General Division of the High Court · Decided 27 November 2023
Terrenus Energy SL2 Pte Ltd v Attika Interior + MEP Pte Ltd
Feedback & support[2023] SGHC 333 · Case no. Suit No 173 of 2022
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Grounds of decision
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Introduction
- [1]
[1] The plaintiff, Terrenus Energy SL2 Pte Ltd (“Terrenus”), entered into a contract (the “Contract”) to employ the defendant, Attika Interior + MEP Pte Ltd (“Attika”), as the main contractor for the construction of a “Ground Mount Solar Generation Facility” (the “Solar Farm”) and “Linkway Solar Generation Facility” (the “Linkway”) at Changi Business Park (the “Project”). In HC/S 173/2022 (“S 173”), Terrenus claims against Attika for damages allegedly arising from three major defects, and for liquidated damages and general damages arising from delays. Attika in turn claims that it is entitled to an extension of time (“EOT”) and counterclaims against Terrenus for payment of the balance of the Contract price.
Facts
- [2]
[2] Both Terrenus and Attika are companies incorporated in Singapore. On 5 April 2021, both parties entered into the Contract, with Terrenus as employer and Attika as the main contractor. The Contract comprises: (1) the Main Builder Agreement (the “MBA”); (2) Annexes A to N of the MBA; and (3) the Contract Drawings. SolarGy Pte Ltd (“SolarGy”) was Terrenus’s solar consultant, and PEC Civil Consultant Pte Ltd (“PEC”) was Terrenus’s civil and structural consultant for the Project. Neither SolarGy nor PEC were called to testify.
- [3]
[3] Annex A of the MBA sets out Attika’s scope of works under the Contract (the “Works”). Attika was responsible for installing, testing, and commissioning the Solar Farm and Linkway. The Solar Farm consists of 71 solar arrays, totalling 35,509 solar panels. Terrenus was responsible for the supply of the solar panels, mounting structures, inverters, cables, containerized transformer and LV switchboard, as well as for the supply and installation of two containerised power grid 22kv substations (the “Substations”). The Substations were to be supplied and installed by Terrenus’s subcontractor, Bulox Power Pte Ltd (“Bulox”). Each Substation energizes 50% of the Solar Farm.
- [4]
[4] Pursuant to cl 4.1.1 of the MBA, the lump sum price of the Works under the Contract was $5,100,000 (the “Contract Sum”). Annex F of the MBA, titled “Schedule of Payment”, provides for the Contract Sum to be paid at three milestones, with the issuance of: (1) 40% of the Contract Sum based on monthly progress per item; (2) 20% of the Contract Sum upon the issuance of the Temporary Occupation Permit (“TOP”) by the Building and Construction Authority (“BCA”); and (3) 40% of the Contract Sum on the issuance of the Certificate of Statutory Completion (“CSC”) by BCA. Annex L of the MBA, titled “Schedule of Prices”, itemises the Works and the “Lumpsum Price” for each item of work.
- [5]
[5] Pursuant to cl 5.5.1 of the MBA, Attika was obliged to complete the Works expeditiously by the “Date of Completion”. Pursuant to cl 5.6.1, Attika was also obliged to meet the requirements of “Partial Completion”, defined in cl 1.3.12 as “the time for completion of part of the Works to commission and energize at least 70% of the [Solar Farm] on or before 30 June 2021, prior to the Date of Completion”. The “Date of Completion” is defined in cl 1.3.5 as the “time or times for the completion of the Works or any phase or part of the Works set out in the Appendix subject to such extension or extensions of time (if any) as the Contractor may be allowed under the Agreement”. The time as set out in the Appendix to the MBA was 31 July 2021. Clauses 5.5.5, 5.5.6, and 5.5.7 allowed Attika to submit formal requests for EOTs, and for Terrenus to allow or deny such requests. It is undisputed that Terrenus did not grant any EOTs, despite several requests from Attika.
- [6]
[6] Parties dispute the date that Partial Completion was achieved and the date that the Works were completed. This is relevant to Terrenus’s claim for liquidated damages.
- [7]
[7] On 12 January 2022, TOP was issued by the BCA. On 3 February 2022, Terrenus terminated Attika’s employment pursuant to cl 14.3 of the MBA, on a without default basis. On 6 July 2023, approval from the National Parks Board (“NParks”) for CSC was obtained. On 13 July 2023, CSC was issued by the BCA.
- [8]
[8] The parties engaged in several rounds of adjudication under the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 2004 (2020 Rev Ed) (“SOPA”) during the course of the Contract.
- [9]
[9] Out of the Contract Sum, Terrenus has paid Attika $1,910,663.40. In May 2023, the parties agreed to fix the quantum of the Linkway. This resulted in an adjustment of the Contract Sum to $5,050,500. Accordingly, Attika’s claim for the balance of the Contract Sum is for the amount of $3,139,836.60 (the “Balance Sum”).
Issues Arising
- [10]
[10] Prior to trial, the parties agreed to narrow the issues and set out their positions in a Scott Schedule. The following main issues arise in S 173:
Whether Attika delivered works with substantial defects
- [11]
[11] The first main issue is whether Attika delivered works with substantial defects. This in turn raises three sub-issues, namely, whether Attika failed to:
Whether Attika failed to embed PEG Rods to a minimum depth of 500mm
- [12]
[12] For context, the mounting structure for the solar panels includes a base bearing plate, a top bracket plate to which the corners of adjacent solar panels were affixed, and supporting rods (“PEG Rods”) that were to be driven into the ground. Each solar panel stands on four PEG Rods. As the PEG Rods connect to one top bracket plate, adjacent solar panels share two PEG Rods. These mounting structures were supplied by Jurchen Technology GmbH (“Jurchen”).
Parties’ cases
- [13]
[13] The first substantial defect that Terrenus claims for is in relation to the embedment depth of the PEG Rods. Terrenus submits that Attika breached a contractual requirement for the installation of the PEG Rods by failing to embed all of them to a depth of at least 500mm below ground. Clause 2.2.3 of Annex A Part III states that “the Contractor shall install the mounting structures on the typical mounting structure details for PEG as specified on drawing no. 102A and manufacturer’s installation manuals”. It is undisputed that this refers to Drawing 102, which sets out a cross-section of the mounting structure. In relation to the PEG Rods, Drawing 102 provides for a “MINIMUM 500mm RAM UNDER GROUND”. The manufacturer’s installation manuals provide that the embedment depth is “to be in accordance with static calculation and soil conditions”, and do not specify any particular minimum embedment depth. Jurchen provided a static calculation for the Project which sets out a ramming depth of 500mm across the Solar Farm, with the exception of certain specified locations which had to achieve a depth of 700mm.
- [14]
[14] Terrenus submits that so long as it is proven that there has been a departure from the contractual specifications, a defect will be made out. Terrenus points out that even Attika’s Mr Steven Tan (“Mr Tan”), the Managing Director of Attika, conceded that there was some non-compliance, such that it cannot be said that there was no breach.
- [16]
[16] While Mr Satchell visited the Project site, he did not assess the actual number of non-compliant PEG Rods. Instead, he utilised an estimate based on the fundamental assumption that the solar arrays rest on slanted ground, such that one end of an array is at a higher elevation than the other end, and that the solar panels are installed on a relatively flat gradient, rather than perpendicular to the sloping ground, following the slope. This assumption was reached by a combination of Mr Satchell’s “observations on site” that the installation guide (which indicates that arrays on slopes are to be perpendicular to the sloping ground) “appears not to have been followed” and Mr Satchell’s analysis of the data provided to him from the Joint Inspection Reports, which marked out non-compliant PEG Rods on the perimeter of the solar arrays. Mr Satchell did not carry out a topographical survey, but instead projected a “ground slope profile across the array between the end points of the non-compliances”. From this assumption, Mr Satchell made an estimate of the non-compliant PEG Rods within a given area. Terrenus submits that Mr Satchell’s estimation proves a trend of increasing non-compliance, and therefore that his estimates prove the extent of non-compliant PEG Rods. Mr Satchell provided his analysis for 6 out of the 71 solar panel arrays and “extrapolated” his analysis to the remaining 65 arrays. There were about 35,509 solar panels installed in the Solar Farm, across 71 arrays, with each array consisting of about 500 solar panels. A visual representation of Mr Satchell’s fundamental assumption is set out below. It also contains a photograph of some of the solar arrays (numbered E38 and E39).
- [17]
[17] Although the claim is in respect of the embedment depth of the PEG Rods, Terrenus quantifies this claim with reference to the number of affected solar panels. This is because Terrenus submits that the appropriate method of rectification is a complete reinstallation of the entire affected solar panels. The Joint Inspection Reports also marked out solar panels as being non-compliant so long as one of the four PEG Rods was insufficiently embedded. In its Closing Submissions, Terrenus revised the number of solar panels that it claims are non-compliant. Terrenus accepts that Mr Satchell had conceded that the estimation for six arrays (where measurements were taken) could not be applied to the rest of the 65 arrays, and that it would therefore limit its claim. Terrenus continues to claim on the basis of Mr Satchell’s estimated numbers for the six arrays for which he provided analysis. However, for the remaining 65 arrays which Mr Satchell initially said were non-compliant based only on his extrapolation, Terrenus claims only for the non-compliant panels recorded in the Joint Inspection Reports. The Joint Inspection Reports only marked out allegedly non-compliant solar panels based on PEG Rods at the perimeter of the solar arrays. On this revised basis, Terrenus claims for 1,578 panels or 4.4% of the panels (reduced from the original claim for 2,733 panels or 7.7% of the panels).
- [18]
[18] As for the consequences of insufficient embedment, Mr Satchell was of the view that the 500mm embedment depth had to be strictly complied with. Terrenus does not contend that the insufficient embedment has any impact on the Solar Farm’s power generation. Terrenus’s case, in the lead up to and during the trial, was that the failure to embed the PEG Rods to a minimum depth of 500mm could result in the PEG Rods being pulled out and parts of the array being thrown up into the air “like a kite” at high windspeeds.
- [19]
[19] In its Closing Submissions, Terrenus revised its position. It now accepts that Mr Satchell had clarified that the risk occasioned by insufficient embedment is more of a pull-out and structural failure in high winds rather than “actual kiting”. Terrenus’s revised position is that its case is not premised on showing that there is “actual kiting” but that there is a risk of pull-out or structural failure during a “design-level wind event”, which Terrenus defines as “peak windspeeds that occur once in many years”, rather than average daily windspeeds. Terrenus relies on Mr Satchell’s evidence that the applicable design-level windspeed is 20m/s, derived from the BS EN 1991-1-4 Eurocode (the “Eurocode”) and the Singapore National Annex to the Eurocode. Aside from this, Terrenus mainly focuses on undermining the evidence of the other structural experts. This is premised on Terrenus’s submission that the burden is on Attika to prove the correct windspeed, and that the calculated minimum embedment depth by the other experts is unconservative. Terrenus’s case is that any deviation from the specified 500mm embedment depth causes the risk.
- [21]
[21] Attika does not dispute that a failure to comply with the minimum embedment depth of 500mm constitutes a breach of contract, but submits that Terrenus has failed to prove the extent of non-compliance and that such non-compliance results in a structural risk to the solar panels.
- [22]
[22] First, Attika submits that the data underlying Terrenus’s case and Mr Satchell’s evidence is unreliable. Mr Satchell’s expert evidence relies fully on the Joint Inspection Reports (above at [15]). The Joint Inspection Reports purport to be “joint inspections” on the basis that they were signed off by both Terrenus’s Mr Bong, and SolarGy’s Mr Albert Lim (“Mr Lim”). However, it became clear during cross-examination that these were not joint inspections but were all unilaterally conducted by Terrenus alone. Mr Bong testified that Mr Lim was not physically present during the inspections, and Mr Bong was unsure how and whether Mr Lim verified the Joint Inspection Reports.
- [23]
[23] Second, Attika submits that the Joint Inspection Reports are unsubstantiated and unreliable as to the alleged quantity of non-compliant PEG Rods for the following reasons:
(a) Mr Bong admitted that the photographs exhibited in evidence to substantiate the Joint Inspection Reports included images of compliant PEG Rods. Thus, the total number of photographs cannot be taken at face value as actual evidence of the extent of non-compliance.
(b) There are problems with the method of measurement. Many photographs fail to show the starting point of the measuring tape, as confirmed by Mr Bong. As such, it is not apparent whether the PEG Rods depicted in those photos are actually non-compliant. Several photographs also show the measuring tape to be slanted. Mr Bong conceded that slanted measuring tapes would result in an inaccurate measurement of the PEG Rods. However, he then made the bare assertion that the difference would only be around 5–10mm. Mr Bong further testified that even if a PEG Rod was measured to be non-compliant by just 1mm, it would still be marked as non-compliant, totally ignoring the 5–10mm margin of error in the taking of measurements.
(c) Mr Bong’s photos showing the alleged non-compliance also do not correspond with the markings in the Joint Inspection Reports. Terrenus is unable to link the photos adduced to any of the shaded markings on the Joint Inspection Reports. Mr Bong admitted that it is uncertain whether the photographs were even of those solar panels which were marked as non-compliant in the Joint Inspection Reports. Terrenus was able to link a few of the photographs to various points on Mr Satchell’s expert report. However, a comparison of the measurements taken by Mr Bong and by Mr Satchell from the same photographs shows that both arrived at different measurements. Attika submits that the number of discrepancies for only six arrays shows that the Joint Inspection Reports cannot be regarded as reliable. Attika points out that Mr Bong conceded that photographs could have been taken for each instance of non-compliance.
- [24]
[24] Third, Attika submits that there were too few data points taken for Mr Satchell to conclude that there was any slope profile across the solar arrays. For example, no data points within the shaded area were taken for array C28 in Exhibit P7 that was shaded in the shape of a chevron. Further, Mr Satchell subsequently conceded that the slope profile that he had concluded for another array (A06) was not correct. The slope profiles across all 71 arrays would be distinct from one another. There is no mathematical or logical basis to assume that just because there are purported slope profiles for the arrays inspected, it necessarily follows that the remaining arrays have similar slope profiles. It is not accurate to rely on the different lengths of the PEG Rods on the perimeter to determine a slope profile. It is unclear whether the different lengths were due to the way the PEG Rods were installed or due to the sloping condition of the ground. Attika points out that no measurements of the ground slope were actually taken, and that Mr Satchell’s estimation was based on no more than assumptions and conjecture.
- [25]
[25] Fourth, Attika argues that Mr Satchell provided no basis for the “triangulation” method which he used to justify his estimation. He could not provide any academic or engineering literature to support its use. By using the “triangulation” method, even complaint PEG Rods were shaded as non-compliant in Mr Satchell’s report.
- [26]
[26] Attika submits that, in any event, such non-compliance did not create the structural risk alleged by Terrenus. Attika submits that, on the evidence, Terrenus’s case at the highest would be that the minimum embedment required to negate the risk is 400mm, but Terrenus has no evidence of the number of PEG Rods which need rectification. The burden remains on Terrenus to show that there is structural risk if the panels are not embedded to 500mm.
- [27]
[27] In support of its position that the minimum embedment required is not 500mm as Terrenus contends, Attika first relies on an email dated 9 December 2021 from Jurchen (the “Jurchen Email”), the mounting structures supplier, to Attika, which states that the ramming depth of 500mm is a mere recommendation based on the assumption that the top 200mm of soil will be eroded over time. Effectively therefore, only a minimum ramming depth of 300mm is required to ensure stability of the mounting structures. The Jurchen Email has a subject title which is specific to the Project and Jurchen has no other project in Singapore.
- [28]
[28] Second, Attika’s structural expert, Mr Sim Kwai Meng (“Mr Sim”), had calculated that the minimum embedment depth for each PEG Rod is 400mm. According to Mr Sim, Jurchen’s recommendation of 500mm as the minimum was a generalisation that was not based on actual pull-out test results, which show that the minimum depth required differed across the Solar Farm depending on location. Mr Sim was unable to attend the Joint Conference of Structural Experts (“JCSE”) at the trial. His written report was adopted by Mr Chua Chin Hiang (“Mr Chua”), who served as Attika’s structural expert during the JCSE. Mr Chua highlighted that Jurchen’s design specification of 500mm was calculated assuming a windspeed of 20m/s. However, Mr Chua’s view was that such a windspeed required an elevation of at least 10m, and that it would not be possible to reach a windspeed of 20m/s at a height of 2m above the ground. Mr Chua drew on three academic articles for his calculations. He testified that his conservative estimate of the windspeed at the Solar Farm, using a height calculation of around 2m for the solar panel structures (rather than their actual height of around 1.5m), was around 10m/s, for which an embedment depth of 360mm would suffice. Attika therefore submits that there is no structural risk for rods embedded to a depth of at least 360mm. Attika highlights that Terrenus’s focus on the design-level windspeed of 20m/s is misplaced, as that relates to design parameters rather than actual structural risks. In addition, Attika calls into question Mr Satchell’s qualifications as an engineer, and highlights Terrenus’s failure to call the Project’s structural engineering consultant, PEC, to give evidence on the risk of structural failure, given that PEC was statutorily obliged to ensure that the Project was structurally safe.
- [30]
[30] If damages are to be awarded, Attika highlights that Terrenus’s own consultant, SolarGy, proposed an alternative method to complete reinstallation, being soil top up to counter the effects of soil erosion. Mr Sim also suggested that a ballast consisting of well-compacted firm soil could resist wind uplift. Another alternative would be localised concrete ballasts. Mr Chua’s unchallenged evidence was that concrete ballasts would not affect re-deployability.
Decision
- [33]
[33] While the forgoing is trite law, it is necessary to highlight these principles as a preliminary matter, as Terrenus has strenuously sought to bolster its claim by pointing to the lack of contrary measurements or evidence from Attika to dispute aspects of Terrenus’s case. In light of the established legal position on the burden of proof, these submissions by Terrenus are, in my view, wholly misconceived. The burden is on Terrenus to prove its case.
- [34]
[34] I find that on the evidence, Terrenus has not discharged its burden of proving its claim for substantial damages for Attika’s non-compliance with the requirement for the PEG Rods to be rammed to a minimum embedment depth of 500mm. This is for two connected but individually sufficient reasons. First, Terrenus has not proven the extent of non-compliance with the requirement and therefore cannot show the amount of any loss. Second, Terrenus has not proven that the non-compliance resulted in any structural risks and therefore cannot show that it has suffered any loss.
(1) Terrenus fails to establish extent of non-compliance
- [35]
[35] I find that Terrenus has not sufficiently proven the extent of the non-compliance with the specified minimum embedment depth of 500mm for the PEG Rods. Even if Terrenus did suffer loss (aside from infringement of rights) caused by the non-compliance, I find that Terrenus failed to establish the amount of such loss. There were numerous difficulties with Terrenus’s evidence:
(a) first, I accept Attika’s submission that it is clear on the evidence that the Joint Inspection Reports were not “joint inspections” at all and were in fact made by Terrenus acting alone. Mr Bong conceded this outright. While this does not change the fact that the Joint Inspection Reports are still part of Mr Bong’s own evidence, there is no basis for the veneer of impartiality that was put forward by presenting it as having been derived from “joint inspections”. Terrenus also did not call Mr Lim or anybody from SolarGy to give supporting evidence;
(b) second, Mr Bong accepted that not all of the 847 photographs relied on by Terrenus to show non-complaint PEG Rods and substantiate the Joint Inspection Reports, are actually non-compliant PEG Rods. Instead, compliant PEG Rods were also photographed;
(c) third, although Terrenus relies on these 847 photographs to support its case that the marking of 971 affected solar panels in the Joint Inspection Reports is reliable, not a single photograph was matched to any PEG Rod for the solar panels that were marked as affected. Mr Bong accepted that it is unclear which photograph relates to which solar panel, and that such matching could have been done for all 71 solar arrays, and that matching ought to have been done, so that there can be reliable evidence for the court. It is notable that when Mr Bong re-surveyed six solar arrays on request of Mr Satchell, the number of solar panels marked as being affected by non-compliant PEG Rods was reduced from the number marked in the Joint Inspection Reports. This further underscored the unreliability of Mr Bong’s evidence in the Joint Inspection Reports. There is also no explanation as to why no photographs had been taken of the PEG Rods during the re-survey, to verify that the marked solar panels were indeed affected;
(d) fourth, I accept Attika’s submission that the method of measurement itself casts doubt on the accuracy of the measurements. The photographs do not show the starting point of the measurement but only a cropped image of the end of the measuring tape. It is hence unclear if the starting point is correctly placed to show insufficient embedment. This is exacerbated by the cumulative effect of other methodological issues. Importantly, the photographs depict that some of the measurements had been taken in a slanted manner, rather than flush with the PEG Rod. Even assuming that the measurements were taken from the correct starting point, the deviation would undoubtedly increase the measurement and give the impression of insufficient embedment. At trial, Mr Bong accepted that a slant affects the accuracy of the measurements but asserted that there would at most be a difference of 5–10mm. However, there was no evidence or explanation to support this assertion and no evidence of how this would affect the total number of non-compliant PEG Rods, as the photographs depict instances of borderline non-compliance. Mr Bong further testified that he took into account this margin of error by beginning his measurement from the ground plate, rather than from the actual surface of the ground. Mr Bong reasoned that had he measured from the ground, the measurements would be greater and therefore show a greater extent of insufficient embedment, as “about 40%” of the ground plates were suspended above rather than sitting flat on the ground. This did not in any way address the inaccuracies brought about by slanted measurements, which are wholly distinct from whether such leeway was given. Moreover, there was no evidence adduced to support Mr Bong’s claim that about 40% of the ground plates were suspended; and
(e) for completeness, I reject Terrenus’s submission that Attika bears the burden of showing the significance of Mr Bong’s inaccurate measurements. It is for Terrenus to prove the extent of the non-compliance to prove its claim.
- [36]
[36] For the forgoing reasons, I find that the “Joint Inspection” Reports are unreliable. This gravely undermines Attika’s ability to discharge its burden of proving the extent of the non-compliance, as Attika relies upon the Joint Inspection Reports as proof of non-compliance in respect of 65 solar arrays (above at [17]). Furthermore, this flaw taints Mr Satchell’s estimation, which Attika relies on to prove its case for the remaining six solar arrays.
- [37]
[37] In its Closing Submissions, Terrenus submits that a “sampling approach” suffices to discharge its burden of proving the extent of non-compliance and that there is no need for a photograph matched to every single defect. Terrenus submits that the latter would result in an “unreasonably onerous burden of proof” given that “there are tens of thousands of solar panels and legs”. I observe that this might have been somewhat overstated given that Terrenus’s case was initially that 2,733 solar panels were affected. In support of this submission, Terrenus relies on Ramo Industries Pte Ltd v DLE Solutions Pte Ltd [2020] SGHC 4 (at [170]) and Millenia Pte Ltd (formerly known as Pontiac Marina Pte Ltd) v Dragages Singapore Pte Ltd (formerly known as Dragages et Travaux Publics (Singapore) Pte Ltd) and others (Arup Singapore Pte Ltd, third party) [2019] 4 SLR 1075 (“Millenia”). However, the defects in those cases arose in relation to standardised, manufactured products. In contrast, the defects in this case are alleged to arise from installing solar panels on a flat gradient notwithstanding a slope profile (above at [16]) and Mr Satchell admitted that the type of slope, and whether there is even a slope to begin with, depends entirely on the specific location of each solar array. Consequently, it is questionable whether Mr Satchell’s estimation can even be properly regarded as an instance of the “sampling approach”.
- [38]
[38] More fundamentally, the difficulty with Terrenus’s case is not whether it is permissible to take a “sampling approach” here, but that even if I accept that Mr Satchell’s estimation was based on such an approach, the samples relied on in the estimation itself were ridden with extensive measurement and identification problems. The issue is not, as Terrenus submits, whether it is necessary to have one photograph for every one defect. The issue is that, even within what Terrenus claims to be a “sample”, there is insufficient assurance that the measurements are sufficiently accurate for any extrapolation to even be made. I accept that what suffices as adequate proof of loss varies depending on the relevant factual matrix and that there is potentially some room to argue that less might be required if there are serious practical difficulties in providing precise evidence (as Terrenus alleges in this case). Nevertheless, if a claimant seeks to rely on a more flexible approach to proof, the law nevertheless requires that the claimant demonstrate that it has attempted its level best to prove its loss and that the available evidence is cogent (Robertson Quay at [27]–[31]). I find that Terrenus has failed to do so. Crucially, the fundamental assumption that Mr Satchell’s estimate is based upon, that there is non-compliance within a given area because the solar arrays rest on sloping ground (above at [16]), was not supported by any other evidence such as a topological survey. The foundational basis of Mr Satchell’s estimate therefore rests on unstable ground.
- [39]
[39] As Mr Satchell’s analysis and estimates are based predominantly on the data provided by Mr Bong, Mr Satchell’s analysis and estimates are consequently also plagued by the same issues of unreliability and inaccuracy arising from Mr Bong’s Joint Inspection Reports and photographs (above at [35]). Mr Satchell testified that he relied on the Joint Inspection Reports and that Terrenus did not provide him with any means to verify Mr Bong’s data. Where the basis or starting point for an expert report is shaky or flawed, the conclusion arrived at will be of little or no use to the court (Khoo Bee Keong v Ang Chun Hong and another [2005] SGHC 128 at [68] and Turf Club Auto Emporium Pte Ltd and others v Yeo Boong Hua and others and another appeal [2019] 1 SLR 214 at [12]). Indeed, this was exemplified when Mr Satchell revised his initial analysis and tendered a new estimate during the trial. This was because Mr Satchell had realised that the data in the Joint Inspection Reports had been “misleading”, and the re-survey requested by Mr Satchell proved that his initial estimate had incorrectly identified compliant PEG Rods as being non-compliant. Mr Satchell also considered his own evidence to be a “best estimate” rather than an “accurate measurement”.
- [40]
[40] As alluded to, I also found difficulties with Mr Satchell’s analysis. Expert opinion must be rational and coherent. Mr Satchell’s fundamental assumption is that there is non-compliance within a given area between non-compliant data points because the solar arrays rest on sloping ground. His estimate is entirely and exclusively based on this assumption. However, there are critical flaws with Mr Satchell’s hypothesis.
(a) There are data points (assuming that they are correct) which do not cohere with his hypothesis. For example, in respect of array A06, Mr Satchell accepted at trial that there is in fact not much of a slope, but he nevertheless marked the panels within the area as non-compliant. Mr Satchell was not able to satisfactorily explain why he did so. Mr Satchell’s estimate is thus internally inconsistent.
(b) Even within the six arrays where the re-survey was carried out, Mr Satchell was not able to rationalise how he decided upon the shape of the marked area of non-compliance. To illustrate, for array C28, Mr Satchell initially marked out an area in the shape of a triangle, with all panels within the marked area being estimated as being non-compliant. However, Mr Satchell subsequently revised this estimate by changing the marked area into the shape of a chevron. This was because data point 15, which fell within the initial triangular area, was discovered to have in fact been sufficiently embedded. Mr Satchell addressed this by simply shifting the base of the triangle past data point 15, resulting in a chevron shape. In my view, this veered on being arbitrary. Mr Satchell’s only explanation was to concede that the accuracy of the estimation would depend on the number of data points available.
(c) Mr Satchell’s extrapolation of his hypothesis to the other remaining solar arrays was wholly speculative. He admitted that he could not provide any assurance that all of the arrays were on sloped ground, and that the extrapolation was purely an assumption. He accepted that the existence and type of slope profile depended on localised ground conditions, and he did not have any data points for the other arrays. He accepted that he did not have any theoretical basis for assuming that there were slopes in the other arrays and, if so, what were the slope profiles, and that when he extrapolated his hypothesis to the other arrays, it was based on pure conjecture.
(d) Despite his acknowledgement that he did not have any theoretical basis for his extrapolation to the other 65 arrays, Mr Satchell maintained in court that as an expert, he considered it reasonable to extrapolate just purely on the basis of the shading in the Joint Inspection Reports without any additional supporting data points. Far from providing comfort, this steadfast willingness to maintain a position notwithstanding the acknowledged absence of any theoretical basis or data supporting that position, called into serious question the impartiality and credibility of his assessment. A bare conclusory statement unsupported by any foundation or explanation has little evidential value.
- [41]
[41] Mr Satchell’s estimation is plainly not “the most cogent evidence of loss available in the given circumstances” [emphasis in original] (Robertson Quay at [36]). I find that this further undermines Attika’s ability to discharge its burden of proving the extent of the non-compliance, even in relation to the remaining six solar arrays.
- [42]
[42] Terrenus submits that because Mr Tan accepts that the photographs that Terrenus relies on shows some non-compliance, it is open to the court to make an adjustment to the quantities of non-compliance. Terrenus submits that this is preferable than to simply assume that there are zero non-compliances. I accept that Attika has breached the Contract (above at [31]), as the degree of non-compliance was non-zero. However, Terrenus provides no basis or framework whatsoever from which a sound and rational adjustment can be made, even after multiple rounds of written submissions.
- [43]
[43] I hence find that Terrenus has not sufficiently proven its case on the extent of non-compliance, even on its revised case (above at [17]). The narrowing of scope does not help Terrenus’s case given the fundamental flaws in the evidence adduced. As Terrenus cannot establish with any certainty the amount of loss suffered as a matter of evidence, it is at best entitled only to nominal damages (Biofuel Industries Pte Ltd v V8 Environmental Pte Ltd and another appeal [2018] 2 SLR 199 (“Biofuel”) at [44]).
(2) Terrenus has not established structural risks
- [44]
[44] I also find that Terrenus has not proven its case that the non-compliance with the minimum embedment depth of 500mm creates the alleged structural risks. This is fatal to Terrenus’s claim for substantial damages. Even if Terrenus could prove the quantity of non-compliant PEG Rods, I find that Terrenus has not established that the non-compliance causes any loss.
- [47]
[47] However, the evidence given by the structural experts during the JCSE shows that the structural risk alleged by Terrenus does not arise the moment there is any deviation from the specified minimum embedment depth of 500mm.
- [48]
[48] Before delving into the experts’ evidence, it is useful to set out briefly the legal principles applicable to assessing the experts’ evidence. In choosing between conflicting expert testimony, the court will have regard to their logic, common sense, coherence, as well as the objective evidence before the court (Lee Hsien Loong v Review Publishing Co Ltd and another and another suit [2007] 2 SLR(R) 453 at [105]; Armstrong, Carol Ann (executrix of the estate of Peter Traynor, deceased, and on behalf of the dependents of Peter Traynor, deceased) v Quest Laboratories Pte Ltd and another and other appeals [2020] 1 SLR 133 at [92]).
- [49]
[49] In Mr Satchell’s expert report, he wholly adopts Jurchen’s static calculations and therefore concludes that the minimum embedment depth is 500mm. Mr Satchell opines that insufficient embedment less than 500mm in depth leads to loss of structural integrity and increased risk of structural failure in the event of a design-level wind event. In Mr Sim’s expert report, he opines that the stipulated minimum embedment depth of 500mm was a generalisation that was not based on the actual pull-out test results. Mr Sim therefore carried out his own calculations to verify the actual minimum embedment depth, based on the actual pull-out test results. Mr Sim calculated that the minimum embedment depth is 400mm rather than 500mm. In Mr Satchell’s second report, Mr Satchell reiterates his view “that non-compliance with [the contractual minimum embedment of 500mm] leads to risk of failure of the solar array structure due to wind uplift”. Mr Satchell did not offer an alternative calculation, but provided criticism of Mr Sim’s calculations, such as by pointing out that Mr Sim had failed to consider the fact that a designer has to design for a worse case uplift scenario.
- [50]
[50] It was agreed between the structural experts that Jurchen designed the mounting structures with reference to the Eurocode, and that this was a valid approach to the design of the mounting structures. However, they differ in opinion on whether Jurchen’s stipulated minimum depth of 500mm was calculated based on the actual results of the pull-out tests. Mr Sim observes that the pull-out tests had been conducted with a pre-determined ramming depth of 500mm, without any indication as to how this depth of 500mm was reached. Put simply, the pull-out tests conducted at the Solar Farm tested the resistance of PEG Rods rammed to a depth of 500mm, rather than testing the minimum embedment depth required to ensure that PEG Rods are sufficiently resistant.
- [51]
[51] The experts agreed that Jurchen had used the design windspeed of 20m/s, and that this windspeed was based on the reference height of a building with a height of 10m. At the JCSE, the experts agreed that there was no risk of structural failure at windspeeds of 2.5m/s to 10m/s. They further agreed that non-compliance with the Eurocode does not mean that a structural risk necessarily arises, as design codes incorporate a safety margin.
- [52]
[52] As for the applicable windspeed, Mr Satchell adopted the figures used in Jurchen’s static calculation. Mr Chua, on the other hand, opined that the windspeed of 20m/s used for the design calculations required considerable elevation from the surface. The solar panels are about 1.5m in height. Mr Chua provided calculations based on three academic articles, that resulted in a windspeed of around 7.9m/s to 10m/s for the area of the Solar Farm. This took into consideration the fact that the solar panels were much closer to the ground than 10m high buildings (Mr Chua’s calculations assumed a height of 2m) and was based on a classification of the Project site as having wind conditions between sub-urban and open terrain due to the presence of some low-rise buildings near Changi Business Park. Mr Chua testified that he took a more conservative position of 10m/s (instead of 7.9m/s) as the actual applicable windspeed at the Solar Farm. With the only variable being a change in windspeed from 20m/s to 10m/s from Mr Sim’s original calculations, Mr Chua calculated the required minimum embedment depth at about 360mm.
- [53]
[53] Terrenus questions Mr Chua’s analysis. Terrenus submits that Mr Chua conceded that for the terrain of the Project (which is airport-like or flat) it was reasonable to design for the peak windspeed at a reference height of 12m experienced in an urban area as opposed to a reference height of 1m. Hence, Terrenus submits that Mr Chua’s thesis of a windspeed of 10m/s, which Terrenus submits was predicated on a reference height of less than 2m rather than the established recommended reference height of 10m, is not supported even on Mr Chua’s materials. To properly contextualise this submission, it is necessary to set out the relevant extracts Terrenus relies upon, which was an exchange between Mr Chua and Mr Teo Wei Xian Kelvin (Zhang Weixian Kelvin) (“Mr Teo”), counsel for Terrenus, during the JCSE:
- [54]
[54] As seen from the above extract, the proposition that was put to Mr Chua was the inverse of the proposition set out in the academic article. The article states that it is reasonable to utilise the peak gust speeds experienced at an airport as the designed windspeed for buildings up to about 12m in a city or town. This is conservative for city designs because the windspeeds experienced in flat terrain are higher than that experienced in cities. However, the proposition put by Mr Teo was that it is reasonable to utilise the peak windspeeds experienced at a height of 12m when designing for structures in airport-like conditions. Although Mr Chua appeared to respond affirmatively to Mr Teo’s question, I consider that Terrenus’s reliance on the purported concession is flawed for two reasons. First, Mr Chua’s evidence is that the reference height used was an elevation of 10m, not 2m. Mr Chua was calculating the windspeed. The crux of Mr Chua’s evidence is that a design windspeed of 20m/s would not realistically develop at the height of the solar panels. Second, what Terrenus relies upon is design windspeeds for buildings in cities that are up to 12m in height. However, what is in issue was not the design parameters; rather, the issue is what a reasonable windspeed that would be experienced at the height of the solar panels would be. Mr Chua drew a distinction between designing for a peak windspeed that is experienced at a height of 12m, and whether there was actual structural risk to the panels for a windspeed that develops at a height of 2m. There was no inconsistency in his explanation. The key point is that while the design of a structure might ensure that it is impervious to a “design-level wind event” to a height of 10m, the question here is whether there is a risk of structural failure for a structure that is actually at a height of (less than) 2m.
- [55]
[55] Terrenus also submits that Mr Chua subsequently accepted that the windspeed would be somewhere higher than 10m/s, but that Mr Chua was not sure what it would be. It is not entirely clear whether Mr Chua’s purported admission was in relation to the applicable windspeed or applicable reference height. Mr Chua consistently testified that the applicable windspeed is 10m/s.
- [56]
[56] Finally, Terrenus submits that Mr Chua incorrectly applied the windspeed formula from the academic articles. Terrenus accepts that it did not put this to Mr Chua at the trial and submits that this was because Terrenus’s counsel and Mr Satchell did not have an adequate opportunity to check Mr Chua’s calculations, as they were “given only minutes” to review the literature provided at the last minute by Attika.
- [57]
[57] This submission did not fully accord with what actually transpired at trial. When Attika introduced the articles, I had queried Attika’s counsel as to whether it would be too much material for Mr Satchell to go through during a stand down. Counsel for Attika agreed that the material would be initially limited to Exhibit D2. Mr Chua’s calculation was also based on the calculations in Mr Sim’s report, with all parameters remaining the same, except for the reduced windspeed. While counsel for Terrenus highlighted his concern that the academic articles had been adduced belatedly, and his specific concern that multiple parameters were changing, he also stated that if it was “just a wind speed change”, Terrenus would “deal with it because it’s just a one pointer.” Counsel then asked for 15 minutes to confer with Mr Satchell and discuss the academic articles and Mr Chua’s calculations. I allowed this request. The hearing was then stood down for 25 minutes, after which counsel for Terrenus informed the court that he was ready to proceed. Given that Terrenus chose to proceed after standing down, and the alleged error in applying the formula was not put to Mr Chua, I do not consider it fair, in the circumstances, for Terrenus to raise this now.
- [58]
[58] However, I do note that Mr Chua accepted that there were potential issues affecting the accuracy of Mr Sim’s calculations, which Mr Chua had used as the basis for his calculation of a minimum embedment depth of 360mm.
- [59]
[59] In any event, Terrenus’s own structural expert, Mr Satchell, agreed with Mr Chua that as a matter of principle, windspeeds would be reduced at lower heights. Mr Satchell was asked if he would intuitively agree with this or if he needed to study the paper. Mr Satchell did not ask for more time to study the paper and agreed with the proposition as a point of general principle. While Mr Satchell did not completely accept that 10m/s would be the applicable windspeed, he did expressly confirm that it would be less than 20m/s, in light of the evidence and agreed principles. However, he was not able to come to a firm view on the precise windspeed. Mr Satchell was able to provide a rough estimate that if the windspeed was dropped by 20%, consistent with the Hong Kong code, that would result in an approximate windspeed of 18m/s. This would mean that an embedment depth of around 400–450mm would be adequate. For avoidance of doubt, I accept Terrenus’s submission that Mr Satchell should not be taken to have conceded that the correct applicable windspeed was 18m/s, as it was a ballpark figure. Accordingly, it follows that I do not believe that Mr Satchell was conceding that the minimum embedment depth was 400–450mm. What Mr Satchell’s evidence does demonstrate, however, is his agreement with the principle that windspeeds would be reduced at lower heights.
- [60]
[60] At this juncture, I reiterate that Terrenus’s case is that a failure to strictly comply with the stipulated minimum embedment depth of 500mm would lead to the risk of pull-out or structural failure during a “design-level wind event”. The evidence led at the JCSE thus critically undermines Terrenus’s case. First, Mr Satchell’s acceptance of the principle that windspeed is lower when closer to the ground and his acceptance that the windspeed is less than 20m/s, means that Mr Satchell effectively accepted that an embedment depth of less than 500mm could suffice. Therefore, even though the experts were unable to agree on the exact applicable windspeed, their consensus that it would be less than 20m/s means that any minute departure from the stipulated depth of 500mm, which was premised on a windspeed of 20m/s, would not necessarily lead to the alleged risk. Second, Mr Satchell’s concession that non-compliance with a code would not necessarily create a risk of structural failure means that a departure from the stipulated depth of 500mm, which was premised on the Eurocode, did not necessarily create a risk of structural failure.
- [61]
[61] In the light of this, it is not necessary for me to decide which expert’s view is correct. I observe, however, that while Mr Satchell found Mr Chua’s calculation based on a windspeed of 10m/s to be aggressive, Mr Satchell did not explain why this was the case, save that it was a significant drop from the design windspeed of 20m/s, which caused him some concern. While I fully appreciate that Mr Satchell may not have had enough time for a detailed critique or review of the materials, he was able to pose questions regarding the basis of Mr Chua’s calculations and provide his estimated views given the agreed principles.
- [62]
[62] The Jurchen Email also casts doubt on Terrenus’s position. In that email, Jurchen’s representative, Mr Nir Dekel (“Mr Dekel”), informed Attika that the minimum depth of 500mm was guidance provided on the assumption that the top 200mm of surface soil would be eroded during the project. The relevant extract from their email correspondence is set out below:
- [63]
[63] As Attika submits, it appears from this exchange that Jurchen’s position is that the minimum depth required for stability is 300mm rather than 500mm. In response, Terrenus submits that Mr Dekel had been misled into giving the comments on embedment depth. Terrenus then relies on a subsequent email dated 10 January 2022, which sets out the following exchange:
- [64]
[64] Terrenus submits that in the above exchange, Mr Dekel qualified his earlier advice to Attika in the Jurchen Email by saying that the advice was generic and “not project specific”. Terrenus focuses on this in support of its case that Mr Dekel walked back on his earlier advice that 300mm was effectively sufficient.
- [65]
[65] However, despite Terrenus specifically asking Mr Dekel if such advice supersedes its earlier emails to the effect that Attika should seek approval from SolarGy and Terrenus should Attika have any proposal for alternative installation specifications which are not in compliance, Mr Dekel did not specifically respond. Notably, Mr Dekel did not expressly take back his earlier statement to Attika communicating that the minimum embedment depth of 500mm was guidance applicable “regardless of the type of soil and the pullout loads” and that the effective requirement was for an embedment depth of 300mm (ignoring projected soil erosion).
- [66]
[66] In my view, Mr Dekel’s statement was, on its face, applicable to the Project. Indeed, the context of the Jurchen Email shows that Mr Dekel’s response was situated within a discussion specifically on the Project. In an earlier email dated 7 December 2021 in the same chain, Attika asked Mr Dekel to confirm if soil topping up was an acceptable solution if the PEG Rods were unable to penetrate 500mm into the ground. In response, Mr Dekel himself questioned Attika specifically on the “soil at Changi Business Park”. This email exchange was sent two days prior to the Jurchen Email and was the most recent exchange. This made it improbable that the advice rendered was generic and “not project specific”. The fact that the guidance depth of 500mm was applicable regardless of the type of soil or pull-out loads also appears to be consistent with Mr Sim’s observation the pull-out tests had been conducted with a pre-determined ramming depth of 500mm (above at [49]).
- [67]
[67] Hence, on the face of the emails, it appears that Jurchen did not actually take back its earlier stated position in the Jurchen Email. At the very least, there are doubts about whether Jurchen did so. Neither party disputed that Mr Dekel made the statements and sent the emails. Neither party called Mr Dekel to clarify. In the absence of such clarification, there is prima facie evidence from Jurchen, the supplier of the PEG Rods, that casts doubt on whether a failure to strictly comply with the stipulated 500mm embedment depth would necessarily create the alleged structural risks. This is significant as Terrenus’s submissions focus on undermining the evidence of the other structural experts, and its positive case relies mainly upon Jurchen’s static calculations.
- [68]
[68] Contrary to Terrenus’s submission, the burden of proof does not lie on Attika. The burden remains on Terrenus to show both the fact of damage and its amount. Taking into consideration the overall evidence, I find that Terrenus has not proven that a failure to strictly comply with the stipulated embedment depth of 500mm would result in the alleged structural risk. Terrenus therefore fails to prove that it suffered any loss for which it is entitled to substantial damages. Terrenus is therefore entitled only to nominal damages (Biofuel at [44]).
- [69]
[69] I observe in passing, that the loss which Terrenus claims to suffer is an uncertain and unquantified increased risk of structural failure upon the occurrence of what both the parties and the experts regarded as an unlikely event, rather than actual structural failure or instability, or even an imminent risk. This raises several interesting questions, such as whether a speculative future loss suffices as loss for the purposes of claiming substantial damages for breach of contract, whether a claim for increased risk of a potential future loss is too remote to be recoverable, and whether the probability of a risk eventuating (if quantifiable) should interact with the quantum of damages awarded so as to avoid overcompensation. The parties also did not provide submissions on these issues. Given my findings above, I need not address these questions.
(3) Appropriate method of rectification
- [70]
[70] As Terrenus has not proven its case on the extent of non-compliance nor its case that any non-compliance with the 500mm embedment depth would result in the alleged structural risk, the issue of the appropriate measure of rectification, assuming that rectification is the appropriate basis of damages, does not arise for my consideration. I observe that while there theoretically could be diminution in value, such a claim is similarly impossible to advance given that Terrenus has not sufficiently proven the extent of non-compliance, even in a broad fashion using reliable methods, such that the court can assess any diminution in value. Nor has Terrenus provided any submissions or evidence of what such diminution in value should be.
(4) Conclusion
- [71]
[71] In the circumstances, while I find that Attika is in breach for some failure to comply with the contractual requirement of a minimum embedment depth of 500mm for PEG Rods, Terrenus has failed to prove its case on the extent of non-compliance and failed to show that the breach resulted in any loss that justifies substantial damages. I hence award Terrenus only nominal damages in respect of such breach, fixed at $1,500.
- [72]
[72] For completeness, Attika submitted that Mr Satchell is unqualified to carry out evaluations and provide engineering advice in this jurisdiction. As I have found that Terrenus has not proven its case, even with the assistance of Mr Satchell’s testimony, I do not consider it necessary to delve into this sub-issue.
Whether Attika failed to ensure an above ground clearance of 700mm
Parties’ cases
- [73]
[73] The second substantial defect that Terrenus claims for is in relation to the ground clearance of the solar panels. This too relates to the embedment of the PEG Rods, with insufficient ground clearance being a result of over embedment. Terrenus submits that Attika breached a contractual requirement that there must be a minimum clearance of 700mm between the ground and the bottom of the solar panel array. Terrenus submits that Drawing 102 clearly shows a minimum clearance requirement of 700mm. I note that unlike the case for embedment depth, which states that 500mm is the “minimum” (above at [13]), Drawing 102 does not describe the clearance height as a minimum. There is also no equivalent to cl 2.2.17 of Annex A Part III of the MBA (above at [31]) that expressly obliges Attika to ensure that the clearance height is achieved.
- [75]
[75] Terrenus initially brought its case, on the extent of non-compliance, on the basis of Mr Satchell’s estimation that approximately 9% (3,292) of the solar panels have insufficient ground clearance. As with the estimate of insufficient embedment, Mr Satchell’s estimate also depended on Mr Bong’s Joint Inspection Reports and the same fundamental assumption of sloping ground (above at [16]). Similarly, Terrenus’s claim was revised downwards after the trial, in its Closing Submissions, on the basis of the same concessions (above at [17]). On this revised basis, Terrenus claims for 1,492 panels or 4.2% of the panels (reduced from the original claim for 3,292 panels or 9.3% of the panels). As before, Terrenus points out that Attika’s Mr Tan had conceded that there was some non-compliance, and that Attika did not produce measurements to contradict Terrenus’s evidence.
- [77]
[77] Attika does not dispute that the 700mm ground clearance was a requirement of the Contract. However, Attika submits it was nothing more than a minor requirement. As with Terrenus’s case on insufficient embedment, Attika submits that Terrenus cannot prove the extent of non-compliant solar panels because the evidence Terrenus relies upon is plagued with the same issues of unreliability and inaccuracy (above at [22]–[25]).
- [78]
[78] Attika also submits that Terrenus cannot prove that it is entitled to substantial damages.
- [79]
[79] First, Attika submits that Terrenus’s case on the necessity of using the Raymo robot is contradictory. Mr Charles Wong (“Mr Wong”), the Chief Executive Officer of the “Terrenus Energy” group, testified that Terrenus would use the Raymo robots for the entire Solar Farm. However, Terrenus’s website states that it intends “[t]o fully utilize every inch of space allocated for the project suitable crops will be planted below the solar arrays”. It is undisputed that some crops have been planted at the Solar Farm. Attika submits that, with crops planted “below the solar arrays” [emphasis added], there would be no grass to be cut below the arrays.
- [80]
[80] Second, Attika submits that the Raymo robot’s height of 510mm means that, on Terrenus’s own design, the cable trays placed under every solar array at a height of 450mm above the ground would obstruct the Raymo robot’s path. In other words, the Raymo robots could never have been used in any event.
- [81]
[81] Third, Attika submits that the loss represented by the alleged inability to use the Raymo robots must fail for being too remote, as there is no evidence that Terrenus ever informed Attika that Raymo robots or any other grass cutting robot would be used for the maintenance of the Solar Farm.
- [82]
[82] Fourth, Attika highlights that Mr Tan gave unchallenged evidence that there are other types of grass cutting robots lower in height than the Raymo robot. Attika challenges Mr Bong’s claim that Terrenus had tested one other type of robot but found it to be unsuitable as a bare statement. In any case, Attika submits that there was no reason why Terrenus could not have tested the suitability of other robots as well. Attika submits that it is implausible that only one type of robot exists that is suitable for the Project. Therefore, Terrenus has breached its duty to mitigate.
Decision
- [84]
[84] The dispute between the parties goes towards the extent of the non-compliance and the effect of the breach. I reiterate that the burden remains on Terrenus to discharge its burden of proof (above at [32]). I find that Terrenus has not met this burden as it failed to show the extent of non-compliance and that it suffered any loss that would entitle it to substantial damages.
- [85]
[85] First, there are severe problems with the Terrenus’s evidence on the extent of non-compliance. The evidence that Terrenus relies on to prove extent is Mr Satchell’s estimate and Mr Bong’s Joint Inspection Reports. As I have explained, both are fundamentally flawed (above at [35] and [38]–[40]). Briefly, the Joint Inspection Reports are of dubious reliability, and Mr Bong’s photographs reveal severe methodological issues. Even if Mr Satchell’s estimation was based on a permissible approach, the absence of basis for Mr Satchell’s fundamental assumption of sloping ground means that his estimate is of little or no use. Mr Bong candidly accepted that there was no certainty about the exact quantity of affected solar panels. I find that Terrenus has not proven the extent of non-compliance with the 700mm ground clearance requirement.
- [86]
[86] Second, I find that Terrenus has not proven that the insufficient clearance caused it to suffer loss that would entitle it to substantial damages:
(a) first, it is unclear whether the non-compliance caused any loss to Terrenus. Terrenus frames its loss as increased operation and maintenance costs but complains exclusively of the alleged inability to use the Raymo robot. While I do not place great weight on the marketing materials on Terrenus’s website, I accept Attika’s point that Terrenus cannot maintain the claim that the Raymo robots were to be used for the entire Solar Farm. Mr Wong did not dispute that parts of the Solar Farm are being used for farming, although he asserted that this would be “very close” but not “underneath” the panels. Mr Bong also testified that Terrenus had in fact nevertheless purchased the Raymo robot, which was already being used at the Solar Farm. It is therefore clear that any non-compliance did not prevent Terrenus from using the Raymo robot entirely. Terrenus appears to have realised the difficulty in its submission, as it reframed its submission as an inability to deploy the Raymo robot only at certain areas. There is, however, no evidence of the extent to which the Raymo robot was obstructed. In any event, Mr Bong testified that Terrenus was only “just recently” able to contact a distributor for the Raymo robot. Terrenus therefore cannot claim that it suffered any loss from the inability to use the Raymo robot prior to this point, as Terrenus had not in any event been able to procure it until recently;
(b) second, the loss is, in any event, too remote. There is no mention of the use of robots or the Raymo robots in the Contract, and there is no evidence that Attika was ever aware that Terrenus had planned to use such a robot or any particular grass-cutting robot. The alleged loss, being a specific inability to use the Raymo robot, falls under the second limb of Hadley v Baxendale (1854) 9 Exch 341 (“Hadley v Baxendale”) which requires Terrenus to prove special knowledge. Terrenus cannot avoid this principle by attempting to reframe its alleged loss at a higher degree of generality as an increase in operations and maintenance costs; and
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