General Division of the High Court · Decided 9 February 2023
Chng Kheng Chye (in a representative capacity on behalf of Kaefer Prostar Pte Ltd) v Kaefer Integrated Services Pte Ltd
Feedback & support[2023] SGHC 30 · Case no. Suit No 318 of 2021
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Grounds of decision
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Introduction
- [1]
[1] In HC/OS 227/2020 (“OS 227”), Chng Kheng Chye (“the Plaintiff”) applied to the court for leave under s 216A of the Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed) (“CA”) to commence a derivative action on behalf of Kaefer Prostar Pte Ltd (“the Company”) against Kaefer Integrated Services Pte Ltd (“the Defendant”). The Plaintiff’s application in OS 227 was dismissed at first instance. However, the Plaintiff succeeded on appeal and was granted leave to take out this derivative action against the Defendant.
- [2]
[2] The Defendant is wholly owned by Kaefer Gmbh (“Kaefer Germany”). The Defendant was the contracting party of the subcontract for the supply of the insulation materials for what the parties termed the “Yamal Project” (“the Yamal Supply Subcontract”), which I shall describe further at [11]–[15] below. However, the Company was the entity that performed the necessary work in furtherance of the Yamal Supply Subcontract for the supply of the insulation materials as well as the subcontract for the installation of these insulation materials. The Defendant paid the Company several sums totalling S$1,931,291.95. The Company alleges that the Defendant still owes the Company the sum of S$1,544,142.47 (“the Disputed Sum”) for the Yamal Supply Subcontract.
- [3]
[3] The Plaintiff now brings the present derivative action as a representative of the Company against the Defendant for the Disputed Sum. The Plaintiff claims that the Disputed Sum rightfully belonged to the Company and that the Company had loaned the Disputed Sum to the Defendant following an oral loan arrangement that was negotiated between the Plaintiff, who represented the Company, and Justin Cooper (“Justin”), the Managing Director of the Defendant. The Defendant, on the other hand, alleges that no such arrangement existed and that any profit entitlement payable to the Company would always be documented. The Defendant thus submits that the Plaintiff was not entitled to the Disputed Sum, as there was no document providing for such an entitlement.
Background to the dispute
The parties
- [4]
[4] The Company is a Singapore-incorporated company. It was formerly known as Prostar Marine Services Pte Ltd. It is in the business of passive fire protection. The Company’s shareholders are Kaefer Germany and the Plaintiff. Kaefer Germany is a majority shareholder of the Company and holds 64,002 shares or 80% of the Company’s shares. The Plaintiff is a minority shareholder of the Company holding 16,000 shares or 20% of the Company’s shares. He is also a director of the Company.
- [5]
[5] The Defendant is a Singapore-incorporated company. It is in the business of scaffolding, insulation, fireproofing, painting and blasting services. The Defendant is wholly owned by Kaefer Germany.
The Company’s shareholding
Original shareholders
- [6]
[6] The Company was founded by one Richard Yeo Kin Poh (“Richard”) and the Plaintiff (collectively “the Founders”). At the time of its incorporation, Richard held 40,002 shares in the Company, whereas the Plaintiff held 40,000 shares in the Company. The Founders thus had an approximately equal shareholding in the Company.
Sale of the Company’s shares to Kaefer Germany
- [7]
[7] A Share Purchase Agreement dated 14 November 2012 was executed between Kaefer Germany as the purchaser and the Founders as the vendors (“the 2012 SPA”). Pursuant to the 2012 SPA, the parties intended that Kaefer Germany purchase all the Founders’ shareholding in the Company. Richard successfully sold all of his shares in the Company. For reasons unrelated to the present matter, the Plaintiff eventually only sold 24,000 shares in the Company for S$4.5m, leaving a balance of 16,000 shares.
- [8]
[8] For the balance of 16,000 shares, a fresh shareholders’ agreement dated 20 July 2016 was executed between Kaefer Germany and the Plaintiff (“the 2016 Shareholders Agreement”). Under the 2016 Shareholders Agreement, the Plaintiff granted Kaefer Germany an option to purchase the Plaintiff’s remaining shareholding in the Company (“the Option”). The Option would be opened for a period of six months commencing from the date the Company’s financial statements for the financial year ended 31 December 2018 were laid before the Company’s annual general meeting. The Option was eventually not exercised by Kaefer Germany.
The Company’s business arrangement
- [9]
[9] Prior to November 2012, the Company operated its business in Indonesia through an entity known as PT Prostar Marine Contact (“PT Prostar”). PT Prostar was a wholly owned subsidiary of the Company. The Company operated its Indonesian business through PT Prostar. PT Prostar directly entered into contracts with third parties in Indonesia. However, the Company was the entity that carried out and completed the works stipulated under the contracts. The Plaintiff alleges that the entire profit paid out of the contracted works was to be accounted for the Company’s benefit as it was the Company that eventually performed the contracts. This was despite the Company not being a party to the contracts with the third parties in Indonesia.
- [10]
[10] Following the sale of the Company’s shares to Kaefer Germany pursuant to the 2012 SPA, the Company ceased using PT Prostar as the contracting party with the third parties in Indonesia. The Company instead used the Indonesian subsidiary of the Kaefer Group (“PT Kaefer”) of the Kaefer Group of Companies (“the Kaefer Group”) as the contracting party with the third parties in Indonesia.
The Yamal Project and the Insulation Supply Subcontract
- [11]
[11] The Yamal Project involved, amongst others, insulation and fireproofing works to be carried out for the Yamal LNG plant in Russia. The Yamal Project was completed around April 2017.
- [12]
[12] The Yamal Project consists of four subcontracts. The present derivative action relates to the profit paid out of the subcontract agreements for the supply and delivery of insulation materials (“the Insulation Supply Subcontract”). The Insulation Supply Subcontract was executed on 1 April 2016 between PT McDermott Indonesia (“PT McDermott”) and the Defendant. Mr David Wong Kwok Meng (“David”), the Defendant’s project manager and President Director in charge of PT Kaefer in Batam, Indonesia, signed the Insulation Supply Subcontract on behalf of the Defendant. The signing was witnessed by Mr Kevin Tan (“Kevin”), who was the Defendant’s Chief Financial Officer and Regional Financial Controller.
- [13]
[13] The other three subcontracts under the Yamal Project involved the installation of the insulation works, the supply and delivery of the passive fire protection and the installation of the passive fire protection for PT McDermott. These three subcontracts are not the subject matters of these proceedings. However, it is important to note that the Company was involved in works done in respect of these three subcontracts, and the Defendant had accounted for the benefit of the Company the profits paid out under these three subcontracts.
- [15]
[15] Following the completion of the Insulation Supply Subcontract, PT McDermott made payment of S$3,475,434.42 to the Defendant. The Defendant accounted the sum of S$1,931,291.95 for the benefit of the Company. The Defendant alleges that this sum was evidenced by six management agreements (“the Management Agreements”). The Defendant retained the Disputed Sum as it alleges that the Management Agreements were the only contracts entered into between the Company and the Defendant to regulate the Company’s profit entitlement for the Insulation Supply Subcontract. There was no documentary evidence to indicate that the Company was entitled to the Disputed Sum. The Plaintiff disputes the Defendant’s retention of the Disputed Sum and alleges that, in accordance with an alleged payment arrangement (the details of which are elaborated at [92]–[131] below), the Company is entitled to the Disputed Sum.
- [16]
[16] I shall now set out the parties’ respective cases.
The parties’ cases
The Plaintiff’s case
- [17]
[17] The Plaintiff alleges that the Company was entitled to the entire profit paid out of the Yamal Project for the completion of the subcontracts undertaken by the Plaintiff for the Defendant, including the Disputed Sum. This was despite the Company not being the contracting party to the Insulation Supply Subcontract.
- [18]
[18] In support of the Company’s entitlement to the Disputed Sum, the Plaintiff relies on several prior payment arrangements between the Company and the various Kaefer entities pursuant to several projects undertaken by the Company and the Kaefer entities. The Plaintiff describes these payment arrangements (“the Payment Arrangement”), as follows:
(a) The Company negotiated and secured the contracts for the various projects that the Company’s customers requested.
(b) The Company then assigned the respective Kaefer entity to act as the contracting party for the respective project. The appropriate Kaefer entity was chosen depending on the country in which the works were carried out.
(c) Although the Company was not a named party to the contract, it was nonetheless responsible for carrying out and completing the works.
(d) Following the completion of the contracted works, payment was made to the respective Kaefer entity involved in the project.
(e) The Plaintiff alleges, however, that these payments, and in particular the entire profit, were accounted for by the respective Kaefer entities for the benefit of the Company. Further, Kevin prepared the necessary accounting documentation recording the payment arrangement to ensure that the profit was accounted for the benefit of the Company.
(f) The Plaintiff contends that there are two ways in which the Kaefer entities accounted the profit for the benefit of the Company. First, the Kaefer entities remitted the profit back to the Company. Second, the Kaefer entities transferred a portion of the profit directly to the Plaintiff equivalent to the Plaintiff’s shareholding in the Company. In other words, when the money was not remitted directly to the Company, the profit was “accounted” for benefit of the Plaintiff as dividends by way of payments made directly to the Plaintiff from the Kaefer entities. The quantum of such payments was equivalent to the Plaintiff’s shareholding in the Company.
- [19]
[19] The Plaintiff’s case is that the Payment Arrangement represents the way in which the Company conducts its business within the Kaefer Group, whenever a project is undertaken by the Company but the contracting party is another Kaefer Group entity. The Plaintiff’s case is that the Payment Arrangement forms the basis in which business was conducted between the respective Kaefer entities and the Company. In respect of the Yamal Project and in particular the Insulation Supply Subcontract, therefore, the Plaintiff submits that the Company was entitled to the entire profit paid out from the Insulation Supply Subcontract to the Defendant, including the Disputed Sum. This was despite the Company not being a party to the Insulation Supply Subcontract with PT McDermott and despite there being no documentary records stipulating the Company’s scope of its profit entitlement.
- [20]
[20] The Plaintiff further submits that the Company loaned the Disputed Sum to the Defendant for the Defendant to pay off its debts and other liabilities to Kaefer Germany pending the merger of the Company and the Defendant, as there was an understanding in 2016 that Kaefer Germany would be buying over the balance of the Plaintiff’s shares in the Company (“the Loan Arrangement”).
- [21]
[21] According to the Plaintiff, the Loan Arrangement was an oral agreement that arose from negotiations between the Plaintiff and Justin that took place during the negotiations for the Yamal Project. In particular, Justin, who represented the Defendant at that time, made a request to the Company for the Defendant to retain part of the Insulation Supply Subcontract’s profit, ie, the Disputed Sum, as a loan to settle some of the Defendant’s liabilities. The Plaintiff agreed on behalf of the Company, but on the condition that the Disputed Sum would still be accounted for the benefit of the Company. In other words, the Disputed Sum would have to be paid back to the Company upon demand by the Company. Justin, on behalf of the Defendant, accepted this condition and the Company thus allowed the Defendant to retain the Disputed Sum. The Plaintiff claims that all of these negotiations took place prior to Justin leaving the Defendant’s employment. The Plaintiff also relies on several email exchanges between the Plaintiff and various representatives of the Kaefer Group to support his case that the Defendant had agreed to retain the Disputed Sum as a loan. It is undisputed that the Disputed Sum was used to pay off some of the liabilities of the Defendant.
- [22]
[22] All of this, in the Plaintiff’s view, explained why he allowed the Defendant to retain the Disputed Sum. The Plaintiff now seeks on behalf of the Company, to claim back the Disputed Sum from the Defendant.
The Defendant’s case
- [23]
[23] The Defendant does not dispute that it had retained the Disputed Sum. However, the Defendant denies that the Company was entitled to the entire profit from the Insulation Supply Subcontract. The Defendant also denies the existence of the Loan Arrangement. The Defendant’s main defence is that the Management Agreements formed the contractual entitlement of the profit paid out of the Insulation Supply Subcontract and allocated it between the Company and the Defendant. Since the Management Agreements do not include the Disputed Sum, the Defendant states that the Plaintiff is not entitled to the Disputed Sum. During the trial, however, both the Defendant’s witnesses, Mr Victor Bogos (“Victor”), who was the Defendant’s regional managing director, and Mr Gregory Daniot (“Gregory”), who was the director of both the Company and the Defendant as well as the Company’s former Regional Financial Controller, advanced several further justifications for why the Defendant was entitled to retain the Disputed Sum. These were not pleaded in the Defendant’s defence, nor were they stated in each of the witnesses’ Affidavit of Evidence-in-Chief (“AEIC”). Be that as it may, I shall consider them in turn below.
- [24]
[24] As regards the Plaintiff’s reliance on the Payment Arrangement outlined at [18] above, the Defendant’s case is that the Payment Arrangement does not exist. Instead, any profit allocation to the Company would be discussed between representatives of the Company and the respective Kaefer entity. The negotiations would be reduced to written agreements, and any payments made, whether to the Company or to the Plaintiff, would be documented accordingly. In other words, the Defendant’s case is that the written agreements and documents are conclusive proof of the Company’s profit entitlement.
- [25]
[25] The Defendant alleges that for the Yamal Project, the Company’s profit entitlement pursuant to the Insulation Supply Subcontract is set out in the Management Agreements. The Management Agreements are conclusive proof of “the obligations of the [D]efendant to [the Company], in terms of accounting for the profits of the Yamal [P]roject”. The Disputed Sum is not reflected in the Management Agreements. Thus, the Company is not entitled to the Disputed Sum as there is no document to substantiate the Company’s claim.
Issues to be determined
- [26]
[26] The overarching issue is whether the Company was entitled to the entire profit arising from the Insulation Supply Subcontract, including the Disputed Sum. The determination of this issue is largely a fact-finding exercise. The Court has to decide whether to believe:
- [27]
[27] Hence, the Court has to determine whether: (a) the Company’s profit entitlement in respect of the work done for the Insulation Supply Subcontract was governed by the Management Agreements, and that these documents are conclusive proof of the Company’s share of its profit; or (b) the Company would be entitled to the entire profit paid out of the projects for which it had undertaken work, regardless of the Management Agreements.
- [28]
[28] At the outset, I note that it would have been desirable and would have greatly assisted the Court if Justin and Kevin had been called to testify given their crucial role in the Yamal Project. Before the trial started, it appeared that both parties intended to call them to testify. At trial, however, both parties failed to call them as witnesses. Thus, I am mindful that much of the parties’ accounts regarding Justin and Kevin must be treated cautiously as they fall within the realm of hearsay evidence.
- [30]
[30] With the above factual issues in mind, I now turn to set out my analysis of the Plaintiff’s case.
My decision
- [31]
[31] The Plaintiff’s primary case is premised on both the Payment Arrangement and the Loan Arrangement. The Plaintiff submits that the Payment Arrangement supports his case that the Company would always be entitled to the entire profit earned from any project for which it had done work. Similarly, as regards the Insulation Supply Subcontract, the Company is entitled to the entire profit, which includes the Disputed Sum. The Loan Arrangement made between the Plaintiff and Justin supports the Plaintiff’s case that the Defendant was allowed to retain the Disputed Sum to discharge some of the Defendant’s liabilities on the understanding that this verbally-arranged loan was to be repaid.
- [32]
[32] This is contrasted with the Defendant’s case, which is premised entirely on the Management Agreements. The Defendant argues that the Management Agreements are binding contracts entered into between the Defendant and the Company. Further, the Defendant argues that the Management Agreements are conclusive proof of the Company’s profit entitlement in respect of the Insulation Supply Subcontract. Hence, the Defendant relies heavily on the Management Agreements in arguing that the Company is not entitled to the Disputed Sum.
- [33]
[33] I shall now deal with the Defendant’s case on the Management Agreements. If I accept that the Management Agreements are binding contracts, then they are likely to be conclusive proof of the Company’s profit entitlement flowing from the Insulation Supply Subcontract. Hence, the Company would not be entitled to the Disputed Sum. The Plaintiff’s case, thus, has to be dismissed on this ground alone.
The Management Agreements
- [34]
[34] The Defendant’s case is that the Management Agreements are contracts entered into between the Company and the Defendant to regulate the Company’s profit entitlement from the Yamal Project. In particular, the Defendant emphasises that the Management Agreements are each titled “Management Agreement” and that they are specifically labelled as “contract”. The Defendant argues that the Management Agreements are, therefore, binding documentation between the Company and the Defendant.
- [35]
[35] Further, the total value of the Management Agreements reflects the sum of S$1,931,291.95. This, in the Defendant’s submission, is all that the Company is entitled to from the profit paid out of the Insulation Supply Subcontract. Since there is no record in the Company’s accounting books and documents indicating that the Company is entitled to the Disputed Sum, it follows that the Company is not entitled to the Disputed Sum.
- [36]
[36] The Plaintiff’s response is that the Management Agreements are not agreements per se, but rather they are accounting documents to record the amount of profit paid by the Defendant to the Company for the indicated periods. Accordingly, the Plaintiff submits that the Management Agreements have no legally binding effect, and are neither indicative nor conclusive of the Company’s profit entitlement. The Management Agreements, therefore, do not support the Defendant’s case that the Company was not entitled to the Disputed Sum.
- [37]
[37] Turning to the Management Agreements, I observe that these documents, on their face, appear to be contracts entered into between the Defendant and the Company. The first Management Agreement dated 31 December 2016, for instance, states as follows:
- [38]
[38] The rest of the five Management Agreements are identical in form to the one above, save that the amount of profit entitlement due to the Company and the period of the profit entitlement differ between each Management Agreement:
Of the six Management Agreements, the first two Management Agreements were signed by Kevin on behalf of the Defendant, and the rest of the Management Agreements were signed on behalf of the Defendant by Gregory. Both Kevin and Gregory were the Defendant’s Regional Finance Officer at different periods of time. On the other hand, Kristoff Tan Song Keong (“Kristoff”), the Company’s general manager, signed the Management Agreements on behalf of the Company.
- [39]
[39] Despite the Management Agreements having the apparent appearance of a contract, I accept the Plaintiff’s case that the Management Agreements are not in fact binding contracts. The Management Agreements also do not limit the Company’s profit entitlement to what is stated therein.
- [40]
[40] First, the most important question is whether the parties intend the Management Agreements to be a binding contract. The mere fact that a document uses words such as “contract” or “agreement”, or contains the company stamp, does not necessarily mean that the document is a legally valid and binding contract. Indeed, to do so would be to elevate substance over form. It is essential to go beyond the veneer of the document to ascertain whether, in substance, that document was intended by the parties to operate as a legally valid and binding contract (see E C Investment Holding Pte Ltd v Ridout Residence Pte Ltd and another (Orion Oil Ltd and another, interveners) [2011] 2 SLR 232 at [77], citing MCST Plan No 1933 v Liang Huat Aluminium Ltd [2001] 2 SLR(R) 91 at [46]).
- [41]
[41] Second, and bearing the above in mind, I find that the substance of the Management Agreements does not have the hallmark of a valid and binding contract. In particular, it is unclear as to what was the consideration contemplated by the parties in respect of some of the Management Agreements. For instance, the first Management Agreement was indicated to be for the period commencing 1 January 2016, while the fourth, fifth and sixth Management Agreements were for periods after the completion of the Insulation Supply Subcontract, ie, April 2017. The Insulation Supply Subcontract, on the other hand, was executed in April 2016 and completed in April 2017. Thus, three out of the six Management Agreements were supposedly entered into after the completion of the Insulation Supply Subcontract.
- [42]
[42] This is, indeed, highly unusual. It is undisputed that the Insulation Supply Subcontract and the accompanying subcontract for the installation of those insulation materials were completed in April 2017. The Defendant’s allegations that there were still uncompleted contractual works for which profit was being paid to explain the three Management Agreements made after the completion of the Insulation Supply Subcontract and the installation of the insulation materials cannot be believed. Hence, this puts the legitimacy of the three Management Agreements, made after the completion date of April 2017, in serious doubt.
- [43]
[43] The total value of the purported contracts for the three Management Agreements post-April 2017 was S$745,316.85. This sum was paid by the Defendant to the Company, and the Defendant appears to have received no consideration in return. It is trite law that every legally binding agreement must be supported by consideration. If the Defendant alleges that the Management Agreements were contracts between the parties that sought to allocate the profit entitlement for the Insulation Supply Subcontract, then this gives rise to the question of why the Defendant continued paying the Company after the completion of the works for the Insulation Supply Subcontract and the installation of the insulation materials. The Defendant could not provide a satisfactory explanation as to what was the consideration underlying these three Management Agreements post-April 2017. This simply makes no sense, and it raises serious suspicion as to whether the Management Agreements were indeed intended to be binding contracts as alleged by the Defendant.
- [44]
[44] Victor suggested that the payments for these three Management Agreements were for the work done by the Plaintiff for the installation of the insulation materials. Victor was asked to explain why these three Management Agreements were dated after the completion of the Insulation Supply Subcontract. Victor’s response was that there was a delay in the installation of the insulation materials, and this led to a corresponding extension in the period of supply of the insulation materials.
- [45]
[45] Victor’s explanation for why the three Management Agreements were dated after the completion date of the Insulation Supply Subcontract, ie, April 2017, was proven to be false. The evidence subsequently revealed that there was no delay in the subcontract for the installation of the insulation materials, and the insulation works were in fact completed in April 2017. In particular, two emails sent by the representatives of PT Kaefer showed that the supply and delivery of the insulation materials, as well as their installation, had already been completed sometime on 19 April 2017. Further, the final invoice for the Insulation Supply Subcontract was issued by the Defendant on 25 April 2017, which was well within the contractually stipulated timeline. When shown these documents, Victor conceded that there were in fact no delay in the installation of the insulation materials. Accordingly, the last delivery date for the insulation materials under the Insulation Supply Subcontract and the installation date for the insulation materials fell within the original contractually stipulated time, ie, April 2017. Victor, therefore, provided no satisfactory explanation as to why the post-April 2017 Management Agreements were issued after the Insulation Supply Subcontract was completed.
- [46]
[46] Third, when the Management Agreements are scrutinised collectively and from a broader perspective, it is clear that the parties could not have intended the very brief Management Agreements to be a valid and binding contract, albeit having included the labels “agreement” and “contract” in its contents. Close scrutiny of the Management Agreements shows a disturbing feature. The payments made thereunder were described as “profit entitlement of [the Company] for Yamal material for insulation”. However, the table in the Management Agreements described the sum as “Yamal Insulation Material Project Management Fee”. There is a material difference between payments made pursuant to a contractual profit entitlement versus payments made pursuant to a management fee. This, therefore, raises the question as to whether the Management Agreements were drafted to record the payment of money for the purpose of profit entitlement, or for the payment of management fees due to the Company. When queried on the stand, Victor was unable to explain the difference in the terminology used. Clearly, something is seriously amiss in the Management Agreements.
- [47]
[47] I also accept the Plaintiff’s submission that the usual manner to enter into a profit sharing contract is to negotiate and enter into a contract or agreement before the commencement of the Insulation Supply Subcontract. In this case, the Management Agreements were signed during and after the Insulation Supply Subcontract. This further reinforces my finding that the Management Agreements cannot be a contract or an agreement contemplated by the parties. The Management Agreements, in substance, appear to be documents that merely record the progressive payments made by the Defendant to the Company.
- [48]
[48] Further, Victor explained at trial that the Management Agreements were drafted to record negotiations between the Plaintiff and Kevin on the exact quantum of profit from the Insulation Supply Subcontract to which the Company was entitled. Following this, invoices would be raised to the Defendant in respect of the sums due to the Company under the respective Management Agreement, which the Defendant would pay.
- [49]
[49] Victor once again qualified his explanation by stating that he had no personal knowledge of any negotiations that might have occurred prior to the execution of each of the Management Agreements. Nevertheless, it is difficult to accept his explanation that this was how the Management Agreements in fact came to be executed. In particular, there appears to be a discrepancy in the fifth and the sixth Management Agreements, as the corresponding invoices to those Management Agreements were dated before the agreements were supposedly entered into. For the fifth Management Agreement, although it was dated 31 July 2017, the accompanying invoice was dated 26 July 2017. And for the sixth Management Agreement, while it was dated 30 September 2017, the accompanying invoice was dated 28 September 2017. The serious discrepancies in the dates of some of these Management Agreements vis-à-vis the corresponding invoices suggest that the Management Agreements were not in fact negotiated contracts between the Plaintiff and Kevin. Rather, the Management Agreements appear more likely to be documents produced to record any payment of profit from the Defendant to the Company.
- [50]
[50] I pause to emphasise another related point. The Counsel for the Plaintiff (Mr Yeo) referred to a management agreement which recorded the profit entitlements arising from two different projects. This was a management agreement dated 29 December 2016 signed between the Company and PT Kaefer. This management agreement stated the Company’s profit entitlements in respect of two different projects, namely the “GORGON” project and two other subcontracts under the Yamal Project. Accompanying the management agreement was a debit note also dated 29 December 2016 reflecting the same projects and the same sums of money as showed in the management agreement. The Plaintiff explained that this was another example of the mechanism in which the parties remitted money back to the Company. Despite the use of labels such as “agreement” and “contract”, the management agreement is clearly in substance an invoice from the Company to PT Kaefer seeking payments from different projects, and clearly supports the finding that the parties did not intend that any document titled “management agreement” to be a legally binding contract between the parties.
- [51]
[51] Crucially, Victor’s admission at trial on the purpose of the Management Agreements and their accompanying invoices strengthens the Plaintiff’s case that Management Agreements were created for accounting purposes, ie, to move funds from a particular Kaefer entity back to the Company:
- [52]
[52] This is further supported by Gregory’s testimony at trial. Gregory confirmed that the Management Agreements were used only for the purposes of recording payments of the profit from the Defendant to the Company:
Hence, the Management Agreements are in fact a veneer for recording progressive payments due to the Company by the Defendant from the Insulation Supply Subcontract.
- [53]
[53] Finally, it also appears that the Management Agreements, far from being negotiated between the parties, were actually prepared on an ad hoc basis. There appears to be some uncertainty as to the identities of the individuals involved in preparing the Management Agreements. Kristoff’s evidence is that the Management Agreements were prepared by Kevin for accounting purposes “to transfer the monies from the Defendant or PT Kaefer to the Company”. Gregory’s evidence was that the Management Agreements were prepared by one Erawati, who was a staff of the Company, on Kristoff’s instruction. Further, the amounts reflected in the debit notes were also decided by Kristoff. Thereafter, the documents were signed by either Kevin and Kristoff, or after Kevin left the Company, by Gregory and Kristoff. Gregory went so far as to say that the amounts contained in the Management Agreements were decided by Kristoff on an ad hoc fashion when “he wants to take out some cash from [the Defendant]”.
- [54]
[54] Be that as it may, both accounts at the very least support the finding that there was no negotiation between the parties as regards the apportionment of the profit paid out under the Insulation Supply Subcontract, or that the money paid out under the Management Agreements would represent the final and conclusive entitlement of profit on the Company’s part. Rather, the Management Agreements were prepared as and when they were needed and appear to be no more than mere formalities recording payments made to the Company.
- [55]
[55] The evidence in totality thus supports the Plaintiff’s submission that the Management Agreements are no more than documents created for accounting purposes. The Management Agreements are, in my view, not contracts or agreements, but mere evidence of receipts of payments by the Company. Hence, the Management Agreements are, in substance, not contracts or agreements that stipulate the Company was only entitled to S$1,931,291.95 for the Insulation Supply Subcontract. Accordingly, the Management Agreements cannot be evidence of the final amount of profit entitlement to which the Company is entitled.
- [56]
[56] Further, the Management Agreements did not state that the sums transferred represented the entire profit to which the Company was entitled, or words to such effect. Accordingly, even on the Defendant’s case regarding the binding nature of the Management Agreements, those documents do not assist the Defendant’s case that the Company is only entitled to the sums stated in the Management Agreements.
The Defendant’s justification for retaining the Disputed Sum
- [57]
[57] Besides the Management Agreements, the Defendant’s witnesses also raised additional reasons during the trial in an attempt to support its retention of the Disputed Sum. I shall now analyse each of these defences.
The purported profit allocation agreed between the parties
- [58]
[58] The Defendant first argues that the Company’s profit entitlement from the Insulation Supply Subcontract was specifically negotiated between the parties. In Court, Victor gave evidence that part of the negotiations was captured in two emails sent on 4 April 2016 (“the 4 April 2016 Emails”). The Australian subsidiary of the Kaefer Group, Kaefer Integrated Services Pty Ltd (“Kaefer Australia”), was mentioned in the emails as the parties initially thought of using Kaefer Australia as the contracting party with PT McDermott instead of the Defendant. The first email, which was sent by Kevin to Victor at 10.32am on 4 April 2016, is as follows:
The second email, which was sent by the Plaintiff to Kevin at 11.14am on 4 April 2016, is as follows:
- [59]
[59] Victor explained that, following the 4 April 2016 Emails, the parties commenced negotiations regarding the Company’s profit entitlement. This eventually resulted in the Management Agreements:
Victor also explained that the 4 April 2016 Emails were evidence of the parties’ negotiations in respect of the profit allocation between the Company and the Defendant.
- [60]
[60] If what Victor said was true, namely that the Company initially asked for three percent of the contract value of S$10m, ie, S$300,000, then this raises the question as to why the Defendant had instead paid the Company S$1,931,291.95. This sum was clearly more than what the Company had asked for, ie, more than six times of the Company’s asking sum. Assuming also that the figure of three percent referred to the profit earned from the Insulation Supply Subcontract, which is S$3,475,434.42, the amount which the Company would have been entitled to would have been only S$104,263.02. On either value, when asked to explain how the Company was eventually paid S$1,931,291.95, Victor was unable to provide an answer. Victor’s explanation is thus incredulous and cannot be believed.
- [61]
[61] Further, when queried on the stand, Victor conceded that he had no personal knowledge of the negotiations and no way of proving if they in fact occurred. When pressed further, Victor conceded that the 4 April 2016 Emails did not in fact form the basis for any profit entitlement agreement between the parties:
This concession puts a critical dent in the Defendant’s case that the parties had negotiated and mutually agreed to record the Company’s and the Defendant’s respective share of the profit arising from the Insulation Supply Subcontract. This further undermined the credibility and reliability of Victor’s evidence.
- [62]
[62] More fundamentally, nothing in the 4 April 2016 Emails even hint of any agreement between the parties on the quantum of profit that both the Company and the Defendant are entitled to from the Insulation Supply Subcontract. Yet on the Defendant’s case, despite the absence of any such negotiations, in the process of performing the Insulation Supply Subcontract, the parties were somehow able to conclude the Management Agreements. This manner of entering into a contract is highly unusual and irregular. Indeed, when asked about whether it was usual for parties to conclude contracts in this manner, Victor agreed that it was unusual:
- [63]
[63] When Victor was pressed on whether there was any agreement between the Company and the Defendant on the latter’s entitlement to retain the Disputed Sum, he resiled from his earlier positive assertion and referred the Court to another email dated 7 March 2016 (“the 7 March 2016 Email”) sent by Kevin to Victor. That email reads as follows:
- [64]
[64] It is clear that nothing in the 7 March 2016 Email even hints of the Defendant’s entitlement to retain the Disputed Sum. When pressed on this point, Victor conceded that there was in fact no agreement on the profit entitlement. All that the Defendant was relying on are the Management Agreements. This concession is yet another critical blow to the Defendant’s case, as it further reinforces the absence of any entitlement on the Defendant’s part to retain the Disputed Sum.
- [65]
[65] Accordingly, there was in fact no agreement on the profit entitlement and, specifically, there was no agreement that the Defendant was entitled to retain the Disputed Sum.
The purported work done by Kaefer Australia and the Defendant
- [67]
[67] Regarding the work done by the Defendant, Victor explained that the work mainly turned on the administrative work done to produce the purchase orders. This was done following the award of the Insulation Supply Subcontract to the Defendant.
- [70]
[70] In any case, when asked about the amount of work done in terms of man-hours, Victor’s response was that it was impossible to give a proper estimate as the work done was complex and involved numerous Kaefer entities, including PT Kaefer and the Defendant. If the work had already been done, there ought to be some record indicating as such. Moreover, Victor confirmed in Court that the Defendant ultimately did not pay Kaefer Australia any form of fees for the latter’s assistance in the Insulation Supply Subcontract. Ultimately, when pressed on this point, Victor conceded that there was in fact no agreement between the parties for the Disputed Sum to be retained to pay off Kaefer Australia for its work done:
- [71]
[71] On the other hand, David in his AEIC stated that it was actually the Company, together with PT Kaefer, that completed the Yamal Project. This aspect of David’s evidence was not challenged by the Defendant in cross-examination. In this regard, I note the rule in Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67, which was stated by Lord Herschell LC at 70–71:
Accordingly, it is essential that when the Defendant sought to disagree with David’s evidence-in-chief it must put its case to him so that he had an opportunity to explain the Defendant’s allegations, failing which there might be an implicit acceptance of David’s evidence-in-chief.
- [72]
[72] The Defendant’s failure to put its case to David, ie, that the Company did not do any work in furtherance of the Yamal Project, means that it is not now open to the Defendant to allege that David’s evidence does not support the Plaintiff’s case and should be rejected by the Court. The Defendant must be taken to have accepted David’s evidence that it was the Company and PT Kaefer which performed the works in relation to the Insulation Supply Subcontract. Hence, the Defendant’s case that it was entitled to retain the Disputed Sum on the basis of the works done by the Defendant and Kaefer Australia cannot stand.
The Defendant’s purported profit margin allocation
- [73]
[73] The Defendant also alleges a 15% profit margin entitlement from the total value of the Insulation Supply Subcontract, ie, 15% of S$10m which equates to S$1.5m, on its part to justify the retention of the Disputed Sum. This was explained by Gregory in Court as follows:
- [74]
[74] Gregory, therefore, claimed at trial that there was an understanding that the Defendant was always entitled to a standard 15% profit margin from the final contract sum arising from any transactions which it entered into on behalf of the Kaefer Group. However, when he was asked to elaborate further, Gregory explained that the 15% profit margin from the final contract sum was in fact derived from the Management Agreements. Put another way, Gregory’s explanation was that since the parties entered into the Management Agreements and nothing further, this suggests that the Defendant was in fact entitled to a 15% profit margin allocation arising from the Insulation Supply Subcontract:
- [75]
[75] At the outset, I note that the alleged 15% profit margin entitlement on the Defendant’s part was not mentioned anywhere in Gregory’s AEIC. In fact, the first time the Court was made aware of this was during the trial. The alleged 15% profit margin was also not pleaded in the Defendant’s defence. When pressed on whether there was in fact an agreement between Gregory and Kristoff regarding this 15% profit margin entitlement for the Defendant, Gregory vacillated in his testimony as to whether there was such an agreement:
It is clear that Gregory had embellished this aspect of his evidence. I am unable to accept Gregory’s evidence on the alleged 15% profit margin from the final contract sum on the Defendant’s part to justify its retention of the Disputed Sum.
- [76]
[76] More importantly, it seems that Gregory’s explanation to justify the Defendant’s alleged 15% profit margin entitlement is premised entirely on the Management Agreements being evidence of the parties’ profit allocation. I emphasise that, for the reasons I gave above, the Management Agreements are not in fact agreements that conclusively determine the parties’ profit allocation. Accordingly, the factual premise from which Gregory derived the purported 15% profit margin entitlement does not hold water.
- [78]
[78] In other words, it is simply an arithmetic exercise to derive the so-called 15% profit margin entitlement on the Defendant’s part. There was no agreement or understanding whatsoever between the parties that this was an entitlement that must be respected.
- [79]
[79] Gregory explained that this 15% profit margin was a target that the Defendant aimed for. However, the 15% profit margin on the contract sum of S$10m is S$1.5m, which is less than the Disputed Sum of S$1,544,142.27. Gregory has not provided any evidence, other than the Management Agreements, to substantiate the Defendant’s case of the 15% profit margin entitlement being the parties’ expectation in respect of the profit allocation arising from the Insulation Supply Subcontract. Indeed, Gregory conceded that there was no separate formal agreement or discussions that evidenced this profit margin entitlement on the Defendant’s part:
- [80]
[80] More importantly, Gregory also conceded at trial that there was no agreement between the parties to limit the Company’s entitlement to the profit to only S$1.9m, while the Defendant was entitled to retain the Disputed Sum.
- [81]
[81] What was even more damning to Gregory’s evidence was his testimony that he in fact assumed, without checking with his boss, Victor, that the Defendant was entitled to retain 15% of the profit margin arising from the total value of the Insulation Supply Subcontract:
Gregory’s evidence regarding the Defendant’s purported 15% profit margin entitlement is thus a false assertion.
- [82]
[82] This assertion is also contradicted by Victor’s evidence that the Company was only entitled to a 3% profit margin (see [59] above). Victor’s evidence suggests that the Defendant was entitled to a higher percentage of profit margin than what Gregory had suggested, ie, the remaining 97%. It seems that Victor and Gregory gave contradictory evidence on crucial aspects of the defence, ie, the Defendant’s entitlement in the Insulation Supply Subcontract.
- [83]
[83] Accordingly, there is no evidence that the Defendant was entitled to retain the Disputed Sum on the basis of a purported agreement between the Company and the Defendant regarding the Defendant’s entitlement to a 15% profit margin from the contract sum.
The absence of any intention to pay the Company the entire profit from the Insulation Supply Subcontract
- [84]
[84] In an attempt to justify the Defendant’s retention of the Disputed Sum, Victor gave evidence that there was no intention to pay the entire profit from the Insulation Supply Subcontract to the Company. Victor referred to the 7 March 2016 Email and the 4 April 2016 Emails as evidence of this.
- [85]
[85] As mentioned above, the two emails did not support Victor’s assertion that the Company was not entitled to the entire profit from the Insulation Supply Subcontract. Indeed, Victor reluctantly conceded:
- [86]
[86] Moreover, Victor was unable to provide the Court with a valid explanation or refer to other evidence supporting the Defendant’s case on how the parties arrived at the respective profit entitlement. Therefore, there is no evidence to suggest that the Defendant was entitled to retain the Disputed Sum for the Insulation Supply Subcontract.
Summary of the Defendant’s defence regarding its entitlement to the Disputed Sum
- [87]
[87] Ultimately, the Defendant alleges that the Company was not entitled to the Disputed Sum as this was the Defendant’s share of the profit in the Insulation Supply Subcontract. This, therefore, implies that the Company’s share was S$1,931,291,95 and the Defendant’s share was S$1,544,142.27. Assuming the Defendant is right, the immediate question is how the parties arrived at such a precise apportionment of the profits for the Insulation Supply Subcontract. There is no evidence to assist the Court in accepting this assertion other than the Management Agreements (the basis of which I have rejected above). The Defendant also did not plead on how the parties were to share the profit accrued from the Insulation Supply Subcontract when the Defendant secured the Yamal Project from PT McDermott. And as I have found above, the further justifications which were provided by the Defendant’s witnesses were not only unpleaded and belatedly raised during the trial, but more importantly were neither supported by any evidence nor capable of withstanding logical scrutiny. The Defendant’s case on the entitlement to the Disputed Sum is, therefore, not credible and difficult to believe.
- [88]
[88] Despite my finding that the Defendant cannot establish any defence to justify its retention of the Disputed Sum, I am aware that this does not automatically mean that the Plaintiff succeeds in his case. This is because such a finding merely means that the Defendant’s defence against the Plaintiff’s claim for the Disputed Sum cannot be made out. This finding does not discharge the Plaintiff’s burden of proving that the Company was entitled to the Disputed sum. In this connection, I am mindful of the fundamental requirement that the Plaintiff ultimately bears the legal burden of proving his case on a balance of probabilities. Indeed, it is a trite proposition that a plaintiff in a civil claim bears the legal burden of proving the existence of any relevant fact necessary to make out its claim on a balance of probabilities (see Britestone Pte Ltd v Smith & Associates Far East, Ltd [2007] 4 SLR(R) 855 (“Britestone”) at [60]). The defendant, on the other hand, will likewise have a legal burden of proving a pleaded defence, unless the defence is a bare denial of the claim (see Cooperatieve Centrale Raiffeisen-Boerenleenbank BA (trading as Rabobank International), Singapore Branch v Motorola Electronics Pte Ltd [2011] 2 SLR 63 at [31]).
- [89]
[89] The mere fact that the court is not satisfied that a defendant has not made out its defence on a balance of probabilities does not mean that the plaintiff succeeds on its claim on the basis that there is no viable defence. This is because the legal burden of proof is always placed on the plaintiff and does not shift, as the party that bears “the obligation to persuade the trier of fact that, in view of the evidence, the fact in dispute exists” (Britestone at [58]). To do otherwise would, as Goh Yihan JC correctly and aptly stressed in Chan Tam Hoi (alias Paul Chan) v Wang Jian and other matters [2022] SGHC 192 (“Chan Tam Hoi”) at [38], “confer an unintended advantage to the plaintiff where the defendant’s defence is unsustainable”.
- [90]
[90] In the present case, the legal burden of proof is ultimately placed on the Plaintiff to prove that the Company was entitled to the Disputed Sum, and that the Loan Arrangement exists to justify the Defendant’s retention of the Disputed Sum. With this in mind, I shall now consider the Plaintiff’s case on the Company’s entitlement to the Disputed Sum.
The Company’s entitlement to the Disputed Sum
- [91]
[91] I shall now consider the Plaintiff’s case that the Company was entitled to the Disputed Sum, on the basis of the Payment Arrangement.
The Payment Arrangement
- [92]
[92] The Plaintiff relies heavily on the Payment Arrangement to advance his case that the Company was entitled to the Disputed Sum. In particular, the Plaintiff referred to the arrangement between the Company and the various Kaefer entities in respect of three prior projects: (a) the Australian Pacific LNG project (“the APLNG Project”); (b) the “Inpex Project”; and (c) the “Wheatstone Project”.
- [93]
[93] According to the Plaintiff, the manner in which the Kaefer Group and the Company dealt with each other in respect of these projects evinces a common understanding that the Company would be entitled to the entire profit paid out of these projects for which it had undertaken to do work. In these projects, the Company was not the contracting party with the third party; rather the contracting party would always be a Kaefer Group entity. Thus, the payment of profit was made to the respective Kaefer Group entity which was the contracting party for the relevant project. In turn, the respective Kaefer Group entities channelled the profit to the Company. The Plaintiff alleges that there was a well-established understanding, captured in verbal agreements between the Plaintiff and the respective representatives of these Kaefer Group entities, which reflects the Payment Arrangement:
- [94]
[94] The Plaintiff thus submits that the Payment Arrangement similarly applies to the parties as regards the Company’s profit entitlement flowing from the Insulation Supply Subcontract. Accordingly, the Plaintiff argues that, despite the Management Agreements, there was, nevertheless, an implicit understanding that the Company was entitled to the Disputed Sum. The Defendant was thus permitted to retain the Disputed Sum because the Company had agreed to allow the Defendant to use the Disputed Sum to discharge its liabilities in anticipation of a merger between the Company and the Defendant. It was not disputed that the Disputed Sum was indeed used to discharge some of the Defendant’s liabilities. This was at the time when Kaefer Germany intended to buy over the Plaintiff’s remaining 20% shares in the Company and the Company and the Defendant would merge as one entity.
- [95]
[95] I shall now consider the parties’ evidence in relation to these three projects.
(1) The APLNG Project
- [96]
[96] The Company carried out and completed the APLNG Project in Batam on behalf of PT Kaefer. PT Kaefer was the contracting party for the benefit of the customer, PT Sembawang Marine & Offshore Engineering (“PT SMOE”). The APLNG Project was valued at about US$6m.
- [97]
[97] The contract for the APLNG Project (“the APLNG Contract”) was negotiated by the Company before Kaefer Germany became a shareholder in the Company. However, the APLNG Contract was signed in November 2012, after the execution of the 2012 SPA. Justin signed the APLNG Contract on behalf of PT Kaefer on 27 December 2012. Despite this, the Plaintiff claims that the entire profit paid out of the APLNG Project was accounted for the benefit of the Company. This amounted to some US$1.2m. According to the Plaintiff, this was evident in the Company’s financial statement for the year ended 31 December 2014 (“the FY2014 Financial Statement”), which reflected the payment of the profit from the APLNG Project as the Company’s revenue in its accounts.
- [98]
[98] The Defendant’s case in respect of the APLNG Project was that there was never any profit distributed to the Company. Instead, the payments made to the Company were reimbursements in respect of the expenses incurred by the Company and labour supplied by the Company in carrying out the works for the APLNG Project. Further, the profit from the APLNG Project was not paid out to the Company because there was no written agreement for the allocation of profit from the APLNG Project to the Company. In response to the Plaintiff’s claims that the Company’s profit entitlement from the APLNG Project was recorded in the FY2014 Financial Statement, the Defendant submits that the financial statement did not expressly state that the Company’s revenue included the profit paid out of the APLNG Project.
- [99]
[99] I accept the Plaintiff’s claim that the sums paid to the Company as recorded in the FY2014 Financial Statement relate to the profit paid to the Company. The evidence shows that the Company only had the APLNG Project in 2013. I also accept the Plaintiff’s explanation that it is simply inconceivable that the Company was tasked to perform the work and yet not be paid.
- [100]
[100] The Defendant does not dispute that the Company had completed work for the APLNG Project, nor does it dispute that the Company had only done work for the APLNG Project in 2013. Further, the Defendant offers no explanation for why the FY2014 Financial Statement reflected such a huge sum of money recorded under the Company’s accounts. Indeed, Victor conceded at trial that he did not have any personal knowledge of the APLNG Project, as he was not involved with PT Kaefer nor the Company at the time of the APLNG Project.
- [101]
[101] On the contrary, the reasonable explanation is that the Company was entitled to the profit from the APLNG Project. Indeed, the Plaintiff explained that it would be contrary to accounting practices to double report a revenue, ie, to report the revenue from the APLNG Project in both the Company’s accounts and PT Kaefer’s accounts. The fact that the revenue from the APLNG Project was recorded under the Company’s accounts, as opposed to PT Kaefer’s accounts, suggests that there was an understanding between the Kaefer Group and the Company that the Company was entitled to the entire profit from the APLNG Project, although such an arrangement was evidently not recorded in a written agreement.
(2) The Inpex Project
- [102]
[102] The Plaintiff further relies on the Company’s profit entitlement under the Inpex Project. The contract for the Inpex Project (“the Inpex Contract”) was entered into on 15 July 2013 between the Thailand subsidiary of the Kaefer Group (“Kaefer Thailand”) and STP & I Public Company Limited (“STPIPC”). The Inpex Project was initially valued at US$14m. At trial, the Plaintiff stated that the Inpex Project was now valued at approximately US$52.8m. The Contract was also signed by Justin on behalf of Kaefer Thailand. Like the APLNG Project, the Company was the entity that performed the work for the Inpex Project. Similarly, the Plaintiff claims that despite the contracting party being Kaefer Thailand, the profit paid out of the Inpex Project was accounted for the benefit of the Company. In particular, the Plaintiff’s case is that taking into account the actual value of the Inpex Project, the Company was entitled to receive around US$9.3m to US$9.5m from Kaefer Thailand, after the latter received payment from STPIPC.
- [103]
[103] The Defendant does not deny that the Company did all the works and that Kaefer Thailand was merely the contracting party. The Defendant, however, referred to three written agreements between Kaefer Thailand and the Company setting out the Company’s profit entitlement (“the Inpex Profit Agreements”). One of the Inpex Profit Agreements was a document titled “Profit Agreement” dated 31 December 2014 between Kaefer Thailand and the Company. This agreement was worded as follows:
- [104]
[104] The Inpex Profit Agreements appear to be similar to the Management Agreements in the Insulation Supply Subcontract, save that the Company’s profit entitlement is different under each of the three Inpex Profit Agreements.
- [105]
[105] The Defendant then referred to an accounting spreadsheet document dated December 2015 indicating the revenue derived from the Inpex Project (“the Inpex Spreadsheet”). According to the Defendant, the Inpex Spreadsheet shows, under the column titled “Profit taken in [the Company] to date”, the sums of US$1m and US$1.25m. The Defendant thus argues that the Inpex Spreadsheet, when read with the Inpex Profit Agreements, is conclusive proof of the Company’s entitlement to the profit valued at US$2.25m. The Defendant alleges that the Company was not entitled to the balance sum of US$3,358,744.01 recorded in the Inpex Spreadsheet under the title “Balance profit in [T]hailand”.
- [106]
[106] In response, the Plaintiff argues that the three Inpex Profit Agreements were merely accounting documents, and do not conclusively show that the Company is only entitled to US$2.25m as stated in the Inpex Profit Agreements. The Inpex Profit Agreements, like the Management Agreements, were not intended to be legally binding agreements between the parties. Instead, these agreements were merely evidence of receipt of monies by the Company.
- [107]
[107] Further, the Plaintiff submits that the balance sum of US$3,358,744.01 reflected in the Inpex Spreadsheet was in fact accounted for as the Company’s profit, after deducting a 3% “cross border fee” payable to Kaefer Thailand and a “management fee” of 1.5% payable to Kaefer Germany. The Plaintiff explains the method in which the profit was “accounted” for to the Company. Instead of paying the Company directly, Kaefer Thailand, for tax purpose, decided to pay US$3,358,744.01 to the shareholders of the Company, ie, the Plaintiff and Kaefer Germany as their “dividend entitlement”. This was explained by the Plaintiff during his cross-examination by the Counsel for the Defendant (Mr Lim), as follows:
- [108]
[108] The Plaintiff explained that the remaining profit of US$3,358,744.01 was then converted into Singapore dollars, which amounts to S$4,635,066.73. Following the necessary deductions, the remaining sum was then split between Kaefer Germany and the Plaintiff as shareholders of the Company. This amounted to approximately S$1,854,000, which the Plaintiff submits was equivalent to the dividend pay-out that he would have been entitled to by virtue of his shareholding in the Company, had the money been transferred to the Company. This payment made to the Plaintiff was also reflected in Attachment 1 of the Addendum to the 2016 Shareholders Agreement under the heading “Ichthys Thailand 01/08/2012-31/12/2015”.
- [109]
[109] The Defendant does not dispute that this was how the profit from the Inpex Project was “accounted” for the Company’s benefit. Indeed, Victor confirmed it at trial:
- [110]
[110] In other words, the profit derived from the Inpex Project was accounted to the Company in two ways: (a) first, an upfront cash payment of US$2.25m to the Company through the three Inpex Profit Agreements; and (b) a direct payment of money to the Company’s shareholders in a proportion equivalent to their shareholding, which in the Plaintiff’s case amounted to S$1,854,000. In respect of (b), although the money was not paid directly to the Company, it logically follows from the fact that the money was nevertheless paid directly to the Plaintiff, albeit in a proportion equivalent to his shareholding in the Company, as the Company was entitled to that portion of the profit paid out of the Inpex Project.
- [111]
[111] The manner in which the parties conducted themselves in the Inpex Project supported the Plaintiff’s case that the entire profit paid out of the Inpex Project were ultimately accounted for the benefit of the Company.
(3) The Wheatstone Project
- [112]
[112] Finally, the Plaintiff referred to the Wheatstone Project. The contract for this project (“the Wheatstone Contract”) was executed on 8 January 2015 between Bechtel Overseas Corporation (“Bechtel”) and Kaefer Australia. The Wheatstone Contract was valued at about US$ 8m. Similarly, the Company was not a party to the Wheatstone Contract, although the Company performed all the work required under the Wheatstone Contract.
- [113]
[113] The Plaintiff submits that in the Wheatstone Project, the Company would issue invoices for its work done in respect of the Wheatstone Project to Kaefer Australia. Kaefer Australia would issue invoices to Bechtel for the progress claims. The full payment made by Bechtel to Kaefer Australia was, in turn, transferred to the Company.
- [114]
[114] The Defendant argues that similar to the Inpex Project, the profit allocation to the Company arising from the Wheatstone Project was detailed in a written business agreement. The Defendant refers to a business agreement entered into between the Company and Kaefer Australia dated 1 January 2015 (“the Wheatstone Business Agreement”), which provided that the Company was entitled to the entire profit from its work done for the Wheatstone Project. The salient terms of the Wheatstone Business Agreement are as follows:
- [115]
[115] The Plaintiff does not deny that the Wheatstone Business Agreement exists. However, the Plaintiff suggests, in his written closing submissions, that this business agreement is merely an accounting document and has no binding effect between the Company and Kaefer Australia.
- [116]
[116] I do not accept the Plaintiff’s written submissions in this respect. The Wheatstone Business Agreement is clearly drafted differently from the Management Agreements and the Inpex Profit Agreements. The Wheatstone Business Agreement appears to be a legally valid and binding contract. It states, for instance, the parties to the contract, the amount of money that is to be paid to Kaefer Australia, and a choice of law clause. Most importantly, the Wheatstone Business Agreement “is a back to back contract of [the Wheatstone Contract]”.
- [117]
[117] In any case, the Plaintiff has rightly conceded in his oral closing submissions that the Wheatstone Business Agreement is a valid and binding contract. Indeed, the Wheatstone Business Agreement has the essential features of a valid contract between the Company and Kaefer Australia, and clearly stipulates the Company’s profit entitlement arising out of its work done in respect of the Wheatstone Project. This is clear from the words “[Kaefer Australia] will subcontract 100% of the contract to [the Company]” and that “all risk and rewards lies with [the Company]”. This “back-to-back” arrangement involved the issuance of invoices by Kaefer Australia to Bechtel. Upon Kaefer Australia’s receipt of payment (as it is the contracting party), the money was then paid to the Company pursuant to a back-to-back invoice issued by the Company to Kaefer Australia.
- [118]
[118] The Defendant contends that there were several invoices generated by the Company which recorded the sums sought from Kaefer Australia for the Company’s work done in respect of the Wheatstone Project (“the Wheatstone Invoices”). The Defendant thus submits that the Wheatstone Invoices all refer to the Wheatstone Business Agreement. For instance, the Wheatstone Invoice dated 11 October 2016 described the invoiced sum as “[p]rogress invoice for [Wheatstone Contract] … as per business agreement” [emphasis added]. Accordingly, the Defendant submits that the Wheatstone Business Agreement and the Wheatstone Invoices refute the Plaintiff’s case premised on the Payment Arrangement, ie, that the profit accounted by the Kaefer entity was agreed on verbally and were never recorded in writing. The Defendant submits that for the Wheatstone Project, the Company’s profit entitlement was derived from the Wheatstone Business Agreement.
- [119]
[119] Despite the existence of the Wheatstone Business Agreement, the parties’ conduct in the Wheatstone Project nevertheless supports the Plaintiff’s case that the Company is entitled to the entire profit arising from that project. Indeed, I accept the Plaintiff’s oral submission that the Wheatstone Business Agreement simply reduces the Payment Arrangement into writing. And as Victor accepted at trial, Kaefer Australia did not retain any of the profit from the Wheatstone Project except for the cross-border fee of US$100,000, which was provided for under the Wheatstone Business Agreement.
(4) The Defendant’s submission on the Payment Arrangement
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