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Grounds publishedDecided 10 Jul 2024

General Division of the High Court

H8 Holdings Pte Ltd v RIC Dormitory (SG) Pte Ltd and others and another suit

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[2024] SGHC 177Case no. Suit No 1006 of 2021

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] HC/S 1006/2021 (“S 1006”) concerns a shareholder oppression action. HC/S 27/2022 (“S 27”) concerns claims for misrepresentation and unlawful means conspiracy in connection with an acquisition underlying the joint venture that is the subject of S 1006. Both actions were tried at the same time, with all parties consenting to the evidence led in one suit being relied on in the other.

  3. Facts

  4. The parties in S 1006

  5. [2] The plaintiff in S 1006 is H8 Holdings Pte Ltd (“H8”), a private limited company incorporated in Singapore. The shareholders of H8 are Thia Tiong Siong (“William”), Teo Ban Lim (“Terrence”) and Han Jieling (“Jieling”). Terrence and Jieling are also the directors of H8.

  6. [3] The first defendant in S 1006 is RIC Dormitory (SG) Pte Ltd (the “Company”), a private limited company incorporated in Singapore and formerly known as QFC Investment Pte Ltd. H8 is the minority shareholder in the Company. The majority shareholder is POP Holdings Pte Ltd (“POP”). H8 and POP acquired the Company, to be their joint venture vehicle, from Eer Kin Pring (“Eer”) and Ting Cher Lan (“Ting”) further to a share purchase agreement entered into on 5 March 2015 (the “SPA”); the acquisition was completed in January 2016.

  7. [4] The second defendant in S 1006 is POP, a private limited company incorporated in Singapore. The third and fourth defendants in S 1006 are Lee Boon Leng (“Jason”) and Leong Poh Choo (“Annie”) respectively. They are the only shareholders and directors of POP. In the context of S 1006, I will refer to POP, Jason and Annie collectively as the “S 1006 Defendants”.

  8. [5] Silvester Legal LLC (“SLL”) acts for H8 in S 1006; Sim Chong LLC acts for the Company; and K&L Gates Straits Law LLC (“KLGSL”) acts for the S 1006 Defendants.

  9. The parties in S 27

  10. [6] The plaintiff in S 27 is POP.

  11. [7] The first and second defendants in S 27 are Ting and Eer respectively. They each held 50% of the shares in, and were the directors of, the Company until the Company was acquired by H8 and POP. Ting held her shares as a nominee for William, who is her husband. The third, fourth and fifth defendants in S 27 are William, Terrence and Jieling respectively. In the context of S 27, I will refer to Ting, Eer, William, Terrence and Jieling collectively as the “S 27 Defendants”.

  12. [8] KLGSL acts for POP in S 27; and SLL acts for the S 27 Defendants.

  13. Background to the disputes

  14. Background to the joint venture

  15. [9] On or around 16 March 2011, the Company was incorporated by Eer and Ting. Each of them held 500,000 shares in the Company, although Ting held her shares as a nominee on behalf of her husband, William.

  16. [10] In August 2012, the Company purchased the leasehold property at 34 Kaki Bukit Place, Eunos Techpark, Singapore 416212 (“34KB”). The Company operated a foreign worker dormitory at 34KB. The 34KB dormitory was run by William, who was assisted by Terrence and Jieling.

  17. [11] On or around 23 February 2013, H8 was incorporated to run a foreign worker dormitory at 8 Enterprise Road, Singapore 629820 (“8ER”). H8 collected the monthly rental from customers at 8ER and, in turn, paid a management fee to RIC Marine Pte Ltd (“RIC Marine”), which at that time held the lease over 8ER from the Jurong Town Corporation (“JTC”).

  18. [12] In 2013, William contacted Jason and Annie to ask if they were interested in a potential joint venture. The joint venture comprised the following steps:

  19. The original plan was for H8 and POP to be equal shareholders in the Company, ie, to hold a 50% shareholding each.

  20. [13] In or around 2013, William also invited Annie to visit 34KB and 8ER. After Annie’s visit to the two dormitories, she informed Jason that 34KB was fully occupied with 362 beds, while 8ER was not occupied yet but could house about 1000 beds. In reality, however, the legally approved capacity of the dormitory at 34KB was 130 workers.

  21. [14] In January 2014, POP sent H8 a draft shareholders’ agreement which reflected (at cl 5.1) the original intent for H8 and POP to be equal shareholders in the Company (the “Draft 50:50 SHA”). However, the Draft 50:50 SHA was never executed because H8 subsequently decided to purchase only 30% of the shares in the Company.

  22. [15] On 14 May 2014, Jieling sent Annie an e-mail with two attachments. The attachments contained various documents including the following, which I discuss in greater detail at [50]–[52] below:

  23. (a) a list of tenants at 34KB as at 14 May 2014;

  24. (b) a Fire Safety Certificate issued by the Singapore Civil Defence Force (“SCDF”) dated 29 November 2012;

  25. (c) a drawing of the floor plan of 34KB that the Company had submitted to SCDF; and

  26. (d) a Grant of Written Permission (Temporary) from the Urban Redevelopment Authority (“URA”) dated 5 April 2012 approving the use of the fifth to seventh floors of 34KB as a dormitory for 130 workers from 5 April 2012 to 5 April 2014 (the “2012 URA Written Permission”). Parenthetically, the 2012 URA Written Permission was subsequently renewed on 5 August 2014 and 24 June 2015.

  27. [16] On 16 July 2014, CKS Property Consultants Pte Ltd (“CKS”) provided a valuation report on 34KB, valuing it at $14m based on, among other things, information that 34KB could house 360 workers (“CKS’ 2014 Valuation Report”).

  28. [17] On 21 August 2014, URA sent a Refusal of Written Permission in respect of 34KB to one Lau Ai Geck, a professional engineer engaged by William on behalf of the Company (the “URA Refusal of Written Permission”). The URA Refusal of Written Permission was issued in response to an application made on 14 August 2014 for “Proposed change of use of 3rd and 4th storey to workers’ dormitory (80 workers) at the existing 7-storey intermediate factory with approved temporary secondary workers’ dormitory (130 workers) at 5th to 7th storey”. URA refused the planning permission applied for.

  29. [18] On or around 5 March 2015, the Company (under Eer and Ting’s ownership, the latter on William’s behalf) acquired RIC Marine for $16.3m.

  30. [19] On 5 March 2015, H8 and POP then entered into the SPA to acquire all the shares in the Company from Eer and Ting for $42m. The price of $42m was based on 34KB and 8ER being valued at $14m and $28m respectively. H8 was to acquire 30%, and POP 70%, of the shares in the Company. POP paid an aggregate sum of $29m for its 70% stake.

  31. [20] To facilitate the financing of the purchase price, H8 and POP procured the following loans:

  32. William, Terrence, Jieling, Jason and Annie were personal guarantors for the Hong Leong Loan. William, Terrence, Jason and Annie were personal guarantors for the RHB Loan.

  33. [21] On 18 January 2016, the transaction under the SPA was completed. H8 and POP held 30% and 70% of the shares in the Company respectively. Terrence, Jason and Annie were appointed as directors of the Company.

  34. Main events in 2018

  35. [22] On 23 April 2018, the Company held its 4th Annual General Meeting (the “4th AGM”). It was resolved, based on POP’s vote as the majority shareholder with H8 opposing the same, that:

  36. (a) Terrence was not re-elected as a director of the Company (see Resolution 4).

  37. (b) The directors of the Company (ie, Jason and Annie) were given the authority to issue shares of the Company (see Resolution 6).

  38. (c) The increase of the Company’s paid-up share capital from $1m to $3m was approved (see Resolution 7).

  39. (d) The issuance and allotment of 2m ordinary shares at $1 per share to existing shareholders was approved (see Resolution 8).

  40. (e) H8’s shareholding in the Company was to be diluted if it could not pay $600,000 (ie, 30% of $2m) for its portion of the new shares, with the first payment of $316,537.47 due on 9 May 2018 and the balance of $283,462.53 due at a later date to be fixed (see Resolution 9).

  41. [23] On 23 May 2018, the Company held an Extraordinary General Meeting (the “2018 EGM”) and passed a resolution to increase the monthly directors’ remuneration of Jason and Annie. H8 voted against the resolution. In FY 2019, the aggregate directors’ remuneration of Jason and Annie was $144,000 and their aggregate directors’ fees were $336,000. The level of directors’ fees and remuneration has remained the same from FY 2019 to-date. The Company has not declared any dividends since the start of the joint venture.

  42. [24] On or around 26 June 2018, 1m ordinary shares were issued to POP at $1 per share. This diluted the shareholding of H8 from 30% to 15% and increased the shareholding of POP from 70% to 85%.

  43. Revaluation of 34KB

  44. [25] On 5 March 2019, CKS provided a revaluation report on 34KB based on its dormitory capacity of 130 workers and revalued the property at $9m (“CKS’ 2019 Valuation Report”).

  45. S 10

  46. [26] On 6 January 2020, POP commenced HC/S 10/2020 (“S 10”) against Eer and Ting for misrepresentation in respect of the capacity of the 34KB dormitory. POP discontinued S 10 on 30 November 2020 in exchange for settlement terms agreed with William.

  47. Bridging Loan

  48. [27] On 3 April 2020, Annie submitted an application on behalf of the Company to RHB for a bridging loan. The bridging loan was part of a programme under which the Singapore Government provided enhanced financial support for small and medium enterprises during the COVID-19 pandemic. RHB granted the Company a bridging loan of $3m, for which Jason and Annie provided a joint and several personal guarantee (the “Bridging Loan”). Of the $3m received by the Company, $2m was transferred by the Company to POP as part repayment of certain shareholder’s loans that POP had made to the Company.

  49. Commencement of S 1006 and S 27

  50. [28] On 8 December 2021, H8 commenced S 1006. On 16 January 2022, POP commenced S 27.

  51. Sale of 34KB

  52. [29] On 31 July 2023, with the approval of both H8 and POP, the Company sold 34KB for $9m.

  53. Listing of 8ER for sale

  54. [30] On 19 September 2023, SLL wrote to KLGSL informing that it had come to H8’s attention on 13 September 2023 that 8ER had been put on sale on the CommercialGuru website without the knowledge or consent of H8.

  55. [31] On 25 September 2023, KLGSL replied that Jason and Annie had no intention of selling 8ER and that the advertisement on the CommercialGuru website had been put up by a property agent, one Matthew Chan (“Matthew”), without authorisation. KLGSL provided a copy of a handwritten apology issued by Matthew. On 27 September 2023, Matthew further made a statutory declaration explaining that he had put up the advertisement on his own accord, without any authorisation, to “fish for potential buyers”.

  56. [32] On 28 September 2023, a marketing director at ERA Real Estate Singapore, one Raymond Koh (“Raymond”), made a statutory declaration setting out his communications with Annie in August 2023 regarding 8ER being put up for sale. Annie had sent him a URA Grant of Written Permission and the storey plans for 8ER. According to him, she confirmed in a call on 28 August 2023 that the asking price for 8ER was $20m.

  57. S 27

  58. [33] The events underpinning the dispute in S 27 precede those in S 1006 and it is apposite to address S 27 first.

  59. The parties’ cases

  60. POP’s case

  61. [34] POP’s primary claim in S 27 is in the tort of deceit. POP’s case is that, in the course of negotiations leading up to the SPA and the joint venture, William, Terrence and Jieling fraudulently represented to Jason and Annie that the legitimate and legally approved capacity of the dormitory at 34KB was 362 workers or beds. Eer and Ting are bound by the representation made by William, Terrence and Jieling, which was made to secure POP’s purchase of the shares in the Company. The representation was false. POP had relied on and was induced by the representation when entering into the SPA. As a result of the misrepresentation, POP suffered damages in the amount of $3.5m. Further and/or alternatively, POP brings claims for negligent misrepresentation and unlawful means conspiracy against the S 27 Defendants based on the same factual matrix.

  62. The S 27 Defendants’ case

  63. [35] In respect of POP’s claim in the tort of deceit, the S 27 Defendants submit that POP was inconsistent on whether the alleged representation that the 34KB dormitory could house 362 workers was a representation that it could factually house that number of workers (which was true) or that it could legally house that number of workers. POP was also inconsistent on what representations Jason and Annie had relied on, and on when Annie discovered the alleged misrepresentation. As such, “little probative weight” should be given to Jason and Annie’s evidence in relation to the alleged misrepresentations. The S 27 Defendants further submit that Jason and Annie did not rely on the alleged representations of William, Terrence or Jieling when entering into the SPA, and were in any event precluded by clauses in the SPA from doing so. Finally, the S 27 Defendants submit that POP failed to plead or substantiate the loss it suffered as a result of the alleged misrepresentation. In respect of POP’s unlawful means conspiracy claim, the S 27 Defendants submit that POP failed to sufficiently plead and particularise the elements of its claim.

  64. Decision on POP’s claim in the tort of deceit

  65. [36] The essential elements of the tort of deceit are as follows. First, a false representation of fact was made by words or conduct. Second, the representation was made with knowledge that it was false, or without belief in its truth, or recklessly, careless whether it be true or false. Third, the representation was made with the intention that it be acted upon by the plaintiff. Fourth, the plaintiff acted upon the false representation. Fifth, the plaintiff suffered damage by so doing. See Panatron Pte Ltd and another v Lee Cheow Lee and another [2001] 2 SLR(R) 435 (“Panatron”) at [14].

  66. The Representation meant that the legally approved capacity of the dormitory at 34KB was 362 workers / beds, and the Representation was false

  67. [37] Beginning with the first element of the tort, an anterior issue arises as to how the representation in question should be interpreted for the purpose of deciding if it was false:

  68. (a) POP pleads that the S 27 Defendants represented that the capacity of the dormitory at 34KB was 362 workers or beds (the “Representation”). POP further pleads that in its natural and/or contextual meaning, “capacity” was the legitimate and legally approved number of workers or beds.

  69. (b) In contrast, the S 27 Defendants plead that:

  70. [38] Here, the court’s task is to ascertain the reasonable interpretation of the Representation from the perspective of the representee (ie, POP): John Cartwright, Misrepresentation, Mistake and Non-Disclosure (Sweet & Maxwell, 6th Ed, 2022) (“Cartwright”) at para 5-09. In my judgment, the objective and reasonable meaning of the Representation is plainly that the legally approved capacity of the dormitory at 34KB was 362 workers / beds. The alleged Representation was made in the context of discussions for POP to acquire a shareholding in the Company, which owned 34KB. A purchaser would usually acquire a property based on the use to which the property could legally be put. It makes no sense that POP would have been interested in only the physical but not the legally approved capacity of 34KB for use as a dormitory. To the contrary, it is only logical and reasonable for POP to have regarded the Representation (if made) as meaning that the legally approved capacity of the dormitory at 34KB was 362 workers / beds. Accordingly and henceforth, all references to the “Representation” in this judgment should be taken to mean the Representation in the sense pleaded by POP.

  71. [39] The Representation is incontrovertibly false. It is undisputed that at the time POP acquired its shareholding in the Company, only the fifth to seventh floors of 34KB could legally be used as a dormitory to house up to 130 workers, as this was the extent of URA’s permission. This remained the position even after POP acquired its shareholding in the Company.

  72. [40] At this juncture, I note that the figures “362”, “360” and “300” were sometimes cited interchangeably in the evidence of the parties. In my view, these differences are not material and do not affect the following analysis concerning the making of and reliance on the Representation.

  73. William, Terrence and Jieling made the Representation, intending it to bear the meaning pleaded by POP, knowing it was false, and intending to induce POP to act on it

  74. [41] In deciding whether a representation was fraudulently made, the court assesses whether the representor honestly believed it to be true in the sense in which he intended it to be understood or knew that it would or might be interpreted: Wee Chiaw Sek Anna v Ng Li-Ann Genevieve (sole executrix of the estate of Ng Hock Seng, deceased) and another [2013] 3 SLR 801 at [40]; Cartwright at para 5-18. While this test is subjective, the objective meaning of the representation may be relevant to whether the representor’s claim that he did not realise that his words would be so interpreted can be believed: Cartwright at para 5-18.

  75. [42] As for the requirement that the representor must have intended to induce the representee to act on the representation, the court may infer this intention from the natural consequences of the representation: Cartwright at para 5-19.

  76. [43] Bearing these legal principles in mind, it is my finding that each of William, Terrence and Jieling (a) made the Representation; (b) intending it to mean, as pleaded by POP, that the legally approved capacity of the dormitory at 34KB was 362 workers / beds; (c) knowing that this meaning was false; and (d) intending to induce POP to act on it by entering into the SPA. I elaborate on my basis for these findings.

  77. (1) William

  78. [44] As a preliminary point, I reject William’s pleaded defence that any representations he made regarding the capacity of the 34KB dormitory were made as a representative of H8 and not in his personal capacity. It makes no sense that H8, which was not the seller of the shares in the Company, would have made any representations regarding the Company’s property. Indeed, William conceded in cross-examination that his representations to POP were conveyed on behalf of the sellers of the Company. William was a de facto seller of the Company since 50% of the shares in the Company were held by Ting as his nominee at that time. His representations were thus made in his personal capacity and on behalf of Eer and Ting.

  79. [45] I reach my findings at [43] above in relation to William for the following reasons.

  80. [46] First, William initially claimed in his Affidavit of Evidence-in-Chief (“AEIC”) that he had “never made such a representation to Jason or Annie” that “[34KB’s] housing capacity for workers was 362 workers”. However, he sang a different tune when he took the stand. He first alleged in cross-examination that from February to April 2014, there were five to six meetings attended by Jason, Annie, Terrence, himself and one Janice Ho from HLF, at which he told the attendees that, in respect of 34KB, “URA’s approval was for 130 people. … the first to fourth floor[s] would be the production area, and the fifth to seventh floors would be the dormitory. PUB’s approval was for 510 people. SCDF’s approval was for 360 people. MOM’s approval was for 362 people”. In re-examination, he then alleged that Janice Ho was present at only one meeting. He had allegedly explained about the various approvals at that meeting. Even at the meetings attended by only Jason, Annie, Terrence and himself, he allegedly “would give the same explanation” when Jason asked questions. I do not accept William’s claim that he had told Jason and Annie that URA’s approval for the use of 34KB as a dormitory was for 130 workers only. This claim was material to William’s defence. Yet it did not feature in his pleaded defence or AEIC but was advanced only belatedly when he took the stand. This suggests that William made up his evidence on this point. His evolving testimony – which shifted from a blanket denial in his AEIC that he had ever represented that the 34KB dormitory could house 362 workers – also dented his credibility.

  81. [47] Second, on 15 January 2014, Janice Ho (who was from the Property Financing Team at HLF, which was going to provide financing for the acquisition of the Company) sent an e-mail to CKS asking for the market valuation of 34KB based on 362 beds. On 16 January 2014, CKS replied that based on the information Janice Ho had furnished, the indicative market value of 34KB was between $14–14.5m. On the same day, Janice Ho forwarded her aforesaid e-mail exchange with CKS to William, Terrence and Jason. The capacity of 362 beds was information that must have originated from William and Terrence. William and Terrence must also have appreciated that (a) as a financial institution, HLF would expect to proceed based on the legally approved capacity for the 34KB dormitory, and (b) HLF had understood 362 beds to be the legally approved capacity. Yet, William and Terrence made no effort to correct Janice Ho’s misunderstanding. The irresistible inference is that they had similarly made only the Representation (and not any representation that the URA-approved capacity for the 34KB dormitory was limited to 130 workers) to Jason and Annie, intending Jason and Annie to understand that the legally approved capacity of the dormitory at 34KB was 362 workers / beds. This coheres with Jason’s evidence, which I accept, that William and Terrence told him, when persuading him to participate in the joint venture, that the 34KB dormitory could host 362 beds.

  82. [48] Third, William accepted that he told Jason and Annie that the Company’s revenue from 34KB came from 362 beds. William must have meant them to understand that the revenue was earned based on the legally approved capacity of the 34KB dormitory. In my view, this was an instance of William impliedly conveying the Representation to Jason and Annie, intending them to understand that the legally approved capacity of the dormitory at 34KB was 362 workers / beds.

  83. [49] Fourth, I accept Annie’s evidence that William and Terrence told her that the capacity of the dormitory was 362 beds when showing her around the 34KB premises in or around April 2013. This was consistent with what she saw as 34KB was occupied from the second to seventh floors and all the rooms had double-decker beds. Jieling conceded in cross-examination that Annie would have seen 362 beds when Annie visited. Jieling further conceded that anyone walking into 34KB would assume that what they saw used as a dormitory had been approved for such use. In my view, on this occasion of Annie’s visit to 34KB, William and Terrence made the Representation to Annie orally, intending her to understand (through her visual confirmation that the second to seventh floors of 34KB were filled with beds) that the legally approved capacity of the dormitory at 34KB was 362 workers / beds.

  84. [50] Fifth, on 14 May 2014, on William’s instructions, Jieling sent a suite of documents to Annie. These documents included:

  85. (a) a list of tenants at 34KB as at 14 May 2014 which showed that a total of 362 of their workers were being housed at 34KB;

  86. (b) a Fire Safety Certificate issued by SCDF dated 29 November 2012 approving the Company’s safety plans for the evacuation of a total of 359 workers from what were stated to be dormitories across the third to seventh floors of 34KB; and

  87. (c) a drawing of the floor plan of 34KB which the Company had submitted to SCDF. This drawing showed the second to seventh floors of 34KB being used as a dormitory with a total capacity in excess of 300 workers. Jieling admitted that this was what the drawing showed and that it would have given the impression that the second to fourth floors were also (in addition to the fifth to seventh floors) approved for dormitory use. Terrence, too, admitted that the drawing showed the use of the second to fourth floors as a dormitory.

  88. [51] By sending the documents at [50] above to Annie, William and Jieling impliedly made the Representation to Annie and intended her to understand that the legally approved capacity of the dormitory at 34KB was 362 workers / beds.

  89. [52] While Jieling had also, via her 14 May 2014 email, sent Annie the 2012 URA Written Permission (see [15(d)] above), this was an outdated document since the period to which it applied had already lapsed. In any event, this document would not on its own have indicated to Annie that the second to fourth floors were not approved for dormitory use, given that the document only addressed the fifth to seventh floors of 34KB.

  90. [53] Sixth, the evidence in fact shows that the URA Refusal of Written Permission, a separate letter from URA refusing permission for the use of the third and fourth floors of 34KB as a workers’ dormitory (see [17] above), was not provided to Jason and Annie. Jieling testified that William had engaged a consultant to apply to URA for this permission. Logically, William must have been contemporaneously aware of the URA Refusal of Written Permission. Yet, as Jieling testified, she was never instructed by William or Terrence to send the URA Refusal of Written Permission to Annie. It is also not the S 27 Defendants’ case that the URA Refusal of Written Permission was sent to Annie. I accept Annie’s evidence that she only found out about the URA Refusal of Written Permission when she checked the Company’s records after an interview with the Ministry of Manpower (“MOM”) in November 2018 when MOM was investigating the Company for the number of workers housed at 34KB (see [115(f)] below), and that a copy of this document was never given to POP, Jason or her prior to the execution of the SPA. I find it more likely than not that William withheld the URA Refusal of Written Permission from Jason and Annie to maintain the false impression deliberately given to them that the legally approved capacity of the dormitory at 34KB was 362 workers / beds.

  91. [54] Seventh, while William passed Annie a copy of URA’s Grant of Written Permission dated 24 June 2015 for the use of the fifth to seventh floors of 34KB as a workers’ dormitory for 130 workers from 5 April 2015 to 5 April 2017, this does not undermine my findings at [43] above. William only provided this document to Annie in June or July 2015, after the Representation had been made in 2013 and 2014 and the SPA had been entered into on 5 March 2015. Further, this document only addressed the fifth to seventh floors of 34KB; the URA Refusal of Written Permission was still not provided to Annie (see [53] above). Further yet, on 16 January 2016, Jieling sent Annie an e-mail attaching a record of the dormitory customers’ deposits for 34KB as at 6 January 2016, which showed that deposits were collected for 285 workers. These matters reinforce that William’s intention was and remained to conceal from POP the full picture regarding URA’s position and to give POP the false impression that the legally approved capacity of the dormitory at 34KB was 362 workers / beds.

  92. [55] Eighth, the record of Jason and Annie’s meetings with Terrence later in March and November 2017 and April 2018 supports the view that William (and Terrence) had made the Representation in 2013 and 2014, intending Jason and Annie to understand (as they did) that the legally approved capacity of the workers’ dormitory at 34KB was 362 workers / beds (see [65]–[72] below).

  93. [56] Ninth, William admitted that before POP acquired the Company, the second to fourth floors of 34KB were being illegally used as a dormitory in breach of URA regulations and he was aware of this at that time. He conceded that URA was the relevant authority where approval for the use of 34KB as a dormitory was concerned and that URA had only approved the use of the fifth to seventh floors of 34KB as a dormitory for 130 workers. In other words, it is incontrovertible that William knew that the Representation was false at all material times.

  94. [57] Finally, the natural and logical inference is that William made the Representation with the intention of inducing POP to acquire a shareholding in the Company, which would thereafter be the joint venture vehicle for H8 and POP. There is no other reason for William to have made the Representation.

  95. [58] For completeness, the S 27 Defendants also suggest that William (and Terrence) did not make the Representation because in an earlier action, S 10, commenced (but discontinued) by POP against Eer and Ting for a similar misrepresentation, POP did not plead the alleged misrepresentation in the same manner as the Representation is pleaded in S 27 and did not aver that William and Terrence made representations. I decline to speculate or place weight on the alleged differences between POP’s claims in S 10 and S 27. The S 27 Defendants’ suggestion is in any event contradicted by the weight of the evidence based on which I find that William (and Terrence) made the Representation, intending it to bear the meaning pleaded by POP, knowing it was false, and intending to induce POP to act on it.

  96. (2) Terrence

  97. [59] William’s evidence was that when Terrence took Annie to see the 34KB dormitory and gave her information during the negotiations, Terrence was doing so on his own behalf as well as on behalf of William and Jieling.

  98. [60] I reach my findings at [43] above in relation to Terrence for the following reasons.

  99. [61] First, the reasons set out at [47] and [49] above similarly apply to my findings regarding Terrence.

  100. [62] Second, Terrence initially claimed in his AEIC that he had “never made such a representation to Jason or Annie” that “[34KB’s] housing capacity for workers was 362 workers”. However, after certain shifts in his evidence when he took the stand, he eventually contradicted his claim in his AEIC. I elaborate.

  101. [63] On Terrence’s first day on the stand, he gave evidence that during the negotiations with Jason and Annie in 2014, he told them that he housed workers on the second to fourth floors of 34KB and that that was illegal. However, as he was compelled to accept, he had not referred to this supposed conversation(s) in his pleaded defence or AEIC. I do not accept Terrence’s incredible and self-serving allegation that he had told Jason and Annie back in 2014 that it was illegal to house workers on the second to fourth floors of 34KB and that the Company was doing so illegally.

  102. [64] Compounding the dent in his credibility, on Terrence’s second day on the stand, his position shifted. He said that during the negotiations, he showed Jason and Annie the approvals from MOM, URA, SCDF and other government agencies. The URA-approved capacity was 130 workers. The SCDF-approved capacity was 360 persons. The MOM-approved capacity was 362 persons. Jason and Annie were also shown the floor plans, which showed that the second to fourth floors were for production use and the fifth to seventh floors were for dormitory use. However, Terrence repeatedly evaded directly answering POP’s counsel’s questions about whether William and Terrence had meant that the 34KB dormitory could legally house 362 workers when they told Jason and Annie that the dormitory capacity was 362 workers. Terrence eventually admitted that he had represented to POP, Jason and Annie that the dormitory at 34KB had a capacity of 362 workers and this was so “according to the approved papers given by the respective authorities”:

  103. In my view, this was an implicit concession that Terrence had made the Representation to Jason and Annie intending them to understand that the legally approved capacity of the dormitory at 34KB was 362 workers / beds.

  104. [65] Third, the exchanges between Annie and Terrence at their meeting on 16 March 2017 are consistent with William and Terrence having made the Representation back in 2013 and 2014. The meeting between Annie and Terrence on 16 March 2017 took place at 8ER. Annie made an audio recording of the meeting. This was her habit for her business meetings to avoid having to take handwritten notes. According to the transcript of the recording, Terrence stated that he would be moving workers out of the third and fourth floors of 34KB in anticipation of MOM and URA inspections and moving them back after the inspections. Annie asked him to send an e-mail on what was discussed so that she could in turn discuss the matter with Jason. Terrence stated: “After this, I will send an email and say that we had a meeting and we decided to do it this way”. The English translation of Annie’s response was: “Ok”. Terrence went on to state that he “did the same thing”, ie, moved workers out of 34KB ahead of a URA inspection, “two years ago”, before POP bought into the Company. Annie responded: “That means the capacity there is 130-la”. In response to Annie pressing to know why there was a need to move the workers, Terrence explained:

  105. Terrence then stated that it was “[b]ecause of URA” that he had to move workers around. Annie then replied: “So must follow URA-la”; and Terrence said: “Yes, on paper, because URA is fixed one”. Terrence then tried to persuade Annie that “at the same time I also want to tell you, that actually, our No. 34 is 360” and “[c]an have 360 headcount, which means it can accommodate 360 people” [emphasis added].

  106. [66] In my view, the totality of this conversation shows that, as at March 2017, Terrence was still not forthright with Annie that housing more than 130 workers at the 34KB dormitory was a breach of URA regulations. He was still trying to sell her the proposition that it was legally permissible to house 360 workers at 34KB. I accept Annie’s evidence that she was confused about the need to move workers around for the purpose of the inspections. Her responses during the conversation show that she did not have a clear picture of what was going on. In fact, Terrence repeatedly asked her if she could “understand” his explanations. It was odd for him to ask this, if he and/or William had already explained the URA restriction to Annie back in 2014. The inference is that William and Terrence had not explained the URA restriction in 2014, but rather, had made the Representation to Jason and Annie intending them to understand that the legally approved capacity of the dormitory at 34KB was 362 workers / beds.

  107. [67] The S 27 Defendants’ counsel put to Annie that her comment – “That means the capacity there is 130-la” – meant that she knew even before this conversation that the URA-approved capacity was 130 workers. Annie disagreed, explaining that she was aware of the URA letter stating 130 workers for the fifth to seventh floors of 34KB, but that when she went to view the premises, the second to seventh floors were filled with dormitory beds; she was given a tenant list showing 362 workers; and she was shown deposits collected for around 362 workers. I accept Annie’s evidence. She may have started to suspect, given what Terrence was telling her on 16 March 2017, that URA’s Grant of Written Permission for 130 workers to be housed on the fifth to seventh floors of 34KB restricted the capacity for the entire 34KB premises to only 130 workers, contrary to what William and Terrence had previously represented to her. But that does not mean that she already knew this beforehand. If she in fact already knew that the legally approved capacity of the 34KB dormitory was only 130 workers, she would not have said “That means the capacity there is 130-la” and “So must follow URA-la”, which are remarks in the nature of seeking clarification of the position.

  108. [68] The S 27 Defendants’ counsel also put that Annie’s “Ok” in response to Terrence saying “After this, I will send an email and say that we had a meeting and we decided to do it this way” meant that she had agreed to Terrence’s plan to move the workers out of the second to fourth floors of 34KB for the URA inspection. Annie disagreed, explaining that she had not agreed to Terrence moving the workers and all she meant was that Terrence was to write an e-mail to explain the matter to the Company’s board as she was not in a position to decide. I find that Annie was simply acknowledging that Terrence intended to write an e-mail. The Chinese word used in Annie’s response was “ 嗯 ”, which could fairly indicate a non-committal acknowledgment of what was being said. The wider conversation shows that Annie was still trying to fathom why there was a need to move the workers, and I do not think she would have agreed on the spot to doing so. Even if she had assented, she would merely have been going along with Terrence on the basis that he had more experience in running dormitory operations and presumably knew what he was doing. It does not in any way indicate that Annie knew all along that the legally approved capacity of the 34KB dormitory was only 130 workers or that she was knowingly acquiescing to any wrongdoing on Terrence’s part.

  109. [69] Fourth, on 22 March 2017, Terrence sent Annie an e-mail. In this e-mail, Terrence stated that the Company’s consultant had submitted an application to URA, MOM and other authorities for renewal of the dormitory licence for 34KB. Terrence added that “due to renewal inspection”, he and Annie had agreed to vacate the second to fourth floors of 34KB. He ended his e-mail stating: “As mentioned during our discussion, the capacity load for the dormitory depend on the final decision from the relevant authorities agency [sic]”. I accept Annie’s explanation that Terrence’s e-mail was misleading in making it sound as though they had both reached an agreement on what needed to be done. More critically, Terrence was still not candid in this e-mail that it was a breach of URA regulations to house more than 130 workers at the 34KB dormitory. That he remained coy about this fact is very likely because he and William had previously made the Representation to Jason and Annie intending them to understand (and knowing that they understood) that the legally approved capacity of the 34KB dormitory was 362 workers / beds.

  110. [70] Fifth, on 29 November 2017, Jason, Annie and Terrence held a meeting of the directors of the Company. At this meeting, Terrence continued to purport that housing over 300 workers at 34KB was legal because MOM had allowed that number of workers to be keyed into their system. That he continued to put up this front before Jason and Annie in 2017 is more consistent with William and Terrence having taken a similar position (ie, having made the Representation) back in 2013 and 2014. Throughout this meeting, Jason and Annie repeatedly maintained that William and Terrence had never told them that the legally approved capacity of the 34KB dormitory was only 130 workers. Terrence did not deny that. In fact, when Jason stated that “William told us it’s 300 from Day 1 until now”, Terrence agreed that “Yes, he said that. I heard it” and added that “If you think that you have been cheated by him, then, it’s the same for me”. In cross-examination, Terrence claimed that because Jason and Annie were recording the conversation, Jason had “deliberately sa[id] that he didn’t know” even though “ever since the beginning, up until 2017, they knew it all along”. However, if Terrence truly thought that Jason was feigning ignorance, the natural thing for him to have done would be to confront Jason at the meeting. Yet, Terrence did not do so. When pressed on why he had not done so, Terrence could only offer the vague excuse that he did not see a need to argue with Jason and Annie because “they knew everything”. I do not find this excuse credible.

  111. [71] Sixth, at a directors’ meeting between Jason, Annie and Terrence on 5 April 2018, the capacity of the 34KB dormitory and the practice of shifting workers in and out of the dormitory during URA inspections were discussed. The minutes of the meeting record that the “ex-directors” of the Company had misrepresented in 2014 that the capacity of the 34KB dormitory was 300 workers when the capacity approved by URA was only 130 workers (at item 16):

  112. [72] Jason, Annie and Terrence approved the resolution to seek legal advice and consider potential legal action against the ex-directors of the Company for misrepresentation. While the minutes referred to the “ex-directors” of the Company (ie, Eer and Ting ) having made the misrepresentation, it is undisputed that Jason and Annie never had any discussions with Eer or Ting at the material time. The Representation came from William, Terrence and Jieling. By approving this item at the meeting, Terrence implicitly admitted that he (along with William and Jieling) had falsely made the Representation to Jason and Annie prior to POP’s entry into the SPA.

  113. [73] Seventh, Terrence was aware all along that the Representation was false. Terrence admitted to housing workers on the second to fourth floors of 34KB in breach of URA regulations, even prior to H8 and POP’s joint venture. Terrence admitted that from 2012 to 2017, he had housed some 362 workers at 34KB, and that this was illegal and a breach of URA regulations.

  114. [74] Finally, for the same reason at [57] above, I find that Terrence made the Representation with the intention of inducing POP to acquire a shareholding in the Company, which would thereafter be the joint venture vehicle for H8 and POP.

  115. (3) Jieling

  116. [75] I reach my findings at [43] above in relation to Jieling for the following reasons.

  117. [76] First, although Jieling stated in her AEIC that she had “never made such a representation to Jason or Annie” that “[34KB’s] housing capacity for workers was 362 workers”, she later admitted that she had represented to Annie that the capacity of the 34KB dormitory was 362 workers. Jieling further admitted that she did not point out to Annie that the capacity of 362 workers was not approved by URA. I find that Jieling’s initial denial in her AEIC that any representations were made is not credible. I accept her later admissions in cross-examination to the effect that she had made the Representation to Annie. I further infer, from Jieling’s admission that she did not tell Annie that the capacity of 362 workers was not approved by URA, that Jieling intended for Annie to understand the Representation as meaning that the legally approved capacity of the 34KB dormitory was 362 workers / beds.

  118. [77] Second, as I have found at [50]–[51] above, through certain documents that Jieling sent Annie on 14 May 2014, Jieling impliedly made the Representation to Annie, intending Annie to understand that the legally approved capacity of the dormitory at 34KB was 362 workers / beds.

  119. [78] Third, Jieling knew at all material times that the Representation was false. This is evident from her admission that the 34KB dormitory was never legally approved to house 362 workers because URA had approved only the fifth to seventh floors for use as a workers’ dormitory.

  120. [79] Finally, Jieling conceded that it was important to let Jason and Annie know if URA did not approve the use of the second to fourth floors for use as a workers’ dormitory. This reflects that Jieling was aware that POP, Jason and Annie were relying on the legally approved capacity of the 34KB dormitory being 362 workers / beds when POP entered into the SPA. She intended to induce POP to act on the false Representation.

  121. POP (through Jason and Annie) understood the Representation in the sense pleaded by POP, and relied on it in agreeing to purchase shares in the Company based on 34KB valued at $14m

  122. [80] I find that Jason and Annie in fact understood the Representation to mean, as pleaded by POP, that the legally approved capacity of the dormitory at 34KB was 362 workers / beds. I accept Jason’s evidence that what he understood from what William and Terrence told him was that it was legal for the 34KB dormitory to house 362 workers. I also accept Annie’s evidence that the impression she received from William, Terrence and Jieling was that the approved capacity of the 34KB dormitory was 362 workers. William and Terrence may not have used the specific words “legal” or “legally” in their discussions about the capacity of the 34KB dormitory, but this does not preclude the Representation from being understood as referring to the legally approved capacity. It is absurd that William and Terrence would have meant prospective buyers of the Company to understand that the capacity conveyed was not a legally approved capacity. It is thus natural that Jason and Annie understood the Representation to mean that the legally approved capacity of the 34KB dormitory was 362 workers / beds.

  123. [81] Turning to the element of reliance, in law, the misrepresentation need not be the sole inducement, so long as it played a real and substantial part and operated in the representee’s mind, no matter how strong or how many the other matters were which played their part in inducing the representee to act: Panatron at [23].

  124. [82] In the present case, I find that the Representation played a real and substantial part in inducing POP to purchase shares in the Company based on 34KB valued at $14m.

  125. [83] First, I accept Jason and Annie’s evidence that POP agreed to the purchase price of $42m for all the shares in the Company based on a $14m valuation for 34KB and a $28m valuation for 8ER. In turn, the $14m valuation of 34KB was based on Jason and Annie’s understanding of the Representation, viz, that the legally approved capacity of the 34KB dormitory was 362 workers / beds, as that directly related to the revenue that the Company could generate from 34KB. It was thus in reliance on the truth of the Representation that POP agreed to purchase shares in the Company based on 34KB valued at $14m. POP ultimately purchased 70% of the shareholding in the Company.

  126. [84] Second, this reliance is further evidenced by POP’s letter to the Company dated 23 May 2014. In this letter, POP referred to its in-principle agreement to acquire shares in the Company. POP referred to the total value of the Company being $42m “subject to” 34KB being valued at $14m and 8ER being valued at $28m “comprised with the current business entity of dormitory”. Annie, on behalf of POP, and Ting, on behalf of the Company, signed the letter in acknowledgment of and agreement with its contents. At around that time, Annie instructed CKS to perform a full valuation of 34KB based on information from Terrence, including that the number of workers housed at 34KB was 360 workers. CKS valued 34KB at $14m in CKS’ 2014 Valuation Report. These matters reinforce that the Representation operated in POP’s mind when it decided to acquire shares in the Company based on 34KB valued at $14m.

  127. [85] Third, William agreed in cross-examination that there was a significant difference in value between a dormitory that could accommodate 130 workers and one that could accommodate 362 workers. This is precisely the logic underlying the reliance placed by POP on the Representation in deciding to acquire shares in the Company based on 34KB valued at $14m.

  128. [86] The S 27 Defendants allege that POP did not rely on the Representation because: (a) Annie had visited the 34KB dormitory between March and April 2014; (b) she had engaged CKS to value 34KB; (c) POP had engaged the services of a law firm to oversee its purchase of the Company; and (d) Annie had engaged an accounting firm to perform due diligence checks. If the S 27 Defendants’ suggestion is that POP did not rely on the Representation because POP in fact somehow found out at the material time that the Representation was false, this is not borne out on the evidence. If the S 27 Defendants’ argument is that POP had relied on other matters in deciding to enter into the SPA, this is legally irrelevant since the misrepresentation need not be the sole inducement (see [81] above), and I have found that the false Representation did play a real and substantial part in inducing POP to purchase shares in the Company based on 34KB valued at $14m (see [82]–[85] above). If the S 27 Defendants’ point is that POP could or should have made its own assessment, through POP’s own checks, of whether the Representation was false before entering into the SPA, this is not a legally tenable defence. In Jurong Town Corp v Wishing Star Ltd [2005] 3 SLR(R) 283, a contractor (WSL) submitted that because the developer (JTC) had gotten its consultant (JCPL) to evaluate WSL’s representations in WSL’s tender, JTC had not relied on the representations but had instead relied on JCPL’s evaluation in awarding the contract to WSL (at [107]). The Court of Appeal roundly rejected this proposition (at [112]–[114]):

  129. [87] In the present case, it is even more churlish of the S 27 Defendants to suggest that POP could and should have ascertained through its own means whether the Representation was true or false, because William’s own evidence was that he, Terrence and Jieling were experienced in running workers’ dormitories as compared to Jason and Annie who had no prior experience in this line. It is understandable that POP would have relied on the truth of the Representation, coming as it did from William, Terrence and Jieling, self-professed experienced hands in running workers’ dormitories.

  130. Eer and Ting are liable for the fraudulent misrepresentation made by William as their agent

  131. [88] POP pleads that the Representation was made by William, Terrence and Jieling in their personal capacities and “on behalf of [Eer] and Ting as their agents”, and that Eer “as the principal, is bound by his agents’ acts and/or omissions”.

  132. [89] I find that the evidence bears out that William was acting not only on his own behalf (see [44] above), but also as an agent for Eer and Ting, when he made the Representation to POP (through Jason and Annie). First, William testified that he represented Eer and negotiated on Eer’s behalf in the transaction for them to sell the Company to H8 and POP. William also conceded in cross-examination that everything that was told to Jason and Annie regarding the acquisition of the Company was told to them on behalf of the sellers of the Company. Second, Eer accepted that he did not negotiate directly with POP for the sale of the Company to H8 and POP, and that he had made William “fully responsible” as his (ie, Eer’s) representative in the sale and purchase transaction. Although Eer attempted to backtrack and assert that William was only negotiating the sale price on his (ie, Eer’s) behalf when POP’s counsel suggested that Eer had to take responsibility for any misrepresentations made by William, I do not accept Eer’s belated attempt to downplay William’s role. The evidence shows that Eer was not involved in any discussions with Jason and Annie at the material time. It is clear that Eer had left all negotiations and discussions for the sale of the Company to be conducted by William on his (ie, Eer’s) behalf. Third, as for Ting, she was, at the material time, merely a nominee shareholder for William of 50% of the shareholding in the Company. For that reason, Ting chose not to give any evidence. This indicates that she accepts that William’s representations in the negotiations and discussions for the sale of the Company were made on her behalf; she thus had nothing to add by way of evidence.

  133. [90] Next, I find that the Representation was made by William within the scope of his actual authority as the agent of Eer and Ting. In respect of Eer, it was Eer’s express evidence that he knew from William, before selling his shares in the Company, that the second to fourth floors of 34KB were not approved for use as a dormitory. Indeed, Eer was named as the “Developer” in the 14 August 2014 application to URA for permission to use the third and fourth floors of 34KB as a workers’ dormitory, which was refused pursuant to the URA Refusal of Written Permission dated 21 August 2014 (see [17] above). I find incredible, and do not accept, Eer’s suggestion that he signed the application without knowing what it was about and his assertion that he did not receive the URA Refusal of Written Permission. He was the owner of 50% of the shares in the Company at that time and was named in the application: he must have known of the contents and significance of the application and the subsequent URA Refusal of Written Permission. In short, Eer would have known that selling the Company to POP on the basis that the 34KB dormitory could legally house 360 workers would be a false basis. And, Eer’s evidence was precisely that he knew that the sale of the Company to POP was based on the 34KB dormitory housing 360 workers. He was evidently content for the sale to proceed on that false basis. When asked by POP’s counsel whether the URA Refusal of Written Permission should have been provided to Jason and Annie during the negotiations, Eer’s response was that “William was handling this”. Eer’s deference to William on this particular matter was consistent with his general position that he had left William “fully responsible” for coordinating the sale and purchase transaction (see [89] above). In other words, Eer gave William free rein to decide what to communicate to POP about the capacity of the 34KB dormitory. Eer is thus bound by the Representation made by William.

  134. [91] As for Ting, she was aware that the Company was being sold on the basis of 34KB valued at $14m (and 8ER valued at $28m), as evidenced by the fact that she signed (on the Company’s behalf) the 23 May 2014 letter recording this basis (see [84] above). As she held 50% of the shares in the Company merely as William’s nominee, and in the absence of her giving any evidence to defend against POP’s claim, the irresistible inference is that she was prepared for William (as the beneficial owner of the shares) to make any representation he saw fit (true or false) in furtherance of achieving a $14m valuation of 34KB. Ting is thus bound by the Representation made by William.

  135. [92] Further and/or alternatively, William had apparent authority to make the Representation. Under the apparent authority analysis, the question is what the principal had represented or held out as the agent’s scope of authority and whether that encompasses the agent’s tortious act: Ong Han Ling and another v American International Assurance Co Ltd and others [2018] 5 SLR 549 at [215]. Annie learned, on or about 24 May 2014, that the Company was owned by Eer and Ting. The SPA with Eer and Ting was eventually executed on 5 March 2015. I find that, by their conduct of leaving the negotiations for the sale of the Company (including the making of any representations to POP) entirely to William and then leaving uncorrected the Representation that William had made to Jason and Annie such that the Representation continued to operate on POP’s mind as at the execution of the SPA, Eer and Ting had impliedly held out to POP that William had apparent authority to make the Representation.

  136. [93] On either of the above bases, Eer and Ting are liable for the fraudulent misrepresentation made by William.

  137. The S 27 Defendants’ contractual defences fail

  138. [94] The SPA was entered into between (a) Eer and Ting as the “Vendors”, (b) H8 and POP as the “Purchasers”, and (c) the Company. The S 27 Defendants rely on the following clauses in the SPA in their defence.

  139. [95] Clause 5.2 of the SPA provides that:

  140. [96] The S 27 Defendants argue that the list of representations and warranties set out in cl 5.1 and sch 2 of the SPA “does not include the capacity of beds at [34KB] and/or whether [34KB] would be able to generate sufficient revenue to sustain the financing for the purchase of the shareholding in [the Company]”.

  141. [97] Clause 9.6 of the SPA provides that:

  142. [98] Clause 3.1(a) of the SPA provides that:

  143. [99] The S 27 Defendants submit that these clauses in the SPA “constitute no representation and/or non-reliance clauses” which “give rise to a contractual and/or evidential estoppel that prevents [POP] from asserting misrepresentation”. This submission is misconceived.

  144. [100] First, cl 3.1(a) of the SPA is not a “no representation” or a “non-reliance” clause. It simply provides that POP’s satisfaction with the due diligence conducted is a condition precedent to the completion of the sale and purchase transaction under the SPA. This is a separate matter from whether any of the S 27 Defendants made representations to POP or whether POP relied on such representations. The clause says nothing about the latter matters and cannot conceivably be construed as a “no representation” or a “non-reliance” clause.

  145. [101] Second, cl 9.6 of the SPA, properly construed, is an entire agreement clause and not a “no representation” or “non-reliance” clause. The effect of an entire agreement clause is to deny contractual force to statements which are not contained in the contract and thereby preclude any claim based on a side agreement or collateral warranty; it does not purport to affect the status of any statement as a (pre-contractual) misrepresentation, and thus does not preclude a claim for misrepresentation: Cartwright at para 9-06; AXA Sun Life Services plc v Campbell Martin Ltd and others and other appeals [2012] 1 All ER (Comm) 268 at [34]–[36], [81] and [91]–[92]; BSkyB Ltd and another v HP Enterprise Services UK Ltd (formerly Electronic Data Systems Ltd) and another (2010) 129 Con LR 147 at [385]; Government of Zanzibar v British Aerospace (Lancaster House) Ltd and others [2000] 1 WLR 2333 at 2344; FoodCo UK LLP (t/a Muffin Break) and others v Henry Boot Developments Ltd [2010] EWHC 358 (Ch) (“FoodCo”) at [165].

  146. [102] Third, I am prepared to accept that the first sentence of cl 5.2 of the SPA constitutes a “no representation” clause insofar as representations falling outside of cl 5.1 and sch 2 of the SPA are concerned, ie, the parties agreed that no representations other than those contained in cl 5.1 and sch 2 of the SPA were made (whether that reflected the real state of affairs or not). A “no representation” clause, as well as a “non-reliance” clause, may give rise to a contractual estoppel where the parties bind themselves by contract to a fictional state of affairs in which no representations have been made (pursuant to the “no representation” clause) or, if made, have not been relied on (pursuant to the “non-reliance” clause): First Tower Trustees Ltd and another v CDS (Superstores International) Ltd [2019] 1 WLR 637 (“First Tower Trustees”) at [47]. Alternatively, such clauses may be capable of operating as an evidential estoppel provided that the three requirements in Lowe v Lombank Ltd [1960] 1 WLR 196 are satisfied, ie, (a) the statement of “no representation” or “non-reliance” in the clauses is clear and unequivocal; (b) the party providing this statement had intended that the counterparty should act on this statement; and (c) the counterparty had believed the statement of “no representation” or “non-reliance” to be true and had acted upon it: Orient Centre Investments Ltd and another v Société Générale [2007] 3 SLR(R) 566 at [44].

  147. [103] In the present case, however, neither a contractual nor an evidential estoppel arises in relation to the Representation. This is because para 4.2 in sch 2 of the SPA contains a widely framed warranty by the Vendors as to the truth of all information provided on their behalf to POP, which is wide enough to cover the Representation:

  148. [104] In other words, the “no representation” clause in the first sentence of cl 5.2 of the SPA does not apply to the Representation because the truth of the Representation was warranted under para 4.2 in sch 2 of the SPA. Neither a contractual nor an evidential estoppel in relation to POP’s claim that the false Representation was made can arise in these circumstances.

  149. [105] Fourth, a “no representation” clause is in effect a term which excludes liability for misrepresentation; the position is the same with “non-reliance” clauses: First Tower Trustees at [52]–[53], [60]–[63], [67], [97]–[98] and [109]. The established position at law is that a principal cannot exclude his own liability for fraudulent misrepresentation: HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd and others v Chase Manhattan Bank and others [2003] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 61 (“HIH”) at [16] and [76]; First Tower Trustees at [74]; FoodCo at [166]. Therefore, I would not construe the “no representation” clause in the first sentence of cl 5.2 of the SPA as extending to fraudulent misrepresentations; if construed widely to cover fraud, it would be ineffective at common law and pursuant to s 3 of the Misrepresentation Act 1967 (2020 Rev Ed), which cannot have been the contracting parties’ intention (see, generally, Cartwright at para 9-13). Further, if a principal intends to exclude his liability for his agent’s misrepresentation, that must be expressed clearly by the clause: HIH at [16]; there is no such clear expression in cl 5.2 of the SPA (or any of the other clauses cited by the S 27 Defendants). The first sentence of cl 5.2 of the SPA thus does not serve to exclude the Vendors’ liability for the false Representation made by William on their behalf.

  150. [106] Fifth, in my judgment, the second sentence of cl 5.2 of the SPA, properly construed, is not a “non-reliance” clause. The Purchasers simply asserted by that sentence their awareness of the state, condition and permitted use of 34KB. The sentence does not go so far as to assert that POP did not rely on the Representation made as to the legally approved capacity of the 34KB dormitory. Even if I am wrong and the sentence amounts to a “non-reliance” clause, it still would not apply to exclude liability for fraudulent misrepresentation, for reasons similar to those at [105] above.

  151. [107] Sixth, William, Terrence and Jieling are personally liable for the fraudulent misrepresentation they each made. They are not parties to the SPA and cannot invoke any of the SPA clauses in the absence of privity of contract. No attempt, whether by joining them as parties to the SPA or in any other way, was made to relieve them of any liability for misrepresentation (see HIH at [6]). Further and in any event, even if they could invoke the SPA clauses, the clauses would not avail of any defence, as explained at [100]–[106] above.

  152. [108] I therefore conclude that the S 27 Defendants’ defence based on the SPA terms fails.

  153. POP suffered damage as a result of its reliance on the false Representation

  154. [109] Damages for the tort of deceit include all loss that flowed directly as a result of the entry by the representee (in reliance on the fraudulent misrepresentation) into the transaction in question, regardless of whether or not such loss was foreseeable, as well as all consequential loss: Wishing Star Ltd v Jurong Town Corp [2008] 2 SLR(R) 909 (“Wishing Star”) at [21]. If the representee was induced by the fraud to enter into a transaction for the purchase of property, the normal method of calculating the loss caused by the fraud is the price paid less the real value of the property: Smith New Court Securities Ltd v Citibank NA [1997] AC 254 (“Smith New Court”) at 284A; Cartwright at para 5-37. This is commonly referred to as the valuation method of measuring loss.

  155. [110] In the present case, POP claims damages in the amount of $3.5m, calculated based on the valuation method, as follows: (a) POP had purchased its shareholding in the Company on the premise that the value of 34KB was $14m based on a capacity of 360 workers for the 34KB dormitory (see CKS’ 2014 Valuation Report ); (b) however, the value of 34KB based on the actual legally approved dormitory capacity of 130 workers was $9m, as seen from CKS’ 2019 Valuation Report and the fact that 34KB was eventually sold for $9m on 31 July 2023 (see [25] and [29] above); (c) the difference in the values is $5m; and (d) POP’s loss, as a purchaser of 70% of the shareholding in the Company, is 70% of that $5m difference, ie, $3.5m.

  156. [111] The S 27 Defendants do not dispute that the valuation method is, in principle, an appropriate method of measuring loss in the present case. Instead, their objections are that:

  157. (a) POP’s reliance on CKS’ 2019 Valuation Report was arbitrary and there was no evidence of “the actual market value of [34KB] in 2014 should the capacity of 130 workers have been taken into account”.

  158. (b) The $9m valuation in CKS’ 2019 Valuation Report could be due to other factors besides the capacity of the 34KB dormitory, such as the shortening of the leasehold for 34KB and the condition of the workers’ dormitory.

  159. (c) POP’s particularisation of its loss was not pleaded and was set out for the first time only in KLGSL’s Opening Statement at para 86.

  160. [112] I find that POP has proven that it suffered actual loss in reliance on the false Representation and I assess such loss to be $3.5m. I explain how I arrive at these findings, addressing as I do so the S 27 Defendants’ objections in turn.

  161. [113] It is undisputed that, at the time of H8 and POP’s acquisition of the Company, the Company’s two main assets were the properties at 34KB and 8ER, which were used for foreign worker dormitories. William agreed in cross-examination that there was a significant difference in value between a dormitory that could accommodate 130 workers and one that could accommodate 362 workers. Thus, it cannot be gainsaid that POP suffered a loss by acquiring 34KB (through its acquisition of the Company) on the basis of the 34KB dormitory having a capacity of 362 workers when the actual value of 34KB was less, since the dormitory had a (legally approved) capacity of only 130 workers.

  162. [114] The first question to then determine is the appropriate date on which to assess the actual value of 34KB. It is not an inflexible rule that the plaintiff must bring into account the value as at the transaction date of the asset acquired; the date of transaction rule will not apply where either (a) the misrepresentation has continued to operate after the date of the acquisition of the asset so as to induce the plaintiff to retain the asset or (b) the circumstances of the case are such that the plaintiff is, by reason of the fraud, locked into the property: Smith New Court at 265A–B and 267C. In 4Eng Ltd v Harper and another [2007] EWHC 1568 (Ch) (“4Eng”), the claimant was induced by the defendants’ fraudulent misrepresentations to purchase shares from the defendants. Summary judgment was entered against the defendants, with damages to be assessed. The court accepted that the valuation of what the claimant received under the transaction should not be carried out as at the date of the agreement for the transaction because, among other reasons, the true nature and full extent of the fraud took some considerable time to emerge after the acquisition, even though aspects of it started to manifest themselves immediately (at [53]). This finding was expressly affirmed in the subsequent judgment on the assessment of damages in 4 Eng Ltd v Harper and another [2008] 3 WLR 892 (at [17]–[18]).

  163. [115] In my judgment, the evidence in the present case shows that POP (through Jason and Annie) formed the view in April 2018 that the Representation was false and that the legally approved capacity of the 34KB dormitory was only 130 workers, and POP received official confirmation of this position only in November 2018. Therefore, applying the principles in Smith New Court and 4Eng above, the appropriate date for assessing the actual value of 34KB would be November 2018, or at the earliest, April 2018. Prior to that, the true nature and full extent of the fraud were still emerging:

  164. (a) At Annie’s meeting with Terrence on 16 March 2017, Terrence was still trying to sell her the proposition that it was legally permissible to house 360 workers at the 34KB dormitory, and Annie was noticeably confused about why Terrence wanted to move workers out of the 34KB dormitory ahead of the URA inspection (see [65]–[68] above).

  165. (b) In Terrence’s 22 March 2017 e-mail to Annie, he was still not candid about the fact that it was a breach of URA regulations to house more than 130 workers at the 34KB dormitory, and he further obfuscated the matter by stating that “the capacity load for the dormitory depend on the final decision from the relevant authorities agency [sic]” (see [69] above).

  166. (c) Annie’s evidence is that after her March 2017 meeting with Terrence, she grew suspicious of the true capacity of the 34KB dormitory. Between March and November 2017, she and Jason had various discussions with William, Terrence and Jieling on this issue, but at no point in time did any of them confirm what the approved capacity of the 34KB dormitory was. Terrence kept giving them the explanation that “follow MOM, follow SCDF”. I accept Annie’s evidence, which is consistent with the records of the 16 March 2017 and 29 November 2017 meetings with Terrence.

  167. (d) At the meeting between Jason, Annie and Terrence on 29 November 2017, Terrence continued to purport that housing over 300 workers at 34KB was legal because MOM had allowed that number of workers to be keyed into their system (see [70] above). Jason and Annie may have had a strong suspicion of the true position by then, but Terrence still did not come clean.

  168. (e) It was only at the directors’ meeting between Jason, Annie and Terrence on 5 April 2018 that Terrence expressly admitted that the URA-approved capacity for the 34KB dormitory was only 130 workers as at July 2014 and that the capacity had been misrepresented in April 2014 to be 300 workers (see [71] above). I accept that by April 2018, Jason and Annie had formed the view that the Representation was false.

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