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Grounds publishedDecided 16 Dec 2024
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General Division of the High Court

A director was liable for shares transferred for nothing to the director's own company

SW Trustees Pte Ltd (in compulsory liquidation) and another v Teodros Ashenafi Tesemma (also known as Tewodros Ashenafi) and others (Teodros Ashenafi Tesemma (also known as Tewodros Ashenafi), third party)

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[2024] SGHC 322Case no. Suit No 229 of 2021

The decision, in one line

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A director was liable for shares transferred for nothing to the director's own company

Summary by laws.sgParagraphs [256], [257], [272]

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Grounds of decision

Official text from eLitigation

  1. Introduction

  2. [1] A liquidator’s task is almost always a challenging one. He or she assumes management of the insolvent entity without any substantive knowledge of its history or affairs, and is expected to, within a short time, understand the entity’s business, reconstruct events which led to its insolvency and determine what action(s) needs to be taken to realise the best return for its creditors. To facilitate this, the law confers on the liquidator significant powers of inquiry and investigation as well as to commence proceedings to unwind unfavourable transactions, recover assets belonging to the entity, and seek redress against those who may have caused it harm. But the liquidator must exercise those powers responsibly and reasonably – he or she is duty bound to act in the best interests of the creditors and, in the case of a court-appointed liquidator, is an officer of the court with consequential obligations.

  3. [2] This action involved an attempt by a court-appointed liquidator to effectively unwind, and seek other reliefs in respect of, two sizeable transactions entered by the insolvent entity as well as to obtain damages for breach of fiduciary duties and conspiracies between the former officers of the insolvent entity and two other parties. The action against three of the former officers were subsequently withdrawn, while the former owner and/or controller of the entity, as well as a party owned by him, did not appear at the trial. The trial therefore only proceeded against a single defendant. It nonetheless engaged interesting issues on undervalue transactions, the valuation of shares (owned by the insolvent company) in the insolvency context and the appropriate remedies.

  4. Facts

  5. The parties

  6. [3] The first plaintiff was SW Trustees Pte Ltd (“SWT”), a company incorporated in Singapore and carrying on the business of investment holding, management and administration of trusts, and consultancy services. It was wound up on 21 June 2019 vide HC/ORC 4169/2019.

  7. [4] The second plaintiff, Mr Farooq Ahmad Mann (“Mr Mann”), was appointed as the liquidator of SWT upon its winding up.

  8. [5] The first defendant, Mr Teodros Ashenafi Tesemma (also known as Tewodros Ashenafi) (“Mr Ashenafi”), was an Ethiopian citizen. He was a director of SWT from 1 September 2004 to 1 August 2017, and the sole shareholder of SWT from 30 May 2016 to 27 February 2018. While Mr Ashenafi initially participated in the proceedings, including by filing a defence and updating the same twice, he ceased to participate on or around 31 July 2024 when his solicitors discharged themselves.

  9. [6] The second defendant was Mr Cheng Ka Wai (“Mr Cheng”), who was a director of SWT from 11 December 2009 to 1 August 2017. Mr Cheng was employed by Mr Ashenafi from sometime in or around 2005 to February 2022, albeit in different capacities throughout this period. The action against Mr Cheng was discontinued as at 21 February 2023 (see below at [40]).

  10. [7] The third defendant was Mr Chooi Kok Yaw (“Mr Chooi”), who was a director of SWT from 10 October 2012 to 1 August 2017. Mr Chooi was SWT’s corporate secretary from 31 July 2011 to the date of its winding up, ie, 21 June 2019. The action against Mr Chooi was discontinued as at 19 December 2023 (see below at [40]).

  11. [8] The fourth defendant was Dr Alexander Ressos (“Dr Ressos”), who was the sole director of SWT from 1 August 2017 to the date of its winding up, ie, 21 June 2019. The action against Dr Ressos was discontinued as at 19 December 2023 (see below at [40]).

  12. [9] The fifth defendant was Sino Africa Trading Ltd (“Sino Africa”), a company with its registered address in the British Virgin Islands (“BVI”). Sino Africa was wholly and/or beneficially owned and/or controlled by Mr Ashenafi. Like Mr Ashenafi, Sino Africa initially participated in the proceedings, including by filing its defence. Its solicitors were discharged sometime in October 2022, after which it was not represented nor did it attend these proceedings (see below at [65]–[67]).

  13. [10] The sixth defendant was Coca-Cola Sabco (East Africa) Ltd (“CCSEA”). CCSEA was wholly owned by Coca-Cola Beverages Africa Proprietary Ltd (“CCBA”). In turn, CCBA was an indirect subsidiary of The Coca-Cola Company, a company incorporated in the US and listed on the New York Stock Exchange.

  14. Background to the dispute

  15. Project Savannah

  16. [11] In late 2014, The Coca-Cola Company (together with its subsidiaries, “TCCC”), SABMiller plc (together with its subsidiaries, “SABMiller Group”) and Gutsche Family Investments Proprietary Ltd (“GFI”) entered an agreement to consolidate the bottling operations of their respective non-alcoholic beverage businesses in Southern and East Africa, to be housed under CCBA. This merger, which would bring together operations in multiple markets across Africa with an annual revenue of US$2.9b, was designated “Project Savannah”.

  17. [12] Broadly, Project Savannah would be effected as follows:

  18. The merger parties would then be shareholders in CCBA, in proportion to the indicative value contributed by each merger party. According to Mr Adriaan Marais (“Mr Marais”), CCBA’s Deputy Company Secretary, the indicative value of the assets contributed by each merger party was calculated based on the individual asset’s earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation (“EBITDA”) in their respective audited financial statements for 2014 multiplied by an agreed multiple.

  19. [13] Amongst other contributions of interests in entities to CCBA, TCCC contributed its 20% shareholding in CCSEA, GFI contributed its 80% shareholding in CCSEA and SABMiller Group contributed its 75% shareholding in Ambo International Holdings Ltd (“AIHL”). At the material time, SWT held the remaining 25% shares in AIHL.

  20. [14] AIHL was a holding company with no operations of its own. In and around 2014, its main asset was a 67% shareholding in Ambo Mineral Water Share Company (“Ambo Min”), an Ethiopian company that owned and operated a bottling plant in Ambo Senkele, Ethiopia, with rights in the “Ambo” brand of beverages. The remaining 33% shareholding in Ambo Min was held by the Ethiopian Governments’ Privatisation and Public Enterprises Supervising Authority (“PPESA”).

  21. [15] Below is a visual representation of the shareholding structure at and around 2014:

  22. [16] Apart from the shareholding in Ambo Min being contributed to CCBA (through AIHL), Ambo Min had further relevance to Project Savannah: the merger parties had agreed that Ambo Min would sell the Ambo brand to TCCC.

  23. [17] On 27 May 2015, after Project Savannah was announced and before its completion, PPESA notified SABMiller Group that it wished to sell its 33% stake in Ambo Min for an amount in Ethiopian Birr (“ETB”) (then) equivalent to US$19,782,807. On 19 June 2015, SABMiller Group, through its subsidiary, AIHL, confirmed its interest for AIHL to acquire PPESA’s 33% minority stake in Ambo Min at the proposed price. By a letter dated 3 July 2015, AIHL informed PPESA that the purchase price would be paid after the execution of a share purchase agreement, a draft of which was attached to its letter. However, the sale did not take place before the completion of Project Savannah on 2 July 2016. According to an investment memorandum dated 15 July 2016 prepared by SABMiller Group (the “SABMiller Group Investment Memo”), this was due to “a number of factors, including a restructuring of Ethiopian Government ministries which resulted in the transfer of responsibility for the investment in [Ambo Min] from PPESA to the Ministry of Public Enterprises”. I shall refer to the Ethiopian Ministry of Public Enterprises as “MoPE”. That said, the merger parties to Project Savannah agreed to work together post-closing to resolve “the ownership issues regarding the Ambo brand”. This, Mr Marais explained, meant that the merger parties wanted Ambo Min to be wholly owned by AIHL, as soon as possible. This had the benefit of securing the ability to sell the Ambo brand from Ambo Min to TCCC.

  24. [18] At and around the closing of Project Savannah, SABMiller Group transferred its 75% shareholding in AIHL to CCBA while GFI and TCCC transferred their shareholdings in CCSEA to CCBA. As part of an internal restructuring, CCBA then transferred its 75% shareholding in AIHL to CCSEA.

  25. [19] Below is a visual representation of the shareholding structure after the completion of Project Savannah in July 2016:

  26. The Ambo Min Sale

  27. [20] According to the SABMiller Group Investment Memo, after the completion of Project Savannah, MoPE raised the Ethiopian government’s desire to dispose of its 33% minority stake in Ambo Min at the same price proposed in May 2015, ie, US$19,782,807 (the “Ambo Min Share Consideration”).

  28. [21] While the SABMiller Group Investment Memo contemplated that 75% of this sale price would be funded by CCBA (as the parent company of CCSEA that held 75% of AIHL) and 25% would be funded by SWT, it transpired that CCSEA wholly funded the purchase consideration by way of an equity injection into AIHL in exchange for an allotment of new shares in the same. After the equity injection and share allotment on or around 14 December 2016, SWT’s shareholding in AIHL was diluted to 16.75% and CCSEA’s shareholding increased to 83.25%.

  29. [22] AIHL successfully completed its purchase of MoPE’s 33% stake in Ambo Min in or around December 2016 pursuant to a contract of sale dated 15 December 2016 between itself and MoPE. I shall refer to this transaction as the “Ambo Min Sale”.

  30. [23] As a result of the share allotment to CCSEA and the Ambo Min Sale, the shareholding structure changed again:

  31. The AIHL Sale

  32. [24] On or around 31 March 2017, CCSEA purchased SWT’s 16.75% minority stake in AIHL (the “Disposed AIHL Shares”) for the sum of US$10,796,784 (the “AIHL Share Consideration”), pursuant to a Share Purchase Agreement dated 23 March 2017, as amended by an addendum dated 31 March 2017 (collectively, the “SPA”). I shall refer to this transaction as the “AIHL Sale”. In purchasing the Disposed AIHL Shares, CCSEA became the sole shareholder of AIHL, and so CCBA indirectly owned 100% of Ambo Min. One of the key issues in this action was whether the AIHL Sale was at an undervalue.

  33. [25] What was critical was how the parties to the SPA arrived at the AIHL Share Consideration. CCSEA’s evidence was that no valuation of the Disposed AIHL Shares was carried out. Instead, referencing the Ambo Min Sale, the indicative equity value for 100% of Ambo Min was US$59,947,900. As Ambo Min was AIHL’s main asset, CCBA notionally treated AIHL’s implied equity value as being the same as that of Ambo Min, ie, US$59,947,900. This translated to a value of US$10,041,273 for the Disposed AIHL Shares, representing 16.75% of the said implied equity value. On top of this, CCSEA claimed that during the negotiations of the SPA, SWT wanted it to pay an additional US$755,511, which represented SWT’s share of unpaid dividends that AIHL “should” have declared and paid to shareholders following Ambo Min’s declarations of dividends in 2014 and 2015. The purchase price therefore totalled US$10,796,784, ie, the AIHL Share Consideration.

  34. [26] Under the SPA, the AIHL Share Consideration was to be, and had been, discharged in the following manner:

  35. The SWE Share Transfer

  36. [27] Prior to April 2017, SWT also held 44,111 shares in Southwest Energy (BVI) Ltd (“SWE (BVI)”) (the “SWE Shares”), a company incorporated in the BVI. The plaintiffs alleged that these shares were owned by SWT while Mr Ashenafi and Sino Africa contended in their defence that the shares were held on trust for Mr Ashenafi. By an instrument of transfer dated 28 April 2017 signed by Mr Ashenafi, SWT transferred 39,957 of its shares in SWE (the “Disposed SWE Shares”) to Sino Africa. I shall refer to this as the “SWE Share Transfer”. The transfer instrument bore Mr Ashenafi’s signatures on behalf of both the transferor and transferee, which were both witnessed by Mr Cheng, and stated the transfer to be by SWT on behalf of one SW Development Trust (“SWDT”). SWT received no consideration for this transfer.

  37. The SGI Creditors

  38. [28] Sometime in or around 2008, SGI SWE Ltd, a company incorporated in the BVI, and Schulze Global Investment Holdings, a corporation incorporated in Delaware, USA, (collectively, the “SGI Creditors”) purchased shares in SWE (BVI). At all material times, Mr Ashenafi was managing the activities of SWE (BVI). Southwest Energy (HK) Ltd (“SWE (HK)”) was a wholly owned subsidiary of SWE (BVI).

  39. [29] Sometime in or around March 2011, one Mr Gabriel David Gottlieb Schulze (“Mr Schulze”), a director of the SGI Creditors, was appointed to the boards of SWE (BVI) and SWE (HK) following the SGI Creditors’ investment.

  40. [30] According to Mr Schulze, the SGI Creditors suspected that Mr Ashenafi was using SWE (BVI) to funnel monies to himself and his companies. Mr Schulze therefore began asking questions during board meetings. In February 2013, Mr Ashenafi informed Mr Schulze that he was no longer welcomed as a board member of SWE (BVI) and SWE (HK). Mr Schulze resigned from his directorships. Without any board presence, the SGI Creditors had little oversight over the affairs of SWE (BVI).

  41. [31] The SGI Creditors decided to sell their shares in SWE (BVI) in light of their “increasingly grave concerns” about the management of the business. Thus, on 7 November 2014, the SGI Creditors and Mr Schulze entered a share purchase agreement with SWT to sell their shareholding in SWE (BVI) for US$3,149,882.28. Pursuant to this agreement, SWT was to pay the purchase price on 7 February 2015, although this could be postponed by up to 30 days. However, the purchase price remained unpaid.

  42. [32] On 7 March 2016, the SGI Creditors commenced arbitration proceedings against SWT (the “Arbitration”). Prior to and after the commencement of the Arbitration, Mr Ashenafi reached out to Mr Schulze to negotiate a settlement. Eventually, on 29 March 2017, the SGI Creditors, SWT, Mr Ashenafi and Mr Schulze entered a settlement agreement (the “Settlement Agreement”) under which, inter alia, SWT was to pay to the SGI Creditors and Mr Schulze the purchase price for the SWE (BVI) shares as agreed in the share purchase agreement. By this time, the AIHL Sale had taken place and CCSEA was in the process of discharging the AIHL Share Consideration in the manner stipulated in the SPA (see above at [24] and [26]).

  43. [34] On 9 October 2017, the SGI Creditors applied for leave to enforce the Final Award against SWT in Singapore vide HC/OS 1137/2017, which application was granted the next day vide HC/ORC 6562/2017 (“ORC 6562”).

  44. [35] On 24 October 2017, SWT applied to set aside ORC 6562 and for a stay of proceedings by the SGI Creditors vide HC/SUM 4874/2017. This application was dismissed on 20 December 2017.

  45. The change in ownership of SWT

  46. [36] On 27 February 2018, Mr Ashenafi transferred his shareholding in SWT to Satomi Services Ltd (“Satomi”), a company incorporated in Seychelles, for a consideration of S$1. This was effected by way of an instrument of share transfer, signed by Mr Ashenafi and Dr Ressos, in his capacity as a director of Satomi.

  47. The liquidation of SWT

  48. [37] On 23 April 2018, the SGI Creditors, through its then-solicitors, served a statutory demand on SWT, demanding the monies due under the Final Award amounting to S$5,782,972.18 at that time. As the statutory demand went unsatisfied, the SGI Creditors applied to wind up SWT on 3 July 2018 vide HC/CWU 137/2018. This application was granted on 21 June 2019 and Mr Mann was appointed as the liquidator of SWT.

  49. Procedural history

  50. [38] On 3 March 2021, SWT commenced these proceedings, against all six defendants. Mr Mann was made a plaintiff to these proceedings in or around 18 May 2022.

  51. [39] According to Mr Schulz, the SGI Creditors were the only creditors of SWT, and therefore any recovery made by SWT in this action would be to the (sole) benefit of the SGI Creditors.

  52. The discontinuance of the action against Mr Cheng, Mr Chooi and Dr Ressos

  53. [40] By December 2023, the proceedings against Mr Cheng, Mr Chooi and Dr Ressos were discontinued on the application of the plaintiffs. This was in exchange for the said defendants giving evidence in these proceedings, which they did.

  54. The absence of Mr Ashenafi and Sino Africa

  55. [41] As canvassed, both Mr Ashenafi and Sino Africa initially participated in these proceedings but eventually ceased to do so (see above at [5] and [9]). They were both absent at trial and did not file any affidavits or call any witnesses.

  56. The parties’ cases

  57. [42] I examine the plaintiffs’ pleadings in some detail as the case they ran, and the evidence presented, against CCSEA at the trial departed from their pleadings.

  58. The plaintiffs’ case

  59. Undervalue Transactions

  60. [43] The plaintiffs averred that Mr Ashenafi, from a time (at the latest) shortly after the commencement of the Arbitration, had taken steps calculated to and did in fact dissipate the assets of SWT, thereby ensuring that the SGI Creditors would not obtain the benefit of the Settlement Agreement or the fruit of any subsequent enforcement proceedings against SWT. To this end, Mr Ashenafi, with the assistance, knowledge, acquiescence, and/or consent of the other directors of SWT, caused SWT to enter three transactions at an undervalue (collectively, the “Undervalue Transactions”) and SWT’s assets were dissipated as a result.

  61. [44] In so far as the Undervalue Transactions were transactions at an undervalue for the purposes of s 224 of the Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act 2018 (2020 Rev Ed) (“IRDA”) (and s 329 of the Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed) (“CA”) read with s 98 of the Bankruptcy Act (Cap 20, 2009 Rev Ed) (“BA”)), they were voidable.

  62. (1) First Undervalue Transaction: the AIHL Sale

  63. [45] The plaintiffs averred that the AIHL Sale (ie, the sale of the Disposed AIHL Shares to CCSEA pursuant to the SPA) was a transaction at an undervalue because the AIHL Share Consideration (ie, US$10,796,784) was “significantly less than the value of” the Disposed AIHL Shares, and that SWT became insolvent as a result of this transaction. I shall refer to this as the “First Undervalue Transaction”.

  64. [46] However, the plaintiffs did not plead what the true value of the Disposed AIHL Shares was at the time of the SPA. It was only in its evidence that the plaintiffs advanced a value of between US$15,110,000 and US$16,006,000, ie, that the AIHL Sale Consideration was approximately 30% below the value of the Disposed AIHL Shares.

  65. (2) Second Undervalue Transaction: the disposal of the AIHL Share Consideration

  66. [47] The plaintiffs averred that SWT received the benefit of only US$5m of the AIHL Share Consideration as CCSEA had “caused the sum of [US$5m] to be paid on [SWT’s] behalf to [SBM], and thereby retired [SWT’s] indebtedness to [SBM] pursuant to a facility”. In their Reply (Amendment No. 3) to the 6th Defendant’s Defence (Amendment No. 3) dated 10 June 2024 and their closing submissions dated 8 November 2024, the plaintiffs accepted that CCSEA had instead paid US$4,375,000 to SWT’s bank account with SBM, and relied on this figure in place of the pleaded figure of US$5m.

  67. [48] As to part of the remainder of the AIHL Share Consideration (the “Diverted AIHL Share Consideration”), the plaintiffs claimed this had been transferred to third parties namely:

  68. (a) US$4,543,759 to Wealth Direct; and

  69. (b) US$755,581 to Long River. In their Reply, the plaintiffs revised the amount transferred to US$755,511.

  70. Given that SWT received no consideration or benefit from Wealth Direct and Long River for these transfers, the said transfers were transactions at an undervalue. I shall refer to these transfers as the “Second Undervalue Transaction”.

  71. [49] Wealth Direct and Long River were both companies beneficially owned and/or controlled by Mr Ashenafi, and of which he was the sole shareholder and director. The plaintiffs pleaded that Mr Ashenafi had negotiated the terms of the SPA to provide for the transfers of the Diverted AIHL Share Consideration to Wealth Direct and Long River, and thereby caused SWT to enter and/or carry out the said transactions at an undervalue.

  72. [50] The plaintiffs did not plead that CCSEA’s payment of US$43,047 to AIHL and CCSEA’s assumption of SWD’s liability of US$1,079,467 (see above at [26(d)] and [26(e)]) were wrongful diversions of the AIHL Share Consideration. In fact, the plaintiffs accepted in their closing submissions that SWT received the benefit in respect of the payment of US$43,047 by CCSEA to AIHL.

  73. [51] Notably, it was not the plaintiffs’ pleaded case that CCSEA was responsible or liable for the Second Undervalue Transaction.

  74. (3) Third Undervalue Transaction: the transfer of the Disposed SWE Shares

  75. [52] The plaintiffs averred that Mr Ashenafi with the assistance, knowledge, acquiescence and/or consent of Mr Cheng and/or Mr Chooi, and Sino Africa, procured and caused SWT to transfer the Disposed SWE Shares to Sino Africa, that SWT received no consideration for this transfer, and that as a result, SWT became insolvent. As such, the transfer of the Disposed SWE Shares to Sino Africa was a transaction at an undervalue. I shall refer to this as the “Third Undervalue Transaction”.

  76. Concealment of the Undervalue Transactions

  77. [53] The plaintiffs pleaded that Mr Ashenafi, Mr Cheng, Mr Chooi and Dr Ressos sought to conceal the Undervalue Transactions by fraudulently removing the Disposed AIHL Shares and the Disposed SWE Shares from SWT’s financial statements for the financial years 2015 to 2017. To this end, Mr Ashenafi created and/or caused to be created and backdated counterfeit documents which purported to evidence the trust arrangements between SWT and SWDT – namely three letters of addition dated between 2008 and 2010 in relation to the Disposed AIHL Shares (collectively, the “Letters of Addition”) and one letter of addition dated around 2014 in relation to shares in CAPTS Beverage Holdings – copies of which were then presented by Mr Cheng and Dr Ressos, at the behest and on the instructions of Mr Ashenafi, to SWT’s then-auditors to procure adjustments to the audited accounts for the financial years 2016 and 2017. The adjustments were made or sought to be made in or around 2018, with the intention of leaving SWT with no real assets to pay its creditors in the anticipated liquidation.

  78. Claims for breach of director’s duties

  79. [54] The plaintiffs averred that Mr Ashenafi owed various duties to SWT qua director. In breach of these fiduciary duties, Mr Ashenafi, along with Mr Cheng and Mr Chooi, caused SWT to enter the Undervalue Transactions. The plaintiffs alleged that these Undervalue Transactions benefitted Mr Ashenafi and/or were for his personal gain to the detriment of SWT, and that SWT suffered loss as a result.

  80. Claims in conspiracy

  81. [55] The plaintiffs alleged three separate conspiracies.

  82. [56] First, Mr Ashenafi, Mr Cheng, Mr Chooi, Dr Ressos and/or CCSEA “wrongfully and with intent to injure [SWT] and/or its creditors and/or to cause loss to [SWT] and/or its creditors by unlawful means conspired and combined to cause [SWT] to carry out the sale and purchase of the Disposed [AIHL] Shares, which was a transaction at an undervalue”.

  83. [57] Second, Mr Ashenafi, Mr Cheng, Mr Chooi, and/or Dr Ressos, “wrongfully and with intent to injure [SWT] and/or its creditors and/or cause loss to [SWT] and/or its creditors by unlawful means conspired and combined to cause the Diverted [AIHL] Share Consideration to be transferred to Wealth Direct and [Long River]”. Notably, it was not the plaintiffs’ case that CCSEA was a participant of this conspiracy.

  84. [58] Third, Mr Ashenafi, Mr Cheng, Mr Chooi, Dr Ressos, and/or Sino Africa “wrongfully and with intent to injure [SWT] and/or its creditors and/or cause loss to [SWT] and/or its creditors by unlawful means conspired and combined to cause [SWT] to transfer the Disposed SWE Shares to Sino Africa, which transfer was a transaction at an undervalue”.

  85. Mr Ashenafi’s case

  86. [59] As noted above, Mr Ashenafi did not give evidence nor made submissions. Based on his Defence, his case was that:

  87. (a) SWT was incorporated for the sole purpose of administering SWDT and holding assets on trust for himself. To that end, SWT executed a Deed of Settlement with one Jocelyn Tan Siang Luang (“Ms Jocelyn Tan”) dated 31 October 2003 (the “Trust Deed”), under which SWT was appointed as the first trustee of SWDT.

  88. (b) Sino Africa was, at all material times, wholly and/or beneficially owned and/or controlled by him.

  89. (c) The Disposed AIHL Shares and the SWE Shares were held by SWT on trust for himself at all material times. The consideration for the acquisition of the Disposed AIHL Shares and the SWE Shares by SWT was not provided by it, and instead was provided for and/or procured by Mr Ashenafi. Specific to the SWE Shares, each of the relevant share certificates recorded that SWT held the shares “on behalf of [SWDT]”.

  90. [60] As to the disposal of the AIHL Share Consideration, Mr Ashenafi accepted that Wealth Direct and Long River were companies beneficially owned and controlled by him. However, he denied that the transfers to these entities were made at an undervalue as SWT was not entitled to receive any consideration from them for the transfers.

  91. [61] Mr Ashenafi admitted that SWT received no consideration for the SWE Share Transfer. However, given that the Disposed SWE Shares were held on trust for him, he contended that SWT was not entitled to receive any consideration for the transfer of those shares.

  92. [62] In response to the allegations of concealment, Mr Ashenafi denied that the Letters of Addition were “counterfeit documents”, and contended that the signatures on them were genuine and that their contents accurately reflected the fact that SWT held the Disposed AIHL Shares on trust for himself.

  93. [63] Mr Ashenafi denied committing any breach of fiduciary duties by causing SWT to enter the Undervalue Transactions, since the Disposed AIHL Shares and the Disposed SWE Shares were held on trust by SWT for himself. For the same reason, SWT did not suffer any loss as it was not the beneficial owner of those shares.

  94. [64] Finally, Mr Ashenafi denied engaging in any conspiracy to cause harm to SWT.

  95. Sino Africa’s case

  96. [65] Before setting out Sino Africa’s case, I set out the procedural history vis-à-vis the filing of its defence. On 26 May 2021 – some two months after SWT commenced proceedings –Sino Africa filed a notice of appointment of solicitor, followed by a memorandum of appearance. At this time, Mr Ashenafi had not been served or entered an appearance.

  97. [66] Subsequently, Mr Ashenafi filed a memorandum of appearance, appointing the same solicitors as Sino Africa. On 24 August 2021, Mr Ashenafi and Sino Africa filed a joint defence. After the plaintiffs filed their Statement of Claim (Amendment No. 1) dated 18 May 2022, Mr Ashenafi and Sino Africa filed their amended joint defence, ie, the 1st and 5th Defendants’ Defence (Amendment No. 1) dated 3 June 2022. This was the last pleading filed by Sino Africa.

  98. [67] Sometime in October 2022, Mr Ashenafi’s and Sino Africa’s then-solicitors were discharged from acting for them.

  99. [68] Mr Ashenafi appointed new solicitors on 11 November 2022, while Sino Africa remained unrepresented. On 24 October 2023, Mr Ashenafi’s solicitors were discharged from acting for him.

  100. [69] On 13 March 2024, Mr Ashenafi appointed new solicitors. On 12 April 2024, he filed his amended defence, ie, the 1st Defendant’s Defence (Amendment No. 2). In doing so, he struck off all averments, assertions and allegations made by Sino Africa in that pleading.

  101. [70] Given that Mr Ashenafi was in no position to amend Sino Africa’s pleading, the last defence filed by Sino Africa, ie, the 1st and 5th Defendants’ Defence (Amendment No. 1) dated 3 June 2022, stood as its pleading. This was notwithstanding that it was a joint defence. In so far as that pleading included averments, assertions and allegations made by Mr Ashenafi, I understood those to be subject to and replaced by Mr Ashenafi’s amended defence, ie, the 1st Defendant’s Defence (Amendment No. 2).

  102. [71] Moving to its defence, Sino Africa averred that the Disposed AIHL Shares and the Disposed SWE Shares were, at all material times, held by SWT on behalf of SWDT and the transfer of the Disposed AIHL Shares from SWT to CCSEA was carried out by SWT on behalf of SWDT. SWT did not receive any funds for the AIHL Sale as it was not entitled to the funds. As the Disposed AIHL Shares and the Disposed SWE Shares were assets held on behalf of SWDT, there was no wrongful depletion of assets and the AIHL Sale and SWE Share Transfer were not transactions at undervalue.

  103. [72] For the same reason, Sino Africa denied being a participant in a conspiracy to cause financial loss to SWT and its creditors.

  104. CCSEA’s case

  105. [73] CCSEA did not dispute that the AIHL Sale took place on or around 23 March 2017 for the AIHL Share Consideration pursuant to the SPA (see above at [24]). However, CCSEA denied that the First and Second Undervalue Transactions were undervalue transactions within the meaning of s 224 of the IRDA or s 329 of the CA read with s 98 of the BA. In this regard, it maintained that:

  106. were not significantly less than the value, in money or money’s worth, than the value of the Disposed AIHL Shares at the time of the SPA.

  107. [74] CCSEA admitted that no valuation of the Disposed AIHL Shares was carried out for the purpose of the SPA, and that the AIHL Share Consideration did not reflect, and was not intended to reflect, the fair market value of the Disposed AIHL Shares. Instead, the AIHL Share Consideration reflected CCSEA’s “unique commercial considerations” as the majority shareholder of AIHL.

  108. [75] In agreeing that the AIHL Share Consideration had been discharged in the manner described above at [26], CCSEA alleged that it was SWT’s then-solicitors who had proposed that the payment of the AIHL Share Consideration be structured in that manner and that CCSEA had no reason to look behind or make inquiries regarding SWT’s intentions. Further, CCSEA averred that absent any knowledge of fraud or insolvency on the part of SWT, it was usual commercial practice in Mauritius (being the governing law of the SPA) for the purchaser in a sale and purchase transaction to make payments to the vendor directly, and/or to persons nominated by the vendor in the written contractual documents. Given that the payments were made as per the SPA, CCSEA was a bona fide purchaser for value.

  109. [76] According to CCSEA, as the AIHL Share Consideration exceeded the fair market value of the Disposed AIHL Shares, SWT could not have become insolvent because of the AIHL Sale. Further, CCSEA did not admit that SWT (a) became unable to pay its debts as at March 2017; and/or (b) became unable to pay its debts in consequence of the AIHL Sale.

  110. [77] CCSEA denied acting in concert with any of the other defendants and denied any involvement in any conspiracy to cause damage or injury to SWT and/or its creditors.

  111. Issues to be determined

  112. [78] The issues to be determined were:

  113. [79] Despite the non-participation of Mr Ashenafi and Sino Africa, the trial against them proceeded on the merits. The court has the power to proceed with a trial on the merits, even in the absence of the defendant, and thereafter grant judgment on the merits if justified in doing so by the evidence: see Indian Overseas Bank v Svil Agro Pte Ltd and others [2014] 3 SLR 892 at [32]–[33]; see also O 35 r 1(2) of the Rules of Court (2014 Rev Ed).

  114. [80] The non-participation of Mr Ashenafi and Sino Africa did not, by itself, shift the legal or evidential burden of proof. Neither did it impact the standard of proof to be met. It remained for the plaintiffs to prove their claims as asserted, on a balance of probabilities, by adducing the necessary evidence. In this regard, in so far as any fact was admitted by either Mr Ashenafi or Sino Africa in their pleadings, I consider that fact to be undisputed as between the plaintiffs and that party. Where a fact was not admitted, it fell to the plaintiffs to prove that affirmatively, if the burden fell on them to do so.

  115. The Disposed AIHL Shares and the Disposed SWE Shares were not held on trust for Mr Ashenafi

  116. [81] The case against Mr Ashenafi and Sino Africa turned, in the main, on their contention that the Disposed AIHL Shares and the Disposed SWE Shares were held by SWT on trust for SWDT and/or Mr Ashenafi (see above at [59(c)] and [71]). Mr Ashenafi would otherwise not be entitled to deal with them for his own benefit or against the interests of SWT, and would be in breach of his fiduciary duties if he did so.

  117. [82] Based on his defence, Mr Ashenafi relied on (a) the Trust Deed; (b) specific to the Disposed AIHL Shares, the Letters of Addition; and (c) specific to the Disposed SWE Shares, the fact that the relevant share certificates stated that SWT held the said shares “on behalf of [SWDT]” (see above at [59(a)], [59(c)] and [62]). In addition, Sino Africa averred that several Certificates of Incumbency for SWE issued by Offshore Incorporations Ltd or Vistra (BVI) Ltd from July 2009 to February 2017 (the “Certificates of Incumbency”) stated that SWT was a shareholder “on behalf of [SWDT]” at the relevant date.

  118. [83] The plaintiffs submitted that there was insufficient evidence to prove the existence of a trust, save for the Trust Deed. The Trust Deed states that a trust known as SWDT was created, and that SWT was the trustee of that trust while Mr Ashenafi was, what appeared to be, the principal beneficiary. However, neither Mr Ashenafi nor Ms Jocelyn Tan gave evidence on the Trust Deed. Further, even if I accept the Trust Deed as evidence of a trust, that does not resolve the question of whether the Disposed AIHL Shares and the Disposed SWE Shares were assets subject to that trust. In fact, the Trust Deed only refers to a sum of S$10 as being subject to the trust at its establishment.

  119. [84] With respect to the Disposed SWE Shares, Mr Mann testified that the share certificates which purportedly showed that SWT held the Disposed SWE Shares on behalf of SWDT were not the same shares, as identified by their unique share numbers, that had been transferred to Sino Africa. In the absence of share certificates evidencing that the Disposed SWE Shares were held on trust, Mr Ashenafi’s and Sino Africa’s assertion was unsupported.

  120. [85] As for the Certificates of Incumbency, these were inconclusive:

  121. (a) Even though the certificates stated that the shareholding in SWE (BVI) was held on behalf of SWDT, SWT’s own audited financial statements (for the financial year ended 2013 onwards) recognised SWT as the owner of some shares in SWE (BVI).

  122. (b) There was no evidence as to the accuracy of these certificates. On its face, the certificates stated that the information contained was “to the best of [the certifier’s] knowledge and according to the [certifier’s] records”. There was no evidence of how these certificates came to be issued, particularly how they were prepared and the source documents consulted.

  123. [86] With respect to the Disposed AIHL Shares, the only evidence that these shares were held by SWT on trust were the Letters of Addition. These were letters from Mr Ashenafi to SWT as trustee of SWDT stating that Mr Ashenafi was adding some number of shares in AIHL to the trust while concurrently declaring that he was the “legal and beneficial owner” of those shares. Each Letter of Addition was followed up by an acknowledgement by SWT, signed by (apparently) Mr Ashenafi, confirming its acceptance and consent to the addition of the AIHL shares to the trust.

  124. [87] The plaintiffs submitted that the Letters of Addition were questionable. They only surfaced after Mr Ashenafi had requested a template for such letters from Dr Ressos in or around the time Mr Ashenafi knew that the Arbitration would be decided in favour of the SGI Creditors. Dr Ressos testified that on or around 15 February 2018, Mr Ashenafi had asked him how assets could be added to a trust after it was formed, to which Dr Ressos explained that this would be by way of letters of addition. Mr Ashenafi then asked and obtained Dr Ressos’ advice that assets held on trust by a company would not be available to a liquidator for distribution if the company went into liquidation. During the same call, Mr Ashenafi requested for a template letter of addition, which Dr Ressos provided to Mr Cheng. At that time, Mr Cheng was employed by Mr Ashenafi although he was not a director of SWT (see above at [6]). Dr Ressos clarified that the template he provided closely resembled templates which he created for, and that was provided to, Mr Ashenafi or Mr Cheng sometime in 2014 and 2017.

  125. [88] According to Mr Cheng, in or around November 2017, Mr Ashenafi informed him that all assets of SWT belonged to SWDT and that he had found the “original” letters of addition, which included the Letters of Addition, in his safe box. By this time, the Final Award had already been issued and the SGI Creditors had begun taking steps to enforce the same against SWT (see above at [33]–[34]). Mr Cheng deposed that this was the first time he had heard of or seen the Letters of Addition. According to him, the Letters of Addition closely resembled the templates provided by Dr Ressos in 2014 and 2017.

  126. [89] In spite of the resemblance to templates that Dr Ressos created in 2014 at the earliest, the Letters of Addition were dated between 2008 and 2010.

  127. [90] Given the above circumstances, and in the absence of any evidence from Mr Ashenafi, I placed no weight on the Letters of Addition. Mr Ashenafi’s claim that the Disposed AIHL Shares were held by SWT on trust for him was therefore unsupported by any evidence.

  128. [91] On the contrary, the contemporaneous documentary evidence showed that the Disposed SWE Shares and the Disposed AIHL Shares were owned by SWT.

  129. [92] First, the SWE Shares were expressly recognised as assets belonging to SWT in its audited financial statements for the financial years ended 2013, 2014, and 2015, and in its unaudited financial statements for the financial year ended 2016. Similarly, SWT’s audited financial statements for the financial years ended 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, and the unaudited financial statements for the financial year ended 2016 consistently recognised the Disposed AIHL Shares as assets of SWT. Mr Ashenafi himself signed off on the audited financial statements for the financial years ended 2012, 2013 , 2014 and 2015, stating that they gave “a true and fair view of the state of affairs of [SWT]”.

  130. [93] It was only in the unaudited financial statements of the financial year ended 2017 that SWT sought to make adjustments to the financial statements corresponding to the years 2015 and 2016 to, inter alia, remove the SWE Shares and the Disposed AIHL Shares from its balance sheet. This set of financial statements were signed off by Dr Ressos on 13 August 2018, after the AIHL Sale was completed and the SWE Share Transfer was performed. This was also after the Final Award was issued.

  131. [94] Second, the way SWT dealt with the SWE Shares corroborated the fact that SWT was and considered itself the beneficial owner of the Disposed SWE Shares. On or around 27 December 2011, SWT’s board of directors unanimously consented to SWT entering a facility agreement with a bank for a loan of US$3.8m, pursuant to which SWT would pledge its legal and beneficial interests its shares of SWE (BVI) for the purpose of granting a security interest to the bank. In addition, this approval was followed by SWT granting an equitable mortgage in favour of the said bank over its shares in SWE (BVI) sometime in or around 16 January 2012. Pursuant to cl 4.6(a) of the equitable mortgage agreement, it was expressly stipulated that SWT shall not permit to subsist any trust over the mortgaged shares without the written consent of the bank. This evidenced that at least the mortgaged SWE (BVI) shares were beneficially owned by SWT.

  132. [95] Third, as for the Disposed AIHL Shares, SWT had unequivocally warrantied in the SPA at cl 5.1.2 that it was “the legal and beneficial owner of the [Disposed AIHL Shares]”. Notably, Mr Ashenafi executed the SPA on behalf of SWT.

  133. [96] Fourth, Mr Cheng gave evidence that sometime in or around mid-2012, Mr Ashenafi instructed him that the Disposed AIHL Shares should be “under SWT, and not under [SWDT]” and that [SWDT] “was no longer applicable”. As such, irrespective of whether there may have been a trust to begin with, the evidence suggested that by mid-2012 there was no trust to speak of, and thus, the Disposed AIHL Shares and the Disposed SWE Shares were beneficially owned by SWT at the time of their transfers to CCSEA and Sino Africa respectively.

  134. [97] Therefore, there was sufficient evidence to conclude that, on the balance of probabilities, the Disposed AIHL Shares and the Disposed SWE Shares were not held by SWT on trust for Mr Ashenafi or SWDT.

  135. [98] In the circumstances, the action turned on whether the plaintiffs were able to make out their case on the Undervalue Transactions.

  136. Only the Third Undervalue Transaction was made out

  137. The law on undervalue transactions

  138. [99] Sections 224 and 226 of the IRDA state:

  139. [100] Sections 224 and 226 of the IRDA replace the previous avoidance regime for undervalue transactions under s 329 of the CA read with s 98 of the BA. That said, s 224(3) of the IRDA – which stipulates what a transaction at an undervalue is – is in pari materia with:

  140. (a) ss 98(3)(a) and 93(3)(c) of the BA; and

  141. (b) s 238(4) (undervalue transactions for corporate insolvency), ss 339(3)(a) and 339(3)(c) (undervalue transactions for personal bankruptcy), and ss 423(1)(a) and 423(1)(c) (transactions defrauding creditors) of the Insolvency Act 1986 (c 45) (UK).

  142. [101] In this regard, the Court of Appeal in Rothstar Group Ltd v Leow Quek Shiong and other appeals [2022] 2 SLR 158 (“Rothstar”) at [23] confirmed that the applicable principles in relation to undervalue transactions remain largely unchanged even after the enactment of the IRDA. To that end, the authorities that analyse the relevant provisions under the BA and the CA remain instructive.

  143. [102] For a transaction to come within s 224 of the IRDA, the following elements must be satisfied: see Mercator & Noordstar NV v Velstra Pte Ltd (in liquidation) [2003] 4 SLR(R) 667 at [21] in the context of s 98(3) of the BA:

  144. A transaction would also fall within the reach of s 224 of the IRDA if the company became insolvent in consequence of the transaction: s 226(2)(b) of the IRDA.

  145. [103] Section 224(3)(b) of the IRDA expressly requires a comparison of value between the consideration provided and the consideration received by the (insolvent) company: Rothstar at [24].

  146. The SWE Share Transfer was a transaction at an undervalue

  147. [104] It was not disputed that the SWE Share Transfer was for no consideration (see above at [61] and [71]). This was even though SWT’s financial statements for the year ended 2013 valued the SWE Shares at US$5,580,878, which appeared to remain unchanged throughout the period SWT owned the shares. This meant that the value of the Disposed SWE Shares amounted to US$5,055,318.23. Absent any other valuation proffered, and given that Mr Ashenafi himself signed off on the audited financial statements stating that they gave “a true and fair view of the state of affairs of [SWT]” (see above at [92]), this was the best evidence of the value of the Disposed SWE Shares.

  148. [105] Mr Ashenafi’s and Sino Africa’s defence that SWT was not entitled to receive any consideration as the Disposed SWE Shares were held on trust was not made out, given my finding that the said shares were beneficially owned by SWT.

  149. [106] The SWE Share Transfer was a transaction that took place on 28 April 2017 (see above at [27]), which was within three years of the winding up of SWT, ie, 21 June 2019 (see above at [37]).

  150. [107] Given that Mr Ashenafi was a director of SWT at the material time and that Sino Africa was a company wholly and/or beneficially owned and/or controlled by him (see above at [9] and [59(b)]), a presumption arose by virtue of s 226(3) of the IRDA (see above at [99]) that SWT was insolvent or became insolvent as a consequence of the SWE Share Transfer.

  151. [108] That presumption was not rebutted on the evidence; on the contrary, the evidence suggested that SWT was insolvent at the material time. Hence, even if the presumption did not apply, I would have found that SWT was unable to pay its debts, within the meaning of s 125(2) of the IRDA, at the time of the SWE Share Transfer (see below at [240]–[248]).

  152. [109] Pulling the threads together, I found that the SWE Share Transfer was a transaction at an undervalue under s 224(1) of the IRDA.

  153. The AIHL Sale was not a transaction at an undervalue

  154. [110] The analysis with respect to the AIHL Sale was more involved, not least because of the plaintiffs’ pleaded case. According to the plaintiffs, the AIHL Sale was a transaction at an undervalue because the AIHL Share Consideration was “arithmetically consistent” with the Ambo Min Sale, and that was itself a transaction at an undervalue on account of an alleged adjustment to AIHL’s accounts for the financial year ended 31 March 2015 to reflect a small loss, and depress the valuation of Ambo Min. That pleaded case was flawed and unsustainable because:

  155. (a) There was no evidence that the consideration for the Ambo Min Sale was based on AIHL’s or Ambo Min’s financial statements or projected performance. The documentary evidence showed that PPESA proposed the price of US$19,782,807 (ie, the Ambo Min Share Consideration), which SABMiller Group, through AIHL, accepted (see above at [17]). There was no evidence of any negotiation or how PPESA arrived at the proposed price.

  156. (b) Critically, there was no evidence that the Ambo Min Sale was at an undervalue. No valuation of Ambo Min was carried out to facilitate the Ambo Min Sale. Further, the plaintiffs’ expert was not asked to carry out a valuation to determine the value of Ambo Min at the material time.

  157. (c) Subsequent to the completion of Project Savannah, MoPE reiterated the government’s desire to dispose of its stake in Ambo Min at the same price previously agreed, ie, the Ambo Min Share Consideration. The shareholders of CCBA, which included SABMiller Group, appeared to have agreed to this price because it was not significantly different from their own internal valuation of Ambo Min. However, that valuation was not based on Ambo Min’s finances and operations in isolation, but rather its value in the context of and relative to other entities or businesses involved in Project Savannah. Indeed, the SABMiller Group Investment Memo noted that the financial performance of Ambo Min had deteriorated since the earlier agreement on the Ambo Min Share Consideration in June 2015, but the CCBA shareholders nonetheless agreed to complete the sale at the same price.

  158. (d) The alleged “adjustment” to AIHL’s accounts was entirely irrelevant to the Ambo Min Share Consideration as:

  159. (i) the “adjustment” in AIHL’s accounts did not and could not affect the valuation of Ambo Min;

  160. (ii) the Ambo Min Share Consideration was based on the price proposed by PPESA, which concerned the price of Ambo Min’s shares, and not AIHL’s shares; and

  161. (iii) the Ambo Min Share Consideration was based on the price proposed by PPESA in May 2015, which was agreed prior to the “adjustment” made to the AIHL financial statements that the independent auditors signed off on in October 2015.

  162. (e) In any event, even if the Ambo Min Sale was at an undervalue, it did not necessarily follow that that the AIHL Sale would also be at an undervalue given that (i) the financial position of Ambo Min (and therefore the value of AIHL) may have deteriorated by 23 March 2017; and (ii) the material issue was the value of AIHL as at 23 March 2017.

  163. [111] For completeness, there was also no evidence that the “adjustment” to AIHL’s accounts was improper or made with a view to depress the Ambo Min Share Consideration:

  164. (a) The plaintiffs’ primary basis was that AIHL reported profits in 2014 and 2016, and the recorded loss of US$53,510 in 2015 was therefore inexplicable. That was plainly not, by itself, a sufficient ground to support their assertion.

  165. (b) On the contrary, the evidence showed that from AIHL’s incorporation in 2009 to 2020, AIHL reported losses in nine out of 12 years. The evidence also established that while AIHL recognised profits when Ambo Min declared dividends, AIHL did not receive payment of those dividends due to Ethiopian foreign exchange problems. AIHL’s losses for the financial year ended 2015 (“FY2015”) were therefore not inconsistent with AIHL’s historical performance. Further, AIHL’s profit of US$3m for the financial year ended 2014 (“FY2014”) was on account of a reversal of a previously recorded impairment loss, and not on account of increased revenue.

  166. (c) The relevant AIHL accounts were independently audited, with the auditors opining that it gave “a true and fair view of the financial position of [SWT]”.

  167. (d) Mr Mann referred to an e-mail from Mr Ashenafi to Mr Cheng dated 25 August 2015, wherein the former stated that while AIHL had made a profit of US$4m for 2015, an accounting adjustment had to be made which showed a small loss. However, there was not a shred of evidence to corroborate this assertion. As mentioned, the financial statements for that year were independently audited. This assertion was also not supported by the historical financial results of AIHL, which never reported profits as high as that since its incorporation, and even all the way till 2020. The e-mail was therefore insufficient evidence to support the conclusion that the “adjustment” was improper.

  168. [112] Further, while the plaintiffs pleaded that the Disposed AIHL Shares were worth “significantly more” than the AIHL Share Consideration (ie, US$10,796,784), the pleadings were deficient as the plaintiffs did not plead what the fair value of the Disposed AIHL Shares was as at 23 March 2017.

  169. The value of the Disposed AIHL Shares

  170. [113] Unsurprisingly, at the trial, the plaintiffs’ abandoned their assertions with respect to the Ambo Min Sale and focused on the value of the Disposed AIHL Shares as at the date of the SPA, ie, 23 March 2017.

  171. [114] The plaintiffs and CCSEA led evidence from two experts, who gave widely different valuations of the Disposed AIHL Shares:

  172. (a) the plaintiffs’ expert, Mr Ong Woon Peng (“Mr Ong”), in his Valuation Report of 20 March 2024 (“Mr Ong’s Report”), valued the Disposed AIHL Shares in the range of US$15.605m to US$16.57m; which he later amended to US$15,110,000 and US$16,006,000, while

  173. (b) CCSEA’s expert, Mr Andrew Ooi Lih De (“Mr Ooi”), in his Expert Report of 29 February 2024 (“Mr Ooi’s Report”), valued the Disposed AIHL Shares in the range of USD1.1m to USD1.9m.

  174. [115] Both experts agreed that in valuing the Disposed AIHL Shares, the critical question was the value of Ambo Min:

  175. (a) AIHL was an investment holding company, with no operations of its own. AIHL’s main asset was its 100% shareholding in Ambo Min. The value of the Disposed AIHL Shares would therefore depend on the value of Ambo Min.

  176. (b) Once the value of Ambo Min was determined, both experts adopted the same valuation approach, ie, the asset approach, applying the summation method or the adjusted book value method, to determine the value of AIHL, and therefore the Disposed AIHL Shares.

  177. The discussion below therefore focuses on the valuation of Ambo Min as at 23 March 2017.

  178. [116] For completeness, I highlight that in the financial statements of AIHL for the financial year ended 31 March 2017, the 100% shareholding in Ambo Min carried a book value of US$40,782,807. However, both experts agreed that the book value may not represent the true value of Ambo Min (and therefore the Disposed AIHL Shares), and an independent valuation was necessary.

  179. [117] I now address the main differences between the valuations advanced by the experts.

  180. (1) The appropriate valuation approach: market value versus equitable value

  181. [118] One of the main disagreements was whether the appropriate value of the AIHL Shares was its equitable value (used by Mr Ong) or market value (used by Mr Ooi). Both experts agreed that the correct approach was critical “because a basis of value may influence or dictate the selection of methods, inputs, assumptions and ultimate value”.

  182. [119] The International Valuation Standards (the “IVS”), relied on by both experts, defined the terms as follows:

  183. (a) Equitable Value: “Equitable Value is the estimated price for the transfer of an asset or liability between identified knowledgeable and willing parties that reflects the respective interests of those parties. Equitable Value requires the assessment of the price that is fair between two specific, identified parties considering the respective advantages or disadvantages that each will gain from the transaction.”

  184. (b) Market Value: “Market Value is the estimated amount for which an asset or liability should exchange on the valuation date between a willing buyer and a willing seller in an arm’s length transaction, after proper marketing and where the parties had each acted knowledgeably, prudently and without compulsion.”

  185. [120] One critical difference between the two was the application of discounts. According to Mr Ooi, the market value of the Disposed AIHL Shares must consider two disamenities:

  186. (a) Given that AIHL was a private company (whose shares cannot be freely sold or traded on an exchange) and that the Disposed AIHL Shares represented a minority stake, those shares lacked marketability. Mr Ooi therefore applied a discount for lack of marketability (“DLOM”) of 16%, based on data he presented in his report.

  187. (b) Given that the Disposed AIHL Shares represented a minority interest in AIHL, Mr Ooi applied a discount for lack of control (“DLOC”) of 18%. Mr Ooi appeared to be relying on the same reason for both discounts, ie, the minority stake in AIHL, but nothing turned on this and this approach went unchallenged.

  188. [121] Mr Ong did not apply any discounts given that he was assessing the equitable value of the AIHL Shares, where marketability and control were already accounted for by virtue of the purchaser being CCSEA, the majority shareholder of AIHL. Nonetheless, he accepted that if he were assessing market value, he would apply a DLOC of 18% to the value of the Disposed AIHL Shares – as Mr Ooi did – irrespective of the method of valuation used, and a DLOM of 20% to the value of Ambo Min only when using the discounted cash flow method (“DCFM”) to calculate the value of Ambo Min. He also testified that he would apply a DLOM of 20%–30% to the value of the Disposed AIHL Shares when employing the prior transaction method (“PTM”), on the assumption that such a discount was not priced in the Ambo Min Sale. He accepted the fact that Ambo Min could not pay dividends upwards to AIHL (due to foreign exchange problems in Ethiopia) would make the Disposed AIHL Shares less marketable, which would increase the DLOM closer to 30%. Mr Ooi’s DLOM of 16% did not take this factor into account.

  189. [122] Mr Ong however opined that the equitable value was the relevant value because:

  190. (a) he had been instructed that the issue was whether the AIHL Share Consideration was an undervaluation for the Disposed AIHL Shares;

  191. (b) he had been instructed to draw reference to s 98 of the BA (read with s 329 of the CA) relating to transactions at an undervalue;

  192. (c) from these instructions and his understanding of s 98 of the BA, the relevant context “should be between [SWT] and [CCSEA], not any market participant”; and

  193. (d) “[g]iven that the parties to the transaction … are identified, the appropriate basis of value … is equitable value.”

  194. [123] In short, Mr Ong considered the equitable value to be appropriate as the relevant transaction dealt with an identified purchaser, ie, CCSEA, which was an existing shareholder of AIHL and which would gain certain advantages in becoming the sole shareholder of Ambo Min. When asked the basis for his interpretation of s 98 of the BA, he clarified that it was from his plain reading of the provision and not from any prior experience or legal advice.

  195. [124] In my view, the appropriate value was the market value (as adopted by Mr Ooi), and the application of equitable value was plainly misconceived.

  196. [125] First, the use of equitable value as the measure would not be consistent with the plain language of s 224(3)(b) of the IRDA (see above at [99] and [103]). The provision is concerned with a comparison between the value of the AIHL Shares against what SWT received (see below at [215]), and not the value of the AIHL Shares “that reflects the interests of” CCSEA. How CCSEA may have subjectively perceived or assessed the value it was giving or receiving was irrelevant.

  197. [126] Second, such an interpretation was consistent with the purpose of the provisions governing the avoidance of antecedent transactions in an insolvency, including s 224(3) of the IRDA, which is to “protect the general body of creditors against a diminution of the assets available to them by a transaction which confers an unfair or improper advantage on the other party”: Rothstar at [1], citing Goode on Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (Kristin van Zwieten gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 5th Ed, 2019) (“Goode on Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law”) at para 13-03.

  198. [128] Third, Mr Ong’s argument was illogical. On his own case, the AIHL Share Consideration necessarily reflected the respective interests of SWT and CCSEA and the advantage they will each gain from the transaction. On that premise, Mr Ong was effectively arguing that the AIHL Sale must have been an undervalue had CCSEA paid less than what the Disposed AIHL Shares might have been worth in CCSEA’s own internal or subjective assessment, even if that price was higher than what others might have been willing to pay. But CCSEA cannot be compelled to purchase the Disposed AIHL Shares at a price higher than it had agreed to pay. If the sale was then set aside or had not taken place, how would SWT’s creditors be better off?

  199. [129] Indeed, in the plaintiffs’ closing submissions, they accepted that:

  200. (a) market participants would regard the Disposed AIHL Shares as being less attractive than to CCSEA because they would be a minority shareholder, and would not be able to influence key decisions, have access to information, or “may risk being oppressed” by CCSEA;

  201. (b) a sale to market participants would fetch a lower price as compared to what CCSEA, as a majority shareholder, would pay; and

  202. (c) there was “no such market in reality for SWT to sell its shares to any other third party at the material time”.

  203. These arguments undermined the plaintiffs’ case that the AIHL Sale was at an undervalue.

  204. [130] Fourth, the necessary consequence of Mr Ong’s argument was that for the purposes of determining whether a transaction had been entered at an undervalue, the value of the consideration offered by the insolvent party may be different depending on the identity of the counterparty. That would not only give rise to uncertainty as to whether a transaction may be set aside in the future, it would also lead to unfair outcomes, eg, where the (insolvent) company had sold similar assets to two different parties, but only one of the transactions was deemed an undervalue.

  205. [131] Fifthly, that the market value was the appropriate value was amply supported by authority.

  206. [132] The learned authors of Goode on Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law at para 13-26 state:

  207. [133] Further, the learned authors of Rebecca Parry et al, Transaction Avoidance in Insolvencies (Oxford University Press, 3rd Ed, 2018) at para 4.96 state:

  208. [134] These remarks are consistent with the approach laid down by the Court of Appeal in Rothstar at [25]: the comparative exercise must be undertaken from the perspective of the insolvent company and the material comparison is between the value received by the company and the value provided by the company, not the value received or provided by any other party.

  209. [135] That the correct approach is the determination of the market value of the subject asset has been adopted in numerous cases: see, for example, Parakou Shipping Pte Ltd (in liquidation) v Liu Cheng Chan [2017] SGHC 15 (“Parakou”) at [97] and [99]; Phillips v Brewin Dolphin Bell Lawrie Ltd [2001] 1 WLR 143 at [30]; Re Brabon, Treharne v Brabon [2001] BCLC 11 at 38; Ailyan and anor v Smith and ors [2010] EWHC 24 (Ch) at [52] and [69]; and Stanley and anor v TMK Finance Ltd and anor [2010] EWHC 3349 (Ch) at [124].

  210. [136] Accordingly, when valuing the Disposed AIHL Shares, the correct inquiry was what they were worth to SWT, and not what they were worth to CCSEA. This negated the application of the equitable value.

  211. [137] In the circumstances, I rejected the valuation advanced in Mr Ong’s Report as he had adopted the wrong approach.

  212. [138] Nonetheless, by a letter to the court dated 10 October 2024 (“P1”), the plaintiffs’ solicitors forwarded a written memorandum issued by Mr Ong where he attempted to calculate the market value of the Disposed AIHL Shares. I shall address the contents of P1 below.

  213. (2) The appropriate method of valuation

  214. [139] The other main difference was the method of valuation the experts adopted.

  215. [140] Mr Ong adopted the “market approach” which, according to the IVS, “provides an indication of value by comparing the asset with identical or comparable (that is similar) assets for which price information is available”, eg, by comparing that asset with similar assets that have been (recently) sold. In this case, Mr Ong adopted the PTM: he ascertained certain financial ratios using the value of Ambo Min as determined by the Ambo Min Sale, and then applied those ratios to Ambo Min as at March 2017, after making certain adjustments to account for the change in the financial position of Ambo Min between the Ambo Min Sale and the AIHL Sale.

  216. [142] The different methods had their advantages and disadvantages. In short, the PTM was premised on the Ambo Min Sale reflecting a fair value of Ambo Min, while the DCFM turned on the reasonableness of Ambo Min’s forecast of its business operations and therefore involved some judgment on the part of Ambo Min’s management.

  217. (A) PTM

  218. [143] I first deal with Mr Ong’s reliance on the PTM. The IVS provides useful guidance on how to apply the PTM:

  219. [144] In Mr Ong’s Report, he stated:

  220. [145] In Mr Ong’s Rebuttal Report dated 28 June 2024 (“Mr Ong’s Rebuttal Report”), he reiterated:

  221. [146] In other words, Mr Ong’s use of the PTM was premised on his position that it was appropriate to determine the equitable value of the AIHL Shares, which approach I have rejected.

  222. [147] Mr Ong also asserted that the Ambo Min Sale was an appropriate prior transaction as:

  223. (a) it involved Ambo Min shares;

  224. (b) the Ambo Min Sale was a transaction with the Ethiopian government, a party not related to both CCSEA and SWT, and so was an arms-length transaction; and

  225. (c) the Ambo Min Share Consideration was agreed just two years before the AIHL Sale.

  226. [148] But Mr Ong’s reliance on the Ambo Min Sale was highly problematic.

  227. [149] First, there was no evidence as to how the Ambo Min Share Consideration was arrived at, particularly whether the parties negotiated the price or how that price was determined (see above at [110(a)]).

  228. [150] What was evident was that the CCBA shareholders were incentivised to buy out MoPE’s interests as part of the plan under Project Savannah and to secure the rights to the Ambo brand for TCCC (see above at [16]).

  229. [151] The Ambo Min Share Consideration of US$19,782,807 for a 33% stake of Ambo Min gave Ambo Min an implied equity value of US$59,947,900. According to the SABMiller Group Investment Memo, the parties to Project Savannah had valued Ambo Min at US$70,191,793, which was derived by applying an unknown multiple to Ambo Min’s EBITDA for the financial year ended 2014 (see above at [12]). Mr Marais further explained that if CCSEA bought the Disposed AIHL Shares at a price that departed significantly from how Ambo Min was valued in the context of Project Savannah, the other merger parties might have reopened commercial points in the merger.

  230. [152] Second, the critical issue was what a willing buyer, in an arm’s length transaction acting knowledgeably, prudently and without compulsion, would pay for the Disposed AIHL Shares. As Mr Ong acknowledged, such a buyer would not simply accept, or treat as determinative, the Ambo Min Share Consideration as evidencing the true value of Ambo Min in 2015. Indeed, this was because:

  231. (a) There was no information as to how the Ambo Min Share Consideration was determined (see above at [110(a)]).

  232. (b) Importantly, the Ambo Min Sale was a purchase of shares in a business in Ethiopia from the Ethiopian government, and that may not reflect a deal conducted at arm’s length. The facts set out above suggested that there was little, if any, negotiation. Using the PTM suggested that an ordinary seller would have been in the same bargaining position as the Ethiopian government, which was unlikely.

  233. (c) The Ambo Min Share Consideration likely reflected the specific interests of the parties to that deal, given CCBA’s shareholders’ interests in securing a 100% stake in Ambo Min as part of the plan under Project Savannah by buying out MoPE (see above at [17]).

  234. (d) The SABMiller Group Investment Memo highlighted that Ambo Min’s profitability had deteriorated from the time the Ambo Min Share Consideration was agreed (in or around June 2015) to the time of the memo in July 2016. CCBA’s shareholders decided, however, to maintain the earlier price despite this deterioration. This further suggested that the deal was not based, or not based entirely, on objective market values.

  235. [153] The use of PTM in this instance therefore went against the guidance highlighted in the IVS (see above at [143]) because (a) there was only a single transaction, ie, the Ambo Min Sale; (b) there was no evidence that the Ambo Min Sale was at “arm’s length”; and (c) there was insufficient information on the Ambo Min Sale available to allow the valuer to develop a reasonable understanding of it and assess the valuation metrics.

  236. [154] In response to these deficiencies, Mr Ong testified that there was a “presumption” that the Ambo Min Sale was done at market value. I rejected that. Mr Ong did not provide any basis for such a “presumption”, and there was no reason for such a presumption to exist. Mr Ong’s evidence only underscored his blinkered approach in carrying out his valuation.

  237. [155] For completeness, I deal with CCSEA’s argument that the Ambo Min Sale did not reflect a transaction at arm’s length because it had been made under compulsion. It referred to the SABMiller Group Investment Memo, wherein it was stated that MoPE was demanding the transaction be executed as a matter of urgency and was threatening to sell its minority stake in Ambo Min to a third party, effectively ignoring any pre-emption rights that AIHL had. I did not accept that argument. According to the SABMiller Group Investment Memo, the “threat” was made by the Ethiopian government in 2016, after the completion of Project Savannah. As noted, the deal was stalled because of a restructuring within the Ethiopian government (see above at [17]). After the restructuring, the Ethiopian government allegedly pressed for the deal to be completed urgently. However, this was not relevant as (a) the Ambo Min Share Consideration was determined in mid-2015, and there was no suggestion that the price was agreed to under compulsion; and (b) the SABMiller Group Investment Memo suggested that the stakeholders of Project Savannah (or the CCBA shareholders) agreed to proceed with the sale as the Ambo Min Share Consideration was acceptable to them. As noted, CCSEA did not want to reopen any commercial points with respect to the merger (see above at [151]).

  238. [156] Nonetheless, the (alleged) threat was consistent with my finding above as to the special position of the Ethiopian government (see above at [152(b)]).

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