injunctions (see [130(c)] below). He does not seek to argue that the plaintiffs have established no legal basis on which to grant final relief.
- [84]
[84] I nevertheless consider that I must satisfy myself on the merits that the plaintiffs have established a legal basis for final relief against the first and third defendants rather than to allow that issue to go by concession. I say that for three reasons.
- [85]
[85] First, identifying a legal basis for granting final relief is fundamental. Without such a basis, I do not consider that I have the power to enter any sort of judgment against the first and third defendants. I consider it particularly important to establish that legal basis on the merits in a case such as this, where the third defendant submits that granting the plaintiffs the relief they seek will nullify the decisions of the Mexican courts leading to the findings summarised at [69]–[70] above and raise issues of judicial comity.
- [86]
[86] Second, it is the plaintiffs’ stated intention to enforce my judgment in Mexico. I consider it necessary to satisfy myself, on the merits rather than by concession, that the plaintiffs have established a legal basis for the final relief lest the failure to do so proves, in itself, to be an obstacle to enforcement. The third defendant has already taken the position before me that I should not give any weight to a January 2019 decision of the Norwegian court on cl 15.1(g) of the bond agreement in favour of the Bond Trustee because the Norwegian court did not, for a different reason, consider it necessary to satisfy itself on the merits that the plaintiffs had established a basis for the final relief that it granted them.
- [87]
[87] Finally, the plaintiffs seek final relief, not just against the third defendant but also against the first defendant. The first defendant is not represented before me and is not bound by the third defendant’s concession as to the legal basis for granting relief against him. I must therefore satisfy myself on the merits that the plaintiffs have established a legal basis for final relief against the first defendant. That legal basis, as will be seen, depends on establishing a legal basis for final relief against the third defendant. It is therefore necessary, in any event, for me to be satisfied that the plaintiffs have established a legal basis for relief against the third defendant.
Third defendant: breach of implied contract
- [88]
[88] I accept the plaintiffs’ submission that the legal basis for granting the final relief they seek against the third defendant lies in an implied contract between each of them and the third defendant that incorporates as a term the substance of Art 115A.
- [89]
[89] One of the central issues on appeal in Oro Negro (CA) was whether the plaintiffs had a good arguable case that the second and third defendants were contractually bound by Art 115A by virtue only of their having accepted appointment as directors of the plaintiffs (at [56]). The plaintiffs relied on Anglo-Austrian Printing and Publishing Union (Isaacs’ Case) [1892] 2 Ch 158 (“Isaacs’ Case”), Chee Kheong Mah Chaly and others v Liquidators of Baring Futures (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2003] 2 SLR(R) 571 (“Chaly Mah”) and Tengku Dato’ Ibrahim Petra bin Tengku Indra Petra & Ors v Perdana Petroleum Bhd (formerly known as Petra Perdana Bhd) [2013] 8 MLJ 280 (“Tengku Dato Ibrahim”) to submit that accepting appointment as a director was enough in itself for Art 115A to bind the second and third defendants (see Oro Negro (CA) at [57]). The second and third defendants argued that there must be something more than merely accepting appointment as a director for Art 115A to bind them (see Oro Negro (CA) at [57]).
- [90]
[90] The Court of Appeal (at [60]) accepted that the plaintiffs had indeed established a good arguable case on this central issue, ie, a case with sufficient merit to support interlocutory relief. As the plaintiffs now seek final relief against the first and third defendants, I have to determine not whether the plaintiffs merely have a good arguable case on this issue but whether they have established that case on the merits. With respect, I come to the same conclusion as the Court of Appeal on the merits.
- [91]
[91] The Court of Appeal in Oro Negro (CA) analysed Isaacs’ Case, Chaly Mah and Tengku Dato Ibrahim in detail before concluding that the plaintiffs had a good arguable case. I analyse the same three cases briefly before concluding that the plaintiffs have more than a good arguable case but have in fact established the third defendant is bound by an implied contract which incorporates as a term the substance of Art 115A.
Isaacs’ Case
- [92]
[92] I begin with Isaacs’ Case. In that case, Sir Henry Isaacs signed a company’s memorandum and articles of association in his capacity as a subscribing shareholder for one share in the company. The company’s articles of association also expressly appointed him as a director of the company upon incorporation. Under the articles, a person was qualified to hold office as a director only if he subscribed for 100 shares of £10 each in the company. A director appointed upon incorporation was given one month after incorporation to subscribe for the shares. The articles provided that, if the director failed to do so: (a) he would be deemed to have agreed to subscribe for the 100 shares; and (b) the company was thereupon entitled to allot the shares to him forthwith.
- [93]
[93] Sir Henry acted as a director of the company from incorporation until it went into liquidation. But he failed to subscribe for 99 additional shares in the company within one month of incorporation, or indeed at all, as required by the articles.
- [94]
[94] The company went into liquidation just 16 months after incorporation. The question arose whether Sir Henry was a contributory for 100 shares or only for his one subscriber share, ie, whether he had an obligation to contribute an additional £990 to the company’s capital for the benefit of its creditors, arising from the 99 shares for which had failed to subscribe.
- [95]
[95] At first instance, Stirling J accepted that Sir Henry qua director of the company was not a party to the express statutory contract comprising the company’s memorandum and articles of association even though Sir Henry qua shareholder was a party to that contract. Stirling J held that Sir Henry qua director was nevertheless bound by an implied contract with the company to subscribe for an additional 99 shares in the company within one month after his appointment as a director. As Stirling J held (at 164–165):
- [96]
[96] On appeal, Lindley, Bowen and Kay LJJ affirmed Stirling J’s judgment. They held unanimously that the articles amounted to the company’s offer to Sir Henry of the terms on which he was to become a director of the company and that he had accepted the company’s offer by his conduct in taking up appointment as a director and especially in acting as a director of the company until it went into liquidation. The acceptance being by conduct, the fact that Sir Henry had signed the memorandum was not essential to bring the implied contract into existence.
Chaly Mah
- [97]
[97] The second case the Court of Appeal analysed in Oro Negro (CA) is Chaly Mah. In that case, a company’s articles provided that every officer of the company was entitled to be indemnified out of the assets of the company against any liabilities he may incur in the discharge of his office. The question was whether this provision was incorporated into the contract between the company and an accounting firm appointed to office as its auditors.
- [98]
[98] Answering the question in the affirmative, the Court of Appeal held that the auditors had clearly accepted their appointment to their office on the footing of the articles. The Court of Appeal accepted that the articles constitute a contract only between a company and its members and generally do not bind third parties (see Hickman v Kent Or Romney Marsh Sheep-Breeders’ Association [1915] 1 Ch 881). But the Court of Appeal also held that in the particular circumstances of a case, a separate contract between the company and a third party who is not directly bound by the articles can incorporate provisions from the articles of association (see Chaly Mah at [24]).
Tengku Dato Ibrahim
- [99]
[99] The third case that the Court of Appeal analysed in Oro Negro (CA) is Tengku Dato Ibrahim. In that case, directors of a company sued the company seeking to be indemnified against legal fees they had incurred in successfully defending a derivative action brought against them qua directors by a minority shareholder of the company. Article 170 of the company’s articles of association gave the directors an express right to such an indemnity. The directors had contracts of employment with the company. But they were not able to point to any words, whether in writing or even in conversation, incorporating Art 170 into their contracts of employment.
- [100]
[100] Mohamad Ariff J in the High Court of Malaya at Kuala Lumpur began his analysis by accepting that “relatively little may be required to incorporate the articles by implication” into a contract between a company and its director (at [19]), citing the dictum of Stanley Burton J in Globalink Telecommunications Ltd v Wilmbury Ltd [2003] 1 BCLC 145 at [30]:
- [101]
[101] Mohamad Ariff J went on to hold that the reason “very little” may be required to incorporate a term in a company’s articles of association into a contract between the company and a director is because it is an obvious and necessary condition of appointing a person to the office of a director of a company that he is so appointed precisely on the footing of the company’s articles (at [27]):
He therefore held that it was obvious that the directors had been appointed “on the footing of the articles” of the company, and that the right to an indemnity conferred by Art 170 had been incorporated as a term of the contract between the directors and the company (at [29]).
Oro Negro (CA)
- [102]
[102] As a result of its analysis of these cases, the Court of Appeal in Oro Negro (CA) held that the plaintiffs had established a good arguable case that an implied contract incorporating as a term the substance of Art 115A arose between each plaintiff and the second and third defendants because their consent to appointment to the office of a director in a plaintiff gave rise to an agreement that each of them would serve that plaintiff based on the terms of the plaintiffs’ constitution.
- [103]
[103] The Court of Appeal gave four reasons for its holding that the plaintiffs had a good arguable case on this issue. First, it did not lie in a person’s mouth to say that he was not familiar with a company’s constitution at the time he accepted appointment as a director of the company (at [70]). Second, the only reasonable inference on the facts of Oro Negro (CA) was that the second and third defendants must have agreed that their terms of service as directors were to incorporate the terms of the plaintiffs’ constitutions (at [70]). Third, it did not matter that Art 115A was inserted into the plaintiffs’ constitutions after the second and third defendants had accepted appointment. That was because they continued to serve as directors after it had been inserted (at [71]). Finally, and in any event, the second and third defendants knew the content of Art 115A because they had signed all of the internal corporate documentation that had been necessary to insert that article into each plaintiff’s constitutions as required by the bond agreements and the charge (at [71]).
Conclusion
- [104]
[104] In my view, the rule to be extracted from the authorities is that where a term in a company’s constitution imposes an obligation or confers a right on a person appointed to an office within a company, including but not limited to the office of director, and that person is aware of that term, accepts appointment as a director of the company and thereafter acts as a director of the company, that term is prima facie incorporated into an implied contract between that person and the company. All of this is, of course, subject to contrary agreement. Therefore, no implied contract will arise if the company and the officer enter into an express and separate contract which: (a) excludes the relevant terms in the constitution; (b) is inconsistent with the terms in the constitution; or (c) expressly provides that it sets out exclusively the terms on which the officer has been appointed to his office.
- [105]
[105] The implied contract is like any other contract. If the director acts contrary to that term, he is in breach of the implied contract. A breach of the contract carries the usual consequences, typically an award of damages for the breach and, in appropriate cases, an award of equitable relief such as an injunction or specific performance.
- [106]
[106] In the present case, Art 115A expressly obliged each director of each plaintiff “not [to] carry into effect…any filing for…concurso mercantile or judicial restructuring” for that plaintiff unless “the Independent Director (whose vote is necessary) has voted in approval”. That obligation in Art 115A was a term of the third defendant’s contract qua director with each plaintiff.
- [107]
[107] The third defendant does not dispute – indeed, cannot credibly dispute –that he was aware of Art 115A when he acted as a director of each plaintiff or, more accurately, continued to act as a director of each plaintiff after Art 115A had been inserted into its constitution. Furthermore, he was personally involved in inserting Art 115A into each plaintiff’s constitution.
- [108]
[108] Liability in contract is strict. It therefore makes no difference to the third defendant’s liability for breach of his implied contract that he acted, as he claims, out of the best of motives, ie, in accordance with what he believed to be the best interests of the plaintiffs, in accordance with what he believed to be his fiduciary duties, and with a genuine belief that complying with Art 115A was inconsistent with those duties and with a genuine belief that Art 115A was ineffective under Mexican law.
- [109]
[109] Art 115A required Mr Cochrane’s vote of approval before the third defendant could carry into effect the content of the Shareholders’ Resolutions, ie, to cause each plaintiff to file a concurso petition. I find that the third defendant did cause each plaintiff to file a concurso petition without Mr Cochrane’s vote of approval. The third defendant has accordingly breached the implied contract between himself and each plaintiff. He is liable in the usual way for damages to each plaintiff for the loss he has caused it to suffer by reason of his breach and to be restrained by inunction from continuing his breach.
- [110]
[110] Given that I have accepted the plaintiffs’ primary legal basis in contract for granting final relief (see [80] above), it is unnecessary for me to consider the plaintiffs’ alternative basis under the Companies Act (see [81] above) or its further alternative basis in the tort of conspiracy (see [82] above).
First defendant: inducing breach of contract
- [111]
[111] I accept the plaintiffs’ submission that the legal basis for granting the final relief they seek against the first defendant lies in its inducement of the third defendant to breach his implied contract with the plaintiffs.
The elements of the tort
- [112]
[112] A person is liable in tort for inducing a breach of a contract if: (a) the person acts with the requisite knowledge of the existence of the contract, even if it lacks knowledge of the precise terms of the contract; (b) the person had the intention – which is to be determined objectively – to interfere with the performance of the contract; and (c) the contract in question is a valid one (see Tribune Investment Trust Inc v Soosan Trading Co Ltd [2000] 2 SLR(R) 407 at [17]).
- [113]
[113] A contract for the purposes of this tort must include the implied contract that arises between a director and a company incorporating a term in the company’s constitution that imposes an obligation or confers a right on the director. There is no basis on which to suggest otherwise. Indeed, where the term in the constitution touches on the internal corporate governance of a company, as Art 115A does, the tort of inducing a breach of contract can be seen as a valuable ancillary legal right for shareholders to ensure proper corporate governance.
- [114]
[114] The first defendant cannot credibly dispute that it was aware of the existence of each plaintiff’s constitution and of the second and third defendants’ obligation qua directors to comply with Art 115A in each constitution. At the material time, the first defendant was the sole shareholder of the first plaintiff and the first plaintiff was the sole shareholder of the second to sixth plaintiffs. As the plaintiffs put it, that makes the first defendant the “ultimate parent” of all six plaintiffs.
- [115]
[115] It is quite rightly not suggested that the implied contract between the plaintiffs and the third defendant is in any sense invalid.
The first defendant’s intention
- [116]
[116] The main question I have to decide is therefore whether the first defendant intended to interfere with the third defendant’s obligation under Art 115A not to carry into effect the first defendant’s resolution to file a concurso petition without Mr Cochrane’s vote of approval. In my view, the first defendant clearly intended to do so, both before it executed the Shareholder’s Resolutions on 20 September 2017 and by executing the Shareholders’ Resolutions on that date.
- [117]
[117] I shall first consider the first defendant’s intent before it executed the Shareholders’ Resolutions. The only way to approach the first defendant’s state of mind is inferentially, by considering the conduct of the defendants taken together. For this purpose, I bear in mind that the third defendant was a director of the first defendant in August and September 2017.
(1) Before the Shareholders’ Resolutions
- [118]
[118] On 31 August 2017, the second and third defendants granted the August 2017 powers of attorney to the Guerra Lawyers on behalf of the plaintiffs (see [42] above). This took place around the time when two key events occurred. The first was the breakdown of talks between the first defendant and bondholders. The second was Pemex’s refusal to implement certain amendments to the sub charters for the rigs, which led the first defendant to apprehend that Pemex would terminate the sub charters. There was therefore an objective basis at this time – which I find the first and third defendants must have realised – for believing that the plaintiffs would soon be, if not already, insolvent or in severe financial distress.
- [119]
[119] The third defendant’s evidence is that both he and the second defendant granted the August 2017 powers of attorney because they believed that it was in the best interests of all of the plaintiffs to seek protection from creditors through self-initiated restructuring proceedings, and to do so in Mexico, being the plaintiffs’ centre of main interests. His evidence is that doing so was also consistent with his fiduciary duties to each plaintiff. He says also that he understood at the time, ie, on 31 August 2017, that Art 115A was ineffective as being contrary to Art 87 of the LCM and Mexican public policy and would not operate to restrain the third defendant from carrying out his fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the plaintiff.
- [120]
[120] I do not accept that the third defendant “understood” any of this in August 2017. As my recounting of the litigation in Mexico has shown, whether Art 115A is or is not effective as a condition precedent to filing a concurso petition under Art 87 of the LCM is a hotly contested issue on which the Mexican courts themselves have been deeply divided for four years, until the amparo court’s decision in December 2021. Despite that, the issue continues to be contested, as that decision is itself on appeal. The third defendant is not a psychic and his claimed understanding in August 2017 may well be contradicted on appeal.
- [122]
[122] In my view, the third defendant intended on 31 August 2017, at the very latest, to carry out a plan to put the rigs out of the reach of bondholders by carrying into effect the Shareholders’ Resolutions without Mr Cochrane’s vote of approval, and without even allowing him an opportunity to vote, in breach of Art 115A. The third defendant’s reliance on Art 87 of the LCM and his fiduciary duties to the plaintiffs as justifications for bypassing Mr Cochrane are nothing but disingenuous ex post facto rationalisations.
- [123]
[123] I am further satisfied that the third defendant’s intent can properly be attributed to the first defendant. The third defendant was a director of the first defendant at the material time. The second defendant was chief legal counsel for the first defendant at the material time. The first defendant was, at that time, dealing with the apprehended insolvency of itself and of the plaintiffs in substance as a single economic problem to be solved, even if the first defendant’s concurso was to be initiated separately from the plaintiffs’ concursos as a matter of legal form.
- [124]
[124] I therefore consider that the first defendant intended, before the Shareholders’ Resolutions were passed, to induce the third defendant to breach his implied contract with the plaintiffs.
(2) In passing the Shareholders’ Resolutions
- [125]
[125] I next consider the first defendant’s intent when it passed the Shareholders’ Resolutions on 20 September 2017. All but one of the Shareholders’ Resolutions were signed by the second defendant as the “authorised representative” of the first defendant with respect to the first plaintiff, and as the authorised representative of the first plaintiff with respect to the remaining plaintiffs. The Shareholders’ Resolutions expressly authorise the Guerra Lawyers to file concurso petitions on behalf of each plaintiff without making any reference to Art 115A and without making any provision for the plaintiffs’ directors to comply with it.
- [126]
[126] The third defendant’s evidence is that, at this time, there was concern that the Bond Trustee would declare an event of default, take control of the first defendant’s shares in the first plaintiff and cause the SPVs to terminate Perforadora’s charters of the rigs and take possession of them. The third defendant expressly links the Shareholders Resolutions to ensuring that the Guerra Lawyers would be able to file concurso petitions in Mexico “in the event that it became necessary to do so”. In context, the necessity for doing so was quite obviously to stop Perforadora losing possession of the rigs. The only way the first defendant could be sure of achieving this was to ensure that the plaintiffs’ directors did not comply with Art 115A before the Guerra Lawyers filed the concurso petitions.
- [127]
[127] This is not to say that I consider that Mr Cochrane would have withheld a vote of approval for restructuring proceedings if it had been sought from him in August or September 2017. If an objective case had been established in at that time that the plaintiffs were insolvent or in severe financial distress and ought to file restructuring petitions, Mr Cochrane could well have decided not to vote against such proceedings but instead simply to withhold his vote of approval for any proposal to file those petitions anywhere but Singapore. That would have avoided the current standoff in Mexico and allowed the plaintiffs to take possession of the rigs. After all, that is what the bondholders, the first plaintiff, the first defendant and Perforadora all bargained for when the bonds were issued.
Conclusion
- [128]
[128] For these reasons, I accept that it was indeed the first defendant’s intention in August and September 2017 to induce the third defendant to breach his implied contract with each plaintiff by carrying into effect the Shareholders’ Resolutions and causing the Petitions to be filed without Mr Cochrane’s vote of approval.
The grounds for opposing final relief
- [129]
[129] I have satisfied myself on the merits that the plaintiffs have established a legal basis for granting the final relief that they seek. I have found that the third defendant breached his implied contract with the plaintiffs. I have also found that the first defendant induced the third defendant to breach his implied contract. I now turn to address the procedural and discretionary grounds on which the third defendant submits I should dismiss this originating summons.
- [130]
[130] The third defendant submits that I should dismiss this originating summons on the following six procedural and discretionary grounds:
(a) The plaintiffs’ claim is an abuse of the process of the court because:
(i) it relitigates issues that have been decided by the Mexican courts; or
(ii) it is a collateral attack on the decision of the Mexican courts.
(b) The plaintiffs’ claim is barred by res judicata.
(c) Granting the plaintiffs the relief they seek would result in a breach of judicial comity.
(d) I cannot grant any injunctions restraining the Guerra Lawyers from continuing the Concursos that can be enforced against them because I have no jurisdiction over them.
(e) I cannot grant a declaration affecting the interests of the Guerra lawyers because none of the Guerra Lawyers is now a party to this originating summons.
- [131]
[131] I deal with each of these grounds in turn.
Abuse of process
- [132]
[132] The third defendant’s first submission is that this originating summons as an abuse of the process of the court on one of two grounds. The first ground is that it duplicates the Concursos and amounts to an impermissible attempt to relitigate issues that have been decided against the plaintiffs by the Mexican courts (see Virsagi Management (S) Pte Ltd v Welltech Construction Pte Ltd and another appeal [2013] 4 SLR 1097 and PT Karya Indo Batam v Wang Zhenwen and others (Wang Zhenwen and others, third parties) [2021] 5 SLR 1381). The second ground is that this originating summons is, in substance, an attempt to mount a collateral attack on the decisions of the Mexican courts leading to the findings summarised at [69]–[70] above.
- [133]
[133] I do not accept either of these grounds. I take them in turn.
Duplicate proceedings
- [134]
[134] The third defendant submits that this originating summons duplicates the Concursos in three respects. First, both proceedings are between the same parties. Second, both proceedings raise the same or similar issues on the same underlying facts. Finally, the plaintiffs seek the same final relief on this originating summons as they seek in the Concursos. Determining this originating summons on the merits therefore risks giving rise to the two undesirable consequences of duplicate proceedings. First, it will create the risk of conflicting judgments in Singapore and Mexico on the same issues on the same facts. Second, it will impose upon the third defendant the unfairness or unconscionability of having to fight the same battle twice or on two fronts.
- [135]
[135] I do not accept the third defendant’s submission. I accept that there is identity of parties between this originating summons and the Concursos. Despite that, it is my view that this originating summons does not duplicate the Concursos because it raises issues and seeks relief which are different from the issues that the plaintiffs have raised and the relief the plaintiffs seek in the Concursos.
- [136]
[136] I now consider the three respects in which the third defendant submits that this originating summons duplicates the Concursos.
(1) Identity of parties
- [137]
[137] I accept that there is identity of parties between the Concursos and this originating summons in relation to both the first defendant and the third defendant.
- [138]
[138] For the purposes of this analysis, I accept the third defendant’s evidence that the plaintiffs’ six Concursos were consolidated in December 2021 with Integradora’s concurso and Perforadora’s concurso. For this analysis, I therefore treat them as a single proceeding in Mexico, as a matter of Mexican procedural law. I am also prepared to accept that it is immaterial that each plaintiff’s concurso was a separate proceeding from commencement in September 2017 until consolidation in December 2021. It is during that period that the Mexican courts issued most of the decisions that the third defendant relies on to argue that this originating summons is an abuse of process. The significant point is that, unless and until an appellate court reverses the consolidation, all of those earlier decisions are now to be treated as having been made in a single consolidated concurso covering the first defendant, Perforadora and all six plaintiffs.
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