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Grounds publishedDecided 12 Jan 2023

General Division of the High Court

Muhammad Ramzaan s/o Akhbar v Public Prosecutor

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[2023] SGHC 9Case no. Magistrate’s Appeal 9144 of 202214 paragraphs

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  1. [2] From January 2020 to January 2021, the appellant went on to commit a series of drug and traffic offences. This spate of offending only ceased on 26 January 2021, when he was arrested. He commenced serving his sentence for the first conviction on the same day.

  2. [3] On 25 July 2022, the appellant pleaded guilty to 14 charges (“the second conviction”). These included one charge under s 8(b)(ii) punishable under s 33A(1) of the MDA, one charge under s 8(a) punishable under s 33(1) of the MDA, seven charges under s 63(4) of the Road Traffic Act (Cap 276, 2004 Rev Ed) (“RTA”), one charge under s 65(1)(b) punishable under s 65(5)(b) of the RTA, and four other charges under the RTA and Misuse of Drugs Regulations (1999 Rev Ed) (“MDR”). Most of these charges, including the MDA and s 65 RTA charges, related to the offences committed from January 2020 to January 2021. An additional 14 charges under the MDR and RTA were taken into consideration.

  3. [5] The individual sentences for the 14 proceeded charges were set out at [7] of the GD as follows:

  4. [6] I set out a timeline of the material dates below:

  5. My decision

  6. The individual and global sentences

  7. [8] The appellant does not challenge the length of the individual sentences imposed by the DJ, nor the length of the global sentence.

  8. [9] In any case, I do not find any of the individual sentences manifestly excessive. Both of the sentences for the charges under the MDA were the statutory minimum. The short custodial sentences for the RTA charges were justified given the appellant’s eight previous traffic convictions and his inability to pay any fine: Low Meng Chay v Public Prosecutor [1993] 1 SLR(R) 46 at [13].

  9. [10] I also do not find the global sentence manifestly excessive. In fact, the global sentence is lower than the sentence submitted for by the appellant himself while he was represented by counsel in the proceedings below.

  10. The date of commencement of the term of imprisonment

  11. [12] I am unable to place much weight on this submission. The reported decision in Sultan pertains only to the accused’s first conviction. There are no written grounds of decision explaining the DJ’s reasons in allowing the sentence for the second set of convictions to commence from the date of conviction. The lack of a reported judgment explaining such reasons means that little weight can be placed on this precedent: Janardana Jayasankarr v Public Prosecutor [2016] 4 SLR 1288 at [13(b)].

  12. [13] The circumstances in the present case conversely point towards the imprisonment term commencing from the expiry of the appellant’s sentence for his first conviction. In line with the considerations in Public Prosecutor v Hang Tuah bin Jumaat [2016] SGHC 20, the fact that the present set of driving and drug offences arose in a different transaction from his earlier drug offences is a weighty consideration in this regard. I agree with the DJ’s assessment that the appellant’s level of criminality was high and that his drug offences were serious. I also agree with the DJ that had all the appellant’s charges been heard together, the aggregate sentence would have been of a similar length to the sentence actually imposed. I am fortified in this conclusion by the fact that the present set of offences were committed while the appellant was absconding from bail.

  13. [14] I thus see no basis to interfere with the DJ’s decision for the imprisonment term to commence upon the end of the appellant’s sentence for the first conviction.

  14. The date of commencement of the disqualification order

  15. [17] In the present case, I find that there are good reasons why the general rule in Saiful should not be applied.

  16. [18] First, the appellant faces numerous driving offences and has extensive related antecedents. Specific deterrence is necessary to deter further reoffending.

  17. [21] Fourth, the appellant committed the s 65 RTA offence while absconding from bail, when he had already been convicted and sentenced to a lengthy term of imprisonment. This increases the relative importance of deterrence compared to the case of Saiful. While prospective offenders are unlikely to base their actions on the consideration that a potential disqualification period would be overtaken by a subsequent imprisonment sentence, they are far more likely to base their actions on the consideration that any potential disqualification period would be rendered completely irrelevant by an existing period of imprisonment that they are already liable to while absconding from bail. Were periods of disqualification for offenders absconding from bail to always run concurrently with their existing imprisonment sentences, there would be no marginal disincentive for accused persons who have already been sentenced to lengthy terms of imprisonment not to commit further driving offences.

  18. [24] For these reasons, I am satisfied that the DJ did not err in ordering the disqualification period to commence from the date of the appellant’s release from prison.

  19. Conclusion