General Division of the High Court · Decided 17 September 2024
Public Prosecutor v CHJ
Feedback & support[2024] SGHC 240 · Case no. Criminal Case No 44 of 2023
✱ What happened, in plain English
There is no plain-English summary of this judgment yet.
Ask about this judgment →Laws this judgment relies on
Grounds of decision
Official text from eLitigation
Introduction
- [1]
[1] The Accused claimed trial to two sexual assault by penetration charges committed against his wife (“the Complainant”) under s 376(2)(a) of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed) (the “Penal Code” and the “SAP Charges”, respectively), and one charge for obstructing the course of justice under s 204A(b) of the Penal Code (the “Obstruction Charge”).
- [2]
[2] The charges read as follows:
- [3]
[3] At the conclusion of the trial, I found that the Prosecution had proved the three charges beyond reasonable doubt and convicted the Accused of the SAP Charges and the Obstruction Charge. The Accused was sentenced to a global sentence of eight years’ imprisonment and six strokes of the cane.
- [4]
[4] I gave brief oral reasons for my decision and indicated that I will be furnishing full grounds in due course. The Accused has appealed against his conviction and sentence, and I now proceed to set out the full reasons for my decision.
The facts
- [5]
[5] The Accused and the Complainant have been married since May 2012. They have a son and a daughter (collectively referred to as “the Children”).
- [6]
[6] On 30 August 2019, upon being discharged from the Institute of Mental Health (“IMH”), after his second admission there, the Accused moved into the home of his sister (“AS”).
Events on 12 July 2020
- [7]
[7] On 12 July 2020, the Accused returned to the couple’s matrimonial home (the “Flat”) with AS and her husband. There was a heated family meeting involving the relatives on both sides (the “Family Meeting”), which resulted in the Complainant eventually acceding to the Accused’s request to move back into the Flat.
- [8]
[8] It was undisputed that this Family Meeting was held because the Accused wanted to move back into the Flat although the Complainant was reluctant to allow him to do so. The individuals present at the Family Meeting were the Accused, the Complainant, the Complainant’s mother (“CM”), the Complainant’s sister, AS and her husband, as well as the Accused’s father.
- [9]
[9] Without delving too much into the contents of the discussion which ensued, AS, her husband and the Accused’s father broadly advocated for the Accused to stay in the Flat whilst CM and the Complainant’s sister took the opposite position. Eventually, the Complainant agreed to the Accused moving back into the Flat on two conditions: first, that the Children were not to be involved in any relationship issues or arguments between them; and second, that any discussions about the marriage must be done downstairs, at the void deck.
Events on 13 July 2020 (ie, the date of the SAP Charges)
- [10]
[10] Sometime in the evening of 13 July 2020, the Accused, the Complainant and the Children went cycling in the neighbourhood. After cycling, they returned to the Flat. Subsequently, the Accused and the Complainant were alone in the master bedroom to talk about their marriage. During this time, the acts of digital penetration took place.
- [11]
[11] During these acts, the Accused and the Complainant’s son and daughter knocked on the master bedroom door to ask for the Complainant’s phone and hair serum, respectively. Their son first asked for the Complainant’s phone, which the Accused handed to him. After passing her phone to their son, the Accused returned to the bed where the Complainant was. Subsequently, their daughter asked for the Complainant’s hair serum which the Accused handed to her.
The Complainant’s version of events
- [12]
[12] In relation to the acts of digital penetration, the Complainant’s version is as follows. The Complainant was in the master bedroom with the Accused, and was sitting on the bed with her back on the bed’s head rest, when they got into an argument. The argument escalated. The Accused proceeded to kneel beside the Complainant, and then he grabbed both sides of her pants and panties and “yanked [them] off of [her]”. The Accused had used “[v]ery, very hard force” when he pulled the Complainant’s pants and panties “off completely … [a]t the same time”, which caused her to slip down from a sitting up position. He then threw the Complainant’s pants and panties “on the floor … to [her] right”. Although the Complainant was initially shocked and unable to react, she subsequently “realised that something was going on” and “twisted [her] legs together as tight as [she] possibly” could by crossing her legs and feet. The Accused proceeded to try and pry her legs open. As he was unsuccessful, he picked up the Complainant’s legs (which were still twisted together) and placed them on his shoulder such that her buttocks were elevated while her back and head were still on the bed and head rest, respectively.
- [13]
[13] The Accused then proceeded to ask the Complainant “questions about the past”, and when she responded with “No, that’s not what happened” or something to that effect, the Accused would insert his finger into her vagina and “wriggle it around”. He did this repeatedly, despite the Complainant’s repeated requests for him to stop and attempts to “wiggle [her] way out”, though she was unable to escape as the Accused held on to her legs with the hand that he was not using to insert his finger into her vagina. The Accused also used both of his hands “to grab [the Complainant’s] breasts multiple times”, and tried to kiss her though she turned her head to avoid kissing him. Throughout, the Complainant continued telling the Accused to cease his actions, but he only stopped when their son knocked on the door to ask for the Complainant’s phone.
- [14]
[14] The Accused asked the Complainant to unlock her phone. When she refused, he placed her “phone down and … proceeded to insert his finger” into her vagina and continued asking her to unlock the phone. Eventually, the Accused agreed to pass the Complainant’s phone to their son if she stayed where she was. The Complainant complied while the Accused passed her phone to their son through a small gap before shutting and locking the door. The Accused then returned to the bed and assumed the same position, with the Complainant’s legs on his shoulders, before he continued questioning her and inserting his finger into her vagina repeatedly. He threatened to “call the [C]hildren to come in” and the Complainant asked him not to “get them involved”, at which point she “completely gave up … [and laid] there and just let him do whatever he wanted”. This continued “for a while” until the parties’ daughter knocked on the door and asked for hair serum. The Accused allowed the Complainant to get up, put on her pants and go to the bathroom to get the hair serum. While he handed the hair serum to their daughter, the Complainant felt sick in her stomach and ran to the bathroom.
The Accused’s version of events
- [15]
[15] In contrast, the Accused recounted that while conversing with the Complainant, he “went on top” of her “in a crawling position” and told her that he did not wish to argue with her. The Complainant then gave him a “seductive look” and pouted, which he took as a sign to initiate intimacy to diffuse the situation and thus kissed her. The Complainant reciprocated his advances by kissing him back, saying “[d]on’t do that” in a low seductive voice when he ran his hands along her body and raising her hips to make it easier for him to take off her pants and panties. She also placed her legs on his shoulder and he proceeded to insert his finger into her, and he “could see that she was enjoying it”.
- [16]
[16] Then, the parties’ son knocked on the master bedroom door asking for the Complainant’s phone. The Complainant instructed the Accused to get her phone from her bag. When he asked her to unlock her phone, she refused, stating that their son knew the password. As such, the Accused proceeded to leave the master bedroom to pass the phone to their son. Afterwards, he closed the door and locked it before going back to the Complainant who had not moved from her position on the bed. The Accused thus went “on top of her again” and resumed inserting his finger into her vagina. This continued until the parties’ daughter knocked on the door asking for hair serum. The Complainant intimated that she should pass the hair serum to their daughter, and so the Accused took this to mean that “the intimacy has stopped”. Thus, he got off the Complainant and handed her clothes to her. She then passed the hair serum to him. The Accused then left the master bedroom and went to the Children’s room to pass the hair serum to their daughter. When he returned to the master bedroom, he noticed that the Complainant was in the toilet.
The Complainant’s police report and the Accused’s arrest
- [17]
[17] On the morning of 14 July 2020, the Complainant made a police report alleging that the Accused had sexually assaulted her. On that same morning, the Accused called AS and spoke with her on the phone. He also sent her several WhatsApp messages. The Accused was subsequently arrested in the afternoon.
Events on 11–17 October 2020 (ie, the dates within the Obstruction Charge)
- [18]
[18] Between 11 and 17 October 2020, the Accused called CM four times. Three of these calls were made on 11 October 2020 and the final call was made on 17 October 2020. The first call was made with AS’s home phone, while the next three calls were made with a prepaid M1 SIM card (the “prepaid card”) using a newly purchased phone (the “Phone”).
Statements recorded from the Accused
- [19]
[19] On the evening of his arrest on 14 July 2020, a video-recorded interview (the “first VRI”) was conducted with the Accused. His cautioned statement for the first SAP Charge was recorded on the following day, ie, 15 July 2020 (the “first Cautioned Statement”). Further video-recorded interviews were subsequently conducted with the Accused, on 9 November 2020 (the “second VRI”), 29 March 2021 and 30 September 2021. The Accused’s cautioned statements for the Obstruction Charge and the second SAP Charge were recorded on 30 September 2021.
The SAP Charges
- [20]
[20] I now turn to deal with the two SAP Charges. For the offence of sexual assault by penetration under s 376 of the Penal Code, two elements must be established beyond reasonable doubt: (a) the Accused sexually penetrated the vagina of the Complainant with his finger; and (b) the Complainant did not consent to the penetration (Pram Nair v Public Prosecutor [2017] 2 SLR 1015 (“Pram Nair”) at [45]).
- [21]
[21] The Prosecution’s case was that the Accused had digitally penetrated the Complainant’s vagina with his finger and that the Complainant did not consent to the penetration. Conversely, while the Accused did not dispute that he penetrated the Complainant’s vagina with his finger, his position was that these sexual acts occurred with her consent. In the alternative, the Accused sought to rely on s 79 of the Penal Code for the defence of mistake on the basis that he had reasonably believed, at all material times, that the Complainant consented to the sexual acts.
The applicable legal principles
- [22]
[22] It is settled law that the uncorroborated evidence of a complainant may be the sole basis for a conviction. However, such evidence must be “unusually convincing”: see Public Prosecutor v GCK [2020] 1 SLR 486 (“GCK”) at [87]; AOF v Public Prosecutor [2012] 3 SLR 34 (“AOF”) at [111]; and Public Prosecutor v Mohammed Liton Mohammed Syeed Mallik [2008] 1 SLR(R) 601 (“Mohammed Liton”) at [37].
- [23]
[23] To elaborate, in AOF, the Court of Appeal held that “in a case where no other evidence is available, a complainant’s testimony can constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt … only when it is so “unusually convincing” as to overcome any doubts that might arise from the lack of corroboration” (at [111]). In determining whether a testimony is “unusually convincing”, the court will “weig[h] the demeanour of the witness alongside both the internal and external consistencies found in the witness’ testimony” (AOF at [115]). If, however, the evidence of the complainant is not “unusually convincing”, the “accused’s conviction is unsafe unless there is some corroboration of the complainant’s story” (AOF at [173]).
- [24]
[24] At [92] of GCK, the Court of Appeal stressed that the “unusually convincing” standard is not meant to impose a mandatory warning from the judge to himself or herself. Rather, it serves as a cautionary reminder at the last stage of the evaluation of the evidence, and just before a conviction is found. It is to ensure that the trial judge has an awareness of the dangers of convicting the offender on uncorroborated evidence, and that he or she undertakes a rigorous and holistic assessment of the evidence.
- [25]
[25] That said, and as it shall appear clear later, this was not a case where the Prosecution relied solely on the Complainant’s testimony. Indeed, I accepted that there were other pieces of evidence which I eventually found to be corroborative of her account. As such, the cautionary reminder was not applicable.
The Complainant’s testimony
- [26]
[26] It would be apposite to start with a consideration of the Complainant’s testimony, especially since a key element of dispute was that of the Complainant’s consent.
- [27]
[27] The main thrust of the Prosecution’s case was that although the “unusually convincing” standard did not apply – as the Complainant’s evidence was not the sole basis which it relied upon – the Complainant was a compelling and highly credible witness whose evidence contained a ring of truth. Her evidence was both internally consistent and corroborated by other pieces of evidence.
- [28]
[28] As I shall set out in more detail later, the Accused contended otherwise.
Whether the Complainant’s testimony was consistent
- [29]
[29] The Prosecution submitted that the Complainant’s testimony in court was “clear and cogent”, and she was able to provide a detailed account “of what happened prior to, during, and after the sexual assaults”. Her credibility was buttressed by the fair and measured nature of her evidence. She also never once sought to portray her relationship with the Accused in the worst possible light. Where there were gaps in her memory, the Complainant did not embellish her account so as to fill in the gaps but was candid about her inability to recall certain details. Importantly, these gaps were minor, and the Complainant’s account remained unwavering even under rigorous cross-examination, and there was no material inconsistency throughout her testimony.
- [30]
[30] Conversely, the Accused sought to rely on several instances of inconsistencies in the Complainant’s evidence to undermine her credibility as a witness. I deal with three areas of such alleged inconsistencies:
(a) the Complainant’s testimony was inconsistent as to whether there was a two-month ultimatum to fix the marriage;
(b) the Complainant’s account of the events preceding the family’s cycling activity was inconsistent; and
(c) the Complainant was inconsistent about the instances when the Accused questioned her during the alleged assault, and was unable to recall certain details during the alleged assault.
- [31]
[31] Ultimately, I did not find any of these instances of inconsistency to be sufficiently material or significant as to seriously impinge upon the Complainant’s credibility. These are my reasons.
- [32]
[32] The first purported inconsistency was the inconsistency in the Complainant’s testimony regarding an alleged two-month ultimatum to fix the marriage, or she would file for divorce. The Accused pointed to the fact that despite appearing to acknowledge the existence of this two-month ultimatum during the Family Meeting, the Complainant subsequently reneged on having made this demand at trial, referring instead to an eight-year ultimatum. He further submitted that this latter ultimatum “defied sense” and the only reference to eight years, during the Family Meeting, was when the Complainant stated that she had already given the parties’ marriage eight years, and not in reference to an ultimatum.
- [33]
[33] For convenience, I reproduce the portion from the transcript of the Family Meeting, ie, an exchange between the Complainant and AS, which the Accused appeared to rely on:
- [34]
[34] In response, the Prosecution pointed out that there was no inconsistency as the reference to the two-month ultimatum, during the Family Meeting, was made by AS who was “pestering” the Complainant to come up with a timeline to fix the marriage. The Complainant’s claim, that there was no two-month ultimatum, was supported by WhatsApp messages between the Accused, the Complainant and AS on 6 July 2020, in which the Complainant tells AS that she could not give the Accused a time frame on when she would be able to trust him again.
- [35]
[35] After examining that exchange and its surrounding discussion, I agreed with the Prosecution that the Complainant had not, in fact, agreed to a two-month ultimatum, and there was therefore no inconsistency in her evidence in this regard. Her reply of “yes” to AS’s statement was in response to a discussion of a timeline and not the two-month ultimatum in particular. Indeed, such a finding is bolstered when examined in context with the 6 July 2020 WhatsApp messages, as the Complainant stated that “ultimately [she] cannot give [the Accused] a time frame for anything because [she does] not know how [she] will feel in time to come”. Additionally, when asked by AS if there was a conclusion to the discussion on their attempt to compromise, the Complainant responded with “nope”. In any regard, even if I were to accept that the Complainant had been inconsistent about the specific timeframe of the ultimatum, this inconsistency was not particularly material. Regardless of whether the ultimatum was two-months or eight-years, the key overall effect remained the same, ie, that the parties’ marriage was on the rocks.
- [36]
[36] The second purported inconsistency was the Complainant’s evidence regarding the Accused’s assault of her in front of the Children before the family went cycling on 13 July 2020. It was undisputed that prior to going cycling, the Accused engaged in “affectionate” acts, such as hugging the Complainant and running his hands over her body, in front of the Children. However, when questioned about this incident in court, the Complainant said that although she had not consented to such acts, she told the Children that she was alright as she did not want to worry them. The Accused submitted that the Complainant’s testimony on this incident was contradictory because when asked if she felt afraid of the Accused after they returned from cycling and were in the master bedroom, she had initially said “No. At that point, no”, but then changed her answer to an inaudible “Yes”, when questioned again.
- [37]
[37] In response, the Prosecution argued that there was no inconsistency. The Complainant had explained that she had locked the door to prevent the Children from going into the master bedroom as she wanted to smoke a cigarette. Importantly, the Complainant had caveated that she was not afraid “at that point” when she locked the door as it was her desire to smoke a cigarette away from the Children, and not her fear of the Accused, that was at the forefront of her mind. Hence, there was no inconsistency in the Complainant’s evidence.
- [38]
[38] I rejected the Accused’s claim that the Complainant’s purported inconsistency, when queried on whether she was afraid of him, was one which materially undermined her credibility. As the Prosecution pointed out, the Complainant’s alleged denial of being afraid was likely due to her being focused on her desire to have a cigarette. Indeed, when queried in cross-examination on why she claimed to not be afraid despite alleging that the Accused had used violence on her in front of the Children, the Complainant explained that she “really needed a cigarette” but did not want the Children around when she was smoking. Hence, even if there was some inconsistency in the Complainant’s evidence on how she felt about the Accused, such an inconsistency did not severely undermine her credibility. Rather, the discrepancies in the Complainant’s answers appeared to be a product of her understanding of the Defence counsel’s questions, as evidenced by how she later clarified her position upon his further questioning. Moreover, much like the inconsistency with the ultimatum, any purported incongruity was not material as the general contours of the Complainant’s evidence, that she did not consent to the Accused’s touching prior to the cycling and that she closed the master bedroom’s door because she did not want the Children to be in the room while she smoked, remained consistent even under cross-examination.
- [39]
[39] The Accused also submitted that the Complainant’s alleged discomfort at his actions was incongruous with her actions as she had proceeded to “go cycling, play Uno and then lock the door in the [master bedroom] with him after they came back from cycling”. More will be said about the Complainant’s actions and behaviour after the incidents of sexual assault and the bearing that has on her credibility (at [54]–[55] below). At this juncture, it would suffice for me to note that victims of sexual assault cannot be straitjacketed into reacting in certain prescribed ways. Thus, the mere fact that the Complainant was able to continue interacting with the Accused and the Children, as per normal, was not dispositive of whether the Complainant felt uncomfortable with the Accused’s actions after they returned from the afternoon outing.
- [40]
[40] The third and final purported inconsistency concerned the Complainant’s inability to recall certain questions that the Accused posed to her about past events, while he allegedly assaulted her, and her inconsistent evidence on what he was doing while asking these questions. The Complainant’s recount of this incident during direct examination is as follows:
During cross-examination, Defence counsel asked when the Accused would insert his finger in her vagina during and the Complainant answered as follows:
- [41]
[41] The Accused argued that it was unbelievable that the Complainant – despite remembering that he brought up “so many things … about the past” and that he did not only mention a single event – was unable to recall any details of what he had brought up. He claimed that this appeared to be a “convenient lapse in her memory”. He also pointed out that the Complainant materially changed her answer. Initially, she stated that the Accused would insert “his finger into [her] vagina … and wiggle it around, and then he will stop, and then he’ll question [her]” and repeat himself. But subsequently, she agreed that the Accused “would put his finger in if he didn’t like [her] answer”.
- [42]
[42] In response, the Prosecution argued that the Complainant’s candour in admitting that there were gaps in her memory, as well as her willingness and readiness to admit to the limitations in her recollection, lent further credence to her testimony. Additionally, these gaps in her memory, eg, on the nature of the questions, were minor and did not affect the overall credibility of her account. Indeed, the Complainant’s incomplete recollection was especially reasonable given the trauma arising from the incident and the passage of time. Ultimately, although the Complainant was unable to recall the precise details of the past incidents the Accused questioned her on, she was still able to consistently testify that such questions were asked, that the Accused was upset during the questioning, and that he would insert his finger in her vagina whenever he disliked her answer.
- [43]
[43] As a preliminary matter, I rejected the Accused’s claim that the Complainant was inconsistent in her testimony. She was clear in her testimony, when questioned by the Prosecution and Defence counsel, that the Accused would insert his finger into her vagina whenever he was dissatisfied with her answer, including instances when she denied and disagreed with what he said (see above at [40]). The Accused’s attempts to suggest that the Complainant’s evidence changed from stating that he would insert his finger whenever she answered him, to only when she gave an answer that he did not like, had no merit. Not only was this not borne out in the notes of evidence, but it was also a needlessly pedantic distinction.
- [44]
[44] In Jagatheesan s/o Krishnasamy v Public Prosecutor [2006] 4 SLR(R) 45, the High Court affirmed that “[i]t is trite law that minor discrepancies in a witness’s testimony should not be held against the witness in assessing his credibility” as “human fallibility in observation, retention and recollection is both common and understandable” (at [82]). I agreed with the Prosecution that where there were gaps in her memory on certain details, the Complainant did not embellish her account so as to fill in the gaps. Instead, she was upfront about her inability to recall certain details of the assault, not just on the questions the Accused asked her while inserting his finger into her vagina, but also which shoulder the Accused placed her legs on, to gain access to her vagina, and which hand the Accused used to insert his finger into her vagina. I disagreed with the Accused’s attempts to diminish the Complainant’s credibility by relying on her inability to recall these details. These were fine and minute details, and such lapses in her memory were understandable. The Complainant’s inability to recall such details did not detract from the overall consistency and reliability of her evidence which was, for the most part, detailed, clear and cogent.
- [45]
[45] Accordingly, I found the Complainant’s account in court, of the events on the evening of 13 July 2020, to be compelling. Her recount of the incidents was sufficiently detailed, and her testimony remained largely consistent even under rigorous cross-examination by the Defence counsel. I further agreed with the Prosecution that the Complainant had been forthright about the nature of her relationship with the Accused. For instance, she readily admitted that despite the separation period of 11 months, she continued to be sexually active with the Accused up to a month before the assault on 13 July 2020. The Complainant had also not attempted to exaggerate the seriousness of the Accused’s behaviour, and openly admitted that the Accused’s behaviour on the night of the incident was abnormal as he had never sexually assaulted her before and that he seemed “out of control” and “not himself”. This, in my view, lent further credence to her testimony.
Whether the Complainant’s testimony was consistent with prior statements
- [46]
[46] The Prosecution submitted that not only was the Complainant’s evidence in court consistent, but it was also consistent with the prior statements she made. The Accused contended otherwise.
(1) The Complainant’s conditioned statement
- [47]
[47] I begin with the Complainant’s conditioned statement, and the alleged discrepancies between her evidence in court and her conditioned statement. The Accused sought to impeach the Complainant’s credibility under s 157(c) of the Evidence Act 1893 (2020 Rev Ed) (“EA”) on the basis that she had materially contradicted her prior testimony in three respects: (a) that the Accused had inserted his finger into her vagina as he was angered that she did not give him her phone’s passcode; (b) that the Accused said that he could “do whatever he wants with” the Complainant as she was his wife; and (c) that she had been the one to calm the Accused down after the incidents. These were details present in her evidence in court but not in her conditioned statement.
- [48]
[48] I had dismissed the Accused’s application to proceed to impeach the Complainant’s evidence. As I indicated when I made the ruling during the proceedings, I did not find the Complainant’s testimony in court materially inconsistent with her conditioned statement. However, the Accused rehashed these same arguments in his closing submissions. In my view, the discrepancies raised were not so much inconsistencies as they were details that were missing from the conditioned statement. More pertinently, these details – such as the Accused inserting his finger into the Complainant’s vagina in retaliation for her not providing her phone’s password, and him saying that he could “do whatever he wants” as the Complainant was his wife – were specifics that did not conflict with the Complainant’s account at trial. Thus, when I compared these gaps against the backdrop of the totality of the Complainant’s evidence, I did not find them sufficiently serious as to warrant permitting the Accused to proceed with his application to impeach her credibility, much less to make a finding that they rendered the Complainant’s testimony materially inconsistent with her prior conditioned statement.
(2) Account provided to Dr Lee Wai Yen
- [49]
[49] The Complainant also provided an account of the incident to Dr Lee Wai Yen (“Dr Lee”), who examined her on 14 July 2020 at the Police Cantonment Complex (“PCC”). I found her account to Dr Lee, as recorded in Dr Lee’s medical report, to be materially consistent with her evidence at trial about the key details of the sexual assault and the surrounding circumstances. These details included the incident prior to cycling, her attempt to lock her knees to prevent the Accused from assaulting her and the times during which the Children interrupted his assault.
Whether the Complainant’s testimony was consistent with her conduct
- [50]
[50] According to the Prosecution, the Complainant’s actions after the alleged assault were also consistent with her account. Immediately after the sexual assault, the Complainant recounted running into the master bedroom toilet. She broke down, cried and even vomited. The Complainant’s genuine emotional distress was also supported by her decision to make a police report the very next morning.
- [51]
[51] The Accused, however, sought to impugn the Complainant’s credibility on the grounds that her testimony was inconsistent with her actions after the incidents, as well as her demeanour and personality. I will address each of these contentions in turn.
(1) The Complainant’s actions after the events
- [52]
[52] With regard to the Complainant’s actions after the incident, the Accused argued that after the alleged sexual assault, the Complainant was able to go to the kitchen to get food for herself and the Accused, eat with him whilst watching television in the master bedroom and sleep in the same bed with him. Additionally, the Complainant made no mention of the sexual assault to any of her family members until after she made the police report, despite regularly communicating with CM and living in the Flat with her father. In particular, the Accused highlighted the fact that despite being incredibly close with CM, it was peculiar that the Complainant did not inform CM of the assault despite communicating with her prior to making the police report, and did not go into the details of the assault even during a call with CM after the police report.
- [53]
[53] In response, the Prosecution relied on the case of GBR v Public Prosecutor and another appeal [2018] 3 SLR 1048 for the proposition that “victims of sexual crimes cannot be straitjacketed in the expectation that they must act or react in a certain manner” provided that their reaction is “within the realm of possibilities” (at [20]). Although the Complainant did not inform anyone or seek help in the immediate aftermath and was able to continue interacting with the Accused, such conduct was not inconsistent with her claim that she had just been assaulted. This was especially since, as the Complainant explained, she was in a state of shock and confusion for most of the night. Moreover, she provided cogent and credible explanations for not informing anyone of the assault immediately. For instance, with regard to her father, the Complainant explained that she did not have that sort of relationship with her father where she would see him as her “protector”, and he had made clear to her that her issues with the Accused did not concern him.
- [54]
[54] I agreed with the Prosecution that the Complainant’s actions, after the incident in the master bedroom, cannot be said to be inconsistent with her claim that she had been sexually assaulted. It is trite that victims of sexual assault may react to sexual abuse in different ways, and it is “not necessary for a complainant to be distraught for her to be believed” (Public Prosecutor v Yue Roger Jr [2019] 3 SLR 749 (“Yue Roger Jr”) at [34]). I accepted the Complainant’s explanation that she had been in a state of shock and confusion after the sexual assault, and that she had tried to maintain an air of normalcy by getting dinner and sleeping in the same room as the Accused. The fact that she was in a state of shock after the assault was also within the realm of possibility, in light of her testimony that the Accused had never “displayed any acts of violence while being intimate with her” before, as the incident was the first time he had sexually assaulted her. The Complainant’s explanation was further supported by her desire to not involve the Children. Acting in an abnormal manner or alerting them as to what had happened might have done so. The reasonableness of her actions must be assessed against the context that she is married to the Accused, that they were sexually intimate until not long before that night and that the sexual assault was confined to acts of digital penetration. Thus, the mere fact that the Complainant had gone through the motions of preparing dinner for the family and slept with the Accused could not be said be contradictory to her testimony that she had just been sexually assaulted prior to those acts.
- [55]
[55] The Complainant’s decision not to inform any of her family members, including CM, with whom she was close, before filing the police report as she did not “want anyone to change [her] mind” must similarly be considered in light of her claim that this was not the first time the Accused had used physical force on her, and that she did not want to risk being dissuaded from filing the report after his most recent escalation to sexual assault. In relation to CM, I did not find the purported delay of the Complainant waiting until after she made the police report before informing CM about the assault to be unreasonable. When she was communicating with CM on the night of 13 July 2020 after the incident, the Complainant was likely still processing what had happened to her given that she was in shock. In light of this, and the sensitive nature of sexual crimes, it was not inconceivable that the Complainant would have been hesitant to speak out about the matter even to her close relatives before making the police report.
(2) The Complainant’s personality
- [56]
[56] Next, the Accused claimed that the Complainant’s testimony of non-consensual sexual activity was inconsistent with her demeanour and personality, as well as the history of them frequently engaging in sexual intercourse. The Accused relied on the Complainant’s purported assertive nature to claim that she could and would have aggressively resisted any unwanted sexual acts on the part of the Accused. He argued that given that she was able to resist his attempt to pry her legs open, this demonstrated how strong she was. Thus, her claim that she could not resist being assaulted was not to be believed. The Accused also relied on a video clip of the Complainant purportedly grabbing his genitals as evidence that she was capable and willing to use physical force on him when necessary. He further supported this with a statement from a mutual friend of theirs (“F”), who testified that the Accused was the passive party to the relationship, whilst the Complainant was the more dominant and controlling party. Finally, the Accused pointed to the fact that the Complainant had repeatedly sneaked him into the Flat for sexual relations to show that he was readily compliant, even to such peculiar requests, and that the couple had frequently engaged in sexual activities. Hence, the sexual activity on 13 July 2020 was simply one such consensual encounter.
- [57]
[57] In response, the Prosecution pointed out that the Complainant had explained that she refrained from using her hands to resist or kick with her legs as she was afraid that the Accused would retaliate and hit her back. Despite this, she made her lack of desire to have sex with him clear, by locking her legs together, and trying to wiggle away from the Accused when he inserted his finger into her vagina. With regard to F’s evidence, the Prosecution submitted that any observations by him were likely to be dated and one-sided, since any knowledge he had of the parties’ relationship after 2019 was solely based on the Accused’s retelling and not independent observation.
- [58]
[58] I did not accept the Accused’s claim that the Complainant’s failure to fight back harder was out of character, and that this undermined the reliability of her evidence. As the Prosecution rightly pointed out, the Complainant had expressed her resistance to the Accused’s actions by locking her legs and verbally informing the Accused to stop violating her. She also explained that she was afraid of running away as the last time she had attempted to run from the Accused, he had twisted her knee resulting in injuries. This explanation was logical and supported by some objective evidence. This came in the form of a medical report from Jurong Polyclinic (which recorded a bruise to the Complainant’s left orbit and tenderness in her right knee) and messages between the Accused and the Complainant, where the latter stated “I am very sorry I did that to you” in relation to the injuries.
- [59]
[59] It also bears repeating that the law does not prescribe certain expected behaviour on victims of sexual assault (see above at [53]). The mere act of helpless resignation or non-resistance cannot signify consent. It is not unreasonable for a victim – even one who is normally assertive and dominant, such as the Complainant – to freeze in shock and fear and not strongly resist in the face of sexual assault (GCK at [111]).
- [60]
[60] I also gave limited weight to F’s evidence. As the Prosecution pointed out, most of his evidence was based on a one-sided retelling of the Accused and the Complainant’s relationship from the Accused’s perspective. For instance, one key aspect of F’s evidence, which the Accused relied on, was an occasion when F observed scratches on the Accused during a friend’s wedding and was informed by the Accused, that the Complainant had been the aggressor. This, the Accused argued, showed that the Complainant had been the more aggressive party and would have easily been able to stop and resist his assault. However, when F was questioned on this incident, he admitted that he never verified with the Complainant on how and why the scratch marks appeared on the Accused and simply took the Accused’s word that “she had scratched him because he disagreed with her”.
- [61]
[61] As a final note, I was unpersuaded by the Accused’s attempts to rely on his and the Complainant’s past sexual encounters, and pattern of engaging in “make-up sex” after an argument to undermine her evidence. It is natural for a married couple to engage in intimate activities, even if their relationship is one that is turbulent. If the fact that parties regularly engaged in sexual intercourse can serve as a reason for disbelieving that an alleged victim did not consent, then it would seem that sexual assault can hardly be made out in cases where the parties were in an intimate relationship. This clearly cannot be the case.
Whether the Complainant’s testimony was corroborated by external evidence
- [62]
[62] In addition to being internally and externally consistent, the Prosecution further submitted that the Complainant’s testimony was supported and corroborated by the WhatsApp messages exchanged between AS and the Accused, the contents of AS’s police statement, as well as the Accused’s admissions in his first VRI.
- [63]
[63] In contrast, the Accused attempted to explain away the WhatsApp messages, and the contents of his statement. He also relied on how AS had retracted from her position in her police statement. Further, the Accused argued that the lack of any injuries or bruises on the Complainant contradicted her claim that she had been assaulted.
(1) WhatsApp messages between AS and the Accused, and AS’s police statement
- [64]
[64] I turn first to the WhatsApp messages between AS and the Accused. To recapitulate, on the morning after the alleged incident of sexual assault (ie, 14 July 2020), the Accused called and messaged AS to inform her about what had happened the night before. Although the call was not recorded, photographs of the subsequent WhatsApp messages between AS and the Accused were taken. I reproduce the material portions of the message conversation between AS and the Accused:
- [65]
[65] After these messages were exchanged, later in the day on 14 July 2020 at around 5.00pm, AS also gave a statement to the police while at the PCC. This statement was subsequently relied upon by the Prosecution to impeach AS’s credibility. The key paragraph relied upon is as follows:
AS also confirmed that her statement was true and correct before she signed it.
- [66]
[66] At trial, AS testified that in her call with the Accused, he only told her that “something was bothering him”, and not that he did something wrong. AS also claimed that she only knew that force had been used on the Complainant, though she was unsure of the nature of the force and whether the Accused was admitting to using force or if he was merely repeating what the Complainant had said. This was despite AS asking, in her WhatsApp messages with the Accused, whether he engaged in penetrative acts, and subsequently stating in her police statement that the Accused told her that he had tried to force himself to make love to the Complaint. When questioned about this apparent inconsistency between her court testimony and her prior statements, AS averred that the version in court was the correct version as she was not in the right state of mind on the day her statement was taken. As for the WhatsApp messages, AS claimed that the “she” referenced in her messages was merely her paraphrasing her friend who said “if there wasn’t any consent”, and was not reflective of any admission by the Accused that the Complainant had not consented.
- [67]
[67] The Prosecution submitted that the WhatsApp messages between AS and the Accused clearly supported an inference that the Accused had admitted to sexually assaulting the Complainant in his call to AS. To this end, AS’s testimony at trial was her attempt to obfuscate the truth to protect the Accused and was clearly inconsistent with her contemporaneous police statement. Thus, the Prosecution applied to impeach AS’s credibility under s 157(c) of the EA and to substitute her oral testimony with her police statement under s 147(3) of the EA.
- [68]
[68] The Prosecution further submitted that AS’s WhatsApp messages and contemporaneous police statement corroborated the Complainant’s testimony that the Accused had sexually assaulted her. This is evidenced from, inter alia, AS’s reference to a lack of consent, her discussion of the possible sexual offences that the Accused might be liable for, her unequivocal criticism of the Accused’s actions as wrong as well as his corresponding expression of shame and remorse for lacking control, and her claim that the Accused told her that he “tried to force himself to make love to [the Complainant]”.
- [69]
[69] In response, the Accused’s position was that his apparent admission of guilt to AS was a product of him mistakenly believing that he had violated the Complainant, as well as his willingness to simply accept blame and apologise. Consequently, AS’s police statement was made under a similar mistaken belief based on her incomplete knowledge from the limited information provided by the Accused and his incorrect belief that the Complainant had not consented. Additionally, AS’s seeming awareness that the Accused had engaged in sexual acts was based on her own assumptions, since the Accused was unlikely to share such intimate details with AS. As for the discrepancies flagged by the Prosecution between AS’s court testimony and police statement, they were minor at best and immaterial, and the former ought to be preferred.
- [70]
[70] I was unconvinced by the Accused’s attempt to explain the discrepancies in AS’s evidence. Looking at the WhatsApp messages in their totality, the references to “she” and “her” were clearly made in relation to the Complainant. Indeed, the Accused’s response that “she was fearful” only made sense if the “she” referenced in AS’s preceding message was interpreted as referring to the Complainant. It was also clear that AS was aware of the sexual nature of the Accused’s acts as she assured him that his actions “won’t go in as rape” though it may “be consider[ed] molest even [if] its [his] wife”. This contradicted her court testimony that she only knew that “force” was used and had been uncertain of its precise nature or of who had been the one to use force.
- [71]
[71] I also rejected the Accused’s claim that the discrepancies were minor and immaterial. In her police statement, AS clearly stated that the Accused told her that he did something wrong and tried to force himself to make love to the Complainant. This was materially different from her evidence in court that she was unaware of the Complainant’s lack of consent and the sexual nature of the Accused’s actions. AS’s explanation that she could not quite remember what she had said in her police statement, and that she signed the statement even though the lines were not accurately recorded as she was “very emotional” and “not in [the] right state of mind”, was unsatisfactory. She accepted in court that she had no reason to lie in her police statement and had been cooperative with the police. While I was cognisant of the emotional turmoil she must have experienced on 14 July 2020, that was insufficient to justify why she would adopt a position unfavourable to the Accused, unless it was the truth. Thus, I held her credit to be impeached.
- [72]
[72] It is trite that more weight is generally accorded to statements made contemporaneously as such temporal proximity guards against inaccuracy (Chai Chien Wei Kelvin v Public Prosecutor [1998] 3 SLR(R) 619 at [71]; s 147(6) of the EA). I thus saw no reason to prefer AS’s court testimony over her police statement and agreed that her version in the police statement should replace her evidence in court. In this regard, AS’s version in the police statement clearly supported and corroborated the Complainant’s testimony that she had not consented and was sexually assaulted by the Accused.
- [73]
[73] I also disbelieved the Accused’s attempt to justify his apparent admission to AS on the grounds that this was aligned with his general behaviour and willingness to accept fault when blamed by the Complainant, and his mistaken belief that he had assaulted her. I did not find his explanation to be particularly persuasive. Even if I were to accept that the Accused mistakenly accepted the Complainant’s claim that she had not consented, this would not explain why he further admitted to being aware that she “was fearful” and that he “lack[ed] control”.
(2) The contents of the Accused’s first VRI
- [74]
[74] The Accused’s initial confession to AS in his call and messages to her are further supplemented by his admissions in his first VRI. When queried on what happened when he inserted his finger into the Complainant’s vagina, the Accused accepted that he had done so without her consent and stated that “she was crying” and “was scared of [him]”. Before me, the Accused sought to undermine the veracity of his admissions in the first VRI, a point which I deal with in greater depth subsequently (from [93] onwards). Regardless, it was clear to me that these admissions corroborated the Complainant’s evidence that she had not consented to the sexual acts of penetration.
(3) The lack of injuries
- [75]
[75] Finally, I turn to the Accused’s contention that the Complainant’s claim, that she had not consented to him inserting his finger into her vagina, was contradicted by the lack of any injuries on her. He argued that if the penetrative acts were truly nonconsensual, she would not have been aroused and thus her unlubricated vagina should have sustained injuries consistent with assault. Additionally, the Complainant did not have any bruising around her thighs or any other part of her body despite her claim that the Accused had used force on her and attempted to force her legs apart. In response, the Prosecution relied on Dr Lee’s testimony, in which she emphasised that it was reasonable for there not to be any injuries to the Complainant’s vagina as she had been digitally penetrated with a single finger. This was so even if the Complainant was neither aroused nor lubricated. Dr Lee also testified that there was no reasonable expectation of injury or bruising to the Victim’s inner thighs, buttocks or sides despite her scuffle with the Accused.
- [76]
[76] I agreed with the Prosecution that Dr Lee had adequately addressed all the issues raised by the Accused. Throughout the Defence counsel’s cross-examination, Dr Lee maintained that it was entirely plausible for the Complainant not to have sustained any injuries to her vagina – despite not consenting to the Accused’s acts – as digital penetration by a finger was unlikely to cause any injuries to the vagina. This was especially so, given that the Complainant was “a non-virgin [and had] given birth twice vaginally”. Relatedly, I also accepted Dr Lee’s evidence that simply because force was applied in an attempt to separate the Complainant’s thighs, it did not necessarily mean that a bruise would form. This was particularly since the Accused had only used his hands and not any other weapon or object to restrain the Complainant. Ultimately, while the presence of injuries may have strengthened the Prosecution’s case, the lack of injuries was simply a neutral matter.
Whether the Complainant had a motive to make false allegations
- [77]
[77] The Accused submitted that the Complainant had lied about the nonconsensual nature of their sexual acts and that she raised these false allegations to implicate him. In GCK, the Court of Appeal affirmed that when “a motive for a false allegation is raised … it is for the Defence to first establish sufficient evidence of such a motive [… additionally,] that motive must be specific to the witness concerned” (at [102]). It is only once the defence is able to raise “sufficient evidence of a motive to fabricate so as to raise a reasonable doubt in the Prosecution’s case” that the burden shifts to the Prosecution “to prove that that there was no such motive” beyond reasonable doubt (Yue Roger Jr at [48]).
- [79]
[79] I pause at this juncture to note that although the main motive alleged by the Accused was the Complainant’s alleged desire to obtain favourable divorce terms, it was one of several other slightly different motives levied by the Accused and his counsel at the Complainant. In the first VRI, the Accused appeared to speculate that the Complainant might have accused him of assaulting her because she was under the influence of marijuana. The Accused then suggested (in his case for the defence (“CFD”) and written submissions) that the Complainant could have been pressured by her mother to end her relationship with him. Finally, for the first time during his cross-examination, the Accused theorised that the Complainant could have lied due to her budding relationship with a mutual friend “M”.
- [80]
[80] The Prosecution, on the other hand, submitted that the Complainant had no reason to lie about the assault or to falsely implicate the Accused. In particular, the Prosecution highlighted the speculative and shifting nature of the motives put forth by the Accused, and argued that all of these alleged motives were bare assertions and unbelievable. In particular, the Accused’s speculation of the Complainant’s relationship and potential intimacy with M appeared to be a mere afterthought. The Complainant’s demeanour in court also contradicted any allegation of motive as she had given an even-handed and candid testimony of the assault and parties’ relationship. Additionally, she only filed for a divorce a year after she made the police report, and subsequently discontinued it. As for the PPO and DEO, she had sought those applications out of genuine concern for her and the Children’s safety.
- [81]
[81] As for the messages between the Complainant and CM as well as the latter’s comments during the Family Meeting – the Prosecution argued that there was ultimately not a single incriminating text message that could support a finding of collusion or instigation. Additionally, the Defence counsel failed to put to the Complainant, his case that she falsely accused the Accused on CM’s instigation to obtain favourable divorce terms. Collectively, the Accused’s constantly evolving and illogical account of the Complainant’s possible motives were mere baseless speculations and unsupported by any piece of evidence.
- [82]
[82] I agreed with the Prosecution that the Complainant’s alleged motives of obtaining more favourable divorce terms and appeasing CM were largely unsubstantiated. In relation to the Accused’s heavy reliance on the messages between the Complainant and CM on 13 July 2020, I was of the view that this reliance was misplaced. CM’s communication that “the only way [for the Complainant] to regain [her] house is to get [the Accused] committed to IMH again” must be seen in light of the fact that the Accused had indeed moved out of the Flat to stay with AS when he was discharged from IMH. This communication, while harsh and hostile towards the Accused, did not evince any instruction or plan for the Complainant to accuse the Accused of any sort of criminal wrongdoing, much less sexual assault. The same could be said of CM’s statements during the Family Meeting. For instance, CM’s statement that the Accused “can’t force somebody to have sex with [him]” comes after the Accused responded stating “We make love”, to the Complainant’s question of “What do you plan on achieving for the both of us being in the same house?”. In this context, it could hardly be said that CM’s statement was an attempt to instigate the Complainant to cast false allegations against the Accused.
- [83]
[83] In a related vein, while the Complainant’s applications for a PPO and DEO were not incongruous with a potential motive to oust the Accused from the Flat and obtain control over the Children, neither were they inconsistent with a desire to protect herself and the Children from the Accused in the immediate aftermath of a sexual assault. As such, even taking the messages on 13 July 2020, the statements during the Family Meeting and the Complainant’s applications into account – the Accused was ultimately unable to raise sufficient evidence of any motive, by the Complainant, to falsely implicate him for sexual assault. He thus failed to raise reasonable doubt in the Prosecution’s case.
- [84]
[84] As for the Accused’s claim that the Complainant might have lied about the assault to be with M, I found this claim to be entirely unmeritorious. Even if I accepted that the Complainant was desirous of a relationship with M, the Accused did not explain why such a relationship was contingent on him being charged with sexual assault. In fact, at the time when the Complainant was talking to M, the Complainant testified that she had already decided that her relationship with the Accused was “not going to work” and that it was “over”. There was no reason for her to make such serious accusations just to engage in a relationship that she would have otherwise been able to engage in, after leaving the Accused. Similarly, his speculation that the Complainant might have consumed marijuana prior to accusing him of assault was pure conjecture and not a single piece of evidence has been provided in support of such claims.
Conclusion on the Complainant’s testimony
- [85]
[85] To conclude on this section of the Complainant’s testimony, after reviewing it in full, I found her testimony credible as not only was it consistent with her other statements and actions, but it was also largely corroborated by external pieces of evidence.
- [86]
[86] In contrast to the Complainant’s detailed and cogent testimony, I found the Accused’s testimony, in respect of the Complainant’s consent, to be a mere afterthought. I shall deal with the Accused’s testimony in greater detail subsequently. For now, I highlight that his claim that the Complainant purportedly gave him a seductive look and pouted and said “don’t do that” in a low seductive voice, which evidenced her consent, was only raised, for the first time, in his CFD. Indeed, the Accused conceded that no mention of such acts was made in his various video-recorded interviews on 14 July 2020, 9 November 2020 and 30 September 2021 as well as his first Cautioned Statement. The belated nature of such statements severely undermined their veracity. The Accused had thus failed to cast any reasonable doubt on the Prosecution’s case that there was no consent by the Complainant to the sexual acts.
- [87]
[87] Therefore, I was satisfied that the Prosecution had proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the Complainant did not consent to the Accused’s acts of digital penetration.
The Accused’s testimony
- [88]
[88] As stated above (at [21]), the Accused’s main defence was that the Complainant consented to the sexual acts. Since I found that the Complainant did not, in fact, consent to the sexual acts of digital penetration done by the Accused, I now assess the Accused’s testimony primarily in relation to the Accused’s alternative defence that he had mistakenly believed that the Complainant had consented to them.
- [89]
[89] When an offender seeks to rely on s 79 of the Penal Code, he bears the burden of establishing, on a balance of probabilities, that he believed “in good faith” that the victim consented to the sexual acts forming the basis of the offence, having exercised due care and attention (Asep Ardiansyah v Public Prosecutor [2020] SGCA 74 at [45]; s 52 of the Penal Code).
- [90]
[90] In my view, there were two key instances where the Accused’s admissions illustrated his awareness that the Complainant had not consented to the sexual acts. These were the Accused’s call and WhatsApp messages to AS and his first VRI. Significantly, it seemed to me that this alternate defence – that the Accused had mistakenly believed that the Complainant had consented – only appeared for the first time in a medical report by Dr Low Tchern Kuang Lambert (“Dr Low”) on 6 October 2020, after his WhatsApp messages to AS, the first VRI and his first Cautioned Statement. In fact, it was not until the Defence’s closing submissions that this defence of mistake, under s 79 of the Penal Code, was particularised for the first time.
The Accused’s messages with AS
- [91]
[91] I first address the Accused’s initial confession to AS in the morning of 14 July 2020. As I had held above (at [70]–[71]), I preferred AS’s police statement over her court testimony, and consequently, her evidence that the Accused told [her] that he did something wrong” by “forc[ing] himself to make love to” the Complainant. I also rejected the Accused’s and AS’s claim – that the former only informed the latter that the Complainant “claimed that [he] was forcing [himself] on her” and had not actually confessed to assaulting the Complainant.
- [92]
[92] It made little sense for AS to admonish the Accused that “it was wrong of [him] to do” what he did, and for the Accused to admit that he felt “ashamed”, if he merely informed AS that the Complainant was accusing him of sexual assault. Indeed, such a response would be at odds with how AS readily came to the Accused’s defence and sought to divert the conversation when CM had suggested, during the Family Meeting, that the Accused cannot “force somebody to have sex with [him]”. It did not make sense for her to have been so protective of him in one instance, and yet immediately accept his guilt, purely based on the Complainant’s accusations, in another. Moreover, the Accused made no mention of the fact that he thought that the Complainant was consenting in his WhatsApp messages with AS – although he could have very well said so, even if he had been led to believe that he was at fault and that the Complainant did not actually consent.
The Accused’s first VRI and first Cautioned Statement
- [93]
[93] I turn next to the first VRI and first Cautioned Statement. The Prosecution argued that the Accused clearly admitted to sexually assaulting the Complainant in his first VRI. When asked if he thought the Complainant consented to him inserting his finger into her vagina, the Accused responded, “no”. Even after the Accused returned from a toilet break, he affirmed that the Complainant “did not want it but then [he] still do it”.
- [94]
[94] While the Accused did not dispute the contents of his first VRI, he argued that limited weight ought to be placed on his statements. He claimed that he was not comfortable sharing personal and intimate details with the two male recording officers that he met for the first time. Additionally, the officers failed to ask appropriate questions, to clarify the Accused’s responses, which could have elicited his responses in a better manner. They also failed to inform the Accused that the first VRI was his formal statement in relation to the Complainant’s allegation. Moreover, when looked at in its entirety, the Accused’s first VRI alongside his first Cautioned Statement were actually exculpatory as, in the latter, he stated that he only realised that he had done something wrong when the Complainant started crying, and had not realised that she was not consenting until she informed him of such after the incident.
- [95]
[95] The Accused further justified his apparent admissions on the grounds that he was not in the “right state of mind” for his statement to be taken. He claimed that he had been hysterical upon his arrest, and he began hyperventilating which resulted in the police aborting the first attempt to conduct the first VRI. He was also incredibly agitated during the interview, and his annoyance and irritation should have indicated to the officers that he wished to stop his statement. Thus, he was psychologically unfit for the interview. In support of this, the Accused relied on the evidence of Dr Tommy Tan (“Dr Tan”) that the officers failed to ask proper questions, interrupted the Accused and ought to have conducted a medical check-up before and after his statement. Thus, the Accused urged the court to treat the first VRI with extreme circumspection.
- [96]
[96] In response, the Prosecution contended that the Accused’s attempts to explain why limited weight should be given to his first VRI, ought not to be accepted. There was nothing to support the Accused’s claim that he was hysterical during his arrest, that he was hyperventilating to such an extent that the first VRI had to be postponed or that he was having trouble comprehending the officers’ questions. Moreover, the Accused was informed that the first VRI would be his formal statement in relation to the Complainant’s accusations, and in any regard, the Accused was aware that he was required to give a truthful and full account. The Prosecution also relied on Dr Low’s evidence that despite being annoyed, angry, and even slightly agitated, the Accused was still able to respond appropriately, carry a reasonable conversation, make sense in his answers and maintain somewhat good eye contact with the officers. The fact that the Accused was unwilling to answer some questions did not mean that he was unable to do so.
- [97]
[97] I rejected the Accused’s submission that limited weight should be placed on his statements as he had been in a state of hysteria, which resulted in an aborted initial attempt to procure a statement, and that he had not been informed of the purpose of the first VRI. In relation to the former, I accepted the officers’ evidence that they did not begin the interview earlier, as it was dinner time, and that there was no such aborted attempt. The Accused’s claim that he was in a state of hysteria was also undermined by his confirmation, at the beginning of the first VRI, that he was fine when queried if he was feeling unwell. Indeed, the Accused subsequently conceded that he had merely assumed that the officers had tried to a take a statement from him prior to the first VRI because he was brought to a room that looked like the interview room – but that no one gave him DVD-ROMs to choose from until the first VRI was taken. I also accepted the officers’ evidence that prior to the start of the recording of the first VRI, they had informed the Accused that the statement was for a case of sexual assault by penetration which involved his Wife. In any regard, the Accused admitted that he knew that he was required to give truthful answers during the interview.
- [98]
[98] I also rejected the Accused’s claim that his first VRI, when considered in tandem with his first Cautioned Statement, was exculpatory. The Accused’s statement, that the Complainant’s crying woke him up “from [his] intense mood of affection” was less evidence that he had mistakenly believed her to have been consenting, and more proof that he had ignored the Complainant’s acts of resistance. Furthermore, even if I were to regard the contents of the Accused’s first Cautioned Statement as not containing any confession, his first VRI, which was given the prior day, clearly did. As I discussed above (at [74] and [93]), the Accused had admitted that he “kn[e]w it was wrong” for him to insert his finger into the Complainant’s vagina without her consent. Thus, it could not be seriously argued that the contents of the first VRI and first Cautioned Statement, when considered in their entirety, were exculpatory.
- [99]
[99] Turning to the Accused’s claims regarding his mental and physical state during the first VRI, I found them to be without merit. Despite being a key lynchpin in the Accused’s case on this issue, Dr Tan’s testimony did not really support his claim. It was notable that when cross-examined by the Prosecution, Dr Tan qualified his report to say that the Accused “appeared agitated and distressed” but that he could only speculate on whether the Accused was able to grasp the questions asked of him. Notably, Dr Tan went on to accept that even when the Accused appeared to not have answered the officers’ questions that this did not “mean that he didn’t understand … the questions”, and while it was possible that the Accused was confused, it was also possible that he was simply unhappy about being handcuffed and interrogated. Finally, as Dr Tan acknowledged, he only interviewed the Accused nearly three years after the purported incident. Given the lapse in time and Dr Tan’s admission that his conclusion that the Accused was unable to comprehend the officers’ questions was equivocal at best, I ascribed limited weight to his report.
- [100]
[100] In contrast, the medical report produced by the Prosecution’s expert Dr Low was far more contemporaneous as it was made on 6 October 2020. In that report, Dr Low stated that the Accused was “forthcoming, relevant and coherent during the interview”. Moreover, his “mood was euthymic and his affect was reactive”. Additionally, he “did not display any abnormal perceptual disturbances”. Dr Low affirmed this report in his court testimony, and testified that although the Accused appeared irritated, agitated and unhappy at times, he did not seem “overtly agitated” as he was “still able to have a reasonable conversation with [the officers, …] provide information, attend to the conversation, and make sense during his answers”. Having watched the first VRI, I agreed with Dr Low’s assessment and was satisfied that the Accused was fit to be questioned. Although the Accused was clearly reticent to answer certain questions that concerned intimate details of his and the Complainant’s sexual life, he was clearly able to understand the questions asked of him, and to provide his answers. More significantly, his state of mind could not serve as an explanation for why he admitted to the non-consensual nature of the sexual acts and his knowledge of the lack of consent.
- [101]
[101] Moreover, even if I accepted that the questions posed by the officers to the Accused could have been better phrased and that the Accused was understandably agitated and stressed, given the circumstances that he had found himself in, I did not find these reasons to be sufficient for me to disbelieve the truth of the Accused’s initial admissions. Indeed, the Accused did not provide any adequate explanation as to why he did not even mention that he had initially believed that the Complainant had consented, even accepting that he was manipulated by the Complainant to believe that such a mistake would not absolve him of fault or guilt. I disagreed with the Accused’s suggestion that had the right questions been posed, the officers would have elicited the fact that he was operating under the mistaken belief that the Complainant was consenting. If he was indeed labouring under such a misapprehension, this would have been a material point he should have readily and naturally raised on his own accord.
The judgment continues past this page. Read the rest at eLitigation.