General Division of the High Court · Decided 19 August 2024
Choo Yew Liang Sebastian v Koh Yew Teck and another (Direct Asia Insurance (Singapore) Pte Ltd, third party) (Etiqa Insurance Pte Ltd, intervener)
Feedback & support[2024] SGHC 212 · Case no. Registrar’s Appeal (State Courts) No 2 of 2024
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Grounds of decision
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Introduction
- [1]
[1] This is an appeal against the award for damages granted in favour of the appellant as a victim of a road traffic accident that took place on 31 December 2013 (“the Accident”). At the first instance vide DC/AD 257/2018, the learned Deputy Registrar (“the learned DR”) awarded the appellant damages totalling $135,268.40. The appellant appealed this decision vide DC/RA 56/2023 (“RA 56”) and the learned District Judge (“the learned DJ”) affirmed all but one of the awards of the learned DR. The remaining award, which related to damages for loss of earning capacity, was increased from $20,000 to $40,000 by the learned DJ.
- [2]
[2] The appellant appeals all but one of the learned DR’s and learned DJ’s awards. I heard the parties over three days and reserved my judgment. I now set out my decision and reasons in respect of each award appealed against.
- [3]
[3] This case also presents an opportunity to clarify the effect of the recent decision of the Court of Appeal (“CA”) in Crapper Ian Anthony v Salmizan bin Abdullah [2024] SGCA 21 (“Salmizan (CA)”) in relation to personal injury cases that have been bifurcated with an interlocutory judgment issued after trial. To the extent that the CA does not address this particular situation in its decision, I record my views and provide guidance on how such actions should be managed.
Facts
Procedural history
- [4]
[4] The appellant was involved in a road accident on 27 May 2010 (“the Previous Accident”), in which his car was rear ended, and he suffered a Grade 2 whiplash injury. The appellant commenced an action in DC/DC 1570/2013 (“DC 1570”) to seek compensation for this said injury.
- [6]
[6] On 31 May 2019, the interveners, who are the respondent’s insurers, applied to join themselves to DC 2183. On 2 July 2019, the court granted this application, and the interveners were added on 16 August 2019.
- [7]
[7] On 15 January 2020, the second defendant in DC 1570, ie, the suit related to the Previous Accident, applied for the ADs in DC 1570 and DC 2183 (namely DC/AD 368/2017 and DC/AD 257/2018, respectively) to be heard together since there would be common issues of attributing the appellant’s injuries to the Previous Accident and the Accident. The application was granted by consent of all the parties in DC 2183. DC 1570 and DC 2183 then proceeded for a consolidated AD hearing before the learned DR. At the final tranche of the AD, DC 1570, relating to the Previous Accident, was amicably settled. This left DC 2183, relating to the Accident, to be resolved.
- [8]
[8] On 23 August 2023, the learned DR delivered her decision for the AD in DC 2183, granting damages in the sum of $135,142 in favour of the appellant. On 4 September 2023, the learned DR clarified that this sum was instead $135,368.40.
- [9]
[9] On 17 September 2023, the appellant filed a notice of appeal in RA 56 to appeal against the decision of the learned DR. On 18 December 2023, the learned DJ affirmed the learned DR’s decision, save that he varied the quantum awarded by the learned DR for the appellant’s loss of earning capacity from $20,000 to $40,000.
- [10]
[10] On 29 December 2023, the appellant filed the notice of appeal in HC/RAS 2/2024, ie, the present appeal, to appeal the learned DJ’s decision in RA 56.
- [11]
[11] For the avoidance of doubt, the present appeal is concerned with the AD of DC 2183, relating to the Accident.
Background to the dispute
- [12]
[12] I briefly note that apart from the two road traffic accidents forming the subject matter of DC 1570 and DC 2183, the appellant had been involved in three other subsequent incidents that may be relevant in assessing the damages that the respondent is liable for as a result of the Accident. The incidents are as follows:
I will refer to these incidents where they are relevant to my decision. While I note that the appellant was involved in other prior incidents, these are immaterial for the present assessment of damages.
Issues to be determined
- [13]
[13] The appellant is appealing against the learned DJ’s decision in respect of every head of damages except the award for damages of $2,000 corresponding to the post-concussion syndrome with giddiness and frequent headache suffered by the appellant. The list of awards (including nil awards) appealed against are as follows:
- [14]
[14] I shall address each head of damages seriatim.
- [15]
[15] In addition, a preliminary issue which the appellant raises is whether the respondent and the intervener (the “opposing parties”) are entitled to dispute the element of causation for each head of damage in view of the High Court decision of Salmizan bin Abdullah v Crapper, Ian Anthony [2023] SGHC 75 (“Salmizan (HC)”).
The applicable law
The level of appellate intervention
- [16]
[16] I first consider the appropriate level of appellate intervention applicable to the present matter. Section 22 of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (2020 Rev Ed) (“SCJA”) provides:
- [17]
[17] The issue of the level of appellate intervention, in the context of an appeal of a decision of a District Judge to the High Court, was recently considered by Goh Yihan J in the case of Lim Chee Seng v Phang Yew Kiat [2024] SGHC 100 (“Lim Chee Seng”). Referencing his earlier decision in Tan Meow Hiang (trading as Chip Huat) v Ong Kay Yong (trading as Wee Wee Laundry Service) [2023] SGHC 218 (“Tan Meow Hiang”) at [20]–[26], Goh J summarised the applicable principles regarding the threshold of appellate intervention in Lim Chee Seng at [58]–[59]:
- [18]
[18] For completeness, I note that the parties had submitted that the principles governing an appeal to a Judge in chambers was set out by the Court of Appeal in Tan Boon Heng v Lay Pang Cheng David [2013] 4 SLR 718 (“Tan Boon Heng”). Their reliance on this decision is, in my view, slightly attenuated. While Tan Boon Heng also concerned an appeal against the assessment of damages in a claim arising out of a motor accident, it is important to recognise the different (procedural) context of that case when compared to the present case.
- [19]
[19] In Tan Boon Heng, the assessment of damages was conducted by an Assistant Registrar and this decision was appealed to a High Court Judge in chambers. The issue before the CA was “what were the applicable principles governing a High Court Judge’s review, on appeal, of a decision made by the Registrar, the Deputy Registrar or an Assistant Registrar of the Supreme Court (“the Registrar”) in an assessment of damages” [emphasis added]: Tan Boon Heng at [2]. In determining the applicable principles governing the intervention by a Judge in chambers in a decision of the Registrar, the CA recognised that the jurisdiction exercised by the Registrar was “delegated”, in that the Registrar is exercising powers and jurisdiction devolved to him from those vested in a High Court Judge: Tan Boon Heng at [14] and [16]. As such, where the Registrar’s decision is taken up to a Judge in chambers, that is not an “appeal” in the true sense, and a Judge in chambers who hears such an appeal is not exercising an appellate jurisdiction – for that term would only be accurate and applicable where the appealed decision emanates from an inferior court or tribunal – but is exercising confirmatory jurisdiction instead: Tan Boon Heng at [16]. It is in view of this foundational premise that the CA proceeded to consider the applicable principles governing the intervention by a Judge in chambers in a decision of the Registrar.
- [20]
[20] In contrast, the present matter concerns an appeal against a decision of a District Judge (of the State Court) and not the Registrar, the Deputy Registrar or an Assistant Registrar of the Supreme Court. Unlike Tan Boon Heng, it thus cannot be said that this court is exercising confirmatory jurisdiction; rather, this court is exercising appellate jurisdiction in its true sense since the appealed decision does in fact emanate from an inferior court. In this sense, the principles espoused by Goh J in Lim Chee Seng would be more germane to the present case.
- [21]
[21] Despite these observations, it must be acknowledged that ultimately, the principles of appellate intervention as set out in Tan Boon Heng do not greatly differ from those summarised by Goh J in Lim Chee Seng. This is primarily because the central issue common to both contexts is how findings of fact of the judge of first instance – who had the benefit of hearing the evidence of the witnesses – should be treated. In this regard, particularly where findings of fact based on oral evidence are concerned, it is essential that some deference must be given to that judge who had the benefit of hearing the evidence of the witnesses (ie, the Assistant Registrar in the case of Tan Boon Heng or the learned DR in the present case).
- [22]
[22] Finally, it is also a crucial reminder that “at the end of the day, the appellate court’s duty is to do justice by correcting plainly wrong decisions”: Tan Meow Hiang at [26].
Burden of proof
- [23]
[23] It should go without saying that the appellant bears the legal burden of establishing his case (see s 103 of the Evidence Act 1893 (2020 Rev Ed) (“the Evidence Act”) which encapsulates the same principle at common law): see Loo Chay Sit v Estate of Loo Chay Loo, deceased [2010] 1 SLR 286 at [14]. In the context of assessing damages in personal injury cases, I note the remarks of the court in Yap Pow Kin v Muhammad bin Johari [2019] SGMC 40 at [21], which I endorse:
Whether the opposing parties are entitled to raise issues of causation
- [24]
[24] The appellant raised a preliminary issue of whether the opposing parties were even entitled to challenge the causation of injuries and/or damages suffered by the appellant at the AD stage. While this issue did not appear to be seriously pursued by the appellant, with no oral submissions made in this regard at the hearings before me, I shall address this question for completeness. The appellant submitted that because of the decision in Salmizan (HC) ([15] supra), which was decided on the basis of “the substantive law on the tort of negligence” and because “there has not been any changes in the law of negligence which would render the decision inapplicable to past cases”, the opposing parties should not be entitled to challenge the element of causation, particularly when the issue was never raised at any time until the commencement of the AD.
- [25]
[25] Before substantively addressing this argument, I note that this argument was not advanced in the appellant’s written submissions before the learned DR. However, this omission is excusable on account of the fact that Salmizan (HC), which the appellant’s argument is based on, was decided on 30 March 2023 while his submissions at first instance were filed before, on 19 December 2022.
- [26]
[26] In Salmizan (HC), the parties there had submitted, pursuant to O 33 r 2 of the Rules of Court (2014 Rev Ed), three questions of law to the court for preliminary determination prior to the AD of that underlying matter. The true import of those questions was whether the issue of causation can be reserved, or at least challenged to some extent, at the AD stage of a proceeding. After a thorough and comprehensive analysis of the tort of negligence, Goh Yihan JC (as he then was) held that the causation of injuries and/or damages cannot be challenged to any extent at the AD stage: Salmizan (HC) at [61] and [145]. Be that as it may, in the subsequent case of Foo Kok Boon v Ngow Kheong Shen and others and another matter [2023] 5 SLR 1633 (“Foo Kok Boon”) at [26] and [37], Goh JC clarified that the doctrine of prospective overruling applied in relation to Salmizan (HC) and therefore a defendant who had entered into an interlocutory judgement (whether by consent or not) prior to the date of the decision in Salmizan (HC) (ie, 30 March 2023) was entitled to raise issues of causation at the AD stage.
- [27]
[27] In coming to her decision, the learned DR was cognisant of the effect of Salmizan (HC) and Foo Kok Boon. In her view, since the interlocutory judgment for DC 2183 was entered on 13 December 2017, ie before the date of the decision in Salmizan (HC), the opposing parties were entitled to raise issues of causation in respect of all the damage the appellant claims to have suffered. Despite this, the appellant consequently raised his objection for the first time in RA 56, stating that the opposing parties were not entitled to dispute causation. The learned DJ took notice of the learned DR’s finding in this regard and found that the appellant’s objection had no merit.
- [28]
[28] Notwithstanding this, the appellant yet again raises the same objection, that too without any further substantiation. In fact, the appellant expressly acknowledges the effect of Foo Kok Boon in his submissions for this appeal.
- [29]
[29] Concurrent to the present proceedings, the CA heard and allowed the appeal against the decision of the High Court in Salmizan (HC): Salmizan (CA) ([3] supra) at [4] and [64]. In brief, the CA found that the issue of causation can be reserved in toto to the AD stage: Salmizan (CA) at [64]. Based on the CA’s analysis, an interlocutory judgment is an intermediate judgment that determines a preliminary or a subordinate point but does not finally decide the case: Salmizan (CA) at [47]. To this end, it is an incorrect presupposition that there cannot be an interlocutory judgment without first establishing liability: Salmizan (CA) at [48]. In determining what an “interlocutory judgment” is, the context and the terms of that particular interlocutory judgment are crucial: Salmizan (CA) at [50]. Accordingly, the CA held that liability does not need to be fully established before a consent interlocutory judgment can be entered into in the context of personal injury motor accident cases: Salmizan (CA) at [35] and [48].
- [30]
[30] In the present case, the interlocutory judgment was not entered by consent, but rather after trial before the learned DR. At the conclusion of the first tranche, the learned DR found the following:
Thus, only the CA’s remarks in Salmizan (CA) in respect of the general principles concerning interlocutory judgments are assistive for our purposes.
- [31]
[31] Turning back to the issue at hand, namely whether the opposing parties are entitled to raise issues of causation at the AD stage, the critical question is what subordinate point was determined in the learned DR’s interlocutory judgment. On the facts of the present case, it is undisputable that the parties had proceeded on the basis that the issue of causation of the appellant’s injuries was to be reserved for the AD stage. The parties only adduced evidence relating to the respondent’s liability for the Accident at the first tranche, and no evidence was given in relation to the alleged injuries suffered by the appellant. The learned DR’s review was thus confined to the facts of the Accident; she did not, and could not, make any findings pertaining to whether the appellant’s injuries (which are the basis of his claim for damages) were caused by the Accident. Therefore, I find that the learned DR’s interlocutory judgment only determined whether the respondent had caused the Accident. The subsequent question of whether the Accident had caused the appellant’s injuries was not addressed in the interlocutory judgment and this issue can be challenged by the opposing parties at the AD stage.
- [32]
[32] Before leaving this matter, I pause to briefly record my views on interlocutory judgments that are not entered into by consent. As the CA recognised, issues may continue to arise as to what an interlocutory judgment was entered in respect of: Salmizan (CA) at [50]. In this regard, the CA remarked at [51] that:
- [34]
[34] I should caveat that requiring precision and clarity ought not to be taken as an indication that the practice of reserving selected questions to a later stage of the proceedings is discouraged. On the contrary, some cases will necessarily be better disposed of if such an approach is taken. For example, such a practice is eminently sensible in the context of personal injury motor accident claims such as the present case, given the resource intensive process of gathering and adducing medical evidence; it might be far more practical for the factual questions of whether a duty of care had been breached and whether a defendant had caused the motor accident (as opposed to causing a claimant’s injuries) to be determined first, before moving further into the process.
- [35]
[35] Having dealt with this preliminary issue, I move to consider the awards for general damages, followed by the awards for special damages.
General Damages
Claim (A)(i): Severe exacerbation of whiplash injury
- [36]
[36] At first instance, the appellant sought $30,000 for the allegedly severe exacerbation of his Grade 2 Whiplash Associated Disorder – which he suffered after the Previous Accident – that caused severe pain and stiffness of his neck and cervicogenic headaches and permanent disabilities. The learned DR awarded $12,000 for the worsened neck pain requiring stronger treatment and the additional symptoms of cervicogenic headaches suffered by the appellant after the Accident. This award was affirmed by the learned DJ.
- [37]
[37] On appeal, the appellant submits that based on the increase in the medical expenses to treat his whiplash injury after the Accident and the differences in modalities of treatment for the injury, the resultant severe exacerbation of the whiplash injury suffered after the Accident was an intervening event which would have overwhelmed and subsumed the effects of the injury suffered after the Previous Accident. Accordingly, the appellant cites the case of Salcon Ltd v United Cements Pte Ltd [2004] 4 SLR(R) 353 (“Salcon”) to suggest that the respondent should be wholly liable for the severe aggravation of the whiplash injury as well as the consequential losses. The appellant further contends that in the premises, the award of $12,000 is low bearing in mind the awards in Pang Tim Fook Paul v Ang Swee Koon and another [2005] SGDC 258 (“Pang Tim Fook”), Karuppiah Nirmala v Singapore Bus Services Ltd [2002] 1 SLR(R) 934 (“Karuppiah”) and Scott Grayham De Silva v Comfort Transportation Pte Ltd and others [2017] SGDC 215 (“Scott Grayham”), and hence, claims for no less than $25,000.
- [38]
[38] The opposing parties do not dispute that the appellant suffered an exacerbation of his neck whiplash injury as a result of the Accident. However, they argue that the appellant’s overall neck symptoms and disabilities cannot be entirely attributed to the injuries sustained in the Accident. The opposing parties highlight that the appellant’s neck pains from his whiplash injury as a result of the Previous Accident persisted to the time of the Accident, and the appellant would have still required treatment for his pre-existing neck injury, irrespective of the Accident. Since the appellant had another pre-existing condition, that of degenerative asymptomatic cervical spondylosis, which predated the accidents, this similar factual matrix must be accounted for in the case authorities relied on. Comparing with the cases of Lee Chen Cher v Chia Boon Hua (DC Suit No 3233 of 2011) (“Lee Chen Cher”) and Karuppiah, the learned DR’s award of $12,000 is fair and reasonable.
- [39]
[39] It is not disputed that the appellant had sustained a Grade 2 neck whiplash injury as a result of the Previous Accident. The key question is whether the exacerbation of the whiplash injury suffered after the Accident should be considered as an intervening event which would have overwhelmed and subsumed the effects of the injury suffered after the Previous Accident. If this is so, an award should be made on the ‘new’ injury without reference to the injuries that pre-existed the Accident. However, if the question is answered in the negative, the neck injury in the Accident would be treated as an exacerbation of a pre-existing neck injury and the award should take into account that pre-existing injury. In my view, the answer to this question lies in understanding the condition of the appellant prior to the Accident and the extent of injuries caused by the Accident. Hence, I turn to the medical evidence.
- [40]
[40] After the Previous Accident, the appellant had seen Dr Razmi Rahmat (“Dr Razmi”), an orthopaedic specialist, who had diagnosed the appellant with Grade 2 whiplash injury to his neck. In a report dated 30 January 2011, Dr Razmi opined that the X-ray and MRI findings after the Previous Accident suggest that the appellant “already ha[d] asymptomatic preexisting mild changes of the cervical spondylosis”. In addition, I observe that the appellant had continued to seek treatment with Dr Razmi after the Previous Accident for chronic neck pain, with the last visit before the Accident as late as 19 December 2013. Under cross-examination, Dr Razmi opined that absent the Accident, the neck injury from the Previous Accident would have continued to affect the appellant:
- [41]
[41] Similarly, the appellant conceded under cross-examination that he would have needed to continue his treatment absent the Accident:
- [42]
[42] Having established that the appellant suffered from a pre-existing condition, namely chronic pain arising from cervical spondylosis and the Grade 2 whiplash injury after the Previous Accident, the question that follows is, what then is the effect of this pre-existing condition in the assessment of the respondent’s liability. The appellant argues that the pre-existing condition was “overwhelmed and subsumed” by the injury of the Accident and cites the case of Salcon in support of his assertion that the respondent had to be fully liable for the symptoms resulting from the aggravation of the neck injury.
- [43]
[43] I do not find the case of Salcon to be relevant for the proposition advanced by the appellant. Salcon was a commercial case concerned with the liability of a contractor who built a defective silo that had eventually collapsed due to the later actions of a third party. The question there was whether the later actions of a third party operated as a novus actus interveniens that relieved the liability of the contractor. It is clear that Salcon was concerned with determining the liability of the earlier tortfeasor that caused the defects in the silo. In the present case, the respondent is not in an analogous position. Rather, the respondent is the subsequent tortfeasor in the chain of events since the appellant had a pre-existing condition before the Accident, and the respondent had caused further injury to the appellant. As such, this authority does not support the appellant’s argument that the respondent should be held fully liable for all the symptoms suffered as if the appellant had suffered a fresh injury.
- [44]
[44] Instead, in my judgment, due consideration must be given to the fact that the appellant had a pre-existing condition that would have continued regardless of the Accident. To ignore such a condition would be artificial and effectively attribute excessive liability onto the respondent. However, this is not to say that the respondent should not be held responsible for the eventual injuries sustained by the Accident. Rather, the respondent would still be liable for the full extent of the appellant’s neck injury after the Accident, albeit recognising the pre-existing condition of the appellant which is not related to the Accident. On this note, I move to consider the extent of injury to the appellant’s neck that was attributable to the Accident.
- [45]
[45] After the Accident, the appellant was first admitted at the hospital on 2 January 2014, at which point Dr Razmi, who was already treating him for his neck injury and chronic pain from the Previous Accident, diagnosed the appellant with “severe exacerbation of his neck whiplash injury” and graded the injury as Grade 2. After he was discharged on 4 January 2014, the appellant was re-admitted two more times, on 8 January and 18 February 2014. During both of these re-admissions, he complained of severe neck pain associated with headaches and giddiness. On his second re-admission, the appellant was referred to Dr Nicholas Chua (“Dr Chua”), a pain specialist, who diagnosed the appellant with Grade 2 Whiplash disorder and associated cervicogenic headache. The appellant was re-admitted again in June and October 2014 for his neck pain, among other things. The appellant continued seeking treatment for his neck pain and associated headaches regularly with Dr Chua all the way up till 2020. This included a whole host of treatments such as pain relief injections, muscle relaxants, nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs and neuropathic medications. Post-2020, the appellant also sought treatment at Singapore General Hospital (“SGH”) twice. Thus, I find that after the Accident, the appellant had sustained a Grade 2 whiplash injury with associated cervicogenic headaches.
- [46]
[46] In comparison with the condition of the appellant immediately prior to the Accident, there is evidently an exacerbation or aggravation of the neck injury. The appellant sought stronger treatment and had the added symptom of cervicogenic headaches. In this regard, the learned DR’s characterisation of the relevant injury as an aggravation of a pre-existing condition of the neck was correct.
- [47]
[47] With that, I address the final issue in relation to this specific claim, that being the appropriate quantum of damages to be awarded. I first set out the cases cited by the parties before applying the relevant precedents to the present facts.
- [48]
[48] In Pang Tim Fook ([37] supra), the plaintiff claimed for personal injuries sustained in a chain collision along the expressway, from the drivers of the two motor cars behind him in the chain. The plaintiff suffered, inter alia, Grade 2 neck whiplash and had pre-existing age-related degenerative cervical spondylosis. The court in that case awarded the plaintiff $12,000 for the injury.
- [49]
[49] In Karuppiah ([37] supra), the first instance court awarded the plaintiff $14,000 for a whiplash injury to the cervical spine aggravating existing cervical spondylosis, with the prospect of osteoarthritis. This was not appealed against and so, this award was not reviewed by the appellate court.
- [50]
[50] In Lee Chen Cher ([38] supra), the plaintiff who suffered a Grade 2 whiplash injury with persistent neck pain, headaches and nausea and stiffness arising from exacerbation of pre-existing cervical spondylosis was awarded $10,000 for the injury. The plaintiff was noted to have restricted range of spinal motions and accelerated progress of cervical spondylosis.
- [51]
[51] In Scott Grayham ([37] supra), the plaintiff suffered a Grade 2 whiplash injury that aggravated the plaintiff’s pre-existing cervical spondylosis. At and around the time after the accident, there was limited range of motion and reduced lateral rotation of the neck. Two and a half years after the accident, the plaintiff complained of intermittent left-sided neck pain and did not take any medication. Five and a half years after, the new symptoms of pain and numbness were noted, which the doctor opined to be related to the pre-existing cervical spondylosis. The court there awarded $11,000 for the injury.
- [52]
[52] The precedent authorities generally support an award of $10,000–$14,000 for exacerbation of existing cervical spondylosis. I agree with the learned DR that the case of Scott Grayham is most similar to the present case. Granted that the degree of severity of the plaintiff’s injury in Scott Grayham was not as high as that of the appellant in the present case, it must be noted that the appellant’s pre-existing condition was already rather advanced, especially in view of the regularity and extensiveness of treatment over the three years with Dr Razmi prior to the Accident. Post the Accident, the appellant’s treatment was amplified to include more medication and the appellant was also hospitalised. Hence, while the present case involved more intensive treatment as compared to Scott Grayham, this should be seen in the context of the treatment the appellant was already undergoing before the Accident. In my judgment, the award of $12,000 is fair and reasonable, and I uphold the learned DR’s decision in this regard.
Claim (A)(ii): Bilateral wrist contusion
Left wrist contusion
- [53]
[53] At first instance, the appellant sought $15,000 for his left wrist contusion. The learned DR declined to make an award for the left wrist contusion on the basis that the appellant had not proven, on a balance of probabilities, that the left wrist injury was caused by the Accident. This was affirmed by the learned DJ on appeal. The learned DR relied primarily on the testimony of Dr Peng Yeong Pin (“Dr Peng”), a hand surgeon who had treated the appellant, which I will set out in greater detail later.
- [54]
[54] In the present appeal, the appellant submits, first, that his complaint of left wrist pain in March 2014 is consistent across the body of evidence, particularly the testimony of Dr Razmi, the appellant’s orthopaedic specialist, and the medical report authored by Dr Peng. Second, although his complaint of left wrist pain only surfaced sometime in March 2014, some three months after the Accident, the appellant submits that the delay in his reporting was explained by Dr Razmi. In brief, Dr Razmi highlighted that the appellant had been under heavy medication for his neck injury that desensitizes the nerves and thereby reduces pain. Dr Razmi also testified that he was not aware of any other accident that could have caused the injury to the appellant’s left wrist. According to the appellant, the learned DR failed to give due consideration to this explanation. Third, the appellant argues that, based on the testimony of Dr Peng, it was “not uncommon that the Accident may have indirectly caused [the] left wrist injury due to over reliance on the uninjured left wrist as a result of the injury and pain from the right wrist”. As such, even if the left wrist injury was indirectly caused by the Accident, the respondent would still be liable for the same since it is undisputed that the appellant suffered the right wrist injury due to the Accident.
- [55]
[55] The opposing parties submit that there is no cogent medical evidence that the appellant’s left wrist injury resulted from the Accident. They point to Dr Razmi’s concession that the appellant’s injury may not be related to the Accident, as well as Dr Peng’s testimony that there is a higher likelihood of an intervening event that caused the pain when there is a longer lapse of time between the traumatic event (ie, the Accident) and the manifestation of pain.
- [56]
[56] The first documented complaint of left wrist pain appears in Dr Razmi’s medical report dated 31 October 2014, where it was stated that “[e]xamination [on 2 January 2014] of his left wrist revealed tenderness over the radial and ulnar styloids of his right wrist but there was no limitation in the range of motion” [emphasis added]. Under cross-examination, Dr Razmi clarified that when the appellant saw him on 2 January 2014, the appellant only presented with right wrist pain and only developed left wrist pain later. As such, the examination by Dr Razmi only focused on the right wrist, and there was no diagnosis made in respect of the left wrist. In view of this, I am in agreement with the learned DR that the reference to the “left wrist” in Dr Razmi’s medical report dated 31 October 2014 had to be an error, and that the appellant did not complain for pain to his left wrist when he saw Dr Razmi on 2 January 2014, after the Accident.
- [57]
[57] Given so, the question remains as to when the appellant had first complained about pain to his left wrist. In Dr Razmi’s medical report dated 31 March 2014, he noted “left wrist pain” as part of a list of new complaints that the appellant experienced immediately after the Accident. Under cross-examination, Dr Razmi clarified as much:
- [58]
[58] This is consistent with Dr Peng’s medical report of 20 January 2018, where he stated that “[p]ain in the right wrist started immediately after the [Accident] and pain in the left wrist developed a few months later”. Under-cross examination, Dr Peng also clarified that he was not sure when the complaint was first made over the left wrist pain. Thus, the evidence of Dr Razmi and Dr Peng strongly suggest that the complaint of left wrist pain was not made at and/or around the time of the Accident. Rather, it is clear to me that the complaint only arose some months after the Accident.
- [59]
[59] Regarding this delay, Dr Razmi conceded under cross-examination that it was possible that the left wrist pain was not related to the Accident:
Be that as it may, Dr Razmi also implied that the delay in the manifestation of pain to the left wrist may be due to the other medications the appellant had been taking:
- [60]
[60] Ultimately, Dr Razmi could not commit to whether the left wrist injury had been caused by the Accident:
- [61]
[61] Dr Peng went further and was more certain in his conclusions than Dr Razmi, opining that the left wrist injury was not directly caused by the Accident:
- [62]
[62] In addition, Dr Peng agreed that the longer the time period between the event and the alleged manifestation of pain, the lower the likelihood that the alleged manifestation of pain is related to the traumatic event. As to Dr Razmi’s explanation that the appellant had been suffering from pain in relation to his neck and had been on pain medication for that, and thus may not have mentioned his wrist pain as it was “masked”, Dr Peng agreed with the explanation. However, this should be examined in light of Dr Peng’s earlier testimony under cross-examination:
Thus, while Dr Peng accepted that the pain medication consumed by the appellant may have caused some delay in the manifestation of pain to his left wrist, Dr Peng did not take the position that this would explain the three-month delay.
- [63]
[63] On a review of the evidence, I find that the appellant has indeed not proven, on a balance of probabilities, that his left wrist injury was caused by the Accident. On one hand, Dr Razmi’s evidence is equivocal and only informs me that it was possible that the Accident caused (or did not cause) the injury to the left wrist. On the other hand, Dr Peng expressly stated that it was his opinion that the injury was not directly caused by the Accident. From this, it is evident that neither Dr Razmi nor Dr Peng was of the opinion that the left wrist injury was likely caused by the Accident. While it is important to prove that causation was possible, it is even more crucial for the appellant, bearing the burden of proof, to prove that causation was probable. On the evidence, this was not achieved. At its highest, the appellant has raised mere suspicions that his left wrist injury is related to the Accident.
- [64]
[64] Therefore, I uphold the learned DR’s decision in this regard and make no award for the left wrist injury.
Right wrist contusion
- [65]
[65] The learned DR awarded $500 for the appellant’s right wrist contusion on the basis that the injury suffered as a result of the Accident had resolved completely soon after the Accident. The learned DR reached this conclusion in view of the fact that the right wrist contusion was treated almost immediately after the Accident and there was no further treatment of wrist pain until June 2015, ie, a year and a half after the Accident. This, in her view, meant that any complaint of wrist pain in May or June 2015 was, on the balance of probabilities, unrelated to the Accident. The learned DJ affirmed the award of $500 on appeal.
- [66]
[66] In the present appeal, the appellant submits that the award of $500 is “too low” in light of the awards of $2,500 and $3,000 in Pang Tim Fook ([37] supra) and Sia Choon Cheong v Yap Choon Hong (MC Suit No 26103 of 2000) (“Sia Choon Cheong”), respectively.
- [67]
[67] The opposing parties submit that the right wrist injury was minor and did not necessitate any treatment, and resolved soon after the Accident. As such, the award of $500 for a single contusion was fair and reasonable.
- [68]
[68] Unlike the injury to the appellant’s left wrist, the key question here is not whether the right wrist injury was caused by the Accident, but rather, what the extent of the injury was. Based on Dr Razmi’s medical report of 31 October 2014, the first instance of a complaint of right wrist pain by the appellant was on 2 January 2014. Dr Razmi’s physical examination revealed that there was “tenderness over the radial and ulnar styloids of his right wrist but there was no limitation in the range of motion”. The appellant was diagnosed to have suffered from a right wrist contusion, and treatment for this injury was by way of the systematic painkiller, Celebrex, which was prescribed for his other injuries as well. At the end of the same report, Dr Razmi did not include this right wrist pain as an outstanding problem of the appellant at that time, ie, 31 October 2014.
- [69]
[69] Subsequently, on 28 May 2015, the appellant underwent an MRI scan over both wrists, and was reviewed by Dr Peng in June 2015. The MRI scan of the right wrist demonstrated extensor carpi ulnaris teninitis, dorsal scapholunate ligament strain and radial-volar gangilion in the wrist joint. The appellant was referred to occupational therapy thereafter for strengthening exercises for both wrists, which lasted till mid-July 2015. While surgical management was discussed with the appellant, he did not return for a follow up appointment. The appellant also agreed that there was no documented complaint of right wrist pain after 2 January 2014 until the time he was seen by Dr Peng in June 2015, about 18 months afterwards.
- [70]
[70] The next documented complaint of right wrist pain by the appellant is in the report of Dr P Thiagarajan (“Dr Raj”), the respondent’s medical expert appointed to review the appellant’s condition, dated 6 June 2016. Dr Raj noted that when he saw the appellant on 10 May 2016, the appellant had complained of bilateral wrist pain. Dr Raj opined that the MRI scans and clinical findings were quite normal apart from slight weakness of the hand, particularly of the left wrist. Further, Dr Raj “did not think any further treatment [was] necessary and the symptoms [would] resolve in the long-term and [was] unlikely to cause any long-term disability”.
- [71]
[71] Looking at the medical evidence as a whole, the lacuna is that there is no support for a finding that the right wrist pain in May or June 2015 was linked to the Accident. In particular, Dr Razmi did not note the right wrist pain as an outstanding issue for the appellant as of 31 October 2014. In the same vein, Dr Peng accepted that a minor wrist injury was commonly resolved relatively quickly:
- [72]
[72] In addition, the lack of complaints and treatment for the right wrist for approximately 18 months should also be viewed in light of the appellant’s general disposition to actively seek medical treatment for his other ailments. It is expected that the appellant would have raised complaints about his wrist if there was indeed an unresolved issue.
- [73]
[73] Hence, I take the same view as the learned DR that the appellant’s right wrist contusion had resolved completely soon after the Accident. The consequence of this is that the award of damages should only be made in respect of the diagnosis by Dr Razmi of a wrist contusion in January 2014, and not in respect of the clinical findings from mid-2015 onwards. In addition to the quick resolution of the injury, I note that this injury was treated conservatively with a systematic painkiller, Celebrex. Accordingly, the right wrist contusion can be considered a minor injury.
- [74]
[74] Having determined the extent of the injury to be compensated for, I turn to address the appropriate quantum of the award. The recommended award for a single contusion on any part of the body as detailed in Charlene Chee et al, Guidelines for the Assessment of General Damages in Personal Injury Cases (Academy Publishing, 2010) (“the Guidelines”) is $500. Notwithstanding this, the appellant argues that the quantum of $500 is “too low” in light of the awards in Pang Tim Fook ([37] supra) and Sia Choon Cheong ([66] supra).
- [75]
[75] In Pang Tim Fook, the plaintiff suffered a right wrist injury and was awarded $2,500 for that injury: Pang Tim Fook at [2]. There was an unchallenged specialist report of a medical examination of the plaintiff there some two years after the relevant incident, which noted that there was slight swelling at the right wrist: Pang Tim Fook at [31]. The court also accepted that there was perhaps some slight residual disability: Pang Tim Fook at [31]. Having regard to the medical evidence which showed that there could have been some slight swelling of the wrist even two years after the accident and noting that the injury had affected the plaintiff’s ability to type efficiently at the keyboard, the court assessed damages at $2,500 for the plaintiff. In contrast, the present case concerns no such residual disability, especially given my view that the right wrist injury had resolved completely (see above at [73]). Pang Tim Fook can hence be distinguished for involving a more serious injury.
- [76]
[76] As for Sia Choon Cheong, the case is unreported. It was cited in Pang Tim Fook at [35], although no details were provided about the extent of the wrist injury. Similarly, Sia Choon Cheong was cited in Carrie Chan et al, Assessment of Damages: Personal Injuries and Fatal Accidents (LexisNexis, 2017), where no details were provided about the wrist contusion. Accordingly, there is a lack of facts to enable the court or the parties to reach a comprehensive understanding of that case to allow any meaningful comparisons to be made with the present case.
- [77]
[77] Therefore, absent a reason why the recommended award as per the Guidelines should not be adhered to, I uphold the learned DR’s award of $500 for the appellant’s right wrist contusion.
Claim (A)(iii): Left calf contusion
- [78]
[78] The learned DR awarded $500 for the appellant’s left calf contusion. This award was affirmed on appeal by the learned DJ.
- [79]
[79] The appellant’s only submission is that this is “low as the award of $500 in the case authority cited by the [opposing parties] was made in 2015, almost 10 years ago and as such there should be an uplift to take into account inflation”. The appellant instead seeks an award of $1,000.
- [80]
[80] The opposing parties submit that there are no cogent arguments on why the learned DR’s award was not warranted on the evidence and the appellant has not substantiated his claim of $1,000. The opposing parties make reference to the Guidelines which recommends an award of $500 for a single contusion on any part of the body. In addition, the opposing parties cite the case of Mohamad Hidayat bin Abdul Rahman v Tan Kim Choon (MC Suit No 21249 of 2012) (“Mohamad Hidayat”), which was relied on at first instance, and also before the learned DJ on appeal. In that case, the plaintiff was awarded $1,000 after sustaining two contusions. As such, the opposing parties submit that in view of the single contusion of the appellant, a substantial reduction of the benchmark award in Mohamad Hidayat is warranted. They argue that the award of $500 is fair and should not be interfered with.
- [81]
[81] In my view, the appellant’s submissions in relation to this head of damage has no merit. The award of damages recommended by the Guidelines is straightforward. The appellant has not seriously challenged the application of the Guidelines in this case and similarly has not proffered an explanation as to the exceptional nature of the injury sustained that would justify an award higher than what is recommended.
- [82]
[82] As for Mohamad Hidayat, while I acknowledge that this authority is not recent, this does not justify an uplift to $1,000 for a single contusion. With regard to the appellant’s submission that an uplift is warranted to take into account inflation, the appellant has not pointed to any authority or legal pronouncement mandating that the court make adjustments for inflation to all awards when referencing precedent cases. In any case, it is my view that such an approach may be undesirable for being overly technical and unduly convoluted.
- [83]
[83] Accordingly, the award of $500 for the appellant’s left calf contusion, which is consistent with the Guidelines and precedent authority, should be upheld.
Claim (A)(iv): Back injury
- [84]
[84] At first instance, the appellant sought $15,000–$18,000 for the injury to the appellant’s lower back caused by the Accident, namely a L4/L5 posterior annular tear (“the annular tear”) with associated central disc protrusion and left sacroiliac joint strain with residual disabilities. The learned DR found that the appellant had not discharged his burden of proof that the annular tear was, on a balance of probabilities, caused by the Accident. As such, the learned DR found that the award should only be in respect of a lumbar contusion caused by the Accident, which had resolved by 31 July 2015. It was hence fair in her view for an award of $6,000. The learned DJ affirmed this finding and the award.
- [85]
[85] I shall consider what injury was caused to the appellant’s back, before proceeding to consider what the appropriate quantum of the award is.
The injury caused by the Accident
- [86]
[86] On appeal, the appellant challenges the learned DR’s finding that the annular tear was not caused by the Accident. The appellant submits that in view of: (a) the strong impact into the appellant’s motor car in the Accident; (b) the appellant’s complaints of back pain in addition to neck pain following the Accident; (c) the fact that the appellant did not have any back problems prior to the Accident; and (d) the opinion of Dr Chua, the appellant’s pain specialist, and Dr Raj, the respondent’s medical expert that examined the appellant, it was more likely than not that the annular tear was caused by the Accident. Even if the annular tear existed prior to the Accident, the Accident had “at least triggered the symptoms arising from the injury caused” to the appellant’s back in the Accident, and he should be compensated for this. In addition, the appellant challenges the learned DR’s finding that the back pain caused by the Accident would have resolved sometime before 31 July 2015, on the basis that he was still having ongoing chronic back pain when he suffered an injury while moving boxes at work on 9 November 2015 (see above at [12]).
- [87]
[87] The opposing parties maintain that the annular tear was not caused by the Accident and the award should be limited to compensation for a lumbar contusion. They highlight that Dr Razmi, the appellant’s orthopaedic specialist, had diagnosed the appellant with a lumbar contusion without reference to the annular tear, despite the fact that the appellant’s MRI scan showed an annular tear. Additionally, there was cogent medical evidence to suggest that the appellant’s lumbar pain from the Accident had resolved before 31 July 2015, and that the primary trigger for his lumbar back pain on 11 November 2015 was an injury sustained while the appellant was lifting boxes.
- [88]
[88] The key question is whether the annular tear suffered by the appellant was, on the balance of probabilities, caused by the Accident. I shall set out the medical evidence that is relevant to this issue. First, the annular tear was only discovered upon an MRI scan on the appellant’s lumbar spine which was carried out after the appellant saw Dr Razmi on 2 January 2014, two days after the Accident. Notwithstanding this, Dr Razmi only diagnosed the appellant with a lumbar contusion, and not the annular tear. Under cross-examination, Dr Razmi clarified why he had done so:
Under re-examination, Dr Razmi reiterated his position:
- [89]
[89] Dr Razmi also noted under re-examination that to his knowledge, the appellant never had any issues with his back prior to the Accident:
- [90]
[90] In short, Dr Razmi did not state that the Accident had caused the annular tear because he was not certain, although he did concede the possibility that the annular tear could have been caused by the Accident and conversely, the possibility that it could have pre-existed the Accident. I also note that Dr Razmi neither opined that the annular tear was likely to have been caused by the Accident nor opined that the annular tear was unlikely to have been caused by the Accident. Thus, I find that Dr Razmi’s evidence is equivocal. His evidence alone is insufficient to prove the appellant’s case.
- [91]
[91] Second, Dr Chua, the appellant’s pain specialist, reported that “[t]he L4/L5 posterior annular tear with left sacroiliac joint strain can be a result of the [Accident] as the car had apparently even spun 180 deg” [emphasis added]. Similar to Dr Razmi’s evidence above, Dr Chua’s statement is one indicating possibility rather than probability; Dr Chua does not opine about whether the annular tear was likely or unlikely to have been caused by the Accident, which is the focus of this inquiry. In this regard, I specifically reject the appellant’s submission that Dr Chua had opined that the annular tear was caused by the Accident. Instead, I find that Dr Chua’s evidence is equivocal and similarly insufficient to prove the appellant’s case.
- [92]
[92] Third, and perhaps most importantly, Dr Raj, the opposing parties’ medical expert that examined the appellant, had testified under cross-examination that:
- [93]
[93] Dr Raj’s testimony, unlike that of Dr Razmi or Dr Chua, speaks to the probability that the annular tear was caused by the Accident, and not merely the possibility of the same. As such, I find that Dr Raj’s evidence is unequivocally in favour of the appellant.
- [94]
[94] Considering the evidence in its totality, especially Dr Raj’s testimony, I find that the annular tear had, on the balance of probabilities, been caused by the Accident. I also find some further support, albeit inconclusive on its own, from the opinions of Dr Razmi and Dr Chua that this was a possibility. In addition, the fact that the annular tear was only discovered soon after the Accident and the absence of complaints from the appellant prior to the Accident as testified to by Dr Razmi (see above at [89]) both reinforce my finding.
- [95]
[95] For completeness, I address the learned DR’s reasons for her conclusion that the appellant had not proven, on a balance of probabilities, that the annular tear was caused by the Accident. In her view, it was significant that the first doctor to have discovered the annular tear, ie, Dr Razmi, had diagnosed the appellant with a lumbar contusion without reference to the annular tear. Respectfully, it is equally significant that Dr Razmi had testified that the omission of the annular tear in his diagnosis was due to his uncertainty as to whether the annular tear had been caused by the Accident, rather than because Dr Razmi had expressly ruled out the link between the tear and the Accident as being impossible or unlikely.
- [96]
[96] In addition, the learned DR appears to have discounted the opinions of Dr Chua and Dr Raj on the basis that their evidence “only tell us of the possibility or likelihood that the [annular tear] was due to the [Accident], but not of the extent of such possibility or likelihood and therefore cannot be more weighty evidence than that set out above”. I am unable to agree with such characterisation of the evidence. While I accept that Dr Razmi’s and Dr Chua’s evidence only speaks towards the possibility that the annular tear was caused by the Accident, Dr Raj had expressly stated that the tear was likely to have been caused by the Accident and therefore addresses the issue of likelihood or probability. Contrary to the learned DR’s views, I do not think that it is necessary for the medical experts (at least in a civil case like this) to precisely identify “the extent of likelihood” so long as there is evidence as to whether a fact is more likely than not, ie, whether the particular fact can be established on a balance of probabilities. To require otherwise would effectively amount to imposing too great of a burden.
- [97]
[97] Therefore, in my judgment, I find that the annular tear had, on the balance of probabilities, been caused by the Accident.
- [98]
[98] In addition to the annular tear, the appellant also submits that he had suffered a left sacroiliac joint strain. Once again, I turn to the relevant medical evidence. In Dr Razmi’s medical report dated 31 October 2014, Dr Razmi noted that upon physical examination of the appellant on 2 January 2014, ie, the appellant’s first medical consultation after the Accident, “[t]here was marked tenderness also noted over his left posterior superior iliac spine. This limited his straight leg raising on the left to 60 deg.” No diagnosis of the appellant’s injury at his left sacroiliac joint was made by Dr Razmi at that time, although Dr Razmi did note that “left sided back pain” was an outstanding problem for the appellant.
- [99]
[99] In Dr Chua’s medical report of 9 September 2014, the appellant was noted to have received “a left sacroiliac joint injection for his lower back pain and hip pain” on 18 June 2014. Similar to Dr Razmi’s report, no diagnosis of the appellant’s injury at his left sacroiliac joint was made at that time. However, in a later report of Dr Chua dated 11 August 2017, Dr Chua diagnosed the appellant with “low back pain due to L4/L5 posterior annular tear with left sacroiliac joint strain”. He also noted that the appellant received another left sacroiliac joint injection on 17 May 2016, which is corroborated by the Clinical Discharge Summary related to the appellant’s hospital admission on 16 May 2016.
- [100]
[100] Dr Chua’s diagnosis of “low back pain due to L4/L5 posterior annular tear with left sacroiliac joint strain” was reiterated in his medical report of 8 February 2018. The same report also stated that the appellant “developed an exacerbation of his right hip and sacro-iliac joint pain on 9 Jan 2018. A right sacroiliac joint, hip injection was done …” [emphasis added]. The Clinical Discharge Summary of the appellant’s hospital admission on 8 January 2018 however indicated that a “left sacroiliac joint … and left hip injection [were] performed”.
- [101]
[101] The same diagnosis was once again reiterated in Dr Chua’s report dated 1 November 2018. In that report, Dr Chua updated that the then-last treatment done on the appellant was on 6 June 2018 whereby the appellant underwent a “bilateral sacroiliac joint” injection. The Clinical Discharge Summary of the appellant’s hospital admission on 4 June 2018 however indicated “right sacroiliac joint injections” had been administered.
- [102]
[102] Based on the above medical evidence, I find that the injury to the appellant’s left sacroiliac joint is well-documented all the way beginning from the immediate aftermath of the Accident. While there was no formal diagnosis made at that point in time, the symptoms relating to this injury appear to have prevailed and a specific diagnosis was made eventually. In my view, the appellant has therefore proven on a balance of probabilities that he suffered from a left sacroiliac joint strain due to the Accident.
- [103]
[103] Accordingly, the Accident had caused the L4/L5 posterior annular tear with left sacroiliac joint strain. I thus overturn the learned DR’s finding in this regard and set aside her award of $6,000, which had been awarded for the appellant’s lumbar contusion.
The appropriate award for the appellant’s back injury
- [104]
[104] I move to consider the appropriate damages to be awarded for the annular tear. The appellant submitted for $15,000–$18,000 and cited four cases in support of this figure.
- [105]
[105] First, the appellant referred to Xiang Ren Cai v Chang Hua Construction Pte Ltd (DC Suit No 1326 of 2003) (“Xiang Ren Cai”). There, the plaintiff was awarded $20,000 for an “annual disc bulge and tear at L2-3 and L5/S1 vertebrae”. The plaintiff was noted to have constant back pain and was unable to perform strenuous work.
- [106]
[106] Second, the appellant raised the case of Bellette David Eason v Yeo Lian Huat (DC Suit No 3705 of 2010). The plaintiff there suffered a generic back injury and had lower back pain, and was awarded $15,000.
- [107]
[107] The third case referred to was Siah Siew Wah & Anor v Tan Lian Hwee (DC Suit No 5188 of 2002) (“Siah Siew Wah”). The plaintiff there was awarded $10,000 for a prolapsed intervertebral disc at L4/L5 level (aggravated substantially by the accident). The plaintiff was noted to have persistent lower back pain, limitation in flexion and extension of spine and inability to walk for long distances or to sit and stand for long.
- [108]
[108] Finally, the appellant cited the case of Tan Boch v Lim Khoong Young (DC Suit No 4908 of 2001) where the plaintiff was awarded $15,000 for spinal protrusion and prolapse. The plaintiff was noted to have suffered aggravation of existing lower back pain with degeneration of two lower spinal discs and decreased range of motion.
- [109]
[109] In comparing the above cases, Xiang Ren Cai and Siah Siew Wah appear to be the most analogous since the injury to the back was at around the same area (the L4/L5 disc). Further, the symptoms appear to be similar with the appellant, with lower back pain and the inability to perform work for long periods of time. As the plaintiff in Xiang Ren Cai suffered injury to two areas, that award should be calibrated downwards in the present context where the injury is confined to a single area. Accordingly, I find that an award of $12,000 would be fair and reasonable to compensate the appellant for the annular tear that was caused by the Accident.
Claim (A)(v): Traumatic left knee chondromalacia patella
- [110]
[110] The learned DR awarded $3,000 for the appellant’s traumatic left knee chondromalacia patella. This award was affirmed on appeal by the learned DJ.
- [111]
[111] The appellant submits that this award is low based on comparable case authority, specifically citing the case of Rajandran s/o Vaithialingam v Habil bin Jamal Mohamed (MC Suit No 25600 of 2000) (“Rajandran”) where the plaintiff was awarded $5,000 for a contusion of the right knee. The appellant also highlighted that Rajandran was decided more than 20 years ago, and the court should take into account inflation in making the award. At the hearing, the counsel for the appellant also made passing reference to two other cases cited in the appellant’s submissions before the learned DR: first, Sia Choon Cheong ([66] supra), where the plaintiff was awarded $10,000 for a left knee contusion; and second, Sim Siew Yen June v Benfort Enterprise Pte Ltd & Ors (MC Suit No 21729 of 1997) (“Sim Siew Yen June”), where the plaintiff was awarded $5,000 for a right knee contusion. In addition, the appellant emphasises that the complaints over his left knee persisted for some 17 months following the Accident, before an MRI scan of the appellant’s knee was undertaken. As such, given the residual disabilities to the appellant’s left knee and the case authorities referred to, the appellant seeks an award of $5,000, which he submits is fair and reasonable.
- [112]
[112] On appeal, the opposing parties do not dispute that the appellant sustained this injury but rather submit that the injury was minor and had completely resolved without any treatment. The opposing parties therefore submit that the award of $3,000 is fair and reasonable and should not be interfered with.
- [114]
[114] In my judgment, it is fallacious for the appellant to assert that his left knee pain persisted for the entire period. While I am prepared to accept that the appellant was probably experiencing pain in May 2015, thereby warranting the MRI scan, it is farfetched to say that it was the same pain which was caused by the Accident – allegedly remaining unresolved for 17 months – that had prompted the MRI scan. The appellant’s position is implausible as it does not explain why no further investigation of the knee pain or treatment was pursued in the intervening period. This lack of investigation or treatment for the knee pain must also be observed against the fact that the appellant had been actively seeking treatment for his other injuries, and it is inexplicable why the appellant would not take the same approach for this injury to his knee. Instead, it is my view that the evidence only supports the fact that the left knee pain persisted till at least 31 March 2014, namely the date of Dr Razmi’s report wherein he had stated the left knee pain as an outstanding problem. Further, this report was the last record of the appellant’s complaint of knee pain until the MRI scan in May 2015.
- [115]
[115] Taking this into account, alongside the fact that no specific treatment was pursued for the appellant’s left knee, I agree with the learned DR’s characterisation of this injury as a minor injury. According to the Guidelines ([74] supra), an award in the range of $1,500–$5,000 is appropriate for a minor knee injury.
- [117]
[117] In relation to Rajendran ([111] supra) where an award of $5,000 was granted, the plaintiff there had suffered from tilting of the right patella, resulting in permanent knee pain with difficulty in walking long distances or climbing stairs. Given that the injury there was clearly more serious than the present case, especially since Dr Razmi had reported that the appellant had full range of his left knee, Rajendran can be distinguished. As for Sia Choon Cheong ([66] supra), the plaintiff there was noted to have problems climbing up stairs and getting up from a squatting position. Similar to Rajendran, the injury in Sia Choon Cheong was clearly more aggravated than the present case. In fact, the severity of the injury was reflected in the award of damages for that injury, ie $10,000, which falls outside the range of damages for a minor knee injury. Lastly, in relation to Sim Siew Yen June ([111] supra), no details were provided of the extent of the knee injury suffered and the treatment undergone such that a meaningful comparison could be made between that case and the present case.
- [118]
[118] Considering that both Rajendran and Sia Choon Cheong involved more serious injuries, it is my view that the award of $3,000 is fair and reasonable, and should be upheld.
- [119]
[119] For completeness, I note that the appellant had, at first instance and on appeal to the learned DJ, sought to claim damages for the menisco-capsular junction sprain that he had sustained, which was discovered after the MRI scan of his left knee in May 2015. However, this claim was not pursued on appeal before me. I thus make no findings in this regard.
Claim (A)(vii): Right shoulder acromioclavicular strain
- [120]
[120] At first instance, the appellant claimed $18,000 for his right shoulder acromioclavicular strain allegedly caused by the Accident, while the opposing parties submitted that no award should be made as there was no cogent evidence that the injury resulted from the Accident . The learned DR held that there was a lack of medical evidence supporting the appellant’s position that the shoulder injury was caused by the Accident, and therefore made no award for this injury. This was affirmed on appeal by the learned DJ.
- [121]
[121] On appeal, the appellant maintains that his claim for $18,000 is fair and reasonable. First, the appellant submits that Dr Chua, the appellant’s pain specialist since February 2014, explained that it was possible for the appellant to have suffered an injury to his right shoulder in view of the mechanism of the collision in the Accident. Second, the appellant argues that the delayed reporting of this injury (which I shall set out in greater detail later) could be explained by the fact that the pain from the whiplash injury to his neck had extended down to the muscles of his shoulders and masked the pain at his right shoulder. In light of these, the appellant submits that it is more likely than not that his shoulder injury was caused by the Accident. In addition, the appellant contends that if there was any other accident that had caused his shoulder injury, this would have been reported to his treating doctor.
- [122]
[122] The opposing parties do not dispute that the appellant sustained a right shoulder acromioclavicular strain but instead argue that there is no cogent evidence that this injury was caused by the Accident. They cite Dr Chua’s equivocal remarks about the cause of the shoulder injury, and the lack of a cogent explanation for the appellant’s delayed reporting of the injury. As such, the dismissal of this claim by the learned DR should be upheld.
- [123]
[123] Based on the parties’ submissions, the central question is whether the appellant’s right shoulder acromioclavicular strain is attributable to the Accident.
- [124]
[124] I first consider the appellant’s delayed reporting of his injury. The first documented report of the injury to the appellant’s right shoulder is in a Clinical Discharge Summary issued on or after 24 March 2017, more than three years after the Accident. No earlier medical report contained any mention of a complaint of pain to the appellant’s right shoulder. Under cross-examination, the appellant conceded as much and confirmed that his first complaint of right shoulder pain was in March 2017 to Dr Chua. Be that as it may, under re-examination, the appellant explained that the pain from his whiplash injury “overlapped” such that he did not feel the pain to his shoulder and only noticed it when his neck pain had subsided after a year and particularly after the pain-relief injections. The learned DR dismissed this explanation, noting that the appellant had multiple hydrocortisone and lignocaine injections for pain relief in relation to his neck injury as early as January 2014. Similarly, Dr Chua had, under cross-examination, remarked that it was quite unlikely for the symptoms of shoulder pain to manifest after three and a half years if the injury had been caused by the Accident.
- [125]
[125] In my judgment, the appellant’s explanation – that the pain from his neck injury had masked the pain to his right shoulder for more than three years – is incredible and internally inconsistent. Indeed, if the appellant only noticed the pain to his right shoulder after his neck pain had subsided, he would have noticed the pain, at least temporarily, as and when he received the hydrocortisone and lignocaine injections that addressed the pain from his neck injury. This, however, was not the case, as recognised by the learned DR. In addition, I am unable to accept the appellant’s contention that, because there was no other documented incident in the intervening period of more than three years that could explain the shoulder injury, it followed that the injury was caused by the Accident. The appellant bears the burden to positively prove his case and such an argument does not satisfy this burden.
- [126]
[126] I next consider the remarks of Dr Chua in relation to the likely cause of the appellant’s shoulder injury. In Dr Chua’s report dated 12 September 2018, he noted the following:
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