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Grounds publishedDecided 15 Jul 2024

General Division of the High Court

Farooq Ahmad Mann (in his capacity as the private trustee in bankruptcy of Li Hua) v Xia Zheng

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[2024] SGHC 182Case no. Originating Application No 3 of 2024 (Summons No 34 of 2024)

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Grounds of decision

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  1. [1] This was an application by Mr Farooq Ahmad Mann (“the Private Trustee”), in his capacity as the private trustee in bankruptcy of Mr Li Hua (“the Bankrupt”), for a Mareva and/or proprietary injunction against the respondent, Ms Xia Zheng (“Ms Xia”), in support of the Private Trustee’s claim against Ms Xia to avoid certain transfers of property from the Bankrupt to Ms Xia in the lead-up to the Bankrupt’s bankruptcy on the grounds that these were transactions at an undervalue or fraudulent conveyances under s 361 of the Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act 2018 (2020 Rev Ed) (“IRDA”) and s 73B of the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act (Cap 61, 1994 Rev Ed) (“CLPA”) respectively.

  2. [3] Having considered the parties’ submissions, including a round of further arguments at Ms Xia’s request, I allowed the Private Trustee’s application and granted a worldwide Mareva injunction as sought. As Ms Xia has appealed against my decision, I now set out the detailed grounds for my decision. In addition to considering the abovementioned tension between the matrimonial and insolvency regimes, these grounds also address fundamental points of principle on the juridical basis of Mareva injunctions, particularly in relation to its constituent elements and the requirement of a real risk of dissipation of assets by the defendant.

  3. Background facts

  4. [4] The Bankrupt and Ms Xia were previously married but are currently divorced, with final judgment having been entered on 9 October 2019. By an interim judgment by consent dated 8 July 2019 (the “Interim Judgment”), the Bankrupt agreed to:

  5. (a) transfer his interests in the following four matrimonial properties (“the Properties”) to Ms Xia for no cash consideration:

  6. (i) a property at Duchess Road (“the Duchess Road Property”);

  7. (ii) a property at Leedon Heights (“the Leedon Heights Property”);

  8. (iii) a property at Duchess Avenue (“the Duchess Avenue Property”); and

  9. (iv) a property at Orchard Boulevard (“the Orchard Property”);

  10. (b) continue making repayments towards the outstanding mortgage loan of the Properties;

  11. (c) transfer all his other Singapore matrimonial assets including but not limited to his shares and credit balance standing in his Singapore bank accounts to Ms Xia as her share of the matrimonial assets; and

  12. (d) pay S$2,000 per month in child maintenance to Ms Xia.

  13. [5] In the main application in HC/OA 3/2024 (“OA 3”), the Private Trustee contends that the Interim Judgment was an asset protection scheme by the Bankrupt, in which Ms Xia was complicit, to put his assets out of reach of his creditors at a time when he was facing multiple lawsuits as the mastermind of an alleged fraudulent investment scheme gone wrong. As a result, the Private Trustee seeks to unwind the transfers of the Bankrupt’s interests in the Properties to Ms Xia as undervalue transactions or fraudulent conveyances under s 361 of the IRDA and s 73B of the CLPA respectively.

  14. [6] By way of background, the Bankrupt is alleged to have used two companies under his and Ms Xia’s control (both currently in liquidation), Sunmax Global Capital 1 Fund Pte Ltd (“Sunmax”) and SMGC Pte Ltd (“SMGC”), to run a fraudulent investment scheme intended to allow him and Ms Xia to profit off the moneys invested into the scheme. The scheme supposedly went on from Sunmax’s incorporation on or around 7 April 2009 until its liquidation on 5 August 2022.

  15. [7] Sunmax was the vehicle used to procure investment from investors, while SMGC was used as a conduit for siphoning off investment monies in Sunmax to the Bankrupt and Ms Xia’s own pockets. This was done under the guise of Sunmax appointing SMGC as an investment manager, and having Sunmax pay SMGC fees for its services, which the Bankrupt then withdrew from SMGC by procuring the payment of directors’ fees and dividends to himself and Ms Xia. The alleged fraud was of a considerable scale. In numerical terms, a large sum of some S$65.7m was invested into Sunmax by investors in the period between 2009 and 2012. From 2009 to 2017, Sunmax paid a substantial total sum in excess of S$14m to SMGC as fees for its services, and in turn, a sum in excess of S$8.5m was paid by SMGC to the Bankrupt and Ms Xia as directors’ fees and/or dividends.

  16. [8] During this period, the Bankrupt and Ms Xia purchased and/or repaid the mortgage loans taken on the Properties in Singapore, which they held as joint tenants. The Private Trustee alleges that the Properties were acquired through monies invested in Sunmax that were siphoned off by the Bankrupt and Ms Xia in the manner described above.

  17. [9] On 21 July 2016, Sunmax informed its investors that they were facing substantial losses on their investments. Subsequently, a wave of litigation from various disgruntled investors was commenced against Sunmax and the Bankrupt. The Private Trustee contends that, as a result of the increase in legal proceedings taken out against him, the Bankrupt began taking steps to dissipate his assets to Ms Xia so as to put them out of reach of his potential creditors.

  18. [10] On or around 26 February 2019, the Bankrupt caused Sunmax to release a mortgage that Sunmax had held over the Leedon Heights Property. The mortgage and caveat lodged against the Leedon Heights Property by Sunmax was fully discharged on 24 June 2019 and, on the same day, the Leedon Heights Property was sold to a third party for S$2.16m, with the entire sale proceeds paid to Ms Xia. Ms Xia did not dispute that she had received the proceeds of sale of the Leedon Heights Property.

  19. [11] Around the same time as the sale of the Leedon Heights Property, the Bankrupt and Ms Xia entered into the Interim Judgment, the terms of which have been set out at [4] above. As is evident from the terms of the Interim Judgment, its result was that the entirety of the Bankrupt’s assets in Singapore (including his interests in the Properties) were transferred to Ms Xia, while keeping the Bankrupt responsible for making child maintenance payments and the mortgage repayments on the Properties.

  20. [12] Shortly after the Interim Judgment, the Duchess Avenue Property and the Duchess Road Property were sold for S$2.4m and S$2.88m on 18 October 2019 and 22 November 2019 respectively. The proceeds of these sales were also paid to Ms Xia, which she also did not dispute.

  21. [13] The total sale proceeds from the sales of the three Properties paid to Ms Xia thus come up to S$7.44m.

  22. [14] At present, only the Orchard Property has not been sold. Despite the terms of the Interim Judgment, the Orchard Property remains registered in the joint names of the Bankrupt and Ms Xia. It is estimated by the Private Trustee to be worth around S$5m.

  23. [15] On 8 May 2022, the Bankrupt filed a debtor’s bankruptcy application seeking to place himself into bankruptcy. He was subsequently adjudged a bankrupt on 28 June 2022, and the Private Trustee was appointed in his capacity as such on 2 August 2022.

  24. The present application

  25. [16] Primarily, the Private Trustee sought a worldwide Mareva injunction of up to S$12.44m, being the total value of the Orchard Property and the sale proceeds from the three Properties, that were the subjects of the Private Trustee’s avoidance action in OA 3.

  26. [17] In the alternative, the Private Trustee sought a domestic Mareva injunction of up to S$7.44m, being the total value of the sale proceeds paid to Ms Xia in respect of the three Properties (see [10]–[13] above), as well as a proprietary injunction over the Orchard Property.

  27. [18] The statutory source of the court’s general jurisdiction to grant injunctions is s 18(2) and paras 5 and 14 of the First Schedule of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (2020 Rev Ed) (“SCJA”). Paragraph 14 of the First Schedule empowers the court to “grant all reliefs and remedies at law and in equity, including damages in addition to, or in substitution for, an injunction or specific performance”. In terms of interlocutory injunctions specifically, para 5(a) gives the court the power to provide for “the interim preservation of property which is the subject matter of the proceedings” (thus referring to a proprietary injunction), while para 5(c) of the First Schedule refers to a power to provide for “the preservation of assets for the satisfaction of any judgment which has been made or may be made” (thus referring to a Mareva injunction).

  28. Mareva injunctions

  29. [19] The purpose of a Mareva injunction is to restrain a defendant from dissipating his assets with a view to frustrating the enforcement of a potential judgment against him on the claimant’s claim (see the Court of Appeal decision of JTrust Asia Pte Ltd v Group Lease Holdings Pte Ltd and others [2018] 2 SLR 159 (“JTrust”) at [95]). In the recent decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Convoy Collateral Ltd v Broad Idea International Ltd [2023] AC 389, Lord Leggatt JSC referred to this rationale as the “enforcement principle” (at [86]), and expanded on it in the following terms (at [89]):

  30. [20] An important point on the nature of a Mareva injunction, made clearly by Lord Leggatt JSC in the extract above, is that it operates as an in personam constraint against the respondent to support enforcement of a money judgment. A Mareva injunction has no in rem effect, in the sense that it has no impact on the legal or beneficial ownership of the respondent’s assets, nor does it operate as a form of attachment or confer any form of security or proprietary interest on the applicant (see Civil Fraud (Thomas Grant QC & David Mumford QC gen eds) (Sweet & Maxwell, 1st Ed, 2018) (“Civil Fraud”) at para 28-004).

  31. [21] The well-established requirements for the grant of a Mareva injunction, insofar as they are relevant to the present application, are twofold (see the Court of Appeal decision of Bouvier, Yves Charles Edgar and another v Accent Delight International Ltd and another and another appeal [2015] 5 SLR 558 (“Bouvier”) at [36]):

  32. (a) first, a good arguable case on the merits of the Private Trustee’s claim in OA 3; and

  33. (b) second, a real risk that Ms Xia would dissipate her assets to frustrate the enforcement of an anticipated judgment on the Private Trustee’s claim.

  34. [23] The legal requirements for a worldwide Mareva injunction are no different from those for a domestic Mareva injunction. However, the courts would generally take a more careful approach, and the threshold of necessity will likely be more exacting where a worldwide Mareva injunction is concerned (see Bouvier at [37]). Thus, if the respondent has sufficient assets in Singapore to satisfy the claim, a domestic Mareva injunction would suffice to adequately protect the applicant’s interest (see Jeffrey Pinsler SC, Singapore Civil Practice (LexisNexis, 2022) (“Singapore Civil Practice”) at para 28-62). Contrariwise, the fewer the assets the respondent appears to have within the jurisdiction, the greater the necessity for extending the reach of the Mareva injunction to assets outside of the jurisdiction (see the Court of Appeal decision of Guan Chong Cocoa Manufacturer Sdn Bhd v Pratiwi Shipping SA [2003] 1 SLR(R) 157 (“Guan Chong”) at [29], citing the English Court of Appeal decision of Derby & Co Ltd and others v Weldon and others (Nos 3 and 4) [1990] 1 Ch 65 (“Derby”) at 79).

  35. Proprietary injunctions

  36. [24] A proprietary injunction is distinct from a Mareva injunction, in that it is granted in support of a claim for proprietary relief in relation to a particular asset in the hands of the defendant, and not a mere personal claim for money (see Bouvier at [143]–[144]). It does so by preserving the claimant’s property (ie, an asset in which he asserts a proprietary interest) and restraining the defendant from dealing with it in a way that may prejudice the claimant’s rights in respect of that asset (see Steven Gee, Commercial Injunctions (Sweet & Maxwell, 7th Ed, 2021) (“Gee on Injunctions”) at para 2-031).

  37. (a) there is a serious question to be tried, ie, a “seriously arguable case”, that he has a proprietary interest in the Orchard Property (see Bouvier at [151], citing the English Court of Appeal decision of Derby & Co Ltd and others v Weldon and others (No 1) [1990] Ch 48 at 64); and

  38. (b) the balance of convenience lay in favour of granting the injunction (see Bouvier at [156]).

  39. In contrast to the Mareva injunction, there is no requirement to show a real risk of dissipation in respect of the Orchard Property (see Gee on Injunctions at para 2-031; and the English High Court decision of Madoff Securities International Ltd and another v Raven and others [2012] 2 All ER (Comm) 634 at [128]).

  40. The parties’ cases

  41. [26] I set out the parties’ cases in the present application in broad strokes, which I will elaborate on at the relevant junctures below.

  42. The Private Trustee’s arguments

  43. [27] The Private Trustee relied solely on its claim based on s 361 of the IRDA (and not its alternative claim under s 73B of the CLPA) for the present injunction application.

  44. [28] The Private Trustee submitted that the requirements of a worldwide Mareva injunction had been satisfied in relation to this claim.

  45. [29] First, there was a good arguable case on the merits. Apart from the formal requirements as to the Private Trustee’s standing, the Interim Judgment being within the relevant look-back period under s 361 of the IRDA, and the Bankrupt’s insolvency at the time of the Interim Judgment, the Interim Judgment was a transaction made on terms that provided for the Bankrupt to receive no consideration (s 361(3)(a) of the IRDA), or at the very least, a transaction in which the Bankrupt received consideration of a significantly lesser value than the consideration he provided (s 361(3)(c) of the IRDA).

  46. [30] There was no rule of law providing for the immunity of ancillary relief orders from the court’s insolvency jurisdiction to set aside certain transactions for the benefit of a bankrupt’s creditors. In particular, there was authority for the proposition that ancillary relief orders that were the product of collusion to adversely affect a bankrupt’s creditors could be set aside as undervalue transactions. In this case, two factors lent to the inference that the Interim Judgment had been the product of such collusion:

  47. (a) First, the suspicious timing of the Interim Judgment and sale of the three Properties, as well as the unusually onerous terms imposed by the Interim Judgment on the Bankrupt, lent to the inference that the Interim Judgment had been a scheme to hide assets from the Bankrupt’s creditors.

  48. (b) Second, the Interim Judgment had been obtained under false pretences and/or material concealment from the Family Court:

  49. (i) In the first place, the stated ground for the parties’ divorce, being irretrievable breakdown based on separation for a continuous period of four years, had been false, as the parties had not in fact separated as they claimed. Indeed, the Bankrupt continued to live with Ms Xia and their children at the Orchard Property for more than two years after the Interim Judgment, had driven and/or been driven in a car registered in Ms Xia’s name, and was continuing being financially supported in his living expenses by Ms Xia.

  50. (ii) Moreover, at the time that the Interim Judgment was obtained, the parties had made material non-disclosures to the court by failing to disclose the completed sale of the Leedon Heights Property (which was a subject of the Interim Judgment), the agreed sale of the Duchess Road Property (also a subject of the Interim Judgment), and pending litigation against the Bankrupt in the High Court at that time.

  51. [31] Second, there was a real risk of Ms Xia dissipating her assets to frustrate the Private Trustee’s enforcement of an anticipated judgment in OA 3. From the outset, the Bankrupt and Ms Xia’s entire purpose had been to use Sunmax and SMGC as vehicles of fraud to dissipate investors’ monies into their own pockets. The Interim Judgment was, at its core, nothing but an attempt by Ms Xia and the Bankrupt to hide the latter’s assets from his creditors. Indeed, their attempt at dissipating the Bankrupt’s assets had already been put into motion with the sale of the three Properties. Ms Xia’s continuing intention to assist the Bankrupt’s scheme was apparent from her refusal to cooperate with the Private Trustee and to respond to his inquiries seeking an account of the whereabouts of the sale proceeds. And in fact, Ms Xia had stated that she had already withdrawn at least S$3.2m of the sale proceeds which she apparently kept as cash in her home. Given the evidence of past and ongoing collusion between Ms Xia and the Bankrupt, it was likely that Ms Xia would complete the dissipation of the sale proceeds and the Orchard Property unless enjoined from doing so.

  52. Ms Xia’s arguments

  53. [33] Ms Xia’s primary case against the injunction, as well as her defence to the main action in OA 3, was that the Private Trustee’s claim was legally unsustainable in the face of the Interim Judgment. The Private Trustee could not challenge or seek to set aside the Interim Judgment in OA 3 through the court’s insolvency jurisdiction.

  54. [34] Alternatively, the requirements of s 361 of the IRDA were not made out in respect of the Interim Judgment. The Bankrupt could not be presumed to have been insolvent at the time of the Interim Judgment. The Bankrupt had received consideration as, in entering into the Interim Judgment by consent, Ms Xia had foregone her rights to seek maintenance and division of matrimonial property in court.

  55. [35] Finally, even if the Private Trustee’s claim was sustainable at this interlocutory stage, the court should nevertheless refrain from ordering a Mareva injunction as that was the course that would carry the lower risk of injustice if the Private Trustee’s claim in OA 3 were to fail in the end. If the injunction were to be issued, the bank holding a mortgage over the Orchard Property would be likely to exercise its power of sale, leaving Ms Xia and her children, who were currently occupying the Orchard Property, without a home.

  56. My decision: the application was allowed

  57. [36] Having considered the parties’ submissions, I allowed the Private Trustee’s primary application for a worldwide Mareva injunction up to the value of S$12.44m.

  58. [37] In the alternative, had I not granted the Private Trustee’s primary application for a worldwide Mareva injunction, I would have at the least granted a domestic Mareva injunction of the same quantum. If necessary, I would also have been satisfied that a proprietary injunction over the Orchard Property should issue.

  59. A worldwide Mareva injunction was granted

  60. [38] I start with the Private Trustee’s primary case, being the application for a worldwide Mareva injunction. This required consideration of three issues:

  61. (a) first, whether the Private Trustee had a good arguable case on the merits in OA 3 given the objections raised by Ms Xia;

  62. (b) second, whether there was a real risk of Ms Xia dissipating her assets; and

  63. (c) third, if the two requirements above for the grant of a Mareva injunction were satisfied, whether the injunction to be granted ought to be a domestic or worldwide Mareva injunction.

  64. Preliminary observations on Ms Xia’s case

  65. [39] There was not much put forward by Ms Xia to address the question of any real risk of dissipation aside from a brief response on affidavit to the Private Trustee’s allegation of a risk of dissipation in respect of the Orchard Property, where Ms Xia stated that “[i]f [she] intended to sell all the properties after the divorce, [she] would already have sold [the Orchard Property]” and that the Orchard Property was the home of Ms Xia and her children. However, this point was not expanded on at any length in either written or oral submissions.

  66. [40] Instead, Ms Xia appeared to adopt a balance of convenience test as being uniformly applicable to both Mareva and proprietary injunctions. This was evident in her submission that “[e]ven if the Court does not consider that OA 3 is doomed to fail, it is nevertheless submitted that [the present application] should be dismissed as that would carry a lower risk of injustice” [emphasis added] – the “lower risk of injustice” being the gravamen of American Cyanamid – and accompanying citation to the Court of Appeal decision of Chuan Hong Petrol Station Pte Ltd v Shell Singapore (Pte) Ltd [1992] 2 SLR(R) 1, which did not involve a Mareva application. I address Ms Xia’s apparent importation of the balance of convenience test into Mareva injunctions at [110]–[133] below.

  67. Good arguable case on the merits?

  68. [41] I agreed with the Private Trustee that the first element of a good arguable case on the merits in respect of his claim in OA 3 was satisfied.

  69. [42] That the court is, in a Mareva injunction application, only concerned with the existence of a “good arguable case” is a point worth emphasising in the present case. As this standard only involves a “preliminary assessment of the merits of the claim”, there is certainly “no need to establish a conclusive case at the outset” (see the Court of Appeal decision of The “Vasiliy Golovnin” [2008] 4 SLR(R) 994 at [51]).

  70. [43] In this regard, the traditional formulation of the “good arguable case” standard in the context of Mareva injunctions, as affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Bouvier (at [36]), is that laid down in the English Court of Appeal decision of Ninemia Maritime Corporation v Trave Schiffahrtgesellschaft mbH und Co KG (The “Niedersachsen”) [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 600 (“The Niedersachsen”): a “good arguable case” is one that is “more than barely capable of serious argument, but not necessarily one which the judge considers would have a better than 50 per cent chance of success” (at 605).

  71. [44] The applicable principles to s 361 of the IRDA were summarised by Goh Yihan J in the recent High Court decision of DDP (in his capacity as the joint and several trustees of the bankruptcy estate of [B]) and another v DDR (a minor) and another [2024] 3 SLR 1457 (“DDP”). Three requirements have to be met for a transaction entered into by an adjudged bankrupt to be set aside as a transaction at an undervalue under s 361 (see DDP at [13]):

  72. (a) first, the transaction was at an undervalue as defined in s 361(3) of the IRDA;

  73. (b) second, the individual entered into the transaction within the relevant time (see s 361(1) read with s 363(1)(a) of the IRDA); and

  74. (c) third, the individual was insolvent at the time of the transaction or became insolvent as a result of the transaction (see s 363(2) of the IRDA).

  75. [45] In the present case, the relevant “transaction” sought to be set aside by the Private Trustee was the transfers of the Properties pursuant to the Interim Judgment.

  76. [46] In my judgment, it was clear that the second and third requirements had been met, as it was the first requirement that was the centre of gravity of the parties’ dispute. Given this, I shall first briefly address the second and third requirements, before turning to address the main point of controversy in the first requirement in detail.

  77. (1) Was the Interim Judgment within the relevant time?

  78. [47] Under s 363(1)(a) of the IRDA, the “relevant time” within which a transaction can be set aside as a transaction at an undervalue under s 361 of the IRDA is defined as the period within three years before the date of the bankruptcy application on which the individual is adjudged bankrupt.

  79. [48] The Bankrupt’s debtor bankruptcy application, on which he was subsequently adjudged bankrupt on 28 June 2022, was filed on 8 May 2022 (see [15] above). Given that the Interim Judgment was dated 8 July 2019 (see [4] above), it was within the period of three years before 8 May 2022, and thus within the “relevant time” as defined in s 363(1)(a) of the IRDA read with s 361(1) of the IRDA.

  80. (2) Was the Bankrupt insolvent at the time of the Interim Judgment?

  81. [49] The insolvency of a bankrupt at the time of the transaction is a requirement under s 363(2) of the IRDA, which provides that a transaction is not within the relevant time for the purposes of s 361 of the IRDA unless the bankrupt was (a) insolvent at that time; or (b) became insolvent in consequence of the transaction.

  82. [50] The Private Trustee did not adduce any specific evidence on the Bankrupt’s solvency at the time of the Interim Judgment. Instead, the Private Trustee relied on the presumption of insolvency that arises when the transaction is entered into with an associate of the bankrupt under s 363(3) of the IRDA.

  83. [51] I agreed with the Private Trustee’s invocation of the presumption in s 363(3) of the IRDA. Being the Bankrupt’s spouse at the time, Ms Xia was clearly an “associate” of the Bankrupt (see s 364(2)(a) of the IRDA). Although Ms Xia asserted that the presumption did not arise in this case, this was a bare assertion that was not coupled with any explanation or evidence as to why this was so.

  84. [52] In the circumstances, I was satisfied that there was a good arguable case that the Bankrupt was insolvent at the time of the Interim Judgment by virtue of the operation of the statutory presumption of insolvency.

  85. (3) Were the transfers of the Properties to Ms Xia a transaction at an undervalue?

  86. [53] I come to the main area of dispute between the parties, which was whether the transfers of the Properties to Ms Xia pursuant to the Interim Judgment could constitute a transaction at an undervalue as defined in s 361(3) of the IRDA.

  87. [54] Section 361(3) of the IRDA provides that an individual enters into a transaction with a person at an undervalue if:

  88. (a) the individual makes a gift to that person or the individual otherwise enters into a transaction with that person on terms that provide for the individual to receive no consideration;

  89. (b) the individual enters into a transaction with that person in consideration of marriage; or

  90. (c) the individual enters into a transaction with that person for a consideration the value of which, in money or money’s worth, is significantly less than the value, in money or money’s worth, of the consideration provided by the individual.

  91. [55] The Private Trustee impugned the transfer of the Properties to Ms Xia through the Interim Judgment as an undervalue transaction on three bases: (a) a gift; (b) a transaction on terms providing for the Bankrupt to receive no consideration; or (c) a transaction involving a significant inequality of exchange in terms of the consideration provided and received by the Bankrupt.

  92. [56] Ms Xia submitted that the transfers of the Properties were fundamentally incapable of amounting to a transaction at an undervalue as they had been done through the Interim Judgment. According to Ms Xia, unless the Interim Judgment was set aside, the Private Trustee could not look behind the Interim Judgment and seek to set aside the transfers of the Properties. In this regard, Ms Xia argued that the insolvency court’s jurisdiction to set aside undervalue transactions did not extend to setting aside the Interim Judgment. Instead, the Private Trustee had to apply to the Family Court to have the Interim Judgment set aside.

  93. [57] There were thus two issues to be determined. First, was it possible for the transfers of the Properties to be reversed under s 361 of the IRDA without the Interim Judgment being set aside? Second, if it was possible in principle for the transfer of the Properties to be set aside, was the transfer of the Properties a transaction at an undervalue as defined in s 361(3) of the IRDA?

  94. (A) Could the transfers of the Properties be reversed while the Interim Judgment remained in place?

  95. [60] The Interim Judgment has been relied on by Ms Xia and the Bankrupt as a defence in multiple proceedings. In the High Court’s decision in Xia Zheng v Song Jianbo and another [2022] SGHC 124, Andre Maniam J set aside a writ of seizure and sale against the Orchard Property issued by a judgment creditor of the Bankrupt on the basis that the Interim Judgment had resulted in the Bankrupt having no interest in the Orchard Property to which the writ could attach. I had also, in an earlier, unreported application, declined to make certain orders of committal against the Bankrupt for the dissipation of the sale proceeds of the Duchess Road and Duchess Avenue Properties in alleged breach of a Mareva injunction on the basis that, the Interim Judgment having pre-dated that Mareva injunction, the Bankrupt did not have any interest in these Properties capable of dissipation. The Interim Judgment was, once again, the centrepiece of Ms Xia’s defence to OA 3 and the present application. The question, therefore, was whether the Interim Judgment posed a similar impediment in the present case as it had on these previous occasions.

  96. [61] In my judgment, no such flaw affected the Private Trustee’s claim in OA 3 and the present application. Bearing in mind, once again, that it was sufficient at this interlocutory stage for the Private Trustee to establish a good arguable case, I did not accept Ms Xia’s submission that the Private Trustee could not seek the reversal of the transfers of the Properties under s 361 of the IRDA without setting aside the Interim Judgment.

  97. [66] Indeed, based on how the Private Trustee’s prayers in OA 3 had been framed, this appeared to be precisely what the Private Trustee had in mind. The Private Trustee was seeking orders for the reversal of the transfers of the Properties and the sale proceeds specifically, as opposed to attacking the Interim Judgment itself. For reference, I reproduce the Private Trustee’s prayers in OA 3 relating to s 361 of the IRDA:

  98. (a) “[a] declaration that the disposal of the interests of [the Bankrupt] in the sale proceeds of [the Leedon Heights Property] to [Ms Xia] … constitutes a transaction at an undervalue …” [emphasis added]; and

  99. (b) “[a] declaration that the transfers of the Bankrupt’s interests in the properties at (i) [the Duchess Road Property]; (ii) the Leedon Heights Property; (iii) [the Duchess Avenue Property]; and (iv) [the Orchard Property] to [Ms Xia], pursuant to paragraph 3(c) of the Interim Judgment … constitute transactions at an undervalue …” [emphasis added].

  100. [68] The second reason I considered was that the possibility of separating the transfer of the Properties and the sale proceeds from the Interim Judgment itself found support from the Court of Appeal decision of Cheo Sharon Andriesz v Official Assignee of the estate of Andriesz Paul Matthew, a bankrupt [2013] 2 SLR 297 (“Cheo Sharon”). Although it was not cited to me by either party, I found this case to be highly instructive.

  101. [70] The Court of Appeal did not accept this argument. Three points from the court’s analysis are apposite.

  102. [74] The third and final reason I considered was that it was well-established under English law that ancillary relief orders are not immune from attack through the transaction avoidance provisions in the insolvency legislation, although the circumstances in which such claims would succeed were not so clearly settled.

  103. [76] Although there is no equivalent provision to s 39 of the MCA 1973 in our local statute books – in particular, the IRDA and the Women’s Charter 1961 (2020 Rev Ed) (“the WC”) – the Court of Appeal in Cheo Sharon expressly stated that the proposition articulated in s 39 of the MCA 1973 was not an idiosyncratic rule of English law, but a clarification of the existing law prior to its enactment, and thus applicable to our local context as well (at [24]). In coming to this conclusion, the court rejected an argument by the wife there that the absence of a local equivalent to s 39 of the MCA 1973 led to the necessary inference that the position under Singapore law was divergent from English law.

  104. [79] In the English High Court, HHJ Pelling QC found in favour of the trustees in bankruptcy. He held that the transfer to Mrs Haines was either (a) a transaction on terms providing for Mr Haines to receive no consideration (under s 339(3)(a) of the IA 1986); or (b) a transaction with a significant inequality of exchange for Mr Haines (under s 339(3)(c) of the IA 1986) (see Hill v Haines [2007] BPIR 727 at [23]).

  105. [81] First, Sir Andrew Morritt C observed that (see Hill v Haines (CA) at [36]):

  106. [82] In a similar vein, Thorpe LJ emphasised the need to strike “a fair balance” between the interests served by the court’s matrimonial and insolvency jurisdictions when dealing with ancillary relief orders (see Hill v Haines (CA) at [60]):

  107. [83] Finally, the last member of the court, Rix LJ, emphatically summarised his conclusion in the following way (see Hill v Haines (CA) at [82]):

  108. [85] For completeness, I note that Hill v Haines (CA) continues to represent the position under English law today. As recently as last year, it was cited with approval by the English Court of Appeal, who made the accompanying observation that “[t]he interplay between IA 1986 and matrimonial law was settled in Hill v Haines” (see Simon v Simon and another [2024] 1 WLR 1207 at [69]).

  109. (B) Were the transfers of the Properties to Ms Xia a transaction at an undervalue?

  110. [86] Turning to the second issue, I was satisfied that there was a good arguable case that the transfers of the Properties to Ms Xia constituted a transaction at an undervalue under s 361(3) of the IRDA.

  111. [92] In my judgment, there was a good arguable case that the exception recognised in Hill v Haines (CA) allowing ancillary relief orders to be challenged as undervalue transactions could apply to the facts of the present case.

  112. [93] First, although the timing of the Interim Judgment was admittedly some time – just under three years – before the Bankrupt filed an application to place himself into bankruptcy, I agreed with the Private Trustee that the terms of the Interim Judgment were so onerous on the Bankrupt that this necessarily raised suspicion as to the Bankrupt and Ms Xia’s bona fides and intentions in entering into the Interim Judgment. As the Private Trustee submitted, it did not appear to be a rational division of matrimonial assets for the Bankrupt to voluntarily impoverish himself by transferring ostensibly every asset he had in Singapore to Ms Xia, while also undertaking to pay child maintenance, in circumstances where he had no income.

  113. [95] By the same token, insofar as consent orders on the division of matrimonial assets between the spouses are concerned, the power of division emanates not from the parties, but the court under s 112(1) of the WC. Of course, this does not mean that the parties’ intentions are irrelevant; s 112(2)(e) of the WC expressly provides that one of the factors that the court can have regard to in exercising its power of division is “any agreement between the parties with respect to the ownership and division of the matrimonial assets made in contemplation of divorce”. All this was clearly stated by Phang JA in the Court of Appeal decision of TQ v TR and another appeal [2009] 2 SLR(R) 961 (at [73]):

  114. [96] It is thus clear that, even in consent orders, the division of matrimonial assets remains governed by the overarching principle that it must be “just and equitable”. Ms Xia did not dispute this. Given this, coming back to the terms of the Interim Judgment in this case, it would to my mind be a vanishingly rare case, if ever, for a court to find the total impoverishment of the husband to be a “just and equitable” division of the matrimonial assets. In the premises, the fact that the terms of the Interim Judgment were so disproportionately skewed in favour of Ms Xia, and thus at variance with the “just and equitable” standard, was a weighty factor in finding a good arguable case that it must have been the product of collusion between the Bankrupt and Ms Xia.

  115. [98] The first material non-disclosure or misrepresentation related to the basis of the parties’ divorce – ie, irretrievable breakdown based on continuous separation of four years. Apart from the Bankrupt having stated – to the Singapore Police Force, no less – that his residential address was the Orchard Property shortly before the Interim Judgment, there was also evidence that the Bankrupt had continued cohabiting in the Orchard Property with Ms Xia and her children even after final judgment dissolving their marriage had been passed. In particular, this included a report prepared by private investigators who had carried out surveillance on the Bankrupt, which contained multiple pictures of the Bankrupt having been sighted at the Orchard Property and driving a vehicle registered in Ms Xia’s name.

  116. [99] In considering the Private Trustee’s evidence, I also noted that Ms Xia did not, in her reply affidavit, make any categorical denial of the Private Trustee’s claim that the Bankrupt had continued to reside with her at the Orchard Property even after their divorce.

  117. [100] Indeed, in oral submissions, Ms Xia’s counsel essentially accepted that Ms Xia and the Bankrupt were continuing to reside together in the Orchard Property, as all she offered in response was that separation for the purposes of establishing an irretrievable breakdown did not require physical separation per se. While that was no doubt a valid point as a matter of legal principle, it was not particularly of believable application to the present case given Ms Xia’s own statements on affidavit that she had “frequent quarrels” with the Bankrupt during their marriage, leading it to deteriorate to the point that it “could not be saved”. Further, given Ms Xia’s position that she had separated from the Bankrupt since 2013, it was highly suspicious that, some eight years on, the Bankrupt appeared to continue to reside at the Orchard Property with her.

  118. [103] The failure to inform the Family Court that the Bankrupt and Ms Xia had already made arrangements to dispose of their interests in Properties over which the Family Court was being asked to make orders for division over was clearly an omission falling foul of the standard of full and frank disclosure.

  119. [105] Crucially, as it happened, a sale of the River Valley property for S$2.17m had already been completed before the entering of the interim judgment, with the balance sale proceeds of S$817,345.40 having been paid to the applicant. In refusing to ratify the disposition of the proceeds of sale of the River Valley property, Mavis Chionh Sze Chyi J found that the concealment of the prior sale of the River Valley property from the Family Court was “strongly indicative of guilty knowledge” and that the applicant had not acted in good faith when she obtained the interim judgment (see Magdalene Ong at [26]). Chionh J’s criticisms of the applicant’s non-disclosure in that case were equally applicable to Ms Xia and the Bankrupt’s concealment of the sale of the Leedon Heights and Duchess Avenue Properties in this case, and are worth referring to in full (see Magdalene Ong at [22]–[23]):

  120. [106] Similar to the apparent deceit practised on the Family Court vis-à-vis continuous separation as the basis for their divorce, the non-disclosure or concealment of the sale of the Leedon Heights and Duchess Avenue Properties to the Family Court was also highly suggestive of collusion between the Bankrupt and Ms Xia to obtain the Interim Judgment on false pretences.

  121. (C) Conclusion

  122. [107] For the reasons above, I was amply satisfied that the Private Trustee had established a good arguable case that the Interim Judgment had been the product of collusion between the Bankrupt and Ms Xia. There was, in turn, more than a good arguable case that the Interim Judgment was susceptible to challenge as a transaction at an undervalue under s 361 of the IRDA in light of the exception recognised by the English Court of Appeal in Hill v Haines (CA).

  123. Real risk of dissipation?

  124. [108] Having found that the Private Trustee had established a good arguable case on the merits of his claim under s 361 of the IRDA in OA 3, I turn to the second requirement of the Mareva injunction, which was a real risk of Ms Xia dissipating her assets.

  125. [109] Before I turn to address whether a real risk of dissipation existed on the facts of this case, I make two related points of principle on this requirement. These relate to (a) the nature of the “real risk of dissipation” requirement; and (b) the applicability of the balance of convenience test to Mareva injunctions. I have found it useful to clarify these two points because, as noted at [39]–[40] above, Ms Xia did not address the “real risk of dissipation” element but instead appeared to apply the balance of convenience test. In my view, once the nature of the “real risk of dissipation” requirement is properly appreciated, there ought to be little confusion that the balance of convenience does not have any distinct role to play in the context of Mareva injunctions.

  126. (1) The nature of the “real risk of dissipation” requirement

  127. [110] As Sundaresh Menon CJ observed in Bouvier, the element of a “real risk of dissipation” of assets by the defendant “lies at the heart of the court’s jurisdiction to grant Mareva injunctions” (at [94]). Put differently, the existence of a real risk of dissipation by the respondent is a jurisdictional fact that enlivens the court’s power to enjoin such dissipation.

  128. [111] However, the search for a precise definition of the concept of “dissipation” in the context of Mareva injunctions has sometimes proven elusive. As Christopher Clarke J observed in the English High Court decision of TTMI Ltd of England v ASM Shipping Ltd of India [2006] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 401, although it is often said that the purpose of the Mareva jurisdiction is to prevent the “dissipation of assets”, “[w]ithout explanation that phrase is, itself, obscure” (at [25]).

  129. [114] The significance of recognising that the Mareva injunction is not intended as a qualification of the proposition that the possibility of non-satisfaction of the claimant’s judgment is an inherent risk of litigation is that it puts the purpose of the Mareva injunction into perspective. A claimant is not entitled to a Mareva injunction as security for his claim if the risk of non-enforcement remains at inherent levels. But, where the risk is artificially generated or inflated by the defendant, the law intervenes because the claimant is now forced to bear a level of risk that the law considers to be illegitimate. As the learned author of Paul McGrath, Commercial Fraud in Civil Practice (Oxford University Press, 2nd Ed, 2014) (“McGrath on Commercial Fraud”) explains (at paras 20.09–20.10):

  130. [116] Seen in this light, quite apart from inter partes justice, a third interest animates the Mareva jurisdiction: the court’s interest in stifling the defendant’s attempt at abusing its process by stultifying enforcement of its judgments. As Lord Donaldson of Lymington MR said in Derby, the “fundamental principle” underlying the Mareva jurisdiction is that “no court should permit a defendant to take action designed to ensure that subsequent orders of the court are rendered less effective than would otherwise be the case” (at 76). The Court of Appeal has also recognised “the need to prevent the defendant snapping his fingers at a judgment of the court with financial impunity” because he has taken steps to engineer that outcome (see Lee Shieh-Peen Clement and another v Ho Chin Nguang and others [2010] 4 SLR 801 at [27]).

  131. [117] However, on the issue of what constitutes abusive conduct by the defendant, notwithstanding the relatively short life of the Mareva injunction, one can discern in the authorities an ebb and flow as to what has to be proven by the claimant to trigger the court’s intervention. Initially, the early authorities from the Mareva jurisdiction’s infancy suggested a high watermark of requiring the court to be satisfied that the defendant had a subjective intent to deal with his assets for the purpose of defeating any judgment which the plaintiff might obtain against him. In the teenage years, a bout of apparent youthful rebellion caused a Janus-like turn to the exceedingly low threshold of a “real risk of the judgment going unsatisfied” (as in the The Niedersachsen case). In modern times, seemingly in correction of the recklessness of its pubescent years, the law has trended towards a middle ground of an unjustified dealing by the defendant with his assets (see McGrath on Commercial Fraud at para 20.12; Gee on Injunctions at para 12-035).

  132. [118] The same development is broadly traceable in the local jurisprudence. The standard was pitched at the high level of subjective dishonesty by the High Court in Meespierson NV v Industrial and Commercial Bank of Vietnam [1998] 1 SLR(R) 287, as Judith Prakash J said there that “the purpose of a Mareva injunction is to prevent a defendant from acting dishonourably” and “[t]he court only renders its assistance when there is evidence that the defendant will act with the express intention of evading his obligations” [emphasis added] (at [19]). After the turn of the millennium, an about turn appeared to be done by the Court of Appeal in Guan Chong who, citing The Niedersachsen, stated that “[t]he court is not concerned with motive or purpose” and “[t]here is no need to show an intention to dissipate assets” (at [17]). Finally, in more recent times, the local courts have arrived at the same equilibrium of focusing on “whether there is objectively a real risk that a judgment may not be satisfied because of a risk of unjustified dealings with assets” (see the Court of Appeal decisions of JTrust at [64] and Milaha Explorer at [23]).

  133. [119] Thus, the prevailing position is that the Mareva jurisdiction rests on a distinction between justified and unjustified dealings with assets. In my view, the distinction is easiest appreciated by considering what is justified rather than unjustified. I agree with the following observations by Andre Maniam JC in the High Court decision of Bugis Founder Pte Ltd v Seng Huat Coffee House Pte Ltd [2021] 5 SLR 1308 (at [27]):

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