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Grounds publishedDecided 2 Mar 2023
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General Division of the High Court

Cheung Phei Chiet v Jujun Tanu and another matter

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[2023] SGHC 51Case no. Originating Summons No 808 of 2021

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Grounds of decision

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] The present applications, namely Originating Summons No 808 of 2021 (“OS 808”) and Originating Summons No 809 of 2021 (“OS 809”), are the latest in a series of acrimonious and bitter disputes between two small groups of subsidiary proprietors, namely the applicant and the respondents. They are living in a very small development along Upper East Coast Road (“the Development”). The Development comprises four commercial units on the ground floor and four residential units above them. The Development’s management corporation (“MCST”) is the Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No. 508 (“MCST 508”).

  3. [3] The Applicant in OS 808 and OS 809 (collectively, the “OSes”) is Mr Cheung Phei Chiet (“Mr Cheung”) and he is the subsidiary proprietor of Unit 53A. The respondent in OS 808 is Mr Jujun Tanu (“Mr Tanu”) and he is the subsidiary proprietor of Unit 55. The respondents in OS 809 are a husband-wife duo, Mdm Cheong Yoke Ling (“Mdm Cheong”) and Mr Chang Chih-Tung Charles (“Mr Chang”). Both are the subsidiary proprietors of Unit 53. They hold Unit 53 in their capacity as executors and trustees for the estate of Mr Cheong Kim Koek, with the title of the unit being transferred to them in January 2021. Both Units 53 and 55 are commercial units on the ground floor of the Development. Unit 53A is a residential unit located at the Development that is directly above Unit 53.

  4. [4] The other subsidiary proprietors in the Development are not parties in the OSes. However, as will be described below, some of them have also featured prominently in the background disputes leading up to the present applications. These include Mr Parameshwara s/o Krishnasamy (“Mr Param”) and his wife, Ms Sarah Shoba Aroul Stashe Aroul (“Ms Aroul”), who are the subsidiary proprietors of Unit 59A at the Development. The present subsidiary proprietor of Unit 59 is One Metal Investment Holdings Pte Ltd (“One Metal”). Mdm Loh Sook Cheng (“Mdm Loh”) was the previous subsidiary proprietor of Unit 59. She was also involved in a past dispute with MCST 508.

  5. [5] Mr Cheung and Mr Param were the initial members of MCST 508’s council. However, they have since resigned from the council in November 2021. This leaves Mdm Cheong and Mr Tanu as the only council members.

  6. [6] Mr Cheung filed the OSes against Mr Tanu, Mdm Cheong and Mr Chang (collectively “the Respondents”) seeking numerous prayers in various forms of reliefs. Most of the reliefs sought in the OSes are common and hence overlapping. The various reliefs contained in the prayers sought by Mr Cheung can be summarised into the following categories:

  7. (a) A declaration that various motions which Mdm Cheong and Mr Tanu sought to pass were unlawful, unenforceable, invalid and/or void. This is the first prayer sought in the OSes.

  8. (b) Orders to restrain the Respondents from exercising their rights as subsidiary proprietors to table motions relating to the installation of various structures on the Development’s common areas. These are the second to sixth prayers sought in the OSes.

  9. (c) Orders curtailing Mdm Cheong’s and Mr Tanu’s power to appoint Legal Solutions LLC (“Legal Solutions”) as MCST 508’s solicitors. This is the seventh prayer sought in the OSes.

  10. (d) A declaration to impose a duty on Mdm Cheong and Mr Tanu to append wet-ink signatures on MCST 508’s official documents. This is the ninth prayer sought in OS 808 and the twelfth prayer sought in OS 809.

  11. (e) Orders that seek to remove Mdm Cheong and Mr Tanu as MCST 508’s council members. This is the tenth and eleventh prayers sought in OS 808 and the thirteenth and fourteenth prayers sought in OS 809.

  12. (f) Orders that seek to impose restrictions on Mdm Cheong and Mr Chang relating to existing and allegedly unauthorised alterations in respect of Unit 53. This is the eighth to tenth prayers sought in OS 809.

  13. [7] Mr Cheung had also sought, in the eighth prayer in OS 808 and the eleventh prayer in OS 809, orders seeking to restrict MCST 508’s access to documents and information contained in MCST 508’s files kept with Aequitas Law LLP (“Aequitas”). However, Counsel for the Applicant informed the Court during oral submissions that Mr Cheung no longer wished to pursue these prayers. Accordingly, I shall not consider this matter in my judgment.

  14. [8] I shall set out the historical background between the parties to fully understand their disputes.

  15. Background

  16. Background history

  17. [9] The disputes in the OSes arose from matters that occurred largely during the events surrounding MCST 508’s formation and tenure of the council in 2021 and 2022.

  18. Formation of the 2021 Council

  19. [10] Prior to the formation of the council in 2021 (“the 2021 Council”), Mr Cheung and Mr Param were the only two council members of MCST 508 from 2017 to 2020.

  20. [11] During MCST 508’s Annual General Meeting held on 30 December 2020 (“the 2020 AGM”), Mr Tanu participated through his proxy, while Mdm Cheong, Mr Cheung and Mr Param attended the meeting in person. The meeting at the 2020 AGM, however, was extremely acrimonious. Mr Tanu’s proxy was not allowed to speak or vote at the 2020 AGM on his behalf because he was allegedly in arrears. When it was time to consider the formation of a new council for 2021 at the 2020 AGM, Mr Cheung and Mr Param took the position that Mr Tanu did not qualify to be nominated as a council member given that he was allegedly in arrears and Mdm Cheong did not qualify as she was only an executor.

  21. [12] Although Mdm Cheong and Mr Tanu eventually became council members for the 2021 Council, there remained numerous disputes between the parties at the 2020 AGM. Thus, many of the motions brought up at the 2020 AGM were ultimately deadlocked. This included the motion empowering the 2021 Council to appoint office bearers. As a result, the 2021 Council did not have any office bearers.

  22. The 2021 Council

  23. [13] The 2021 Council was a split council, with Mr Cheung and Mr Param usually on one side and Mdm Cheong and Mr Tanu on the other side. It was an acrimonious situation. Any attempts to hold a council meeting, whether physically or by correspondence, were futile. The fact remained that the 2021 Council never held its first council meeting. Accordingly, there were no collective decisions made by MCST 508 in the year 2021.

  24. [14] As a consequence, Mr Cheung and Mr Param did not inform or involve Mdm Cheong and Mr Tanu, and they proceeded to make several decisions for MCST 508 on their own accord. These included the appointment and instruction of their own solicitors, Aequitas, to act for MCST 508 in CA/CA 6 of 2021 (“CA 6”), which was a dispute involving MCST 508 and Mdm Loh, the previous subsidiary proprietor of Unit 59. They also procured insurance for MCST 508 and made payment to vendors appointed for MCST 508’s benefit without involving Mdm Cheong and Mr Tanu. Mr Cheung and Mr Param had also appointed Singapore Accounting and Business Services Ltd (“SABS”) to provide bookkeeping and accounting services to MCST 508. This was also done without informing Mdm Cheong and Mr Tanu. The non-consultative manner in which Mr Cheung and Mr Param had conducted themselves in running the 2021 Council to the exclusion of Mdm Cheong and Mr Tanu showed the extent to which they vehemently refused to work with their fellow council members. The bitterness that both camps harboured for each other is clearly evident.

  25. Mdm Cheong’s and Mr Tanu’s attempts to requisition an EGM

  26. [15] On 21 April 2021, Mdm Cheong and Mr Tanu attempted to requisition an extraordinary general meeting (“EGM”) pursuant to paragraph 14(1) of the First Schedule to the Building Maintenance and Strata Management Act (Cap 30C, 2008 Rev Ed) (“BMSMA”). They sent a letter to Mr Cheung and Mr Param to inform them that they wished to convene an EGM (“the 1st EGM”) to pass a total of 14 ordinary resolutions (“the 21 April Letter”). On 30 April 2021, Mr Cheung and Mr Param replied that they objected to the calling of the 1st EGM. On 17 May 2021, Mdm Cheong and Mr Tanu sent a further letter setting out additional motions which they wished to pass for the 1st EGM (“the 17 May Letter”).

  27. Commencement of OS 808 and OS 809

  28. [16] On 21 July 2021, Mdm Cheong and Mr Tanu served on all the subsidiary proprietors of the Development a Notice to convene the 1st EGM on 14 August 2021 to pass the proposed ordinary resolutions as set out in the 21 April Letter and the 17 May Letter. In response, Mr Cheung filed the OSes against Mr Tanu and Mdm Cheong seeking the various reliefs.

  29. (a) Mdm Cheong and Mr Tanu will submit to all council members of MCST 508 by 18 August 2021 a fresh requisition for all 22 proposed resolutions with the necessary amendments, if any.

  30. (b) In the event that the council members do not convene an EGM within 14 days of receipt of the requisition, Mdm Cheong and Mr Tanu shall be entitled to call for an EGM in relation to the proposed fresh requisitions pursuant to para 14(3) of the First Schedule to the BMSMA.

  31. Events following Mr Cheung’s and Mr Param’s resignation

  32. [19] On 10 November 2021, Mr Cheung and Mr Param resigned from the 2021 Council. Therefore, Mdm Cheong and Mr Tanu became the only two remaining members of the 2021 Council.

  33. [20] Following Mr Cheung’s and Mr Param’s resignation, Mdm Cheong and Tanu were left to deal with the various matters and decisions mentioned above at [14] which Mr Cheung and Mr Param had previously handled without involving Mdm Cheong and Mr Tanu. Thus, Mdm Cheung and Mr Tanu were left groping in the dark regarding the affairs of MCST 508. This was because Mr Cheung and Mr Param failed to conduct a proper handover of documents, information and assets of MCST 508 to Mdm Cheong and Mr Tanu. Mr Cheung and Mr Param had sent a letter dated 9 November 2021 to Mdm Cheong and Mr Tanu that they could collect MCST 508’s chequebook and the key to MCST 508’s electrical switchboard from Aequitas. They also informed Mdm Cheong and Mr Tanu that MCST 508’s accounting documents were with SABS and that Mdm Cheong and Mr Tanu could collect them from SABS.

  34. [21] In a letter dated 15 November 2021, Mr Cheung and Mr Param informed Mdm Cheong and Mr Tanu that the Police had requested them to preserve documents relating to MCST 508. This was purportedly to assist in Police investigations regarding the allegation that Mdm Cheong had forged MCST 508’s documents. Thus, they were unable to hand over any documents.

  35. [22] Despite these letters, Mdm Cheong and Mr Tanu did not receive any of the said documents and the key from Mr Cheung or Mr Param, nor were they able to obtain these documents through their own means. For instance, when Mdm Cheong called Aequitas about the key to MCST 508’s electrical switchboard, Aequitas had informed her that they had neither the key nor MCST 508’s chequebook. Further, in relation to the accounting documents that were with SABS, Mdm Cheong had attempted to contact and liaise with SABS on numerous occasions via phone, letters and emails throughout the month of December 2021. However, SABS was unresponsive for the most part.

  36. [23] Mdm Cheong had also contacted the Police to enquire about the status of the investigations regarding her alleged forgery. The Police informed Mdm Cheong that they had completed the investigations and would not be taking further action on the matter. The Police had also issued a letter dated 19 November 2021 stating the same. Despite this, Mr Cheung and Mr Param refused to hand over the documents to Mdm Cheong. Thus, Mdm Cheong and Mr Tanu did not receive any of the said documents and the key from Mr Cheung or Mr Param, nor were they able to obtain these documents through their own means.

  37. [24] It was only in late 2021 and early 2022, following the formation of the new council for 2022 (“the 2022 Council”), that some of MCST 508’s accounting documents and the electrical switchboard key and chequebook were handed over to Mdm Cheong and Mr Tanu. Even then, Mr Cheung and Mr Param continued to hold on to most of MCST 508’s documents, information and assets, including MCST 508’s CCTV passwords, security tokens and other access passwords. Mdm Cheong and Mr Tanu thus had access to very limited documents. Mr Cheung and Mr Param did not hand over the contracts and appointment letters of third-party vendors appointed in 2021 by MCST 508. Mdm Cheong and Mr Tanu were also not provided with the original bank statements relating to MCST 508’s bank account. Any requests made by Mdm Cheong and Mr Tanu for the delivery of the remainder of MCST 508’s documents and assets held by Mr Cheung and Mr Param were met with refusal. All of these made it extremely difficult for Mdm Cheong and Mr Tanu to run MCST 508’s affairs as members of the 2022 Council.

  38. [25] As for the matters pertaining to CA 6, although Mdm Cheong and Mr Tanu were aware of the existence of CA 6 as early as in July 2021, they did not have a clear understanding of the nature of the issues in CA 6. Further, both Mdm Cheong and Mr Tanu did not give any instructions or approve any of the documents filed in court by Aequitas. On Mdm Cheong’s instructions, Legal Solutions wrote to Aequitas to ask for Aequitas’ warrant to act. Aequitas did not accede to Mdm Cheong’s request. On the contrary, Aequitas responded and questioned the basis for Legal Solutions’ request for the former’s warrant to act in CA 6. Mdm Cheong and Mr Tanu had also requested Aequitas, who had acted for MCST 508 in CA 6, to provide their files for inspection. Mdm Cheong and Mr Tanu also asked Aequitas to provide their invoices and breakdown of time spent for all matters that they had acted on behalf of MCST 508. However, their requests were met with refusal on Aequitas’ part. Thus, Mdm Cheong and Mr Tanu, till this day, do not understand the exact nature of the legal services which Aequitas had provided in respect of the dispute in CA 6.

  39. Formation of the 2022 Council

  40. [27] Following the cancellation of the 2nd EGM, Mdm Cheong and Mr Tanu decided that it did not make sense to hold two general meetings so close to each other. They felt that it would be more sensible to table the amended proposed resolutions at MCST 508’s 2021 annual general meeting (“the 2021 AGM”). Accordingly, in December 2021, Mdm Cheong and Mr Tanu circulated to the Development’s subsidiary proprietors the Notice and Agenda for the 2021 AGM. The 2021 AGM was scheduled to be held on 30 December 2021. Mdm Cheong and Mr Tanu, acting on behalf of MCST 508, engaged Legal Solutions to prepare the Notice and Agenda for the 2021 AGM. The Agenda for the 2021 AGM had included a majority of the resolutions that were tabled previously for the 1st EGM and the 2nd EGM, both of which did not take place. However, Mdm Cheong and Mr Tanu had, following a review of the amended proposed resolutions, decided to remove some of them as their current tenants no longer required them. Further, the subsidiary proprietor of Unit 59, One Metal, had also requested two resolutions to be included in the 2021 AGM.

  41. [28] The 2021 AGM was attended by Mdm Cheong, Mr Chang, and Mr Tanu’s proxy. As for Mr Cheung and Mr Param, they were represented by their respective proxies. During the 2021 AGM itself, only Mdm Cheong and Mr Tanu put in their nominations as council members. Apart from them, no one else put themselves forward to be council members. Accordingly, Mr Cheung and Mr Param were not appointed as council members. Following the 2021 AGM, Mdm Cheong and Mr Tanu were appointed to the 2022 Council. Further, some of the amended proposed resolutions which formed the subject matters of the OSes were voted upon at the 2021 AGM. They were not passed.

  42. Prior litigation involving the Development’s subsidiary proprietors

  43. [29] There were three key disputes in which the subsidiary proprietors of the Development were involved.

  44. DC/OSS 3 of 2020

  45. [30] The first key dispute between the parties was in the matter of DC/OSS 3 of 2020 (“OSS 3”). OSS 3 involved a dispute between Mdm Cheong and Mr Chang on the one hand, and MCST 508 on the other. While Legal Solutions represented Mdm Cheong and Mr Chang for the dispute, Aequitas represented MCST 508. The crux of the dispute involved, amongst others, Mdm Cheong’s and Mr Chang’s claim for reliefs relating to MCST 508’s right to remove certain fixtures and alterations in Unit 53 and the surrounding common property. MCST 508 on the other hand brought counterclaims against Mdm Cheong and Mr Chang seeking, amongst others, an injunction that Mdm Cheong and Mr Chang remove and rectify certain fixtures from the Property.

  46. [31] Following the hearing of the dispute in OSS 3, the District Judge found, amongst others, that there were several claims and counterclaims that could not be resolved in OSS 3 because the disputes were factual in nature. Accordingly, the District Judge in his written grounds in Cheong Yoke Ling @ Zhang Yuling and another v Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No 508 and others [2020] SGDC 295 (“Cheong Yoke Ling (SGDC)”) held at [7] that if the parties wished to further pursue these claims and counterclaims, they should proceed by writ action. It is important to note that the District Judge made no specific orders in relation to the further resolution of the unresolved claims and counterclaims brought by both parties in OSS 3. I shall elaborate on this at [144]–[145] below.

  47. CA/CA 6 of 2021

  48. [32] CA 6 is an appeal to the Court of Appeal brought by Mdm Loh in 2021 against MCST 508 following the decisions below in HC/RAS 13 of 2020 (“RAS 13”) and DC/OSS 159 of 2020 (“OSS 159”). As mentioned earlier, Mdm Loh was at that time the subsidiary proprietor of Unit 59 at the Development. The dispute below and in CA 6 relates to an action by Mdm Loh against MCST 508 to pray that the Court allow Unit 59 to undertake certain works on the Development’s common property.

  49. [33] At first instance in OSS 159, Mdm Loh succeeded in her claim against MCST 508. The details of Mdm Loh’s suit is unclear. MCST 508 then brought an appeal against the decision in OSS 159 to the High Court in RAS 13. MCST 508 succeeded in its appeal, with the High Court holding that the works sought to be undertaken entailed the installation of “permanent structures being installed on common property for the sole benefit” of Unit 59. Accordingly, the High Court held that the works required the necessary resolutions to be passed in accordance with s 33 of the BMSMA.

  50. DC/DC 2809 of 2019

  51. Issue to be determined

  52. [37] The issue is whether the Court should grant the Applicant, Mr Cheung, the reliefs sought in his prayers in OS 808 and OS 809, many of which are overlapping as stated above at [6]. I shall now consider, in turn, the various reliefs in each prayer and the parties’ respective arguments.

  53. My decision

  54. Declaration in relation to the legality of several proposed resolutions

  55. [38] The first prayer in OS 808 and OS 809 concerns the legality of proposed resolutions 10(e), 14, 17, 18, 19 and 21 in the Notice and Agenda of the 2021 AGM (“the Proposed Resolutions”). In particular, Mr Cheung seeks in his first prayer a declaration that the Proposed Resolutions are unlawful, unenforceable, invalid and/or void at law (“the First Prayer”). The First Prayer states as follows:

  56. [39] I now reproduce the Proposed Resolutions as follows:

  57. [40] I shall now consider each party’s submissions with respect to the legality of the Proposed Resolutions.

  58. The Parties’ submissions

  59. (1) The Applicant’s case

  60. [41] Mr Cheung accepts that, since the Proposed Resolutions were not passed, they were ultimately not given effect. Mr Cheung, nevertheless, seeks the First Prayer as he is of the view that the declaration granted in the First Prayer would provide a sense of finality for the parties, given the extent of the disputes between them.

  61. [42] Mr Cheung argues that the Proposed Resolutions are unlawful, unenforceable, invalid and/or void at law for the following reasons:

  62. (a) In respect of Resolution 10(e), the BMSMA does not expressly provide for the Chairman of MCST 508’s council to have a casting vote. Instead, the BMSMA provides that any decision by MCST 508’s council on any matter, where there are two or more members in that council, is based on the majority’s votes. In other words, the BMSMA requires a majority of the council members for a decision to be made. Accordingly, the effect of Resolution 10(e) at the 2021 AGM would be to empower the Chairman to render a casting vote, such that any decision made in this manner would not be made by a majority. This would, therefore, be contrary to the express wording of the BMSMA. Further, it would be inconsistent with the legislative scheme for subsidiary proprietors to be able to allow the Chairman to have the casting vote. In so far as any issues of deadlock at council meetings are concerned, this is sufficiently addressed by the provisions in the BMSMA.

  63. (b) In respect of Resolutions 14, 17, 18 and 21, these resolutions seek to confer on the Respondents exclusive use of the Development’s common property in various ways. However, these resolutions are intended to pass by way of ordinary resolutions, which Mr Cheung submits is improper. According to Mr Cheung, these resolutions do not comply with the requirements of s 33 of the BMSMA. This is because the specification in these resolutions that the exclusive use is sought for only one year is artificial, given that they are intended to be of a permanent nature and would, therefore, likely be put up for more than one year. Accordingly, it would have been necessary for these resolutions to be passed pursuant to a 90% resolution in accordance with s 33 of the BMSMA. Further, Mr Cheung argues that these resolutions are not passed in accordance with the appropriate format.

  64. (c) In respect of Resolution 19, the removal of Unit 53’s rear windows was plainly unauthorised. Mr Cheung submits that MCST 508 was not empowered to approve the same, given that the removal of these windows detracts from the appearance of the Development. In any case, the issue of reinstatement of these windows was an issue raised in an ongoing proceedings as a counterclaim by MCST 508, and the counterclaim was left to be resolved via a writ action. According to Mr Cheung, such an action is unlikely to be brought since Mdm Cheong and Mr Tanu are the only members on the council.

  65. (2) The Respondents’ case

  66. [43] The Respondents submit that the Proposed Resolutions no longer exist and are, therefore, inapplicable. Hence, Mr Cheung is not entitled to ask the Court for a declaration on matters that are no longer in existence or that are inapplicable.

  67. [44] In the alternative, the Respondents argue that the Proposed Resolutions are valid for the following reasons:

  68. (a) In respect of Resolution 10(e), the BMSMA does not prohibit the Chairman from having the casting vote, and that the purpose of the casting vote is to resolve deadlocks.

  69. (b) In respect of Resolutions 14, 17, 18 and 21, the Respondents are only seeking exclusive use of the various stated common properties at the Development for one year. Accordingly, a 90% resolution is not required when exclusive use is stated to be sought for one year under s 33 of the BMSMA. Further, there is no prescribed format for the passing of a by-law.

  70. The Court’s discretion to grant declaratory relief

  71. [45] The Court’s power to grant declaratory judgments is found in s 18 read with para 14 of the First Schedule to the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (2020 Rev Ed) (“SCJA”), and O 4, r 7 of the Rules of Court 2021 (“the Rules”) (previously O 15, r 16 of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed)).

  72. [46] Section 18 of the SCJA reads as follows:

  73. [47] Paragraph 14 of the First Schedule to the SCJA reads as follows:

  74. [49] The Court of Appeal in Salijah bte Ab Latef v Mohd Irwan bin Abdullah Teo [1996] 2 SLR(R) 80 (“Salijah”) at [50(b)] observed that the court’s power to grant a declaratory relief is discretionary in nature. Accordingly, the party seeking a declaratory relief has to show that the court’s discretion ought to be exercised in favour of granting the relief (see Sun Travels & Tours Pvt Ltd v Hilton International Manage (Maldives) Pvt Ltd [2019] 1 SLR 732 at [136]). In the exercise of the court’s discretionary power, the court has to weigh the competing considerations in deciding whether the circumstances of the specific case warrant the exercise of the discretion.

  75. [50] In Karaha Bodas Co LLC v Pertamina Energy Trading Ltd [2006] 1 SLR(R) 112 (“Karaha Bodas”), the Court of Appeal held at [14] that the following factors governed the exercise of the court’s discretionary power to grant declaratory relief:

  76. [51] Specifically in relation to requirement (d) as stated in Karaha Bodas, ie, that there must be “a real controversy”, the Court of Appeal in Tan Eng Hong v Attorney-General [2012] 4 SLR 476 (“Tan Eng Hong”) at [143] considered this requirement in detail:

  77. [52] For there to be “a real controversy” such as to warrant the court’s exercise of its discretion to grant a declaratory relief, the parties must show that there is “a real legal interest” in a case being heard. This may include, but is not limited to, a novel question of law which arises for determination.

  78. [53] However, “a real controversy” is unlikely to be established where the question is purely hypothetical. As was observed by the High Court of Australia in Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission (1992) 106 ALR 11 at 22 (per Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ):

  79. [54] Where the question posed to the court is purely hypothetical or relates to circumstances that never existed and may never exist, or if the declaration will produce no foreseeable consequences for the parties, these are countervailing factors that weigh heavily against the court’s exercise of its discretion. As the Court of Appeal in Salijah observed at [59], “in practically all cases where the issues are theoretical the courts have declined to exercise their discretion” [emphasis added]. The court in Salijah explained at [60] (citing Zamir and Woolf, The Declaratory Judgment (2nd Ed, 1993)):

  80. Accordingly, the rationale underlying the court’s reluctance to grant a declaration on hypothetical or theoretical issues is to ensure finality in litigation. In the absence of any real subsisting issue, the grant of a declaration would not be res judicata. This, in turn, encourages the parties to re-litigate the matter over and over again, which is antithetical to the general interest in ensuring finality in litigation.

  81. [55] Thus, the court should not be asked to exercise its discretion to grant a declaratory relief based on a hypothetical issue. As the Court of Appeal in Tan Eng Hong at [145] observed:

  82. Where the court is asked to make a declaration on hypothetical or academic issues, therefore, the question is whether it is in the public interest that the court grants a declaration in respect of the issue sought to be adjudicated upon. This must be correct. This is consistent with the High Court’s views in Salijah bte Ab Latef v Mohd Irwan bin Abdullah Teo [1995] 3 SLR(R) 233 at [17] that the remedy of a declaration should provide “relief” in a real sense:

  83. [56] And as the Court of Appeal in Latham Scott v Credit Suisse First Boston [2000] 2 SLR(R) 30 at [74] held, there must be a useful or practical purpose to be served before it would exercise its discretion to grant a declaration:

  84. [57] To summarise, while the grant of a declaration is a discretionary relief, the court ought to exercise its discretion carefully. The pertinent factors are whether there was a real controversy to be resolved, or if any useful or practical purpose would be served by the grant of a bare declaration. Where the issue for which a declaration is sought is hypothetical or academic in nature, the court would lean heavily against granting a declaration. The court’s intervention may be warranted if it can be shown that there is an overwhelming public interest underlying the legal issue and that any declaration made on that issue can be said to be useful or would serve a practical purpose. It is important, however, to stress that it is not merely any form of public interest that would suffice to tilt the balance in favour of granting the declaratory relief. The threshold must necessarily be a high bar. This is to discourage the inculcation of a litigious mindset and the view that the court is necessarily the most appropriate forum to resolve any and all theoretical disputes.

  85. [58] I shall now address the issue of whether the First Prayer should be granted.

  86. My analysis

  87. [59] The issue in the First Prayer is whether there is a real controversy or dispute and if the parties have a real legal interest in having the declaration granted. The answer must be in the negative.

  88. [60] At the outset, I point out that Mr Cheung’s characterisation of the Proposed Resolutions as “resolutions” is, strictly speaking, incorrect. The appropriate term to use would be “motions”. As was observed by Professor Teo Keang Sood in Strata Title in Singapore and Malaysia (Lexis Nexis, 5th ed, 2015) (“Strata Title in Singapore and Malaysia”) at para 11.107, a “motion” is defined as a “proposal for consideration at a meeting”. Where the motion is passed, only then will it become “a resolution of the management corporation”. Similarly, Belinda Ang Saw Ean J (as she then was) held in Tunas Pte Ltd v Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No 562 [2015] 5 SLR 756 at [48] (citing N E Renton, Guide for meetings and organisations vol 2: Guide for Meetings (LBC Information Services, 7th Ed, 2000) at para 4.1 and A D Lang, Horsley’s Meetings: procedure, law and practice (LexisNexis, 6th Ed, 2010 at para 11.1)) that a resolution “is a decision of a meeting of a corporate body”. Ang J further defined a resolution (citing Black’s Law Dictionary (Bryan A Garner chief ed) (Thomson Reuters, 10th Ed, 2014) as a “[f]ormal action by a corporate body … authorising a particular act, transaction or appointment”. In other words, a motion that has been voted upon and accepted by MCST 508’s council at a meeting is given legal effect in the form of a resolution. In such a case, the resolution can be said to have been validly authorised and passed in accordance with the proper procedures.

  89. [61] In the present case, it is not disputed by the parties that although the Proposed Resolutions (which are in fact motions) proposed by the Respondents were voted upon, it remains that they were in fact not passed (see [28] above). This is because the parties were in a deadlock during the 2021 AGM, such that the requisite majority was not reached. It cannot be said, therefore, that the Proposed Resolutions were passed as proper resolutions. MCST 508 thus could not be said to have authorised the Proposed Resolutions. The motions were, therefore, of no legal effect.

  90. [62] Accordingly, any declaration that the Court should render in respect of the Proposed Resolutions would necessarily be academic or hypothetical in nature. This is because the Court is asked to determine whether the Proposed Resolutions, if they had been passed, would have been unlawful, unenforceable, invalid and/or void at law. This is clearly a hypothetical question and relates to circumstances that never existed.

  91. [63] The Respondents argue that the Court should dismiss the First Prayer. In their submission, the Proposed Resolutions are non-existent and are inapplicable, and hence there is no “real controversy” that the Court is asked to decide. The Respondents’ submission is that the Court should dismiss the declaratory relief sought in the First Prayer, as the relief is sought in relation to circumstances that never existed. As I have held above at [57], however, the mere fact that the Court is asked to grant a declaratory relief in respect of an academic or hypothetical issue is not conclusive of the matter. If there exists a strong public interest in respect of the legal issue put before the Court, this will weigh in favour of the Court’s exercise of its discretion to grant the declaration sought.

  92. [64] Therefore, the question is whether there exists, in the present case, a strong public interest for the Court to render a declaration to this effect. That question is answered in the negative. Even if Mr Cheung’s allegations are made out, I am not convinced that the Court should exercise its discretion in favour of granting the declaration in the First Prayer. There is no real purpose to be served in the grant of this declaration. The Proposed Resolutions were ultimately not passed. This being the case, there is no adverse outcome that would affect Mr Cheung or the other subsidiary proprietors. For instance, Mr Cheung did not show that he or the other subsidiary proprietors suffered any prejudice or incurred any loss or damages which require redress. Any declaration that is granted would ultimately relate to an issue that is rendered moot by virtue of the fact that the Proposed Resolutions were not passed.

  93. [65] In any event, Counsel for the Applicant conceded at the oral hearing of the OSes that, if the Proposed Resolutions or motions of similar effect are ever raised again in future general meetings, it is always open to the subsidiary proprietors to raise their objections in the general meeting. There is, therefore, absolutely no reason why the declaration ought to be granted. Indeed, subsidiary proprietors who are dissatisfied with any proposed resolution should avail themselves of the internal mechanisms for objecting to a by-law in the form of the voting system contained in the BMSMA to make their objections heard.

  94. [66] Further, the Proposed Resolutions do not appear patently unlawful in any way. In so far as the Respondents, in a subsequent general meeting, are to submit the Proposed Resolutions and the resolutions are passed in accordance with the requirements set out in s 33 of the BMSMA, they ought to be valid. Accordingly, there is no real controversy for the Court to resolve, or any real relief to be provided to Mr Cheung by making the declaration that he sought.

  95. [67] I, therefore, dismiss the First Prayer.

  96. Order restraining the Respondents from raising the proposed resolutions

  97. [68] The second prayer in OS 808 and OS 809 concerns the restraining of the Respondents from introducing the Proposed Resolutions, or motions to similar effect, at general meetings (“the Second Prayer”). The Second Prayer for each of the respective OSes states as follows:

  98. [69] I pause to observe that although the wording of the Second Prayer in respect of each of the OSes are slightly different, namely that the Second Prayer in OS 809 uses the term “future general meeting” while that of OS 808 uses the term “general meeting” without the word “future”, the substance of the prayers remain the same in so far as the effect would be to prospectively restrict the Respondents from introducing motions at any general meeting.

  99. The parties’ submissions

  100. (1) The Applicant’s case

  101. (2) The Respondents’ case

  102. [71] On the other hand, the Respondents submit that the Second Prayer should not be granted because it would be against the legislative scheme of the BMSMA. In particular, it would be inconsistent with the Respondents’ statutory rights as subsidiary proprietors as prescribed under the BMSMA.

  103. My analysis

  104. [72] Given that I have dismissed the First Prayer, it follows that there exists no valid reason for me to grant the Second Prayer.

  105. [73] In any case, I accept the Respondents’ argument that the effect of the Second Prayer would be to effectively and permanently curtail the Respondents’ rights as subsidiary proprietors to propose any motions they wish for the general body’s consideration. This is an impermissible limitation that is not legally sustainable. The right of a subsidiary proprietor to put forth any motion he or she wishes for the general body’s consideration is a statutory right that is enshrined under para 12 of the First Schedule to the BMSMA, which states as follows:

  106. [74] The plain wording of paras 12(1) and 12(2) of the First Schedule makes it clear that “the secretary of the council of the management corporation must comply with the notice” [emphasis added] given by any subsidiary proprietor seeking to propose a motion in a meeting and further, that the secretary “must give effect to every requirement in every notice” [emphasis added]. The mandatory language of para 12(1) of the First Schedule reinforces the absolute right accorded to a subsidiary proprietor to put in motions in a meeting. Indeed, this right is so crucial to a subsidiary proprietor that “the right to call for a motion is also available to a subsidiary proprietor who may be in arrears in contributions because of a dispute with the council” (see Strata Title in Singapore and Malaysia at para 11.109).

  107. [75] The Second Prayer, therefore, offends the statutory rights of the Respondents as subsidiary proprietors. Accordingly, I dismiss the Second Prayer.

  108. Orders securing the Respondents’ compliance with statutory requirements under the BMSMA

  109. [76] The third and fourth prayers in OS 808 and OS 809 are framed as alternatives to the Second Prayer. The third prayer is as follows (“the Third Prayer”):

  110. The Third Prayer seeks to restrain the Respondents from tabling motions for any future general meetings which pertain to or benefit only Unit 53 or Unit 55 unless they first serve a written requisition in accordance with para 12 of the First Schedule to the BMSMA.

  111. [77] The fourth prayer is as follows (“the Fourth Prayer”):

  112. The Fourth Prayer seeks to restrain the Respondents from tabling motions for any future general meetings which seek to grant the Respondents exclusive use over common property, unless the motions are tabled in the form of a by-law and are passed pursuant to the requirements of s 33 of the BMSMA.

  113. [78] Both the Third Prayer and the Fourth Prayer, therefore, seek to secure the Respondents’ compliance with the various requirements under the BMSMA.

  114. The parties’ submissions

  115. (1) The Applicant’s case

  116. [79] In respect of the Third Prayer, Mr Cheung does not dispute that, as subsidiary proprietors, the Respondents are entitled to put forth motions for inclusion in the general meeting agenda which benefit only their units. What Mr Cheung contends is that any such motions, which the Respondents intend to put forward for consideration in a meeting, must first be requisitioned and served on the secretary of MCST 508’s council pursuant to para 12 of the First Schedule to the BMSMA. If there is no secretary, then Mr Cheung accepts that the requisition should, nonetheless, be served on all council members instead. Mr Cheung submits that the Respondents failed to serve any such written notice to the council members when deciding the agenda for the 2021 AGM.

  117. [80] Mr Cheung also alleges that para 12(3) of the First Schedule to the BMSMA contemplates the situation where notice of a general meeting had been issued before the requisition for the motions had been served. The requisitioned motions would then have to be included in the next general meeting after the meeting for which Notice had been given. Since the Respondents had sent the requisitions for the 1st EGM and the 2nd EGM prior to the notice of the EGMs being served on each subsidiary proprietor of the Development, para 12(3) of the First Schedule to the BMSMA does not apply.

  118. [81] As for the Fourth Prayer, Mr Cheung submits that the Proposed Resolutions failed to comply with the requirements under s 33 of the BMSMA for three reasons. First, while the Proposed Resolutions are framed as ordinary resolutions that purport to confer exclusive use of the common property for one year, the Proposed Resolutions in fact refer to the installation of structures that are likely to be of a permanent nature. This being the case, Mdm Cheong and Mr Tanu ought to have tabled the motions indicating that the structures are to be used for a period of more than three years, instead of tabling the motions indicating that these structures are to be maintained on the common property for a period of one year. It, therefore, follows that the by‑law, being an exclusive use by-law, must be passed pursuant to a 90% resolution as prescribed under s 33(1)(c) of the BMSMA.

  119. [82] Second, s 33(1) of the BMSMA requires an exclusive use by-law to be made pursuant to the appropriate resolution required. Mr Cheung alleges that none of the Proposed Resolutions purport to make a by-law or to set out the terms of a by-law to be passed. Mr Cheung argues that this would be contrary to the need for such resolutions to state that it intended to pass a by-law, and to provide the actual wording of the proposed by-law.

  120. [83] Third, s 33(2) of the BMSMA requires an exclusive use by-law to either state whether a management corporation or the subsidiary proprietor is responsible for performing the management corporation’s duties prescribed under s 29(1) of the BMSMA. However, the Proposed Resolutions do not state whether it is MCST 508 or the Respondents who must perform MCST 508’s duties under s 29(1) of the BMSMA in respect of the common property for which exclusive use is conferred.

  121. (2) The Respondents’ case

  122. [84] The Respondents submit that they were not able to make a fresh requisition in accordance with para 12(3) of the First Schedule to the BMSMA, as there was no secretary for the 2021 Council at the time the Notice and Agenda for the 2021 AGM were sent out. Further, the Respondents had previously sent requisitions for the 1st EGM and the 2nd EGM, which were not convened. Thus, they were entitled to rely on para 12(3) of the First Schedule to the BMSMA to include the prior requisitions in the 2021 AGM’s Notice and Agenda.

  123. [85] Finally, the Respondents submit that the Third Prayer is unduly restrictive for two reasons. First, given that the failure to abide by para 12(3) of the First Schedule to the BMSMA was due to the absence of any secretary in the 2021 Council, and should this state of affairs continue, this would mean that the Respondents can never submit any motion to be tabled for a meeting. Second, if one of the Respondents becomes the secretary and wishes to submit a motion, the effect of the Third Prayer would be to require the secretary to write to himself or herself before sending his or her motion to the rest of the council members. According to them, this is not much different from what Mdm Cheong and Mr Tanu had done for their joint resolutions for the 1st EGM and the 2nd EGM.

  124. [86] As for the Fourth Prayer, the Respondents contend that the Proposed Resolutions were framed as ordinary motions for a prescribed period of one year. There is, therefore, nothing irregular in the way the Proposed Resolutions were framed. Further, there is no prescribed format for drafting a by-law in either the BMSMA or the Building Maintenance (Strata Management) Regulations 2005. The focus of the inquiry should be on the substance of the Proposed Resolutions rather than the form. The Respondents also submit that it is not necessary to affix the word “by-law” to a resolution before it is to be taken as a by-law.

  125. My analysis

  126. (1) The Third Prayer

  127. [87] The Third Prayer should be dismissed. While I generally agree with Mr Cheung’s submission on the need to comply with the provisions under the BMSMA on giving notices for requisitions, I find that there is no utility in granting this prayer.

  128. [88] First, I agree with Mr Cheung’s submission that, if there was no council member holding the office of secretary of the MCST 508’s council, then any written notice for requisitioning motions should, nonetheless, be served on all council members. The secretary of MCST 508’s council plays a largely administrative role in facilitating the conduct of MCST 508’s day-to-day activities. This is made clear by s 56 of the BMSMA, which prescribes the duties of the secretary. Specifically, s 56(g) of the BMSMA states that the secretary is to attend to matters of an administrative or secretarial nature in connection with the exercise of MCST 508’s council’s functions:

  129. [89] Thus, the secretary is an intermediary between subsidiary proprietors and the council members. That being the case, where an MCST council does not have a secretary and where subsidiary proprietors seek to give written notice for the requisitioning of motions pursuant to para 12(1) of the First Schedule to the BMSMA, the most practical alternative would be to serve the written notice onto every council member. This is the equivalent of serving the written notice for the requisitioning of motions on the council’s secretary, who would then collate these notices to be conveyed to the council members.

  130. [90] Second, the plain wording of para 12(3) of the First Schedule to the BMSMA makes clear that, where notice for the convening of a general meeting has been served on each subsidiary proprietor, any notice for the requisition for the motions which was served on the secretary would be included in the next general meeting without the need to serve another written notice:

  131. [91] The Respondents cannot rely on para 12(3) of the First Schedule to the BMSMA to validate the requisition for motions tabled in the agenda for the 2021 AGM. This is because Mdm Cheong and Mr Tanu had served the written notice setting out requisitions to be tabled for the 1st EGM and the 2nd EGM, prior to issuing the notice for the convening of these respective EGMs. In this case, the condition prescribed under para 12(3) of the First Schedule to the BMSMA is not met.

  132. [92] Finally, the Third Prayer is not unduly restrictive. The Third Prayer simply seeks to restate the need for the Respondents to abide by the requirements stipulated in para 12 of the First Schedule to the BMSMA, if they wish to have a requisition for motions to be included in the agenda for a general meeting.

  133. [93] However, the end result which Mr Cheung seeks to achieve, ie, to ensure that the Respondents comply with the requirements under para 12 of the First Schedule to the BMSMA, is already enshrined under the BMSMA itself. There is, therefore, no utility in granting this prayer. Accordingly, I dismiss the Third Prayer.

  134. (2) The Fourth Prayer

  135. [95] In any case, I also do not agree with Mr Cheung’s submission regarding his understanding of the requirements to comply with the exclusive use by-laws.

  136. [96] Firstly, Mr Cheung alleges that the Proposed Resolutions in the present case are intended by the Respondents to circumvent the requirements under s 33(1) of the BMSMA. I do not agree. The wordings of the relevant motions which I have reproduced at [39] above, in so far as they relate to motions seeking to pass exclusive use by-laws, show clearly that the structures to be installed would be for a clearly defined period of one year. Thus, s 33(1)(a) of the BMSMA requires that such motions be passed pursuant to an ordinary resolution:

  137. [97] Mr Cheung relies on the case of Mu Qi and another v Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No. 1849 [2021] 5 SLR 1401 (“Mu Qi”) in support of his submission that the Proposed Resolutions are framed in such a way as to permit the Respondents to avoid having to pass a 90% resolution for installations of a permanent nature. Specifically, Mr Cheung submits that, according to Mu Qi at [69], it would be improper and illegal to effectively confer exclusive use indefinitely by repeatedly passing resolutions at a lower threshold:

  138. [98] The case of Mu Qi does not assist Mr Cheung. The paragraph which he relies on must be read in the context of the facts of Mu Qi. There, the MCST sought to pass a by-law that would provide a blanket whitewash approval in respect of all unauthorised structures on the common property of the development. The precise wording of the by-law in Mu Qi was as follows (at [20]):

  139. [99] The effect of this by-law was to permit the subsidiary proprietors in that development to submit a list of all unauthorised structures on, or alterations to common property to the MCST’s office by a fixed date, and once recorded by the MCST’s staff, these structures or alterations would be deemed authorised. But, if the structure or alteration, of whatever nature, was not reported to the management office by then, it would be deemed to be unauthorised.

  140. [100] This by-law, in Ang Cheng Hock J’s view, was “a rather cynical abuse of the approach envisaged by Parliament and set out in s 33 of the BMSMA” (at [64]). In Ang J’s view, the by-law in Mu Qi offended the requirement set out in s 33 of the BMSMA as it did not identify, amongst others, the period of time over which the exclusive use, or special privilege accorded, should last (Mu Qi at [66]). Although the chairman of the development’s MCST in Mu Qi gave evidence that the intention was to authorise the installations for a period of three years, Ang J ascribed great weight to the fact that the words of the by-law did not state that the installations or alterations would be for a period of three years (Mu Qi at [67]). In the absence of any express wording in the by-law to this effect, Ang J turned to examine the circumstances of the case, including the nature of the installations and alterations. It was in this context that Ang J made the following findings and holdings (Mu Qi at [68] and [69]):

  141. [101] Therefore, in the absence of any express wording in the by-law as to the duration of the alterations or installations, Ang J turned to examine the nature of the alterations or installations in concluding that they could not have been intended to be in place for only three years. On the contrary, they were more likely to be intended to be of a permanent nature. This was especially so given that one of the installations had been in place since 2011. It was in this context that Ang J thus held that it would be improper and illegal to effectively confer exclusive use indefinitely by repeatedly passing resolutions at a lower threshold.

  142. [102] The facts of the present case are materially different from the context of Mu Qi. In this instant case, the Proposed Resolutions which were sought to be passed during the 2021 AGM were all expressly stated to be for a period of one year. The burden lies on Mr Cheung to show that the Respondents had intended to abuse the requirements under s 33(1) of the BMSMA through the indefinite passing of ordinary, and not 90%, resolution every year. This Mr Cheung could not prove. He asserts that “these installations are evidently of a permanent nature, and it defies belief that these structures are meant to be put up for no more than [one] year”. Mr Cheung is referring to the installation of air-conditioning compressors, a shop name and logo, and a light source at the common areas outside Unit 53 and Unit 55 which the Respondents sought to pass in the various motions at [39] above. These structures may appear permanent, but if the Respondents table the resolutions for one year, then they will have to bear the consequences of them being illegal structures after one year, should they be unable to obtain the necessary votes to pass the resolutions for these structures. These structures will thus have to be removed if no further approvals are given. Alternatively, they could propose resolutions for further extensions, but these will also have to depend on whether the Respondents are able to obtain the necessary approvals.

  143. [103] I, therefore, accept that the Proposed Resolutions were correctly framed as ordinary motions in accordance with s 33(1)(a) of the BMSMA as the Respondents were only seeking for a period of one year.

  144. [104] Secondly, Mr Cheung also alleges that the Proposed Resolutions did not accord with the formalities requirement of passing an exclusive use by-law under s 33(2) of the BMSMA as they did not state whether it is MCST 508 or the subsidiary proprietor that is to perform the duties in respect of the common property for which exclusive use is conferred on the subsidiary proprietor. Section 33(2) of the BMSMA states as follows:

  145. [105] Where the exclusive use by-law does not stipulate whether it is the management corporation or the subsidiary proprietor who is responsible, the default rule under s 33(5) of the BMSMA kicks in, ie, the subsidiary propriety is responsible. Section 33(5) of the BMSMA states as follows:

  146. [106] Indeed, as Prof Teo stated in Strata Title in Singapore and Malaysia at para 15.80:

  147. [107] Finally, Mr Cheung refers to sources which provide guidance on the drafting of resolutions for exclusive use of common property that comply with the requirements of s 33 of the BMSMA (see Hairani Saban, Strata Living - Governance and Management (LexisNexis, 2010) at Appendix B-R3 page 331). While it may certainly be good practice to adopt the suggested wording from this guide, it is, as Mr Cheung states, simply a guide. In any event, as I have held at [28] above, the Proposed Resolutions were not passed. Therefore, I need not consider their legality or validity.

  148. [108] For the above reasons, I dismiss the Fourth Prayer. I shall now consider the fifth and sixth prayers which Mr Cheung seeks in the OSes.

  149. Order restraining the Respondents from installing kitchen exhaust systems on the Development’s common property

  150. [109] The fifth prayer which Mr Cheung has sought in OS 808 and OS 809 is as follows (“the Fifth Prayer”):

  151. The Fifth Prayer effectively seeks to permanently restrain the Respondents from installing any kitchen exhaust system or ducting (“KED”) on the common property of the Development. The Fifth Prayer was sought in response to the proposed resolutions by the Respondents in the 1st EGM and the 2nd EGM to be granted exclusive use over the common property walls of the Development and for the installation of a KED for Unit 53 and Unit 55 along the said walls, with the KED to be erected for a period of one year. However, these proposed resolutions were removed from the agenda for the 2021 AGM. This was because the current tenants of Unit 53 and Unit 55 do not require a KED to be installed.

  152. [110] The sixth prayer in OS 808 and OS 809 is framed as an alternative to the Fifth Prayer, and is as follows (“the Sixth Prayer”):

  153. Similar to the Fifth Prayer, the Sixth Prayer effectively seeks to permanently restrain the Respondents from installing any KED on the common property of the Development, unless the requirements under s 33(1)(c) of the BMSMA are met, ie, that the by-law is passed pursuant to a 90% resolution. I note the mandatory nature in which the Sixth Prayer is phrased. Therefore, regardless of the duration for which the KED would be installed, Mr Cheung effectively requires that any exclusive use by-law passed to this effect be subject to a 90% resolution.

  154. The parties’ submissions

  155. (1) The Applicant’s case

  156. [112] Mr Cheung further submits that there is simply no place for a KED on the common area of the Development. Mr Cheung alleges that the installation of a KED would detract from the appearance of the building. Further, it causes disamenity to the residential units as it discharges fumes and grease to the open roof-top terraces and/or gardens of the residential units. The KED also poses a tremendous fire hazard to residents. The KED, therefore, interferes unreasonably with the harmonious enjoyment which the subsidiary proprietors of the various affected units at the Development are entitled to.

  157. [113] Therefore, even if the Respondents were to obtain the appropriate by-law passed under s 33 of the BMSMA to have exclusive use over the common property to install a KED, this does not change the fact that any KED installed would be an illegal structure. This is because the installation of a KED would cause disamenity, nuisance and be a fire hazard. Thus, it would be in breach of s 63 of the BMSMA.

  158. [114] Mr Cheung’s submission in respect of the Sixth Prayer is that any installation of KEDs on the common areas of the Development would have to be subject to the requirements laid out in s 33 of the BMSMA. Mr Cheung further relies on Ang J’s decision in Mu Qi in support of the position that, in relation to works of a permanent nature it would be improper to confer exclusive use indefinitely by the passing of special resolutions every three years instead of passing a 90% resolution under s 33 of the BMSMA. Accordingly, Mr Cheung submits that a KED is likely to be an installation of a permanent nature, and would, therefore, have to satisfy the requirement under s 33(1)(c) of the BMSMA.

  159. (2) The Respondents’ case

  160. [115] The Respondents submit that the Fifth Prayer would be an undue curtailment of their statutory rights as subsidiary proprietors under paras 12 and 14 of the First Schedule to the BMSMA to put forth any motion they wish for the general body’s consideration.

  161. My analysis

  162. (1) The Fifth Prayer

  163. [117] I do not accept Mr Cheung’s submission that the Fifth Prayer should be granted.

  164. [118] It is important to point out that any motion for the installation of KEDs at the Development was not tabled in the Notice and Agenda for the 2021 AGM, although they were tabled in the agenda for the 1st EGM and the 2nd EGM. Mr Cheung accepts this in his submission. Hence, Mr Cheung is effectively seeking, in the Fifth Prayer, a pre-emptive and permanent prohibition that would preclude the Respondents from proposing any motions in relation to the installation of KEDs at the general meeting.

  165. [121] This brings me to the next point raised by Mr Cheung on the alleged illegality of the installation of KED devices. Mr Cheung refers to ss 63(c) and 63(d) of the BMSMA, which state as follows:

  166. [122] Sections 63(c) and 63(d) of the BMSMA state that a subsidiary proprietor’s use or enjoyment of the common property must not be in a manner or for a purpose that would interfere unreasonably with the use or enjoyment of the common property or any other lot by other subsidiary proprietors.

  167. [123] I reiterate that the Respondents have not tabled any motions on the installation of any KEDs. Thus, it is difficult to determine whether the mere fact of the installation of KEDs in itself would lead to a violation of ss 63(c) and 63(d) of the BMSMA. As I have said above at [119], I cannot rule out the possibility that any KED’s technology proposed to be installed at the Development would be such that it does not give rise to the concerns raised by Mr Cheung. It would, therefore, be too premature for the Court to make any determination to this effect in respect of Mr Cheung’s submission that the Fifth Prayer should be granted for the reason that the installation of KEDs at the Development would be in violation of ss 63(c) and 63(d) of the BMSMA.

  168. [124] I also reiterate my holdings at [73]–[74] above that a subsidiary proprietor has a right to put forth any motion which he or she wishes for the general body’s consideration. Such a right is statutorily enshrined in paras 12 and 14 of the First Schedule to the BMSMA. To pre-emptively preclude the Respondents from submitting motions to be voted on at a general meeting would be incompatible with this right. I, therefore, dismiss the Fifth Prayer.

  169. (2) The Sixth Prayer

  170. [125] I also do not accept Mr Cheung’s submission that the Sixth Prayer should be granted. To impose a mandatory requirement of a 90% resolution in respect of motions for the exclusive use of KEDs in the common property, regardless of the actual duration of use as stated in the motion, may be in contravention of the BMSMA. The statutory regime regarding the passing of exclusive use by-laws as prescribed under s 33 of the BMSMA makes reference to the duration of exclusive use stated in the resolution and the corresponding percentage of votes required to pass the resolution.

  171. [126] Mr Cheung seeks to rely on the decision of Mu Qi in support of his view that the 90% resolution requirement as prescribed by s 33(1)(c) of the BMSMA must be adhered to where an exclusive use by-law sought to be passed relates to the installation of structures that are likely permanent in nature. I have held above at [98]–[103] that Mr Cheung’s interpretation of the holding in Mu Qi is incorrect.

  172. [127] To reiterate, Ang J held that the by-law sought to be passed in Mu Qi offended the requirement set out in s 33 of the BMSMA as it does not identify, amongst others, the period of time over which the exclusive use, or special privilege accorded, should last (Mu Qi at [66]). In the absence of any express wording in the by-law to this effect, Ang J turned to examine the circumstances of the case, including the nature of the installations and alterations, before concluding that the installations were more likely than not to be of a permanent nature. It, therefore, follows that, where the by-law indicates the duration for which the exclusive use of the common area is intended, it would not be necessary, and would indeed be contrary to s 33 of the BMSMA, to continue to impose a 90% resolution for passing such by-laws.

  173. [128] It would be legally incorrect to require that all exclusive use by-laws on the installation of KEDs at the Development’s common area be passed only upon a 90% resolution being obtained at any subsequent general meetings regardless of the duration for which the KED is to be installed. Accordingly, I dismiss the Sixth Prayer.

  174. Order restraining the Respondents from engaging Legal Solutions

  175. [129] The seventh prayer which Mr Cheung seeks in OS 808 and OS 809 is as follows (“the Seventh Prayer”):

  176. [130] The Seventh Prayer concerns the propriety of engaging the Respondents’ personal solicitors, Legal Solutions, to act for MCST 508.

  177. The parties’ submissions

  178. (1) The Applicant’s case

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