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Grounds publishedDecided 28 Nov 2024

General Division of the High Court

Interim injunctions barred the parent from exercising rights under disputed security

Group Lease Holdings Pte Ltd (in liquidation) and another v Group Lease Public Co Ltd

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[2024] SGHC 302Case no. Originating Claim No 565 of 2024 (Summons No 2102 of 2024)

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Interim injunctions barred the parent from exercising rights under disputed security

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  1. [1] In this application, HC/SUM 2102/2024, the claimants, Group Lease Holdings Pte Ltd (in liquidation) (“GLH”) and its liquidator, Mr Cosimo Borrelli (“Mr Borrelli”), sought an interim injunction and other related reliefs against the defendant, Group Lease Public Company Ltd (“GL Thailand”). More specifically, the claimants sought to restrain GL Thailand from exercising its rights under certain security and receivables assignment agreements, pending the determination of the claimants’ allegations in HC/OC 565/2024 (“OC 565”) that these agreements are improper on, inter alia, the ground that they constitute unfair preference transactions.

  2. [2] After hearing the parties on 7 October 2024, I granted most of the reliefs sought by the claimants with brief oral reasons. As this application touched upon several interesting points of law and practice on topics such as injunctions, non-registration of charges, and unfair preferences, I now expand on my reasons, and consider these points in greater depth, in these written grounds of decision.

  3. Background facts

  4. The parties

  5. [3] The first and second claimants are, respectively, GLH, a Singapore-incorporated company undergoing insolvent liquidation, and Mr Borrelli, its liquidator.

  6. [5] GLH is the holding company for subsidiaries of the Group Lease group of companies operating in various Southeast Asian countries. The shares that GLH holds in these subsidiaries are among the subject-matter of the present dispute.

  7. [6] The defendant, GL Thailand, is a Thailand-incorporated company publicly listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand. It is the sole shareholder of GLH.

  8. The Loan Agreements between GL Thailand and GLH

  9. [7] The genesis of the parties’ dispute is a series of 35 loan agreements between GL Thailand and GLH, that was entered into between 16 July 2015 and 7 July 2021 (collectively, the “Loan Agreements”), whereunder GL Thailand extended inter-company loans to GLH.

  10. [8] I observe that, although the claimants have questioned (or at least have not admitted) the validity of the Loan Agreements in these proceedings, a Singapore court has previously granted judgment to GL Thailand on the loans arising from the Loan Agreements (see [24] below). As the issue of the veracity of the Loan Agreements was not directly before me, I proceeded on the basis that the Loan Agreements were valid.

  11. [9] The loans pursuant to the 1st to 28th Loan Agreements were entered into between 16 July 2015 to 21 March 2017. According to GL Thailand, they were made to provide working capital to GLH.

  12. [10] The loans pursuant to the 29th to 35th Loan Agreements were entered into between 20 April 2021 and 7 July 2021. In contrast to the earlier loans, they were made to enable GLH to satisfy a judgment debt pursuant to the Court of Appeal’s decision in CA/CA 21/2020 (see JTrust Asia Pte Ltd v Group Lease Holdings Pte Ltd and others [2020] 2 SLR 1256 (“JTA (1)”)). To understand how this judgment debt came about, it is necessary to briefly explain the protracted litigation between JTA and GLH.

  13. The litigation between JTA and GLH

  14. [11] JTA commenced an action in HC/S 1212/2017 against various parties including GLH on 26 December 2017. In that action, JTA brought various claims in deceit and conspiracy in respect of losses it incurred under three investment agreements with GL Thailand between March 2015 and September 2017 (respectively, the “1st IA”, “2nd IA” and “3rd IA”).

  15. [12] On 6 October 2020, the Court of Appeal held in JTA (1) that GLH was liable for losses amounting to US$70.01m that JTA had suffered under the 1st and 3rd IAs (see JTA (1) at [257]). However, the Court of Appeal also held that JTA was only entitled to repayment of the principal sums due under the 2nd IA upon its maturity on 1 August 2021, and JTA thus suffered no loss in respect of the 2nd IA at the time of JTA (1) (see JTA (1) at [244]). I shall refer to the judgment debt arising from JTA (1) as the “1st Judgment Debt”. The 1st Judgment Debt has been paid in full (see [16] below).

  16. The Mareva injunctions obtained by JTA in JTA (1) and JTA (2)

  17. [14] JTA obtained Mareva injunctions against GLH in the course of the proceedings in both JTA (1) and JTA (2).

  18. [15] During the pendency of JTA (1), the Court of Appeal found that there was a real risk that GLH’s assets would be dissipated pending the determination of JTA (1), and granted a worldwide Mareva injunction (the “1st Mareva Injunction”) restraining GLH from disposing of its assets other than in the ordinary course of business (see JTrust Asia Pte Ltd v Group Lease Holdings Pte Ltd and others [2018] 2 SLR 159; JTrust Asia Pte Ltd v Group Lease Holdings Pte Ltd and others [2020] 2 SLR 490). After the Court of Appeal handed down its decision in JTA (1), it extended the Mareva injunction to be in force until full satisfaction of the 1st Judgment Debt (see JTrust Asia Pte Ltd v Group Lease Holdings Pte Ltd and others [2021] 1 SLR 1298).

  19. [16] GLH paid the 1st Judgment Debt in full on 19 July 2021, having received assistance from GL Thailand in the form of the 29th to 35th Loan Agreements (see [10] above). This caused the 1st Mareva Injunction to lapse (on the same day) given the satisfaction of the condition imposed by the Court of Appeal.

  20. [17] However, slightly over two weeks later, following its commencement of the proceedings in JTA (2), JTA applied for and obtained a fresh Mareva injunction from the High Court on 4 August 2021 (the “2nd Mareva Injunction”). The 2nd Mareva Injunction remains in force after it was extended by the Court on 3 July 2023 until such time as the 2nd Judgment Debt is paid in full.

  21. GL Thailand’s attempts to recover the sums due under the Loan Agreements

  22. [18] The gravamen of the claimants’ complaint in OC 565 is that GL Thailand engaged in the asset-stripping of GLH. Specifically, beginning from shortly before the lapse of the 1st Mareva Injunction on 19 July 2021 until the issue of the 2nd Mareva Injunction on 4 August 2021, GL Thailand and GLH entered into various arrangements (which I shall refer to as the “Security Documents” and “Receivables Agreements”) that had the effect of granting security over, or assigning, substantially all of GLH’s assets to GL Thailand. These were done to secure or reduce the outstanding sums due to GL Thailand under the 35 Loan Agreements and had the effect of unfairly improving GL Thailand’s position in GLH’s liquidation.

  23. [19] Indeed, prior to the discharge of the 1st Mareva Injunction, GL Thailand had already begun taking steps during the ongoing litigation between JTA and GLH to recover sums due under the Loan Agreements. On 20 October 2020, GL Thailand issued a statutory demand to GLH in respect of the 1st to 28th loans.

  24. [20] Between 14 July 2021 (five days before the lapse of the 1st Mareva Injunction) and 30 July 2021, GL Thailand and GLH entered into the Security Documents under which GLH granted security to GL Thailand for its repayment obligations under the Loan Agreements.

  25. [21] Between 1 July 2020 and 30 July 2021, GL Thailand and GLH also entered into various Receivables Agreements by which GLH agreed to transfer receivables from its subsidiary and associate companies to GL Thailand in satisfaction of its liabilities under the Loan Agreements.

  26. [22] It is noteworthy that, apart from the first of the Receivables Agreements (which was executed on 1 July 2020), all of the Security Documents and the Receivables Agreements were executed between 14 and 30 July 2021. This was about two weeks before the maturity of the 2nd IA on 1 August 2021 and the subsequent grant of the 2nd Mareva Injunction on 4 August 2021 after proceedings in JTA (2) were commenced on 3 August 2021.

  27. [23] GL Thailand issued further statutory demands to GLH on 10 and 11 August 2021. When GLH was unable to repay the sums due under the Loan Agreements, GL Thailand commenced HC/S 23/2022 against GLH on 13 January 2022 to recover US$147.5m from GLH, being the total sum due under the 35 Loan Agreements. In its defence, GLH accepted that it had entered into the 35 Loan Agreements and that it had received the sums that GL Thailand claimed to have lent out. However, GLH pleaded a defence only in respect of the first 28 Loan Agreements and not the remaining seven that were entered into in 2021.

  28. [24] GL Thailand then applied to enter summary judgment against GLH on 14 March 2022. On 12 April 2022, GL Thailand obtained summary judgment against GLH for US$147,484,923 plus interest.

  29. The winding-up proceedings against GLH and other developments

  30. (a) First, to take into possession all of GLH’s books of accounts, general records, and real and personal estate.

  31. (b) Second, to take all necessary steps to preserve GLH’s assets (including all of GLH’s books of accounts, general records and real and personal estate).

  32. (c) Third, to review and, where appropriate, investigate historical transactions entered into by GLH.

  33. [28] Following this development, Mr Borrelli, still as provisional liquidator, received further letters on 18 January 2024 similarly informing him that GL Thailand had become the shareholder of GL Leasing (Lao) Company Ltd (“GL Laos”), BG Microfinance Myanmar Co Ltd (“BGM”), and GL-AMMK after exercising its purported rights under the Security Documents. GL Finance PLC (“GL Cambodia”) also wrote to Mr Borrelli on the same day informing him that GL Thailand held security and had placed a provision attachment on GL Cambodia shares held by GLH. GL Laos, BGM, GL-AMMK, and GL Cambodia are all subsidiaries of GLH whose shares were the subject of the Security Documents.

  34. [29] Mr Borrelli’s solicitors then sought clarification from GL Thailand’s solicitors on these developments, particularly since, in Mr Borrelli’s view, the shares concerned fell within the scope of the 2nd Mareva Injunction. GL Thailand’s solicitors replied to state, among other things, that GL Thailand had no intention to dispose of or assign the shares over which it had exercised its security interests. In a further letter, GL Thailand’s solicitors explained that GL Thailand took the view that the Security Documents were valid and binding and that it was entitled to act upon its rights to realise those securities. However, as the claimants pointed out, this is inconsistent with GL Thailand’s earlier position in its (unsuccessful) application in HC/SUM 3287/2023 (“SUM 3287”) made on 23 October 2023. In SUM 3287, GL Thailand had sought a variation of the 2nd Mareva Injunction so that it could enforce its security interests under the Security Documents. According to the claimants, the fact that GL Thailand took out SUM 3287 indicates clearly that GL Thailand appreciated that the 2nd Mareva Injunction prohibited its exercise of any security interests it may have had over GLH’s assets.

  35. [30] Indeed, GL Thailand’s director, Mr Riki Ishigami (“Mr Ishigami”), had said on affidavit in support of SUM 3287 that:

  36. I would point out at this juncture that Mr Luis Inaki Duhart Gonzalez (“Mr Duhart”), who appeared for GL Thailand before me, candidly acknowledged that his client was put in a difficult position in the present application due to this affidavit. However, Mr Duhart explained that he and his team have advised GL Thailand that Mr Ishigami’s position is wrong, and that GL Thailand has since revised its position on the ambit of the 2nd Mareva Injunction. I would only observe that Mr Duhart and his team were also the solicitors on record in respect of SUM 3287 and when Mr Ishigami’s said affidavit was filed on 24 October 2023. Thus, it appears that Mr Ishigami was advised by the same team of solicitors in respect of his former (supposedly wrong) position and current (supposedly correct) position.

  37. [31] GLH was eventually wound up on 4 March 2024. Thereafter, on 26 July 2024, the claimants filed the underlying action to this application, viz, OC 565, against GL Thailand, in which the claimants have sought various reliefs which centre on the Security Documents and the Receivables Agreements being unfair preference transactions.

  38. The present application

  39. [32] In advance of the determination of OC 565, the claimants brought the present application for interim injunctions and other reliefs against GL Thailand. In particular, the claimants sought the following:

  40. (a) pending the final determination of OC 565, an interim injunction restraining GL Thailand (whether by itself, directors, officers, employees or agents) from enforcing or exercising rights under the Security Documents set out at Annex A to the claimants’ summons in HC/SUM 2102/2024 (“SUM 2102”);

  41. (b) in the event that GL Thailand has received assets which are the subject of the Security Documents (including any dividends or distributions), such assets are to be transferred to Mr Borrelli to be held in an escrow account (to be nominated by Mr Borrelli) or in the Companies Liquidation Account maintained with the Official Receiver until the determination of OC 565;

  42. (c) any sums received (whether past, present or future) by the defendant under the Receivables Agreements set out in Annex B to the claimants’ summons in SUM 2102 ought to be paid into an escrow account (to be nominated by Mr Borrelli) or the Companies Liquidation Account maintained with the Official Receiver;

  43. (d) further and/or alternatively, an interim injunction restraining GL Thailand (whether by itself, directors, officers, employees or agents) from disposing or dealing with any (i) moneys or proceeds referred to in the Receivables Agreements; and (ii) assets (including any proceeds of sale, dividends or distribution) referred to in the Security Documents;

  44. (f) that the Mareva injunction dated 3 July 2023 in HC/ORC 3189/2023 (ie, the 2nd Mareva Injunction) be varied or discharged such that Mr Borrelli may carry out his duties as GLH’s liquidator.

  45. [33] Before me, the claimants confirmed that they were not proceeding with prayer (f) because Mr Borrelli wanted to seek the views of JTA and GL Thailand before filing the appropriate application in OS 780.

  46. [34] It is useful to begin with an overview of the applicable legal framework on injunctions relevant to the present application. There were two strands underlying the injunctions sought by the claimants in this application. The first was the court’s general jurisdiction to grant injunctions under s 18(2) read with paras 5 and 14 of the First Schedule to the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (2020 Rev Ed), as well as s 4(10) of the Civil Law Act 1909 (2020 Rev Ed) (“CLA”) (see the General Division of the High Court decisions of Leong Quee Ching Karen v Lim Soon Huat and others [2024] 4 SLR 862 (“Karen Leong”) at [16] and Farooq Ahmad Mann (in his capacity as the private trustee in bankruptcy of Li Hua) v Xia Zheng [2024] SGHC 182 (“Farooq Ahmad Mann”) at [18]). The second was the specific jurisdiction granted by s 270 of the IRDA.

  47. [35] Although my decision to grant the injunctions sought by the claimants was strictly based on the former, I take the opportunity to discuss s 270 of the IRDA given the apparent absence of any local authority addressing its operation, and the fact that I did receive some submissions on it from the parties (see [176]–[192] below).

  48. [37] This distinction was of some relevance to the present case. As GL Thailand (rightly) pointed out, the claimants were seeking not only interim prohibitory injunctions, but interim mandatory injunctions, as prayers (b) and (c) required GL Thailand to take the positive step of paying or transferring assets received by GL Thailand under the Security Documents or Receivable Agreements into either an escrow account or the Companies Liquidation Account maintained with the Official Receiver (see [32] above). GL Thailand submitted that an interim mandatory injunction was a “very exceptional remedy” that was only granted in “special circumstances”, which required GLH to meet a “much higher threshold” of justification. The rationale for this caution was that a mandatory injunction was more invasive than a prohibitory injunction.

  49. [38] At this point, I shall first outline the principles governing interim prohibitory injunctions, before turning to a brief consideration of the distinction between prohibitory and mandatory injunctions contended for by GL Thailand.

  50. The law on interim prohibitory injunctions

  51. [39] The law on interim prohibitory injunctions is relatively well-established, having been the subject of an authoritative restatement in the modern locus classicus that is the House of Lords decision in American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396 (“American Cyanamid”). The general rule is that a court will grant an interim prohibitory injunction if (a) there is a serious issue to be tried; and (b) the balance of convenience lies in favour of granting the injunction (see RGA Holdings at [28]). These requirements encapsulate the overarching principle that, when called upon to give interim relief based on a preliminary view of the parties’ cases and pending the final determination of the parties’ rights and obligations, the court should chart the path of least injustice if it turns out to be wrong in its preliminary assessment, in the sense of having granted an injunction when it otherwise should not have, or having refused an injunction when it ought to have been granted (see the Court of Appeal decisions of Maldives Airports Co Ltd and another v GMR Malé International Airport Pte Ltd [2013] 2 SLR 449 at [53] and Chuan Hong Petrol Station Pte Ltd v Shell Singapore (Pte) Ltd [1992] 2 SLR(R) 1 (“Chuan Hong”) at [88]).

  52. [40] The merits threshold of a serious issue to be tried is not a high one. In American Cyanamid, Lord Diplock deprecated the previous practice of the court investigating if there was a “prima facie case” or a “strong prima facie case” as inapposite to the context of interim relief. This was because the court’s function at this stage of the proceedings was not to attempt to resolve conflicts of evidence or questions of law which called for detailed argument and mature consideration. Rather, all that was required was for a claimant to demonstrate that its claim is not frivolous or vexatious (at 407). More recently, this was reiterated by the English Court of Appeal in Planon Ltd v Gilligan [2022] EWCA Civ 642, where Nugee LJ said that the “serious issue to be tried” standard was “not a demanding test, and it really only serves to exclude the case where the claim is frivolous or vexatious, or otherwise demonstrably bad” [emphasis added] (at [102]).

  53. [41] I would make two observations at this juncture. First, the “serious issue to be tried” test goes towards enlivening the court’s jurisdiction to grant an interim injunction. In other words, the court cannot ordinarily grant an interim injunction if that standard has not been met. But it does not follow that the strength of the merits of the parties’ cases is an altogether irrelevant consideration once the court is satisfied that there is a serious issue to be tried (see David Bean, Isabel Parry & Andrew Burns, Injunctions (Sweet & Maxwell, 14th Ed, 2021) at para 3-17). The extent of Lord Diplock’s criticism of tests premised on the relative strengths of the parties’ cases at the stage of interim relief was that it should not be necessary for the court to always consider if an applicant’s chance of ultimate success was more than 50 per cent (at 406). Lord Diplock did not say that this was an altogether irrelevant or impermissible consideration when the court decides whether to exercise its discretion once it was satisfied that the baseline requirements for an injunction were met. Indeed, Lord Diplock himself observed that, in the event that the balance of convenience appeared relatively even (at 409):

  54. Thus, subject to the qualifier that the court should not be engaging in a mini-trial at the interlocutory stage, a judge is not constrained from factoring in the prospects of success into the analysis.

  55. [42] Indeed, there are situations where the court must assess the merits of the parties’ cases. A notable exception, which Lord Diplock revisited in the House of Lords decision of NWL Ltd v Woods [1979] 1 WLR 1294, is where the grant or refusal of the interim injunction would, in effect, dispose of the action finally in favour of whichever party is successful in the application (at 1306). In such a scenario, the conventional approach to the balance of convenience is somewhat inapposite as it is premised “on the proposition that there will be a proper trial at a later stage when the rights of the parties will be determined” (see the English Court of Appeal decision of Cayne and another v Global Natural Resources plc [1984] 1 All ER 225 at 238). Put differently, because the complexion of the matter is such that the court is, in substance, being called on to give final rather than interim relief, the path of least injustice legitimately requires the court to consider the more likely substantive outcome on the merits of the parties’ cases.

  56. [43] The second point, which is related to the first, is that the proposition that the court should not undertake an examination of the merits of the parties’ cases has much greater force vis-à-vis disputes of fact rather than disputes of law. It is a not uncommon refrain, when pressed by the court, for parties to profess that the court should adjourn consideration of a difficult point of law to the trial. The following observations by George Wei J in the High Court decision of AYW v AYX [2016] 1 SLR 1183 are a regular refuge for a party making such a submission (at [35]):

  57. [44] I respectfully disagree with the extent to which this paragraph has been relied upon as a crutch by parties with tenuous cases to hobble to the next stop in the proceedings. In this regard, I respectfully prefer the observations of Mohamed Faizal JC in the recent decision of the General Division of the High Court in Ng Chee Tian and another v Ng Chee Pong and others [2024] SGHC 226 at [81]–[85]. Similar to the learned judge, I see no reason why discrete issues of law that do not implicate any factual dispute between the parties cannot be well-ventilated before a court at an interlocutory stage. Indeed, one of the grounds for striking out a claim in the interests of justice under O 9 r 16(1)(c) of the Rules of Court 2021 (“ROC 2021”) is that the claim is legally unsustainable (see the Court of Appeal decision of Iskandar bin Rahmat and others v Attorney-General and another [2022] 2 SLR 1018 at [19]). The test of legal unsustainability itself calls on the court to assess whether a claimant would be entitled to the remedies sought if he or she succeeds in proving all facts he or she asserts or offers to prove (see the Court of Appeal decision of The “Bunga Melati 5” [2012] 4 SLR 546 at [39(a)]). If this is answered in the negative, “a trial of the facts would be a waste of time and money, and it is proper that the action should be taken out of court as soon as possible” (see the House of Lords decision of Three Rivers District Council and others v Governor and Company of the Bank of England [2003] 2 AC 1 at [95]).

  58. [45] The practical experience also reveals that the courts have not shied away from determining novel points of law at an interlocutory stage. For example, in the recent decision of the General Division of the High Court in Farooq Ahmad Mann, in the context of an application for a Mareva injunction, Aidan Xu J undertook a detailed analysis of the difficult issue of whether a disposition of property through an interim judgment of the Family Court could be reversed using the provisions for the avoidance of transactions in the insolvency legislation. It seems to me that this type of flexibility in approach commends itself to the Ideals set out in O 3 r 1 of the ROC 2021. More generally, it accords with common sense, as Laddie J observed in the English High Court decision of Series 5 Software Ltd v Clarke and others [1996] 1 All ER 853 (at 866):

  59. Laddie J’s observations were not confined to pure questions of law. Indeed, I do not doubt that a court should not attempt to resolve thorny disputes of fact at an interlocutory stage. However, I consider that one would be hard-pressed to deny that an opinion highlighting a major factual gap and, a fortiori, legal defect in the parties’ cases, would either facilitate amicable settlement or, at the very least, assist the parties in focussing on the true issues if the case subsequently proceeds to trial.

  60. [46] Turning to the balance of convenience, the analysis consists of two broad questions: (a) first, a threshold question of the adequacy of damages to either party arising from the grant or refusal of the injunction; and (b) second, the assessment of the balance of convenience proper if damages would be an inadequate remedy to both parties or the court is in doubt on this point (see American Cyanamid at 408). It may be useful to break up the inquiry in sequential fashion, consisting of the following three-stage analytical framework:

  61. (a) First, if the injunction were to be refused, and that decision turns out to be wrong as the claimant is ultimately successful at trial, would damages be an adequate remedy for the claimant’s loss arising out of the defendant not having been enjoined from engaging in the conduct that has now been deemed to be wrongful?

  62. (i) If damages would be an adequate remedy and the defendant would be in a financial position to pay them, no interim injunction should normally be granted, however strong the claimant’s claim appears to be at the interim stage.

  63. (ii) If, on the other hand, damages would not be an adequate remedy or the court has doubt on the adequacy of damages and/or the defendant’s ability to pay them, the court should move on to consider (b).

  64. (b) Second, assuming the opposite vantage point of the defendant, if the injunction were to be granted and that decision turns out to be wrong at trial, would the defendant be adequately compensated in damages for its losses from being (wrongly) restrained from engaging in what has now been determined to be lawful conduct?

  65. (i) If damages would be an adequate remedy and the claimant in a position to pay them, the court should grant the injunction.

  66. (ii) If, on the other hand, damages would not be an adequate remedy or the court has doubt on the adequacy of damages and/or the claimant’s ability to pay them, the court should move on to consider (c).

  67. (c) Third, if damages would not be an adequate remedy for both parties, or the court is in doubt on the adequacy of damages as a remedy to either party, the question as to the balance of convenience properly arises. In this regard, factors which the court may consider include:

  68. (i) any difference in the extent as to the inadequacy of damages to the parties;

  69. (ii) the relative strengths of the parties’ cases (see [41] above); and

  70. (iii) as a last resort, where all other factors appear balanced, the course of action that entails preserving the status quo.

  71. The distinction between prohibitory and mandatory injunctions

  72. [47] Having set out the principles on prohibitory injunctions, I come to consider GL Thailand’s submission on the ostensibly higher threshold guarding the court’s jurisdiction to grant mandatory injunctions.

  73. [48] At the outset, I accept that, as a general matter, a court would require more justification for the issue of a mandatory injunction than a prohibitory injunction. That proposition derives support from the Court of Appeal’s remarks in RGA Holdings (at [31]). But, in my view, the authorities also counsel that this can be an oversimplification.

  74. [49] In my judgment, the suggestion that a mandatory injunction is a “very exceptional discretionary remedy” and that there exists a “much higher threshold to be met” is less a firm principle of law than a heuristic tool. In a similar vein to the “unusually convincing” standard in criminal law (see, eg, the Court of Appeal decision of Public Prosecutor v GCK and another matter [2020] 1 SLR 486 at [91]), it serves as a cautionary tool that reminds the decision-maker that the generally more invasive nature of the mandatory injunction means that it can cause greater prejudice than its less invasive prohibitory variant if it turns out to be wrongly granted. However, there is no difference in the underlying principle: the court is ultimately tasked to take the course which involves the least risk of injustice if it turns out to be wrong. See Kee Oon JAD, writing extrajudicially in a learned monograph, has observed that (see See Kee Oon, Fact-Finding and Reality: A Judicial Decision-Making Primer (Academy Publishing, 2022) at pp 11–12):

  75. [50] Coming back to the principles at hand, a good starting point is the decision of the English High Court in Shepherd Homes Ltd v Sandham [1971] Ch 340 (“Shepherd Homes”), which is often cited as authority supporting a higher standard for the grant of a mandatory injunction. In that case, Megarry J said that (at 351):

  76. [51] Megarry J’s reference to a “high degree of assurance” could have led to the impression that a different set of rules underpinned the grant of mandatory injunctions. But subsequent cases of the English courts, with Lord Hoffmann leading the charge, have pulled back from this view. In the English High Court decision of Films Rover International Ltd and others v Cannon Film Sales Ltd [1987] 1 WLR 670 (“Films Rover”), Hoffmann J (as he then was) commented that (at 680–681):

  77. [52] Locally, the Court of Appeal had occasion to consider what to make of the decisions in Shepherd Homes and Films Rover in Chuan Hong. Warren L H Khoo J, delivering the decision of the court that also included Yong Pung How CJ and Chan Sek Keong J (as he then was), preferred the view espoused by Hoffmann J in Films Rover (see Chuan Hong at [88]–[89]):

  78. The Court of Appeal was thus unequivocal that the so-called higher standard suggested by Megarry J in Shepherd Homes was “no more than a generalisation” or, as I have suggested above, a heuristic tool. Chuan Hong was subsequently cited with approval and followed in multiple decisions of the Singapore courts, including the Court of Appeal’s own decisions in Singapore Press Holdings Ltd v Brown Noel Trading Pte Ltd and others [1994] 3 SLR(R) 114 (“SPH Ltd”) (at [18]–[22]) and Projector SA v Marubeni International Petroleum (S) Pte Ltd [2005] 2 SLR(R) 144 at ([34]–[37]). In the former case, in particular, M Karthigesu JA expressly confirmed that while “what was said by this court in Chuan Hong v Shell … may be obiter dicta, we respectfully adopt it as a correct statement of principle governing the granting of interim mandatory injunctions” (see SPH Ltd at [22]).

  79. [53] However, the law apparently did an about-turn in the Court of Appeal decision in NCC International AB v Alliance Concrete Singapore Pte Ltd [2008] 2 SLR(R) 565 (“NCC International”). GL Thailand placed particular reliance on the court’s statements under the header of “[t]he exceptional nature of an interim mandatory injunction” which, admittedly, appear more aligned with Megarry J’s view in Shepherd Homes (see NCC International at [75]):

  80. [54] I make three observations on NCC International. The first is that it may fairly be said that the issue of the differences in approach to mandatory and prohibitory injunctions was not squarely considered in this case in the same way as it was in Chuan Hong. The second is that neither Chuan Hong nor (as the High Court subsequently observed in Rikvin Consultancy Pte Ltd v Pardeep Singh Boparai and another [2010] SGHC 191 at [12]) the opposing view in Films Rover appears to have been cited to the Court of Appeal in NCC International. The third is that the decision cited – the Court of Appeal decision of Chin Bay Ching v Merchant Ventures Pte Ltd [2005] 3 SLR(R) 142 (“Chin Bay Ching”) – had in fact cited the earlier decisions of Chuan Hong and SPH Ltd without adverse comment but considered that the principles had to be “modified” in “their application to the special situation of a defamation action” (see Chin Bay Ching at [31]). Indeed, that Chin Bay Ching should not be taken as authority stating principles governing the grant of mandatory injunctions generally is apparent from how, in the paragraph (ie, Chin Bay Ching at [37]) cited by the court in NCC International, the court had expressly stated that it was making special provision for the defamation context by departing from American Cyanamid in relation to both prohibitory and mandatory injunctions.

  81. [55] For these reasons, with great respect, I do not read NCC International to be strong authority indicating that the Court of Appeal intended to walk back on the comments it had made in Chuan Hong and affirmed in subsequent cases such as SPH Ltd. In particular, it is reasonably arguable that the especial context in Chin Bay Ching was not taken into account.

  82. [56] Not too long after the Court of Appeal decided NCC International, Lord Hoffmann had the opportunity to revisit the views he had expressed more than two decades earlier in the decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in National Commercial Bank Jamaica Ltd v Olint Corpn Ltd [2009] 1 WLR 1405 (“Olint Corpn”). His position on the matter was resolutely unchanged. He reiterated that “arguments over whether the injunction should be classified as prohibitive or mandatory are barren”, as “[w]hat matters is what the practical consequences of the actual injunction are likely to be” (at [20]). In his view, the courts below had erred in their approach (at [20]–[21]):

  83. [57] The position under English law is thus clear. As Teare J cautioned in the English High Court decision of SDI Retail Services Ltd v The Rangers Football Club Ltd [2018] EWHC 2772 (Comm), “one must be careful not to place too much weight on the formal distinction between mandatory and prohibitory injunctions” (at [50]). More recently, the received wisdom was the subject of a clear restatement by Henshaw J in Trafigura Maritime Logistics Pte Ltd v Clearlake Shipping Pte Ltd (The “Miracle Hope”) [2021] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 533, who said that (at [30]):

  84. [58] The latest word on the matter in Singapore appears to be the Court of Appeal decision in RGA Holdings. Although the court did cite expressions used in NCC International, it also referred to Chuan Hong in the same breath. Indeed, I would venture to suggest that, on a close reading, the Court of Appeal’s thinking in RGA Holdings was more aligned with the view in Chuan Hong that there was no perceptible difference of principle between mandatory and prohibitory injunctions. This emerges from Chao Hick Tin JA’s observations that (see RGA Holdings at [31]):

  85. [59] Based on the survey of authority above, I consider that the position is most accurately stated in the Court of Appeal decision in Chuan Hong. There is no warrant for saying that a different set of rules apply to the grant of mandatory injunctions since, as Chao JA made clear in RGA Holdings, the “fundamental principle” of the path of least injustice underlies an interim mandatory injunction just as much as it does for interim prohibitory injunctions. It appears to me that harping too much on vague notions of mandatory injunctions being “more exceptional” obfuscates the underlying principle; there is a tendency to fall into the pitfall identified by See JAD of allowing a heuristic to “colour our opinion and skew our decisions” (see [49] above).

  86. [60] I note that this is also the general consensus reached amongst other common law jurisdictions. The Malaysian Court of Appeal held in ESPL (M) Sdn Bhd v Radio & General Engineering Sdn Bhd [2005] 2 MLJ 422 that although it was once thought to be the case that the grant of a mandatory injunction was governed by principles different from those applicable to prohibitory injunctions, this was “[n]o longer so” (at [27]). The Court of Appeal decision in SPH Ltd was cited as authority (at [29]). Similarly, in Australia, the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia undertook a comprehensive survey of the authorities in Mineralogy Pty Ltd v Sino Iron Pty Ltd [2016] WASCA 105 and concluded that “both principle and the weight of recent authority lead to the conclusion that no different standard applies in respect of an application for a mandatory injunction” (at [76]–[85]). The position in New Zealand is no different (see the New Zealand Court of Appeal decision of Fidelity Life Assurance Co Ltd v Pilkington [2010] NZCA 424 at [26], and more recently, the New Zealand High Court decision of Clode v Oliphant and others [2018] NZHC 1442 at [21]–[22]).

  87. [61] Interestingly, the Canadian courts have opted for a different approach. In R v Canadian Broadcasting Corp [2018] 1 SCR 196, Brown J, delivering the unanimous judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada, held that the appropriate criterion for assessing the strength of an applicant’s case in an application for an interim mandatory injunction was “not whether there is a serious issue to be tried, but rather whether the applicant has shown a strong prima facie case” [emphasis in original] (at [15]). This was justified on the ground that “[t]he potentially severe consequences for a defendant which can result from a mandatory interlocutory injunction … further demand [an] ‘extensive review of the merits’ at the interlocutory stage” (at [15]). As to what amounted to a “strong prima facie case”, the learned judge said the following (at [17]):

  88. [64] This is not to say, of course, that the distinction between mandatory and prohibitory injunctions is completely redundant. To that extent I might not go so far as Lord Hoffmann and refer to the distinction as a “barren” one. In my view, two related points that are worth bearing in mind are as follows:

  89. (a) First, before applying to the court, parties and their counsel should consider the necessity of seeking a mandatory injunction. If the protection sought can be appropriately or sufficiently achieved through a properly framed prohibitory injunction, the latter option should be pursued.

  90. (b) Second, if a party persists in seeking a mandatory injunction, the court may be interested to hear why a prohibitory injunction does not suffice to fulfil its purposes. The party should be prepared to explain its thought process with some particularity. This is especially so, as in the present case, where a party seeks both types of injunction – he or she should be prepared for the court’s inquiry as to why such a sweeping array of relief is necessary at this juncture.

  91. It seems to me that these two questions flow naturally from the fundamental principle of charting the path of least injustice, which counsels a minimally invasive approach to interim relief. An element of proportionality between the relief sought and the underlying interest that is sought to be protected is necessary to ensure that the court does not sanction overkill. As Hoffmann J said in Films Rover, there is a need to consider a “due process” question: the court must be wary to not allow the defendant’s interests to be trodden over before he or she has had the protection of a full hearing at trial (at 681).

  92. The parties’ cases

  93. [65] I now summarise the parties’ cases in broad strokes.

  94. The claimants’ arguments

  95. [66] The claimants submitted that the requirements for the grant of the injunctions had been met.

  96. [67] First, there was a serious issue to be tried, as well as a high degree of assurance, that the Security Documents and Receivables Agreements were unfair preferences under s 225 of the IRDA. The transactions took place within two years of the commencement of GLH’s winding up (ie, 12 April 2023), and GLH was insolvent at the time of the transactions; GL Thailand was placed in a better position in GLH’s liquidation as it was elevated to the position of a secured creditor as a result of the Security Documents and Receivables Agreements; and GLH was presumed to have been influenced by a desire to prefer GL Thailand as GL Thailand was a related company to GLH.

  97. [68] Further and/or alternatively, a number of the Security Documents were void against GLH as a company in insolvent liquidation as they constituted unregistered charges under s 131 of the Companies Act 1967 (2020 Rev Ed) (the “CA”). As for the first of the Receivables Agreements that was entered into on 1 July 2020 (and thereby fell outside the scope of the unfair preference provisions), this agreement was an unenforceable contract that was tainted by illegality as it was entered into in breach of the 1st Mareva Injunction that had been in force at the time.

  98. [69] The balance of convenience lay in favour of granting the injunctions sought. GL Thailand’s unwillingness to hold the ring pending the determination of the validity of the Security Documents was apparent from how it had (a) already taken steps to enforce its disputed security interests pursuant to the Security Documents even after GLH had gone into provisional liquidation; and (b) acted obstructively towards Mr Borrelli’s efforts to carry out his duties.

  99. [70] Damages would not be an adequate remedy for GLH if no injunctions were to be issued, as GL Thailand would be given free rein to enforce its remaining security interests, take control of GLH’s subsidiaries, and dissipate the subsidiaries’ assets. Even if the claimants turned out to be successful upon the final resolution of OC 565, their success could be rendered nugatory if the subsidiaries had by then already been reduced to shell companies of no value. At this juncture, I highlight that, given that a shareholder has no direct interest in the assets of the company by virtue of the cardinal principle of separate legal personality (see the House of Lords decision of Macaura v Northern Assurance Company, Limited and others [1925] AC 619 at 626–627, affirmed by the High Court in Jhaveri Darsan Jitendra and others v Salgaocar Anil Vassudeva and others [2018] 5 SLR 689 at [34] and the Court of Appeal in Miao Weiguo v Tendcare Medical Group Holdings Pte Ltd (formerly known as Tian Jian Hua Xia Medical Group Holdings Pte Ltd) (in judicial management) and another [2022] 1 SLR 884 at [115]), there was a missing step in the claimants’ submission between the dissipation of the assets of GLH’s subsidiaries and GLH suffering loss. I therefore understood the substance of the argument to be that the dissipation of the assets of GLH’s subsidiaries would hurt the value of the shares in the subsidiaries, so as to render futile a restoration of those shares to GLH in the event that the Security Documents were successfully set aside in OC 565.

  100. [71] The prejudice that would be suffered by GL Thailand in the event that the injunctions were wrongly granted was less than the prejudice that would be suffered by the claimants in the event that the injunctions were wrongly not granted. As Mr Borrelli qua liquidator was an officer of the court, there was no risk that he would act adversely towards GL Thailand and harm the value of its security interests in the event that they were adjudicated to be valid. Further, as no distribution of GLH’s assets would take place prior to the determination of OC 565, the assets that were the subject of GL Thailand’s claimed security would remain intact. Finally, the claimants were willing to give the usual undertaking as to damages.

  101. The defendant’s arguments

  102. [72] GL Thailand contended that the injunctions should not be issued.

  103. [73] There was neither a serious issue to be tried nor a high degree of assurance as to the success of the claimants’ claim in OC 565. The Security Documents and Receivables Agreements fell outside the scope of the unfair preference regime as GLH had not been insolvent when these transactions were executed. GLH had not been influenced by a desire to prefer GL Thailand when executing these transactions as it (GLH) was responding to legitimate commercial pressure exerted on it by GL Thailand.

  104. [74] GL Thailand had provided consideration for the Security Documents and Receivables Agreements in the form of its forbearance from enforcing the Loan Agreements despite GLH’s obligations to repay having fallen due. GL Thailand had also extended further loans to GLH pursuant to some of the Loan Agreements in exchange for some of the Security Documents and Receivables Agreements. The grant of security from GLH to GL Thailand had post-dated these further loans as GLH had been subject to the 1st Mareva Injunction, and had to wait until the lapse of the 1st Mareva Injunction to grant security to GL Thailand.

  105. [75] GL Thailand’s prior exercise of its rights under a number of the Security Documents was not in breach of the 2nd Mareva Injunction as GL Thailand was not subject to the 2nd Mareva Injunction.

  106. [76] The Security Documents alleged by the claimants to be void as unregistered charges under s 131 of the CA were not so because GL Thailand had exercised its rights prior to the commencement of GLH’s winding up and Mr Borrelli’s appointment as provisional liquidator. The exercise of its rights caused the charges to be spent, and the charges could not be rendered retrospectively void by GLH subsequently going into insolvent liquidation.

  107. [77] Further, the balance of convenience lay in favour of not granting the injunctions sought. In the first place, the claimants would be adequately compensated in damages in the event of their success in OC 565. The claimants’ claims in OC 565 were merely personal claims as opposed to proprietary claims to any assets or securities. GL Thailand could simply be required to pay a sum of money that restored the value of the securities and/or receivables under the Security Documents and Receivables Agreements to GLH’s estate for distribution to its unsecured creditors.

  108. [78] In any event, greater prejudice would be occasioned to GL Thailand from the injunctions being wrongly granted as opposed to the claimants being wrongly deprived of injunctions in the event of their success in OC 565. The injunctions sought by the claimants would prevent GL Thailand from exercising its securities under the Security Documents. If the value of these securities fell in the meantime, GL Thailand would be prejudiced as its exposure as an unsecured creditor would increase. Further, as GLH was already insolvent, there was a real risk that GLH would not be able to compensate GL Thailand for any loss in the value of its security; there was also doubt as to whether Mr Borrelli was providing an undertaking as to damages in his personal capacity.

  109. My decision: the application was granted in part

  110. The interim mandatory injunctions were not granted

  111. [80] I can first briefly dispose of the interim mandatory injunctions sought by the claimants in prayers (b) and (c). As I reflected to counsel for the claimants, Mr Suresh Nair Sukumaran (“Mr Nair”), at the hearing, the net effect of prayers (a) and (d) appeared to be identical to prayers (b) and (c) in so far as both sets of prayers were purposed towards preserving the assets that were the subject of the parties’ dispute in OC 565. Mr Nair fairly acknowledged this, and stated that prayers (b) and (c) had been included due to “concerns with the limits of the prohibitory injunction”.

  112. [81] Against this backdrop, I declined to grant the interim mandatory injunctions. As I explained at [64] above, if an applicant’s interests can be adequately protected by appropriately framed prohibitory injunctions, there would generally be no reason for the issue of more invasive mandatory injunctions. Further, although Mr Nair did gesture to “concerns with the limits of the prohibitory injunction”, the claimants did not explain or particularise what these “concerns” or “limits” were in their written and oral submissions. Indeed, my impression was that having ascertained that the interim prohibitory injunctions in prayers (a) and (d) achieved the purpose they needed, the claimants did not consider it necessary to push for the interim mandatory injunctions in prayers (b) and (c).

  113. The interim prohibitory injunctions were granted

  114. There was a serious question to be tried

  115. [82] Turning now to the interim prohibitory injunctions, I was satisfied that there was a serious question to be tried on the merits of GLH’s claim.

  116. (1) Whether the Security Documents and Receivables Agreements were unfair preferences

  117. [83] The principal claim made by the claimants in OC 565 is that the Security Documents and Receivables Agreements were unfair preferences. Given that there does not appear to have been a local decision that has clearly set out the applicable legal principles on the avoidance of unfair preference transactions, I consider it apposite to attempt to provide an overview below.

  118. (A) The applicable law on unfair preference

  119. [84] I begin with the statutory scheme on unfair preference. The main provision, s 225 of the IRDA, provides as follows:

  120. [85] In turn, s 226 of the IRDA, which defines the “relevant time” referred to in s 225(1) of the IRDA, provides (in so far as relevant to unfair preference) as follows:

  121. [87] It may be useful to briefly return to first principles: what is the object of the unfair preference regime? A common answer is that the rationale of the law of unfair preference is to uphold the integrity of the pari passu principle of distribution that is “the default rule in insolvent liquidation”, and which is statutorily enshrined in s 172 of the IRDA (see the General Division of the High Court decision in Park Hotel CQ Pte Ltd (in liquidation) and others v Law Ching Hung and another suit [2024] 5 SLR 138 at [49] and [51]). In this regard, the unfair preference regime reverses transactions that have the effect of improving the position of certain creditors in relation to those who would otherwise have been equally situated creditors in the liquidation. Normatively, the preferred creditor is viewed as having been unjustly enriched at the expense of the other unsecured creditors of the company (see the General Division of the High Court decision in Re Eng Lee Ling and another matter [2024] 4 SLR 929 at [31]), and the “unjust factor” that supplies the reason for – and indeed demands – restitution from the preferred creditor is thus insolvency law’s focus on equality amongst creditors (see Chua Rui Yuan, “The Aftermath of a Ponzi Scheme” [2023] LMCLQ 218 at 223; and Simone Degeling, “Restitution for Vulnerable Transactions” in Vulnerable Transactions in Corporate Insolvency (John Armour & Howard Bennett eds) (Hart Publishing, 2003) at paras 9.49–9.50). The following straightforward example illustrates this point (see Adrian Walters, “Preferences” in Vulnerable Transactions in Corporate Insolvency (John Armour & Howard Bennett eds) (Hart Publishing, 2003) (“Preferences”) at para 4.1):

  122. [88] However, as some commentators have pointed out, this is an inaccurate (or, at any rate, incomplete) rationalisation of the unfair preference regime under Singapore (and English) law (see Rebecca Parry, James Ayliffe QC & Sharif Shivji, Transaction Avoidance in Insolvencies (Oxford University Press, 3rd Ed, 2018) (“Transaction Avoidance in Insolvencies”) at paras 2.41–2.46). If the view above were to be taken to its logical conclusion, the unfair preference regime would bite solely upon a transaction having a preferential effect. But that is not the local position, as s 225(4) of the IRDA institutes a mental element of the company having been influenced by a desire to prefer the preferred creditor. By contrast, a purely effects-based regime can be found in Australian law, as s 588FA of the Australian Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (“Australian CA”) does not contain a similar mental element:

  123. [89] This is not merely a theoretical difference. The difference in legislative design and purpose can have practical consequences which should be borne in mind. Indeed, to take the present case (and OC 565) as an example, one of the defences that GL Thailand has raised is that the Security Documents and Receivables Agreements were extracted by GL Thailand from GLH based on legitimate commercial pressure; the implication of this argument is that GLH did not have the requisite mental element of a desire to prefer GL Thailand because its entry into the Security Documents and Receivables Agreements was a response to such pressure (see [73] above). This would be a valid argument in the unfair preference regime under Singapore (and English) law, but not so under effects-based regimes such as that under Australian law (see Report of the Review Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice (Cmnd 8558, 1982) at paras 1255–1256). In the present application, GLH was content to rest its case on the mental element mostly on the statutory presumption under s 225(5) of the IRDA where the recipient of the preference is (as GL Thailand is) a connected person to the company. I was satisfied that this was sufficient to raise a serious issue to be tried in so far as that requirement was concerned, but it should not be assumed that this would always suffice, still less when it comes to the full determination of OC 565.

  124. [90] With the statutory scheme and a brief understanding of the rationale underpinning the unfair preference regime in mind, I turn to the constituent elements of an unfair preference. In my view, a transaction would constitute an unfair preference if the following conditions are met:

  125. (a) First, there must be a pre-existing relationship of debtor and creditor (or debtor and guarantor/surety) between the company and the transaction counterparty.

  126. (b) Second, the transaction that is alleged to be a preference must be referable to an antecedent debt between the company and the transaction counterparty.

  127. (c) Third, the company must have given a factual preference to the transaction counterparty. There are two facets to this:

  128. (i) one, the company must have done (or suffered to have been done) something that had the effect of putting the counterparty in a better position in the company’s liquidation than it would otherwise have been if that thing had not been done; and

  129. (ii) two, the advantage to the counterparty must have come at the expense of the company’s other unsecured creditors.

  130. (d) Fourth, the company must have been influenced by a desire to prefer the transaction counterparty. This can either be proven through evidence or with the aid of the statutory presumption if the counterparty is a connected person to the company.

  131. (e) Fifth, the transaction must have taken place at a relevant time prior to the commencement of the winding up. There are two facets to this:

  132. (i) one, the transaction must have taken place either within one year before the commencement of the winding up or, where the counterparty is a connected person to the company, two years before the commencement of the winding up; and

  133. (ii) two, the transaction must either have taken place when the company was insolvent or the company became insolvent as a result of the transaction. The relevant test of insolvency is the test of inability to pay debts under s 125(2) of the IRDA.

  134. [91] I explain each of the elements below.

  135. (I) Pre-existing relationship of debtor and creditor

  136. [92] First, the necessity of a pre-existing relationship of debtor and creditor (or debtor and guarantor/surety) between the company and the recipient of the preference is made explicit by s 225(3)(a) of the IRDA. The logic is also commonsensical: it is inherent in the very concept of a preference, that is concerned with inter-creditor fairness, that the recipient of the preference is an existing creditor. As the General Division of the High Court explained in Envy Asset Management Pte Ltd (in liquidation) and others v CH Biovest Pte Ltd [2024] SGHC 46, the giving of a preference has no effect on the debtor’s net asset position; there is no change in net asset position because the diminution in the debtor’s assets is matched by a corresponding decrease in its liabilities when the debtor pays off a debt or liability (at [72(a)]). Contrariwise, a transaction that does adversely affect the debtor’s net asset position would not fall to be caught by the preference regime but would instead be redressed by the provisions on undervalue transactions (at [72(b)]).

  137. (II) The transaction must be referable to an antecedent debt

  138. [93] The second requirement is a refinement of the first. It is not the case that, once a creditor-debtor relationship comes into being, all subsequent transactions between the parties would amount to a preference. Instead, a creditor can only be said to have been preferred (relative to other existing creditors) if it gains an advantage in respect of a pre-existing, or antecedent, debt owed to it by the company (see Preferences at para 4.25). As the leading textbook Goode on Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (Kristin van Zwieten ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 5th Ed, 2018) (“Goode on Insolvency”) puts it, “[t]he payment, transfer or other act under attack must relate to a past indebtedness, for to the extent that the creditor gives new value, he gains no advantage” (at para 13-79). The reason for this was explained by Dixon J (as he then was) in the High Court of Australia decision of Robertson v Grigg (1932) 47 CLR 257 (at 271):

  139. (a) If Company X grants a charge over its assets to secure a repayment of a contemporaneous advance of moneys from Company Y, the creation of that charge does not amount to a preference even if there are existing debts owing from Company X to Company Y. The transaction is not referable to any past indebtedness of Company X.

  140. (b) If, on the other hand, Company X grants a charge over its assets to secure an existing debt owed to Company Y, the creation of that charge would amount to a preference as Company Y is now in a better position in the event of Company X’s insolvent liquidation than it otherwise would have been but for the grant of the charge.

  141. (c) If Company X grants a charge over its assets to secure both existing indebtedness and a contemporaneous advance, the creation of that charge would be a partial preference to the extent that it relates to the existing indebtedness. But for the grant of the charge, Company Y would have been in a worse position in Company X’s insolvent liquidation in so far as the existing debt(s) are concerned.

  142. (III) The creditor must have received a factual preference

  143. [95] The third requirement of a factual preference is, self-evidently, the crux of the unfair preference regime. The relevant inquiry is whether the effect of the transaction is to place the creditor in a better position in the company’s insolvency than he would otherwise have been in a counterfactual insolvency where the transaction had not occurred (see Preferences at para 4.28).

  144. [96] It is notable that s 225 of the IRDA is silent on the time when the preferential effect (or otherwise) of the transaction should be assessed. In practice, I suspect that whether the time chosen is the time of the transaction or the time of the company’s actual liquidation would not make a difference. Nonetheless, there is English authority supporting the view that the court should assess the preferential effect of the transaction by comparing the creditor’s position in a hypothetical liquidation right before the transaction and a hypothetical liquidation right after the transaction (see the English High Court decision of Re Hawkes Hill Publishing Co Ltd (in liquidation) [2007] BPIR 1305 (“Hawkes Hill”) at [31]). This is also the view that the High Court of Australia adopted in Airservices Australia v Ferrier and another (1996) 185 CLR 483 (at 501). I consider this to be correct in principle; in particular, the phrase “in the event of the company’s winding up” [emphasis added] in s 225(3)(b) of the IRDA suggests that the court should look to an immediate hypothetical liquidation rather than the actual liquidation (see Transaction Avoidance in Insolvencies at para 5.56).

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