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Grounds publishedDecided 26 Oct 2023

General Division of the High Court

Affert Resources Pte Ltd (in compulsory winding up) v Industries Chimiques du Senegal and another

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[2023] SGHC 305Case no. Originating Summons No 544 of 2019 (Registrar’s Appeal No 201 of 2023)30 paragraphs

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  1. [1] This was an appeal by the applicant (the “appellant”) against the following parts of the decision of the learned Assistant Registrar (the “learned AR”) in HC/SUM 2881/2023 (“SUM 2881”) below:

  2. (a) that the appellant be granted an extension of time until 6pm on 25 September 2023 to file its expert affidavit on foreign law, failing which no expert affidavit is to be filed;

  3. (b) that the 12th Affidavit of Abuthahir s/o Abdul Gafoor (“Mr Abuthahir”) filed by the appellant on 20 September 2023 be struck out; and

  4. (c) that the appellant pay to the respondents costs of $1,500 (all-in).

  5. [2] After hearing the parties on 4 October 2023, I granted the appellant a final extension of time until 7 October 2023 to file its expert affidavit, provided that it undertook to tender the final but unnotarised version of the affidavit to the respondents by 5 October 2023. I, however, dismissed the appellant’s appeal in relation to the striking out of the 12th Affidavit of Mr Abuthahir.

  6. The background facts

  7. [4] I begin with the background facts. The appellant, Affert Resources Pte Ltd (“Affert”), is a company in liquidation. Between May 2012 and June 2013, the appellant and the first respondent, Industries Chimiques du Senegal (“ICS”), entered into six contracts for ICS’s purchase of sulphur from Affert. The total amount unpaid on those contracts was US$17,007,263.60 (the “ICS Debt”).

  8. [5] On 20 August 2014, the second respondent, Indorama Holdings BV (“IHBV”), bought 66% of the shares in ICS from Senfer Africa Limited (“Senfer”). By way of context, Affert, ICS, and Senfer were part of the Archean Group of Companies (the “Archean Group”) that was based in India. The remaining 34% of the shares in ICS was held by the State of Senegal, the Government of India, and the Indian Farmers Fertilisers Cooperative Ltd. Further, ICS had a negative net worth of about US$137m and had defaulted on most of its loans.

  9. [7] Subsequently, Affert stated in a letter dated 7 October 2014 and addressed to ICS (the “Letter”) that:

  10. [9] Subsequently, RV1 was not able to pursue Suit 724. This is because the Court of Appeal had found in CA/CA 31/2020 and CA/CA 32/2020 that, among other findings, Affert’s claim for the ICS Debt is governed by Senegalese law and is time-barred. In the circumstances, Affert amended its claim in OS 544 to join IHBV as a respondent and to seek payment orders against both ICS and IHBV.

  11. Procedural history leading to the present appeal

  12. [10] Against the background facts above, on 6 October 2022, the respondents filed and served their reply affidavits for OS 544. One of the reply affidavits is the 3rd Affidavit of Khaled Abou El Houda, which exhibits an expert opinion that deals with the issue of when the ICS Debt had become time-barred under Senegalese law. By way of a letter dated 1 August 2023, the appellant sought leave to file further affidavits in OS 544 to address, among other issues, the time-bar issue.

  13. [11] Later, at a pre-trial conference (“PTC”) on 3 August 2023, the learned AR directed as follows:

  14. (a) the appellant was to file its further affidavit by 28 August 2023;

  15. (b) the respondents were to file their reply affidavit by 25 September 2023; and

  16. (c) by the next PTC on 31 August 2023, the appellant must have filed its further affidavit, and the parties will discuss hearing dates for OS 544.

  17. [12] On 30 August 2023, the appellant informed the respondents that it intended to file an expert affidavit on Senegalese law and would do so by 21 September 2023. At the PTC on 31 August 2023, the learned AR granted the appellant an extension of time until 14 September 2023 to do so. On 11 September 2023, the parties informed the court of common available hearing dates for OS 544 in late November 2023, as well as in February and March 2024. The hearing for OS 544 was then fixed for 22 and 23 November 2023.

  18. [13] On 13 September 2023, the appellant requested a further extension until 28 September 2023 to file its expert affidavit. On 17 September 2023, the learned AR granted “a final extension of time … to the [appellant] to file the expert affidavit by 20 September 2023, failing which no further affidavit is to be filed by the [appellant] without leave of [c]ourt”. Notably, the learned AR observed that this was the appellant’s second request for an extension of time for the filing of its expert affidavit, and that the appellant had written in to seek an extension of time only on the eve of the date when the affidavit was due.

  19. [14] Late at night on 20 September 2023, the appellant filed the 12th Affidavit of Mr Abuthahir. This affidavit stated that Mr Abuthahir had been “advised by West African lawyers who are members of the OHADA legal community that [five] judgments are relevant in the interpretation of the OHADA Commercial Act”. The affidavit also exhibited copies of the said judgments, which are in the French language, together with “Machine Translations of the Judgments in English”, using Google Translate. Also on 20 September 2023, the appellant filed SUM 2881, accompanied by the 13th Affidavit of Mr Abuthahir. SUM 2881 was the appellant’s application for an extension of time until 28 September 2023 to file the expert affidavit.

  20. (a) the 12th Affidavit of Mr Abuthahir was to be struck out as it was filed without leave of court;

  21. (b) the appellant was given a final extension of time to file its expert affidavit by 6pm on 25 September 2023, failing which no expert affidavit is to be filed by the appellant;

  22. (c) the respondents are to file their reply affidavit by 12pm on 6 November 2023; and

  23. (d) the parties are to file their submissions for the hearing of OS 544 on 22 and 23 November 2023 by 10 November 2023.

  24. [16] On 25 September 2023, with less than half an hour before the appellant was due to file its expert affidavit, the appellant filed the present appeal against the learned AR’s decision in SUM 2881.

  25. The applicable principles regarding extension of time in interlocutory applications generally

  26. [17] I turn now to the applicable principles regarding extension of time in interlocutory applications generally. To begin with, the court indisputably has the power to extend time generally pursuant to O 3 r 4(1) of the Rules of Court (2014 Rev Ed) (the “ROC 2014”) (see also O 3 r 4(1) of the Rules of Court 2021), although this has to be read in the context of the rules which govern the circumstances. As Professor Jeffrey Pinsler (“Prof Pinsler”) notes in Singapore Court Practice 2020 (LexisNexis, 2020) (at para 3/4/1), while it is ideal that all prescribed time limits should be complied with all the time, this is rarely the case in practice because a multitude of circumstances may result in delay. This much is completely understandable.

  27. [20] However, the above-mentioned approach has been eclipsed by a parallel approach that developed in the 1990s. Indeed, the Court of Appeal did not limit the applicable principles to its observations in The “Tokai Maru” and Chan Chin Cheung, but continued to develop the applicable principles in relation to extensions of time in other cases. within this regard, as Prof Pinsler explains in Singapore Civil Practice 2022 (LexisNexis, 2022) (at para 3-39), the concept of what justice requires changed “when the courts began to emphasise the importance of expedition [sic] the interests of the administration of justice”. Thus, in the English Court of Appeal decision of Mortgage Corporation Ltd v Sandoes, Blinkhorn & Co and Gibson [1996] TLR 751 (“Mortgage Corporation”), Millett LJ laid down a set of guidelines (at 752) “as to the future approach which litigants could expect the court to adopt to the failure to adhere to time limits contained in the rules or directions of the court”:

  28. [22] Similarly, in the Court of Appeal decision of Sun Jin Engineering Pte Ltd v Hwang Jae Woo [2011] 2 SLR 196 (“Sun Jin”), Chao JA quoted these guidelines from Mortgage Corporation with apparent approval (at [27]) and concluded (at [30]) that, in deciding whether to grant an extension of time, a court “has to balance the competing interests of the parties concerned” and that “[i]n determining how the balance of interests should be struck and in applying the four factors mentioned [ie, (a) the length of the delay; (b) the reasons for the delay; (c) the chances of the defaulting party succeeding if an extension was granted; and (d) the degree of prejudice to the counterparty] … it is the overall picture that emerges to the court as to where the justice of the case lies which will ultimately be decisive”. According to Prof Pinsler, with whom I respectfully agreed, while Chao JA in Sun Jin did not expressly stress the importance of the administration of justice as a factor to be taken into account, the learned judge’s reference to the list of considerations from Mortgage Corporation, which includes references to the administration of justice, as well as the existence of other authorities which specifically mention its importance, must mean that this is a significant factor under Singapore law (see Singapore Civil Practice 2022 at para 3-44).

  29. [23] Therefore, in contrast to an approach which only weighed the parties’ individual interests against each other, a parallel approach has developed which also factors in the court’s interest in maintaining the due administration of civil justice. This approach is neatly summarised in the High Court decision of Lea Tool and Moulding Industries Pte Ltd (in liquidation) v CGU International Insurance plc (formerly known as Commer Union Assurance Co plc) [2000] 3 SLR(R) 745 (“Lea Tool”), where Lai Kew Chai J stated that (at [15]):

  30. [24] Accordingly, in my respectful view, the focus of the appropriate test to determine whether an extension of time should be granted in interlocutory applications generally should be to strike a balance between the parties’ interests, bearing in mind: (a) a party’s interest to have its case determined on the substantive merits; (b) the counterparty’s interest to have the matter resolved as expeditiously as possible; and (c) the court’s interest in maintaining the due administration of civil justice. This balance is expressed by four factors, which Chao JA outlined in Sun Jin (at [29]), and which Woo Bih Li JAD applied in the recent Appellate Division of the High Court decision of Sunpower Semiconductor Ltd v Powercom Yuraku Pte Ltd [2023] SGHC(A) 14 (“Sunpower Semiconductor”) (at [20]–[21]): (a) the length of the delay; (b) the reasons for the delay; (c) the merits of the intended appeal (or application, as the case may be); and (d) the degree of prejudice to the other party if the extension of time were granted. As Woo JAD explained in Sunpower Semiconducter (at [21]), “the court will adopt a ‘far stricter approach’ in applying the above factors where the application is for an extension of time to file or serve a notice of appeal, because the overriding concern in those applications is finality and ensuring that the winning party is not kept waiting ‘on tenterhooks to receive the fruits of its judgment’”.

  31. [26] To summarise the above, in my respectful view, the applicable legal principles in relation to an application for an extension of time generally are as follows.

  32. (b) However, instead of the single-minded focus on the parties’ interests, the courts have also considered the interest in maintaining the due administration of civil justice (see Lea Tool at [15]).

  33. (c) Therefore, in determining whether to grant an extension of time, the appropriate test should strike a balance between: (i) a party’s interest to have its case determined on the substantive merits; (ii) the counterparty’s interest to have the matter resolved as expeditiously as possible; and (iii) the court’s interest in maintaining the due administration of civil justice. In weighing these interests, relevant factors include: (i) the length of the delay; (ii) the reasons for the delay; (iii) the merits of the intended appeal (or application, as the case may be); and (iv) the degree of prejudice to the other party if the extension of time were granted (see Sun Jin at [29]).

  34. My decision: the appeal in relation to extension of time was allowed

  35. [27] With the above principles in mind, I allowed the appellant’s appeal in relation to the learned AR’s decision to only grant a final extension to the appellant for it to file its expert affidavit by 25 September 2023, failing which no expert affidavit is to be filed by the appellant. Nonetheless, this was a case where the twin interests of: (a) the respondents’ interest in having the matter resolved as expeditiously as possible; and (b) the court’s interest in maintaining the due administration of civil justice, almost outweighed the appellant’s interest in having its case determined on the substantive merits.

  36. The appellant has shown a disregard for court-imposed deadlines to file the expert affidavit, without good reason

  37. [28] In my judgment, the appellant has shown a disregard for court-imposed deadlines to file the expert affidavit, without good reason. I say this for the following reasons.

  38. [29] First, the appellant has breached four court-imposed deadlines to file the expert affidavit on the following occasions: (a) 28 August 2023; (b) 14 September 2023; (c) 20 September 2023; and (d) 25 September 2023. To be clear, I was aware that the appellant only indicated its intention to file an expert affidavit on 30 August 2023, ie, after the first deadline lapsed. However, the appellant was aware after the PTC on 3 August 2023 that it had to file its reply affidavit by 28 August 2023. Thus, while it did file a reply affidavit on 28 August 2023, it is inexplicable why the appellant left it to 30 August 2023 to explore the possibility of filing an expert affidavit. For all intents and purposes, the appellant had acted in breach of the first court-imposed deadline of 28 August 2023 by seeking to admit a further affidavit after that date. Indeed, there was no good reason why the appellant could not have done so earlier, when the respondents had filed their expert affidavit almost a year ago, on 6 October 2022.

  39. [30] Objectively, the length of the delay was, taken on the whole, not long. This was because if the appellant were to file the expert affidavit by 7 October 2023, and counting from the original deadline of 28 August 2023, the appellant would have been out of time by only slightly more than one month. In contrast, there have been longer periods of delay, eg, in The “Tokai Maru”, where the party applying for an extension of time had delayed filing its affidavit by nine months. However, what is of concern here is not the length of delay per se, but the fact that the appellant had breached multiple deadlines. Viewed in this light, the appellant’s conduct was even more egregious, especially when it breached timelines that the learned AR had variously described as a “final extension of time” (on 17 September 2023) and a “final extension” (on 21 September 2023). If the learned AR’s words are to mean anything, then there ought to be consequences to the appellant’s conduct, which cannot be swept under the rug simply because the appellant had filed the present appeal.

  40. [31] Second, the appellant has never offered any good reason for its failure to meet the court-imposed deadlines. This can be seen from the following instances.

  41. (a) When the appellant did not meet the 28 August 2023 deadline, the appellant, through its solicitors’ letter dated 30 August 2023 which was filed with the court on 31 August 2023, indicated that it had filed its reply affidavit. However, with respect to the expert affidavit, the appellant merely stated that it “still wishes to file a reply affidavit with respect to Sengalese [sic] law and has been taking steps in this regard”. It then proposed to file the expert affidavit on 21 September 2023 and for the respondents to file their reply affidavit by 12 October 2023. The appellant provided no other explanation as to why it could not have taken steps much earlier to engage an expert, when it has had access to the respondents’ expert affidavit from 6 October 2022. The appellant also provided no explanation as to why, despite knowing about the court-imposed deadline for it to file its further affidavit by 28 August 2023, it wrote belatedly to the respondents on 30 August 2023 to bring up the filing of its expert affidavit. Despite the proposed deadline of 21 September 2023, the learned AR allowed only an extension of time until 14 September 2023 (see [12] above).

  42. (b) When the appellant could not meet the 14 September 2023 deadline, its solicitors reached out to the respondents’ solicitors on 13 September 2023 to seek an agreement for an extension of time. The appellant proposed the deadline of 28 September 2023. It explained that “there have been certain issues that have arisen in relation [sic] the said persons that have been approached and this has resulted in our client needing more time and also considering alternative person(s)”. There were no further particulars as to how many persons were approached, or when they were approached. The appellant also asserted that “there may be no prejudice suffered by [the respondents] if the said further extension is agreed to”. Again, despite the proposed deadline of 28 September 2023, the learned AR allowed only an extension of time until 20 September 2023 (see [13] above).

  43. (c) When the appellant could not meet the 20 September 2023 deadline, it sought a further extension on 20 September 2023 via SUM 2881. However, it did not provide any good reason why it could not meet the deadline of 20 September 2023. All that was asserted in the 13th Affidavit of Mr Abuthahir was that “[w]hile [the appellant] has endeavoured to keep to the Court’s deadlines, it has been unable to do so as [the appellant] had required time to secure an expert and to finalise the expert’s appointment”. While Mr Abuthahir then explains that the appellant has since engaged Ms Sylvie Bebohi (“Ms Bebohi”) as its expert, he does not provide any reason why she would only “be in a position to submit her opinion by 28 September 2023”. The AR allowed an extension of time until 25 September 2023 (see [15] above).

  44. (d) When the appellant could not meet the 25 September 2023 deadline, it filed the present appeal. However, the only reasons it gave were that “[t]here was a limited pool of experts / legal practitioners who had qualifications in OHADA law that were available for appointment” and that “[g]iven the time difference between Singapore and Senegal / Cameroon, it was significantly more challenging to instruct prospective experts given the time difference, the volume of materials and the tight deadlines”. In my view, these are not good reasons. For one, I cannot understand how the time difference would make it difficult to engage an expert. Also, given the time that the plaintiff has had since 6 October 2022, I cannot understand how it can assert that it was subjected to tight deadlines.

  45. [33] Fourth, the appellant has not given the respondents and the court much notice before taking out applications to seek the various extensions of time. Indeed, its requests for extensions of time were made either at the last minute, or even after the deadline had already passed. These requests were also made despite the learned AR having indicated twice below that her deadlines were “final” (see above at [30]). Moreover, even in its submissions filed for this appeal, there were references within wrongly referring to the submissions being an “affidavit”, and which seemed to be copied directly from what appeared to be an affidavit. Such slip-ups, when taken in the round, showed that the appellant has not been taking the court’s processes seriously.

  46. [34] For all these reasons, I was satisfied that the appellant has shown a disregard for court-imposed deadlines to file the expert affidavit without good reason.

  47. The respondents would suffer prejudice

  48. [38] Ultimately, with the above considerations in mind, my decision boiled down to the question of whether: (a) the appellant’s disregard for the court-imposed timelines; and (b) the prejudice caused to the respondents, should outweigh the appellant’s opportunity to dispute the respondents’ defence on a substantive basis.

  49. The appellant should have the opportunity to dispute the respondents’ claim on the time-bar issue

  50. [39] The appellant understandably submitted that if it were denied an extension of time, it would be “unduly deprived of its opportunity to dispute the [respondents’] claims on the Time Bar Issue”. This was particularly since the appellant had yet to file any opinion on foreign law in OS 544. Instead, the only expert affidavit on foreign law filed in OS 544 thus far has been from the respondents. Thus, if the appellant was not able to file any expert affidavit, the respondents’ expert affidavit would be unrebutted in relation to issues pertaining to Senegalese law.

  51. My decision: the appeal in relation to the 12th Affidavit of Mr Abuthahir is dismissed

  52. [42] For completeness, I dismissed the appellant’s appeal in relation to the striking out of the 12th Affidavit of Mr Abuthahir dated 20 September 2023. While the appellant did not address this directly, this affidavit was clearly filed without the leave of court. It was clear from the court’s letter on 17 September 2023 that the appellant was granted a “final extension of time … to file the expert affidavit by 20 September 2023, failing which no further affidavit is to be filed by the [a]ppellant without leave of [c]ourt”. The context of the learned AR’s letter is as below:

  53. It was clear that the court’s permission to file an affidavit was limited to the expert affidavit only. Since Mr Abuthahir is not an expert on Senegalese law, his affidavit was filed without the court’s permission.

  54. [43] In any event, substantial portions of this affidavit cannot be received, filed or used in the court given that it has not been adequately translated into the English language. While s 40 of the Evidence Act 1893 (2020 Rev Ed) provides that “any statement of the law contained in a book purporting to be printed or published under the authority of the government of the country, and to contain any such law, and any report of a ruling of the courts of the country contained in a book purporting to be a report of the rulings, is relevant” when a court “has to form an opinion as to a law of any country”, this has to be read alongside the applicable procedural rules. In this regard, O 92 r 1 of the ROC 2014 provides that “[e]very document if not in the English language must be accompanied by a translation thereof certified by a court interpreter or a translation verified by the affidavit of a person qualified to translate it before it may be received, filed or used in the [c]ourt”. This is consistent with the requirement that “[f]oreign court decisions extracted from publications of law reports, translated into English, may … be cited as evidence of the foreign law” (see the High Court decision of Wong Kai Woon alias Wong Kai Boon and Another v Wong Kong Hom alias Ng Kong Hom and Others [2000] SGHC 176 at [54]) [emphasis added].

  55. [44] When applied to the present case, the affidavit concerned was not helpful towards the determination of Senegalese law since it exhibits judgments in the French language that are not translated into coherent English. Also, in so far as s 40 applies, there must surely be a coherent translation into English in accordance with O 92 r 1, and not one done by Google Translate, as the appellant has done. More broadly, given the time that the appellant has had since 6 October 2022 to engage an expert, it was puzzling why, even if it were relying on s 40, it did not have the time to obtain proper translations.

  56. Conclusion