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Grounds publishedDecided 4 Nov 2024

General Division of the High Court

A shipowner that released cargo without the bills of lading was liable to the bank

The “Maersk Katalin”

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[2024] SGHC 282Case no. Admiralty in Rem No 20 of 2021

The decision, in one line

Not legal advice

A shipowner that released cargo without the bills of lading was liable to the bank

Summary by laws.sgParagraphs [231], [5]

There is no fuller plain-English summary of this judgment yet.

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Grounds of decision

Official text from eLitigation

  1. [1] Bills of lading stand at the intersection between the international sale of goods, the operation of documentary credits mediating those sales, and the carriage of goods by sea. A buyer of goods will typically apply to its bank for the issuance of a letter of credit under pre-arranged credit lines; a letter of credit is then ‘opened’ in favour of the seller, who will receive payment for the goods from the bank on (or shortly after) presentation by the seller of documents complying with the terms of the credit. In most cases, original bills of lading will number among the documents that the seller will have to present for payment.

  2. [2] The bank will ordinarily retain possession of the original bills as security for the financing it has extended. This is usually done pursuant to a pre-negotiated pledge of those bills by its customer. Should the customer default on its repayment obligations, the bank may – as holder and pledgee of the original bills of lading – call on the ocean carrier for delivery of the subject cargo, which cargo may then be sold by the bank and the proceeds applied in satisfaction of the debt. In circumstances where the carrier has already parted with the cargo other than against presentation of the original bills, the bank as holders will have to make do with a claim against the carrier for inter alia misdelivery. It is against that backdrop that bills of lading have come to be regarded as “one of the pillars of international trade”: J. I. MacWilliam Co. Inc. v Mediterranean Shipping Co. S.A. (The “Rafaela S”) [2005] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 347 at [38]. If letters of credit are the ‘lifeblood’ of cross-border commerce, as they are sometimes described, then it is bills of lading that are responsible for keeping that lifeblood flowing in most trades.

  3. [3] It is common knowledge, however, that modern commercial pressures often demand the physical transfer and delivery of cargoes on tight schedules, irrespective of where the bills of lading may be. Carriers are regularly made to release their cargoes at the port of discharge without original bills having been presented to it or its agents. In most instances, this will be done pursuant to instructions from their charterers. To protect themselves against the familiar legal risks and consequences of doing so, carriers will typically comply with such instructions only if they are suitably indemnified by their charterers or the cargo receivers (usually by means of a letter of indemnity). In this way, the legal risk is allocated as between the carrier and the parties to the underlying sale (or sales) of the goods. When things go wrong, banks almost inevitably turn to the carrier for the goods or their monetary equivalent; in turn, the carrier’s indemnitor – or, where back-to-back indemnities are given, the last of the indemnitors in the chain – will be in the hot seat.

  4. [4] The arrangements for the discharge of cargoes that I have just described above may, in some cases, have been known to the bank; in other cases, the bank may have even enabled them. Circumstances like these have spawned the incantation in pleadings and submissions that the bank “never looked to the bills of lading as security”. In the end, however, there is no magic to these words. At best, they are no more than shorthand for some combination of mental states and conduct that may or may not disclose defences resting on established legal principles. It is therefore vital in every case that the factual and legal analyses are not clouded by recourse to shorthands like these.

  5. [5] The present suit was yet another product stemming from the collapse of Hin Leong Trading (Pte) Ltd (“Hin Leong” or “HLT”) in 2020. The plaintiff bank (“UOB”) claims as holders of certain bills of lading against the defendant shipowner, Maersk Tankers Singapore Pte Ltd (“Maersk”), for the misdelivery of a cargo of gasoil sold to Hin Leong by Winson Oil Trading Pte Ltd (“Winson”).

  6. [6] That cargo was carried onboard the vessel “MAERSK PRINCESS” (the “Vessel”) pursuant to a voyage charterparty between Maersk as owners and Winson as charterers. It is not disputed that the cargo was discharged without original bills of lading having been presented. Maersk did so in reliance on indemnities given by Winson. Winson was granted permission to intervene in this action and has joined forces with Maersk in resisting UOB’s claims. In this judgment, and solely for ease of expression, I shall refer to Maersk and Winson jointly as “the Defendants”.

  7. [7] While admitting that Maersk discharged and delivered the cargo without original bills of lading having been presented, the Defendants have advanced a number of defences against liability for misdelivery. Most of them are bonded together by the overarching assertion that UOB “never looked to the bills of lading as security”.

  8. [8] Having carefully considered the evidence and parties’ submissions, I allow UOB’s claim against Maersk for breach of contract and award UOB damages in the sum of US$39,372,300.00. These are my reasons.

  9. The background

  10. The sale and purchase of the cargo

  11. [9] This dispute arises out of a shipment of 752,870 barrels of gasoil 10ppm sulphur. That cargo was split into and dealt with in four parcels at all material times:

  12. [10] The entire cargo was eventually on-sold by Winson to Hin Leong on delivery ex ship (or “DES”) terms pursuant to a sale contract dated 12 February 2020, as amended by an addendum dated 17 February 2020 (collectively, the “Sale Contract”). As is customary, that contract provided for payment by irrevocable letter of credit 30 days after notice of readiness (or “NOR”) is tendered by the performing vessel at the port of discharge.

  13. The carriage of the cargo

  14. [11] By a charterparty in an amended ASBATANKVOY form dated 10 February 2020 (the “Charterparty”), the Vessel was voyage chartered by Maersk to Winson for the carriage of the cargo.

  15. [12] Loading of the cargo commenced at Mailiao, Taiwan on 18 February 2020 and was completed on 21 February 2020, whereupon the following bills of lading were issued in triplicate by the master of the Vessel for each of the four parcels described above (at [9]):

  16. Formosa Petrochemical Corporation was the shipper named on all the bills of lading.

  17. [13] UOB eventually came to be interested in Parcels A and C, and they form the subject matter of this action. I will therefore refer to both these parcels collectively as the “Cargo”. I will also refer to BL-A and BL-C collectively as the “OBLs”.

  18. [14] On 26 February 2020, Winson (through its chartering broker, Swift Maritime Services Pte Ltd) provided Maersk with discharge orders, the relevant parts of which read:

  19. That same day, Winson issued a letter to Maersk requesting that Maersk discharge the cargo per its instructions and without presentation of original bills of lading in return for the usual indemnities from Winson (the “Discharge LOI”).

  20. [15] The Vessel arrived in Singapore and tendered its notice of readiness to discharge on the night of 27 February 2020. Discharge commenced the next morning and was completed shortly before noon the following day on 29 February 2020. As I mentioned, it is undisputed that all of this took place without any original bills of lading having been presented. At the time, BL-A was indorsed to BP, and BL-C was indorsed to either Crédit Agricole or UniCredit Bank AG (“UniCredit”); the physical location of those bills, however, was unclear on the evidence.

  21. The financing arrangements between Hin Leong and UOB

  22. The letter of credit

  23. [16] On 3 March 2020, Hin Leong applied to UOB for a letter of credit to finance its purchase of the Cargo. The remainder (ie, Parcels B and D) was separately financed by Standard Chartered Bank, Singapore Branch (“Standard Chartered”). It bears emphasising that by the time Hin Leong submitted this application to UOB, the Cargo had already been discharged and delivered at Universal Terminal, Singapore (“Universal Terminal”) by Maersk some three days prior (see [15] above).

  24. [17] For context, Hin Leong’s application to UOB was made pursuant to a letter of offer dated 6 April 2018, by which UOB extended to Hin Leong uncommitted banking facilities for a total amount of US$250,000,000.00 (the “Letter of Offer”). This comprised various lines of credit, two of which are relevant for present purposes. The first is the “LC1” sub-facility for “sold” cargoes; the second is the “LC2” sub-facility for “unsold cargoes”. More will be said about this distinction shortly.

  25. [18] The Letter of Offer was accompanied by a “General Memorandum of Pledge of Goods” dated 6 August 2002 and executed by Hin Leong in favour of UOB. By this document, Hin Leong essentially undertook to inter alia grant UOB a pledge of any bills of lading subsequently deposited with the bank in respect of goods it has financed.

  26. [19] On 4 March 2020, UOB approved Hin Leong’s application and issued Letter of Credit No. 1P1LC019575 (the “L/C”). The L/C was booked under the LC2 sub-facility, and its maturity date was 27 March 2020.

  27. [20] Of significance to this dispute are the terms of the L/C listing the documents required for a compliant presentation thereunder. Field 46A of the L/C (headed “Documents Required”) states that payment is to be made by UOB against the presentation of:

  28. [21] Clause 15 of Field 47A (headed “Additional Conditions”) further provides that:

  29. The clause then goes on to set out the format and text of the letter of indemnity that the beneficiary (ie, Winson) will have to provide under item (B) of cl 15. In essence, this letter of indemnity sets out the beneficiary’s undertaking to inter alia provide the documents required under Field 46A (which includes the OBLs) to UOB in consideration of the bank making payment without having yet received those documents.

  30. [22] On 5 March 2020, Winson – relying on the mechanism provided for by Field 47A of the L/C – presented its commercial invoice for a sum of US$43,563,960.00 (the “Commercial Invoice”) and a letter of indemnity (the “Payment LOI”) in the required wording to Credit Suisse (Switzerland) Ltd (“Credit Suisse”). Credit Suisse was Winson’s advising and negotiating bank under the L/C. At the trial, the court heard evidence from Winson’s Executive Director, Ms Tung Ching Ching, that this was done because “the original bills of lading and Other Shipping Documents were not yet available to [Winson]” at the time.

  31. [23] On 9 March 2020, UOB was notified by Credit Suisse that “[d]ocuments in strict compliance with LC terms and conditions have been negotiated [by Credit Suisse] and sent to [UOB] by courier service”. The Payment LOI and Commercial Invoice were eventually received at UOB’s counters on 11 March 2020.

  32. [24] On 12 March 2020, UOB sent Hin Leong an email attaching a document titled “Collection Notice Term Bills 1P1TB109504” (the “Collection Notice”). The email also enclosed copies of the documents presented to UOB by Credit Suisse. UOB sought Hin Leong’s confirmation as to the correctness of those documents, and Hin Leong returned the Collection Notice to UOB on the morning of 24 March 2020 with its confirmation:

  33. [25] UOB then notified Credit Suisse on the same day that the documents presented had been accepted and that UOB will remit payment to Credit Suisse upon maturity of the L/C on 27 March 2020. It is not disputed that payment was eventually made.

  34. Hin Leong’s sales allocations

  35. [26] At this point, I briefly digress to consider one aspect of UOB and Hin Leong’s financing arrangements. Quite apart from the General Memorandum of Pledge, the terms of the Letter of Offer also required Hin Leong to (a) lodge or “allocate” sale contracts entered into by Hin Leong as seller; and (b) assign the receivables thereunder to UOB, all within 21 days from the date of the “import leg” documentary credit being opened under the LC2 line. In the ordinary course of things, the proceeds of those sale contracts would be utilised by UOB in settlement of the financing extended under the documentary credit.

  36. [27] As regards the L/C in this case, Hin Leong was obliged to allocate its sale contracts by 25 March 2020, but it only did so on 26 March 2020. Specifically, three contracts (the “Rotterdam Contracts”) worth approximately US$90 million on UOB’s contemporaneous estimation were allocated to cover Hin Leong’s repayment obligations under two import letters of credit, one of which was the L/C. Those allocations were duly accepted by UOB.

  37. The Trust Receipt Loan

  38. [28] On 27 March 2020 (being the due date for payment under the L/C), Hin Leong returned a further copy of the Collection Notice requesting the grant of a trust receipt on the terms and conditions set out overleaf:

  39. [29] A conventional trust receipt involves the bank releasing original bills of lading to its customer, who will then take receipt of the cargo (and any proceeds subsequently generated therefrom) on trust for the bank. It is common ground that because UOB was not in possession of the OBLs at the material time (see [33]–[35] below), the bank could not have extended a trust receipt, properly so-called, to Hin Leong.

  40. [30] Therefore, what followed in practical terms upon UOB approving Hin Leong’s request for a “trust receipt” was an arrangement in which Hin Leong drew on credit under its Trust Receipt (1) sub-facility with UOB to notionally settle its repayment obligations in respect of the L/C. The tenor of that loan was 27 March 2020 to 8 April 2020. I will refer to this arrangement as the “Trust Receipt Loan”. The original of the Commercial Invoice was then released by UOB to Hin Leong, but not the Payment LOI.

  41. Roll-over of the Trust Receipt Loan

  42. [31] On 8 April 2020 (when repayment of the Trust Receipt Loan fell due), Hin Leong sent a letter to UOB requesting for a “roll-over [of] the principal amount of US$43,563,960.00 for period from 08/04/2020 to 17/04/2020”. That request was approved on the same day.

  43. [32] On 9 April 2020, Hin Leong informed UOB that it was withdrawing its earlier allocation of the Rotterdam Contracts (see [27] above). An explanation was sought by the bank, but it appears from the evidence that no response was given.

  44. Events following Hin Leong’s announcement of its insolvency

  45. [33] On 14 April 2020, Hin Leong announced its insolvency at a meeting with its creditors. The events that followed are by now notorious. Soon after that meeting, UOB went on to inquire of Winson on the status of the OBLs. As time passed, those inquiries grew in urgency and several of them were accompanied by warnings that UOB would look to Winson for any loss arising out of its failure to convey the necessary documents (including the OBLs) per the Payment LOI’s terms.

  46. [34] Instructions were thus given within Winson internally “to secure the original Bills of Lading as well as the Other Shipping Documents for redemption of the Payment LOIs.” Winson eventually received BL-C from UniCredit on or around 26 June 2020; BL-A was received from BP on or around 7 July 2020.

  47. Commencement of these proceedings

  48. [36] On 3 February 2021, UOB wrote to the Vessel’s then-registered owners, Sri Asih Maritime Ltd (“Sri Asih”), demanding delivery up of the Cargo. UOB also issued a writ in rem against the Vessel in HC/ADM 10/2021 (“ADM 10”) on the same day. On 5 February 2021, Sri Asih informed UOB that it only became the Vessel’s registered owner on 5 March 2020. In light of this, UOB’s action in ADM 10 was eventually discontinued on 16 June 2021.

  49. [37] Following Sri Asih’s response, UOB wrote to Maersk on 18 February 2021 to demand delivery up of the Cargo – on the evidence before me, that was the very first communication between UOB and Maersk pertaining to the Cargo or the OBLs. The writ in rem in the present action was also issued on the same day. On 27 May 2021, the writ was served on Maersk (through its solicitors) as owner of the Vessel at the material time. Winson was granted leave to intervene in this action on 15 September 2021 and it duly entered an appearance as intervener on the same day.

  50. [38] To assist the reader, a tabular chronology of the key events described above is annexed to this judgment.

  51. Parties’ cases on Maersk’s liability for misdelivery

  52. [39] As a starting point, it was not seriously disputed that the contract of carriage evidenced by or contained in the OBLs was governed by English law, given the choice-of-law clause incorporated into the OBLs by reference to the Charterparty. Although UOB made no admission of that in its pleadings, expert evidence on English law was led and submissions were advanced by both sides on the footing that English law was indeed the governing law – or at least, there was nothing to indicate otherwise. In any case, nothing of significance to this dispute turned on any divergence between English and Singapore law. Given that extensive references were made by both parties to authorities from both jurisdictions, I took a holistic view of them in approaching the material issues before me.

  53. [40] UOB’s basic contention is that given the Defendants’ admission of Maersk having discharged and delivered the Cargo to Hin Leong without presentation of the OBLs (which remain in UOB’s possession as lawful holders), Maersk’s liability for misdelivery is cut-and-dried. The claim is chiefly pursued as one in contract, although alternative claims in negligence, bailment and conversion have been pleaded.

  54. [41] The Defendants, for their part, have advanced a number of defences. For ease of analysis, I shall broadly organise them under four heads.

  55. [42] The first is the “Contractual Defence”. The basic argument is that because the contract – or contracts, if one is to be precise – evidenced by or contained in the OBLs positively required Maersk to deliver the Cargo without presentation of the OBLs in return for a suitable indemnity, Maersk cannot be held liable for having done exactly that.

  56. [43] The second is the “Consent-Based Defences”. These comprise various arguments joined on the premise that UOB had consented (and here, I use the word loosely) to Maersk’s delivery of the Cargo to Hin Leong without presentation of the OBLs, whether before or after the event.

  57. [44] The third is the “Rights of Suit Defences”, and they are directed at challenging UOB’s rights of suit under the U.K. Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992 (c.50) (the “UK COGSA”).

  58. [45] The fourth is the “Causation Defence”. This defence draws its inspiration from the English Court of Appeal’s recent decision in Unicredit Bank AG v Euronav NV [2024] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 177 (“The Sienna (CA)”), and it is aimed at disproving the causality between Maersk’s putative breach of contract and the loss for which UOB now claims.

  59. The Contractual Defence

  60. [46] I begin with the Contractual Defence. Reliance was placed by the Defendants on that part of Winson and Maersk’s fixture recap which reads:

  61. [47] I was also referred to cl 28 of the Charterparty:

  62. [48] The Defendants say that by reason of these provisions, Maersk was not only permitted but obliged to deliver the Cargo without production of the OBLs at Winson’s request, provided that a suitable letter of indemnity was furnished. Maersk was therefore never “under any obligation, whether express or implied, to only deliver the Cargo against the surrender, production or presentation of an original Bill of Lading”.

  63. [49] I am in no doubt that this defence is a bad one. Shipowners commonly enter into charterparties on terms that oblige them to discharge cargo without presentation of original bills of lading, provided a suitable indemnity is furnished in advance. In agreeing to such terms, the shipowner effectively commits itself to breaching its primary obligation under the bills of lading, which is to deliver the cargo only upon presentation of those bills. By design, the quid pro quo of an indemnity acknowledges the wrongfulness of what the shipowner may be called upon to do and contains a promise by the indemnitor to shoulder any consequences flowing therefrom. In this way, the letter of indemnity merely reallocates the legal risk of the carrier’s unlawful conduct – it neither absolves nor authorises the shipowner’s breach of the contract of carriage.

  64. [50] A similar defence was raised in BNP Paribas v Bandung Shipping Pte Ltd (Shweta International Pte Ltd and another, third parties) [2003] 3 SLR(R) 611 (“Bandung Shipping”) on the strength of a contractual provision materially identical to those relied on by the Defendants. It was robustly rejected (at [65]–[69]) for substantially the reasons I have just given, and I have no hesitation in doing the same here.

  65. [51] Moving on to the Consent-Based Defences, I begin by reproducing the relevant parts of the Defendants’ pleaded case:

  66. [52] I should state at the outset that parties do themselves no favours by composing such a turgid medley of pleaded facts and distinct legal propositions. If parties wish to state the legal result flowing from particular facts, the links should be expressed in a coherent manner. It should not be for the court to sieve them out of disjointed pleadings like these.

  67. [53] Be that as it may, the gravamen of the Defendants’ position is that the bank ‘consented’ to discharge and delivery of the Cargo to Hin Leong without presentation of the OBLs, if not prior to discharge then at any rate after the fact. I use the parenthetical ‘consent’ as encompassing the various concepts (technical or otherwise) that the Defendants have invoked, and my use of the term in the discussion that follows should be understood in that light.

  68. [54] I start with an obvious point, which is that there could have been no consent prior to the Cargo’s discharge on 28–29 February 2020 because UOB only came into the picture on 3 March 2020 at the very earliest (on which date Hin Leong’s application for the L/C was received by the bank).

  69. [55] Were authority needed for the point, I would refer to The “Yue You 902” and another matter [2020] 3 SLR 573 (“The Yue You 902”). The facts are strikingly similar to those before me. That case concerned a cargo of palm oil that had been sold in the first instance by FGV to Aavanti, and then to Ruchi. The eponymous vessel was chartered by FGV for the carriage of the cargo, which was eventually discharged in New Mangalore, India without original bills of lading having been presented.

  70. [56] A day before discharge commenced, the bills of lading indorsed in blank were received by the plaintiff (“OCBC”) as Aavanti’s bank. Instructions were sought from Aavanti, who duly made an application to OCBC for financing by way of a “trust receipt loan”. That application was approved and OCBC made payment to FGV’s collecting bank on the day discharge of the cargo was completed. The bills of lading remained in OCBC’s possession throughout and after Aavanti defaulted on its loan, OCBC commenced proceedings against the owners for misdelivery of the cargo.

  71. [57] A number of defences were mounted by the owners and I shall have more to say about them later on. Relevant for present purposes is the argument that in granting the loan to Aavanti “with the knowledge that the cargo would be or had been delivered against an LOI without presentation of bills of lading, OCBC had consented to the discharge of the cargo without production of the bills of lading” (at [119]). Pang Khang Chau JC (as he then was) rejected those arguments (at [122]):

  72. [58] In my view, the defence of consent was rightly rejected in The Yue You 902 and that would make the present case an a fortiori one: there is no evidence whatsoever of any material communications between UOB and Hin Leong until some three days after the Cargo had already been completely discharged, and none between UOB and Maersk at any material point in time (see [37] above and [64] below). For these reasons, the Defendants’ cognate arguments of UOB having agreed to or authorised Maersk’s discharge and delivery of the Cargo to Hin Leong are doomed to fail.

  73. [59] As for the Defendants’ suggestion that UOB had acquiesced in Maersk’s misdelivery of the Cargo, the point was apparently abandoned even before trial: nothing was said on the topic in the Defendants’ opening statement or any of its closing submissions. Be that as it may, I shall offer my views on this point for completeness.

  74. [60] The doctrine of acquiescence is the precursor to what the law now recognises as estoppel by acquiescence. The classic statement of the law in this regard can be found in Willmott v Barber (1880) 15 ChD 96 (at 105–106):

  75. These principles are most commonly invoked to estop assertions of proprietary rights, but the authorities indicate that an estoppel by acquiescence may, in principle, be raised in the context of cargo claims: F&T Terrix Ltd v CBT Global Ltd [2021] EWHC 3397 (Comm) at [52], citing Pacol Ltd. and others v Trade Lines Ltd. and R/I Sif IV (The “Henrik Sif”) [1982] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 456.

  76. [61] In this case, the defence of acquiescence is, in my view, a non-starter because Maersk was plainly under no misapprehension as to the legal exposure it had taken on when it discharged the Cargo into Hin Leong’s possession – that was precisely why it did so on condition of Winson’s indemnification. Moreover, UOB had not even entered the fray at the time of the misdelivery; to that extent, the third to fifth elements of the Willmott v Barber test cannot be established: see Richard Aikens et al, Bills of Lading (Routledge, 3rd Ed, 2021) (“Aikens”) at para 8.48.

  77. Ratification

  78. [62] It follows from what I have just expressed that any arguable defence of ‘consent’ must relate to ‘consent’ post-dating the discharge and delivery of the Cargo. Recognising this, the Defendants’ closing submissions were focused exclusively on the doctrine of ratification:

  79. [63] No authority was cited in support of these arguments but it is clear to me that they fail, not least on first principles. It has been settled since the decision of Firth v Staines [1897] 2 QB 70 that the agent whose act is sought to be ratified must have purported to act for the principal in doing that act (at 75). In other words, no act can be validly ratified by a principal undisclosed to the third party at the time it was done; if the agent professed to act for himself, then it follows that the act is not capable of ratification by anyone. These principles were affirmed by an eight-member coram of the House of Lords in Keighley, Maxsted & Co v Durant [1901] AC 240.

  80. [64] In this case, the act put forward by the Defendants as having been ratified by UOB is Hin Leong taking delivery of the Cargo from Maersk without production of the OBLs. The Defendants’ case of ratification therefore hinges on proof that in so taking delivery, Hin Leong had professed to act on behalf of UOB. The stark reality, however, is that not a wisp of evidence was led to establish that fact. There is no indication of Maersk having ever directly corresponded with Hin Leong. If anything, Maersk’s sole witness, Capt Sushil Bhushan (who was on the operations team that oversaw the Vessel’s voyage from Taiwan to Singapore) confirmed in cross-examination that there was never any indication to Maersk that UOB was involved or would be involved with the Cargo:

  81. So far as Maersk was concerned, a suitable letter of indemnity had been given in respect of Winson’s instructions for discharge of the Cargo, and Maersk never looked behind those instructions because there was no reason to. That was Maersk’s bottom-line in these proceedings and on the evidence, that was plainly the case.

  82. [65] I should add that the Defendants have not called on any representatives of Hin Leong or Universal Terminal to give evidence. What might have emerged from that evidence is of course speculative, but the Defendants’ case on ratification is certainly all the worse for its absence.

  83. [66] There are other conditions for ratification that present tremendous difficulties to the Defendants (eg, making out a clear act of ratification by UOB). In my view, it is unnecessary to grapple with them because I am not at all persuaded that Hin Leong ever professed to act on behalf of UOB in taking delivery of the Cargo. That finding alone is fatal to the Defendants’ arguments on ratification.

  84. Waiver

  85. [67] Before leaving the discussion on the Consent-Based Defences, I should briefly consider an argument that one would think follows naturally from the contentions made by the Defendants, and it is that UOB had waived its claims against Maersk in respect of the misdelivery. The point was never taken up by the Defendants in its pleadings or submissions, but it was one that UOB sought to pre-empt and I shall say a few words on it.

  86. [68] Broadly speaking, the law recognises two species of waiver. The first is waiver by election, and it occurs when a person, having been presented with a choice between two or more mutually inconsistent rights, elects in clear and unequivocal terms to exercise one of them. The elector will then be regarded as having abandoned those other inconsistent rights pro tanto: Audi Construction Pte Ltd v Kian Hiap Construction Pte Ltd [2018] 1 SLR 317 (“Audi Construction”) at [54]. This form of waiver is of no relevance here because, plainly, UOB was never presented with a choice between competing rights to begin with.

  87. [69] The other form of waiver – that is, waiver by estoppel – involves an “unequivocal representation by one party that he will not insist upon his legal rights against the other party, and such reliance by the representee as will render it inequitable for the representor to go back upon his representation”: Audi Construction at [57], citing Motor Oil Hellas (Corinth) Refineries S.A. v Shipping Corporation of India (The “Kanchenjunga”) [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 391 at 399. But this too is not a defence that is available to Maersk on the facts. Quite apart from UOB never having communicated with Maersk, Maersk had no knowledge whatsoever of UOB’s involvement with the Cargo until this action had been commenced (see [37] and [64] above). There were hence no representations of any kind between UOB and Maersk capable of sustaining an estoppel.

  88. [70] In the premises, questions of reliance do not even arise. I would, however, observe that the Discharge LOI was issued and accepted on terms (as provided for in the Charterparty) that it would become null and void either upon presentation of an original bill of lading or “13 months after completion of discharge”, whichever should occur first. In my view, that latter hard-stop was plainly intended to ensure that Maersk would be covered until such time as any cargo claims (including claims for misdelivery) became time-barred upon expiry of the 12-month limitation period applicable under the Hague or Hague-Visby Rules. It is therefore obvious to me that Maersk was alive to a continuing risk of misdelivery claims being brought against it, albeit Maersk had no reason to be concerned about that risk given the indemnities it had obtained from Winson pursuant to the Discharge LOI. Thus, far from having relied on any promises of forbearance by UOB, Maersk was counting on Winson’s credit as its indemnitor under the Discharge LOI.

  89. The Rights of Suit Defences

  90. The Spent Bills Defence

  91. [71] I turn now to the Rights of Suit Defences, the first of which is the argument that the OBLs had been “spent by the discharge and delivery of the Cargo to [Hin Leong] on or around 28/29 February 2020”, in which case UOB could have acquired no rights of suit thereunder. I will refer to this as the “Spent Bills Defence”.

  92. [72] The transfer of rights of suit under bills of lading that are ‘spent’ – in the sense that their possession “no longer gives a right (as against the carrier) to possession of the goods to which the bill relates” – is governed by s 2(2) of the UK COGSA, which is in pari materia with s 2(2) of Singapore’s Bills of Lading Act (Cap 384, 1994 Rev Ed) (the “SG BLA”):

  93. The OBLs were not spent

  94. [73] It has been confirmed by a long line of cases that bills of lading are not spent by delivery of cargo to a person not entitled to them under those bills: Bandung Shipping at [30], followed in The “Pacific Vigorous” [2006] 3 SLR(R) 374 at [5] and The Yue You 902 at [45]–[46] and [74]. The position is the same under English law: Standard Chartered Bank v Dorchester LNG (2) Ltd (The “Erin Schulte”) [2015] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 97 (“The Erin Schulte”) at [53]. Indeed, Dame Elizabeth Gloster (for UOB) and Mr Timothy Young KC (for the Defendants) confirmed in their joint experts’ memorandum on English law that:

  95. [74] In this case, the Defendants’ pleaded position is that the OBLs had been spent by the discharge and delivery of the Cargo to Hin Leong on 28–29 February 2020. This contention was initially advanced on the basis that Hin Leong was in fact “the party entitled to the delivery of the Cargo at the time that it was delivered to it”.

  96. [75] The argument then morphed into an entirely different one in the Defendants’ written closing submissions. As I understand it, the revised argument begins with the proposition that “the bill of lading being the symbol of the goods, the office of the symbol is exhausted when the symbol is united with the goods” (citing The Yue You 902 at [70]). The Defendants then say that, in this case:

  97. [76] The Defendants’ original argument is plainly untenable. No reasons were given for the bold assertion that Hin Leong was the party entitled to the Cargo on 28–29 February 2020. One might infer that it rides on the Defendants’ case that Hin Leong had taken receipt of the Cargo with UOB’s consent or authorisation, but if that were correct – and it is plainly not for reasons which I have already given – the Defendants would have succeeded in its defence of consent/authorisation and the present discussion would be moot. I have also rejected the Defendants’ case on ratification and so their revised arguments on the unity of actual and constructive possession likewise cannot stand.

  98. [77] On the whole, it is clear to me that at no point was Hin Leong the party entitled to the Cargo under the OBLs because Hin Leong was never in possession of the OBLs. The OBLs were not, therefore, spent at the time they came into UOB’s possession. Accordingly, the Spent Bills Defence fails.

  99. Rights of suit would nevertheless have passed under s 2(2)(a) UK COGSA

  100. [78] Even if I am wrong on the foregoing points and the OBLs had been spent by the time they came into UOB’s possession, UOB would, in my judgment, nevertheless have acquired rights of suit pursuant to the proviso in s 2(2)(a) of the UK COGSA.

  101. [79] The scope of the proviso was considered in some detail in The Yue You 902 (at [88]–[91]). Here, I would highlight a few principles identified by the learned judge:

  102. (a) It was held in Primetrade AG v Ythan Ltd (The “Ythan”) [2006] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 457 that the word “transaction” refers to the physical process by which the bill is transferred from one person to another while “contractual or other arrangements” refers to the reason or cause for the transfer (at [66] and [84]).

  103. (b) In The Erin Schulte, Moore-Bick LJ eschewed any attempt at identifying the “real and effective cause” (as had been done in the court below) and instead considered it “preferable simply to identify the arrangement, if any, pursuant to which the transfer was made” (at [56]).

  104. (c) The authors of Scrutton on Charterparties and Bills of Lading (David Foxton et al, eds) (Sweet & Maxwell, 24th Ed, 2020) argue that “the phrase ‘in pursuance of’ requires merely that the pre-existing arrangement provides the trigger for the transfer, not that it creates a legal entitlement to the transfer of the bill of lading” (at para 3-025).

  105. [80] The basic facts of The Yue You 902 have been set out at [55]–[56] above. Pang JC held that the bills of lading in that case were not spent for the reasons I have canvassed at [73] above. The learned judge then went on to say that even if those bills had been spent, he would have held that either the facility agreement governing the trust receipt loan or the sale contract between FGV and Aavanti – both of which pre-dated the cargo’s misdelivery – furnished the relevant “contractual or other arrangement” upon which the proviso could operate (at [94]–[96]):

  106. [81] I return to the facts of this case. According to the Defendants, the relevant “contractual or other arrangement” was the L/C or the Payment LOI, both of which post-date the Cargo’s discharge. UOB, on the other hand, say that the issuance of the L/C (or acceptance of the Payment LOI) was only the relevant “transaction”, whereas the “contractual or other arrangement” would be UOB’s Letter of Offer or the Sale Contract.

  107. [82] I prefer UOB’s position. The Payment LOI was the contractual arrangement that supplied the most proximate ‘trigger’ for the indorsement and delivery of the OBLs to UOB. But even so, the Payment LOI was only an incident of the L/C itself: the Payment LOI was merely an interim device that secured a transfer of the OBLs that was already called for under the L/C. The L/C, in its turn, was opened because that was what the Sale Contract required. Indeed, the Sale Contract expressly contemplated payment under a documentary credit against presentation of the OBLs:

  108. [83] All of this is to say that if one were to consider the Sale Contract on its own terms, it will be readily apparent that its performance would culminate in the indorsement and delivery of the OBLs to the buyer’s issuing bank. That was precisely what happened in this case, albeit after a significant delay. In my view, the Sale Contract would therefore furnish a clear basis for the operation of s 2(2)(a) UK COGSA. In view of this, it is unnecessary for me to further consider if the same may be said about UOB’s Letter of Offer.

  109. The Good Faith Defence

  110. [84] Under s 5(2) of the UK COGSA (which is in pari materia with s 5(2) of the SG BLA), the transfer of title to sue is conditional on the transferee becoming the holder of the bills of lading in good faith:

  111. [85] The concept of “good faith” in this context was also explored in The Yue You 902 (at [101]–[108]). The following is a summary of the learned judge’s analysis and conclusions:

  112. (a) In Aegean Sea Traders Corporation v Repsol Petroleo S.A. and another (The “Aegean Sea”) [1998] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 39 (at 60), Thomas J rejected an invitation to read “good faith” broadly and instead took the view that the phrase:

  113. (b) In UCO Bank v Golden Shore Transportation Pte Ltd [2006] 1 SLR(R) 1 (“UCO Bank”) (at [39]–[40]), the Singapore Court of Appeal affirmed Thomas J’s interpretation of “good faith” as connoting “honest conduct” and added that the requirement was intended to “preclude the case where possession is obtained unlawfully, or by other improper means”.

  114. (c) On Pang JC’s reading of the authorities, the concept of “good faith” should be stable and circumscribed so that it is capable of unambiguous application. Honesty was therefore the lodestar of the inquiry, and the Court of Appeal’s reference to “improper means” in UCO Bank ought not be read as roping in conduct that is not dishonest (The Yue You 902 at [104]–[106]).

  115. (d) The requirement of “good faith” was never intended as a gate against transfers of bills of lading for the purpose of obtaining bare rights of suit – that is the mischief that the provisions on spent bills are intended to meet, and it would be wrong for their functions to be overtaken by expansive interpretations of the “good faith” requirement (The Yue You 902 at [107]).

  116. [86] In this case, the Defendants have essentially put forward two reasons for saying that UOB became the holder of the OBLs by dishonest or improper means (the “Good Faith Defence”):

  117. (a) The first is that UOB, although knowing that it had no entitlement to the OBLs under the Payment LOI, nevertheless demanded them from Winson with implicit enticements or threats of legal consequences.

  118. (b) The second is that UOB never intended for the OBLs to function as security; instead, UOB eventually called for them at the time it did for the sole purpose of contriving a claim against Maersk and to minimise its exposure to Hin Leong’s insolvency.

  119. [87] The Defendants referred me to the Assistant Registrar’s decision in The STI Orchard [2022] SGHCR 6 (“The STI Orchard”) and the unreported judgment of Kwek Mean Luck J in the appeal therefrom. It was contemplated in both instances that bills of lading may not have been acquired in good faith where the claimant bank suing on them never intended for those bills to function as security to begin with. In my view, the Defendants’ reliance on these observations is plainly misplaced because they were only made in the context of proceedings for summary judgment. The bank’s application in The STI Orchard was refused because the Assistant Registrar felt (and Kwek J agreed) that there were triable issues on the question of whether the banks had acquired the bills of lading in good faith, but there was no sustained analysis of the law or evidence on those points (bearing in mind the nature of the application that was being considered). Nothing was settled in those decisions except that there were triable issues of good faith (or the lack thereof) warranting fuller consideration at trial.

  120. [88] In this case, I am of the view that there was no dishonesty in the way UOB became holders of the OBLs. The Defendants’ second argument (see [86(b)] above) is a non-starter. It is indistinguishable from an argument that UOB acted dishonestly because it called for and acquired the OBLs to obtain bare rights of suit against Maersk – that argument is bad for the reasons given by Pang JC in The Yue You 902 at [107] (see [85(d)] above). Further, I also note that the parties’ experts on English law are agreed that:

  121. [89] As for the Defendants’ first argument (see [86(a)] above), I accept that – as a matter of general principle – the requirement of good faith may not be satisfied where the holder procured the bills of lading by asserting a legal entitlement to them that was known to be unsubstantiated. But I am far from convinced that that was what had happened in this case.

  122. [90] The argument starts with the assertion that UOB in fact had no entitlement to the OBLs under the Payment LOI. This is because the Payment LOI, according to the Defendants, can only be construed as an undertaking to Hin Leong and no one else. For instance, the first paragraph of the letter reads:

  123. [91] This point is somewhat diminished by the fact that there are other parts of the Payment LOI that may equally be read as referring to UOB. For example, the LOI is addressed to “United Overseas Bank Limited, Singapore for account of Hin Leong Trading (Pte) Ltd”, and it includes phrases like “[i]n consideration of your making payment”.

  124. [92] More striking is the fact that the Payment LOI contains the following clause (the “Exclusion of Third-Party Rights Clause”):

  125. [93] Evidence was led to show that, at the time UOB processed Hin Leong’s application for the L/C, it was aware that the template for a letter of indemnity issued pursuant to Field 47A (see [21] above) in Hin Leong’s initial draft contained the Exclusion of Third-Party Rights Clause. This was flagged out as part of the bank’s approval processes for being contrary to its internal guidelines, but the clause was ultimately retained in the L/C (and therefore the Payment LOI).

  126. [94] Before I proceed further, it is important to emphasise that the present inquiry is not concerned with what the parties’ true legal positions under the Payment LOI were. This is not an action on the Payment LOI itself, and the issue that I am concerned with is whether UOB acquired the OBLs dishonestly. Thus, if UOB and Winson believed – and in fact acted on the belief – that the Payment LOI’s terms entitled UOB to the OBLs, then the Defendants cannot be heard to complain of any dishonesty tainting the transaction and it would be irrelevant that the parties were mistaken as to their true legal positions.

  127. [95] The Defendants say that UOB plainly knew but did not care that the Payment LOI conferred no rights upon them (including any rights to the OBLs). UOB’s witnesses, however, testified that the bank was content to retain the Exclusion of Third-Party Rights Clause because, as they understood it, UOB’s specific inclusion as an addressee of the Payment LOI was sufficient to confer rights upon the bank thereunder.

  128. [96] Having considered the evidence, I ultimately prefer UOB’s position. Firstly, an internal transaction form was prepared by UOB’s staff in the course of reviewing Hin Leong’s application for the L/C (the “Transaction Form”). That form contained a comment in print that read: “ILC LOI’s format does not confer a benefit or remedy on the bank.” The form was then sent up for further internal approvals and eventually returned with a handwritten notation next to the printed comment which read: “LOI is addressed to UOB for account of HL.” Both the printed comment and handwritten notation were then checked off with ticks:

  129. [97] For context, a draft of the L/C wording was first tendered by Hin Leong as part of its application to UOB for the same. In that draft, Hin Leong was the sole addressee named in the template for the Payment LOI. The wording of the template was the subject of some negotiation between Hin Leong and UOB. Of the changes proposed by UOB, the only one that Hin Leong eventually accepted was the bank’s inclusion as an addressee.

  130. [98] What is striking, however, is that UOB had also requested for the deletion of the Exclusion of Third-Party Rights Clause altogether. Hin Leong did not agree to that request and insisted that the said clause remain. UOB evidently considered that to have been of no consequence – indeed, that would explain the written annotation added to the Transaction Form. This suggests to me that the UOB officers responsible for reviewing and approving the L/C application (and the draft wording of the Payment LOI) held a genuine belief that the presence of the Exclusion of Third-Party Rights Clause was immaterial, given the bank’s specific inclusion as an addressee.

  131. [99] More crucial, in my view, is the fact that it would have been commercially unreal for UOB to knowingly relinquish any entitlement to the OBLs in accepting the Payment LOI, bearing in mind especially that the Payment LOI was only intended as a stop-gap to secure the accomplishment of what the L/C required by default in Field 46A, ie, presentation of the full set of OBLs. Ms Lim Chen Chen (who was among the officers who had a hand in approving Hin Leong’s application) was challenged in cross-examination as to why she thought the bank had rights to the OBLs under the infelicitously worded Payment LOI. Her reply then was, “why is the bank financing these goods if it’s not to me?” I have struggled to find a meaningful answer from the Defendants to this retort.

  132. [100] The circumstances in which Winson eventually parted with the OBLs are also relevant. There is no contemporaneous evidence of Winson having protested even once against UOB’s entitlement to them. The only whiff of discontent from Winson is reflected in an email of 30 April 2020 from Ms Sheena Ng (of Winson’s Shipping Department) to Ms Freida Koh (who was UOB’s Senior Relationship Manager responsible for Hin Leong’s account). Even then, the discontent was directed towards the time pressure that UOB was bringing to bear on Winson:

  133. [101] This is consistent with Ms Tung’s evidence that her instructions for the indorsement and delivery of the OBLs to UOB were only given for the purpose of redeeming the Payment LOI. When questioned as to why the OBLs were eventually conveyed to UOB and not Hin Leong – as the logic of Winson’s case suggests it should – her answer was that she simply understood that to have been the usual procedure:

  134. [102] Ms Tung was later questioned on the absence of any contemporaneous objection to UOB’s claims to the OBLs. The response she gave when offered an opportunity to explain is telling:

  135. [103] Taken at face value, Ms Tung’s evidence quite plainly contradicts the suggestion that Winson endorsed and delivered the OBLs on account of some trickery or unfair pressure from UOB. It is also striking that although Ms Tung says she and her colleagues were content to assume UOB’s entitlement to the OBLs, she also maintains that Winson would have endorsed and delivered the OBLs to UOB anyway because, so far as Winson was concerned, that was the way things were supposed to be done.

  136. [104] Ms Tung also testified that in the course of a phone call with Ms Lim on the evening of 15 April 2020, Ms Lim had intimated that “UOB would consider [Winson’s] assistance in securing the documents favourably when reviewing [Winson’s] credit line with UOB, including future applications for letters of credit by [Winson]”. The context of this evidence was that, at the time, Winson was also one of UOB’s customers and UOB was reviewing Winson’s credit facilities with UOB (at least according to Ms Tung).

  137. [105] There is, however, no contemporaneous evidence of that exchange ever having taken place. One would expect that some documentary record of the conversation would have been made given its significance, but none was presented to me. Ms Lim was not even questioned at trial on this alleged phone conversation between her and Ms Tung. On balance, I do not accept that any such assurance was given by UOB to Winson. Accordingly, I am also unable to accept the suggestion that implicit enticements (or threats) had been made by UOB in relation to its review of Winson’s credit lines specifically.

  138. [106] Overall, I am entirely unpersuaded that there was any dishonesty involved in how UOB came to acquire the OBLs from Winson. I am satisfied that UOB’s demands were made on a genuine (and not unreasonable) belief as to its rights and entitlements under the Payment LOI. Winson, for its part, either shared in that belief or was indifferent to the legal propriety of UOB’s demands. On balance, I am more inclined to believe that it was the former. However, nothing turns on this because on either view, Winson considered itself bound to endorse and deliver the OBLs to UOB; it eventually did just that without any protest. For these reasons, I find and hold that UOB did acquire possession of the OBLs in good faith and would accordingly dismiss the Defendants’ Good Faith Defence.

  139. The Endorsement Defence

  140. [107] I now consider what I shall refer to as the Defendants’ “Endorsement Defence”. This defence seizes upon Moore-Bick LJ’s rejection of the argument in The Erin Schulte (at [26]) that “a mere transfer of possession without an accompanying intention to transfer and accept the rights under the contract of carriage is sufficient to complete an indorsement.” In this case, it is said that Winson only parted with the OBLs to UOB:

  141. [110] I acknowledge that Moore-Bick LJ’s conception of “delivery” is reciprocal in that it first requires a “voluntary and unconditional transfer of possession by the holder to the indorsee” (at [28]) accompanied by an intention to “transfer … rights under the contract of carriage” (at [26]). Was there such an intention on Winson’s part in this case?

  142. There is no suggestion that these indorsements were unauthorised, or that the physical delivery of the OBLs was anything but voluntary. Indeed, it is Ms Tung’s evidence that all of this was done in accordance with her instructions (see [34] and [101]–[102] above).

  143. [112] The Endorsement Defence therefore comes down to nothing more than the allegation that there was no subjective intention on Winson’s part to transfer rights of suit to UOB. There is no need to reach for authority because I am certain that this is not an argument that would find favour with any commercial judge – it certainly finds no favour with me. If the Defendants were correct, the most astonishing results would follow: no business could be transacted on the faith of bills of lading, the value of which would very much depend on subjective (and possibly fickle) states of mind known only to the transferor. I should add that it was agreed between Dame Elizabeth and Mr Young that:

  144. [113] In any event, there is no doubt in my mind that Ms Tung fully understood the significance of the OBLs and the act of endorsing them to UOB. It was Ms Tung’s evidence that, having dealt almost exclusively with letters of indemnity (like the Payment LOI) in her line of work, she had no understanding at the time of how bills of lading functioned; to her, the endorsement of bills of lading was nothing more than a ministerial act done to redeem letters of indemnity given to banks:

  145. [114] Leaving aside the inherent unbelievability of Winson’s Executive Director having been ignorant about those matters, Ms Tung betrayed the real extent of her knowledge in re-examination:

  146. [115] It is clear from this exchange that Ms Tung appreciated the importance of a bill of lading to Hin Leong if, for example, there was a dispute as to possession of or title to a cargo that Winson had sold to Hin Leong. This evidence did not sit well with her professed ignorance as to the purpose or significance of endorsing bills of lading other than to redeem letters of indemnity. It was quite apparent to me that Ms Tung knew more than she was letting on.

  147. [116] For the foregoing reasons, the Endorsement Defence is, in my view, without merit and also fails.

  148. The Causation Defence

  149. [117] I turn finally to the Causation Defence which, until the decision in The Sienna (CA), was long considered to be no more than a final throw of the dice for carriers faced with misdelivery claims.

  150. [118] It is trite law that a claimant may recover damages for breach of contract only insofar as the breach was the “effective” or “dominant” cause of the loss claimed for: Monarch Steamship Co, Limited v Karlshamns Oljefabriker (A/B) [1949] AC 196. Notwithstanding the vintage of this rule, how it should operate in the context of misdelivery claims is a question that has not been explored until recently.

  151. The authorities

  152. The Nika

  153. [119] I begin with Fimbank Plc v Discover Investment Corporation (The “Nika”) [2021] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 109 (“The Nika”). In that case, the defendant owners discharged a cargo of wheat into the possession of AOS Egypt against a discharge letter of indemnity and not original bills of lading. The wheat was thereafter transferred to a bonded warehouse and was eventually delivered out of that warehouse against the production of forged bills of lading. At that time, Fimbank was the lawful holders of the originals (albeit that those bills were held by Fimbank’s collecting agent in Egypt).

  154. [120] It was against that backdrop that Fimbank brought a claim in arbitration against the owners for misdelivery. Freezing orders were obtained by Fimbank in the English High Court, and Mr Justice Baker’s decision in The Nika was concerned with cross-applications for the continuance or discharge of those freezing orders. One of the grounds advanced by the owners for discharge of the freezing orders was that Fimbank had no “good arguable case” in the arbitration. It was on that basis that Baker J had to inquire into the merits of Fimbank’s misdelivery claim.

  155. [121] On the facts, Fimbank became interested in the bills of lading pursuant to financing arrangements between it and its customer, AOS Dubai (and not AOS Egypt). The scheme of the transaction was such that the cargo would first be discharged from the performing vessel without production of bills of lading, before being transferred to a bonded warehouse. Fimbank would pay AOS Dubai’s sellers against presentation of original bills of lading and then forward those bills to its collecting bank in Egypt with instructions to transfer them onwards to AOS Dubai’s end-buyers on a “cash against documents” basis. The end-buyers would then take delivery from the warehouse by presenting the bills of lading.

  156. [122] In furtherance of this scheme, a tripartite stock management agreement (“the SMA”) was entered into between Fimbank, AOS Dubai, and Vallis Commodities Ltd (who were the stock managers). Importantly, cl 2.3.4 of the SMA provided:

  157. [123] Baker J’s conclusion that Fimbank did not have a “good arguable case” was reached principally on grounds of a finding that AOS Egypt had in fact been authorised by Fimbank to take delivery of the cargo from the vessel. If AOS Egypt was not a separate legal entity but a branch or trading name of AOS Dubai, then AOS Egypt, in receiving the Cargo, only did what cl 2.3.4 of the SMA expressly authorised it to do (at [26]). Baker J would have found in the alternative that AOS Egypt took delivery as AOS Dubai’s agent (at [29]).

  158. [125] Baker J then observed in obiter that, questions of authorisation aside, the claim would have run up against “formidable difficulties of causation” because the tripartite warehousing arrangement had in fact been accomplished; the loss was, in truth, a result of the subsequent fraud (at [30]):

  159. [126] Of particular interest is how Baker J reached that conclusion. For Fimbank, it was submitted that had the cargo not been discharged other than against presentation of the original bills of lading (at [33]):

  160. [127] As against that submission, Baker J expressed doubt as to whether Fimbank had even posited the correct “but for” question, but then went on to hold that the bank’s counterfactual was untenable even on its own premises (at [34]):

  161. The Cherry

  162. [128] Closer to home is Kan Ting Chiu J’s decision in The “Cherry” and others [2002] 1 SLR(R) 643 (“The Cherry (HC)”) and the appeal therefrom in The “Cherry” and others [2003] 1 SLR(R) 471 (“The Cherry (CA)”). They concerned three actions in rem that were consolidated at trial.

  163. [129] The brief facts are these. The plaintiff in all three actions (“Glencore”) purchased four parcels of oil from a company called “Metro”. Metro was the time charterer of the vessels “Cherry”, “Epic”, and “Addax”. Glencore in turn voyage chartered those vessels from Metro to carry three oil parcels from Kuwait to a facility operated by Metro in Fujairah, United Arab Emirates.

  164. [130] On arrival at Fujairah, the “Cherry” and “Epic” each discharged only a part of the cargoes carried on board; none was discharged from the “Addax” at all. The vessels’ owners did so on instructions (backed by indemnities) from Metro. The oil remaining on board the three vessels were then carried elsewhere and released without original bills of lading having been presented. Glencore eventually came into possession of those bills and claimed against the owners of the three vessels for inter alia breach of the contract of carriage by reason of the misdeliveries. Metro, who was by then insolvent, was not a party to the proceedings.

  165. [131] As for the fourth oil parcel, it had initially been carried from Bandar Mahshahr, Iran to Fujairah by the vessel “Hyperion” pursuant to a voyage charterparty between Glencore as charterers and Metro as owners. The “Hyperion” eventually arrived in Fujairah, whereupon its cargo was transhipped onto the “Cherry” and whisked off elsewhere. The only bills of lading that Glencore had in respect of this parcel were those issued by Metro; in the absence of a contract between Glencore and the owner of the “Cherry” in respect of the fourth oil parcel, Glencore was left to claim in inter alia bailment and conversion. These non-contractual claims were disallowed by the Court of Appeal on grounds that Glencore did not have the requisite possessory interest at the time the fourth oil parcel was transhipped in Fujairah. Nothing more need be said in respect of the “Hyperion” and its cargo for now.

  166. [132] As regards the oil shipped on board the “Cherry”, “Epic” and “Addax”, it was argued for the owners at first instance that Glencore would have lost all of the oil even it had been discharged in full at Fujairah (which, according to Glencore, should have been the case). The owners submitted that Metro would in any event have reloaded and sold the cargoes because that was what Metro in fact did on the evidence, albeit only in relation to the oil that was never discharged from the vessels. That argument failed to impress Kan J. The learned judge observed (at [47]) that:

  167. [133] The Court of Appeal agreed with the learned judge and held that “to succeed in their argument, the [owners] have to be able to show exactly what would have happened to the oil had it been discharged in full” (at [72]). Having considered the evidence, the court was not persuaded that the oil would have been lost:

  168. (a) No evidence was led to prove that, had the cargoes been discharged in full, the very same cargo would have eventually been removed by Metro for its own use. It was clear that the owners faced insuperable difficulties in doing so because once discharged into Metro’s storage tanks and commingled with existing stock, it would be nigh impossible for the owners to show that Metro could and would have simply reloaded the “same” cargoes for shipment later on (at [72]).

  169. (b) As for the on-sales that in fact transpired, there was no evidence that Metro had contracted to sell the specific cargoes that were on board the “Cherry”, the “Epic”, and the “Addax” (at [73]).

  170. (c) There was evidence that substantial quantities of fuel oil remained in Metro’s storage facility at the time of its financial collapse, and so it was entirely possible that the oil carried on board the three vessels would have remained in storage had it been discharged in full (at [75]).

  171. [134] A further argument was advanced on appeal by the owners in relation to two “In-tank Transfer Contracts” that Metro and Glencore had entered into. Those contracts pertained to the oil shipped on board the “Cherry” and the “Epic”, and they were concluded some time after the short delivery of those cargoes had taken place in Fujairah. By those contracts, Glencore essentially sold the oil – which, to its knowledge, was still sitting in storage – to Metro, with delivery to take place upon Metro’s presentation to Glencore of an irrevocable letter of credit for the contract price. Practically speaking, delivery would have involved no physical transfer of the oil but only a transfer on Metro’s inventory records.

  172. [135] This led the owners to contend that “even if the entirety of the cargoes lately laden on board [the “Cherry” and the “Epic”] had been discharged … Metro would have had full control of such cargoes and the ability to deal with them as Metro deemed fit” well before the time when Glencore had in fact brought its claims against the owners (at [79]).

  173. [136] The flaw in that argument, as the Court of Appeal noted, was that it remained for the owners to show that Metro “would have so dealt with all of the oil so as to remove it entirely from the storage facility” before Glencore’s claims were brought – this, the owners failed to do (at [85]). The owners thus failed to establish either of their two grounds on the absence of causation.

  174. The Sienna

  175. [137] I turn now to the decisions of Unicredit Bank AG v Euronav NV [2022] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 467 (“The Sienna (HC)”) and The Sienna (CA), upon which the Defendants placed heavy reliance.

  176. [139] Gulf’s purchase of the cargo was financed in part by a letter of credit issued by the claimant bank, UniCredit. It was intended between UniCredit and Gulf that the cargo would be on-sold to sub-buyers on payment terms that required direct payment from the sub-buyers to UniCredit. In that way, the transaction was intended to be “self-liquidating”.

  177. [140] As it were, the owners eventually discharged the cargo by ship-to-ship (or “STS”) transfer to two other vessels at Sohar (instead of Fujairah) between 26 April and 2 May 2020. It was not disputed that the owners did so without the original bills of lading having been presented. The bills of lading were eventually indorsed and delivered by BPI to UniCredit. By that time, it emerged that Gulf had been guilty of fraud in relation to this and other cargoes. No repayment was made on the sums extended under the letter of credit.

  178. [141] So far as issues of causation were concerned, the owners pleaded two closely-related defences. The first was essentially that UniCredit caused its own loss by having authorised the owners to discharge the cargo without production of original bills of lading (The Sienna (HC) at [52]):

  179. This was described by Popplewell LJ in the appeal as the “positive causation defence”.

  180. [142] The second argument was that the owners’ breach caused UniCredit no loss – or, put another way, that UniCredit would have suffered the same loss in any event. This was described in the appeal as the “negative causation defence”, and it arose out of the following parts of the owners’ pleadings (The Sienna (HC) at [53]):

  181. UniCredit’s response to this was that, had the owners performed its obligations under the contract of carriage, it would not have discharged the cargo without presentation of the original bills of lading (or would not have done so without valid authorisation).

  182. [143] It was common ground in the appeal that Moulder J made no finding on the positive causation defence at first instance. Popplewell LJ, however, doubted the correctness of that position (at [37]) in view of what Moulder J had said at [121] of her judgment, which I reproduce here:

  183. Be that as it may, Popplewell LJ was content to proceed on the basis of the parties’ agreement (namely, that Moulder J had made no finding on the positive causation defence).

The judgment continues past this page. Read the rest at eLitigation.