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Grounds publishedDecided 3 Mar 2023

General Division of the High Court

Cheng Hoe Soon v Ezekiel Peter Latimer

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[2023] SGHC 53Case no. Suit No 654 of 2019 (Registrar’s Appeal No 334 of 2022)22 paragraphs

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  1. Introduction

  2. [2] The Defendant was the solicitor who represented the Plaintiff when he took out a suit to claim for damages arising from a road traffic accident. The Defendant commenced an action in the District Court between 2010 and 2015 (the “District Court suit”). The Defendant was negligent in handling the Plaintiff’s District Court suit and this resulted in the striking out of the District Court suit. Accordingly, the Plaintiff engaged another law firm, S K Kumar Law Practice LLP (“SKK”), to commence Suit 654 against the Defendant for his negligent handling of the District Court suit.

  3. The facts

  4. The parties

  5. [4] In 2008, the Plaintiff was the hirer of a motor taxi bearing vehicle plate number SHC6348Y belonging to Premier Taxis Pte Ltd (the “motor taxi”). He was involved in a road traffic accident and he engaged the Defendant, a solicitor practicing in the style of M/S Peter Ezekiel & Co, to commence a suit in the District Court against the other party.

  6. Background of the Plaintiff’s dispute

  7. The Defendant’s conduct of the Plaintiff’s claim for damages in the District Court suit

  8. [5] On or about 31 January 2008, the Plaintiff was driving the motor taxi along Beach Road towards Rochor Road at the extreme left lane. There was a collision between the motor taxi and a motor lorry bearing vehicle plate number GX8291P (the “motor lorry”). The driver of the motor lorry was one Chua Yeo Meng (“Mr Chua”). The Plaintiff sustained severe personal injuries and suffered loss and damages as a result of the road traffic accident. The Plaintiff alleged that the road traffic accident was caused by Mr Chua’s negligence. Thus, the Plaintiff engaged solicitors to commence the District Court suit, DC 1462/2009 (“DC 1462”). A Writ of Summons was issued on 24 April 2009 against Mr Chua. In the course of the proceedings in the District Court, the Plaintiff discharged his original solicitors and eventually engaged the Defendant.

  9. [7] In view of the Defendant’s misconduct which led to the Plaintiff’s claim in DC 1462 being struck off, the Plaintiff initiated Suit 654 against the Defendant in July 2019. In Suit 654, the Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant had acted negligently in his conduct of DC 1462, in breach of the retainer and duty of care owed to the Plaintiff.

  10. [8] Thereupon, the Plaintiff engaged SKK to act as his solicitors in Suit 654. A Notice of Appointment of Solicitor indicating SKK’s appointment as the Plaintiff’s solicitors was filed on 13 September 2019.

  11. SKK’s conduct of the Plaintiff’s suit against the Defendant in Suit 654

  12. [9] In the course of Suit 654 between April 2022 and August 2022, the solicitors from SKK repeatedly failed to either attend pre-trial conferences (“PTC”) on the Plaintiff’s behalf or have a person with a valid practising certificate to attend the PTCs:

  13. (a) At the PTC on 12 April 2022, Mr Charles Yeo (“Mr Yeo”) from SKK appeared on behalf of the Plaintiff. However, Mr Yeo did not have a valid practising certificate at that time. In view of this, the PTC was adjourned to 26 April 2022.

  14. (b) At the PTC on 26 April 2022, Mr Yeo once again appeared on behalf of the Plaintiff without a valid practising certificate. In view of this, the PTC was adjourned to 17 May 2022.

  15. (c) At the PTC on 17 May 2022, no solicitor from SKK appeared on behalf of the Plaintiff. The PTC was, therefore, adjourned to 23 May 2022. The First AR having conduct of the PTC also directed SKK to explain its absence from the PTC. The First AR also indicated that he may consider striking out the Plaintiff’s Statement of Claim (“SOC”) at an appropriate stage if there was a further non-attendance at the PTC. In a letter filed by SKK on 18 May 2022, SKK stated that its solicitor, Mr Foo Ho Chew (“Mr Foo”), was occupied with other matters in the Family Justice Court and was therefore late for the PTC. The letter also stated that Mr Yeo was waiting for a conditional practising certificate to be issued. In its letter, SKK also stated that it would ensure attendance at all future court dates.

  16. (d) At the PTC on 23 May 2022, no solicitor from SKK appeared on behalf of the Plaintiff. The PTC was, therefore, adjourned to 30 May 2022. The First AR having conduct of the PTC stated that he would proceed to strike out the Plaintiff’s SOC if a solicitor from SKK was not present at the PTC on 30 May 2022. The PTC on 30 May 2022 was subsequently rescheduled to 14 June 2022.

  17. [11] At the PTC on 23 August 2022, no solicitor from SKK appeared on behalf of the Plaintiff. The PTC was, therefore, adjourned to 27 September 2022. The First AR having conduct of the PTC stated that he would proceed to strike out the Plaintiff’s SOC if a solicitor from SKK was not present at the PTC on 27 September 2022.

  18. The parties’ submissions in SUM 3828 and the decision below

  19. [15] The hearing for SUM 3828 took place on 4 November 2022 before a different Assistant Registrar (the “Second AR”).

  20. [18] In contrast, the Defendant’s position was as follows:

  21. [21] Dissatisfied with the decision of the Second AR, the Plaintiff filed an appeal which I heard on 13 January 2023. Ahead of the appeal, the Plaintiff discharged SKK as his solicitors and engaged Mr Foo as his solicitor.

  22. The parties’ cases on appeal

  23. The Plaintiff’s case

  24. [22] On appeal, the Plaintiff makes the following arguments:

  25. The Defendant’s case

  26. [23] The Defendant makes the following arguments on appeal:

  27. (d) Further, the Plaintiff had no basis to ask for leave to file a notice of appeal out of time given the Plaintiff’s lack of explanation on why the notice of appeal was not filed in a timely manner.

  28. Issues to be determined

  29. [24] At this appeal, there are primarily two issues for me to address:

  30. (a) First, the preliminary issue of whether the Second AR had jurisdiction to decide on the merits of the prayers sought by the Plaintiff in SUM 3828.

  31. My decision

  32. Whether the Second AR had jurisdiction to decide on the merits of the prayers sought by the Plaintiff in SUM 3828

  33. Whether the order to strike out the Plaintiff’s SOC was proportionate on the facts of the case

  34. [32] The conduct of SKK’s solicitors was plainly contumelious and unsatisfactory. Their repeated absences from the scheduled PTCs while having conduct of Suit 654 were clearly unacceptable.

  35. [34] On the facts, the striking out of the Plaintiff’s SOC because of the failure of SKK’s solicitors to attend the PTCs was a disproportionate consequence. There was no suggestion by the parties before the Second AR or on appeal that the conduct of SKK’s solicitors was instigated by the Plaintiff himself or attributable to the Plaintiff’s conduct. The evidence suggests that the Plaintiff was not even aware of the obstinate misconduct of his solicitors in refusing to attend the PTCs. It was the disrespectful misconduct of SKK’s solicitors that resulted in the Plaintiff’s SOC being struck out.

  36. The Defendant’s argument that SKK’s solicitors should have been aware of the consequences of failing to attend court hearings

  37. [37] In the Defendant’s written submission, he argues that SKK’s solicitors should have been cognisant of the consequences of failing to attend hearings fixed by the court. In particular, the Defendant highlighted the recent High Court decision of Pakirisamy Rajoo and another v Sheila Devi d/o Pakirisamy Rajoo [2022] SGHC 285 (“Pakirisamy”), where See Kee Oon J had warned one of SKK’s solicitors, Mr Singh, about his unacceptable conduct in failing to attend trial without giving prior notice to the court.

  38. [38] In Pakirisamy, the case was scheduled for a two-day trial. However, both the plaintiffs and their counsel, Mr Singh, were absent on the first day of trial without any prior notice given to the court. Following the brief submissions from the defendant’s counsel, See J dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim. Medical certificates covering one plaintiff and Mr Singh were subsequently produced during a summons hearing which sought to set aside See J’s dismissal of the claim. However, these medical certificates did not excuse the plaintiff or Mr Singh from court proceedings. In arriving at his decision, See J considered the following:

  39. (a) The plaintiffs and Mr Singh did not have good reasons for being absent from trial. The medical certificates did not operate to excuse the plaintiffs or Mr Singh from court attendance. Further, no notice was given to the court ahead of the trial (Pakirisamy at [34], [35] and [39]).

  40. (b) The plaintiffs’ claim did not appear to have a real prospect of success. No objective evidence was put forth by the plaintiffs to support their allegations. Further, one of their claims was time-barred under s 6 of the Limitation Act 1959 (2020 Rev Ed) (Pakirisamy at [44]–[48]).

  41. (c) Although the plaintiffs had applied promptly to set aside the judgment dismissing their claim, this appeared to undermine their claims that they were so ill that they could not be present for trial (Pakirisamy at [50]–[51]).

  42. [39] The Defendant, in this case, argues that Mr Singh and SKK’s solicitors should have been especially mindful of the need to attend court hearings following See J’s decision in Pakirisamy. The facts in Pakirisamy and this case are significantly different. In particular, there are two key differences between Pakirisamy and the present case:

  43. (a) In Pakirisamy, both the plaintiffs and the solicitor failed to attend the trial on the scheduled date. The plaintiffs were also unable to satisfactorily account for their absence from trial. One plaintiff produced a medical certificate that See J observed was obtained under questionable circumstances and which did not excuse the plaintiff from court proceedings. The second plaintiff failed to produce any medical certificate to explain her absence from trial. This was quite unlike the present case where the contumelious conduct was only on the part of the solicitors from SKK. No evidence was adduced before me to show that the Plaintiff was complicit in the contumelious conduct of the solicitors from SKK.

  44. (b) Further, and more significantly, See J opined that the plaintiffs’ claim in Pakirisamy lacked a real prospect of success. On the contrary, the Plaintiff appears to have a strong case to claim for damages arising from the road traffic accident involving his motor taxi’s collision with a motor lorry. The Plaintiff also appears to have a strong case against the Defendant for the latter’s negligent handling of his road traffic accident claim. This is especially so since the Defendant does not dispute in the pleadings that it was his own failure to set down DC 1462 for trial which caused the Plaintiff’s road traffic accident claim to be struck off in the District Court. Therefore, to strike out the Plaintiff’s SOC which prima facie appears to have a real substantial prospect of success would be a wholly disproportionate response to address the misconduct of the Plaintiff’s solicitors.

  45. [40] While SKK’s solicitors should have been aware of the consequences of failing to attend court hearings, the Defendant has not satisfactorily explained why the Plaintiff, who was innocent of the failure of SKK’s solicitors to attend the PTCs, should bear the brunt of his solicitors’ misconduct and to have his SOC struck out.

  46. The Defendant’s suggestion that the Plaintiff would continue to have recourse was unsatisfactory

  47. [41] In the course of the oral submissions on 13 January 2023, the Defendant suggested that the striking out of the Plaintiff’s SOC was not fatal to the Plaintiff’s claim as he could then proceed with another action against SKK for its solicitors’ negligent conduct of his case in Suit 654. The Defendant readily acknowledged, however, that the Plaintiff would have to jump through additional hurdles before the Plaintiff would be able to successfully obtain justice.

  48. [42] This is a wholly unsatisfactory, unjust and prejudicial recourse available to the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff was already denied access to justice in DC 1462 because of the errant conduct of his previous solicitor, the Defendant. By striking out the Plaintiff’s SOC in Suit 654, the Plaintiff would have once again been denied access to justice simply because of the misconduct of another set of errant solicitors, ie, SKK, his current solicitors in Suit 654. It did not appear to be in the interests of justice to place the burden on the Plaintiff to commence fresh proceedings against SKK, when the present breach in Suit 654 was through no fault of his.

  49. Show Cause

  50. Conclusion

  51. [48] In summary, I make the following findings:

  52. (c) On the issue of costs, Mr Foo, in his letter dated 23 February 2023, rightly acknowledges that the past and present solicitors for the Plaintiff will bear all costs including the costs of this appeal. Accordingly, it may not be necessary for this Court to refer the errant solicitors to the LSS for any action.