Skip to content
Grounds publishedDecided 21 Feb 2024
Contents

General Division of the High Court

Envy Asset Management Pte Ltd (in liquidation) and others v CH Biovest Pte Ltd

Feedback & support

[2024] SGHC 46Case no. Originating Application No 311 of 2023

What happened, in plain English

There is no plain-English summary of this judgment yet.

Ask about this judgment

Laws this judgment relies on

Grounds of decision

Official text from eLitigation

  1. [1] In the 1920s, Charles Ponzi, the namesake of the Ponzi scheme, defrauded investors in the United States of over US$20m. Close to a century later, Bernie Madoff did the same, but on a significantly larger scale, with investors suffering losses of approximately US$18bn. When a Ponzi scheme meets its inevitable collapse, how should the winnings and losses be divided among investors and the creditors of the scheme? This question has been the subject of great attention by various foreign courts, but no Singapore court has had the opportunity to analyse this issue until the present application before me.

  2. [2] The present application has been brought by the second, third, and fourth claimants, who are the joint and several liquidators (the “Liquidators”) of the first claimant, Envy Asset Management Pte Ltd (in liquidation) (“EAM”). They are also the liquidators of other members of the Envy group of companies, namely, Envy Management Holdings Pte Ltd (in liquidation) (“EMH”) and Envy Global Trading Pte Ltd (in liquidation) (“EGT”) (collectively, the “Envy Companies”). The Liquidators are applying for the following orders against the defendant, CH Biovest Pte Ltd:

  3. (a) a declaration that the sum of $2,319,484 paid by EAM to the defendant (the “Overwithdrawn Sums”) was paid to the defendant for the purposes of putting assets beyond the reach of the creditors of EAM and/or prejudicing their interests, within the meaning of s 438(4) read with s 439(1)(d) of the Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act 2018 (2020 Rev Ed) (the “IRDA”) and/or with intent to defraud creditors of EAM within the meaning of s 73B of the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act (Cap 61, 1994 Rev Ed) (the “CLPA”);

  4. (b) further and/or in the alternative, a declaration that the payment of the Overwithdrawn Sums to the defendant were transactions at an undervalue within the meaning of s 224(3) of the IRDA;

  5. (c) further and/or in the further alternative, a declaration that the defendant was unjustly enriched by the Overwithdrawn Sums, to the detriment of EAM; and

  6. [3] Because the parties have decided that it is in their best interest to have an expeditious determination of their dispute, they have agreed to certain facts (the “Agreed Facts”) and legal issues (the “Agreed Issues”). This necessarily means that my determinations are confined to the present application only and have no bearing on any related proceedings.

  7. Background to the present application

  8. [4] I begin with the background to the present application, which is necessary for a fuller context of the Agreed Facts and the Agreed Issues.

  9. The Envy Companies’ purported business of nickel trading

  10. [5] From around January 2016 to around April 2020, EAM purported to purchase quantities of London Metal Exchange (“LME”) Nickel Grade Metal (“Poseidon Nickel”) from an Australian company, Poseidon Nickel Limited (“Poseidon”). In particular, EAM purported to purchase Poseidon Nickel at a 16% to 25% discount compared to the average of the LME Nickel official daily cash settlement prices for the month prior to the month of scheduled shipment. EAM then purported to sell Poseidon Nickel at a higher price to third party buyers, such as China MinMetals Corporation and BNP Paribas Commodity Futures Limited.

  11. [6] In respect of the purchase and sale of Poseidon Nickel, EAM entered into Letters of Agreement (“LOAs”) with its investors. The investors would pay a principal amount to EAM to be used “solely for investment in LME Nickel Grade Metal” or “solely for investment in LME Grade Nickel Concentrates” for a three-month period. In certain cases, investors could commit to multiple, consecutive three-month tranches upfront.

  12. [7] Each of the LOAs contemplated investments which were materially similar in the following ways:

  13. (a) Investors would pay a principal amount to buy into one of EAM’s purported trades in Poseidon Nickel.

  14. (b) When the LOA matured, EAM would pay investors an amount comprising: (i) a percentage of their principal amount; (ii) appreciation on Poseidon Nickel; (iii) less shipping and insurance costs incurred by EAM, and a commission fee retained by EAM.

  15. (c) EAM guaranteed that it would return investors approximately 85% of their principal amount upon maturity of the LOA.

  16. (d) After the LOA matured, investors had the option of: (i) fully or partially withdrawing their returns; or (ii) “rolling over” any returns that were not withdrawn into a new LOA.

  17. [8] From around June 2019 to around February 2020, the defendant entered into LOAs with EAM. The relevant terms in those LOAs are as follows:

  18. (a) Clause 1.2 defines appreciation as “(i) the [Fair Market Value] of each liquid asset of [EAM] at any given time after the [e]ffective [d]ate”; minus “(ii) the [Fair Market Value] of each liquid asset of [EAM] as of the [e]ffective [d]ate (or the date of acquisition of such asset, if after the date hereof) after the deduction of the relevant clearance and bourse fees”.

  19. (b) Clause 1.7 defines commission as “a percentage of realised [a]ppreciation in the [p]ortfolio of [EAM] at the end of each calendar month following the [e]ffective [d]ate”, ie, the date when the LOA was entered into.

  20. (c) Clause 1.8 defines portfolio as EAM’s “invested asset holdings in 5,000 tonnes of [LME] Nickel Grade Metal purchased from an asset operated by Poseidon”.

  21. (d) Clause 2.1 provides that EAM “may use [the principal amount] [solely] for investment in LME Nickel Grade Metal” during the period of the LOAs.

  22. (e) Clause 2.4 provides as follows:

  23. (f) Clause 3 provides that when the LOAs mature, EAM would pay the defendant: (i) the principal amount of $1m in each LOA; (ii) appreciation on Poseidon Nickel; less (iii) shipping and insurance costs incurred by EAM, and a commission fee retained by EAM. The principal amount is defined as “a buy-in into the Portfolio of [EAM]”.

  24. [9] In purported discharge of EAM’s obligations under cl 3 of its LOAs, the defendant received sums in excess of the principal sums it invested, which I have referred to as the “Overwithdrawn Sums” (see [2] above). The breakdown of the Overwithdrawn Sums is as follows:

  25. [10] On 19 March 2020, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (“MAS”) placed EAM on its Investor Alert List. MAS did this to “highlight that EAM may have been wrongly perceived as being licensed by MAS”. According to a statement that MAS released at the material time, it had “received public feedback that EAM had told [investors] that it was in the process of applying for a license from MAS, when in fact no such application had been submitted”.

  26. [12] From around April 2020 to around March 2021, EGT continued the business of purported nickel trading. However, instead of LOAs, investors invested by way of Receivables Purchase Agreements (“RPAs”). The RPAs differed in operation from the LOAs in the following ways:

  27. (a) Instead of an investment into EAM’s “Portfolio”, an investor would purchase a proportion of the receivables that EGT was purportedly entitled to receive under a Forward Contract with a third party buyer at a certain “Sale Price”, that is, the sum invested by the investor.

  28. (b) In addition to BNP Commodity Futures Limited, EGT held out that BNP Paribas and Raffemet Pte Ltd were also buyers for a number of Forward Contracts.

  29. (c) The “Sale Price” would entitle the investor to a proportion of the “Total Receivable” which EGT would be entitled to from the Forward Contract with the third-party buyer.

  30. The winding-up of the Envy Companies

  31. [13] On 22 March 2021, the Commercial Affairs Department announced that it had preferred charges against the key person behind the Envy Companies, Mr Ng Yu Zhi (“NYZ”), for cheating and fraudulent trading. On 15 April 2021, the Envy Companies filed applications to place themselves under judicial management. Interim judicial managers (“IJMs”) were appointed over the Envy Companies on 27 April 2021. The IJMs were tasked with, among other things, preparing a report on the financial position of the Envy Companies, along with their views on the prospects of the objectives of judicial management being achieved.

  32. [14] On 25 May 2021, the IJMs issued the Interim Judicial Managers’ Report (the “Interim Report”). In the Interim Report, the IJMs found that the Envy Companies’ purported nickel trading were non-existent, and that the documents which had been presented to them in support of the said trading activity were forgeries. Instead, investors’ funds that had been invested in EAM and/or EGT had, among others, been: (a) transferred to NYZ without any proper or legitimate basis; (b) paid to NYZ and one Ms Lee Si Ye as directors’ fees without any proper or legitimate basis; (c) paid to employees of the Envy Companies as commissions, profit sharing and/or referral fees without any proper or legitimate basis; and (d) paid to other investors as referral fees and/or fictitious profits in excess of their principal amounts invested, without any proper basis. The IJMs therefore concluded that “none of the purposes of a judicial management as set out in section 89(1) of the IRDA can be achieved”. This was not only because the purported nickel trading was non-existent, but also because the Envy Companies did not partake in any other meaningful business. Moreover, the Envy Companies’ known assets were grossly insufficient to meet the potential claims of the Envy Companies’ creditors.

  33. The present application

  34. [16] After the winding up of the Envy Companies, the Liquidators sought several other avenues of recovery that had been identified in the Update. On 22 September 2022, the Liquidators issued several letters of demand against the Overwithdrawn Investors, including but not limited to the defendant, for the Overwithdrawn Sums. The Liquidators and the defendant then engaged in without prejudice correspondence before eventually agreeing on the Agreed Facts, the Agreed Issues, and the prayers for the present application.

  35. [17] This is thus the background by which the present application has come before me.

  36. The Agreed Facts and the defendant’s elaboration

  37. [18] As I mentioned (see [3] above), the present application has been made more expeditious due to the parties’ Agreed Facts. As a starting point, these are as follows:

  38. (a) The defendant invested in the purported nickel trading and was paid the aggregate sum of $2,319,484 in excess of the principal sum it invested, the details of which are contained in the Annex to the letter of demand to the defendant dated 26 September 2022.

  39. (b) The purported nickel trading was non-existent.

  40. (c) The Overwithdrawn Sums were paid out of moneys invested by other investors in the Envy Companies, as opposed to any proceeds of the purported nickel trading.

  41. [19] Additionally, some of the Agreed Facts are based on various findings contained in the Interim Report and the Update. For example:

  42. (a) Poseidon confirmed by way of: (i) an announcement on the Australian Securities Exchange; and (ii) correspondence with the IJMs, that it had no business relationship with the Envy Companies, NYZ, or any associates. Accordingly, the entire basis of the Envy Companies’ alleged source of physical nickel for the purported nickel trading was false.

  43. (b) EAM and/or EGT did not enter into any transaction for the sale of physical nickel to any third party. For instance, BNP Paribas Commodities Futures Limited was no longer authorised to conduct regulated business on 4 February 2019, and closed from 15 March 2019. Accordingly, the entire basis of the Envy Companies’ alleged sale of physical nickel and consequent profits was false.

  44. (c) Various documents, such as contracts, trading statements, and shipping documents contained a number of irregularities.

  45. (d) Accordingly, the purported nickel trading was non-existent.

  46. [20] The defendant makes two clarifications to the Agreed Facts. First, the parties agreed that they may introduce any facts beyond the Agreed Facts to advance their respective cases. Second, the defendant had agreed to the Agreed Facts on the basis of the findings in the Interim Report and the Update. More specifically, the defendant had agreed because it did not see any reason to dispute the facts as set out in the Interim Report and the Update, and not because the defendant had been aware of these facts prior to the Interim Report and the Update being issued. In addition to these clarifications, the defendant also, with the claimants’ consent, introduced supplemental facts to the Agreed Facts.

  47. [21] In sum, the defendant submits that it is a bona fide investor who had no knowledge or notice of the non-existence of the purported nickel trading or that the Overwithdrawn Sums were paid out of moneys invested by other investors in the Envy Companies at all material times. Instead, the defendant discovered this for the first time in the first quarter of 2021. This was around the time when the Envy Companies’ scheme unravelled publicly.

  48. [22] Given that the purpose of the defendant’s supplemental facts is clear, there is no need to go through those facts in detail. For the present purposes, those facts may be summarised. In January 2019, the defendant’s holding company, Chuan Hup Holdings Limited (the “Holding Company”), announced it was disposing one of its SGX-listed subsidiaries. The Holding Company decided to reinvest part of the resulting sale proceeds. It transferred part of the sale proceeds to the defendant for the defendant to oversee the investment. It was against this background that the defendant decided to invest with EAM.

  49. [23] Between June 2019 and February 2020, the defendant invested $5,480,246 with EAM. It received $7,799,730 in return, thus making a profit of $2,319,484, ie, the Overwithdrawn Sums. The defendant therefore agrees that it received $2,319,484 as profits from its investment with EAM. The manner of the defendant’s investment is as described above (see [8]–[9]).

  50. [24] The defendant emphasises that it believed that EAM was conducting a legitimate business and had no reason to suspect otherwise. The defendant elaborates that EAM always followed up promptly with the defendant in relation to various written records and documents such as invoices and settlement receipts. The defendant also received monthly email updates from EAM, consisting of the market outlook for the month, nickel daily prices, and an investment report that EAM had prepared for the defendant. Further, the defendant explains that before it could invest in the purported nickel trading with EAM, EAM had undertaken know-your-client checks on the defendant, and had sought various documents from the defendant for the purpose of performing its due diligence checks on the defendant. As such, EAM represented to the defendant that it had robust business practices in place, including anti-money laundering checks. These checks gave the defendant the impression that EAM had established a safe and trustworthy environment for investors to deposit funds.

  51. [25] Despite the defendant’s confidence in EAM’s investment portfolio, the defendant says it took measures to manage the risks of its investment with EAM. In this regard, the defendant did not invest a huge one-time lump sum amount with EAM. The defendant also decided to take a step-up investment approach, with the amount of its investment only increasing upon the completion of the first contract. This allowed the defendant to test the waters and evaluate if its investments with EAM were viable before increasing any future investment.

  52. [26] The defendant’s investment with EAM concluded around 12 February 2020, which was the start date of the final LOA it had entered into with EAM. The defendant made its final withdrawal of the proceeds from its investment with EAM on 28 May 2020. The defendant decided to withdraw all of the funds it had invested with EAM in May 2020 because the Holding Company and its subsidiaries had found new business investment opportunities elsewhere. It was only a year later that the defendant came to learn of the Envy Companies’ alleged scheme.

  53. [27] Upon concluding its investment with EAM, the principal amount that the defendant invested with EAM was used to repay the amount owing to the Holding Company. As for the profits which were paid out (ie, the Overwithdrawn Sums), these were all used by the defendant to repay other amounts owing to the Holding Company, amounting to $2,045,118 in May 2020. The remaining amounts were used to pay the defendant’s operating expenses in 2020 and 2021. As a result, the 2019 to 2020 accounts have all been finalised and audited, including the group accounts of the Holding Company.

  54. The Agreed Issues

  55. [28] From the Agreed Facts as elaborated above, the parties have come to the Agreed Issues, which concern whether, by way of statutory clawback actions or otherwise, the fact that the Envy Companies had no meaningful business means that those investors who profited from the scheme ought to repay the aggregate sum that they have received in excess of their actual principal invested to the Envy Companies.

  56. [29] More specifically, the Agreed Issues are encapsulated within the declarations sought (see [2] above) and I set them out again for convenience:

  57. (a) a declaration that the Overwithdrawn Sums were paid to the defendant for the purposes of putting assets beyond the reach of the creditors of EAM and/or prejudicing their interests, within the meaning of s 438(4) read with s 439(1)(d) of the IRDA and/or with intent to defraud creditors of EAM within the meaning of s 73B of the CLPA;

  58. (b) further and/or in the alternative, a declaration that the payment of the Overwithdrawn Sums to the defendant were transactions at an undervalue within the meaning of s 224(3) of the IRDA;

  59. (c) further and/or in the further alternative, a declaration that the defendant was unjustly enriched by the Overwithdrawn Sums, to the detriment of EAM; and

  60. Appointment of Young Independent Counsel

  61. [30] Because the present application raised several novel issues, I appointed a Young Independent Counsel, Mr Jason Teo (“Mr Teo”), to answer the following questions (the “YIC Questions”):

  62. (i) Assuming a trust exists, does it exist over the entirety of the Overwithdrawn Sums, or only the principal, or only the profits?

  63. (i) Assuming s 224(1) applies, does it apply across investors or per transaction?

  64. [31] I express my gratitude at the outset to Mr Teo, as well as counsel for the claimants, Mr David Chan (“Mr Chan”), and counsel for the defendant, Mr Pereira Kenetth Jerald (“Mr Pereira”), including their respective teams, for all their very helpful submissions.

  65. Three preliminary issues

  66. [32] Before I deal with the Agreed Issues and the bulk of the YIC Questions, I turn to address three preliminary issues. First, whether the claimants are entitled to declaratory relief at all. Second, whether the Overwithdrawn Sums are trust property and therefore not the assets of EAM. Third, whether, as the defendant contends, the claimants have made a fundamental error in their choice of the avoidance provisions which they have invoked in this application. I have termed these as preliminary issues because, depending on how they are resolved, it may render it unnecessary for me to consider certain (to even substantial) portions of the claimants’ application in any substantive manner.

  67. Whether the claimants are entitled to declaratory relief

  68. [33] To begin with, the court’s power to grant declaratory relief is statutory. This power is located in s 18 read with para 14 of the First Schedule to the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (2020 Rev Ed) and O 15 r 16 of the Rules of Court (2014 Rev Ed) (or its equivalent provision in O 4 r 7 of the Rules of Court 2021) (see the Court of Appeal decision of Salijah bte Ab Latef v Mohd Irwan bin Abdullah Teo [1996] 2 SLR(R) 80 at [51]).

  69. [34] However, although the court has the power to grant declaratory relief, this does not mean that the court should always exercise its discretion to do so. The English position is that the discretion should be exercised “with great care and jealousy” or “with extreme caution” (see the House of Lords decision of Russian Commercial and Industrial Bank v British Bank for Foreign Trade Ltd [1921] 2 AC 438 at 445, citing Austen v Collins (1886) 54 LT 903 at 905 and Faber v Gosworth Urban District Council (1903) 88 LT 549 at 550).

  70. [35] In Singapore, declaratory relief must be justified by the circumstances of the case (see the Court of Appeal decision in Karaha Bodas Co LLC v Pertamina Energy Trading Ltd and another appeal [2006] 1 SLR(R) 112 (“Karaha Bodas”) at [14(c)]). In this regard, a claimant seeking declaratory relief must satisfy six requirements: (a) the court must have the jurisdiction and power to award the remedy; (b) the matter must be justiciable in the court; (c) as a declaration is a discretionary remedy, it must be justified by the circumstances of the case; (d) the plaintiff must have locus standi to bring the suit and there must be a real controversy for the court to resolve; (e) any person whose interests might be affected by the declaration should be before the court; and (f) there must be some ambiguity or uncertainty about the issue in respect of which the declaration is asked for so that the court’s determination would have the effect of laying such doubts to rest (see Karaha Bodas at [14]).

  71. [36] For the present purposes, it is unnecessary for me to consider all of these requirements in detail. Instead, I only need to focus on the third requirement of whether the circumstances justify granting the declarations sought. With the above in mind, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to grant the declarations sought, if the claimants convince me that it is correct as a matter of law to do so. Indeed, the defendant has not seriously contended that the claimants are not able to seek the declarations concerned.

  72. Whether the Overwithdrawn Sums are trust property and therefore not the assets of EAM

  73. The parties’ positions

  74. [37] As a preliminary point, the defendant submits that the moneys paid by investors to EAM were held by EAM on a Quistclose trust and/or an institutional constructive trust for the investors. This means, in the defendant’s submission, that the Overwithdrawn Sums constitute trust property that would not form part of EAM’s assets, and therefore would not be subject to the relevant avoidance provisions in the CLPA and the IRDA (though cf the English Court of Appeal decision of Invest Bank PSC v El-Husseini and others [2023] 3 WLR 645).

  75. [38] More specifically, the defendant submits that a Quistclose trust arose over the moneys that EAM received from investors because the moneys were subject to “restrictions on use” and “solely for investment in LME Nickel Grade Metal” as stated in cl 2.1 of the LOAs. Given the specified, exclusive purpose for the moneys, the moneys were not at EAM’s free disposal but held on a Quistclose trust for the investors. In the alternative, the defendant submits that an institutional constructive trust arose over the moneys that EAM received from investors because: (a) EAM fraudulently induced investors to invest into the Ponzi scheme it perpertrated; and (b) when property is acquired by fraud, equity imposes a constructive trust on the fraudulent recipient.

  76. [39] In response, the claimants submit that the Overwithdrawn Sums are not trust property and therefore form part of EAM’s assets that would be subject to the relevant avoidance provisions in the CLPA and the IRDA. With regard to the Quistclose trust argument, the claimants submit that such a trust did not arise because: (a) the LOAs did not oblige EAM to apply the moneys to a specific purpose; and (b) there was no common intention between EAM and its investors that the moneys would be segregated from EAM’s general fund. With regard to the institutional constructive trust argument, the claimants submit that such a trust also did not arise, because it requires the fraudster to commit a fraud by relying on the informality of a transaction to deny the claimant’s beneficial interest in the property, which did not occur in the present application.

  77. [41] Mr Teo submits that both a Quistclose trust and an institutional constructive trust did not arise in the present application. A Quistclose trust did not arise because the LOAs merely entitled the defendant to “receiv[e] the benefit of a counter-obligation to pay an amount quantified by reference to the supposed Nickel appreciation”. This meant that the defendant was merely a contract debtor, and not the beneficiary of a Quistclose trust for which EAM was the trustee. Also, an institutional constructive trust did not arise because, as a matter of law, it is insufficient that there be property transferred in circumstances involving fraud. Instead, what is required for an institutional constructive trust to arise is “fraudulent taking”, ie, fraud involving the outright taking of a person’s property.

  78. My decision: the Overwithdrawn Sums are not subject to a Quistclose trust

  79. (1) The applicable law

  80. [42] The parties accept that the Quistclose trust is part of Singapore law (see generally Alvin See, Yip Man and Goh Yihan, Property and Trust Law in Singapore (Kluwer Law International, 2018) (“Trust Law in Singapore”) at para 1098 and Alvin W-L See, “The Quistclose Trust in Singapore” (2014) 20 T&T 362). Indeed, in the High Court decision of Pacific Rim Palm Oil Ltd v PT Asiatic Persada and others [2003] 4 SLR(R) 731 (“Pacific Rim”) (at [16]), Belinda Ang Saw Ean J (as she then was) described the doctrine as follows:

  81. [43] No discussion of the Quistclose trust will be complete without mentioning the competing judicial accounts of its juridical nature. Starting with the eponymous House of Lords decision of Barclays Bank Ltd v Quistclose Investments Ltd [1970] AC 567 (at 581–582), Lord Wilberforce suggested there that where one party (A) lends money to another party (B) for the purpose of paying a third party (C), a primary trust would arise in favour of C and, if the purpose or the primary trust should fail, a secondary trust would then arise in favour of A. However, this dual-trusts analysis has generally been rejected, especially after Lord Millett’s account of the Quistclose trust as a resulting trust in the House of Lords decision of Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley and others [2002] 2 AC 164 (“Twinsectra”), where the learned judge stated as follows (at [92]):

  82. According to the resulting trust account, the Quistclose trust arises in response to the absence of the transferor’s intention to benefit the recipient. The trust thus arises from the outset. Since the beneficiary is the transferor himself, this account explains the outcome of the Quistclose trust without offending the beneficiary principle.

  83. [44] Indeed, it has been suggested that Lord Wilberforce’s account would not have been able to fully explain the result in Twinsectra itself, where the loan was extended to perform the abstract purpose of acquiring properties, without also taking the major step of abrogating the beneficiary principle (see Trust Law in Singapore at para 1099).

  84. [45] In Singapore, the Quistclose trust has been traditionally characterised as a resulting trust (see Pacific Rim at [19]), though an express trust account has also been approved of by the courts (see Christopher Hare and Vincent Ooi, Singapore Trusts Law (LexisNexis, 2021) at p 484). This is best reflected in the High Court decision of Attorney-General v Aljunied-Hougang-Punggol East Town Council [2015] 4 SLR 474 (“AHPETC (HC)”) (at [108]), where Quentin Loh J observed that “no Singapore court has, as of yet, definitively pronounced on this issue”, being the issue of which account of the Quistclose trust is authoritative. Indeed, Loh J noted (at [111]) that “although Lord Millett characterised the Quistclose trust as a resulting trust for the transferor with a mandate to the transferee to apply the money for a stated purpose”, “there is nothing in principle that prevents the constitution of an express trust that operates in the same manner as a resulting Quistclose trust”. When AHPETC (HC) went on appeal, the Court of Appeal in Attorney-General v Aljunied-Hougang-Punggol East Town Council [2016] 1 SLR 915 (at [123]) declined to consider the claim regarding the Quistclose trust and did not comment on whether the Quistclose trust should be rationalised as an express trust or a resulting trust. Indeed, in the subsequent High Court decision of CCM Industrial Pte Ltd (in liquidation) v Chan Pui Yee [2016] SGHC 231 (at [48]), Chua Lee Ming JC (as he then was) recognised both accounts of the Quistclose trust (though cf the High Court decision of MSP4GE Asia Pte Ltd and another v MSP Global Pte Ltd and others [2019] 3 SLR 1348 at [110]).

  85. [46] More practically, as Loh J set out in AHPETC (HC) (at [114]), there are four key principles that govern the doctrine of a Quistclose trust under Singapore law:

  86. In sum, the key ingredient of a Quistclose trust, whether analysed as an express trust or a resulting trust, is that a donor “transfers money to a recipient for a specified purpose”. Although the donor’s state of mind may result in the characterisation of a Quistclose trust as an express trust or a resulting trust, that is unlikely to have a practical impact in most cases.

  87. [47] In setting out these key principles, I agree with two specific points made by Mr Teo. First, I agree that the Singapore courts have not definitively resolved the issue of the degree of evidential rigour that should be applied when considering whether the ingredients of a Quistclose trust are satisfied. Thus, in the Appellate Division of the High Court decision of Wei Ho-Hung v Lyu Jun [2022] 2 SLR 1066 (at [52]), Belinda Ang Saw Ean JAD (as she then was) observed that the courts have not applied a consistent degree of evidential rigour even with respect to commercial cases. However, as Mr Teo rightly submits, it is not necessary to determine this issue to resolve the present application. It suffices for me to state that what amounts to sufficient evidence to give rise to a Quistclose trust will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.

  88. [48] Second, I also agree that because the doctrine of a Quistclose trust is not rooted in inequity or unconscionability, the courts should not apply a lower standard of evidential rigour in the present application simply because EAM was operating a Ponzi scheme. Thus, a defrauded investor should not be entitled to a greater degree of protection through a Quistclose trust. It follows that there ought to be no difference in establishing the ingredients of a Quistclose trust in the context of a Ponzi scheme, as with any ordinary, profit-seeking commercial transaction.

  89. (2) The Overwithdrawn Sums are not subject to a Quistclose trust

  90. [49] With these principles in mind, I come to the present application. In my judgment, the Overwithdrawn Sums are not subject to a Quistclose trust. This is because the material terms of the LOAs do not show an intention to subject the funds received by EAM to the requisite exclusivity of purpose, restriction against free disposal, or segregation, so as to have given rise to a Quistclose trust.

  91. [50] First, I agree with the claimants and Mr Teo that, pursuant to the terms of the LOAs, the moneys that the defendant invested in EAM were not intended to be applied for a special designated purpose. In this regard, cll 1.7 and 3 of the LOAs (see [8] above) contemplated a “buy in” into a specific batch of Poseidon Nickel that had already been acquired by EAM. Nothing in the LOAs required EAM to use the principal amount to buy more nickel. Therefore, when the defendant paid the principal amount, it was entitled only to the benefit of EAM’s counter-obligation to pay “profits” (hereafter, “fictitious profits”) based on the appreciation of Poseidon Nickel. Conversely, the LOAs did not amount to payment of the Investment Amount for a specific purpose, simply because EAM was never obliged to actually carry out any specific action with the principal amount.

  92. [51] In connection with the above, I disagree with the defendant that cl 2.1 of the LOAs shows the requisite exclusivity of purpose. Clause 2.1 provided that the investment amount provided by the investor was subject to “restrictions on use”, in that EAM may use the amount “solely for investment in LME Nickel Grade Metal”. In my view, cl 2.1 is much too vague to have constituted the basis of a specific and exclusive purpose behind the payment. If at all, as Mr Teo submitted, cl 2.1 was intended to signify a division in EAM’s supposed investment classes as opposed to creating a specific purpose behind the payment of the investment amount under the LOAs.

  93. [52] Second, I do not find that EAM and the defendant shared any mutual intention that the defendant’s moneys would be segregated from EAM’s general fund. The defendant paid moneys to EAM to buy into EAM’s portfolio and to acquire the right to be repaid its principal amount and fictitious profits. The LOAs did not oblige EAM to keep the moneys paid by the defendant separate from EAM’s general fund.

  94. [53] Third, I do not think that the New South Wales Supreme Court decisions of Re Courtenay House Capital Trading Group Pty Ltd (in liq) [2018] NSWSC 404 (“Re Courtenay 2018”) and Re Courtenay House Capital Trading Group Pty Ltd (in liq) [2019] NSWSC 1113 (“Re Courtenay 2019”), which the defendant relies on, are of assistance. In these cases, investors invested in funds managed by a Ponzi scheme, with their funds purportedly to be used in foreign exchange trading. In Re Courtenay 2018, the New South Wales Supreme Court held that an express trust arose by operation of the terms of the investment contracts signed by the investors, which explicitly described the investment amounts as being “held in trust”, along with other clauses consistent with segregation of the investment amounts from the general pool of the company’s assets. The court therefore held, in the alternative, that the investment amounts were held on a Quistclose trust as well. This was based on the very same facts that gave rise to an express trust, in that it was “abundantly clear that the funds were not intended to become part of the general assets of [the company]” (see Re Courtenay 2018 at [29]). This case therefore does not assist the defendant, since in the present application, there was no similar expressed intention for the investment moneys to be held on trust, nor was there any clause in the LOAs requiring segregation of the investment moneys.

  95. [54] In Re Courtenay 2019, the New South Wales Supreme Court dealt with a different group of investors whose contracts did not contain the words “held in trust”. The court found that the absence of such words militated against an express trust. However, the court concluded that there was a Quistclose trust because the investment contracts referred to the funds being used by the company to trade “on behalf of” the investors (see Re Courtenay 2019 at [33]). The use of those words was sufficient to give rise to an inference that the parties intended for the company to segregate the invested funds. In the present case, while there were several clauses in the LOAs that refer to “investment decisions that [EAM] will make for the [i]nvestor” (see cl 2.4 at [8] above), I agree with Mr Teo that, on balance, cl 3 should take precedence over these clauses. In my view, despite other references to EAM making investment decisions “for the [i]nvestor”, cl 3 makes it clear that the LOAs were really more akin to agreements to acquire or subscribe to units or shares, under which the investor obtains a chance of a return on his investment based on the performance of the issuer. As such, this construction of the LOAs militates against the finding of a Quistclose trust even in the presence of “investment management” clauses.

  96. [55] Finally, I also do not think that the defendant can rely on the Singapore International Commercial Court decision of Perry, Tamar and another v Esculier, Bonnet Servane Michele Thais and another [2022] 4 SLR 243 (“Perry Tamar (SICC)”) as authority for the general proposition that a Quistclose and/or constructive trust arises specifically over funds which were paid into a Ponzi scheme for the benefit of the investors. In my view, Perry Tamar (SICC) can be easily distinguished because the court there found that the relationship between the parties was one of trust “on the assumption that … there was no contractual relationship between [the parties]” (at [139]). It is clear, therefore, that the court’s finding of a trust was premised on the absence of a contractual relationship between the parties. In contrast, the parties in the present application shared a contractual relationship through the LOAs. The terms of the LOAs do not suggest that EAM held the investors’ moneys on trust and that suffices to dispose of this argument.

  97. [56] For all these reasons, I conclude that the Overwithdrawn Sums are not subject to a Quistclose trust.

  98. [57] In closing, I add that, even if I did find that a Quistclose trust arose in favour of the investors, it was not entirely clear to me how the existence of such a trust could justify the defendant’s retention of the Overwithdrawn Sums. If a Quistclose trust did arise, it would have only been over the defendant’s initial investment. As the claimants point out, the Overwithdrawn Sums, being in the nature of putative profits on the defendant’s investment, fall outside the scope of any Quistclose trust which would only cover the defendant’s principal. Herein lies another reason why I do not think Re Courtenay 2018 and Re Courtenay 2019 assist the defendant. In both these cases, the issue was whether the liquidators of the Ponzi scheme vehicle were entitled to distribute certain funds only amongst certain investors on the basis that these funds were held on trust for these specified investors. The situation in the Re Courtenay cases was thus markedly different from the submission that the defendant has made in the present application. The courts in Re Courtenay 2018 and Re Courtenay 2019, in finding that a trust had arisen, said nothing about an individual investor’s ability to retain moneys that had been paid to him out of other investors’ moneys. Rather, all that was said was that the moneys held on trust for one group of investors should not be distributed to investors outside that specified group. Put differently, the courts in the Re Courtenay cases only pronounced on the entitlements as between beneficiaries to a trust on the one hand and strangers to the trust on the other; they did not descend into the different issue of the entitlements of the trust beneficiaries inter se.

  99. [58] Further, another difficulty that arises is the fact that, on the defendant’s own case, similar Quistclose trusts would have arisen in favour of every investor that advanced moneys to EAM. The Overwithdrawn Sums would therefore constitute moneys beneficially owned by other investors under individual Quistclose trusts. In this regard, Mr Teo calls into question whether the defendant, as a stranger to these Quistclose trusts in favour of the other investors, has the standing to assert the existence of such trusts. I do not propose to resolve that question. However, I do say that, taking a step back, the defendant’s argument is essentially that, while the Overwithdrawn Sums are beneficially owned by neither EAM nor the defendant, the defendant should nevertheless be allowed to retain them simply because EAM is itself not beneficially entitled. Subject to more detailed arguments, that does not seem to be a particularly strong argument.

  100. My decision: the Overwithdrawn Sums are not subject to an institutional constructive trust

  101. (1) The applicable law

  102. [59] Because the defendant has referred to an “institutional constructive trust”, it is helpful to begin with the distinction between an institutional constructive trust and a remedial constructive trust. The distinction was helpfully set out by Lord Browne-Wilkinson in the seminal House of Lords decision of Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council [1996] AC 669 (“Westdeutsche”) (at 714–715):

  103. With that being said, the English courts do not recognise the remedial constructive trust, because of their “avers[ion] to the discretionary adjustment of property rights” (see the UK Supreme Court decision of Angove’s Pty Ltd v Bailey and another [2016] 1 WLR 3179 at [27]).

  104. [60] On the other hand, the Singapore courts have been receptive to the remedial constructive trust. In the Court of Appeal decision of Ching Mun Fong (executrix of the estate of Tan Geok Tee, deceased) v Liu Cho Chit [2001] 1 SLR(R) 856 (at [36]), the court held that, assuming the remedial constructive trust applies in Singapore, no such trust arose on the facts of the case. Implied in this reasoning is that the court was clearly open to the possibility of the remedial constructive trust applying in Singapore. Similarly, the Court of Appeal in Wee Chiaw Sek Anna v Ng Li-Ann Genevieve (sole executrix of the estate of Ng Hock Seng, deceased) and another [2013] 3 SLR 801 (“Anna Wee”) (at [169]–[185]) discussed the availability of the remedial constructive trust as a remedy for a claim in unjust enrichment, without expressly rejecting the applicability of the doctrine in Singapore.

  105. [61] With that being said, while the doctrinal distinction between the two types of trusts is clear, how that line is to be drawn in practice is less clear. Several problems emerge in this regard, including whether new categories of constructive trusts may be recognised solely through the remedial constructive trust framework (see generally, Tang Hang Wu, “The Constructive Trust in Singapore: Five Persistent Puzzles” (2012) 22 SAcLJ 136). For present purposes, it is important to note that an institutional constructive trust only arises in certain species of fraud, and not in any case where property is transferred in circumstances involving fraud. Thus, the High Court in National Bank of Oman SAOG Dubai Branch v Bikash Dhamala and others [2021] 3 SLR 943 (at [52]) has observed that:

  106. [62] The learned authors of Snell’s Equity (John McGhee and Steven Elliott QC gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 34th Ed, 2020) (“Snell’s Equity”) explain further that Westdeutsche is authority for the principle that an institutional constructive trust would only be imposed in circumstances of “fraudulent taking”, which relates to fraud involving the outright taking of a person’s property. This stands in contrast to cases involving a “fraudulently induced transfer” (see Snell’s Equity at paras 26-012–26-014).

  107. (2) The Overwithdrawn Sums are not subject to an institutional constructive trust

  108. [63] In the present application, it is clear that the moneys paid by the defendant under the LOAs do not amount to “fraudulent taking” so as to give rise to an institutional constructive trust on the basis of Westdeutsche. This is because the defendant voluntarily handed over the principal sum to EAM pursuant to the LOAs. It likewise cannot be said that the moneys were received by EAM in circumstances where it relied on the informality of the transaction to deny the beneficial interest of the defendant who paid it in. Therefore, the Overwithdrawn Sums are not subject to an institutional constructive trust.

  109. Whether the claimants have fundamentally erred in their choice of avoidance provisions

  110. The parties’ positions

  111. [64] As a final preliminary issue, the defendant argues that the claimants’ reliance on s 224 of the IRDA “vexes the policy underpinnings of this section”. For reasons that I will explain below, I consider that this argument could, in principle, have been raised in relation to the claimants’ action under s 73B of the CLPA due to a conceptual affinity between s 224 of the IRDA and s 73B of the CLPA. I thus deal with this objection both as against s 224 of the IRDA (as the defendant has framed it) as well as against s 73B of the CLPA.

  112. [65] As I see it, the defendant’s objection is based on a conceptual distinction between two types of avoidance provisions. The “crucial distinction” lies in the differing “policy objectives” that each category of avoidance provisions serves. The first category targets transactions that have the effect of causing a diminution in EAM’s assets. The second category targets transactions that confer an unfair or improper advantage on the defendant (without necessarily causing a diminution in EAM’s assets). According to the defendant, s 224(1) of the IRDA properly falls within the first category. Drawing upon this, the defendant argues that the claimants have erred in law by invoking s 224(1) of the IRDA to achieve the purpose of the second category:

  113. [66] At this juncture, I reiterate that the defendant could have raised this same objection in respect of the claim under s 73B of the CLPA. This is because, although the elements of s 73B of the CLPA differ from those of s 224(1) of the IRDA, the former is a provision that would properly fall within the first category of avoidance provision. I draw this conclusion from the Report of the Insolvency Law Review Committee 2013, where it was observed that the “underlying policy rationale” of s 73B of the CLPA was “the preservation of the net asset value of the company for distribution amongst its creditors” (see Singapore, Ministry of Law, Report of the Insolvency Law Review Committee: Final Report (2013) (Chairperson: Lee Eng Beng SC) (the “Report”) at p 185). To use the distinction drawn by the defendant, this statement in the Report makes clear that s 73B of the CLPA, similar to s 224(1) of the IRDA, redresses diminution of assets rather than uneven distribution of assets. Thus, if the defendant is correct on its objection vis-à-vis the claimants’ reliance on s 224(1) of the IRDA, it would necessarily follow that the claimants’ invocation of s 73B of the CLPA must also fail on the same basis.

  114. [67] On the other hand, the claimants argue that they have properly invoked s 224(1) of the IRDA (and, for the reason I have just explained, s 73B of the CLPA as well). In sum, the claimants’ submission is that the defendant’s objection would only succeed if the claimants were seeking to claw back not only the Overwithdrawn Sums, but also repayments of the defendant’s initial investment. Since the claimants have limited their claim to the Overwithdrawn Sums, they are seeking to redress a diminution in EAM’s assets rather than an unfair distribution of EAM’s assets to EAM’s creditors (which include the defendant). Put simply, the claimants have framed their claim to precisely come outside the scope of the defendant’s objection.

  115. My decision: the claimants have not fundamentally erred in their choice of avoidance provisions

  116. (1) The applicable law

  117. [68] At the outset, I agree with the defendant that the clawback provisions can, as a general matter, be grouped into two categories. The defendant is also correct in its identification of the purpose of each category. However, given the centrality of the distinction between these two categories to the defendant’s submission (as well as the difficulty that it has historically posed), I find it apposite to start by explaining this distinction in greater detail.

  118. [69] In this regard, a useful starting point is the leading treatise, Goode on Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (Kristin van Zwieten gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 5th Ed, 2018), where the relevant distinction is elucidated in the following terms (at para 13-03):

  119. [70] This conceptual distinction between the two categories of avoidance provisions lay at the heart of the Court of Appeal decision in Rothstar Group Ltd v Leow Quek Shiong and other appeals [2022] 2 SLR 158 (“Rothstar”). The issue in Rothstar was whether a grant of security by a debtor in respect of its existing debt could constitute a transaction at an undervalue under s 98(3) of the Bankruptcy Act (Cap 20, 2009 Rev Ed) (the “BA”), which is in pari materia to s 224 of the IRDA (see Rothstar at [23]). The Court of Appeal answered in the negative. In support of this conclusion, Steven Chong JCA focused on the fact that such a transaction had no effect on the debtor’s net asset position. As a result, such a transaction was properly within the purview of the second category of avoidance provisions (addressing unfair preferences) rather than the first category (on undervalue transactions) (see Rothstar at [39]–[40]).

  120. [71] The position in relation to a grant of security in respect of a third party’s existing debt provides a useful contrast. In this situation, the Court of Appeal had little difficulty in finding that such a transaction could be impugned as an undervalue transaction, as Chong JCA explained in the following terms (see Rothstar at [43]):

  121. [72] At this point, I can summarise the import of Rothstar as follows:

  122. (a) A grant of security in respect of the grantor’s own existing debt is a transaction with no effect on the company’s net asset position because the decrease (by the grant of security) in the company’s available assets for distribution to its unsecured creditors would be correspondingly matched by a decrease in its unsecured liabilities on the other side of the balance sheet. The advantage received by the creditor, who is the beneficiary of the grant of security, may be disgorged through the provisions addressing the reversal of unfair preferences (eg, s 225 of the IRDA), subject to the elements of the relevant provision being established.

  123. (b) A grant of security in respect of a third party’s existing debt is a transaction that does adversely affect the company’s net asset position because the decrease (by the grant of security) in the company’s available assets for distribution to its unsecured creditors would not be correspondingly matched by a decrease in its unsecured liabilities on the other side of the balance sheet. The disadvantage engendered on the company’s unsecured creditors through the reduction of the assets available to satisfy their claims may be reversed through the provisions redressing undervalue transactions (eg, s 224 of the IRDA and s 73B of the CLPA), also subject, of course, to the requirements under the relevant provision(s) being established.

  124. [73] To put the point across more directly, to the extent that the company can be said to be applying assets towards the discharge of its own existing debt or other liability, such a transaction would not amount to an undervalue transaction but a potential preference.

  125. [74] For the avoidance of doubt, I have used a grant of security by an insolvent company in the illustration above simply because that was the relevant transaction on the facts of Rothstar. The same analysis would apply, mutatis mutandis, to any transaction that involves the expenditure of the company’s assets. This would include a payment of money by EAM to the defendant, as in the present case.

  126. [75] The question that arises is, of course, how this distinction bears out in the present context of a Ponzi scheme. If the claimants can establish that the payments of the Overwithdrawn Sums cannot be properly characterised as debt repayments or going towards the discharge of liabilities owed by EAM to the defendant, it would follow from the discussion above that their reliance on s 224(1) of the IRDA and s 73B of the CLPA (being provisions that reverse transactions causing a deterioration of the company’s net asset position) is not misplaced.

  127. (2) The claimants have not erred in relying on s 224(1) of the IRDA and s 73B of the CLPA

  128. [76] Although it was not cited to me by both parties, the UK Supreme Court decision of Stanford International Bank Ltd (in liquidation) v HSBC Bank plc [2023] AC 761 (“SIB v HSBC”) would seem, at first blush, to suggest that payments out of a Ponzi scheme are in the nature of debt repayments such that they ought to be challenged as preferences rather than undervalue transactions (see generally Chua Rui Yuan, “The Aftermath of a Ponzi Scheme” [2023] LMCLQ 218).

  129. [77] SIB v HSBC arose out of an infamous Ponzi scheme perpetrated by Robert Allen Stanford. The liquidators of Stanford International Bank (“SIB”), the vehicle that had been used to perpetrate the fraud, brought an action against SIB’s bank, HSBC. SIB alleged that, in failing to freeze SIB’s bank accounts by a certain time and continuing to execute payment instructions that had been issued to it, HSBC was in breach of its Quincecare duty of care (named after the English High Court decision in Barclays Bank plc v Quincecare Ltd [1992] 4 All ER 363). The matter came before the UK Supreme Court in an appeal arising from HSBC’s application to strike out SIB’s claim. HSBC’s argument was that, even if liability for breach of duty were assumed in favour of SIB, SIB’s claim would fail in any event as it had suffered no loss because the payments executed by HSBC went towards the discharge of SIB’s liabilities to its creditors. Given that the question of breach was assumed for the purposes of HSBC’s striking-out application, I do not understand the UK Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Philipp v Barclays Bank UK plc [2023] 3 WLR 284 (“Philipp”), where it undertook a root and branch re-examination of the juridical basis of the Quincecare duty, to have the effect of casting any doubt on its decision on the narrowly-framed issue in SIB v HSBC (see SIB v HSBC at [4]; Philipp at [52]).

  130. [78] Returning to SIB v HSBC, the UK Supreme Court (by a majority of four to one), accepted HSBC’s submission that SIB had suffered no loss. The concurring judgment of Lord Leggatt JSC is particularly relevant to the issues that have arisen in the present application. First, Lord Leggatt summarised HSBC’s submission in the following terms (at [38]):

  131. The learned judge considered “the logic of this argument as unassailable”, as “[t]here is no way of escaping the simple truth that paying a valid debt does not reduce the payer’s wealth” (at [40]).

  132. [79] More interestingly, however, is how Lord Leggatt linked this to the avoidance provisions. In particular, the learned judge recognised the distinction between the two categories of avoidance provisions that the defendant has sought the protection of in the present application (at [48]):

  133. [80] Lord Leggatt went on to hold that, if the payments made by SIB were to be challenged under an avoidance provision, it would have been properly through a provision dealing with unfair preferences rather than undervalue transactions (at [49]):

  134. Nevertheless, this was not possible on the facts because the applicable statutory insolvency regime – namely, Antiguan insolvency law – did not contain provisions allowing for the unwinding of unfair preferences (at [51]). This thus explains the way that SIB had framed its claim in SIB v HSBC: being unable to pursue restitution from the payees (ie, the creditors), SIB instead sought compensation from its bank for its part in making out these payments.

  135. [81] On first impression, Lord Leggatt’s reasoning would appear to support a general proposition that payments out of a Ponzi scheme vehicle (as EAM was) cannot be challenged as undervalue transactions, thereby supporting the defendant’s argument that the claimants’ reliance on s 224(1) of the IRDA and s 73B of the CLPA is misplaced. However, on closer inspection, I do not think that SIB v HSBC lays down any such general proposition. Ultimately, in my view, the characterisation of payments out of a Ponzi scheme must be considered on the specific facts of each case.

  136. [82] In my judgment, Lord Leggatt’s reasoning in SIB v HSBC, which I have set out above, is distinguishable and does not apply to the present case. Lord Leggatt’s reasoning, and the UK Supreme Court’s decision generally, was premised on the court’s characterisation of the payments by SIB being repayments of SIB’s debts. That being the case, in line with what the Court of Appeal decided in Rothstar, it is correct that they could not be impugned as undervalue transactions due to there being no change in the SIB’s net asset position. It follows that, if the payments of the Overwithdrawn Sums cannot similarly be characterised as payments of debts owed by EAM to the defendant, then the present application is distinguishable from the situation in SIB v HSBC.

  137. [83] I find that the present application is so distinguishable. For reasons which I will explain later, I find that the Overwithdrawn Sums cannot be characterised as debts owed by EAM to the defendant because, under the terms of the LOAs, EAM never became obliged to pay profits on the value of the Overwithdrawn Sums to the defendant. This is because, as I will explain in detail below, under the terms of the LOAs, EAM would only have been liable to pay profits on the defendant’s investment if Poseidon Nickel purchased by EAM appreciated in value. Since EAM did not, in fact, invest in any Poseidon Nickel, there would never have been any appreciation in value of Poseidon Nickel owned by EAM so that EAM would come under a liability, or incur a debt, to pay profits of the value of the Overwithdrawn Sums to the defendant. Since the payment of the Overwithdrawn Sums to the defendant did not go to the discharge of any liabilities owed by EAM to the defendant, they fall outside the realm of unfair preference.

  138. [84] I therefore accept the claimants’ argument that, having limited their claim to only the Overwithdrawn Sums, they have taken themselves outside the scope of the defendant’s objection.

  139. Whether the Overwithdrawn Sums were paid to the defendant with the intent to defraud creditors of EAM within the meaning of s 73B of the CLPA

  140. [85] Having resolved the three preliminary issues above in favour of the claimants, I turn to deal with the substance of the present application, starting with arguments in relation to the CLPA.

  141. The continued applicability of s 73B of the CLPA

  142. [86] I begin with s 73B of the CLPA, which provides as follows:

  143. [87] Although s 73B of the CLPA was repealed on 30 July 2020, reg 15 of the Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution (Saving and Transitional Provisions) Regulations 2020 provides that s 73B of the CLPA continues to apply to any conveyance of property before 30 July 2020. Further, although s 73B was repealed before the claimants commenced the present application, they can nevertheless rely on s 73B because the provision was in force when the cause of action accrued (see the Court of Appeal decision of Quah Kay Tee v Ong and Co Pte Ltd [1996] 3 SLR(R) 637 (“Quah Kay Tee”) at [10]). Therefore, because the latest transaction between EAM and the defendant occurred in February 2020, s 73B applies in the present application.

  144. [88] I should note that, following the entry into force of the IRDA on 30 July 2020, s 73B of the CLPA appears in a different form in s 438 and s 439 of the IRDA. The latter sections do not apply in the present application because no relevant transaction in relation to the Overwithdrawn Sums occurred after 30 July 2020.

  145. The parties’ positions

  146. [89] The claimants’ position under s 73B of the CLPA is as follows. Because the Overwithdrawn Sums were payments of fictitious profits under a Ponzi scheme, they must have been made with the intent to defraud creditors and ought to be set aside under s 73B of the CLPA. In particular, the claimants say that there would also have been an intent to defraud other investors because the Envy Companies and their controllers (especially NYZ) must have known that there was no meaningful business. Therefore, any payment of the Overwithdrawn Sums to the defendant would be at the expense of all remaining investors who had not recovered their principal sums. The claimants thus submit that all of the Overwithdrawn Sums paid to the defendant are liable to be clawed back pursuant to s 73B of the CLPA.

  147. [90] In response, the defendant in its submissions raises four points. First, the defendant contends that, having regard to the historical purpose of s 73B of the CLPA, it is inappropriate for the claimants to rely on it in the present application. Second, assuming that the claimants can rely on s 73B of the CLPA, the Overwithdrawn Sums, being trust property, were never property that “would otherwise be applicable for the benefit of the creditors”. Third, the defendant submits that even if the Overwithdrawn Sums do not constitute trust property, the payment of the Overwithdrawn Sums was not made with an intent to “hinder, delay or defraud” creditors, nor with the intent to deprive creditors of timely recourse to property otherwise applicable for their benefit. The defendant further submits that EAM’s real intention in making payment of the Overwithdrawn Sums was to keep the Ponzi scheme alive, which is supported by the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decision of In re Bernard L Madoff Investment Securities LLC 12 F 4th 171 (2nd Cir, 2021) (“Bernard”). Fourth, the defendant says that it comes completely within the defence under s 73B(3) of the CLPA because it has, in particular, provided good consideration to EAM pursuant to the LOAs.

  148. [91] With regard to the issue of whether valuable consideration may be provided in a Ponzi scheme, Mr Teo submits that there is no general proposition that no valuable consideration may be given in Ponzi schemes. Although it may generally be the case that no valuable consideration is given for the payment of fictitious profits in Ponzi schemes, this is an outcome derived from applying principles of contract law. In the present application, the defendant did not provide valuable consideration for the Overwithdrawn Sums it received from EAM.

  149. My decision: the Overwithdrawn Sums were paid to the defendant with the intent to defraud creditors of EAM within the meaning of s 73B of the CLPA

  150. The broadly applicable law

  151. [92] Under s 73B of the CLPA, a voluntary conveyance that was entered into with the intention of defrauding creditors can be set aside. The relevant principles are as follows:

  152. (a) The claimant bears the burden of proving that: (i) there had been a conveyance of property; (ii) that this conveyance was made with the intent of defrauding creditors; and (iii) that he was a person who was prejudiced by the foregoing conveyance of property. The defendant can defeat the claim by establishing that: (i) he acquired the property for valuable consideration and in good faith or for good consideration and in good faith; and (ii) he did not have notice of the claimant’s intent to defraud his creditors (see the High Court decision of Wong Ser Wan v Ng Bok Eng Holdings Pte Ltd and another [2004] 4 SLR(R) 365 (“Wong Ser Wan”) at [5] and [27]).

  153. (b) The intent to defraud creditors may be evidenced by actual fraud or constructive fraud. For constructive fraud, if a person conveys property to his creditors for no consideration or for nominal consideration and that person is then insolvent or becomes insolvent by reason of the conveyance, a fraudulent intent would be “irrebuttably imputed to that person, even if he did not subjectively intend to defraud his creditors” (see the High Court decision of Sim Guan Seng and others v One Organisation Ltd and others [2023] 3 SLR 590 (“Sim Guan Seng”) at [150]).

  154. (c) For the issue of good faith in the defence in s 73B(3), the transferee must possess more than merely “a belief that all the steps have been regularly and properly done”. Instead, “the transferee must have no reason to believe that there is anything dubious about the transaction” (see Wong Ser Wan at [58]).

  155. The specific meaning of “good consideration” and “valuable consideration” under s 73B(3)

  156. [93] At this point, given the centrality of the defence under s 73B(3) to the present application, I pause to make some observations on its scope. I focus specifically on the requirement that the defendant provide “good consideration” or “valuable consideration”.

  157. [94] The appropriate starting point is, of course, the plain wording of the statute. In this regard, s 73B(3) of the CLPA excludes dispositions of property made by a person with intent to defraud his creditors where such disposition is “for valuable consideration and in good faith or upon good consideration and in good faith” (along with another requirement of the defendant not having notice of the transferor’s fraudulent intent). In my view, the natural reading of this phrase is that it sets out two distinct ways through which a defendant can satisfy the requirement of providing consideration for the disposition: (a) valuable consideration and in good faith; and (b) good consideration and in good faith. This is for two reasons. The first is that the word “or” suggests, on its face, a disjunctive interpretation. The second is the canon of construction that Parliament shuns tautology and does not legislate in vain, and that a court should therefore endeavour to give significance to every word in an enactment (see the Court of Appeal decision in Tan Cheng Bock v Attorney-General [2017] 2 SLR 850 at [38]). I find that this principle operates more than once in the context of s 73B(3) of the CLPA. Indeed, the fact that Parliament has used both “valuable” and “good” separately indicates that the two should not be read as mere synonyms of each other. Further, the fact that “and in good faith” is repeated, being appended at the end of “valuable consideration” and “good consideration” each, suggests that the draftsman’s intention is for “valuable consideration and in good faith” to be one composite and “good consideration and in good faith” to be read as another composite.

  158. [95] What then is the significance of there being two disjunctive limbs to the consideration requirement in s 73B(3) of the CLPA? In my view, the significance is that the requirement of “good consideration” does not require an inquiry into the value of the consideration provided by the defendant, such that nominal consideration could suffice to satisfy that requirement. This is because “valuable consideration”, on its face, requires that the consideration provided by the defendant be of adequate value; and, as discussed above, the requirement of “valuable consideration” cannot carry the same meaning as the requirement of “good consideration”. Thus, the defendant may either provide “valuable consideration”, in the sense that it is of adequate value, or “good consideration”, which extends to include nominal consideration. Put differently, “consideration” in s 73B(3) of the CLPA carries the same meaning as under contract law.

  159. [96] This interpretation is supported by three reasons. First, by way of analogy, the Court of Appeal in Rothstar held that “consideration” in the context of s 98(3) of the BA “would appear to have the normal meaning ascribed to it by the law of contract” (at [24]). I do not see why the same cannot be said in relation to s 73B(3) of the CLPA. Although it is located in a different statute, I have noted above at [66] that s 73B(3) of the CLPA and s 98(3) of the BA (which is in pari materia to s 224(1) of the IRDA) serve a common purpose of preventing a deterioration in a debtor’s net asset position. It therefore makes sense that “consideration” in s 73B(3) of the CLPA would carry the same meaning as in s 98(3) of the BA.

The judgment continues past this page. Read the rest at eLitigation.