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Grounds publishedDecided 24 Oct 2023
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General Division of the High Court

Public Prosecutor v Soh Chee Wen and another

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[2023] SGHC 299Case no. Criminal Case No 9 of 2019

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] Between 1 August 2012 and 3 October 2013 (the “Relevant Period”), the two accused persons conspired to manipulate the markets for and prices of three counters which were, at the time, being traded on the Mainboard of the Singapore Exchange (“SGX”). These were Blumont, Asiasons, and LionGold (collectively, “BAL”). The accused persons succeeded.

  3. [2] Not only was their scheme elaborate and thoroughly planned, but it was also complex, sophisticated, highly exploitative, long running, and well-guised. Before me, the accused persons also displayed no remorse for their conduct, or regret for the damaging consequences which followed therefrom. Instead, they denied every charge brought against them and pushed the blame to others. They also cast aspersions on the integrity of the Prosecution and investigating agencies.

  4. [3] For these, amongst other reasons I will discuss in these grounds, it is – on hindsight – perhaps somewhat unsurprising that the Prosecution had described this matter as the “most serious case of stock market manipulation in Singapore”, an assertion which I will need to return at the very end of these grounds.

  5. [4] For his involvement in the entire scheme – from its conception, its execution, to the period following its eventual discovery – the First Accused, Mr Soh Chee Wen (also known as “John Soh”), faced a total of 189 charges. These fell within five distinct groups:

  6. (a) First, ten charges for being a party to conspiracies to commit offences under s 197(1)(b) of the Securities and Futures Act (Cap 289, 2006 Rev Ed) (the “SFA”), which proscribed “false trading and market rigging transactions”. The Second Accused, Ms Quah Su-Ling, was alleged to be his co-conspirator. It should also be noted that six of these ten charges concerned the markets for BAL shares (the “False Trading Charges”). The remaining four concerned the prices of BAL shares (the “Price Manipulation Charges”).

  7. (b) Second, 162 charges for a party to conspiracies to commit offences under s 201(b) of the SFA, which prohibited the use of manipulative or deceptive devices in connection with the subscription, purchase, or sale of securities. The Second Accused was, again, alleged to be his co-conspirator. After the close of the Prosecution’s case, only 161 of these charges remained in issue before me as I had acquitted the accused persons of a single charge pursuant to the submissions that there had been no case to answer by the accused persons (see [1518]–[1519] below). Thus, in these grounds, I will refer only to the 161 charges as the “Deception Charges”.

  8. (c) Third, six charges for being a party to conspiracies to commit offences under s 420 of the Penal Code (Cap 224, Rev Ed 2008) (the “Penal Code”), that was, cheating and dishonestly inducing property to be delivered (the “Cheating Charges”). In essence, these charges alleged that the accused persons had conspired to dishonestly induce two entities to deliver hundreds of millions in margin financing.

  9. (d) Fourth, three charges for being concerned in the management of Blumont, Asiasons, and LionGold while being an undischarged bankrupt, contrary to s 148(1) of the Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed) (the “Companies Act”). I refer to these charges as the “Company Management Charges”. The First Accused had been adjudged bankrupt in Malaysia on 14 January 2002 and has remained undischarged ever since.

  10. (e) Lastly, five charges for perverting the course of justice contrary to s 204A of the Penal Code and a further three charges for attempting to pervert the course of justice contrary to s 204A read with s 511 of the Penal Code (collectively, the “Witness Tampering Charges”). These eight charges essentially alleged that the First Accused had successfully tampered or attempted to tamper with the evidence of four key witnesses in these proceedings.

  11. [5] The Second Accused faced 178 charges for offences falling within the first three groups of charges brought against the First Accused. As she was alleged to be his co-conspirator, the charges against her were essentially identical to those brought against him. When I refer to the False Trading, Price Manipulation, Deception, and Cheating Charges, I include those charges faced by the Second Accused. I will also refer to all these charges faced by both the accused persons collectively as the “Conspiracy Charges”.

  12. [6] The Prosecution’s case for these 367 charges commenced on 25 March 2019 and concluded on 21 April 2021, after 169 hearing days. There were 95 witnesses of fact for the Prosecution, though the attendance of 34 were dispensed with. Of these 95, 85 witnesses gave evidence by way of conditioned statements pursuant to s 264(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) (the “CPC”). The Prosecution also called two experts – one on market surveillance, Professor Aitken; and the other on valuation, Mr Ellison. The defence was developed over 28 hearing days thereafter. The First Accused took the stand for 25 hearing days, and called an expert witness, Mr White, to respond to the evidence of Professor Aitken. Mr White took the stand for the remaining three days. The Second Accused elected not to give evidence in her defence and did not call any witnesses. At the trial, miscellaneous evidential and procedural disputes also arose, primarily during the Prosecution’s case, which necessitated intermediate resolution (for example, see my decisions in Public Prosecutor v Soh Chee Wen and another [2020] 3 SLR 1435 (“PP v Soh Chee Wen (No 1)”) and Public Prosecutor v Soh Chee Wen and another [2021] 3 SLR 641 (“PP v Soh Chee Wen (No 2)”). There were also other issues which did not give rise to published judgments.

  13. [7] On 5 May 2022, after careful consideration of the evidence, the parties’ written submissions and their oral arguments, I convicted the accused persons, respectively, of 180 and 169 of the total 189 and 178 charges which had been brought against them. The parties were given time to tender their submissions on sentence. On 28 December 2022, after considering the parties’ written submissions and their oral arguments, I imposed on the accused persons aggregate sentences of 36- and 20-years’ imprisonment, respectively. On both 5 May and 28 December 2022, I delivered fairly detailed reasons for my decisions, but, even so, I stated that full grounds would follow. These are the full grounds of my decision.

  14. [8] Given the unprecedented scale of this matter, it should come as no surprise that these grounds of decision must address a very substantial number of issues and, as such, they are commensurately extensive. To aid the reader in navigating them, I will begin by stating the structure of these grounds, and then setting out a table of contents.

  15. Structure of these grounds of decision

  16. [9] These grounds will proceed as follows:

  17. (a) First, following this section, I will provide some general background to this matter. As the events with which this case was concerned took place around a decade ago, it is useful to be reminded of the circumstances surrounding the discovery and investigation of the offences as well as the initiation of prosecution.

  18. (b) Second, I will state the crucial components of the Prosecution’s case. As would have been gleaned from [1] above, the essence of the Prosecution’s case was that the accused persons had successfully executed a conspiracy to manipulate the markets for and prices of BAL shares during the Relevant Period. This general conspiracy (which I will call the “Scheme”), however, did not form the subject of any specific charge. The charges were instead concerned with narrower aspects of the Scheme; for example, with creating a false appearance with respect to the market for Blumont shares across different periods, or for dishonestly inducing Goldman Sachs to provide substantial margin financing. Nevertheless, the narrative put forth by the Prosecution in relation to the Scheme as a whole was the through line of all 367 charges which had been brought, and serves as a useful framework for organising the various strands of the case.

  19. (c) Third, I will explain the broad categories of evidence relied on by the Prosecution to prove the components of its case and, thus, the individual charges. Although the probative value and limitations of most of these categories of evidence should be clear once I turn to my substantive analyses of them, it is still useful to state – in a single section of these grounds – how the Prosecution set out to prove the entirety of its case.

  20. (d) Fourth, I will state the accused persons’ defence. As would have been gathered from [2] above, the accused persons’ principal response was to deny liability for all the charges brought against them. In this connection, efforts were made to undermine the credibility of the Prosecution’s case and the quality of the Prosecution’s evidence. Apart from this negative defence, however, the accused persons also put forth the positive case that several other actors who featured in this matter were the ones who had actually coordinated to manipulate the markets for and prices of BAL shares during the Relevant Period. This section will therefore also generally explain that positive case.

  21. (f) Sixth, I will set out my detailed reasons for imposing on the First and Second Accused, respectively, imprisonment terms of 36 and 20 years. In this section, I will also deal with several issues which were generally disputed during the trial, but which were most relevant to the issue of sentencing.

  22. (g) Seventh, as mentioned at [2] above, aspersions were cast on the integrity of the Prosecution. More specifically, these were allegations that there had been Prosecutorial misconduct in this case. Thus, in the final section of these grounds, prior to my conclusion, I will address those allegations.

  23. Appendices to these grounds

  24. [10] There are four appendices. First, an Excel Workbook: “Index of Relevant Accounts and Charges”. Second, a table containing a glossary of the persons –both individuals and companies – referred to in these grounds. Third, a diagram which illustrates the relationships between the accused persons and certain persons relevant to this matter. Lastly, descriptions of important procedural and evidential issues which arose during the trial, and my decisions in respect of those issues.

  25. Table of contents

  26. [11] A full table of the foregoing contents follows.

  27. Introduction

  28. [1]

  29. Structure of these grounds of decision

  30. [9]

  31. Appendices to these grounds

  32. [10]

  33. Table of contents

  34. [11]

  35. Background

  36. [12]

  37. The Prosecution’s Case

  38. [25]

  39. The accused persons controlled the 189 Relevant Accounts

  40. [28]

  41. The accused persons used the Relevant Accounts in concert

  42. [51]

  43. The accused persons obtained financing for the Relevant Accounts

  44. [64]

  45. The accused persons inflated the liquidity of BAL shares

  46. [74]

  47. The accused persons inflated the prices of BAL shares

  48. [88]

  49. The accused persons had a broader plan for their Scheme

  50. [96]

  51. The accused persons’ conduct after the Crash indicated their Scheme

  52. [101]

  53. Categories of evidence relied on by the Prosecution

  54. [107]

  55. The Defence’s case

  56. [122]

  57. The False Trading and Price Manipulation Charges

  58. [125]

  59. The charges lacked particulars

  60. [126]

  61. Other actors controlled the major Relevant Accounts

  62. [129]

  63. Control of the remaining Relevant Accounts was also not made out

  64. [135]

  65. The Prosecution also failed to prove the conspiracies alleged

  66. [136]

  67. The accused persons did not cause the Crash

  68. [138]

  69. The Deception Charges

  70. [139]

  71. The charges lacked particulars

  72. [141]

  73. Case in respect of the Foreign Accounts

  74. [144]

  75. Case in respect of the Local Accounts

  76. [146]

  77. The Cheating Charges

  78. [148]

  79. The Company Management Charges

  80. [151]

  81. The Witness Tampering Charges

  82. [154]

  83. The Prosecution misconducted the case

  84. [155]

  85. The False Trading and Price Manipulation Charges

  86. [156]

  87. The charges

  88. [157]

  89. [161]

  90. Criminal conspiracy

  91. [161]

  92. False trading and market rigging transactions

  93. [164]

  94. (1) Elements of s 197(1)(b) offence prior to SFA Amendments

  95. [165]

  96. (2) Elements of s 197(1)(b) offence after SFA Amendments

  97. [172]

  98. (3) Meaning of false appearance as to “market” and “price”

  99. [178]

  100. Preliminary issue: Whether the charges were sufficiently particularised

  101. [180]

  102. Overview of the factual issues

  103. [191]

  104. Issue 1: Did the accused persons control the Relevant Accounts?

  105. [194]

  106. Preliminary sub-issue: The accused persons’ mobile phone numbers

  107. [197]

  108. Grouping of the Relevant Accounts for determining control

  109. [199]

  110. Group 1: Local Accounts; Deception Charges brought

  111. [202]

  112. (1) Two accounts under Ms Ang

  113. [203]

  114. (2) Eight accounts under Mr Alex Chew

  115. [229]

  116. (3) Three accounts under Mr Jordan Chew

  117. [256]

  118. (4) Five accounts under Ms Chua

  119. [273]

  120. (5) Two accounts under Mr Kam

  121. [301]

  122. (6) Account belonging to Mr Leroy Lau

  123. [308]

  124. (7) Eight accounts under Mr Andy Lee

  125. [323]

  126. (8) Three accounts under Mr Lincoln Lee

  127. [331]

  128. (9) Account under Ms Jenny Lim

  129. [357]

  130. (10) Six accounts under Mr Jack Ng

  131. [374]

  132. (11) Two accounts under Mr Aaron Ong

  133. [385]

  134. (12) Three accounts under Mr Ong KC

  135. [388]

  136. (13) Six accounts under Ms Poon

  137. [399]

  138. (14) Account under Mr See

  139. [409]

  140. (15) Account under Ms Tian

  141. [420]

  142. (16) Two accounts under Mr Tiong

  143. [428]

  144. (17) Twenty-seven accounts under Mr Wong XY

  145. [444]

  146. (18) Account under Mr Yong

  147. [479]

  148. (19) Account under Ms Yu

  149. [494]

  150. (20) Whether these Local Accounts were part of the Scheme

  151. [508]

  152. Group 2: Local Accounts; no Deception Charges brought

  153. [518]

  154. Group 3: Foreign Accounts; Deception Charges brought

  155. [541]

  156. (1) Three accounts managed by Infiniti Asset

  157. [542]

  158. (2) Three accounts managed by Stamford Management

  159. [569]

  160. (3) Ms Cheng’s one personal and four corporate accounts

  161. [600]

  162. (4) Nine accounts managed by Alethia Asset

  163. [617]

  164. Group 4: Foreign Accounts; no Deception Charges brought

  165. [631]

  166. (1) Mr Hong’s account with Credit Suisse

  167. [632]

  168. (2) Six accounts belonging to the Second Accused

  169. [637]

  170. Accounts under the Manhattan House Group

  171. [648]

  172. (1) The Manhattan House Group generally

  173. [649]

  174. (2) Twenty-nine accounts managed by Algo Companies

  175. [688]

  176. (3) Two accounts under Mr Gan

  177. [704]

  178. (4) Twenty-seven accounts under Mr Tjoa

  179. [716]

  180. Summary of my findings on Issue 1

  181. [727]

  182. Issue 2: Was the accused persons’ control of the accounts coordinated?

  183. [728]

  184. The gathering of trading accounts

  185. [730]

  186. The reporting of trades to the accused persons

  187. [736]

  188. Tracking the shareholdings of some Relevant Accounts

  189. [744]

  190. Tracking and paying the contra losses of some Relevant Accounts

  191. [751]

  192. Treating BAL shares in the Relevant Accounts as part of a pool

  193. [761]

  194. Involvement in the securing of trade financing

  195. [772]

  196. Key communications with and between the accused persons

  197. [773]

  198. Summary of my findings on Issue 2

  199. [777]

  200. Issue 3: Did the Relevant Accounts use illegitimate trading practices?

  201. [778]

  202. Roll-over contra trading

  203. [782]

  204. Wash trading

  205. [783]

  206. Pre-arranged trading

  207. [789]

  208. Constraining the spread

  209. [791]

  210. Removing orders while having large orders on both sides of the book

  211. [796]

  212. Aggressive trading

  213. [802]

  214. Uneconomic trading

  215. [810]

  216. Summary of my findings on Issue 3

  217. [814]

  218. Issue 4: Were the markets for BAL shares inflated?

  219. [817]

  220. Issue 5: Were the prices of BAL shares inflated?

  221. [826]

  222. Mr Ellison’s methodology and valuation evidence

  223. [827]

  224. The Defence’s criticism of Mr Ellison’s evidence

  225. [834]

  226. My findings on whether BAL shares were overvalued

  227. [837]

  228. Issue 6: Did the accused persons have a broader plan for their Scheme?

  229. [850]

  230. The First Accused’s involvement in the management of BAL

  231. [851]

  232. The endgame planned for the Scheme

  233. [853]

  234. The monetisation of BAL shares

  235. [870]

  236. Summary of my findings on Issue 6

  237. [880]

  238. Issue 7: What did the accused persons’ post-Crash conduct reveal?

  239. [882]

  240. Settlement meetings and settlement of losses

  241. [883]

  242. The First Accused’s witness tampering

  243. [886]

  244. Summary of my findings on Issue 7

  245. [887]

  246. Issue 8: Were the accused persons responsible for the Crash?

  247. [888]

  248. My general findings: Drawing the various threads together

  249. [889]

  250. My decision on each of the False Trading Charges

  251. [895]

  252. Charge 1: Blumont; from 2 January to 15 March 2013

  253. [895]

  254. Charge 2: Blumont; from 18 March to 3 October 2013

  255. [900]

  256. Charge 4: Asiasons; from 1 August 2012 to 15 March 2013

  257. [902]

  258. Charge 5: Asiasons; from 18 March to 3 October 2013

  259. [904]

  260. Charge 8: LionGold; from 1 August 2012 to 15 March 2013

  261. [906]

  262. Charge 9: LionGold; from 18 March to 3 October 2013

  263. [909]

  264. My decision on each of the Price Manipulation Charges

  265. [912]

  266. Charge 3: Blumont; on 2 and 3 October 2013

  267. [912]

  268. Charge 6: Asiasons; in September 2013

  269. [923]

  270. Charge 7: Asiasons from 1 to 3 October 2013

  271. [928]

  272. Charge 10: LionGold; in August and September 2013

  273. [934]

  274. Summary: The False Trading and Price Manipulation Charges

  275. [943]

  276. The Deception Charges

  277. [944]

  278. The charges

  279. [946]

  280. Preliminary issue 1: Whether the charges were sufficiently particularised

  281. [948]

  282. Preliminary issue 2: The scope of s 201(b) of the SFA

  283. [958]

  284. Preliminary issue 3: Standard of proof to be met by the Prosecution

  285. [977]

  286. Overview of the factual issues to be addressed

  287. [984]

  288. Grouping of the Accounts for the Deception Charges

  289. [986]

  290. Local Accounts; direct instructions

  291. [988]

  292. A general defence: Attribution of knowledge to the TRs

  293. [990]

  294. Two accounts under Ms Ang

  295. [1004]

  296. Eight accounts under Mr Alex Chew

  297. [1010]

  298. Three accounts under Mr Jordan Chew

  299. [1013]

  300. Five accounts under Ms Chua

  301. [1016]

  302. Two accounts under Mr Gan

  303. [1020]

  304. Two accounts under Mr Kam

  305. [1023]

  306. Eight accounts under Mr Andy Lee

  307. [1026]

  308. Three accounts under Mr Lincoln Lee

  309. [1030]

  310. Six accounts under Mr Jack Ng

  311. [1032]

  312. Three accounts under Mr Ong KC

  313. [1033]

  314. Six accounts under Ms Poon

  315. [1036]

  316. Two accounts under Mr Tiong

  317. [1041]

  318. Twenty-seven accounts under Mr Tjoa

  319. [1044]

  320. Twenty-seven accounts under Mr Wong XY

  321. [1050]

  322. Account under Mr Yong

  323. [1053]

  324. Account under Ms Yu

  325. [1059]

  326. Local Accounts; no direct instructions

  327. [1063]

  328. Preliminary note: Inapplicability of the attribution defence

  329. [1066]

  330. Three accounts belonging to Mr Hong and G1 Investments

  331. [1068]

  332. Account belonging to Annica Holdings under Mr See

  333. [1072]

  334. Account belonging to Ms Cheng

  335. [1074]

  336. Account belonging to Mr Leroy Lau

  337. [1075]

  338. Foreign Accounts; direct instructions

  339. [1082]

  340. Twenty-nine accounts managed by the Algo Companies

  341. [1082]

  342. Three accounts managed by Infiniti Asset

  343. [1085]

  344. Three accounts managed by Stamford Management

  345. [1087]

  346. Ms Cheng’s one personal and four corporate accounts

  347. [1093]

  348. Nine accounts managed by Alethia Asset

  349. [1102]

  350. Summary: The Deception Charges

  351. [1111]

  352. The Cheating Charges

  353. [1115]

  354. Overview of the Cheating Charges

  355. [1115]

  356. The elements which needed to be proved

  357. [1117]

  358. The two Relevant Accounts held with Goldman Sachs

  359. [1125]

  360. The four Relevant Accounts held with IB

  361. [1148]

  362. Summary: The Cheating Charges

  363. [1157]

  364. The Company Management Charges

  365. [1158]

  366. The meaning of “concerned in the management of any corporation”

  367. [1161]

  368. Charge 179: Involvement in the management of Blumont

  369. [1166]

  370. Charge 180: Involvement in the management of Asiasons

  371. [1180]

  372. Charge 181: Involvement in the management of LionGold

  373. [1187]

  374. Summary: The Company Management Charges

  375. [1196]

  376. The Witness Tampering Charges

  377. [1197]

  378. [1201]

  379. The charges pertaining to Mr Gan

  380. [1211]

  381. Charge 182: Mr Gan; incident in November 2014

  382. [1213]

  383. Charge 183: Mr Gan; incident in December 2015

  384. [1226]

  385. Charge 184: Mr Gan; incident on 4 April 2016

  386. [1236]

  387. Charge 185: Mr Gan; incident on 15 April 2016

  388. [1244]

  389. The charges pertaining to Mr Tai

  390. [1250]

  391. Charge 186: Mr Tai; incident in December 2013

  392. [1258]

  393. Charge 187: Mr Tai; incident between January and April 2015

  394. [1265]

  395. Charge 188: Mr Chen; incident in April 2014

  396. [1269]

  397. Charge 189: Mr Wong XY; incident in April 2014

  398. [1275]

  399. Summary: The Witness Tampering Charges

  400. [1287]

  401. Summary of my decisions on criminal liability

  402. [1289]

  403. My decision on sentence

  404. [1296]

  405. Two salient issues relevant to sentencing

  406. [1298]

  407. The accused persons’ responsibility for the Crash

  408. [1299]

  409. Volume of BAL trades attributable to the accused persons

  410. [1307]

  411. Two general arguments raised by the Defence

  412. [1317]

  413. Sentencing provision applicable to the Conspiracy Charges

  414. [1319]

  415. Alleged prosecutorial delay warranting a sentencing discount

  416. [1340]

  417. The False Trading and Price Manipulation Charges

  418. [1352]

  419. Aggravating factors raised by the Prosecution

  420. [1353]

  421. Sentences proposed by the Prosecution

  422. [1363]

  423. The aggravating factors taken into account

  424. [1365]

  425. (1) The scale of the Scheme

  426. [1366]

  427. (2) The sophistication of the Scheme

  428. [1370]

  429. (3) The harm caused by the Scheme

  430. [1373]

  431. (4) The gains made from the Scheme

  432. [1378]

  433. (5) The Second Accused’s abuse of her position

  434. [1381]

  435. The Second Accused’s relative culpability in respect of the Scheme

  436. [1382]

  437. The appropriate sentence for each charge

  438. [1388]

  439. The Deception Charges

  440. [1391]

  441. Aggravating factors raised by the Prosecution

  442. [1392]

  443. The aggravating factors not taken into account

  444. [1395]

  445. The aggravating factors taken into account

  446. [1405]

  447. The appropriate sentence for each charge

  448. [1407]

  449. The Cheating Charges

  450. [1410]

  451. Aggravating factors raised by the Prosecution

  452. [1411]

  453. Sentences proposed by the Prosecution

  454. [1413]

  455. The aggravating factors taken into account

  456. [1415]

  457. The appropriate sentence for each charge

  458. [1420]

  459. The Company Management Charges

  460. [1424]

  461. The Witness Tampering Charges

  462. [1428]

  463. Aggravating factors raised by the Prosecution

  464. [1429]

  465. Defence’s responses to the aggravating factors raised

  466. [1430]

  467. My decision in respect of the aggravating factors raised

  468. [1431]

  469. The appropriate sentence for each charge

  470. [1442]

  471. Aggregate sentences imposed on the accused persons

  472. [1443]

  473. The First Accused’s aggregate sentence

  474. [1451]

  475. The Second Accused’s aggregate sentence

  476. [1454]

  477. Commencement of the accused persons’ sentences

  478. [1456]

  479. Addressing the allegations of Prosecutorial misconduct

  480. [1460]

  481. Allegations made by the First Accused

  482. [1461]

  483. Allegations made by the Second Accused

  484. [1469]

  485. Conclusion

  486. [1489]

  487. Appendices

  488. [1494]

  489. Appendix 1: Index of Relevant Accounts and Charges

  490. [1495]

  491. Appendix 2: Glossary of Persons

  492. [1497]

  493. Appendix 3: Relationship Diagram

  494. [1499]

  495. Appendix 4: Important Procedural and Evidential Decisions

  496. [1500]

  497. The Prosecution’s application to amend the charges

  498. [1502]

  499. The parties’ dispute over litigation privilege

  500. [1507]

  501. The Defence’s application to stay proceedings

  502. [1509]

  503. The parties’ dispute over plea negotiations privilege

  504. [1511]

  505. The Defence’s submission of ‘no case to answer’

  506. [1518]

  507. Background

  508. [12] Given the elusive nature of the Scheme, it is apposite to begin near its end. On Saturday, 7 September 2013, the Straits Times published an article by Senior Correspondent Mr Goh Eng Yeow titled, “Blumont’s meteoric rise raises concerns: Mining counter’s huge gains don’t square with the firm’s Q2 results”. For context, the price of Blumont shares at the beginning of the second quarter of 2013 was approximately S$0.625. By the first week of September 2013, when the foregoing article was published, this price had climbed to just under S$2.00, a more-than threefold increase.

  509. [13] The publication of this article led Commercial Affairs Officer (“CAO”) Ms Eunice Yeo to lodge a police report raising the possibility that Blumont’s shares may have been the subject of manipulation. This triggered an inquiry by the Commercial Affairs Department (“CAD”) into the matter.

  510. [14] This inquiry, however, did not get far before others began expressing similar sentiments. On 1 October 2013, SGX’s then-Head of Market Surveillance, Mr Kelvin Koh, issued the following query to Blumont’s Executive Director and Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”), Mr Hong, using the central exchange’s online announcement platform:

  511. [15] Similarly, on 2 October 2013, Today published an article titled, “SIAS and SGX query ‘steep increase’ in Blumont share price”. The article, by and large, expressed the same message as that in the SGX’s query.

  512. [16] These statements shortly preceded the most significant event connected with this matter. On Friday, 4 October 2013, Blumont’s share price fell sharply from S$1.895 to S$0.88 within the first hour of the trading day. The share prices of Asiasons and LionGold followed suit, falling from S$2.65 to S$1.04 and S$1.42 to S$0.875, respectively. As a response, the SGX suspended the trading of all three counters that same day at around 10.00am.

  513. [17] On Sunday, 6 October 2013 at around 6.00pm, the SGX announced that trading would resume the next day, but, that the three counters were to be declared “Designated Securities”. This meant that BAL shares could only be purchased if the buyer had cash on hand; contra trading was not permitted. Further, short selling was also prohibited. Shares could only be sold if the seller had the shares to be sold on hand.

  514. [18] After these announcements were made, on the evidence of the First Accused – Blumont’s lawyer at the time, Mrs Lee SF of Stamford Law Corporation – called and spoke to SGX’s then-Chief Risk and Regulatory Officer, Mdm Yeo. This conversation was held with a view to convincing the SGX to defer the resumption of trading by two days to allow traders to prepare the funds needed to trade in BAL, given its designated status. Without such buffer time, the First Accused suggested that “mayhem” was bound to ensue. This request was ultimately not acceded to for reasons which were not made known. At the trial, nothing more was revealed about any such communications (on this, see [1302] below). When trading resumed on 7 October 2013, BAL’s share prices continued to fall rapidly, dropping from S$0.88, S$1.04, and S$0.875 before the suspension, to S$0.13, S$0.15, and S$0.25 by the end of that trading day. Collectively, I will refer to the sharp price drops on both 4 and 7 October 2013 as “the Crash”.

  515. [19] Whether the foregoing articles, queries, and decisions had materially contributed to the crash that followed the crescendo which had been building since August 2012 was a matter of considerable dispute. The Prosecution’s case was, naturally, that the accused persons were responsible for the Crash because they had, by their Scheme, created appearances as to the markets and prices of BAL shares which were “so utterly false that, when the music eventually stopped and the bubble burst on 4 October 2013, the share prices of all three companies collapsed”. The accused persons’ submissions, of course, opposed this. Assuming they were even the ones to manipulate the markets for and prices of BAL’s shares – which they denied – the accused persons cited several factors, including but not limited to the articles, queries, and decisions, and suggested that they could not be said to have caused the Crash.

  516. [20] These are matters I will return to much later in these grounds (see [1299] below). For now, the salient point is that the Crash resulted in the CAD and the Monetary Authority of Singapore (“MAS”) launching a joint investigation into the matter. The CAO who led the joint investigation was Ms Sheryl Tan and her team’s investigations were extensive.

  517. [21] Following investigations, in the third quarter of 2016, the Prosecution preferred charges against the First and Second Accused. However, it should be noted that at the start of the trial, the accused persons were charged with abetting, by conspiracy, offences under s 197(1)(b) and s 201(b) of the SFA as well as s 420 of the Penal Code. They had not been charged for criminal conspiracy under s 120B of the Penal Code. It was only in July 2019, after the trial had commenced, that the Prosecution applied to amend the original charges for abetment to the Conspiracy Charges, an application which I allowed (see [1502]–[1506] below). The consequences of this amendment remained contentious in closing (see [126] below) and even at the sentencing stage of these proceedings (see [1319] below).

  518. [22] A third person, Mr Goh HC, whom the Prosecution assessed had played a smaller role in the Scheme – was also charged alongside the accused persons. Mr Goh HC faced a total of six charges for abetting, by intentionally aiding, the accused persons in their commission of offences under s 197(1)(b) of the SFA. These six offences were punishable under s 204(1) of the SFA read with s 109 of the Penal Code.

  519. [23] On 20 March 2019, before See Kee Oon J, Mr Goh HC pleaded guilty to two of the six charges he faced, with the four others being taken into consideration for the purposes of sentencing. The two charges to which Mr Goh HC pleaded guilty were essentially identical save that one pertained to the role he played in connection with the false trading of Blumont shares, and the other concerned Asiasons shares. As an illustration, I reproduce the charge which concerned Blumont shares:

  520. The Prosecution’s case

  521. [25] Broadly, it was the Prosecution’s case that during the Relevant Period, the accused persons had masterminded a scheme to artificially inflate the markets for and manipulate prices of BAL shares. They were said, essentially, to have carried out this scheme by controlling, coordinating their use of, obtaining financing for, and conducting illegitimate trading activity in an extensive web comprising 189 trading accounts (the “Relevant Accounts”) held with 20 financial institutions (“FIs”) in the names of 60 individuals and companies (the “Relevant Accountholders”). The 20 FIs comprised nine local brokerages, as well as 11 foreign brokerages and private banks.

  522. [26] In the next seven sub-sections, I will set out the aspects of this general case in greater detail as follows.

  523. (a) First, how the accused persons were said to have obtained control of and used the Relevant Accounts. The broad relationships between the accused persons and the Relevant Accountholders will be described.

  524. (b) Second, how the accused persons were said to have coordinated their use of the Relevant Accounts to perpetuate their Scheme, and how the accused persons allegedly kept atop the coordination of the substantial number of accounts they controlled.

  525. (c) Third, how the accused persons purportedly financed the Relevant Accounts. This principally included obtaining margin financing from the FIs.

  526. (d) Fourth, the two key techniques used by accused persons to inflate the liquidity of BAL shares. The predominant practice that was said to have been used was “wash trading”. Connectedly, and although not illegitimate per se, the accused persons were also said to have abused contra trading.

  527. (e) Fifth, by way of illustration, a trading technique allegedly used by accused persons to inflate the prices of BAL shares will be described. This was known as “aggressive trading”. In this connection, I will also set out an incident relied on by the Prosecution to establish one of the four Price Manipulation Charges.

  528. (f) Sixth, the alleged broader purpose of the accused persons’ Scheme, and how they intended it to be utilised beyond the mere fact of price hikes and drops. On this matter, it is necessary to outline the evidence of two key witnesses, Mr Tai and Mr Leroy Lau.

  529. (g) Lastly, how the accused persons conducted themselves after the Crash. Such conduct included, for example, the First Accused’s involvement in meetings that appeared to serve the purpose of assisting various Relevant Accountholders settle losses suffered as a result of the Crash.

  530. [27] These seven components formed the building blocks on which the Prosecution’s overarching thesis – as stated at [25] above – was constructed. They served to support the general inference that there were, in fact, conspiracies between the accused persons to manipulate the markets for and prices of BAL shares, and, further, that such conspiracies had been successfully carried out.

  531. The accused persons controlled the 189 Relevant Accounts

  532. [28] In this sub-section, I set out some details about the Relevant Accounts, state how the accused persons were said by the Prosecution to have obtained control of them and, further, how the accused persons actually used them.

  533. [29] The 189 Relevant Accounts were held in the names of the Second Accused, Mr Goh HC, as well as 36 other individuals and 22 corporations. Most of these individuals and companies had some link to or relationship with either the First Accused, the Second Accused, or both. In the Relationship Diagram appended to these grounds, I have illustrated these links. Here, I will briefly describe some of these connections falling within two pertinent groups.

  534. (a) First, amongst the Relevant Accountholders were several members of both accused persons’ immediate and extended family. There were eight people in this group: the First Accused’s two sons, his brother, his two brothers-in-law, the wife of a brother-in-law, the Second Accused’s mother, and her brother-in-law. Collectively, they held 22 Relevant Accounts with eight FIs.

  535. (b) Second, amongst the Relevant Accountholders were also many of the First Accused’s Malaysian friends, as well as business and political associates. This group was the most significant. Excluding entities under their control, it comprised 14 individuals under whose names 81 Relevant Accounts were held with 13 FIs. The entities under these associates’ control comprised a further 14 corporate accountholders with 25 Relevant Accounts in 11 FIs.

  536. [30] Persons in the latter group included, for example, one Mr Neo. Apart from the fact that he held the appointments of Chairman and Executive Director of Blumont, Mr Neo was also an individual in whose name nine Relevant Accounts were held with seven FIs. The First Accused had known Mr Neo since 1981 or 1982, and has kept close ties with him through a country club in Petaling Jaya, Malaysia, called the “Lakeview Club”. Both maintained office spaces in this club. Another example was one Mr Chen, under whose name 14 Relevant Accounts were held with eight FIs. The First Accused had met Mr Chen sometime in 1993 or 1994 at a Malaysian Chinese Association (“MCA”) meeting. Both Mr Neo and Mr Chen have, over the years, worked with the First Accused on various projects or business acquisitions. Other identifiable but less direct connections included one Ms Hairani. She was a “good friend” of one Ms Ung, who was Mr Chen’s ex-fiancée. According to Mr Chen, Ms Ung was also the First Accused’s god-sister. Ms Ung was not a Relevant Accountholder though Ms Hairani was.

  537. [31] However, some connections were stronger than others and, indeed, not every Relevant Account was obviously linked to either the First or Second Accused. These included individuals such as Mr Chiew in whose name three Relevant Accounts were held with two FIs. On the First Accused’s account, he was a building contractor who worked for Mr Neo. However, no evidence was adduced to show links other than this. There were also some Relevant Accountholders who had no personal connections to the accused persons. These included Mr Lim HP, Mr Lim LA, and Mr Toh.

  538. [33] That said, although the accused persons supposedly “drew on” their relationships with the Relevant Accountholders, these accountholders were not the characters that were most germane to the issue of control. Indeed, the fact that Mr Chen gave evidence as an accountholder was the exception. Of the 60 Relevant Accountholders, only six individuals were called by the Prosecution to give evidence at the trial, although some of them were able to speak for corporate accountholders.

  539. [34] Instead, the persons more pertinent to the Prosecution’s case were those who had performed functions which directly or indirectly allowed the accused persons to regularly place trades in the Relevant Accounts in furtherance of the Scheme, who had kept them apprised of the information they needed to know to stay atop the Scheme, and who had even managed certain Relevant Accounts on their behalf.

  540. [35] Broadly, the functions performed by these persons could be divided into two categories:

  541. (a) First, functions which were operational in character. This would include tasks such as keying orders into the Relevant Accounts pursuant to trading instructions given by the accused persons; relaying instructions to persons who would then key in the orders; reporting the status of orders placed; and providing updates of the trades in cash accounts due to be settled.

  542. [36] Four types of persons allegedly carried out these functions. First, the dealers or remisiers employed by and/or acting as commissioned agents for the local FIs. I will refer to them as trading representatives or “TRs”. Second, the persons or entities formally authorised to give trading instructions on behalf of the Relevant Accountholders. Specifically, these were persons with limited powers of attorney (“LPOA”) to instruct or place trades on behalf of the Relevant Accountholders in their accounts. I will refer to these persons as the “intermediaries”. Third, some of the Relevant Accountholders themselves, in connection with certain accounts. Lastly, third parties who were not TRs, intermediaries, or Relevant Accountholders.

  543. [37] The most significant of these four groups were the TRs and intermediaries. A total of 23 TRs managed the 131 Relevant Accounts held with local FIs (the “Local Accounts”). Sixteen of these 23 TRs gave evidence at the trial and, in respect of one other TR, the Prosecution admitted two of his investigative statements with the Defence’s consent. As regards the 58 accounts held with foreign FIs (the “Foreign Accounts”), five distinct intermediaries had been appointed to manage 53 of them. Evidence was given by or on behalf of all five intermediaries.

  544. [38] The Prosecution’s case was that the TRs and intermediaries principally performed functions falling within the first category. That said, certain TRs and intermediaries were said to have been more involved than others, taking on functions within the second category.

  545. [39] Take for example, Mr Gan. He was a TR with DMG & Partners, and managed two accounts held in the names of two Relevant Accountholders, Mr Lim KY and Mr Fernandez. In addition to functions within the first category, Mr Gan was also said to have exercised decision-making functions in respect of the two accounts under his management, 27 accounts held with Phillip Securities under the management of another TR, Mr Tjoa, and a further 32 accounts held with IB and Saxo managed by Mr Tai, the intermediary for these 32 accounts. Mr Gan was also purported to have shared this responsibility with two other individuals, Mr Tai and Mr Gwee.

  546. [40] Nevertheless, the functions performed by the majority of TRs and intermediaries who gave evidence were distinguishable from those allegedly performed by Mr Gan, Mr Tai, and Mr Gwee. Mr Jack Ng was an example of a TR which only performed functions within the first category as described at [35(a)] above. He was a TR associated with OCBC Securities and managed eight Relevant Accounts held in the names of six accountholders. These were ESA Electronics, Mr Goh HC, Mr Kuan AM, Ms Lim SH, Ms Ng SL, and the Second Accused. The Prosecution’s case was that the accused persons had directly called and given trading instructions to Mr Jack Ng, who would, in turn, place orders for BAL shares in these eight accounts pursuant to their instructions. Other functions performed by Mr Jack Ng included providing trade reports to the accused persons and reminders in respect of cash trades due for settlement. It was not said that Mr Jack Ng exercised any discretion in relation to these accounts.

  547. [41] I give another example. This example illustrates the Prosecution’s case not only in respect of what functions specific TRs had performed, but also how those TRs came to perform those functions in the first place. This “how” question complemented the Prosecution’s claim that the accused persons “drew on” their personal relationship to obtain control of the Relevant Accounts. Mr Chen held one Relevant Account with Maybank Kim Eng under the management of a TR, Mr Ong KC. As stated at [30] above, the First Accused had known Mr Chen since around 1993 or 1994. They were also both acquainted with Mr Ong KC, having met him sometime in the 1990s. Mr Ong KC knew that the two were acquainted.

  548. [42] It was Mr Ong KC’s evidence that, by August 2012 the First Accused had frequently been giving trading instructions in respect of Mr Chen’s account with Maybank Kim Eng. This arrangement was initially limited. On Mr Ong KC’s evidence, Mr Chen would occasionally permit the First Accused to give trading instructions on his behalf, whenever he was busy. On such occasions, Mr Chen would inform him ahead of time that the First Accused would be calling Mr Ong KC to give trading instructions. Subsequently, however, instructions from the First Accused were not prefaced by such calls from Mr Chen to Mr Ong KC. Nevertheless, the latter continued to accept those instructions because he “trusted” that Mr Chen “would not act as a proxy for other persons [given that] he was a lawyer in Malaysia”.

  549. [44] However, not all TRs accepted the accused persons’ trading instructions because they trusted their legitimacy on the basis of some prior relationship. There were varying reasons they each did so, including a fear of losing the commissions they earned from the accused persons’ very active trading. Mr Jack Ng (see [40] above) was an example. His evidence was that after he had been verbally authorised by the Relevant Accountholders to accept instructions from the Second Accused, he had mailed third-party authorisation forms to each of them so as to allow them to properly authorise the Second Accused to give instructions on their behalf. The Second Accused, he testified, took issue with this and threatened to move her business to another FI. Not wanting to lose her or the other accountholders as clients, Mr Jack Ng dropped the issue and continued accepting her instructions without her being formally authorised. A similar example was Mr Wong XY, a TR associated with AmFraser. Under his management were 29 Relevant Accounts of 19 accountholders. He gave evidence that, despite believing that the accused persons’ trades had likely been improper, he nevertheless carried them out because he was “greedy for the commissions”. He likely made around S$1 million in commissions between January 2012 and October 2013 “just by trading for [the accused persons]” alone.

  550. [45] These examples highlight a salient point about the Prosecution’s case. For the accused persons to have obtained direct control of the Relevant Accounts, they required both the Relevant Accountholder, and the TR or intermediary managing the account, to be amenable. Even if a particular accountholder was agreeable to their account being used, it still would not have been possible for the accused persons to exercise direct control if the TR or intermediary had refused to act on their instructions. Although the use of internet trading accounts qualified this, most of the Relevant Accountholders as well as the accused persons did not have a penchant for using internet trading platforms. This was the reason the TRs and intermediaries – as stated at [37] above – played a significant role in this matter.

  551. [46] An example of a TR who was probably not amenable to receiving instructions from persons who were not formally authorised was Mr See associated with Lim & Tan. Mr See managed five Relevant Accounts held in the names of four accountholders; they were the Second Accused, Mr Neo, Friendship Bridge, and Annica Holdings. Friendship Bridge was a subsidiary of IPCO; the Second Accused was the CEO of IPCO during the Relevant Period. Annica Holdings was a company under the control of Mr Sugiarto, an associate of the First Accused with whom the First Accused kept ties through his membership at the Lakeview Club. Mr Sugiarto was himself the holder of six Relevant Accounts.

  552. [47] From Mr See’s evidence, he operated by the book, and did not accept instructions from anyone who was not formally authorised. Therefore, it was the Prosecution’s case that in respect of Annica Holdings’ account, the First Accused exercised indirect control by relaying instructions through Mr Sugiarto. This would have cloaked his involvement from Mr See. Indeed, Mr See’s evidence was that he had never spoken to the First Accused, and that Mr Sugiarto was the only person who gave instructions in respect of Annica Holdings’ account. As regards the other four Relevant Accounts, the Second Accused was the one who gave Mr See instructions. She was, of course, authorised in respect of her own accounts and she was also an authorised signatory for Friendship Bridge’s account. The Second Accused was also formally authorised to give instructions in respect of Mr Neo’s account as she had been granted an LPOA. Accordingly, there was no reason for Mr See not to accept her instructions.

  553. [48] From this, it can be seen that even if the accused persons had not been able – or had not attempted to – persuade a particular TR or intermediary to permit their direct use of the Relevant Accounts, they could still exercise indirect control by relaying instructions through the Relevant Accountholder or authorised signatories. On the other hand, if the TR or intermediary was amenable to acting on the accused persons’ instructions despite want of formal authority – eg, Mr Ong KC, Mr Jack Ng, and Mr Wong XY discussed above – the accused persons then allegedly had a range of means by which they could exercise control. They could, as suggested at [35] above, give direct instructions, relay instructions through various individuals, or even delegate the task of giving instructions to others.

  554. [49] Given the number of Relevant Accounts, accountholders, TRs, and intermediaries, it should not be surprising that there were a fair number of permutations as regards how the accused persons were said to have obtained control of the Relevant Accounts, and exercised control – whether it was through the giving of direct instructions to TRs or intermediaries, relaying instructions through others, or delegating their decision-making functions.

  555. [50] I return to these variations and nuances on the issue of control at [194] below when I turn to explain my findings in respect of whether the accused persons had in fact controlled each account. Having set out this broad explanation, I turn next to describe how the accused persons allegedly coordinated such control in pursuance of the Scheme.

  556. The accused persons used the Relevant Accounts in concert

  557. [51] On the footing that the Relevant Accounts had been controlled by the accused persons, the Prosecution suggested that such control had been exercised in concert to give effect to their Scheme. This took many forms, and, in this sub-section, I set out some examples from various strands of the Prosecution’s case.

  558. [52] The most straightforward manner in which the accused persons were said to have acted in concert, was by coordinating the BAL trading activity of the Relevant Accounts so as to carry out wash trading between them (“wash trading” is explained at [78] below). Various modes of proof were relied on by the Prosecution to establish the blatant coordination. The first and most direct means of proof was the evidence of key witnesses. Mr Leroy Lau, for example, testified that he took trading instructions from the accused persons to coordinate ‘roll-over’ trades with them so as to enable them to “refresh” the positions in the other Relevant Accounts. His description of such coordination is usefully considered in full:

  559. [53] The Prosecution also carried out their own verification work to demonstrate that the communications records between Mr Leroy Lau and the accused persons cohered with the account given by Mr Leroy Lau. The following table illustrates proximate calls interspersed between LionGold orders entered by Mr Leroy Lau in his own account on 23 July 2013:

  560. Time

  561. Activity

  562. 4.05.36pm

  563. Mr Leroy Lau calls the Second Accused for 23 seconds.

  564. 4.05.47pm

  565. Mr Leroy Lau enters a bid for 586,000 LionGold shares at S$1.150.

  566. 4.06.02pm

  567. Mr Leroy Lau enters a bid for 300,000 LionGold shares at S$1.150.

  568. 4.06.10pm

  569. Mr Leroy Lau enters a bid for 300,000 LionGold shares at S$1.155.

  570. 4.10.26pm

  571. Mr Leroy Lau calls the Second Accused for 19 or 20 seconds.

  572. 4.10.58pm

  573. Mr Leroy Lau enters an ask for 50,000 LionGold shares at S$1.155.

  574. 4.19.10pm

  575. Mr Leroy Lau enters an ask for 300,000 LionGold shares at S$1.155.

  576. 4.19.32pm

  577. 4.19.35pm

  578. Mr Leroy Lau calls the Second Accused for 38 seconds.

  579. 4.20.27pm

  580. Mr Leroy Lau enters an ask for 300,000 LionGold shares at S$1.155.

  581. 5.17.35pm

  582. Mr Leroy Lau calls the Second Accused for 157 seconds.

  583. [54] Read with Mr Leroy Lau’s evidence as to the purpose of his communications with the Second Accused, this table suggested that the accused persons had in fact been coordinating their Scheme.

  584. [55] Apart from unabashedly coordinating trading activity in an illegitimate manner, there were also less direct means by which the Prosecution suggested that the accused persons had acted in concert, or, at least, had enabled themselves to do so more effectively. These included certain practices they had allegedly adopted and documents that they had supposedly maintained.

  585. [56] One such practice was trade reporting. This was a practice that was most pertinent to the Relevant Accounts held with local FIs, in respect of which the accused persons were said to have given direct instructions to the TRs. For example, this included the accounts managed by Mr Jack Ng mentioned at [40] above.

  586. [58] Mr Jack Ng may, again, be used as an example. The messages set out below were extracted from Mr Jack Ng’s mobile device and the recipients of these messages were the phone numbers +60 12304 0678 (the “678 number”) and 9650 6523. The former number, on the Prosecution’s case, was one used by the First Accused, though there was some dispute about this. I will return to this dispute at [197] below. There was no dispute that the latter number had belonged to the Second Accused. Some of the messages sent by Mr Jack Ng to these two numbers, were as follows:

  587. [59] That Mr Jack Ng had been sending such messages at all, was said to be telling that the accused persons were not only in control of the accounts. The verification work performed by the investigation officers showed that Mr Jack Ng had, in these messages, aggregated the total shares purchased in the eight Relevant Accounts under his management. In fact, he had also averaged the purchase price of multiple orders without either specifying the account in which the trades had been executed, or the specific prices at which the individual purchases had been made. This, on the Prosecution’s case, stood in support of the conclusion that the accused persons were coordinating their control of the Relevant Accounts because, if they had not been, one would expect lines between the individual accounts – particularly for those accounts held by different accountholders – to matter.

  588. [60] I turn to the documents mentioned at [55] above. These included spreadsheets extracted from the accused persons’ electronic devices which recorded the shareholdings of various securities trading accounts, including several Relevant Accounts. I will refer to this generally, as the “Shareholding Schedule”, though I should note that there were various iterations of these spreadsheets uncovered during the investigations. These spreadsheets were not a perfect reflection of the complete list of Relevant Accounts and Relevant Accountholders. There were entries for trading accounts which did not form the subject matter of, nor were they relevant to, any of the charges. Conversely, there were Relevant Accounts which did not feature in them. Nevertheless, the Prosecution’s case was that, when viewed alongside the totality of the other strands of evidence, the Shareholding Schedule supported the inference that the accused persons had been coordinating their use of the Relevant Accounts.

  589. [61] The Shareholding Schedule captured the following information. The headings of the first three columns were: (a) “Name”; (b) “Broker”; and (c) “Statement Date”. In the rows under “Name”, there are entries such as “QSL” (ie, the Second Accused) and “GHC” (ie, Mr Goh HC). The rows under “Broker” recorded particular FIs with which the shares had been held. Some entries under this column also specified whether the shares held with a particular FI were “collateral”, “lock[ed] up”, or “trading”. The rows under “Statement Date” simply indicated the dates of the trading account statements from which the information was derived. The headings of the subsequent columns contained the names of the particular shares which the accused persons were allegedly tracking. This included Blumont, Asiasons, and LionGold. The rows under each of these columns recorded a volume. For example, assuming the spreadsheet was correct, as at 19 March 2013, there were 18,422,000 Blumont shares in the Second Accused’s account with Julius Baer. The heading of the final column was liabilities. Although it was unclear the exact liabilities to which this was referring, the Prosecution suggested it could be inferred. Using the Second Accused’s Julius Baer account as a continuing example, the Shareholding Schedule indicated that as at 19 March 2013, the account had S$30,400,000 in liabilities. Referring to the relevant statements for this account showed that the account did indeed owe S$30,407,654.63 as at 21 March 2023, chiefly for “Advance Refunds”.

  590. [62] The inclusion of these details in the spreadsheets – especially in light of the number of accountholders and accounts which featured – begged the question of why the accused persons were even interested in this information. This, on the Prosecution’s case, was most sensibly answered by the inference that the accused persons had been monitoring the BAL shareholdings they held through the various Relevant Accounts they had controlled. Such monitoring was essential for the accused persons to stay atop their highly complex scheme with so many moving parts and persons.

  591. [63] On the Prosecution’s full case, the accused persons’ coordinated use of the Relevant Accounts could be inferred from many more facts and pieces of evidence than set out above. I will return to them in greater detail when I turn to set out my findings on this issue at [728] below. For now, the three facets of coordination set out above adequately illustrate the manner in which the Prosecution set out to prove this aspect of its case.

  592. The accused persons obtained financing for the Relevant Accounts

  593. [64] I turn next to how the accused persons had allegedly financed the trading activity conducted in the Relevant Accounts. Such financing also allowed the Scheme to be scaled-up. Chiefly, the method the accused persons were said to have used was margin financing. Of the 131 Local Accounts, 40 were margin accounts. As regards the remaining 58 Foreign Accounts, 57 had been granted some kind of credit facilities. Margin financing was available for most of the Foreign Accounts, while short-term loans were granted in relation to some others.

  594. [65] The quantum of financing provided to the accounts held with the foreign FIs, in particular, was extensive. Six such accounts formed the subject of the Cheating Charges – two held with Goldman Sachs and four with IB. Through these six accounts, cheated Goldman Sachs and IB were said to have been cheated of more than S$820 million (see [68] below).

  595. [66] To explain briefly, margin accounts are used to purchase shares using credit facilities granted on the value of shares provided to the FI as collateral. The acceptability of the shares proposed as collateral varied amongst FIs. For example, the representative who gave evidence on behalf of Maybank Kim Eng, Mr Kwek, testified that prior to 2013, the Head of the FI’s Margin Department had the sole discretion to determine the shares which were marginable, taking into account considerations such as the market capitalisation of the shares, its liquidity, and volatility. Thereafter, the decision-making powers in respect of this function was conferred on a committee within Maybank Kim Eng.

  596. [67] Further, not all marginable shares commanded the same loan-to-value ratio. Even in respect of the same share, this ratio also varied amongst FIs. That said, the actual ratios commanded by the shares pledged in the financed accounts were not essential to the case. What was more pertinent was whether the FIs had in fact financed those accounts. To prove this, the Prosecution relied on the FIs’ representatives’ evidence. I take, for example, the margin accounts held with AmFraser. Its representative, one Mr Tan SK, testified that as of 9 October 2013, 11 Relevant (margin) Accounts, each held in the name of a different accountholder, owed almost S$14 million.

  597. [68] Representatives from the other FIs (with which financed Relevant Accounts had been held), gave evidence similar to that of Mr Tan SK. Most saliently, in respect of the two Relevant Accounts held with Goldman Sachs that formed the subject of two Cheating Charges (these being accounts held in the names of the Second Accused and Mr Hong), a representative of Goldman Sach – one Mr Moo – testified that, respectively, S$69.36 million and S$73.23 million in financing had been extended to those two accounts. In fact, these sums represented all the funds used to acquire shares as Mr Moo also gave evidence that the cash balances in these accounts had always been zero or negative. As regards the four IB accounts which formed the subject of the remaining Cheating Charges (these being accounts held in the names of the Second Accused, Mr Neo, Mr Tan BK, and Mr Chen), the representative for IB – one Ms Mary Ng – testified that a total amount of about S$815 million in financing had been furnished by IB during the Relevant Period. Respectively, S$200.73 million, S$232.16 million, S$117.68 million, and S$130.61 million in financing had been extended to those four accounts during the period of these four Cheating Charges which spanned 2 January 2013 to 3 October 2013.

  598. [69] On the Prosecution’s case, the crucial issue which arose from the fact of such financing was whether the accused persons had been involved in the provision of collateral and, thus, the procuring of margin financing from these FIs. In their opening statement, it was said that the accused persons wanted to increase the attractiveness of BAL shares so that they could be pledged as collateral to obtain financing. This financing then allowed them to engage in further manipulative activities, which would, in turn, further increase the attractiveness of those shares as collateral, allowing them to obtain even more financing, and so on. This was characterised by the Prosecution as a “vicious cycle of deception, cheating, and market manipulation”. If, indeed, the accused persons had been involved in the procurement of such financing, the greater the extent of their involvement, the stronger the base of facts from which an inference can be drawn as regards the existence of the Scheme alleged.

  599. [70] Despite the fact that such financing was crucial to the operation of the Scheme on the Prosecution’s general case, it should be noted that they did not endeavour to address this issue comprehensively. By this, I mean that the Prosecution did not set out to prove that the accused persons had been involved in the obtaining of financing for each and every Relevant Account. In so far as the False Trading and Price Manipulation Charges were concerned, the extent of the accused persons’ involvement in the context of financing was but one part of the Prosecution’s case from which they invited the court to infer the accused persons’ Scheme.

  600. [71] In respect of the Cheating Charges, however, it was axiomatic that the Prosecution needed to prove its specific case that the accused persons had conspired to obtain financing from Goldman Sachs and IB in violation of s 420 of the Penal Code. In this regard, it was the Prosecution’s case that the accused persons had conspired to induce the provision of such financing by dishonestly concealing from Goldman Sachs and IB, the fact that they had been “engaging in a course of conduct, a purpose of which was to create a false appearance in the market” for BAL shares.

  601. [72] On this issue of inducement, however, it is pertinent to reiterate that the marginability and the loan-to-value ratio of a share were matters determined by the FI (see [66] above). Clients and third parties did not have input on these decisions, and, in that sense, they are unable (barring an allegation of there being some influence over the relevant decision-makers) to positively induce an FI to provide financing. The Prosecution therefore took the position that, rather than positively misrepresenting to Goldman Sachs and IB that BAL shares were not the subject of false trading or price manipulation, the accused persons had misrepresented this state of affairs by omission.

  602. [73] I will return to this issue at [1117] below. For now, it suffices to state that the Prosecution’s factual case in respect of the six Cheating Charges turned on the fundamental question of whether the accused persons had controlled the six Relevant Accounts. The Prosecution said that in the context of their case, “the entire deception required that [the First Accused] conceal his involvement from the FIs completely, and that [the Second Accused] conceal her involvement in the accounts for which she was not an accountholder”. Thus, the accused persons would not have made personal representations to Goldman Sachs and IB that would have revealed their involvement. On the footing that the Relevant Accounts had been controlled by the accused persons, it was the Prosecution’s case that they had been actively involved in orchestrating and facilitating the deception of Goldman Sachs and IB. This evidenced their conspiracies to induce these FIs to deliver financing, which they were ultimately successful in doing.

  603. The accused persons inflated the liquidity of BAL shares

  604. [74] Earlier in the Relevant Period, BAL shares were not widely marginable. Thus, to keep their capital needs to a minimum, it was the Prosecution’s case that the accused persons initially engaged in active contra trading using the cash accounts held with local FIs. It should be noted that of the total 131 Local Accounts, 91 were cash accounts.

  605. [76] On the Prosecution’s case, by carrying out consistent “roll-over” contra trades, the accused persons were able to abuse the contra trading mechanism to inflate the liquidity of BAL shares. Such artificial liquidity, in turn, had the effect of making BAL shares more attractive to genuine market participants. The involvement of real market participants would also help keep the shares on an upward trend which would also allow the accused persons to avoid contra losses that would have otherwise crippled a long-term market manipulation scheme premised heavily on contra trading. By way of an illustration, Mr Jack Ng gave evidence that the Second Accused was a “contra player”, and that she generally “rolled over her trades”:

  606. [77] Contra trading was not, by itself, an illegitimate trading technique. That said, the accused persons were said to have abused it whilst also deploying other illegitimate trading techniques to inflate the liquidity of BAL shares. This included, predominantly, “wash trading”.

  607. [79] To illustrate how the Relevant Accounts typically traded in BAL shares, I set out a simple sequence of trades. This sequence concerned the trading of Asiasons shares on 6 September 2013.

  608. (a) Of interest were two buy orders (or “bids”) for 50,000 and 120,000 shares entered during pre-opening in the account of Mr Lim KY held with DMG & Partners. Both orders sat at the best bid of S$0.975. For context, this was one of two Relevant Accounts under the management of Mr Gan (see [39] above).

  609. (b) By 11.09.00am, 11,000 of the bid for 50,000 had traded out against sell orders (or “asks”) of non-Relevant Accounts, but 17,000 had traded against a Relevant Account in the name of one Mr Lee CH, leaving a balance of 22,000 to be fulfilled. Mr Lee CH was an associate of the First Accused, whom he had known since the 1980s, and this particular account was one of 27 Relevant Accounts held with Phillip Securities under the management of Mr Tjoa.

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