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Grounds publishedDecided 13 Apr 2023

General Division of the High Court

Ahmad Danial bin Mohamed Rafa’ee v Public Prosecutor

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[2023] SGHC 94Case no. Magistrate’s Appeal No 9133 of 2022/0144 paragraphs

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] The appellant, Mr Ahmad Danial bin Mohamed Rafa’ee, was charged with murder under s 302 read with s 34 of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 1985 Rev Ed) (the “Charge”) on 17 December 2020. About 18 months later, on 27 June 2022, the Prosecution applied for a discharge not amounting to an acquittal (“DNATA”) in respect of the Charge. The district judge below (the “DJ”) granted the DNATA. The appellant appealed against that decision contending that the DJ should instead have granted a discharge amounting to an acquittal (“DATA”) on the Charge. After hearing the parties, I dismissed the appeal and gave my reasons in brief. I now provide the full grounds for my decision.

  3. Facts

  4. [2] At the outset, it may be noted that the facts are unusual. The Charge arose out of events that took place in 2007, when Ms Felicia Teo Wei Ling (“Ms Teo”) went missing. The last two people to see Ms Teo alive were the appellant and one Mr Ragil Putra Setia Sukmarahjana (“Mr Ragil”). The appellant and Mr Ragil were traced and interviewed by the authorities in 2007, but they both claimed at the time that they did not know what happened to Ms Teo or where she was.

  5. [3] Thirteen years later, in 2020, a review of the case uncovered evidence that suggested that the appellant might have provided an inaccurate account of events when he was interviewed in 2007. This led to the appellant being arrested on 15 December 2020 and questioned again. On 17 December 2020, the appellant was charged with the murder of Ms Teo in furtherance of a common intention between him and Mr Ragil. In the course of further investigations, the appellant revealed to the authorities that, in 2007, he had deposited Ms Teo’s corpse in a public place, misappropriated her property, failed to report her death, given false statements to the police and fabricated false evidence to evade suspicion. The appellant maintained, however, that he was not in any way responsible for causing Ms Teo’s death.

  6. [4] From the time of his arrest on 15 December 2020, the appellant remained in remand because he was facing a charge of murder, which is a non-bailable offence. Slightly more than 18 months after it brought the Charge, on 27 June 2022, the Prosecution applied under s 232(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (2020 Rev Ed) (“CPC”) for a DNATA in respect of the Charge. The appellant objected to the Prosecution’s application and sought a DATA instead. The DJ allowed the Prosecution’s application. On the same day, the Prosecution tendered six new charges arising from the appellant’s admissions about his conduct after Ms Teo’s death.

  7. [5] On 14 October 2022, the appellant pleaded guilty to four of those charges: one for depositing Ms Teo’s corpse with Mr Ragil; one for dishonestly appropriating Ms Teo’s property with Mr Ragil; one for giving false information to the police with Mr Ragil; and one for fabricating false evidence with Mr Ragil. He consented to having the remaining two charges taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing. He was sentenced to an aggregate of 26 months’ imprisonment, which was backdated to the date of his initial arrest on 15 December 2020. He was therefore released on the same day, having already spent 22 months in remand.

  8. The parties’ cases below

  9. [6] Before the DJ, the Prosecution explained that it was seeking a DNATA because Mr Ragil was still at large. Based on investigations, the police had traced him to Indonesia and were in contact with the Indonesian authorities. While the Prosecution could adjourn proceedings in the hope that Mr Ragil would be found soon, it thought it would be fairer to grant the appellant a DNATA so that he could be released from remand while the police continued their efforts to locate Mr Ragil.

  10. [8] Second, by the time of the Prosecution’s application, the appellant had already spent 18 months in prison. It was submitted that the six new charges that the Prosecution preferred would not typically result in a sentence that would be close to that duration. Thus, there was a need to compensate the appellant for the 18 months he had spent in prison on account of the Charge. The appellant also highlighted the suffering that he and his family were still subject to as a result of his arrest in December 2020 and by reason of the Charge being laid against him. In these circumstances, fairness demanded that he be given a DATA.

  11. Decision below

  12. [10] The DJ granted the Prosecution’s application for a DNATA: see Public Prosecutor v Ahmad Danial Bin Mohamed Rafa’ee [2022] SGDC 176.

  13. [11] The DJ found that even if he were to accept the appellant’s claims as to the hardship suffered by him and his family, this would not displace the strong public interest in ensuring that all who may be responsible for Ms Teo’s death were held to account for their actions. The 18-month period that the appellant had spent in remand was not unduly long in all the circumstances of the case. It was clear that the Prosecution had made some progress on the case in that period, and that the appellant was indeed involved in Ms Teo’s disappearance.

  14. [12] Further, while it was clear that the appellant’s family (and the appellant himself, after serving his time for the charges that were pursued) deserved to be allowed to go about their affairs without undue interference, the appropriate way to achieve this was not by granting the appellant immunity from prosecution. Doing so would be contrary to the public interest in pursuing whoever was responsible for Ms Teo’s death.

  15. Parties’ cases on appeal

  16. Appellant’s case

  17. [14] Before me, the appellant argued that the DJ erred for the following reasons.

  18. [15] First, the DJ failed to conduct a proper inquiry into the status and details of the police’s efforts to locate Mr Ragil. He simply accepted the Prosecution’s “brief” reasons for seeking a DNATA without taking further steps to apprise himself of the state of the investigations. The DJ had therefore not been able to make a proper and informed assessment of the likelihood of Mr Ragil being found within a reasonable period of time, or at all. The appellant contended that based on the prevailing jurisprudence, the court would lean towards ordering a DATA where the Prosecution was not in a position to indicate a determinate time within which it could proceed with charges against the accused person.

  19. [16] Second, and following from the first point, it was said that it would be unfair to have the Charge hang over the appellant indefinitely. In this connection, the appellant contended that:

  20. (a) The DJ failed to consider that the authorities had had ample time to search for Mr Ragil since the appellant’s arrest in December 2020. They ought to have commenced efforts to locate Mr Ragil from that time because that was when the appellant had informed them of Mr Ragil’s involvement in Ms Teo’s disappearance.

  21. (b) The Prosecution erred in charging the appellant prematurely when there was insufficient evidence to substantiate the charge. The appellant cited a recent decision of the Malaysian Federal Court, Vigny Alfred Raj a/l Vicetor Amratha Raja v Public Prosecutor [2022] 5 MLJ 639 (“Vigny Alfred Raj”), where the court criticised the prosecutorial approach of “charge now, investigate later” (at [92]). The appellant maintained that this applied to the Prosecution’s approach in this case and that by granting a DNATA on the Charge, the DJ in effect condoned the Prosecution’s poor conduct.

  22. (c) Further, even if Mr Ragil were to be found, it was highly unlikely that he would provide evidence that could go towards proving the Charge against the appellant. He was a co-accused person who was unlikely to incriminate himself by incriminating the appellant.

  23. (e) Finally, the DJ failed to give sufficient weight to the hardship suffered by the appellant and his family, which was said to be exceptional. Unless a DATA was granted, the appellant and his family would remain at the receiving end of the negative public opinion that had already caused them much hardship.

  24. [17] Third, the appellant maintained that the DJ placed excessive weight on the fact that the present case concerned a murder charge. It was not the case that such cases could be held in abeyance indefinitely.

  25. Respondent’s case

  26. [18] The Prosecution, on the other hand, submitted that there had been no undue delay in the investigations. The lapse in time between Ms Teo’s disappearance in 2007 and the arrest of the appellant in 2020 had been caused, or at least significantly contributed to, by the appellant’s lies to the police when he was first interviewed in 2007. From the time the appellant was arrested in 2020 until the time of the application, there had been clear progress in the investigations which revealed that the appellant had committed various offences after Ms Teo’s death, leading to his being charged with six new charges. There was also no basis for the appellant to allege that the police were not taking the necessary steps to locate Mr Ragil. The Prosecution’s request for additional time was justified given the need to work with foreign authorities and the complexity of the case.

  27. [19] Further, the seriousness of the offence involved weighed heavily against a DATA being granted at this stage of the proceedings. The hardship suffered by the appellant did not justify conferring on him an absolute immunity from being prosecuted in respect of the Charge even if new evidence were to emerge. This was especially the case given that there were pending investigations and leads being pursued.

  28. [20] At the hearing, the Prosecution, at my request, also confirmed the following points:

  29. Issues to be determined

  30. [22] There were two issues before me. The first was whether the DJ properly exercised his discretion to grant a DNATA on the Charge. The second was whether the I had the power to grant a DATA on the Charge when hearing an appeal against the DJ’s decision.

  31. Did the DJ properly exercise his discretion to grant a DNATA on the Charge?

  32. Applicable law

  33. [23] The Prosecution’s application for a discharge was brought pursuant to s 232 of the CPC. Sections 232(1) and 232(2) of the CPC provide:

  34. Sections 232(1) and 232(2) of the CPC are substantially similar to ss 184(1) and 184(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 1985 Rev Ed) (the “CPC 1985 Ed”). Sections 184(1) and 184(2) of the CPC 1985 Ed have been considered in a number of High Court cases, and the principles set out in those cases apply equally to s 232 of the CPC.

  35. [25] The court does, however, have the discretion to decide whether that discharge should amount to an acquittal. This discretion is encapsulated in s 232(2) of the CPC. In exercising this discretion, it is well-established that: (a) there is an initial presumption in favour of granting a DNATA, and the accused person must show sufficient reasons to displace this presumption; and (b) the court must decide the matter on the merits, balancing the public interest and the rights of the accused person (see K Abdul Rasheed and another v Public Prosecutor [1985–1986] SLR(R) 1 (“K Abdul Rasheed”) at [5]–[6]; Goh Cheng Chuan v Public Prosecutor [1990] 1 SLR(R) 660 (“Goh Cheng Chuan”) at [14]; TS Video and Laser Pte Ltd v Lim Chee Yong and another appeal [2001] 3 SLR(R) 639 (“TS Video”) at [7]).

  36. My decision

  37. Principles guiding the exercise of discretion under s 232(2) of the CPC

  38. (1) The presumptive position

  39. [26] To understand the relevant principles guiding the discretion under s 232(2) of the CPC, it is important first to situate the issue correctly. Typically, the question of whether a DNATA or a DATA should be granted will arise where: (a) an accused person has been charged; (b) there is no clarity as to his guilt or innocence; and (c) there is some basis for thinking that the accused person is involved in the matter. Where it is clear that the accused person is innocent or there is no basis at all for thinking he might be involved in the offence, it is obvious that a DATA would be appropriate.

  40. [28] Given that a DATA completely clears an accused person of the offence with which he was charged without a trial, it is evident why a DATA will not generally be appropriate where the three conditions set out at [26] above are satisfied. Where there remains reason to believe that the accused person is in some way involved in the offence that is the subject of the charge against him, the public interest demands that the authorities be given adequate opportunity to complete their investigations. It is also true that, the more serious the charge, the more time the authorities will need to complete their investigations. Indeed, the public interest in giving the authorities ample time to complete their investigations is reflected in the fact that, in Singapore, there is no limitation period on criminal offences, and so no time limit is placed on the gathering of evidence and the subsequent mounting of a charge. The facts of this case provide a good example. Thirteen years after Ms Teo’s disappearance, when investigations revealed new evidence, the appellant was apprehended, charged and also convicted of some other offences relating to her disappearance.

  41. [30] In the majority of cases, a DNATA strikes an obvious balance in that it allows the State to revive the proceedings if and when it is able to pursue the prosecution, while the accused person is freed of at least of some of the restrictions that come with having been charged, including very onerous ones such as being held in remand where the offence is a non-bailable one. It is for these reasons that the presumptive position is that the court’s discretion will be exercised in favour of ordering a DNATA.

  42. [31] In certain cases, the presumptive position will be even stronger. Where the charge is for a serious offence, the presumptive position will be stronger because there is a stronger public interest in prosecuting serious offences, and accordingly, there is a stronger public interest in giving the authorities adequate time to do so. Where there is no uncertainty about when the Prosecution will complete its investigations, the presumptive position is stronger because the accused person will not be subject to the indefinite apprehension of potential criminal proceedings. This could be the case where the Prosecution simply needs a reasonable time to review new evidence that has come to light (see Ng Guan Hup at [62]) or where the accused person needs to complete a course of treatment at a drug rehabilitation centre before the Prosecution proceeds with pending criminal proceedings (see Arjan Singh at [5] and [14]). Similarly, in cases where the accused person has somehow wrongfully contributed to the Prosecution’s difficulty in proceeding with the matter, the presumptive position will typically be stronger. In such cases, there is the added public interest in preventing an accused person from benefitting from his own wrongful conduct.

  43. (2) Displacing the presumptive position

  44. [33] At the same time, being a presumptive position, it should be recognised that this may be displaced in suitable cases. This would be so where the specific facts of the case are such that the prejudice to the accused person in facing an uncertain future outweighs the public interest in ensuring that a suspect is not cleared of an offence without trial. By way of example, this could be where: (a) there is no real or reasonable prospect of a prosecution occurring in the future; or (b) there are grounds to suggest that the charge should not have been brought at all. I elaborate on this by reference to some of the past cases involving discharges.

  45. [35] In contrast, in Loh Siang Piow, the Prosecution sought a DNATA because it had lost contact with a material witness in the case (see [7]). Yong Pung How CJ distinguished the case from Goh Cheng Chuan and K Abdul Rasheed and held that the witness’s non-availability should not militate in favour of granting a DATA. This was because: (a) the witness was a Singapore citizen; (b) the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau had indicated that the assistance of the police had been sought in tracing the witness; (c) a check with the Singapore Immigration Department did not indicate that the witness had left Singapore; (d) arrangements had been made for the investigator to be informed should the immigration authorities come across the witness attempting to leave Singapore; (e) that was not a case where it appeared that the witness would not be found even if much time and effort were expended; and (f) the loss of contact was fairly recent (at [32]–[33]). In Loh Siang Piow, the non-availability of a material witness did not detract from the presumptive position because there was clearly a real and reasonable prospect of a prosecution in the future, and a live lead was being pursued.

  46. [36] As for cases where the charge should not have been brought in the first place, there is Vigny Alfred Raj. In Vigny Alfred Raj, the Prosecution applied, on the first day of trial, for a DNATA because “the investigation [sic] still going on” (at [17]). The trial judge granted the DNATA, which was affirmed by the Malaysian Court of Appeal. On further appeal to the Malaysian Federal Court, Mary Lim FCJ described the Prosecution’s explanation for seeking a DNATA as “troubling and telling” (at [90]). She explained that there should not have been a charge in the first place if investigations were still going on or incomplete, and that it would be “an aberration and a travesty on the administration of criminal justice if the courts were seen to condone a practice of charge now, investigate later” (at [92]). The Malaysian Federal Court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders of the Malaysian High Court and the Malaysian Court of Appeal, and granted a DATA on this basis.

  47. [37] While the decision seems unimpeachable on the facts, it should be noted that it is not necessarily wrong for the Prosecution to charge an accused person before the investigations are complete. In fact, a person is typically charged at an early stage when the Prosecution has sufficient reason to think that he was involved in the offence. There usually follows a long process during which the investigations are pursued, and all the evidence required to secure a conviction at trial is gathered. This can take years. It is important to note that in Vigny Alfred Raj, by the time the appeal was heard by the Malaysian Federal Court, the Prosecution had “completed” investigations and indicated that it did not wish to proceed (see [13]). This suggests that the appellant in that case had been charged even though the investigations had not progressed to the point where it could be reasonably said that he was likely to have been involved in the offence.

  48. (3) Irrelevant considerations

  49. [38] Having outlined the considerations that may be relevant to the exercise of discretion under s 232(2) of the CPC, it is also useful to explain what should be irrelevant to this exercise.

  50. [40] Thean J was not suggesting that the Prosecution had conducted itself poorly in its failure to locate the material witness for five years, or that such poor conduct would justify the granting of a DATA. As I explained earlier (at [27] above), the consequence of a DATA is that the person suspected of an offence is cleared of the offence without a trial. It would be inappropriate for such a consequence, with such a significant adverse impact on the public interest where there remains reason to believe the accused person was involved in the offence, to be deployed as a means of punishing the Prosecution or compensating the accused person for the hardship he may have endured. The discretion under s 232(2) of the CPC is not to be exercised as a form of social accounting where the harms said to have been suffered by the accused person are somehow to be weighed in his favour to offset the prejudice that he may suffer if the Prosecution were to be given more time to complete the investigations.

  51. (4) Summary of the guiding principles

  52. [42] To summarise:

  53. The balance in the present case

  54. [44] On the other hand, Mr Nathan pointed to the fact that the offence occurred some 16 or so years ago. That was true, but, as I pointed out in the course of the arguments, when Ms Teo’s disappearance first came to light, the appellant and Mr Ragil were both interviewed by the police and they evidently lied about their involvement. In that sense, the Prosecution’s inability to locate Mr Ragil was at least partly due to the appellant’s conduct. Had he been truthful about his and Mr Ragil’s involvement in Ms Teo’s disappearance when he was first interviewed, Mr Ragil may have been prevented from leaving Singapore. In these circumstances, the appellant’s hardship stemming from the time the Prosecution needed to locate Mr Ragil carried much less weight. Any delay was, in a sense, a problem of his own making.

  55. [46] I accepted that the Prosecution could not be certain that such a prosecution would take place in the future, because it could not be certain that Mr Ragil would be located, and, even if he was, the Prosecution could not be certain that he would provide them with the required assistance. But I only had to be satisfied that a future Prosecution on the Charge was not so unlikely that the strong presumption of a DNATA being appropriate was displaced. On that count, I was satisfied.

  56. [47] I was also not convinced by the appellant’s reliance on Vigny Alfred Raj and the suggestion that the charge against him was improperly brought or premature. As I have explained at [37] above, it is not the case that an accused person cannot be charged until investigations are complete. What matters is whether, when the charge was made, the Prosecution had sufficient basis for considering that the accused person was involved in the offence. In this case, the appellant was one of the last two people to see Ms Teo alive; he disposed of Ms Teo’s body; he misappropriated Ms Teo’s property; he took steps to conceal his involvement; and then he lied about all this to the authorities. This was hardly a case where there was no basis for the Charge in the first place.

  57. [48] And based on the reasons set out at [39] to [41] above, the past hardship caused to the appellant and his family and the alleged inefficiency of the Prosecution’s past investigations carried no weight.

  58. [49] Given the very strong public interest in enabling the investigations to be completed, in all the circumstances of the case, I was satisfied that the DJ had struck the balance correctly when he granted a DNATA.

  59. [50] I noted Mr Nathan’s submission that, if a DNATA were granted, there would be continuing hardship on the appellant. Further, it was only the Prosecution that could return to court to ask for a DATA instead, if, for example, its efforts to locate Mr Ragil turned out to be fruitless or it no longer wished to prosecute the appellant for some other reason. Section 232 of the CPC does not provide an avenue for the accused person to make such an application. In this regard, I noted the Prosecution’s assurance that it would keep the matter under close review and would be mindful of the continuing hardship on the part of the appellant.

  60. Did I have the power to grant a DATA on the Charge?

  61. [51] Given my conclusion that the DJ had exercised his discretion properly, I did not need to interfere with his decision. I therefore did not need to decide whether he had the power to grant a DATA and whether, as a consequence, I had the power to grant a DATA on appeal from his decision. Nevertheless, I make some observations on this point.

  62. [56] It bears noting that, after Yen Ching Yan was decided, three new subsections were enacted in the CPC provision dealing with discharge. As mentioned at [23] above, ss 184(1) and 184(2) of the CPC 1985 Ed are substantially similar to ss 232(1) and 232(2) of the CPC. Unlike s 184 of the CPC 1985 Ed, however, s 232 of the CPC contains ss 232(3)–232(5), which provide:

  63. [57] Prior to the enactment of these subsections, there was no convenient way for the Prosecution to seek a DATA on a charge after a DNATA had previously been sought and granted. Such a situation could arise, for instance, where the Prosecution having initially sought a DNATA because investigations were pending, determined upon completion of those investigations that it was no longer viable to pursue the charge. In such a case, the reason for a DNATA being sought in the first place would no longer apply, and it would be fair to clear the accused person of the charge such that it no longer hangs over him. Under s 184 of the CPC 1985 Ed, for this to be done, the Prosecution would have to first reinstate the charge before making a fresh application for a discharge under s 184(1) of the CPC 1985 Ed. Following the introduction of ss 232(3)–232(5) of the CPC, the Prosecution is no longer required to reinstate the charge but can just make an application to the Magistrate’s Court or District Court for:

  64. [60] At the hearing, Mr Nathan took issue with the latter part of the reasoning in Yen Ching Yan set out at [55] above. While he accepted that the DJ may not have had the power to grant a DATA on the Charge even with the benefit of ss 232(2)–232(5) of the CPC, he contended that the High Court could grant a DATA when it was hearing an appeal against the DJ’s decision pursuant to the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction.

  65. It did appear to me that, in certain circumstances, the granting of a DATA would be necessary to prevent abuses of process and to safeguard an accused person from oppression or prejudice.

  66. [62] In Lim Chit Foo v Public Prosecutor [2020] 1 SLR 64, the Court of Appeal found at [25] that the practice of standing down charges should not be seen as falling purely within the Prosecution’s discretion because doing so would grant the Prosecution “unfettered control over the conduct of criminal proceedings that are before the court”. The Court of Appeal held:

  67. [64] That said, I did not have to decide this point.

  68. Conclusion

  69. [65] For these reasons, I dismissed the appeal.