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Grounds publishedDecided 8 Jul 2024

General Division of the High Court

Turms Advisors APAC Pte Ltd v Steppe Gold Ltd

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[2024] SGHC 174Case no. Originating Claim No 77 of 2023

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] This case takes me into the nebulous world of project finance and development in emerging jurisdictions. The road to success or failure is marked by high risks and rewards for investors, as well as their service providers and financial advisors. Contracts are signed but their bases are often overtaken by events as timelines slip and circumstances change. In this case, the claimant seeks to enforce allegedly plain contractual promises. The defendant puts forward a different narrative that countermands any such promises. Breaches of gentlemen’s agreements and conventions are introduced. I am asked to unravel the tangled web woven by the parties.

  3. Facts

  4. The parties

  5. [2] The claimant is a boutique corporate finance advisory firm incorporated in Singapore. It is an exempted corporate finance advisor under the Securities and Futures (Licensing and Conduct of Business) Regulations (2004 Rev Ed). It specialises in private credit and complex structured transactions, primarily serving clients in emerging Asian markets.

  6. [3] The defendant is a company incorporated in Ontario and is listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange. It operates, develops, explores and acquires precious metals projects in Mongolia. Its commercially producing mine is the Altan Tsagaan Ovoo property (the “ATO Mine”) located in Eastern Mongolia.

  7. Background to the dispute

  8. [4] In 2017, the Mongolian government initiated the “Gold-2 Programme”. The programme aimed to support gold producers in Mongolia and assist in the recovery of Mongolia’s economy. To this end, Mongolia’s central bank, the Bank of Mongolia, provided loans to the gold producers in Mongolia. On or around 18 September 2020, the defendant obtained, through the Trade & Development Bank of Mongolia (“TDB”), a US$10.5m loan from the Bank of Mongolia under the Gold-2 Programme (the “2020 Gold-2 Loan”). This loan was to be used for the expansion of the ATO Mine.

  9. [5] To finance the expansion of the ATO Mine, the defendant needed more funds, in addition to the 2020 Gold-2 Loan. Pursuant to a contract executed on 24 October 2020 (the “Mandate Letter”), the defendant engaged the claimant as its “exclusive financial adviser in connection with the structuring, arrangement and placement of a US[$]50–80m debt financing (or a combination of financings) to be entered into by the [claimant] (the ‘Transaction’ or, each, a ‘Transaction’)”. All subsequent references to the word “Transaction” in this judgment refer to Transaction as defined in the Mandate Letter.

  10. [6] Under the Mandate Letter, the claimant was to provide deal advisory and deal execution services for the Transaction for a period of nine months. Under cl 2.1 of the Mandate Letter, the claimant was to identify “potential lenders and / or investors” (the “Investors”), initiate discussions with short-listed Investors and implement the deal. Under cl 2.2 of the Mandate Letter, the claimant had to prepare a financial model for the prospective Investors (the “Investor Financial Model”) and an information memorandum (the “Information Memorandum”). The claimant also had to design and advise on the structure of the Transaction in a term sheet form. In return, the defendant would pay the claimant two types of fees. First, retainer fees were payable upon the occurrence of specific milestone events stipulated in the Mandate Letter. Second, a success fee equal to 2.50% of the deal value was payable “in the event of a Transaction”.

  11. [7] Beginning in or around November 2020, the parties discussed the potential target Investors and the financing structure for the Transaction.

  12. [8] Between about 24 May 2021 and about 14 June 2021, the parties exchanged correspondence in relation to a potential financing of around US$60m to US$65m by TDB under the Gold-2 Programme. It is undisputed that the claimant had no contact with TDB or the Bank of Mongolia in general or specifically in relation to the potential TDB loan facility.

  13. [9] Concurrently, around 16 May 2021 to around 17 June 2021, the parties also discussed an extension of the Mandate Letter which was due to expire in July 2021. The engagement was extended for another nine months by an extension letter dated 3 June 2021 (the “Extension Letter”). Following the Extension Letter, the parties continued discussions on the arrangement and structuring of the Transaction.

  14. [10] On 10 November 2021, the defendant released an official public announcement that it had secured a debt facility of US$65m advanced by TDB for the expansion of the ATO Mine (the “US$65m TDB Facility”). This comprised two components. The first was a US$59.7m loan pursuant to the Gold-2 Programme, facilitated by the Bank of Mongolia and provided to the defendant by TDB in the third quarter of 2021. The second was a US$5m loan funded directly by TDB.

  15. [11] On 8 December 2021, the claimant circulated the first draft of the Investor Financial Model to the defendant. On 28 January 2022, the claimant sent Invoice No SG04-22 to the defendant for US$25,000.00. This was pursuant to cl 6(b) of the Mandate Letter which provided that the retainer fee of that amount would be payable upon the claimant’s submission of the first draft of the Investor Financial Model (“Cl 6(b) Retainer Fee”).

  16. [12] On or around 10 or 11 March 2022, the defendant informed the claimant that it was unable to continue with the claimant’s engagement under the Mandate Letter.

  17. [13] On 23 March 2022, the claimant sent Invoice No SG11-22 to the defendant for the total amount of US$1.745m. This was a claim for the following fees:

  18. (a) US$120,000.00, as the retainer fee for the period between 24 November 2020 and 8 November 2021 under cl 6(e) of the Mandate Letter. That clause provided for a monthly retainer of US$10,000.00 until the defendant gave “necessary information” for the claimant’s construction of the first draft of the Investor Financial Model and the Information Memorandum within 30 days of execution of the Mandate Letter (“Cl 6(e) Retainer Fee”).

  19. (b) US$1,625,000.00, as the success fee in relation to the defendant’s conclusion of the US$65m TDB Facility (“Success Fee”).

  20. [14] On 6 July 2022, the defendant paid US$25,000.00 to the claimant in satisfaction of the Cl 6(b) Retainer Fee.

  21. [15] On 6 February 2023, the claimant commenced this action to recover the following sums from the defendant:

  22. Procedural history

  23. [16] On 20 April 2023, the claimant sought a summary judgment against the defendant for the Cl 6(e) Retainer Fee, and late payment interest accrued on both the Cl 6(e) Retainer Fee and on the Cl 6(b) Retainer Fee. Following the filing of an amended defence by the defendant, the claimant applied for and was granted leave on 9 July 2023 to withdraw the summary judgment application.

  24. [18] On 6 December 2023, the claimant sought temporary injunctions against the defendant. Amongst other things, the claimant sought to restrain the defendant from pursuing or continuing to pursue the claim filed against the claimant’s director, Mr Antonio Víctor López Abelló (“Mr López”), in the Sukhbaatar District Court in Mongolia, until the final determination of the suit. I dismissed the claimant’s application on 11 January 2024.

  25. The parties’ cases

  26. [19] The claimant’s case is that the terms of the mandate are clear. The defendant is an obstinate client who has failed to honour the contract. The claimant makes broadly four main arguments:

  27. (a) The claimant claims the Success Fee. The US$65m TDB Facility falls squarely within the definition of Transaction. There is no express or implied term that the claimant must be the effective cause of that facility. Even if the US$65m TDB Facility falls outside the scope of the claimant’s mandate, the claimant argues that it is entitled to a reasonable sum in quantum meruit.

  28. (b) The claimant argues that it is entitled to the Cl 6(e) Retainer Fee. It required the defendant to provide a feasibility study of the project before it could construct the Investor Financial Model. The feasibility study was not provided within the deadline agreed under the Mandate Letter. The claimant disagrees with the defendant that cl 6(e) of the Mandate Letter is a penalty clause or that the claimant provided no consideration.

  29. (c) On late payment interest, the claimant relies on the contractually agreed rate of 10% per annum. The claimant contests the defendant’s allegation of waiver of late payment interest and reliance on the penalty rule.

  30. (d) Finally, the claimant argues that, should it succeed in its claims, it is contractually entitled to a full indemnity from the defendant for costs and expenses incurred in connection with this suit and Invoices No SG04-22 and SG11-22. In the alternative, the claimant seeks its costs of this suit.

  31. [20] The defendant’s case is that the claimant is seeking a free lunch.

  32. (a) The defendant disputes the claimant’s entitlement to the Success Fee. This is mainly for two reasons. First, the claimant was not the effective cause of the US$65m TDB Facility. Second, the parties have agreed to exclude the US$65m TDB Facility from the scope of the claimant’s mandate. Even if the US$65m TDB Facility falls within the claimant’s mandate, the claimant is estopped by convention from insisting that it is within scope. Further, the Mandate Letter and/or the Extension Letter is void or voidable because the defendant entered into them under a unilateral mistake.

  33. (b) On the Cl 6(e) Retainer Fee, the defendant argues that it is unenforceable because it is a penalty clause and/or no consideration was provided for cl 6(e). Even if the clause is enforceable, it is argued that the Cl 6(e) Retainer Fee had not accrued – the defendant had provided sufficient information for the claimant to begin work on the Investor Financial Model within the stated deadline.

  34. (c) On late payment interest, the defendant argues that it is an unenforceable penalty clause. Specifically in relation to the Cl 6(b) Retainer Fee, the claimant has allegedly waived its claim for late payment interest.

  35. (d) Finally, the defendant avers that the claimant is not entitled to a claim for quantum meruit.

  36. Issues to be determined

  37. [21] The issues to be determined are as follows:

  38. Issue 1: The claimant is not entitled to the Success Fee

  39. [22] I start with the claimant’s entitlement to the Success Fee. There are four sub-issues which I address in turn:

  40. (a) first, whether the US$65m TDB Facility was a Transaction as defined in the Mandate Letter;

  41. (b) second, whether there is an express or implied term that the claimant must be the effective cause of the Transaction to be entitled to the Success Fee, and if so, whether the claimant was an effective cause;

  42. (c) third, whether the US$65m TDB Facility was excluded from the scope of the Mandate Letter and/or the Extension Letter; and/or

  43. (d) fourth, if the US$65m TDB Facility fell outside the scope of the Mandate Letter and/or the Extension Letter, whether the claimant is entitled to a reasonable quantum meruit.

  44. The US$65m TDB Facility was a Transaction under the Mandate Letter

  45. [23] I found that the US$65m TDB Facility was a Transaction as defined under the Mandate Letter.

  46. [24] The purpose of contractual interpretation is to give effect to the objectively ascertained expressed intentions of the contracting parties as it emerges from the contextual meaning of the relevant contractual language (Yap Son On v Ding Pei Zhen [2017] 1 SLR 219 at [30]). The starting point of contractual interpretation is the text of the contract (CIFG Special Assets Capital I Ltd (formerly known as Diamond Kendall Ltd) v Ong Puay Koon and others and another appeal [2018] 1 SLR 170 (“CIFG”) at [19(a)]). Relevant context may be considered in contractual interpretation as long as the contextual points are clear, obvious and known to both parties (CIFG at [19(b)]). Ultimately, the meaning ascribed to the contractual terms must be one which the expressions used by the parties can reasonably bear (CIFG at [19(d)]).

  47. [25] Turning to the text of the Mandate Letter, I reproduce the definition of Transaction below (see also [5] above):

  48. [26] The defendant contends that on a plain reading, Transaction refers to a US$50m to US$80m debt financing which the claimant is required to structure, arrange and place. The various services the claimant had to perform in the “structuring, arrangement and placement” of that financing are detailed in cl 2 of the Mandate Letter – eg, the preparation of the Investor Financial Model and the Information Memorandum (see [6] above). In other words, on the defendant’s interpretation, a Transaction is a US$50m to US$80m debt financing for which the claimant had carried out the work envisaged in cl 2 of the Mandate Letter.

  49. [27] I disagree with this reading. The parties entered into the Mandate Letter and the Extension Letter so that the claimant would act as the “exclusive financial advisor in connection with the structuring, arrangement and placement” of the Transaction. As the claimant points out, it is illogical for a debt financing to only qualify as a Transaction where the claimant has acted as an exclusive financial advisor and was engaged in its “structuring, arrangement and placement”. The definition of Transaction was unambiguous. I agree with the claimant that Transaction simply refers to a debt financing (or a combination of financings) for an amount of US$50m to US$80m to finance the ATO Mine expansion.

  50. [28] The claimant also contends that the Mandate Letter only contains two express carve-outs from the definition of Transaction, and that the US$65m TDB Facility does not fall under either carve-out. The first was equity-type financings described in cl 3 of the Mandate Letter as “listing on secondary stock exchanges, placement of either primary and / or secondary listed equity to be undertaken by [the defendant] and / or [its] shareholder”. The second was financings stated in cl 4 of the Mandate Letter – financings that fall within the tail of “an expired financial advisory agreement that has led to a completed stream financings with Triple Flag Mine Finance … and / or [its] affiliates”.

  51. [29] The defendant disagrees. On equity-type financings, the defendant refers to an email from Mr Jeremy Thomas South (“Mr South”) to Mr López dated 21 October 2020. It states that “clearly if you [ie, the claimant] bring us [ie, the defendant] an equity deal we will pay you on that”. According to the defendant, this suggests that equity-type financings were not actually excluded from the claimant’s mandate. On Triple Flag Mine Finance (“TF”), the defendant contends that, as conceded by Mr Carl Dunton (“Mr Dunton”), cl 4 of the Mandate Letter does not carve out TF tail financings. Rather, cl 4 addresses a situation where a Transaction is caught by the tail of a previous advisor who had closed the TF facility. According to the defendant, cl 4 assures the claimant that it would be paid a success fee, even if the defendant has to pay a commission to its previous advisor.

  52. [30] As neither party argues that the US$65m TDB Facility is an equity financing or a TF-related financing, it is unnecessary for me to determine whether the Mandate Letter had carved out these two types of financings.

  53. [31] For completeness, I address the claimant’s reliance on the oral testimony of Mr South, the defendant’s Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer. Mr South admitted on the stand that the US$65m TDB Facility fell within the definition of Transaction under the Mandate Letter. I do not place any significant weight on this testimony. I agree with the defendant’s counsel that a witness’s interpretation of a contract on the stand has little or no bearing on its legal meaning and effect, which is a question of law. As observed in Pacific Autocom Enterprise Pte Ltd v Chia Wah Siang [2004] 3 SLR(R) 73, the court takes an objective view based on the language of the contract and is “not guided by the subjective understanding of either party unless there is clear evidence that the agreement was to be interpreted in accordance with a particular subjective intention” (at [31]). There is no such clear evidence suggesting that the Mandate Letter be interpreted based on the parties’ subjective intention.

  54. [32] For the above reasons, I find that the US$65m TDB Facility was a Transaction within the meaning of the Mandate Letter.

  55. The claimant was not required to be the effective cause of the US$65m TDB Facility

  56. [33] I turn to the issue of whether the Mandate Letter requires the claimant to be the effective cause of a Transaction to be entitled to a success fee.

  57. The law on effective cause

  58. [34] The genesis of the effective cause term is the English Court of Appeal’s case in Millar, Son & Co v Radford (1903) 19 TLR 575 (“Millar”). In Millar, the plaintiff, an agent employed by the defendant, found a tenant who later purchased the property. The plaintiff claimed commission on the sale even though he was not involved in the sale. Lord Collins MR disallowed the plaintiff’s claim for commission because it was “necessary to show that the introduction [of a tenant or purchaser] was an efficient cause in bringing about the letting or the sale” and “the mere fact that agents had introduced a tenant or purchaser” was insufficient (cited in Emporium Holdings (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Knight Frank Cheong Hock Chye & Baillieu (Property Consultants) Pte Ltd [1994] SGCA 147 (“Emporium”) at [22]). The modern equivalent of “efficient” cause is “effective” cause (Watersheds v Christopher Simms [2009] EWHC 713 (QB) (“Watersheds”) at [16]).

  59. [35] The case of Millar led to the following modern restatement of the law, as expressed in Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency (Sweet & Maxwell, 18th Ed, 2006) (“Bowstead”) at para 7-027 (cited in Colliers International (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Senkee Logistics Pte Ltd [2007] 2 SLR(R) 230 at [70]):

  60. [36] It is undisputed that the above principle is part of Singapore law. The applicable principles are summarised in the Court of Appeal case of Goh Lay Khim and others v Isabel Redrup Agency Pte Ltd and another appeal [2017] 1 SLR 546 (“Isabel Redrup”):

  61. (a) The relationship between an agent and his principal is a contractual one with any entitlement to commission being governed by the contractual terms (at [28], citing Deans Property Pte Ltd v Land Estates Apartments Pte Ltd [1994] 3 SLR(R) 804 (“Deans Property”) at [17]).

  62. (b) Where there is an “absence of an express contractual term governing the agent’s right to commission, the agent is only entitled to commission if his services were the effective cause of the transaction, this being an implied term of the agency contract” [emphasis in original] (at [28], citing Deans Property at [17]).

  63. (c) There is no precise definition of what “effective cause” means, as the inquiry is fact-specific and requires a holistic assessment of all the relevant facts of each case (at [37]). To be an effective cause, the agent would have to show that it was “the critical cause”; it is insufficient to be “one of the causes” of the transaction (at [37], citing Grandhome Pte Ltd v Ng Kok Eng [1996] 1 SLR(R) 14 at [7]).

  64. [37] In the UK, the Court of Appeal in EMFC Loan Syndications LLP v The Resort Group plc [2021] EWCA Civ 844 (“EMFC”) noted that the principle in Bowstead may not apply outside the residential estate agency context (at [64]). Similarly, the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal in Eminent Investments (Asia Pacific) Limited v Dio Corporation [2020] HKCFA 38 (“Eminent”) observed that “there is little to be said for a presumption, and nothing to be said for an implied term” of effective cause outside the sphere of estate agents, “especially in the residential consumer context” (at [72]). Under Singapore law, most of the cases addressed the effective cause term in the context of real estate agency (see eg, Emporium, Isabel Redrup, Deans Property). However, the Court of Appeal in SAR Maritime Agencies (Pvt) Ltd v PCL (Shipping) Pte Ltd [2020] 1 SLR 896 (“SAR Maritime”) clarified that effective cause term is not limited to the real estate agency context (at [30]). SAR Maritime itself involved a ship broking contract, and ANC Holdings Pte Ltd v Bina Puri Holdings Bhd [2013] 3 SLR 666 (which found an implied effective cause term) involved an agent engaged to secure housing construction projects. Hence, the fact that the present case concerns a financial advisory contract does not preclude me from finding that there is an effective cause term.

  65. The claimant was engaged as the defendant’s agent

  66. [38] As a preliminary point, the claimant argues that the Mandate Letter was not a commission-based contract of agency which attracted the doctrine of effective cause. In Edmond De Rothschild Securities (UK) Ltd v Exillon Energy plc [2014] EWHC 2165 (Comm) (“Rothschild”), Exillon engaged Rothschild as its exclusive financial advisor in relation to Worldview’s shareholder requisition. In considering whether an effective cause term should be implied into the contract between Exillon and Rothschild, the English High Court found that there was no contract of agency. In the court’s view, there was “a contract to provide strategic and financial advice”, and the contract “[did] not contemplate, as a typical agency contract would, that Rothschild will introduce or seek to introduce counterparties who will enter into contracts with Exillon” (Rothschild at [25(a)]). The claimant contends that it was engaged as a financial advisor to secure a Transaction, not as an estate agent or financial broker whose job was to look for interested counter-parties in the market and introduce them to the principal.

  67. [39] I distinguish the claimant’s mandate from that in Rothschild. An agency relationship simply refers to a relationship, often undergirded by a contractual agreement, where one party is able to act for another party (Tan Cheng Han, The Law of Agency (Academy Publishing, 2nd Ed, 2017) at para 01.008). In the present case, the claimant was engaged to find a prospective Investor and negotiate on the Transaction with and on behalf of the defendant. Unlike in Rothschild, the claimant was not engaged solely to provide financial advice. As the defendant’s counsel submitted during the hearing on 26 April 2024, this made the Mandate Letter akin to a quasi-brokerage agreement. I agree with this characterisation.

  68. There is no express effective cause term under the Mandate Letter

  69. [40] I turn to the issue of whether there is an express effective cause term under the Mandate Letter.

  70. [41] The clause that deals with the claimant’s Success Fee is cl 6 of the Mandate Letter, which provides as follows:

  71. The success fee clause is unambiguous. It simply provides that “success fee [is] payable in cash in the event of a Transaction”, ie, a US$50m to US$80m debt facility for the purposes of financing the ATO Mine expansion.

  72. [42] The defendant disagrees, arguing that on a contextual reading of cl 6, the effective cause term can be read into in the Mandate Letter. For clarity, this argument is not a matter of implication (which is addressed below) but a matter of interpretation – ie, whether on a true construction of the express terms, the Mandate Letter required the claimant to be an effective cause of the Transaction to be entitled to the Success Fee (see eg, Centre for Laser and Aesthetic Medicine Pte Ltd v GPK Clinic (Orchard) Pte Ltd and others and another appeal [2018] 1 SLR 180 (“GPK Clinic”) at [40]).

  73. [43] First, the defendant argues that on a plain reading, a Transaction refers to a US$50m to US$80m debt financing for which the claimant is required to “structure[e], arrange[] and place[]”. I have dismissed this interpretation above (see [27]) and say no more on this point.

  74. [44] Second, the defendant relies on the fee structure in cl 6. The defendant argues that cl 6 sets out milestone payments that lead up to a success fee which can only be earned after the claimant had achieved all the prior milestones. I disagree with this reading. The claimant rightly points out the absurd outcome that would follow from such a construction. For instance, if the claimant executes a non-disclosure agreement with less than five reputable financial institutions, the claimant would have failed to achieve milestone (d) of cl 6 above (see [41]). In such a situation, even if the defendant manages to secure a Transaction, the claimant would not be entitled to a success fee for failure to complete milestone (d). This is not a commercially reasonable construction of cl 6. Instead, I read the part of cl 6 which deals with the success fee as independent from the earlier parts of cl 6 that address the retainer fees. Clause 6 uses the word “Plus” (see [41] above), indicating that the success fee is a form of remuneration which is separate from and in addition to the retainer fees that the claimant may earn.

  75. [45] Third, the defendant relies on cl 4 of the Mandate Letter which provides that if any potential Investor approaches the defendant directly, the claimant is to “assist [the defendant] in subsequent negotiations and closure of each Transaction with such potential Investor(s)”. This clause does not assist the defendant. It requires the claimant to provide services for the securing of the Transaction. But it does not suggest that a transaction only qualifies as a Transaction for which success fee is payable, if the claimant was the effective cause.

  76. [46] Finally, the defendant refers to the tail-gunner provision in cl 4 which states as follows:

  77. The defendant argues that based on this clause, the claimant is only entitled to a success fee post-termination if, amongst other requirements, the claimant had previously come into contact with and worked with an Investor to provide a proposal to the defendant. I agree with this reading. However, this clause applies where the claimant is seeking a success fee where a transaction is consummated after the termination of the claimant’s mandate, which is not the case here. The relevant clause in the circumstances is cl 6, which does not state that the claimant is only entitled to a success fee if it had worked with an Investor to provide a proposal to the defendant. It simply states that “success fee [is] payable in cash in the event of a Transaction” [emphasis added].

  78. [47] I agree with the claimant that it would have been easy for the parties to include further requirements such as those in the tail-gunner provision if they had intended to impose such qualifications to cl 6. The failure to do so means that the claimant may be entitled to a success fee so long as a Transaction is concluded during its engagement, even if it has not done any work. By contrast, if a Transaction is concluded after the expiry or termination of the Mandate Letter, the claimant is only entitled to a success fee if the above tail-gunner provision requirements are met. I do not consider this an absurd outcome. During the claimant’s mandate, the intended structure of the Mandate Letter was for the defendant to engage the claimant to assist with any introductions the defendant could provide with respect to Investors to the ATO Mine expansion. Whether or not introductions were made, the defendant should engage the claimant to work on closing the Transaction in question. If the defendant chose not to engage the claimant to carry out such work, the claimant would still be entitled to the success fee.

  79. [48] In light of the above, I agree with the claimant that there is no contractual language which points towards an express effective cause term, nor any room to read an effective cause term into the Mandate Letter.

  80. [49] The parties made extensive written and oral arguments on foreign authorities where the courts have read in an effective cause term in the context of financial advisory agency. For completeness, I address the salient cases.

  81. [50] In Crema v Cenkos Securities plc [2010] 2 All ER (Comm) 1 (“Crema”), Mr Crema, an investment banker, was engaged as a sub-broker by Cenkos in relation to a fundraising for Green Park Ventures Ltd. The interpretation of the following written communications was in issue:

  82. The court read in an effective cause term because “it [was] clear from the written communications between Mr Crema and Cenkos that he was to be paid commission on investments ‘raised’ by him”, which “[meant] that Mr Crema had to be the effective cause of the investment” (Crema at [40]).

  83. [51] In Wollenberg v Casinos Austria International Holdings GmbH [2011] EWHC 103 (Ch) (“Wollenberg”), Mr Wollenberg was engaged as an exclusive consultant for Casinos Austria International Holdings GmbH to identify appropriate sites for the operation of casinos, negotiate the terms for the occupation of those sites, and liaise with regulatory authorities to implement the company’s business plans. The contract entitled Mr Wollenberg to a “right to acquire 4% of the equity held by Casinos Austria International Holding GmbH or any affiliate of the Casinos Austria Group of Companies of each UK project introduced by [him]”. The English High Court held that the word “introduced” in the phrase “each UK project introduced by you” carried “an effective causative element” which required the agent’s actions to “really [bring] about the relation of buyer and seller” (Wollenberg at [160]). Hence, the “natural reading” of this provision was that the success fee is payable if “Mr Wollenberg (not anybody else) introduces a project (not a person who knows about a project); and Mr Wollenberg was the (or an) effective cause of the introduction of the project in question” (at [163]).

  84. [52] In Cavendish Corporate Finance LLP v KIMS Property Co Ltd [2014] EWHC 1282 (Ch) (“Cavendish”), Cavendish was engaged by Nome Properties LLP under a contract (later novated to KIMS) to find an investor for construction projects. Cavendish’s task included giving advice as to the corporate structure for the project and the financial model, preparing information documents, providing assistance in presentations, and reviewing offers made by potential investors. The relevant clauses provided as follows:

  85. [53] In construing the success fee clause, the English High Court considered that the contract was an agency agreement providing for a commission, such that the principle in Bowstead (see [35] above) was applicable (Cavendish at [162]). The court also noted that the statement in Bowstead “is only a principle” and that “the actual meaning of the contract depends on the words used and their factual context” (Cavendish at [164]). On the facts, the court held that it had no difficulty concluding that the words “successful fundraising from the Cavendish exercise” [emphasis added] meant that the success fee was payable if Cavendish’s work was an effective cause of the deal (Cavendish at [164]).

  86. [54] The above cases are distinguishable from the present case. An effective cause term was read into the contract in those cases because the plain reading of the express words of the contract clearly supported a causal link between the agent and the consummated transaction. Clause 6 of the Mandate Letter expressly states that a success fee is payable “in the event of a Transaction” simpliciter. I note that it also contains the following phrase – “[i]n respect of amounts related to any form of debt capital raised” [emphasis added]. This can be interpreted as a reference to debt capital raised by the claimant. However, I do not place any significant meaning to the word “raised” in this context. Unlike Crema which explicitly referred to “funds raised by yourselves [ie, the agent]”, intimating a substantive fund-raising obligation, there is no such express language in cl 6 of the Mandate Letter.

  87. [55] The defendant relies heavily on the Hong Kong case of Eminent ([37] supra). There, Eminent was engaged as the “sole and exclusive” financial adviser of DIO to provide “international financial advice on fundraising with a view to DIO raising additional capital to expand its overseas business” (Eminent at [48]). Eminent introduced a prospective investor (Dentsply International Inc) to DIO, and a fundraising transaction was entered into between Dentsply and DIO after the termination of Eminent’s advisory agreement. Eminent claimed for a success fee in respect of the transaction.

  88. [56] The Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal started with the success fee clause which applied to transactions completed during the currency of the advisory agreement. It provided that:

  89. [57] The court interpreted the above clause to mean that Eminent was required not just to introduce a third party but “to put in work towards achieving the successful completion of the actual fundraising transaction” (Eminent at [53]). That the clause made “a completed transaction pivotal for entitlement to” [emphasis in original] a success fee was evident from the following (Eminent at [52]):

  90. (a) the heading of the success fee clause was “TRANSACTION FEE”;

  91. (b) the fee was a “success fee” payable “[u]pon completion of any transaction for the company”;

  92. (c) the amount of the success fee was a percentage of the “total transactional amount”; and

  93. (d) the qualifying transaction – ie, “any financial transaction related to Fund Raising or Private Placement or Shareholder restructuring, or Mergers & Acquisition for the Company” – was linked to the services that Eminent was expressly required to provide under the contract.

  94. [58] Additionally, the addendum to the advisory agreement provided for milestone payments which supported the finding of an effective cause term. Eminent was entitled to an additional “fixed retainer” to be paid in instalments (a) on signing; (b) on completion of specified events (eg, acceptance of the term sheet for the transaction); and (c) on completion of the transaction (Eminent at [58]). According to the court, this provided compensation to Eminent “in stages as work [was] done and progress [was] made” and “demonstrate[d] that Eminent [was] intended to be actively involved in bringing about completion of the transaction and compensated for its services at each stage” (Eminent at [59]). There was no provision that attached a fee entitlement merely to the “introduction” of a counterparty (Eminent at [59]).

  95. [59] The court then turned to the tail-gunner clause which applied to transactions completed after the termination of the advisory agreement. It stated:

  96. Based on the phrase “according to this Agreement…”, the court concluded that the success fee under the tail-gunner clause was to be calculated on the same basis as during the currency of the advisory agreement (Eminent at [62]). The words “introduced by the Financial Advisor” was thus read to mean that it was “the transaction which [was] successfully completed that Eminent [had] to introduce” [emphasis in original] (Eminent at [64]). In other words, if Eminent introduced a party but “play[ed] no part or an insignificant part in bringing about the fundraising transaction”, there would be no entitlement to a success fee (Eminent at [64]).

  97. [60] At first glance, the analysis in Eminent appears to be applicable to the present case. Some of the factors that pointed towards an effective cause term (see [57]–[58] above) are also present in this case. For instance, a success fee is calculated as a percentage of the deal value, and the claimant was engaged to provide services in relation to a Transaction. There were also milestone payments which envisaged the claimant’s active involvement in the securing of the Transaction. Despite these similarities, the analysis in Eminent is of limited value. Whether an effective cause term should be read into the contract ultimately turns on the interpretation of its terms. I agree with the following observations made in Eminent:

  98. [61] Whether there is an effective cause term is essentially a fact-sensitive inquiry that turns on the principles of contractual interpretation. In that regard, I note that the factors at [57]–[58] above went towards the issue of whether a mere introduction of an investor sufficed for Eminent to be entitled to a success fee (although the work done by Eminent was not the effective cause of the eventual transaction). It was undisputed that Eminent’s mandate required Eminent to have introduced the financing source to DIO. That is distinguishable from the present case, where the claimant is not even required to be an introducer. Clause 4 of the Mandate Letter contains a deeming provision, providing that “irrespective of the source of such Investor [the claimant] will be paid the success fee as if the Investor was contacted directly by [the claimant]”. The issue is thus whether the claimant, who is deemed to have introduced the Investors to the defendant, nevertheless had to be an effective cause of the Transaction to be entitled to a success fee. As noted above repeatedly, there is no express language that can be interpreted to that effect. Even in Eminent, the success fee was stated to be payable “upon completion of any transaction for the Company” [emphasis added], which was accepted by Eminent as an effective cause term (Eminent Investments (Asia Pacific) Limited v DIO Corporation [2019] HKCA 606 at [6.4]). Clause 6 of the Mandate Letter does not condition the success fee upon the claimant having completed any specific work.

  99. [62] For the above reasons, I find that an effective cause term is not expressly provided in the Mandate Letter and cannot be read into the contract as a matter of construction.

  100. An effective cause term cannot be implied into the Mandate Letter

  101. [63] I turn to the defendant’s alternative argument that an effective cause term should be implied. The claimant contends that the need for implication does not arise in an exclusive agency like the present. This is because the main reason for implying an effective cause term is to minimise the risk of the principal having to pay double or multiple commissions (EMFC ([37] supra) at [72] and [78]). Accordingly, an effective cause term provides business efficacy in non-exclusive contracts of agency where multiple agents are engaged to secure a transaction.

  102. [64] While the risk of double commission is a primary rationale behind implying an effective cause term, it is not the sole rationale. The court in Crema ([50] supra) explicitly rejected the argument that an effective cause term “only arose where there was a risk of the client having to pay more than one commission” (at [40]). For instance, as expressed in Foxtons Ltd v Pelkey Bicknell [2008] EWCA Civ 419 in the context of real estate agency, “it is by no means apparent why [the sole agent] should be entitled to commission on a purchaser for which he had no responsibility” (at [26]). In other words, the exclusive nature of the claimant’s mandate is not fatal to implying an effective cause term. However, that the key rationale (of double commission) for implying such a term does not apply in the present case, is a relevant factor weighing against such implication.

  103. [65] Ultimately, it is trite that under Singapore law, a term would only be implied into an agency contract if the parties did not contemplate the issue at all and so left a “gap” (Sembcorp Marine Ltd v PPL Holdings Pte Ltd and another and another appeal [2013] 4 SLR 193 (“Sembcorp Marine”) at [94]–[95]). Here, there is an express clause (ie, cl 6 of the Mandate Letter) that unambiguously governs the claimant’s entitlement to commission. There is no “gap” to address, and the implication of the effective cause term is unnecessary (Isabel Redrup ([36] supra) at [29]).

  104. [66] The English cases that the parties relied on support this conclusion. As the claimant argues, they suggest that an effective cause term would not be implied into an otherwise clear and workable contract.

  105. [67] In Watersheds ([34] supra), Watersheds was engaged by Simms as a financial advisor to raise finance for a waste business (phase I) and then to assist him in its sale (phase II). It was undisputed that Watersheds did not do any work in connection with the sale. The relevant clause on fee entitlement for phase II provided as follows:

  106. [68] Simms sought to imply an effective cause term into cl (ii). The English High Court refused to imply an effective cause term as it was inconsistent with the express terms of the contract. It was “quite impossible” to imply such a term into cl (i) because the agreement envisaged that such an introduction might take place years before any serious work leading to an eventual sale (Watersheds at [24]). Since it was inconsistent with the express terms and the nature of the engagement to imply an effective cause term into cl (i), an effective cause term could not be implied into cl (ii) either (Watersheds at [24]). The court observed that cl (ii) did not even require Watersheds to have introduced the client, suggesting that it was meant to provide “protection to Watersheds in circumstances where [Simms] chooses to exclude it from the process even if he has not formally terminated the agreement” (Watersheds at [24]).

  107. [69] In Seymour Pierce Limited v Grandtop International Holdings Limited [2010] EWHC 676 (“Seymour Pierce”), Seymour Pierce was engaged as a financial adviser of Grandtop in connection with an acquisition of an English football club. Seymour Pierce sought a success fee for a successful acquisition. The English High Court refused to imply an effective cause term as there was “no need as a matter of business efficacy” (Seymour Pierce at [45]). The success fee clause provided that “the Company shall pay to Seymour Pierce the Success Fee in full” if there is a successful acquisition within 12 months after Seymour Pierce’s termination. It was held that this clause was “entirely comprehensible without any such implication” and did not require Seymour to be the effective cause (Seymour Pierce at [45]–[46]).

  108. [70] In Rothschild ([38] supra), the contract entitled Rothschild to a success fee where one of the five events occurred, including when “Worldview has reduced its shareholding in [Exillon] to below 5%”. The English High Court held that a success fee was payable “without further inquiry” when one or more of the five events have materialised (Rothschild at [20] and [25(d)]). It was also relevant that the contract entitled Rothschild to a success fee even if the transaction was concluded some considerable time after termination, at a time when Rothschild’s work was unlikely to have constituted an effective cause (Rothschild at [20] and [25(d)]). Given this “natural meaning” of the clause (Rothschild at [22]), there was no need and scope to read into or imply an effective cause term.

  109. [71] The defendant distinguishes Watersheds and Rothschild. The defendant points out that in Watersheds, it was relevant that implying an effective cause term in that case would have left Watersheds vulnerable to receiving no fees (at [25]–[26]). By contrast, there is a tail-gunner provision under the Mandate Letter. This meant that the claimant was protected from a situation where the defendant terminates the claimant (despite it having done useful work) and then securing the Transaction. As for Rothschild, the defendant argues that it was relevant that there would have been evidential difficulty in proving that the agent was an effective cause of the sale (at [22]). By contrast, it is contended that the claimant’s role in securing the Transaction (had it done so) would have been self-evident. The defendant rightly points out that these factors were relevant to the courts’ determination that an effective cause term should not be implied. However, the central reason for non-implication in both cases was that an implied effective cause term would be inconsistent with other terms of the contract.

  110. [72] The position under Singapore law is similar. The term to be implied cannot contradict any express term of the contract (Sembcorp Marine ([65] supra) at [98]). In the present case, it would be inconsistent with the express terms of the Mandate Letter to imply an effective cause term. As the claimant points out, cl 4 of the Mandate Letter contains a deeming provision (see [61] above). Such a deeming provision was interpreted in The County Homesearch Co (Thames & Chilterns) Ltd v Cowham [2008] 1 WLR 909 (“County Homesearch”), which concerned an estate agency contract, as being inconsistent with any implied effective cause term. The following reasoning by the English Court of Appeal at [19] applies equally to the present case:

  111. [73] The defendant argues that County Homesearch is distinguishable. The agent in that case had to cooperate with the principal in finding a property. According to the defendant, that gave rise to difficulties in attribution, making the deemed introduction provision necessary and the implication of an effective cause term inappropriate. The defendant contends that no such inappropriateness arises in this case. I disagree. The above paragraph from County Homesearch is not confined to the specific facts of that case. I interpret it as an explanation of the effect of deemed introduction provisions, and hence being of broader applicability. The effect of the deemed introduction provision in cl 4 is that the claimant would still get paid even if it has not introduced the Investor to the defendant (and was hence not the effective cause of the Transaction with that Investor). This is an unambiguous and explicit term of the Mandate Letter. Implying an effective cause term into the Mandate Letter would hence be inconsistent with its express terms.

  112. [74] The outcome of this interpretation is that the claimant would be entitled to a free lunch. But it is not for the court to imply an effective cause term to prevent that outcome. In the absence of any vitiating factors, courts will give effect to a contract voluntarily entered into by the parties, especially for contracts negotiated between two sophisticated commercial parties as in the present case. In Rothschild, the English High Court dismissed Exillon’s argument that Rothschild would be provided with a windfall or that it would be contrary to business common sense. According to the court, where the desired event had in fact been achieved, there was “nothing contrary to business common sense” in entitling Rothschild to its fee regardless of whether it was an effective cause of that event – in fact, “there [was] much to be said for simplicity and certainty” in doing away with evidential issues of proving an effective cause (Rothschild at [25]). In EMFC ([37] supra), the English Court of Appeal noted that while the refusal to imply an effective cause term may produce a windfall for EMFC, “the test is not one of fairness or reasonableness but rather a question of what, objectively viewed, the parties are to be taken as having agreed” (at [79]). I could not agree more with the decisions in Rothschild and EMFC. It is not for this court to stand in the way of an agreement freely entered into between the parties. In this case, the express language of cl 6 of the Mandate Letter is that the claimant is entitled to a success fee upon the occurrence of a specified event – ie, the consummation of the Transaction.

  113. [75] In light of the above, there is no express or implied effective cause term that qualifies the claimant’s entitlement to the Success Fee.

  114. The parties agreed to exclude the US$65m TDB Facility from the Mandate Letter

  115. [76] The next issue is whether there was an agreement by the parties to exclude the US$65m TDB Facility from the scope of the Mandate Letter and/or the Extension Letter. This gave rise to the following sub-issues:

  116. (a) first, whether the Extension Letter was a separate contract;

  117. (b) second, whether the no oral modification clause precluded reliance on an alleged subsequent oral contract to exclude the US$65m TDB Facility;

  118. (c) third, whether there was an oral contract to exclude the US$65m TDB Facility; and

  119. (d) fourth, whether the evidence of the alleged oral agreement was admissible.

  120. The Extension Letter was a separate contract to extend the Mandate Letter

  121. [77] The defendant’s case is that the Extension Letter is a new mandate agreement which is separate from the Mandate Letter and carves out the US$65m TDB Facility. The claimant’s case is that the Extension Letter simply extends the life of the existing Mandate Letter. For reasons explained below, I find that the Extension Letter is a separate standalone contract merely to extend the duration of the Mandate Letter.

  122. [78] I reproduce the salient parts of the Extension Letter dated 3 June 2021 from Mr López to Mr South below:

  123. [79] On 16 June 2021, Mr South sent the following email attaching the counter-signed Extension Letter:

  124. [80] The claimant relies on the words of the Extension Letter which state that it is “an extension of nine (9) months of the Mandate [Letter] from the end of the original validity period”. The claimant also emphasises Mr South’s concession on the stand that the meaning of “extension” is to “prolong” or “lengthen” the life of the contract. I repeat my observation (at [31] above) on the relevance of a witness’ interpretation of the contract. Based on a plain reading of the phrase quoted by the claimant, I agree with the claimant that it points towards the parties’ intention to simply lengthen the duration of the existing Mandate Letter. I do not see how the Extension Letter can be interpreted as a new advisory contract that incorporates the terms of the Mandate Letter.

  125. [81] I now turn to the question of whether the Extension Letter is a separate agreement from the Mandate Letter. I find that various factors point towards the former being a standalone contract. First, cl 4 of the Mandate Letter entitles the parties to extend the duration of the claimant’s mandate. I reproduce cl 4 below:

  126. [82] It is undisputed that neither party relied on cl 4 of the Mandate Letter to extend the claimant’s mandate. No convincing explanation was given as to why the claimant had failed to invoke its contractual right to extend the duration of the Mandate Letter. Mr Dunton, the claimant’s external legal counsel and senior adviser who drafted the Extension Letter, testified that he considered “the simplest way of extending the mandate letter is a separate letter rather than invoking clauses within the letter”. This was notwithstanding that he was aware of cl 4 of the Mandate Letter. The claimant’s failure to utilise the existing contractual mechanism to extend the duration of the Mandate Letter points towards the Extension Letter being a separate agreement. In fact, the claimant’s own case is that it is irrelevant that the parties did not rely on the extension provisions in cl 4 because they were “free to enter into a separate agreement to extend the duration of their existing contract”. In other words, while the claimant contends that the practical effect of the Extension Letter is merely to lengthen the duration of the Mandate Letter, the claimant appears to accept that the Extension Letter is nevertheless a separate standalone contract.

  127. [83] Second, unlike the Mandate Letter which was governed by Singapore law, the Extension Letter was stated to be governed by English law (see [78] above). The claimant contends that just because the Extension Letter was governed by a different law from the Mandate Letter does not mean that the Extension Letter is a separate agreement. Mr Dunton’s explanation on the stand was that English law was stated as the governing law out of “muscle memory” and that it was unintentional. The choice of a different governing law may indeed have been unintentional. However, the very fact that Mr Dunton, “a lawyer for 25 years”, considered it necessary to include a governing law clause suggests that he knew the Extension Letter was a separate standalone agreement. It also makes more legal sense to have a standalone extension governed by English law and the extended Mandate Letter would continue to be governed by Singapore law as per the parties’ original agreement.

  128. [84] All the elements of a contract – offer, acceptance, consideration and intention to create legal relations – are present (Gay Choon Ing v Loh Sze Ti Terence Peter and another appeal [2009] 2 SLR(R) 332 (“Gay Choon Ing”) at [46]). The Extension Letter from Mr López to Mr South on 3 June 2021 was an offer by the claimant to enter into a contract that (a) extends the length of the Mandate Letter by nine months from the expiry date of 24 July 2021; and (b) is governed by English law. This offer was accepted by the defendant, evident in the counter-signed Extension Letter on 16 June 2021.

  129. [85] For completeness, it is assumed that Singapore law applies to the Extension Letter even though the governing law of the Extension Letter is English law.

  130. [86] As the Court of Appeal in EFT Holdings, Inc and another v Marinteknik Shipbuilders (S) Pte Ltd and another [2014] 1 SLR 860 (“EFT”) held, it is for the party who wishes to assert an applicable foreign law to plead that foreign law (at [61]). Where foreign law is not pleaded, Singapore courts will simply apply Singapore law (EFT at [58]). This is unless “a mandatory pleading of foreign law is required as a matter of law” (EFT at [58] citing Goh Chok Tong v Tang Liang Hong [1997] 1 SLR(R) 811). As none of the parties had pleaded the applicability of English law, I assume that Singapore law applies.

  131. [87] I also note that the presumption of similarity need not be considered in this case. The presumption of similarity is a rule of evidence concerned with what the content of foreign law should be taken to be (Ollech David v Horizon Capital Fund [2024] SGHC(A) 8 at [55]). The Court of Appeal in EFT clarified that where foreign law has not been pleaded at all – as distinguished from situations where proof of foreign law has failed or not been attempted (despite foreign law having been pleaded) – the presumption of similarity is irrelevant (at [63]). Hence, I do not have to consider the applicability of the presumption of similarity of laws.

  132. [88] Based on my finding above, the operative contract under which the claimant brings its claims is the Mandate Letter (as extended by the Extension Letter, which is a standalone extension agreement but not a new advisory contract).

  133. The no oral modification clause in the Mandate Letter does not preclude a finding of a subsequent oral agreement

  134. [89] The key issue is whether, as the defendant argues, the Mandate Letter excluded the US$65m TDB Facility from the scope of a Transaction. It is clear that there are no express words in the Mandate Letter that may be interpreted to mean that the US$65m TDB Facility is excluded. However, the defendant relies on a purported oral agreement between Mr López and Mr South to carve out this facility. This allegedly took place over phone calls in June 2021, including on 4 June 2021 when Mr López agreed that the US$65m TDB Facility was out of scope. This alleged oral agreement was recorded in Mr South’s email attaching the counter-signed Extension Letter (see [79] above).

  135. [90] The starting point is the no oral modification clause in cl 14 of the Standard Terms of Engagement which form part of the Mandate Letter. . Clause 14 provides as follows:

  136. [91] The first sentence of cl 14 is an entire agreement clause, while the second sentence is a no oral modification clause. While the parties’ submissions address the application of the former, it is the latter that is of relevance in the present case. The effect of an entire agreement clause is that it nullifies prior agreements and gives effect to the latest expression of the parties’ intentions (Charles Lim Teng Siang and another v Hong Choon Hau and another [2021] 2 SLR 153 (“Charles Lim”) at [48]). A no oral modification (“NOM”) clause nullifies a later agreement by giving effect to an earlier manifestation of the parties’ intentions as to formal requirements (Charles Lim at [48]). In the present case, the alleged oral agreement was concluded on 4 June 2021. This came after the date of 24 October 2020, which was when the Mandate Letter (which is the operative contract in the present case) was executed (see [5] above).

  137. [92] The NOM clause in the present case provides that parties may amend the terms of the Mandate Letter “only by written agreement signed by the party against whom enforcement of any … modification … is sought”. There is no such written document signed by the claimant, providing that the US$65m TDB Facility is excluded from the scope of the Mandate Letter. However, this does not preclude this court from finding that there was a valid and binding oral agreement to exclude the US$65m TDB Facility.

  138. [93] The Court of Appeal in Charles Lim noted in obiter that a NOM clause “merely raises a rebuttable presumption that in the absence of an agreement in writing, there would be no variation” (Charles Lim at [38], citing Comfort Management Pte Ltd v OGSP Engineering Pte Ltd [2018] 1 SLR 979 (“Comfort Management”) at [90]). The Court of Appeal was of the view that the benefits of commercial certainty (which support a rigorous enforcement of a NOM clause) do not provide a legitimate reason to prevent parties from making an oral variation where it can be proved (Charles Lim at [37]). The perceived difficulty in proving an oral variation could be suitably addressed by evidential principles and not contractual principles (Charles Lim at [50]). The approach expressed in Comfort Management was preferred because it upheld the parties’ collective autonomy to together agree to depart from the NOM clause either expressly or by necessary implication (Charles Lim at [51] and [61]).

  139. [94] For the court to infer that parties had by necessary implication agreed to depart from a NOM clause, the test is “whether at the point when parties agreed on the oral variation, they would necessarily have agreed to depart from the NOM clause had they addressed their mind to the question” (Charles Lim at [54]). In other words, to rebut the presumption that there is no variation, “compelling evidence” or “cogent evidence” is required to prove an oral variation (Charles Lim at [56]).

  140. [95] I thus turn to the question of whether there is compelling evidence before me that there was an oral agreement to exclude the US$65m TDB Facility from the scope of the Mandate Letter.

  141. There is compelling evidence of an oral agreement to exclude the US$65m TDB Facility

  142. [96] I start with the law on oral contracts. The substantive requirements of an oral agreement are the same as those of a written contract, namely (a) offer and acceptance; (b) intention to create legal relations; (c) certainty of terms; and (d) consideration (Tan Swee Wan and another v Johnny Lian Tian Yong [2018] SGHC 169 at [222]). In determining whether the substantive requirements of an oral agreement are satisfied, the court must consider objectively the relevant documentary evidence and the parties’ contemporaneous conduct at the material time (Tribune Investment Trust Inc v Soosan Trading Co Ltd [2000] 2 SLR(R) 407 at [39]–[40]).

  143. [97] I start with Mr South’s email to Mr López on 4 June 2021. In the email, Mr South requested for “a call on the engagement letter [ie, the Extension Letter]”. This was so as to “clarify [the claimant’s] role and fees on this loan [ie, the US$65m TDB Facility] within the context of the main objective of the international syndicated loan”, since the “TDB deal won’t really involve a lot of [the claimant’s] time - terms are not flexible and the documents are already being drafted”. During cross-examination, Mr López testified that this was merely “a unilateral statement” by Mr South and that he “never agree[d] to any changes to the terms of variation of the Mandate Letter”. Mr South disagreed and testified that there was an agreement with Mr López to exclude the US$65m TDB Facility.

  144. [98] I note that Mr López did not deny that a call with Mr South had taken place. Taken together with Mr South’s email above which specifically requests for a call, I find that it is more likely than not that there was a call between Mr López and Mr South after this email on 4 June 2021.

  145. [99] As to the conflicting oral testimonies by Mr López and Mr South in relation to the existence of an oral agreement, the Court of Appeal in OCBC Capital Investment Asia Ltd v Wong Hua Choon [2012] 4 SLR 1206 (“Wong Hua Choon”) cautioned that the “first port of call” is the relevant documentary evidence, and where the issue is whether a binding contract exists between the parties, “a contemporaneous written record of the evidence is obviously more reliable than a witness’s oral testimony given well after the fact, recollecting what has transpired” (Wong Hua Choon at [41]). I hence place little weight on Mr López and Mr South’s oral testimonies and place significant weight on the contemporaneous documentary evidence in the form of Mr South’s email on 16 June 2021 (see [79] above).

  146. [100] Mr South’s email on 16 June 2021 supports the finding that the call took place and that there was such an agreement as alleged by the defendant. What is recorded in Mr South’s email is specific and contemporaneous – it states that the parties had “agreed” that the US$65m TDB Facility was out of the scope of the claimant’s mandate. Mr South’s email also states that the defendant is “committed to completion of the international lender syndicated project facility as contemplated in the mandate letter”, but does not identify the US$65m TDB Facility as the relevant facility “contemplated in the mandate letter”. Mr South further states that he “hope[s] to be able to restart the process [in] mid-July” and that “[t]he completion of this project debt facility by Q1 2022” is a key goal for the defendant for the next 12 months. If the US$65m TDB Facility was indeed within the claimant’s mandate, it is unclear why Mr South would have expressed his hope to “restart the process” of finding a prospective Investor for the “project debt facility”.

  147. [101] Next, I turn to the Extension Letter sent by Mr López to Mr South on 3 June 2021 (see [78] above). By that date, the claimant had already seen the draft TDB term sheet relating to the US$65m TDB Facility, as Mr South had forwarded it to Mr López on 29 May 2021. However, the Extension Letter is completely silent on the US$65m TDB Facility. The Extension Letter even states that the claimant “look[s] forward to a successful completion of the Transaction”. The choice of the word “Transaction” (and the lack of any reference to the US$65m TDB Facility), and the forward-looking language used, are consistent with the defendant’s case that the parties did not consider the US$65m TDB Facility as a Transaction under the Mandate Letter.

  148. [102] The parties’ contemporaneous conduct also suggests the existence of an oral agreement to exclude the US$65m TDB Facility. In the Extension Letter, the claimant did not invoke cl 4(i) of the Mandate Letter (see [81] above) to extend its mandate. This is notwithstanding that the US$65m TDB Facility satisfies the condition for extension under cl 4(i) (ie, “non-binding expression of interests … received by any Investor totalling in aggregate equal to or in excess of USD25 million”). Mr Dunton, a practising lawyer, was aware of cl 4(i) of the Mandate Letter (see [82] above). The fact that this clause was still not invoked suggests that the claimant knew cl 4(i) was inapplicable, as the US$65m TDB Facility was not within its mandate and not a Transaction within the meaning of the Mandate Letter.

  149. [103] Looking at the above evidence in totality, I find that there is compelling evidence establishing the substantive requirements of an oral contract. The terms of the alleged oral contract are certain – ie, the US$65m TDB Facility would be excluded from the scope of the Mandate Letter. Consideration was provided by the defendant in the form of a promise to extend the claimant’s mandate. I am also persuaded that the parties intended to create a legally binding contract in agreeing to such terms. It is more likely than not that the parties had, by necessary implication, agreed to depart from a NOM clause and concluded a valid oral agreement to vary the Mandate Letter.

  150. [104] The parties’ subsequent conduct buttresses my finding that an oral agreement had been reached. In Simpson Marine (SEA) Pte Ltd v Jiacipto Jiaravonon [2019] 1 SLR 696 (“Simpson Marine”), the Court of Appeal declined to express definitive views on the admissibility, relevance and probative value of subsequent conduct for the purpose of either contract formation or interpretation (at [79]). However, the Court of Appeal considered that the parties’ post-contract communications and conduct did aid the court in objectively ascertaining whether an agreement was reached, especially as such post-contract conduct involved both parties (Simpson Marine at [79]). In a similar vein, the Court of Appeal in GPK Clinic ([42] supra) noted that subsequent conduct is relevant where such conduct “provides cogent evidence on the parties’ agreement at the time when the contract was concluded” [emphasis in original] (at [51]). In the present case, the subsequent conduct relied on by the defendant provides cogent evidence that supports a finding that there was an agreement to exclude the US$65m TDB Facility from the scope of the Mandate Letter.

  151. [105] First, the claimant did not object to Mr South’s email on 16 June 2021, which recorded the purported oral agreement between the parties. When questioned on the stand, Mr López explained that he took a “commercial decision” not to respond to Mr South’s email because it was a stressful time for the defendant. This does not offer a credible explanation. In the ebb and flow of a commercial transaction, I agree that there are times when a service provider should sensibly decide not to place additional and unnecessary pressure and stress on a client. However, the statement that the US$65m TDB Facility is excluded unequivocally takes away the claimant’s entitlement to any success fee in relation to that transaction. This goes to the very heart of the claimant’s deal with defendant. It is implausible that the claimant would allow this statement to stand and not make any response to Mr South’s email. Mr South stated in his cross-examination that he would have responded immediately if he had received such an email from a client. I agree that this would be the most plausible course of action.

  152. [106] Mr López also explained that no objection was made because based on his discussion with Mr Dunton, he knew that a unilateral email from one party to vary the contractual terms would be invalid. I do not find this a convincing explanation either. Further, Mr Dunton testified that he does not even recall having had any discussion with Mr López in relation to Mr South’s email. If both Mr López and Mr Dunton were of the view that the US$65m TDB Facility was excluded, I find it implausible that they had nothing to say to each other about this, particularly bearing in mind Mr Dunton’s position as a practising solicitor for 25 years. The inconsistent testimonies by Mr López and Mr Dunton in relation to this purported discussion between them did not assist the claimant’s case.

  153. [107] Second, consistent with the existence of the oral agreement, the claimant did not ask to be involved in the negotiations of the US$65m TDB Facility. As the defendant points out, Mr López’s handwritten notes (which record his discussions with Mr South post-execution of the Extension Letter) do not indicate any interest on the part of the claimant to participate in the negotiations with TDB. To this, Mr López gave a convenient explanation that he had asked Mr South orally but that such requests were not documented in the handwritten notes because he only recorded what Mr South had told him. I am not convinced by this explanation.

  154. [108] Third, a kick-off call took place between the parties on 23 November 2021 in relation to a senior secured financing. During that call, the claimant referred to the marketing materials it had prepared. The first page of the marketing materials states that the defendant was looking for “Expansion Capex / USD 90-100m”. I agree with the defendant’s submission that if the US$65m TDB Facility was part of the financing that formed the Transaction (ie, the US$50m to US$80m debt financing), then the defendant should only be seeking US$15m from the Investors, not US$90m to US$100m. The marketing materials thus reflect the claimant’s own understanding that the US$65m TDB Facility was excluded from the scope of the Mandate Letter.

  155. [109] Finally, as the defendant points out, the claimant did not invoice for the Success Fee even after the defendant made a public announcement that it had secured the US$65m TDB Facility. The claimant only invoiced the defendant for the Cl 6(b) Retainer Fee (for the submission of the first draft of the Investor Financial Model), and this is consistent with the understanding that the US$65m TDB Facility was not part of the claimant’s mandate. Mr López’s explanation on the stand was that the claimant made a “commercial decision” not to invoice the defendant, as the latter was in financial difficulties. I am not persuaded by this explanation (see [105] above). The claimant could have at the very least, indicated to the defendant that the success fee had accrued but that the claimant would not be sending an invoice as it understands the defendant’s financial situation. That the claimant only issued an invoice for the Success Fee after the termination of its engagement in March 2022 suggests that this was an afterthought post termination of the engagement and not a not a genuine belief as to its entitlement as part of the engagement.

  156. [110] For the above reasons, I find that there was an oral agreement to exclude the US$65m TDB Facility from the scope of the Mandate Letter.

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