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Grounds publishedDecided 3 Dec 2024

General Division of the High Court

A party enforcing a foreign award must still follow the court's procedural rules

Wuhu Ruyi Xinbo Investment Partnership (Ltd Partnership) v Shandong Ruyi Technology Group Co, Ltd and another

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[2024] SGHC 308Case no. Originating Application No 222 of 2023 (Registrar’s Appeal No 90 of 2024)

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A party enforcing a foreign award must still follow the court's procedural rules

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] This is a case about the consequences of one’s actions or, perhaps more accurately, one’s failure to act.

  3. [3] It should seem obvious, as night follows day, that if a party fails to make use of his “last chance”, the guillotine should drop and the prescribed consequence(s) ought to follow. For one, the court should not be seen as prone to making idle threats; an ultimatum is hardly an ultimatum if it is not ultimate. But it is contended in this appeal that this intuitive, if not reflexive, flow of events in fact does not flow.

  4. [7] This appeal presents a useful opportunity to revisit and consider important aspects of the document production regime and the court’s jurisdiction on unless orders, particularly under the ROC 2021. Having considered the parties’ submissions carefully, I dismiss the appeal for the reasons explained in this judgment. My findings, in summary, are as follows:

  5. (b) Second, it is not disproportionate for the stated consequences of the dismissal of the enforcement proceedings to kick in.

  6. Background facts and procedural history

  7. [8] I start with the factual background underlying this appeal. The background to the dispute between the parties and the procedural history of this matter are somewhat complicated and warrants being set out in some detail.

  8. Background to the parties’ dispute

  9. [9] The underlying dispute centres around the parties’ rights to shares in a company incorporated in Luxembourg, SMCP SA (“SMCP” and the “SMCP Shares”) held by the second respondent, European Topsoho S.àr.l. (“ETS”). The claimant, Wuhu Ruyi Xinbo Investment Partnership (Ltd Partnership) (“Xinbo”), claims that pursuant to a tripartite agreement (the “Guarantee”), ETS agreed to pledge some 40m shares in SMCP (comprising all of ETS’s shares in SMCP) to Xinbo as security for a debt owed by the first respondent, Shandong Ruyi Technology Group Co, Ltd (“Ruyi”), to Xinbo. Xinbo is the ultimate parent company of ETS. The Guarantee was dated 25 July 2018 and was signed on behalf of ETS by one Ms Qiu Chenran (“QCR”), who was, at that time, one of ETS’s managers.

  10. [10] The gravamen of Xinbo’s complaint is that, unbeknownst to it, ETS had double-pledged some 28m of the SMCP Shares (the “Pledged Shares”) by offering it as security to back an issuance of bonds (the “Bonds”) by ETS to bondholders. Subsequently, ETS defaulted on the Bonds, and the trustee for the bondholders, GLAS SAS (London Branch) (the “Trustee”), took possession of the Pledged Shares sometime on or around 27 October 2021. After Xinbo learned of the Bonds and the Pledged Shares, it issued notices dated 8 and 9 October 2021 seeking the transfer of ETS’s remaining shares in SMCP – some 12m shares (the “Remaining Shares”) – to its nominee for the purpose of safeguarding Xinbo’s rights to the Remaining Shares. The transfer of the SMCP Shares to Xinbo’s nominee was completed on or around 27 October 2021, pursuant to an earlier share sale agreement dated 22 October 2021.

  11. [11] The Trustee subsequently commenced proceedings in the English courts against ETS and other persons. It obtained summary judgment on 17 October 2022 in respect of the debt owed by ETS under the Bonds, and thereby became a judgment creditor of ETS. It has also challenged the transfer of the Remaining Shares on the ground, inter alia, that it constitutes a transaction in fraud of ETS’s creditors under s 423 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (c 45) (UK). It appears that, at present, the Trustee had applied for and been refused summary judgment, and the matter is to proceed to trial before the English High Court (see GLAS SAS (London Branch) v European Topsoho SARL and others [2024] EWHC 83 (Comm)). Nonetheless, the previous and ongoing proceedings before the English courts are not of any particular relevance to the present matter.

  12. The Arbitration

  13. [13] On 18 November 2022, Xinbo commenced arbitration proceedings that resulted in the award that forms the subject-matter of its present enforcement proceedings in Singapore (the “Arbitration”). According to Xinbo, the Arbitration was commenced for the purpose of addressing its rights to the Remaining Shares under the Guarantee.

  14. [14] The underlying arbitration agreement in the Guarantee had, initially, provided for the parties’ disputes to be resolved by arbitration under the auspices of the “Jining Arbitration Commission” (the “JAC”) in the People’s Republic of China. Article V of the Guarantee provided as follows:

  15. [15] However, the Arbitration was instead conducted under the auspices of the “Beihai Court of International Arbitration” (“BCIA”). As the AR noted, there is a curious inconsistency in Xinbo’s position as to when Art V of the Guarantee was varied to change the arbitral institution from the JAC to the BCIA (see GD at [5] and [107]).

  16. [16] Initially, in Xinbo’s supporting affidavit for its application for permission to enforce the award in HC/OA 222/2023 (“OA 222”), Xinbo had stated that the parties to the Guarantee – ie, Xinbo, Ruyi and ETS – had agreed to change the identified arbitral institution to the BCIA pursuant to a memorandum signed in or around June 2019 (the “Memorandum”), due to apparent concerns over the JAC’s ability to hear an arbitration over the parties’ dispute as it was a foreign-related arbitration. Like the Guarantee, the Memorandum was signed on behalf of ETS by QCR. A copy of the Memorandum (undated) was exhibited to the supporting affidavit, and cl 1 of the Memorandum stipulated a variation to Art V of the Guarantee as follows:

  17. [18] Leaving aside the ambiguity as to the time when the agreement to change the arbitral institution occurred, the Arbitration was conducted at a private hearing on 30 December 2022, and the tribunal handed down its award on 10 January 2023 (the “Award”). It was recorded in the Award that the following persons had appeared before the tribunal at the hearing:

  18. (a) Wei, as the lawyer acting for Xinbo;

  19. (b) Ma, as the lawyer acting for Ruyi; and

  20. (c) Mr He Hanchu (“HHC”), as the lawyer acting for ETS.

  21. [19] In the Award, the tribunal affirmed the validity of the debt owed by Ruyi to Xinbo as well as the Guarantee. It adjudged Xinbo to have rights to the Remaining Shares under a pledge of the SMCP Shares by ETS to Xinbo under the Guarantee, and held that Xinbo had a “priority right of compensation” out of the proceeds of sale of the Remaining Shares. Notably, it was recorded at various parts of the Award that (despite being represented by HHC at the hearing) ETS had no objection to the evidence submitted by Xinbo, as well as the reliefs claimed by Xinbo.

  22. Xinbo’s enforcement proceedings in Singapore

  23. [20] In OA 222, Xinbo commenced proceedings in Singapore seeking permission to enforce the Award. The application was heard on an ex parte basis and permission was granted in HC/ORC 1189/2023 (“ORC 1189”).

  24. ETS’s application to refuse enforcement of the Award

  25. [21] Subsequently, ETS applied in HC/SUM 952/2023 (“SUM 952”) seeking to set aside ORC 1189. In an affidavit filed in support of SUM 952, the Curator alleged various irregularities relating to the Arbitration and the Award that supplied grounds for ORC 1189 to be set aside. Among other things, the Curator stated that:

  26. (a) the arbitration agreement in Art V of the Guarantee was invalid and unenforceable as QCR did not have authority under ETS’s articles of association to enter into either the Guarantee or the Memorandum;

  27. (b) the Award was invalid as there was no dispute between the parties that the tribunal had jurisdiction to adjudicate upon;

  28. (c) HHC had no authority to act on ETS’s behalf in the Arbitration;

  29. (d) the Award was procured by fraud as evidenced inter alia by the BCIA being (allegedly) a fictitious and non-existent arbitral institution; and

  30. (e) enforcement of the Award would be contrary to the public policy of Singapore.

  31. [22] In a nutshell, ETS’s case in SUM 952 was that the Arbitration and the Award had been concocted for the purpose of allowing Xinbo to steal a march ahead of ETS’s other creditors in ETS’s liquidation by giving Xinbo proprietary rights to the Remaining Shares. A common thread underlying the Curator’s assertions was that prior to being notified by Xinbo, the Curator had not had any knowledge of the existence of the Arbitration and the Award, and the Curator had also not been able to, in the course of its investigations into ETS’s affairs, uncover any internal documents relating to the parties’ alleged dispute under the Guarantee, the parties’ entry into the Memorandum, as well as the Arbitration itself (see GD at [6]).

  32. ETS’s application for production of documents and the Production Order

  33. [23] To fill the gaps in the Curator’s knowledge about the Arbitration and the Award, ETS applied in HC/SUM 2987/2023 (“SUM 2987”) for Xinbo to produce eight categories of documents which it claimed were material to the determination of SUM 952.

  34. (a) Category 1: Communications between Xinbo (which includes Xinbo’s representatives and lawyers) and ETS and/or any of its representatives (including QCR and QYF) regarding the need for and negotiation and execution of the Memorandum, including communications relating to the purported deficiency of the JAC and the circumstances which necessitated a variation of the agreed arbitral institution to the BCIA.

  35. (b) Category 2: Communications from Xinbo (which includes Xinbo’s representatives and lawyers) to ETS and/or any of its representatives (including QCR, QYF, HHC or any other person from HHC’s law firm) in respect of each of the following time periods and subject matter:

  36. (i) Category 2(a): prior to the commencement of the Arbitration, alleging a dispute and demanding reliefs from ETS and/or its representatives, whether in the form of a demand letter or otherwise.

  37. (ii) Category 2(b): after the commencement of the Arbitration, notifying ETS and/or its purported representatives of the commencement of the Arbitration; and

  38. (iii) Category 2(c): after the commencement of the Arbitration, in relation to any matter arising out of or in connection with the Arbitration, including but not limited to matters such as the terms of reference, list of issues, administrative matters and logistics of the hearing(s) for the Arbitration.

  39. (c) Category 3: Communications in respect of any matter arising out of or in connection with the Arbitration from Xinbo to the BCIA.

  40. Xinbo’s non-compliance with the Production Order and the imposition of the Unless Order

  41. Xinbo’s attempts at complying with the Unless Order

  42. (1) Category 1

  43. [33] Category 1 related to communications between Xinbo and ETS regarding the execution of the Memorandum. No documents responsive to Category 1 have been disclosed by Xinbo. Zhang explained that:

  44. (a) The change of the arbitral institution had been discussed and agreed upon in-person at the 9 April Meeting. At that meeting, Ma (ie, Ruyi’s lawyer in the Arbitration) had raised the inadequacies of the JAC and suggested a change to the BCIA. The other attendees agreed. Following the meeting, Wang drafted the Memorandum, which was later executed in-person by the parties’ representatives on 11 April 2022.

  45. (b) The main mode of communication between the parties was through physical meetings, telephone calls or WeChat messages. Any WeChat messages that might have been responsive to Category 1 were no longer in Xinbo’s possession or control as “any relevant WeChat records of [Xinbo’s] representatives” – specifically, Wang – had been “deleted due to a change of mobile phones”.

  46. (2) Category 2(a)

  47. [35] Be that as it may, Xinbo’s position seems to be that, those two notices aside, it had not disclosed any other documents responsive to Category 2(a) because no such documents remained in its possession or control. In this regard, Zhang explained that:

  48. (a) The parties’ discussions on Xinbo’s interest in the Remaining Shares had taken place at in-person meetings, including at the 9 April Meeting. At the 9 April Meeting, the parties apparently had differing views on the effect of the terms of the Guarantee, specifically, on whether the Guarantee granted Xinbo any priority right to the Remaining Shares and/or their proceeds of sale. It was thus proposed by Wang that the Arbitration be initiated to determine Xinbo’s rights to the Remaining Shares under the Guarantee.

  49. (b) Any WeChat messages between Xinbo and ETS responsive to Category 2(a) had been lost, and were thus no longer in Xinbo’s possession or control, due to Xinbo’s representatives having changed their mobile phones.

  50. (3) Category 2(b)

  51. [36] Category 2(b) encompassed communications between Xinbo and ETS after the commencement of the Arbitration, and specifically, those involving Xinbo notifying ETS of the commencement of the Arbitration. Xinbo took the position that it had complied with Category 2(b) by disclosing an e-mail from the BCIA to ETS communicating the commencement of the Arbitration in the SLOD. No further documents responsive to Category 2(b) were disclosed as there was no (and no need for) separate communication between Xinbo and ETS on this matter.

  52. (4) Category 2(c)

  53. [37] Category 2(c) involved communications between Xinbo and ETS after the commencement of the Arbitration, and specifically, in connection with matters arising out of or in connection with the Arbitration. Xinbo’s position appears to be that it had complied with Category 2(c).

  54. [38] Zhang explained that Xinbo itself had no documents responsive to Category 2(c) in its possession or control given the parties’ main modes of communication (ie, physical meetings, telephone calls and WeChat messages) and the loss of the WeChat messages due to the change of mobile phones of Xinbo’s representatives. However, Xinbo had gone the extra mile by reaching out to one Mr Jing Lin (“Jing”), a secretary of the BCIA who handled administrative matters relating to the Arbitration, and who was able to provide some WeChat messages exchanged between (a) Jing and HHC (purportedly ETS’s lawyer in the Arbitration) from 7 December 2022 to 9 December 2022; and (b) Jing and one Zhang Tongtong (another secretary of the BCIA who handled the Arbitration). These messages that Xinbo obtained from Jing were disclosed in the 2SLOD.

  55. [40] In her 14 March Affidavit, Zhang sought to explain away this inconsistency on the basis that the reference in the first e-mail to ETS’s application was infelicitous, as the application had all along been a joint one. Further, any discussions between the parties on the procedure for the Arbitration had been through their aforementioned main modes of communication, and any WeChat messages that existed had since been lost due to the change of mobile phones of Xinbo’s representatives.

  56. (5) Category 3

  57. [41] Category 3 concerned communications from Xinbo to the BCIA in respect of any matter arising out of or in connection with the Arbitration. Xinbo’s position appears to be that it had complied with Category 3.

  58. [42] Zhang averred that, in general, no documents responsive to Category 3 existed because, according to Wei (ie, Xinbo’s lawyer in the Arbitration), the parties had contacted the BCIA through its designated telephone line as this was the BCIA’s common practice. Wei no longer retained telephone records detailing those calls due to the passage of time. Further, Wei had advised that no written correspondence was exchanged between Xinbo and the BCIA because (a) the issues in the Arbitration were not particularly complex; and (b) when necessary, apart from discussions over the telephone, Wei had attended in person at the BCIA to deal with matters concerning the Arbitration, such as when he tendered evidence for the Arbitration.

  59. [44] In her 14 March Affidavit, Zhang stated that Wei had advised that the 10 January E-mail had simply been intended to put on record matters that had previously been addressed at the hearing of the Arbitration. In any event, Wang had forwarded the e-mail to Wei, who subsequently contacted Zhang via the BCIA’s telephone line to confirm the same on 10 January 2023. Further, Jing had also liaised with Liang (Xinbo’s legal advisor) on WeChat on 10 January 2023 on the same issues in the 10 January E-mail, and Xinbo had disclosed these messages (which it obtained from Jing) in the 2SLOD. Apart from these messages, Xinbo did not have any further documents responsive to Category 3 in its possession or control.

  60. ETS’s application to enforce the Unless Order

  61. Decision below

  62. Xinbo had breached the Unless Order

  63. [50] Third, the AR accepted Xinbo’s averment that it had no further documents responsive to Categories 2(b) and 3 on the basis that, respectively, Xinbo had not communicated separately with ETS about the commencement of the Arbitration and Zhang’s explanations in the 14 March Affidavit – as confirmed by Wei in a subsequent affidavit of his dated 26 March 2024 (the “26 March Affidavit”) – that no written communications were exchanged between Xinbo and the BCIA as Wei had either spoken to the BCIA over the telephone or attended in person when necessary (see GD at [67]–[68]).

  64. (a) Although Zhang had stated that Xinbo’s representatives were unable to access their past WeChat messages after changing their mobile phones, Zhang had not stated that the past WeChat messages could no longer be accessed on these representatives’ old phones or that these representatives no longer had access to their old phones. Xinbo’s explanation was thus incomplete insofar as it only covered its representatives’ inability to access the WeChat messages on their current (new) phones (see GD at [75]).

  65. [52] Fifth, the AR held that, separate from the issue of production of documents, Xinbo had breached its obligation to allow ETS to inspect the documents that Xinbo had produced under the LOD, SLOD and 2SLOD. Instead of providing ETS the opportunity to inspect the originals of these documents, Xinbo had simply provided printed hardcopies of documents that it had already provided in soft copy to ETS (see GD at [85]).

  66. The consequences in the Unless Order should take effect

  67. Parties’ cases on appeal

  68. [58] I summarise the parties’ positions on appeal in broad strokes, which I shall address in greater detail in the course of my analysis below.

  69. Xinbo’s arguments

  70. (a) First, the effect of the AR’s decision was to fashion a new ground for refusing enforcement of a foreign arbitral award beyond the enumerated grounds in the New York Convention and s 31 of the IAA. That, it was argued, was in contravention of the New York Convention. It was not open to the Singapore courts to make orders that had the practical effect of refusing enforcement of an award on a ground outside of these exhaustive bases, and in that respect, the New York Convention and IAA imposed constraints on the court’s procedural powers under the ROC 2021.

  71. ETS’s arguments

  72. Issues to be determined

  73. [65] The two main issues before me in this appeal are:

  74. For Xinbo’s benefit, in the main, I shall focus on the findings that the AR made against it.

  75. Issue 1: Did Xinbo breach the Unless Order?

  76. [68] It is trite that an affidavit relating to the discovery of documents is generally conclusive as to what documents are or were in a party's possession or control, responsive to a party’s discovery obligations, or protected by grounds such as legal professional privilege (see Jeffrey Pinsler SC, Singapore Civil Practice (LexisNexis, 2022) (“Singapore Civil Practice”) at para 30-76; Hodge M Malek & Paul Matthews, Disclosure (Sweet & Maxwell, 6th Ed, 2023) (“Disclosure”) at para 6-79). This principle has typically been articulated in caselaw (some of which I refer to in the following paragraphs) in the specific context of applications for discovery of documents under the ROC 2014 regime (or its English equivalent). Nevertheless, there is, in my view, no reason why the underlying principle as to the conclusiveness of affidavits should be any different under the current regime for production of documents under O 11 of the ROC 2021.

  77. [69] The principle as to the general conclusiveness of affidavits has been articulated in several authorities, including South Staffordshire Tramways Company v Ebbsmith (1895) 2 QB 669, where Lord Esher MR made the following reference to it (at 674):

  78. [70] However, it is equally well-established that the court is not invariably bound by a statement on affidavit, if it is satisfied that the statement is clearly false or deficient. The leading case for this proposition is the English Court of Appeal decision of Jones v The Monte Video Gas Company (1880) 5 QBD 556. All three members of the court were unanimous on this point. First, Brett LJ (as he then was), delivering the lead judgment, explained that (at 558):

  79. In a similar vein, Cotton LJ framed the rule thus (at 559):

  80. Although the last member of the court, Thesiger LJ, “confess[ed] that [he] felt somewhat apprehensive about drawing a hard and fast rule”, he nonetheless agreed that “unless the party seeking production can surmise from his adversary’s admissions that some documents are being withheld, he must rest content with the statements in the affidavit of discovery” (at 559).

  81. [71] The natural question that arises from this is: when can a court look behind the affidavit?

  82. [72] Under the ROC 2014, our courts proceeded on the basis of the well-known test of “reasonable suspicion”: the court could look behind the deponent’s affidavit as to the adequacy of its performance of its discovery obligations if the court entertained a “reasonable suspicion” that there were further documents to be discovered, based on the disclosed documents themselves or the surrounding circumstances (see Soh Lup Chee and others v Seow Boon Cheng and another [2002] 1 SLR(R) 604 at [9]; Natixis, Singapore Branch v Lim Oon Kuin and others [2024] 3 SLR 1502 (“Natixis”) at [27]).

  83. [73] But the position is different under the current ROC 2021. Earlier this year, in Lutfi Salim bin Talib and another v British and Malayan Trustees Ltd [2024] 5 SLR 86 (“Lutfi”), Chua Lee Ming J examined the authorities and held that the prevailing “reasonable suspicion” test was inapt having regard to the ethos of the ROC 2021. The learned judge considered a higher threshold of “plain and obvious” to be appropriate (at [32]):

  84. [74] Although the view expressed in Lutfi is not strictly binding on me, I consider, on principle, that Chua J was correct in raising the bar in the context of the ROC 2021. As the learned judge alluded to, the ROC 2021 was intended to usher in a new approach to the disclosure and production of documents – specifically, a narrower regime – than the discovery regime under the former ROC 2014 (see Lutfi at [34], citing Civil Justice Commission, Civil Justice Commission Report (29 December 2017) (Chairperson: Justice Tay Yong Kwang) at p 19). Indeed, apart from the specific issue of the conclusiveness of affidavits filed in fulfilment of a party’s disclosure and production obligations, the paradigm shift is apparent from the move away from the previous test of “relevance-necessity” for specific discovery under O 24 of the ROC 2014 (see, for example, The Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No 689 v DTZ Debenham Tie Leung (SEA) Pte Ltd and Another [2008] SGHC 98), to the higher and stricter threshold of “materiality” under O 11 of the ROC 2021 (see Eng’s Wantan Noodle Pte Ltd and another v Eng’s Char Siew Wantan Mee Pte Ltd [2023] SGHCR 17 at [49(b)]; Cachet Multi Strategy Fund SPC on behalf of Cachet Special Opportunities SP v Feng Shi and others [2024] SGHCR 8 (“Cachet”) at [30]–[31] and [33]).

  85. [78] The court agreed with the plaintiffs that the defendants’ affidavit was insufficient. Brett LJ observed that “[t]he defendants ought to verify on oath the facts on which they claim the privilege” (see Gardner at 52). Cotton LJ considered that “[the defendants] ought to say not only that the documents are privileged, which is a statement of law, but they ought to set out the facts from which [the court] can see that [their] view of the law is right” (see Gardner at 53). His Lordship then went on to explain the reason as follows (see Gardner at 53):

  86. [80] Similar sentiments have been expressed in the local jurisprudence. For example, in Technigroup Far East Pte Ltd and another v Jaswinderpal Singh s/o Bachint Singh and others [2018] 3 SLR 1391, Steven Chong J (as he then was) said that it was not the position that (at [56]):

  87. In the same vein, I made the observation in Natixis that (at [32]):

  88. [81] In my judgment, given the issues that have arisen in this case, it may be useful, without being unduly prescriptive, to lay down some general expectations as to affidavits filed in compliance with a party’s document production obligations.

  89. [83] Second, and following from the first point, addressing a category as a whole does not mean that a party can get by with making a rolled-up or sweeping statement that “no documents responsive to Category X exist and/or are in our possession or control”. The court would expect some particularity in terms of a party’s explanation. If a class of documents comprises different types of documents, it would be prudent to address each type of document specifically (as appropriate) rather than simply referring to the class in its entirety. If necessary, the affidavit could also contain the broad statement as a “sweeping-up” provision to make clear a party’s position; but a blanket statement like that cannot be the only information or “explanation” that is presented to the other party and the court. The Gardner case illustrates this point.

  90. [84] Third, an explanation is hardly an explanation if it throws up as many, or worse, more, questions than it answers. Thus, for example, if it is asserted that certain documents do (or did) exist but are no longer in a party’s possession or control, it would be expected that the party sets out the steps that it has taken to verify this, and perhaps, even the steps that it has taken to make a good faith attempt at obtaining the documents. As a general litmus test, if there is an obvious follow-on question to what a party has put on affidavit, that is a fair indication that that question should be proactively addressed, so as to complete the explanation, as opposed to leaving the point hanging. To use another aspect of the present case as an illustration, if Xinbo was taking the position that it did not retain certain WeChat messages due to its representatives having changed their mobile phones, it would have been obvious to any bystander that the immediate follow-on questions to this would have been, amongst others, the individual identification of these representatives, the time(s) when the change(s) in mobile phones occurred, and what became of the old mobile phones.

  91. [86] These four points that I have identified are not matters that require the expenditure of significant mental bandwidth to conceive. On the contrary, these are matters that would (or should) occur to any party who approaches its document production obligations in good faith and a dose of common sense.

  92. My decision: Xinbo breached the Production Order and the Unless Order

  93. [90] I can quickly dispose of Xinbo’s suggestion that the AR conflated the tests of “reasonable suspicion” and “plain and obvious”. I flatly disagree. It is clear beyond peradventure that the AR was keenly aware of the difference between the two tests. Indeed, the AR expressly stated that he had initially made his decision based on the “reasonable suspicion” test as Chua J’s decision in Lutfi was handed down on the same day that SUM 643 had been heard and decided. The AR recognised explicitly that it was therefore necessary to consider “whether [his] decision [was] now indefensible given the principles set out by the court in Lutfi” (see GD at [32]). Xinbo’s contention is plainly unsustainable in the face of the AR’s awareness that he had to reassess whether his findings based on the “reasonable suspicion” test were maintainable based on the higher “plain and obvious” standard. Indeed, the AR immediately went on to state that “[he] would have reached the same conclusion in SUM 643 even if [he] had applied the ‘plain and obvious’ test in Lutfi” (see GD at [32]).

  94. [92] I shall take each of these alleged breaches in turn.

  95. Whether Xinbo breached the Unless Order by failing to give an adequate account of the WeChat messages

  96. [95] However, I do not think that this carries Xinbo very far. The fact that Zhang had attempted to provide some explanation as to Xinbo’s loss of possession or control of the WeChat messages (by repeatedly pointing to its representatives’ change of their mobile phones) was not fortuitous. On the contrary, it indicates that Xinbo was clearly aware of the need for an explanation if it was not producing (or able to produce) the WeChat messages for whatever reason.

  97. [99] It is against this backdrop that I assess the adequacy of Xinbo’s explanation. In my judgment, the AR was correct to find that Xinbo’s explanation was lacking.

  98. [100] Although Zhang made the general assertion at various points of the 14 March Affidavit that Xinbo’s representatives had changed their mobile phones, and some individual references were made to certain representatives specifically (viz, Wang and Liang), there was a general lack of particularisation in the affidavit as to: (a) the status of the WeChat messages in the possession or control of other representatives of Xinbo; (b) the time when Xinbo’s representatives had lost their phones; and (c) how exactly the change of mobile phones caused Xinbo to lose possession or control of the WeChat messages on the old mobile phones.

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