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Grounds publishedDecided 2 Feb 2024
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General Division of the High Court

Hang Huo Investment Pte Ltd v Wong Pheng Cheong Martin

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[2024] SGHC 32Case no. Originating Application No 633 of 2023

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] HC/OA 633/2023 (“OA 633”) is an application by Hang Huo Investment Pte Ltd (“Applicant”) under s 78(1)(a) of the Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act 2018 (“IRDA”) for the court to fix the amount to be paid by way of remuneration to Mr Wong Pheng Cheong Martin (“Respondent”), who was appointed by the Applicant’s lender, DBS Bank Ltd (“DBS”), as receiver and manager of the Applicant’s property on 11 April 2023 and discharged from those appointments on 26 June 2023.

  3. Background

  4. The parties

  5. [4] The Applicant is a company incorporated in Singapore. Its only business is the ownership of a hotel known as Link Hotel Singapore (“Link Hotel”) which is sited at 50 Tiong Bahru Road, Singapore 158794 and 51 Tiong Bahru Road, Singapore 158795 (“50 and 51 Tiong Bahru Road”). The Applicant is the registered and beneficial owner of the properties at, and the link bridge (“Link Bridge”) connecting, 50 and 51 Tiong Bahru Road. The Applicant is wholly owned by Silverine Pacific Ltd (“Silverine”), a British Virgin Islands company, which is in turn wholly owned by Link Holdings Limited (“Link Holdings”), a Hong Kong-listed company.

  6. [5] The Respondent is a Senior Managing Director of the Corporate Finance and Restructuring department of FTI.

  7. Appointment of the Respondent

  8. [6] In consideration of DBS granting banking facilities to the Applicant, the Applicant mortgaged its interest in 50 and 51 Tiong Bahru Road and the Link Bridge (“Mortgaged Properties”) to DBS pursuant to two mortgages dated 8 August 2008 and 24 January 2018 respectively (“Mortgages”). The Mortgages are in similar terms and incorporate certain provisions of DBS’ Memorandum of Mortgage MM/23.

  9. [8] Following the Applicant’s default on the payment of sums due under the facilities granted by DBS, DBS and the Respondent executed two Deeds of Appointment dated 11 April 2023. Under one Deed of Appointment, DBS appointed the Respondent as the receiver (“Receiver”) of the Mortgaged Properties (“DOA (Mortgage)”). Under the other Deed of Appointment, DBS appointed the Respondent as the receiver and manager (“R&M”) of the Charged Property (“DOA (Debenture)”).

  10. [9] It is undisputed that the Respondent’s main task during his appointment was to organise a sale of 50 and 51 Tiong Bahru Road and the Link Bridge by public tender. It is also undisputed that the Respondent’s appointment did not entail operating Link Hotel. Link Hotel was operated, both before and during the Respondent’s appointment, by Link Hotels International Pte Ltd (“LHI”), a company separate from (albeit related to) the Applicant.

  11. Filing of OA 633 and payment of the Respondent’s fees by the Applicant

  12. [10] The tender exercise began on or around 26 May 2023. Sometime in early June 2023, the Applicant informed DBS that it intended to make full repayment of all sums due to DBS, thereby redeeming the Mortgaged Properties and discharging the Charged Property. DBS informed the Applicant that (a) as the tender would close on 16 June 2023 and (b) an indication had been given to bidders that the accepted bid would be announced by 20 June 2023, the latest dates the Applicant could serve its redemption notice and complete the redemption were 16 June 2023 and 27 June 2023 respectively.

  13. [11] On 15 June 2023, the Applicant’s solicitors, Dentons Rodyk & Davidson LLP (“DR”) served the Applicant’s redemption notice dated 15 June 2023 on DBS.

  14. [12] On 20 June 2023, Shook Lin & Bok LLP (“SLB”), who had been appointed as solicitors for both DBS and the Respondent, provided DBS’ Redemption Statement dated 20 June 2023 (“Redemption Statement”) to DR together with copies of the FTI Invoice and SLB’s invoice. The Redemption Statement set out the amounts due and payable by the Applicant to DBS at the expected date of redemption on 26 June 2023. These amounts included fees due to FTI in the total amount of $1,477,546.80, and fees due to SLB in the amount of $253,592.31.

  15. [13] According to the Applicant, it was shocked at the fees imposed by the Respondent / FTI but felt that it had no choice but to make full payment of all the sums set out in the Redemption Statement because the Respondent intended to announce the accepted bid pursuant to the tender exercise imminently, and the latest date the Applicant could complete its redemption was 27 June 2023 (see [10] above). The Applicant felt compelled not to question the fees at that stage in case doing so jeopardised its redemption.

  16. [14] However, the Applicant decided to file OA 633 on 23 June 2023 before making full payment of the sums stated in the Redemption Statement. The Applicant thought that so long as it filed the application prior to paying the Respondent’s fees, it could subsequently seek an account from the Respondent of any excess moneys paid. In the Applicant’s words:

  17. [15] The Applicant did not file a supporting affidavit, serve the originating application for OA 633 (“Originating Application”) or notify the Respondent of OA 633 at the time.

  18. [16] On 26 June 2023, the Applicant made full payment of the sums set out in the Redemption Statement including the FTI Invoice. On the same day, DBS removed and discharged the Respondent from his appointments as Receiver of the Mortgaged Properties and R&M of the Charged Property.

  19. [17] According to the Applicant, it subsequently reviewed the various documents accompanying the Redemption Statement, including the FTI Invoice, and noticed that the Respondent’s fees for “Total Professional Services” were in the sum of $1,358,142.50. No breakdown of this figure was provided in the FTI Invoice. This led the Applicant to request a breakdown from the Respondent (see [20] below).

  20. [18] For completeness, the total bill of $1,477,546.80 in the FTI Invoice comprises charges for:

  21. (a) professional services in the amount of $1,358,142.50. It is this amount of remuneration that the Applicant challenges as being “manifestly excessive” and “unreasonable”;

  22. (b) expenses totalling $9,956.39; and

  23. (c) goods and services tax (“GST”) of $109,447.91.

  24. Procedural history

  25. [19] OA 633 was first fixed for a case conference on 11 July 2023 before the Registrar. On 30 June 2023, the court re-fixed the case conference to 13 July 2023.

  26. [20] On 10 July 2023, DR took two steps. At 1.35 pm, DR sent SLB a letter dated 10 July 2023, requesting an itemised bill from the Respondent by 13 July 2023. DR’s letter explained that the breakdown was necessary to enable the Applicant to make an informed decision on the reasonableness of the Respondent’s fees:

  27. [21] At 3.26 pm, DR filed a Request for the case conference to be re-fixed to the week of 24 July 2023. DR’s Request explained that OA 633 had been filed to “preserve the Applicant’s rights under section 78, in particular, sections 78(2)(c) and 78(3) of the [IRDA]”, and that the Originating Application had not been served yet as the Applicant was “liaising with the Respondent on the issue of the Respondent’s professional fees with a view to resolving the issues in [OA 633] amicably”.

  28. [22] On 10 July 2023, the court replied to DR’s Request, re-fixing the case conference to 27 July 2023 and directing that: “Applicant to write in by 24 July 2023 to provide an update on whether this matter has been resolved amicabl[y]. Solicitor to inform other party of the court’s directions.”

  29. [23] On 13 July 2023, SLB provided DR with a breakdown of the FTI Invoice. This breakdown was less detailed than the spreadsheet later filed by the Respondent in OA 633 (“FTI Spreadsheet”).

  30. [24] On 24 July 2023, DR filed a Request for the case conference to be re-fixed to the week of 28 August 2023. DR explained that the Respondent had provided a breakdown of his fees, with which the Applicant did not agree. The Applicant thus wished to proceed with OA 633. DR indicated that it expected to be able to file the supporting affidavit for the application within a week, and would serve the necessary papers on the Respondent thereafter.

  31. [25] On 24 July 2023, the court replied to DR’s Request, directing that the supporting affidavit was to be filed and served on the Respondent by 31 July 2023 and re-fixing the case conference to 31 August 2023.

  32. [26] On 31 July 2023, DR filed and served the Applicant’s Affidavit, with the Originating Application, on SLB.

  33. The parties’ cases

  34. [27] I set out the broad strokes of the parties’ cases, to be elaborated at the relevant junctures.

  35. The Applicant’s case

  36. [29] Second, the Applicant argued that the burden of proof is on the Respondent to satisfy the court that his remuneration is justified.

  37. The Respondent’s case

  38. [31] The Respondent raised four preliminary objections. First, the Applicant’s Affidavit should be disregarded by the court as the deponent, Mr He, was allegedly not authorised to make the affidavit on behalf of the Applicant. Second, the Applicant failed to comply with the requirements of the Rules of Court 2021 (“ROC 2021”) for service of the Originating Application and supporting affidavit. Third, OA 633 was filed by the Applicant “maliciously and in bad faith”. Fourth, the Applicant is estopped from taking issue with the Respondent’s fees “at this belated juncture”.

  39. [33] The Respondent also argued that the burden is not on him to justify his fees since he was neither a court-appointed receiver / manager nor the applicant in the present case.

  40. [34] Finally, the Respondent submitted that his fees were “fair, reasonable and proportionate” to the work carried out given the complexity of the receivership. The Respondent explained that $1,358,142.50 was incurred based on 1,881.20 hours spent by a ten-person team from FTI (including himself). He provided the FTI Spreadsheet showing a breakdown of work items and time spent by each person. The date “03-Jun-23” stated at the bottom of the spreadsheet is a typographical error and should read 3 August 2023 instead. A copy of the FTI Spreadsheet, with edits made by me in red font to (a) anonymise the names of the Respondent’s team members and (b) insert row numbers for ease of reference, is placed in an annex (“Annex”) to this judgment.

  41. [35] A summary table reflecting the ten persons’ respective designations, years of experience, hourly charge-out rates, time spent, and fees billed by dollar amount and as a percentage of the total fees is set out below:

  42. [36] As observed by the Respondent, 45% of the total time spent on the matter was spent by the more senior members of the team (Director-level and above) and 55% of the total time was spent by the more junior members. According to the Respondent, the time was spent across four categories of work:

  43. (a) “Administrative and Planning”: 205.30 hours (10.91%);

  44. (b) “Legal matters”: 80.20 hours (4.26%);

  45. (c) “Realisation of Assets”: 1,572.20 hours (83.58%); and

  46. (d) “Trading – Employee Issues”: 23.50 hours (1.25%).

  47. Issues to be determined

  48. [37] The preliminary issues for determination are:

  49. (a) whether the Applicant’s Affidavit should be disregarded;

  50. (b) whether the Applicant breached procedural rules for service of the Originating Application and the Applicant’s Affidavit;

  51. (c) whether OA 633 was brought maliciously or in bad faith; and

  52. (d) whether the Applicant is estopped from bringing OA 633.

  53. [38] Assuming OA 633 should not be dismissed on any of the above grounds, the further issues for determination are:

  54. (a) whether s 78(1)(a) of the IRDA applies to the Respondent’s fees billed under the FTI Invoice; and if so,

  55. (c) whether special circumstances under s 78(3) of the IRDA are present; and if so,

  56. (d) turning to the fixing of the Respondent’s remuneration:

  57. (i) whether the Respondent bears the burden of justifying his fees; and

  58. (ii) how the Respondent’s remuneration should be fixed.

  59. Whether the Applicant’s Affidavit should be disregarded

  60. The Respondent’s arguments

  61. [39] The Respondent submitted that the court should disregard the Applicant’s Affidavit as Mr He lacked authority to depose to it on the Applicant’s behalf. Mr He was not a director, shareholder or employee of the Applicant. He was a director of Silverine, the Applicant’s sole shareholder. Without express authorisation from the Applicant’s board, he had no legal standing to make representations on the Applicant’s behalf. Mr He has not exhibited documents to show that he was authorised, nor explained why he and not the Applicant’s directors was deposing to the affidavit.

  62. The Applicant’s arguments

  63. [40] In response, the Applicant pointed out that Mr He stated in the Applicant’s Affidavit that he was authorised to depose to the affidavit on the Applicant’s behalf. The Respondent has not referred to any legal requirement that every witness who deposes to an affidavit on behalf of a company must exhibit an authorisation. Rule 18(2) of the Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution (Corporate Insolvency and Restructuring) Rules 2020 (“CIR Rules”), which apply to OA 633, states that an affidavit may be sworn by a person “possessing direct knowledge of the subject matter of the application”. As a director of the Applicant’s sole shareholder, Mr He possessed direct knowledge of the subject matter of the application and was in a position to depose to the affidavit. The Respondent himself exhibited numerous emails on which Mr He was copied in the course of the Respondent’s receivership. This shows that the Respondent and DBS accept that Mr He has the requisite authority to act on the Applicant’s behalf.

  64. Decision

  65. [41] I find no reason to disregard the Applicant’s Affidavit. The Applicant is not confined to having only its directors depose to its affidavit. I am not persuaded by the Respondent’s insinuations of Mr He’s lack of authority. First, as a director of the Applicant’s sole shareholder, Mr He’s ties to the Applicant are close enough not to engender disbelief that the Applicant authorised him to file its affidavit. Second, Mr He was involved in the contemporaneous email correspondence on the redemption exercise, suggesting that he had direct knowledge of the subject matter of OA 633 and that he was authorised to depose the Applicant’s Affidavit. Third, Mr He affirmed that he was authorised to depose to the affidavit on the Applicant’s behalf and DR was obviously satisfied to proceed with its conduct of OA 633 on this basis. In the absence of the Respondent establishing a prima facie case that Mr He lacked authorisation to depose the Applicant’s Affidavit, the Applicant and Mr He are not obliged to explain the choice of deponent or exhibit proof of Mr He’s authorisation.

  66. Whether the Applicant breached the rules for service of documents

  67. The Respondent’s arguments

  68. [42] The Originating Application and the Applicant’s Affidavit were served on the Respondent on 31 July 2023, 38 days after OA 633 was filed on 23 June 2023. The Respondent submitted that this contravened O 6 r 11(4) of the ROC 2021 which provides that reasonable steps to serve an originating application and the supporting affidavit on a defendant must be made as soon as possible and in any event within 14 days after the originating application is issued. The Respondent averred that the court has the power to dismiss OA 633 given “the Applicant’s blatant disregard of the Rules of Court 2021”.

  69. [43] In oral submissions, the Respondent’s counsel further argued that the ROC 2021 (and not the CIR Rules) applied to OA 633 as: (a) the Originating Application was “in the [Rules of Court] format” and contained a statement that the affidavit in reply was to be filed within 21 days of service of the Applicant’s supporting affidavit, which is the timeline under O 6 r 12(1) of the ROC 2021; and (b) a case conference, which is “a creature of” the Rules of Court, would otherwise not have been scheduled. In any event, under r 14 of the CIR Rules, the Applicant should have served the Originating Application by 4 July 2023.

  70. The Applicant’s arguments

  71. [44] The Applicant submitted that the Respondent’s reliance on the ROC 2021 is misconceived because the CIR Rules apply to OA 633. OA 633 is commenced under Part 6, and specifically, s 78(1)(a), of the IRDA. Paragraph 1 of the table at O 1 r 2(11) of the ROC 2021 makes clear that the ROC 2021 does not generally apply to proceedings under the IRDA. Instead, under s 448 of the IRDA, the Rules Committee appointed under s 80(3) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 may make Rules of Court to regulate and prescribe proceedings and the practice and procedure of the court under the IRDA. The enacting formula of the CIR Rules states that the Rules Committee has made the CIR Rules in exercise of the powers conferred by s 448 of the IRDA.

  72. [45] Given that the CIR Rules apply, the applicable provisions are:

  73. (a) Rule 14, which provides that, unless the court gives permission to the contrary, an application must be served on every person affected by the application not less than seven days before the date of the hearing of the application; and

  74. (b) Rule 19, which provides that a party who intends to rely on affidavit evidence at the hearing of the application must file and serve their affidavit at least five days before the date fixed for the hearing.

  75. [46] The Applicant duly served the Originating Application and the Applicant’s Affidavit within the time prescribed by the CIR Rules and as directed by the court on 24 July 2023 (see [25] above).

  76. Decision

  77. [47] In my judgment, the Applicant has not failed to comply with the relevant procedural rules for service. I agree with the Applicant, for the reasons it provided, that the CIR Rules apply to OA 633. I add that r 3 of the CIR Rules states that the CIR Rules apply to the proceedings, practice and procedure of the General Division of the High Court under Parts 3 to 12 and 22 of the IRDA and matters incidental or relating thereto. This includes OA 633, which is made under s 78(1)(a) in Part 6 of the IRDA. The CIR Rules do not provide for a particular originating application form to be used. There is thus nothing untoward in the Applicant’s use of the form provided in the Supreme Court Practice Directions 2021 for originating applications, referred to in O 6 r 11(2) of the ROC 2021. It is not logical for the Respondent to reason backwards from this and surmise that the ROC 2021 applies to the exclusion of the CIR Rules. The Respondent’s submission that case conferences are convened only for matters to which the Rules of Court apply is unsupported by authority and does not reflect practice. In sum, service of the Originating Application and the Applicant’s Affidavit is governed by rr 14 and 19 of the CIR Rules respectively.

  78. [48] The Applicant did not breach r 14 of the CIR Rules. Rule 14 states:

  79. [49] When the sealed copy of the Originating Application was returned by the court, it indicated “Hearing Date: 11-July-2023”, “Hearing Type: Case Conference (OA)” and “Attend Before: Registrar”. The Respondent’s submission that, under r 14 of the CIR Rules, the Applicant should have served the Originating Application by 4 July 2023 appears premised on interpreting the phrase “the hearing of the application” in r 14 as referring to (or at least including) a case conference in the matter.

  80. [50] In my view, having regard to the text, context and purpose of r 14 of the CIR Rules, the phrase “the hearing of the application” means the substantive or merits hearing of the application and not a case conference. The ordinary meaning of “the hearing of the application” is a hearing where the application is substantively heard, ie, on the merits. An application is not substantively heard at a case conference, and it would not be meaningful to say that there is a “hearing” “of the application” at a case conference. Further support for this interpretation is found in the related r 19 of the CIR Rules, which provides:

  81. [51] As a case conference is not a substantive hearing of the application, it is not usual to say that parties “rely on affidavit evidence” at a case conference. The phrase “the hearing of the application” in r 19 must therefore mean the substantive or merits hearing of the application, at which affidavit evidence will be relied on. Given that r 14 pertains to service of the application and r 19 pertains to filing and service of affidavits for the application, the phrase “the hearing of the application” must be given the same meaning in both provisions.

  82. [52] Further, in my view, the purpose of both provisions is to ensure fairness to affected persons by providing them with notice of the application and supporting affidavit(s) before the court is addressed on the substance and merits of the application. The interpretation of “the hearing of the application” as referring to the substantive or merits hearing of the application promotes this purpose. There is no concern that unfairness may result if longer timelines than those stipulated under rr 14 and 19 are required in certain instances because the court has power under both rules to adjust the timelines.

  83. [53] Thus, the Applicant was not required to serve the Originating Application or the Applicant’s Affidavit prior to the case conference originally fixed for 11 July 2023. When the court directed on 24 July 2023 that service be effected by 31 July 2023 (before the substantive hearing of OA 633 was even fixed), the Applicant duly complied (see [25]–[26] above). The Applicant therefore did not breach r 14 (or r 19) of the CIR Rules.

  84. Whether the Applicant brought OA 633 maliciously or in bad faith

  85. The Respondent’s arguments

  86. [55] The Respondent submitted that the Applicant had filed OA 633 “maliciously and in bad faith”. First, prior to serving OA 633 on the Respondent on 31 July 2023, the Applicant did not raise any issues with the Respondent’s fees. There was no indication or any reservation of rights by the Applicant that it was not agreeable to make payment of the Respondent’s fees or that it was making payment under protest. On 24 June 2023, one day after OA 633 had been filed, Mr He sent an email to all parties involved in the redemption, including the Respondent, stating: “On behalf of Link Holdings I’d like to take this opportunity to thank all for the hard work to make this happen under such a tight timetable. Much appreciated!” (“Mr He’s 24 June 2023 Email”).

  87. The Applicant’s arguments

  88. [57] The Applicant’s explanation of its thought process and conduct in filing OA 633 and making payment of the Respondent’s fees is set out in [13] and [17] above. The Applicant further rejected the allegation that a “blatant lie” was conveyed in DR’s 10 July 2023 Request filed in court. DR sent its letter dated 10 July 2023 to SLB requesting for the breakdown of FTI’s Invoice at 1.35 pm, before filing its Request at 3.26 pm (see [20]–[21] above). The Applicant acted through DR in requesting for the breakdown. DR’s letter to SLB states that the breakdown was requested to enable the Applicant to judge the reasonableness of the charges in the FTI Invoice. This shows that the Applicant did not think that the fees were reasonable. Nonetheless, had the breakdown shown that the fees were, in fact, reasonable, the matter would have been resolved and the Applicant would not have continued with OA 633.

  89. Decision

  90. [58] I find that the Respondent has not established that the Applicant brought OA 633 maliciously or in bad faith. First, I accept that the Applicant has given an honest account of its rationale and motivations for filing OA 633 and paying the Respondent’s fees without giving any notice to the Respondent that the Applicant would challenge his fees – in short, that the Applicant felt compelled to make full payment and not question the fees at that stage for fear of jeopardising the redemption of the Mortgaged Properties. That being so, the Applicant’s conduct in the lead-up to filing OA 633 and paying the Respondent’s fees did not stem from malice or bad faith. It also cannot be said that Mr He’s 24 June 2023 Email strung the Respondent along in any way. Mr He’s 24 June 2023 Email was sent in response to a lawyer’s email of 23 June 2023 confirming, among others, that completion of the redemption would take place on 26 June 2023 at an agreed venue. Read in its proper context, Mr He was expressing appreciation for the work done in ensuring that the redemption would take place within a tight timeframe (from DR’s service of the Notice of Redemption on 15 June 2023) and not any sentiment towards the Respondent’s work as Receiver and R&M. Mr He’s 24 June 2023 Email simply did not indicate that the Applicant had no issues with the Respondent’s fees.

  91. [59] Second, although the remark in DR’s 10 July 2023 Request that “the Applicant is liaising with the Respondent on the issue of the Respondent’s professional fees with a view to resolving the issues in [OA 633] amicably” may have conveyed the impression of ongoing discussions between the parties, the remark was, strictly, accurate since (a) a precursor to considering an amicable resolution entailed the Applicant considering the reasonableness of the Respondent’s fees in light of the breakdown of the FTI Invoice to be provided, and (b) DR had liaised with SLB on obtaining the breakdown prior to filing its Request. On balance, I do not consider the remark an untruth, much less a “blatant lie”. I also accept that the Applicant formed the view that the matter could not be resolved after the breakdown of the FTI Invoice, in their view, failed to demonstrate that the Respondent’s fees were reasonable. While the Applicant has not explained its non-compliance with the court’s direction of 10 July 2023, this might be due to the Applicant’s view, after receiving the breakdown on 13 July 2023, that it would proceed with OA 633. I do not suggest that this excuses non-compliance with a court direction. However, in respect of the present analysis, the short point is that these matters do not evidence that the Applicant brought OA 633 maliciously or in bad faith.

  92. Whether the Applicant is estopped from bringing OA 633

  93. The Respondent’s arguments

  94. [60] The Respondent’s written submissions on estoppel comprise a mere three paragraphs. In the first paragraph, the Respondent reproduced quotes from Tan Yong San v Neo Kok Eng and others [2011] SGHC 30 at [112] (which cited from Genelabs Diagnostics Pte Ltd v Institut Pasteur [2000] 3 SLR(R) 530 at [76]) and [114] on what the term “acquiescence” means. In the next paragraph, the Respondent submitted that “[c]onsequently … the Applicant is estopped from taking issue with the Respondent’s professional fees at this belated juncture”, citing: (a) the contents of Mr He’s 24 June 2023 Email; (b) the Applicant not raising any issues with the Respondent’s fees prior to the completion of redemption on 26 June 2023; (c) the Applicant not informing DBS or the Respondent that it had already filed OA 633 on 23 June 2023; and (d) the Applicant making full payment of the amounts stated in the Redemption Statement, including the FTI Invoice, on completion on 26 June 2023 “unconditionally without any protest or reservation of its rights”. This payment was made by the Applicant in exchange for DBS’ discharge of the Mortgages and the Debenture. In the third and last paragraph of its submissions on this point, the Respondent concluded that the Applicant is estopped from objecting to the Respondent’s fees “bearing in mind that DBS had discharged the Mortgages and the Debenture in exchange for the Respondent’s payment of the Redemption Sum, which included FTI’s professional fees, on completion”.

  95. Decision

  96. [61] I find that the Respondent has not established his case on estoppel. The Respondent did not, in his written or oral submissions, explain the nature of the estoppel relied on, much less demonstrate how, in law, the specific elements of that estoppel are established. It is necessary for the Respondent to do so. While acquiescence may found an estoppel, it still behoves the Respondent to identify the estoppel on which he relies.

  97. [62] For example, if the Respondent was asserting that an equitable or promissory estoppel had arisen, he was required to establish an unequivocal representation by the Applicant that it would not insist on its legal rights against him, and that he had relied on that representation: Salaya Kalairani (legal representative of the estate of Tey Siew Choon, deceased) and another v Appangam Govindhasamy (legal representative of the estate of T Govindasamy, deceased) and others and another appeal [2023] SGHC(A) 40 at [59] and [65].

  98. [63] In my judgment, no equitable or promissory estoppel arises. I have explained at [58] above that Mr He’s 24 June 2023 Email did not indicate that the Applicant had no issues with the Respondent’s fees. I disagree that, by paying the full redemption sum on 26 June 2023 without raising any issues with the Respondent’s fees or reserving its rights, the Applicant unequivocally represented that it would not dispute the Respondent’s fees. The Applicant did not close off the possibility that it would seek to have the Respondent’s remuneration retrospectively fixed by the court (under s 78(1)(a) read with s 78(2)(a) of the IRDA) and to have the Respondent account for excess paid remuneration (under s 78(2)(c) read with s 78(3) of the IRDA). Further, the Respondent has not established the requirement of reliance. The Respondent did not aver (much less demonstrate) that it issued, maintained or collected on the FTI Invoice only in reliance on the Applicant’s lack of prior objection to the Respondent’s fees.

  99. [64] If the Respondent was relying on estoppel by acquiescence, the requirements are stated in Halsbury’s Laws of Singapore vol 10 (LexisNexis, 2006 Reissue) at para 120.203 as being:

  100. [65] However, the Respondent has not identified, among others, what “rights” he mistakenly believed he had acquired against the Applicant or how any such mistaken enjoyment and assumption of rights had been to his detriment. That the Applicant obtained consideration for its payment of the redemption sum (which included the Respondent’s fees) in the form of DBS discharging the Mortgages and Debenture does not translate to a detriment suffered by the Respondent.

  101. [66] Having dismissed the Respondent’s preliminary objections to OA 633, I turn now to the substantive issues engaged in this application.

  102. Whether s 78(1)(a) of the IRDA applies to the fees in the FTI Invoice

  103. [68] In the present case, the parties also assumed that s 78(1)(a) of the IRDA applies in relation to both the Respondent’s appointments as Receiver of the Mortgaged Properties and R&M of the Charged Property. In this regard, however, the parties did not consider the anterior issue of whether s 78(1)(a) of the IRDA would apply in relation to the Respondent’s remuneration as Receiver of the Mortgaged Properties when his appointment as such was made by DBS pursuant to the statutory power conferred by ss 24(1) and 29(1) of the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act 1886 (“CLPA”).

  104. [69] Sections 24(1) and 29(1) of the CLPA confer on mortgagees a statutory power to appoint a receiver of the income of mortgaged property. Where a receiver has been appointed pursuant to such statutory power, s 29(6) pertaining to the receiver’s remuneration applies. Section 29(6) of the CLPA states:

  105. [70] In Vedalease Ltd v Averti Developments Ltd and another [2007] 2 EGLR 125 (“Vedalease”) at [99]–[100], the court held that where a receiver was appointed under the statutory power conferred by the Law of Property Act 1925 (c 20) (UK) (“1925 Act”), only the statutory remuneration under s 109(6) of the 1925 Act (which is reproduced in Vedalease at [85] and is materially similar to s 29(6) of the CLPA) could be imposed:

  106. [71] In my view, where a mortgagee appoints a receiver pursuant to the statutory power under ss 24(1) and 29(1) of the CLPA, the provision in s 29(6) of the CLPA for the receiver’s remuneration applies, and there is no room for the court to separately fix such remuneration (including under s 78(1)(a) of the IRDA) independent of what s 29(6) of the CLPA provides.

  107. The Respondent’s appointment as Receiver of the Mortgaged Properties

  108. [72] In the present case, I find that the Respondent was appointed as Receiver of the Mortgaged Properties pursuant to ss 24(1) and 29(1) of the CLPA:

  109. (a) The terms of the Mortgages do not confer any power on DBS to appoint a receiver. Instead cl 10(1) of the Mortgages refers to DBS appointing a receiver “in the exercise of its statutory power”, which must mean the power under ss 24(1) and 29(1) of the CLPA.

  110. (b) Recital 3 of the DOA (Mortgage) cites s 24(1) of the CLPA; Recital 5 cites s 29(1) of the CLPA; and Recital 8 concludes that the power of appointing a receiver conferred by s 24 of the CLPA has become exercisable by DBS and DBS wishes to appoint the Respondent to act as Receiver of the Mortgaged Properties. Clause 1 then states:

  111. While cl 1 is framed widely and mentions provisions in the Mortgages, there are no provisions in the Mortgages containing a power of appointment of a receiver. The relevant power of appointment referred to in cl 1 must be that under ss 24(1) and 29(1) of the CLPA.

  112. [73] The Mortgages and the DOA (Mortgage) are also silent on the remuneration of an appointed receiver. In these circumstances, s 29(6) of the CLPA applies. I therefore find that there is no basis for the court to fix the remuneration of the Respondent qua Receiver of the Mortgaged Properties under s 78(1)(a) of the IRDA.

  113. The Respondent’s appointment as R&M of the Charged Property

  114. [74] However, the court may fix the Respondent’s remuneration qua R&M of the Charged Property under s 78(1)(a) of the IRDA since his appointment as such was made by DBS pursuant to its right of appointment under cl 12(A) of the Debenture. Recitals 3 and 7 of the DOA (Debenture) also refer to the power conferred by the terms of the Debenture on DBS to appoint a receiver and manager of the Charged Property. Further and pertinently, cl 12(G) of the Debenture provides for the appointed receiver’s remuneration to be agreed between DBS and the receiver.

  115. The singular FTI Invoice

  116. [75] The question then arises whether it would be apposite to fix the Respondent’s remuneration as R&M of the Charged Property having regard to the FTI Invoice since it is a singular invoice that does not split up work done by the Respondent qua Receiver of the Mortgaged Properties and qua R&M of the Charged Property. On balance, I find that there is no impediment to doing so.

  117. [76] First, in my view, all of the work performed by the Respondent would have fallen under the scope of his role as R&M, which is arguably wider than that of his role as Receiver. Historically, “receivers” were confined to collecting and securing rents, income and profits, whereas “managers” were empowered to also buy, sell and manage the business as a going concern: Kao Chai-Chau Linda v Fong Wai Lyn Carolyn and others [2016] 1 SLR 21 (“Linda Kao”) at [19]. Although this distinction is not often drawn today (Linda Kao at [19]), it coheres with the narrower powers of the Receiver under the Mortgages as compared to those of the R&M under the Debenture. For example, cl 12(D)(3) of the Debenture expressly confers power on the R&M to sell the Charged Property (of which the Mortgaged Properties are a subset), whereas cl 10(1) of the Mortgages is silent regarding any power of sale on the part of the Receiver.

  118. [77] Second, in all likelihood, the Respondent did not differentiate in his mind which role he was playing (or he considered that he was playing both roles) when carrying out his tasks. This is evident from how the Respondent held himself out as undertaking his main task of organising the tender sale of 50 and 51 Tiong Bahru Road and the Link Bridge in both his capacities as R&M and Receiver. For example, an email from the Respondent’s team member to an interested party dated 21 April 2023 states:

  119. [78] The Information Memorandum dated 26 May 2023 for the proposed sale of 50 and 51 Tiong Bahru Road and the Link Bridge (“IM”), prepared by the Respondent’s team, states:

  120. [79] Third, it is obvious that the Respondent has not charged the fees in the FTI Invoice based on s 29(6) of the CLPA, but rather, based on the terms of the Debenture, for the entirety of the work undertaken. There is no evidence of what, if any, money he received as Receiver, much less that he billed based on the rate of 5% of the gross amount of all money received (as stipulated in s 29(6) of the CLPA).

  121. [80] I will therefore proceed to consider only the part of the Applicant’s OA 633 application pertaining to the remuneration of the Respondent as R&M of the Charged Property, but with reference to the entirety of the professional fees charged in the FTI Invoice.

  122. Whether special circumstances under s 78(3) of the IRDA must be shown

  123. [81] To frame the discussion that follows, I first set out the relevant provisions in s 78 of the IRDA:

  124. The Applicant’s arguments

  125. The Respondent’s arguments

  126. Decision

  127. [85] The difference in the parties’ positions turns on the interpretation of the phrase “in respect of any period before the making of the application” in s 78(3) of the IRDA. The central question is whether that phrase refers to:

  128. (a) the timeframe when payment was made (“interpretation (a)”); or

  129. (b) the timeframe for which payment was made (“interpretation (b)”).

  130. The Applicant’s position was premised on interpretation (a), while the Respondent’s position was premised on interpretation (b).

  131. [86] In the purposive approach to statutory interpretation, the court applies the three steps set out in Tan Cheng Bock v Attorney-General [2017] 2 SLR 850 at [37]–[53]. The principles particularly relevant to the present case are: (a) first, ascertain the possible interpretations of the provision, having regard not just to its text but also the context of that provision within the written law as a whole; (b) second, ascertain the legislative purpose or object of the provision. The purpose should ordinarily be gleaned from the text itself; and (c) third, compare the possible interpretations of the text against the purposes or objects of the statute and prefer the interpretation that advances those purposes or objects over one that does not. Extraneous material can be used to confirm the ordinary meaning of the provision.

  132. [94] The relevant extraneous material confirms that the ordinary meaning of s 78(3) deduced at [87] above is the correct and intended meaning. The predecessor provision to s 78 of the IRDA was s 219 of the Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed) (“CA”). Section 219 of the CA gave only the liquidator of a company (and no other person) the right to apply for the court to fix the remuneration of a receiver / manager appointed under the powers contained in an instrument. The provision was otherwise in similar terms as s 78 of the IRDA. Section 219 of the CA was repealed by s 451(21) of the Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act 2018 (Act 40 of 2018) with effect from 30 July 2020. Section 78 of the IRDA was enacted in its place. There is no Parliamentary material touching on s 78 of the IRDA or s 219 of the CA. However, the annotations to s 219 of the CA read “[UK, 1948, s. 371; Aust., 1961, s. 189]”, indicating that the provision was derived from s 371 of the Companies Act 1948 (c 38) (UK) (“1948 Act”) and s 189 of the Companies Act 1961 (NSW). The English authorities shed some light.

  133. Whether special circumstances under s 78(3) of the IRDA are present

  134. The Applicant’s arguments

  135. [99] The Applicant relies on the following as special circumstances:

  136. (a) It was critical that the Mortgaged Properties be redeemed by 27 June 2023. The Applicant could not afford to jeopardise this in any way, such as by querying or disputing the Respondent’s fees at the time.

  137. (b) No breakdown of the Respondent’s fees was provided at the time of payment of the Respondent’s fees.

  138. (c) The Respondent’s fees are prima facie excessive, given that his receivership / management was only over 53 working days.

  139. The Respondent’s arguments

  140. [100] The Respondent’s counsel countered that it was not reasonable and contrary to the existence of “special circumstances” for the Applicant to have made payment without objection. He posited there were two possibilities had the Applicant disputed the Respondent’s fees when the FTI Invoice was presented: (a) the Applicant’s objections may have been acceded to; or (b) the Applicant’s objections may have been rejected, but it could put its reservation on record and make payment under protest. The Respondent submitted that, save for bare assertions that the Respondent’s fees are excessive, the Applicant has not shown any special circumstances.

  141. Decision

  142. It is useful to survey how the Singapore courts have applied the requirement for special circumstances to be shown under s 122 of the LPA (“s 122”).

  143. [103] In Kosui Singapore Pte Ltd v Thangavelu [2015] 5 SLR 722 (“Kosui”), the court held that special circumstances must, in some rational way, address the fundamental question posed by s 122, viz, why it was right to refer the solicitor’s bill for taxation even though the client had allowed a disqualifying event under s 122 to be triggered (at [62]). The requirement that the client apply to tax the bill before paying served to discourage the client from approbating and reprobating and upheld the solicitor’s interest in security of receipt for his fees (at [64]). The client ought to advance special circumstances which explained or excused his decision to pay the bill. These could be circumstances which showed why the client was not, in fact, approbating or reprobating or why the solicitor was not entitled to security of receipt for his fees (at [65]). If the client was relying on a lack of particulars in the bill as a special circumstance for why the bill was paid, the client could show that the lack of detail led the client to pay the bill in ignorance of what work it actually covered (at [90]).

  144. [105] In Loganathan Ravishankar v ACIES Law Corp [2022] SGHC 135 at [6], one of the special circumstances found by the court was that given the quantum of the bills and the nature of the work done, the bills appeared excessive unless explained.

  145. [106] In Marisol Llenos Foley v Harry Elias Partnership LLP [2022] 3 SLR 585, the court found that the following special circumstances warranted taxation even after bills were paid: (a) the client did not know of her right to tax them – “[i]f one does not know of a right, one can hardly be faulted for not exercising it” (at [44]); (b) the client, a layperson, was in an anxious state of mind, and, being concerned about being left in the lurch by her solicitors should she not pay the bills within the stipulated period of 14 days, paid them in haste (at [46(b)]); and (c) the bills were lacking in particulars (at [46(c)]).

  146. [107] In my view, the common thread running through the inquiry in the above cases is whether circumstances exist which show that it is fair for a solicitor to have to refund fees he has already received upon taxation of his bill which has been paid. A similar inquiry should apply under s 78(3) of the IRDA given its purpose (see [91] above). The core question is whether it would be fair for a receiver / manager to have to refund part of the fees he has been paid. The dimensions of this consideration of fairness include, taking a leaf from Kosui, whether the applicant was approbating and reprobating, and whether the receiver / manager should be ensured security of receipt for his fees. In turn, the special circumstances relied on by an applicant to show that it would be fair for the receiver / manager to refund part of the fees he has been paid may include:

  147. (a) the circumstances in which the receiver / manager’s bill was presented and paid, if these indicate that the applicant was not approbating and reprobating; and

  148. (b) obvious excessiveness of the receiver / manager’s bill that indicates overcharging. It is not unfair to deny the receiver / manager security of receipt for fees not reasonably due to him in the first place.

  149. [109] First, I do not think the Applicant was approbating and reprobating by making payment of the FTI Invoice and pursuing this application. These are the circumstances in which the FTI Invoice was presented and paid:

  150. (a) The Applicant was provided the Redemption Statement (which included the amount due under the FTI Invoice) on 20 June 2023 and was expected to make full payment of the redemption sum by 26 June 2023 (see [12] above).

  151. (b) The Applicant has explained that it was shocked by the quantum of fees imposed by the Respondent / FTI but felt compelled to make full payment without questioning the fees at that stage to avoid jeopardising the redemption due for completion on 27 June 2023 (see [13] above). Compounding this, there was also no breakdown of the FTI Invoice provided at the time, and the Applicant could not make an informed judgment on the reasonableness of the Respondent’s fees (see [20] above). I accept that the Applicant has given an honest account of its thought process. Further, the Respondent has no evidence to show that, had the Applicant raised objections to the Respondent’s fees at the time, the consequences on the redemption exercise would have been as sanguine as his counsel posited (see [100] above).

  152. (c) Faced with the provisions in ss 78(2)(c) and 78(3) of the IRDA which have hitherto not been interpreted, the Applicant formed the erroneous (as I have found) view that so long as it filed a s 78(1) application before paying the Respondent’s fees, it would “preserve” its right to seek an account of any excess paid remuneration from the Respondent as a matter of course. The Applicant thus filed OA 633 on 23 June 2023 as a (perceived) protective step before making full payment of the redemption sum on 26 June 2023 (see [14] and [21] above). In my view, it cannot be said that the Applicant was consciously taking inconsistent courses when it decided to make payment. To the contrary, the Applicant thought at the time that it was acting consistently with its rights under s 78 of the IRDA when it made payment only after filing OA 633.

  153. The totality of the above circumstances under which the Applicant paid the FTI Invoice does not indicate that the Applicant is approbating and reprobating by now pursuing OA 633. Viewed another way, it is not unfair for the Respondent’s fees to now be challenged given that the FTI Invoice was paid after being presented in an opaque manner and in pressing circumstances.

  154. [110] Second, it is my view that the Respondent’s fees of $1,358,142.50 are obviously excessive given that the nature of the matter and work undertaken by the Respondent was not complex:

  155. (a) The Respondent’s main task was to organise a sale by public tender of Link Hotel and the property it stood on. The property was being sold on an as-is-where-is basis. The value involved was fairly modest. Link Hotel comprises two four-storey blocks connected by a link bridge, with 274 guest rooms and was valued at $137m (or a forced sale value of $109.6m) as at 31 May 2023. The contemplated transaction was not in a particularly technical or specialised field.

  156. (b) The Respondent’s appointment was terminated before any tender bid was accepted. The Respondent’s counsel conceded that the bulk of the work had been done by 16 June 2023, when the tender closed. After 16 June 2023, not much work was done because the Applicant had served the Notice of Redemption on 15 June 2023. There was still some work in respect of opening up tender bids, but that was not much work. In any event, he pointed out that FTI’s Invoice was dated 20 June 2023, so the work covered by the invoice was only until 20 June 2023. This means the Respondent’s appointment lasted only about two months (or about 49 working days).

  157. (c) It is undisputed that the Respondent did not operate Link Hotel during the period of his appointment. In any event, the hotel had only eight tenanted shop units at the time.

  158. (d) This was simply not a case where the insolvency practitioner ran extensive or multi-faceted business operations; investigated suspicious major transactions; dealt with cross-border issues; managed multiple creditors; and/or undertook corporate or debt restructuring that brought value-add to the company.

  159. [112] I now turn to the fixing of the Respondent’s remuneration.

  160. Whether the Respondent bears the burden of justifying his remuneration

  161. The Applicant’s arguments

  162. [113] The Applicant submitted that the burden of proof is on the Respondent, as the insolvency practitioner, to satisfy the court that his remuneration is justifiable, citing Re Econ Corp Ltd (in provisional liquidation) [2004] 2 SLR(R) 264 (“Re Econ”) at [49].

  163. The Respondent’s arguments

  164. [114] The Respondent’s counsel argued that the Respondent does not bear the burden of justifying his remuneration because: (a) Linda Kao and Re Econ may be distinguished. In those cases, the insolvency professionals were held to bear the burden of proof as they were appointed by the court. In contrast, the Respondent was privately appointed; and (b) the Applicant should bear the burden of proof as an applicant usually would. However, when asked who would bear the burden of proof had DBS applied to fix the Respondent’s remuneration, the Respondent’s counsel stated that the Respondent would bear the burden. This was because there was a fiduciary relationship between the appointer and appointee and the situation would be akin to a client applying to tax his lawyer’s fees. The Respondent’s counsel submitted that the Respondent only owed a duty to DBS, not the Applicant, as there was a conflict of interests between DBS and the Applicant.

  165. Decision

  166. [115] In my judgment, the Respondent bears the burden of justifying his remuneration in this application. This stems from the Respondent owing a duty to account to the Applicant, which arises from his appointment as agent of the Applicant under cl 12(F) of the Debenture. I elaborate.

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