General Division of the High Court · Decided 17 December 2024
Damages were estimated because the hairstyling business kept no reliable accounts
Concorde Services Pte Ltd (in liquidation) v Ong Kim Hock and another
Feedback & support[2024] SGHC 324 · Case no. Originating Claim No 246 of 2023
✱ The decision, in one line
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Damages were estimated because the hairstyling business kept no reliable accounts
Summary by laws.sg·Paragraphs [1], [186]
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Grounds of decision
Official text from eLitigation
Introduction
- [1]
[1] Going into business with the wrong people is akin to handing a scalpel to someone who does not know how to use it – it can quickly become a recipe for disaster. The case before me is emblematic of that reality. It stems from a business arrangement for a hairstyling business involving two (initial) friends that, in theory, held much promise. However, this unravelled quickly in the space of a few months, when the business started showing promising shoots of profitability and one party to the arrangement decided to take the business all for himself to the exclusion of the other. To exacerbate matters, for many years, the business did not seem to maintain any reliable financial documentation. Consequently, the financial accounts were nothing more than a caricature of reality and this rendered any attempt to understand (let alone, properly quantify) the business’ financial health for the purposes of an assessment of damages very much a process of educated guesses.
Facts
Background
- [2]
[2] Mr Chua Swee Kheng (“Mr Chua”) was a “business developer” who “owned several businesses”. The first defendant, Mr Ong Kim Hock, was a hairstylist who, from 10 April 2002 to sometime in 2010, ran his own hairstyling studio under the name of “Andy Ong Hair Studio” (“AOHS”). He and the first defendant met during their time in the Singapore military during their national service and/or when serving their reservist obligations. Sometime in 2010, the first defendant closed down AOHS. At around the same time, Mr Chua and the first defendant agreed to start a hairstyling and salon business together.
- [3]
[3] The claimant was incorporated on 26 May 2010, with its principal activity listed as beauty salons and spas, and manpower contracting services. Mr Chua and the first defendant were the only two directors and shareholders in the claimant, and they each held half of the shares in the claimant.
- [4]
[4] Sometime in August 2011, a tender was submitted on behalf of the claimant to lease a space in the Mass Rapid Transit (“MRT”) station (the “Premises”) at Sembawang. The Singapore Mass Rapid Transit Corporation (“SMRT”) awarded the tender to the claimant, and a lease agreement was entered into between SMRT and the claimant (the “Claimant’s Lease”). The Claimant’s Lease was for 36 months and commenced on 16 October 2011. The monthly rental was $15,000. In May 2014, the Claimant’s Lease was successfully renewed by the first defendant for another 36 months from 16 October 2014 at an increased monthly rental of $17,000. The Claimant’s Lease was terminated upon its expiry on 16 October 2017. The circumstances of such termination will be discussed at some length below (at [27]).
- [5]
[5] On 2 September 2011, the claimant registered a sole proprietorship named Station 33 to carry out the hairstyling business. Station 33 was wholly owned by the claimant. In November 2011, Station 33 commenced its business at the Premises. The first defendant was mainly responsible for Station 33’s day to day operations, and he worked as the head hairstylist at Station 33. Excluding the first defendant, it appears that Station 33 typically employed about four hairstylists at any given time.
- [6]
[6] Around early 2012, barely a couple of months after the start of business, the relationship between Mr Chua and the first defendant deteriorated as a result of various disagreements. Since then, it is undisputed that Mr Chua did not physically return to the premises of Station 33. Station 33’s business registration lapsed on 2 September 2016, and neither Mr Chua nor the first defendant renewed its registration. As such, Station 33’s business registration was cancelled on 29 July 2017.
Station 33’s finances
- [8]
[8] Even though its business registration was cancelled on 29 July 2017, Station 33’s business operated from November 2011 to sometime in September or October 2017. For the first few months, Station 33’s earnings were typically deposited into Station 33’s bank account (the “Station 33 Bank Account”) with United Overseas Bank Ltd (“UOB”). The signatories of the Station 33 Bank Account comprised the first defendant and Mdm Lim Ping Ping (“Mdm Lim”), who is Mr Chua’s wife. Both the first defendant and Mr Chua each deposited $100,000 into the Station 33 Bank Account which comprised the initial equity for Station 33.
- [9]
[9] Separately, there is another bank account opened under the claimant’s name with UOB (the “Concorde Bank Account”). Upon the claimant’s incorporation, Mr Chua deposited $25,000 into the Concorde Bank Account to facilitate miscellaneous expenses for the business as well. The signatories of the Concorde Bank Account comprise the first defendant, Mr Chua and Mdm Lim.
The cash takings
- [10]
[10] When customers make payment to Station 33, whether by credit card, debit card or Network for Electronic Transfers payment (“NETS”), the money goes directly into the Station 33 Bank Account. In theory, the cash takings of Station 33 should have been collected from the customer and kept in the cash register, before being subsequently banked into the Station 33 Bank Account. However, it is not in dispute that, from the start of 2012, none of Station 33’s cash takings were deposited into the Station 33 Bank Account. Although a point-of-sale system was set up, whereby the cash takings from customers could be logged, such a system was not utilised by the first defendant. After a customer paid in cash, either the first defendant, one Mr Peter Chong Chung Hong (“Mr Peter Chong”) (whose involvement and role within Station 33 will be explained subsequently) or the other hairstylists employed at Station 33 collected the cash. It is similarly not in dispute that such cash takings were eventually put into the possession of the first defendant.
- [11]
[11] As it will be apparent later, one of the primary issues in the present case is whether Station 33 was a profitable business, and the resolution of this question necessarily hinges on the quantum and whereabouts of these cash takings. It is the Defendants’ case that Station 33 was not profitable, and the first defendant had used all the cash takings, including the rental payment received from subletting the Premises (see below at [12]), to pay for the workers’ salaries, including their commission payments and Central Provident Fund (“CPF”) employee contributions, foreign worker levies to the Ministry of Manpower and payments to Station 33’s suppliers. However, almost none of the purported levy bills, suppliers’ invoices or salary vouchers underlying these supposed payments during Station 33’s operation have been produced before the court. Instead, most of the documents that were tendered as part of the Defendants’ bundle of documents related to the second defendant’s operations instead of that of Station 33.
The rental payment received from subletting the Premises
- [12]
[12] On 13 February 2012, the first defendant personally entered into a tenancy agreement with one Ye Lizhen for the latter to sublet a part of the Premises to operate her business known as “J.C. Skin” (the “Subletting Agreement”). Although the Subletting Agreement appears to suggest that the first defendant had personally entered into the Subletting Agreement, the first defendant claims that he was in fact doing so on behalf of Station 33 but had to put the tenancy agreement in his personal name as he wanted to avoid detection of such a subletting arrangement. This was because, pursuant to the agreement between SMRT and the claimant for the Claimant’s Lease, subletting any part of the Premises would be forbidden.
- [13]
[13] Based on the first defendant’s own recollection, the Subletting Agreement went on for between ten to 18 months. There does not appear to be any meaningful way to verify this since there is no independent corroboration of this, though I note that the latest cheque for rental payment issued by J.C. Skin to the first defendant was dated 10 May 2013, which suggests that the Subletting Agreement went on from at least February 2012 to May 2013. In any event, only four months’ worth of rental payment, totalling $20,000, was transferred directly to the Station 33 Bank Account. The remaining amount of rental payments collected from J.C. Skin was transferred directly to the first defendant’s personal bank account. According to the first defendant, the money received from the Subletting Agreement was similarly used to pay for Station 33’s outgoing expenses, such as employees’ salaries.
Management of the financial records
- [14]
[14] Mdm Lim managed the accounting and finances for Station 33 from its registration (ie, 2 September 2011) to December 2011. As a result, since Station 33 commenced its business in November 2011, only the financial records for the months of November and December 2011 were overseen by Mdm Lim. After December 2011, the first defendant’s friend, Mr Peter Chong, was introduced by the first defendant to Mr Chua as a prospective employee. Mr Peter Chong was subsequently hired to take over the accounting of Station 33. The subsequent financial documentation for Station 33 was prepared by Mr Peter Chong. The reason for Mdm Lim’s departure from her role, and how exactly Mr Peter Chong came to be employed in Station 33, is disputed.
- [15]
[15] I pause to highlight that, according to the first defendant’s version of events before this court, one of the disputes which led to the deteriorating relationship between the first defendant and Mr Chua was the issue of remuneration of certain employees, including Mdm Lim. According to the first defendant, Mdm Lim was paid a monthly salary of $1,500 even though she worked 16 hours a week, which was starkly contrasted with the first defendant’s remuneration despite his full-time obligation at the Premises. I will discuss this issue in greater detail later. The first defendant was also unhappy that, allegedly, certain parties related to Mr Chua were given CPF contributions even though they did not work for Station 33.
- [16]
[16] Additionally, Mr Chua had formed a team under the claimant to handle the backend operations of Station 33, which comprised Mdm Lim, Ms Shirley Chee Fung Mei (who subsequently served as the liquidator of the Claimant) (“Ms Shirley Chee”), Ms Belinda Ng (“Ms Belinda”) and Mr Selvakumar A/L Marimuth (“Mr Selvakumar”) (collectively, the “Team”).
Attempts to retrieve the records of Station 33
- [17]
[17] On 1 April 2013, Mr Selvakumar sent an e-mail to Station 33’s e-mail address, addressed to Mr Peter Chong, stating:
- [18]
[18] On the morning of 20 April 2013, Mr Peter Chong replied with some of Station 33’s general ledger details, and stated as follows:
- [19]
[19] Shortly after, in the afternoon of the same day, Mr Peter Chong forwarded to Mr Selvakumar some of Station 33’s balance sheets, the general ledgers from 2011 to 31 March 2013, and three profit and loss statements of Station 33, which I will collectively refer to as part of the financial documents prepared by Mr Peter Chong. As is evident from the subsequent letters sent by Mr Chua to the first defendant, these documents produced by Mr Peter Chong were not satisfactory to Mr Chua and the Team. According to Mr Chua, both Ms Belinda and Mr Selvakumar had attempted to retrieve the financial records and documents of Station 33, whether by way of e-mail or by physically going to the Premises, but to no avail. In fact, the Team had been allegedly “chased away” from the Premises by the first defendant at times.
- [20]
[20] I now set out the letters that Mr Chua purportedly sent to the first defendant, requesting for Station 33’s records or for further action or updates regarding the business. There was no response from the first defendant to any of these letters. He denies receiving any of the letters outlined below.
- [21]
[21] On 7 March 2015, Mr Chua sent a letter to Station 33, addressed to Mr Ong, requesting, inter alia, the financial management records for Station 33 for the years 2012, 2013 and 2014, further information on the renewal of the Claimant’s Lease in 2014, and also the details of the Subletting Agreement (the “March 2015 Letter”):
- [22]
[22] On 20 April 2015, Mr Chua sent a follow-up letter to the letter reproduced in the preceding paragraph, stating that the first defendant would be given “30 days from the date of this letter to summit [sic] all the documents as requested” and that the claimant would “not hesitate to take further action against [the first defendant] for the noncompliance [sic]”.
- [23]
[23] On 15 July 2015, Mr Chua sent a third letter to the first defendant, attaching two other letters for the first defendant’s “immediate action”: (a) a letter from the Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore (“IRAS”) to the claimant requesting for the provision of “income tax form C-S” for the year of assessment 2014 by 10 August 2015; and (b) a summons letter from the State Courts, requiring attendance in court. Another letter from IRAS, on 25 July 2016, was sent addressed to the claimant at its office regarding an offer to compound the offence of failing to submit its employees’ income information for Station 33 for the year of assessment 2016, which included a summons for attendance in court as well.
- [24]
[24] A fourth letter was sent by Mr Chua, on behalf of the claimant, to the first defendant on 13 October 2017. The letter is reproduced below:
Incorporation of the second defendant
- [25]
[25] The first defendant claimed that Mr Chua was an “absent business partner” who was “no longer interested [in] and/or no longer wanted” Station 33’s business. As the first defendant saw himself as the one who had experience as a hairstylist and the “know-how of running a hair salon business”, and Station 33’s business registration had expired in 2016 (and was to be cancelled soon enough), he decided to run such a business by himself.
- [26]
[26] On 3 April 2017, the first defendant submitted a tender for the lease of the Premises under the name of Station 33 for a proposed monthly rental charge of $15,000. In the “Remarks” section of the tender submission form, it was indicated that “[t]here will be a change of company name upon successful tender due to different ownership of the business”. At this time, Station 33’s business registration had not been cancelled even though it was expired (see above at [6]). According to the first defendant, he intended to incorporate a new business to operate a new hair salon at the Premises. However, since he had yet to incorporate a new business at the time, he submitted the tender under Station 33’s name instead.
- [27]
[27] A few days later, on 6 April 2017, SMRT sent a letter by courier to the Premises stating that the Claimant’s Lease would be terminated upon its expiry on 16 October 2017. Between 12 April and 22 May 2017, SMRT had discussions via e-mail with the first defendant and/or his nephew, Mr Johnson Ong, in relation to the key commercial terms for the tender. On 25 April 2017, the second defendant, Andy Ong Beauty Services Pte Ltd, was incorporated by the first defendant, allegedly with the assistance of his sister. The second defendant’s Accounting and Corporate Regulatory Authority (“ACRA”) profile was provided to SMRT to facilitate the lease agreement between parties.
- [28]
[28] Subsequently, on 27 June 2017, SMRT sent a letter addressed to the second defendant regarding an offer for the lease of the Premises. A lease agreement was entered into between SMRT and the second defendant (the “Second Defendant’s Lease”) for 36 months from 19 October 2017, at a monthly rental of $18,300 for the first year, $18,500 for the second year and $18,700 for the third year. On top of the monthly rental, the second defendant also had to pay additional rent of 0.5% of monthly gross sales generated. As noted earlier, the Claimant’s Lease was terminated on 16 October 2017 (see above at [4]). Shortly after, the Second Defendant’s Lease of the Premises then commenced on 19 October 2017, ie, just three days after 16 October 2017. A three-day fitting period was granted by SMRT for the first defendant to carry out “minor renovation such as changing a new signboard and minimum renovation work in the [Premises]” before the term commenced.
- [29]
[29] On 1 June 2019, Mr Chua filed a police report against the first defendant, in relation to the first defendant’s act of tendering for the lease of the Premises under the Claimant’s name and then subsequently changing the name that the lease was under to the second defendant’s.
- [30]
[30] The Second Defendant’s Lease was subsequently renewed twice:
(a) On 4 October 2020, the Second Defendant’s Lease was renewed for another 36 months from 19 October 2020 to 18 October 2023, but at a discounted rental rate due to the COVID-19 pandemic at that time. The monthly rental charge was $9,800 for the first year, $10,600 for the second year and $11,700 for the third year.
(b) On 11 May 2023, the Second Defendant’s Lease was renewed again for another 36 months from 19 October 2023 to 18 October 2026 for $13,688 per month.
The Premises were still leased under the second defendant’s name at the time of the trial.
- [31]
[31] The claimant commenced the present claim against the Defendants on 24 April 2023.
The parties’ cases
The claimant’s case
- [32]
[32] In gist, the claimant’s position in these proceedings is that Station 33 was profitable and the first defendant had, in breach of his duties owed to the claimant, misapplied the earnings of Station 33, and also wrongfully used or transferred the assets of Station 33 to the second defendant.
- [33]
[33] First, the first defendant owed fiduciary duties to the claimant, including that of good faith and/or fidelity, to act in the best interests of the claimant. Not only was the first defendant a director of the claimant, but he was the one who solely managed Station 33’s business to the exclusion of Mr Chua and the claimant’s other representatives (who were allegedly “chased away” from the Premises; see above at [19]). The first defendant was entrusted with extensive discretion to act in relation to Station 33’s business and he had solely handled, prepared and/or kept all relevant financial documents and records of the business. The claimant thus had no knowledge of the operations and financial status of Station 33.
- [34]
[34] The first defendant had breached these duties by failing to account to the claimant for the profits made and/or assets derived in respect of Station 33’s business while Station 33 was in operation. As a result of the first defendant’s duties to the claimant, the former held the profits made and/or assets derived in respect of Station 33’s business on trust for the claimant and is liable to account for the same. Further or alternatively, the claimant suffered loss which the first defendant is personally liable for.
- [35]
[35] Next, the first defendant is also in breach of the same duties owed to the claimant by his wrongful use and/or transfer of profits, assets, business, goodwill, clientele, management staff and/or employees of the claimant to build up the business and/or to pay the operating expenses of the second defendant, or to use the money for other personal or collateral purposes. The first defendant transferred, “lock stock and barrel”, Station 33’s assets to the second defendant. Essentially, according to the claimant, the first defendant merely changed the shop sign at the Premises from “Station 33” to the name of the second defendant and continued operating the salon business at the same place.
- [36]
[36] The claimant seeks damages (in the sum of a total of $2,498,000 ) and/or an account of the profits and/or assets derived by the defendants from the claimant as a result of the following:
(a) Unjust enrichment: The first and/or second defendant(s) have been unjustly enriched at the expense of the claimant (in relation to the profits, assets, business, goodwill, clientele and/or staff of the claimant) and are liable for the damages suffered and are to account to the claimant for the same. Notably, no unjust factor has been identified in the claimant’s statement of claim or its written submissions.
(b) Dishonest assistance: In the statement of claim, the claimant initially pleaded that the first defendant dishonestly assisted the transfer of profits, assets and the like from the claimant to the second defendant, and, alternatively, that either or both defendants are also liable for dishonest assistance in so far as any of the benefits derived from the wrongful transfer or use of Station 33’s profits, assets and the like were traceable to them. However, none of these arguments were expounded upon in the claimant’s written submissions.
(c) Knowing receipt: Similar to its claim in dishonest assistance, the claimant’s pleadings in relation to the defendants’ liability for knowing receipt were not completely elaborated on in their written submissions. In its statement of claim, the claimant pleaded that the second defendant is in knowing receipt of the benefits derived from any wrongful use or transfer of Station 33’s assets, and, more broadly, in relation to both defendants as long as the said asset is traceable to them. However, in the claimant’s reply submissions, the claim in knowing receipt appears to be solely confined to the second defendant.
(d) Conspiracy: Both defendants had conspired, whether by lawful or unlawful means, such that the claimant suffered loss and damage as a result of the conspiracy. However, only the claimant’s reply submissions broadly discussed this claim, and only in relation to an unlawful means conspiracy.
The defendants’ case
- [38]
[38] The first defendant denies breaching any fiduciary duty owed to the claimant:
(a) The first defendant denies operating the Station 33 business to the exclusion of Mr Chua or any other representatives of the claimant. The first defendant was in charge of the day-to-day operations of Station 33, while it was Mr Chua himself (and/or Mdm Lim or even Mr Peter Chong) that was in charge of the administration and accounting of Station 33.
(b) The first defendant did furnish documents relating to Station 33 to the claimant and/or Mr Chua, and the claimant evidently was able to disclose such documents belonging to Station 33 in the course of these proceedings.
(c) The first defendant was unaware of his directorship in the claimant and he thus cannot be held liable for any breach of director’s duties.
- [39]
[39] The first defendant also could not have wrongfully used or transferred any of the claimant’s alleged profit or assets for the following reasons:
(a) There was no profit to begin with, ie, Station 33 had incurred losses for almost the entire course of its existence.
(b) The first defendant could not have transferred or used any of the claimant’s or Station 33’s alleged funds to pay for the second defendant’s costs because Mr Chua and Mdm Lim were also signatories to either (or both) the Station 33 Bank Account and Concorde Bank Account. The accounts’ passbooks, cheque books and/or bank cards were retained by Mr Chua and/or Mdm Lim.
(c) The setting up, renovations, equipment and the paid up capital of the second defendant were all paid for by the first defendant, not the claimant and/or Station 33. This was, as the first defendant claims, funded by the first defendant’s sale of his condominium unit at Balestier, Singapore.
(d) Any clientele and/or goodwill vested in Station 33 belonged to the first defendant. The first defendant brought his contacts and clientele to Station 33 from AOHS, and the customers visited Station 33 mostly because of the services provided by the first defendant. In any event, any goodwill vested in Station 33 ended when its business registration was cancelled in July 2017.
(e) In relation to the staff, the first defendant hired new employees for the second defendant’s business. According to the first defendant, only Mr Feng Zhen (“Mr Feng”), who was previously employed by Station 33, was re-employed by the second defendant because Mr Feng wanted to work with the first defendant. For completeness, I note that Mdm Chong Hui Xian (“Mdm Chong”), who was also employed by Station 33 at a point in time, was re-employed by the second defendant for much the same reason.
- [40]
[40] By virtue of the above, since there was no underlying breach of duty or wrongful transfer and/or use of assets, the defendants are not liable for any claim in unjust enrichment, dishonest assistance, knowing receipt or conspiracy.
- [41]
[41] The defendants also submit that, alternatively, the defence of acquiescence applies. Mr Chua and/or the claimant was, at all times, explicitly aware that the first defendant had: (a) tendered for the Premises on behalf of the second defendant; (b) incorporated the second defendant; and (c) had operated the second defendants’ business at the Premises since September 2017. Notwithstanding this, Mr Chua allegedly “stood by for years without raising any objection”.
- [42]
[42] In the further alternative, if this court does find that the first defendant had breached his duties to the claimant, the claimant did not suffer loss and/or damage that the defendants are liable for.
- [43]
[43] In the defendants’ closing submissions, it was raised for the first time that the claim was potentially time-barred. I note that such a defence was not pleaded. I also note that, in the first defendant’s affidavit, he stated that Mr Chua himself “turned a blind eye” to the claimant’s and Station 33’s well-being, and that the entire suit was a conspiracy by Mr Chua and Ms Shirley Chee (the claimant’s liquidator) to “fix” the first defendant.
- [44]
[44] Finally, the defendants accept that, from October 2017 to May 2022, some of the second defendant’s outgoing expenses were erroneously paid from the Station 33 Bank Account. Such expenses totalled $15,801.24. The first defendant accepts that such moneys should be returned as it was wrongfully used by the second defendant. The first defendant also indicates that he will be prepared to make restitution of this amount to the claimant.
The issues to be determined
- [45]
[45] To my mind, the issues to be determined are as follows:
- [46]
[46] As I highlighted earlier (see above at [36(b)]–[36(d)]), it appears that the claimant has confined its submissions in relation to its claims in dishonest assistance and knowing receipt such that it is only pursuing a claim in knowing receipt against the second defendant, and its claim in conspiracy to only that of unlawful means conspiracy. I will therefore focus on those matters.
- [47]
[47] I also do not propose to address the claim in unjust enrichment. It is trite that, for a claim in unjust enrichment to be made out, there must be a “particular recognised unjust factor or event which gives rise to a claim”, and a “general notion of unconscionability or unjustness” is not sufficient (Wee Chiaw Sek Anna v Ng Li-Ann Genevieve (sole executrix of the estate of Ng Hock Seng, deceased) and another [2013] 3 SLR 801 (“Anna Wee”) at [130] and [134]). Similar to the appellant in Anna Wee, the claimant in the present case failed to refer to a specific unjust factor underlying its claim in unjust enrichment, and there is no support for the argument in law that the enrichment was “unjust” (without more) (Anna Wee at [135]–[136]). For the avoidance of any doubt, this is not to say that I would have concluded that there are no recognised unjust factors that the claimant may point to for their present claim. My simple point is that this was not canvassed before me and, in that sense, there was nothing pleaded or argued by way of a recognised “unjust factor” for me to even consider and assess.
The claim is not time-barred
- [48]
[48] Before turning to the trunk of my analysis, I first address a preliminary point. The defendants, in their closing submissions filed about two months after the end of the trial, argue for the first time in the proceedings before me that the claim is time-barred. According to the defendants, the time bar operates because more than six years have elapsed “since the cessation of Station 33’s business … in September 2016[,] if not July 2017”. The defendants proffer no further explanation, nor have they referred the court to any particular provision in the Limitation Act 1959 (2020 Rev Ed) (“Limitation Act”). In response, the claimant merely state in its reply submissions that, since it “pleaded fraud … against the [d]efendants”, the “time bar [does] not apply”.
- [49]
[49] I reproduce the relevant provision of the Limitation Act for ease of reference. Section 4 provides as such:
- [50]
[50] It is “indisputable” that the defendant bears the burden to plead the defence on limitation (IPP Financial Advisers Pte Ltd v Saimee bin Jumaat and another appeal [2020] 2 SLR 272 (“Saimee”) at [34]). In Saimee, the limitation defence was raised at the pleading stage but not in the written closing and reply submissions of the party seeking to invoke the limitation defence. The Court of Appeal found that the limitation defence was adequately pleaded in that case, albeit sloppy, since the other party “would have been put on notice that evidence would have to be adduced at the trial to establish that his claim was brought within time” (Saimee at [35]). That reasoning does not apply in the present case. On these facts, there is nothing in the defence filed which even vaguely alludes to a potential time bar. Indeed, Andrew McGee, Limitation Periods (Sweet & Maxwell, 9th Ed, 2022) at para 21.002 states that “the plea of the Limitation Act should be raised expressly and unambiguously” [emphasis added], though “it is sufficient to state the fact of raising the plea – the burden of proof on this point will then normally be transferred to the claimant to show that the action is not time-barred”. In my mind, the defendants’ tardy (or more accurately, non-existent) pleading of the limitation defence did not place the claimant on notice to adduce the relevant evidence during trial that the claim was not time-barred, and the defendants have plainly failed to discharge their burden of pleading the limitation defence. The above suffices to dispose of this point.
- [51]
[51] Nonetheless, for completeness, I would have found that the claim is not likely to have been time-barred. As a starting point, the entire claim would be caught by virtue of ss 6(2) and 6(7) of the Limitation Act. I reproduce these provisions below for ease of reference:
- [52]
[52] As held by the Court of Appeal in Yong Kheng Leong and another v Panweld Trading Pte Ltd and another [2013] 1 SLR 173 (“Yong Kheng Leong”) (at [69]), the effect of s 6(7) is that “the entire s 6 [applies] to all claims for equitable relief, whether these be founded upon contract, tort, a trust or other ground in equity”. The present claim, being founded on the first defendant’s breach of his fiduciary obligations (which are akin to that of a trustee), and the second defendant’s liability for knowing receipt and/or unlawfully conspiring with the first defendant, would fall within the provision. The claimant’s action for an account of the claimant’s assets would also be caught by s 6(2) of the Limitation Act. Nonetheless, the applicability of the time bar to these claims is subject to, inter alia, s 22 of the Limitation Act.
- [53]
[53] It is clear that the first defendant, as a director of the claimant, is a “Class 1” constructive trustee, ie, a person that held a position of a trustee and dealt with the trust property in breach of a trust, that is subject to the time bar prescribed in s 22(2) of the Limitation Act (Yong Kheng Leong at [46] and [52]). This is distinct to a “Class 2” constructive trustee, who fraudulently acquired property over which he had never previously been impressed with trust obligations, and it is only because of that fraudulent conduct that he be held liable to account as if he were a constructive trustee (Yong Kheng Leong at [46]).
- [54]
[54] I return to the claimant’s submission that since it “pleaded fraud”, the time bar “does not apply”. To my mind, the claimant was necessarily referring to s 22(1)(a) of the Limitation Act in particular, which provides that there will be no time bar where there is fraud, or a fraudulent breach of trust. In comparison, s 29 of the Limitation Act merely postpones the limitation period in the case of fraud or mistake. As such, if the defendants had adequately pleaded their limitation defence (which they did not), I proceed on the basis that the claimant would have relied on s 22(1)(a) to disapply the time bar. The relevant provisions are as follows:
- [55]
[55] I note that the claimant did not specifically plead that the first defendant’s breach of his fiduciary obligations was fraudulent, ie, the word “fraud” or “fraudulent” did not feature in that part of the claim. Nonetheless, for the purposes of s 22(1)(a) of the Limitation Act, it is sufficient if fraud is present even if it is not an element of the cause of action (Lim Ah Leh v Heng Fock Lin [2018] SGHC 156 (“Lim Ah Leh”) at [201]). Indeed, as the court observed in Lim Ah Leh (at [201]–[202]), a breach of trust as a cause of action has no fixed set of elements – the court should thus determine if a breach of trust has been established, and if so, whether it is “fraudulent” within the meaning of s 22(1)(a) of the Limitation Act.
- [56]
[56] Having established the above, I would have found that the exception in s 22(1)(a) of the Limitation Act applies to the claim against the first defendant, such that the present claim is not time-barred. The meaning of “fraud” and “fraudulent” for the purposes of s 22(1)(a) entails “dishonesty”, which is defined as if the trustee “acts in a way which he does not honestly believe is in the interests of the beneficiaries then he is acting dishonestly”. In turn, “dishonesty” requires that: (a) “the defendant’s conduct was dishonest by the ordinary standards of reasonable and honest people”; and (b) the defendant “himself realised that by those standards his conduct was dishonest” (Yong Kheng Leong at [52], citing Armitage v Nurse and others [1998] Ch 241 at 260F and Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley and others [2002] 2 AC 164 at [27]). Based on the particulars of the claimant’s pleaded claim, it is clear that the first defendant objectively could not have been said to have acted honestly, and he must have known that his conduct was dishonest: not only did he siphon the cash takings from the claimant’s registered business and convert its assets to his own use, but he also repeatedly failed to account for the trust property.
- [57]
[57] In contrast to the first defendant, the second defendant is a “Class 2” constructive trustee where such a constructive trust potentially arises as a result of the fraudulent or unlawful transaction. Such a claim would be subject to s 6(7) of the Limitation Act instead and the six-year time bar thereunder (Yong Kheng Leong at [51] and [69]). Nonetheless, the claim against the second defendant would not be time-barred either. The claimant’s assets would have been wrongfully transferred and received by the second defendant, at the very earliest, on the day it was incorporated (ie, 25 April 2017). The present claim was brought on 24 April 2023 – a day shy of six years from the date the second defendant was incorporated.
- [58]
[58] Therefore, in the event the matter of limitation was properly pleaded (and I stress that it was not), I would still have likely found that the limitation period simply did not apply. Be that as it may, it is a moot point given the conclusions that I had arrived at earlier about the fact that the claimant was never put on notice that limitation was even an issue in this case and understandably never led any evidence that was focused on such matter.
My decision on liability
- [59]
[59] The claimant called only one witness, Mr Chua, and the defendants called three witnesses for the trial before me. These three defence witnesses comprise the first defendant, and two individuals who were employed by Station 33 and also by the second defendant at certain points in time. The evidence given by the two individuals – namely Mr Feng and Mdm Chong – was largely tangential to my decision on liability for reasons that I will explain later on. In my view, the case turns primarily on the evidence and accompanying documentation of the two key individuals, namely Mr Chua and the first defendant. If I prefer Mr Chua’s evidence, it almost automatically follows that the first defendant would be in breach of his directors’ duties. In the same vein, if I accept the first defendant’s version of events, there would be few breaches, and any such breach would be technical at best (save for the matter of the second defendant’s expenses that were taken from Station 33’s Bank Account, which the first defendant accepts that he is liable for and needs to return – see above at [44]).
- [60]
[60] On a balance of probabilities, I find Mr Chua’s evidence to be much more cogent and plausible than that of the first defendant. It is also more aligned to the breadth of the evidence before me.
The first defendant was aware that he was a director of the claimant from the outset
- [61]
[61] I now turn to the first issue to be determined – whether the first defendant owed duties to the claimant. It is trite that directors owe fiduciary duties to their companies, which include: (a) the duty to act honestly and in good faith in the best interests of their company; (b) the duty not to exercise their powers for an improper purpose such as feathering their own nests; and (c) the duty not to place themselves in a position in which there is a conflict between their duties to the company and their personal interests or duties to others (DM Divers Technics Pte Ltd v Tee Chin Hock [2004] 4 SLR(R) 424 at [80]). Such fiduciary obligations are “voluntarily undertaken … in the sense that [they arise] as a consequence of a fiduciary’s conduct … where the fiduciary voluntarily places himself in a position where the law can objectively impute an intention on his or her part to undertake those obligations” (Tan Yok Koon v Tan Choo Suan and another and other appeals [2017] 1 SLR 654 at [194]). It is undisputed that the first defendant was a director of the claimant, and it follows that he would owe fiduciary duties to the claimant. In this regard, in an attempt to legally make the case that he owed no director duties to the claimant, the first defendant claimed that he was not even aware that he was a director (or a shareholder) of the claimant and thus cannot be bound by any such obligations.
- [62]
[62] In the first defendant’s oral evidence and written submissions, he painted the following picture:
(a) Mr Chua allegedly lied that the first defendant would be a director of Station 33, rather than a director of the claimant, in an attempt to “cheat” the first defendant. In fact, the entire corporate structure where Station 33 was owned by the claimant was allegedly concocted by Mr Chua as a “trick” to “frame” the first defendant, particularly since there was no “logical explanation” why such a corporate structure was necessary for a “simple hair salon business”. This point was made vociferously numerous times by the first defendant when he was on the stand.
(b) In fact, the first defendant had informed Mr Chua that he was only interested in the hairstyling and salon business, and “explicitly” reminded Mr Chua to “remove [his] name from any company … after SMRT award [sic] any lease” to the claimant. According to the first defendant, Mr Chua agreed to “take [the first defendant’s] name out of [the claimant], because [the claimant] was just a shell company”.
(c) There was a “clear demarcation of responsibilities and duties” where Mr Chua was in charge of all the administrative and accounting matters and the first defendant was only involved in the day to day operations of Station 33.
(d) In comparison to Mr Chua who was an “experienced businessman” that was “more educated and sophisticated”, the first defendant claimed to be “barely literate, [he] could not speak or write in proper English and was ignorant of corporate matters”. Due to the first defendant’s near-illiteracy and unfamiliarity with corporate documents and processes, he did not know he was registered as a director of the claimant. He harboured the mistaken impression that his signing of certain documents was merely to set up the claimant to procure the Claimant’s Lease for the Premises.
- [63]
[63] Four obvious points suggest that the first defendant’s narrative as set out in the preceding paragraph is false. I deal with each in turn.
- [64]
[64] First, the entire account is simply irreconcilable with the first defendant’s many concessions regarding his knowledge of the involvement of the claimant as part of the corporate structure. In particular, in various parts of his own affidavit, the first defendant admitted that he was informed by Mr Chua that a company known as “Concorde” would be the vehicle that the investment for Station 33 would be parked in, that this would be the corporate entity that would bid for the tender for the Premises and the Claimant’s Lease obtained in 2011 was indeed under the claimant’s name. The first defendant even knew that he was a signatory to the Concorde Bank Account (ie, the claimant’s bank account) in mid-June 2010, and that this bank account was to be used for some of Station 33’s financial transactions. Even when taking the defendants’ case at its absolute highest (which I do not accept for reasons that I will highlight below), it would have been obvious that the claimant was a corporate entity that, on a broad level, oversaw the hairstyling business. It also did not escape my attention that the first defendant’s account in court that there was an express representation by Mr Chua to him that he was a director of Station 33, and not of the claimant, was conspicuously absent from his affidavit.
- [65]
[65] Second, and relatedly, the evidence very much suggests that the first defendant was, in fact, aware that he was a director of the claimant. Indeed, the first defendant repeatedly and categorically asserted in his affidavit that he had asked for his name to be removed as a director (since one cannot be “removed” as a shareholder as such) of the claimant after the Claimant’s Lease was awarded (see above at [62(b)]). It is immediately self-evident that it would be absurd for the first defendant to seek to be removed from a position that he claims to not even know that he occupied. His claim, that he had stridently insisted on having his name removed as a director of the claimant, therefore only proves his awareness of his status as a director. To be clear, I do not accept that the first defendant had indeed made such a request to remove his name as a director to Mr Chua at the time. The only point I am making is that the first defendant cannot in the same breath claim that he was unaware of his directorship in the claimant while simultaneously contending that he had specifically requested to be removed as its director.
- [66]
[66] I would parenthetically note that even the first defendant’s affidavit evidence, on its own, points inexorably to the fact that he knew full well that he was going to serve as a director of the claimant for the purposes of the business in question. To recapitulate, he claimed that he requested that his name be removed from the claimant’s directors after SMRT awarded the lease. Such an averment simply did not make any sense. If he had any objections to being a director of the claimant, why did he not just refuse to serve as a director from the get-go? What would be the value or significance of only having his name as a director for the purposes of obtaining the lease? In the same vein, what would be the purpose, or value, of removing his name immediately after? In any event, if the first defendant’s narrative was true, why did he not follow up on his desire to be removed as a director or liaise with ACRA to make the necessary changes? All of this further reflects the fact that his actions, based on his own account in his affidavit, proves that he knew full well that he was serving as a director of the claimant, which is also the modality by which the hairstyling business would be run.
- [67]
[67] The third point is a logical one. I am unable to see how the corporate structure allegedly devised by Mr Chua, where the first defendant and Mr Chua would be co-directors and equal shareholders of the claimant which registered Station 33, would prejudice or “cheat” the first defendant in any way. The first defendant, throughout the entirety of his evidence, has not been able to point to how such a corporate structure in any way left him worse off (or left Mr Chua better off). It was a plain vanilla corporate structure that was entirely unexceptional. The first defendant has not made good the rather absurd assertion that “he cheated me into signing all these documents [making me a director of the claimant] to try and frame me”. Being a director of the claimant could not in any way “frame” the first defendant, or somehow put him in a worse off position, unless he was seeking to breach his duties to the claimant (and to hollow it of its funds) and was therefore not ready to be shackled with such duties to begin with.
- [68]
[68] Indeed, if nothing else, Mr Chua was effecting a corporate structure in which the first defendant was given much more power over the affairs of the company (qua director) than the first defendant even claims he sought. On this front, it defies logic that Mr Chua would have made the first defendant a joint shareholder (with equal shares) of the claimant, unless doing so gave voice to the specific agreement between the parties. This is especially if, as Mr Chua pointed out, he had contributed more financially than the first defendant in the business. Mr Chua had also invested an initial sum of $25,000 above and beyond the $200,000 that came in equal parts from Mr Chua and the first defendant (see above at [9]). Why would Mr Chua intentionally mislead the first defendant, or be incentivised to cajole him, into signing a deal that accorded the first defendant directorship powers which would have been to Mr Chua’s own detriment (in that the first defendant now had say on how things were run qua director) unless the agreement struck between the parties was to make them equal partners in the entire transaction? It would appear obvious that the only reason for Mr Chua to do this was because the parties had, in fact, come to such an agreement on how to operate the hairstyling business. If Mr Chua had ill-intended aims of freezing out the first defendant from the get-go, as the first defendant continually asserted in cross-examination, then it would have been much easier to facilitate that by leaving the first defendant’s name out of the company, thereby allowing Mr Chua to have full control of the company at all times.
- [69]
[69] In the premises, it is clear to me that the first defendant knew at all times he was in fact a director of the claimant. Of course, I accept that it was probable that Mr Chua took primary charge of preparing the necessary paperwork for the corporate set up in 2011. Nonetheless, this had no causal connection with what the first defendant would have known about the corporate arrangements being made at the time. During these proceedings, the defendants harped on the fact that the first defendant “merely managed the day-to-day operations of Station 33” and worked as the head hairstylist of Station 33 while Mr Chua took primary charge of the administrative matters of the business. Even if I accept that there was such a demarcation of responsibilities at the outset, it does not follow that the first defendant was in the dark about the existence and significance of his own position as a director of the claimant. Indeed, as Mr Chua pointed out on the stand, the first defendant was distinctly remunerated for his hairstyling work which is additional to any other responsibilities owed to the claimant and/or Station 33. I also highlight that it appeared inconceivable that Mr Chua did not fully explain to the first defendant the corporate structure involved, or that the first defendant was unaware of the papers that he signed (to serve as a director of the claimant).
- [71]
[71] The final point I would make on this front pertains to the first defendant’s proficiency (or to be more precise, alleged non-proficiency) in the English language. The first defendant repeatedly made the point that he was unable to read and write “proper English”, though he was able to handle “simple tasks … using English”, and was thus unaware of the nature of the documents he had signed. To be sure, I accepted that having had only a primary school education, the first defendant was, in all likelihood, not particularly proficient in reading and writing in English. Nonetheless, I reject the first defendant’s self-serving assertion that he did not have an adequate command of the English language to understand the documents he had signed. Indeed, the record is replete with numerous written payment vouchers that he issued in English. In the same vein, his employment agreement, as simple as it is, is also written in English and does not appear to be based off a template, suggesting once more that he has a working understanding of written English.
- [72]
[72] For what it is worth, it is also clear during the trial that the first defendant has a fairly decent command of spoken English. The first defendant had, at numerous times, insisted on answering questions in English before they had been interpreted, to the point that the court – and even the first defendant’s own counsel – had to explicitly request that he refrain from answering in English. I would only add that such proficiency (both of written and spoken English) would have been likely necessary for anyone in the position of the first defendant, who has been running businesses in Singapore for over a decade, and, in that capacity, needed to sign leases like the one he did with SMRT in 2014 (see above at [4]).
The first defendant misapplied Station 33’s assets
The first defendant’s actions from late 2011
- [74]
[74] As set out above, the parties advance quite distinct narratives of what transpired from about two months into the running of Station 33 (sometime in early 2012 when Mr Chua and the first defendant started to drift apart). The first defendant claims that it was Mr Chua who had abandoned Station 33 (from about sometime in May 2012), whilst the claimant contends that it was the first defendant who took steps to effectively convert the claimant’s resources to his own use, and to freeze Mr Chua out of the business.
- [75]
[75] On balance, I accept the claimant’s version of what transpired at the time. I further find, on a balance of probabilities, that the first defendant effectively treated Station 33 and, by extension, the claimant’s receivables (the claimant’s cash receivables, in particular) as his own assets, for his use as and when he pleased, by the turn of 2012.
(1) Missing cash receipts from January 2012
- [76]
[76] One of the biggest markers in this regard is the sudden conspicuous disappearance of all cash receipts from the business from January 2012. The bank statements tell a clear and indisputable story: in the first two months of business, namely in November and December 2011, cash receipts (ie, cash earnings) from the business amounted to about $18,979.40 and $23,798.37 respectively. Over the subsequent six years, not a single further cent was deposited into the Station 33 Bank Account by way of cash receipts. This was especially odd given the nature of a hairstyling business – one imagines that such a business may typically see slowly increasing revenue until it starts to establish a following and a loyal customer base, thereby potentially allowing for a more sustained uptick in revenue after. Instead, inexplicably, there were no recorded cash earnings to speak of for many years. To be fair, the first defendant does not deny that there were indeed cash takings by Station 33 even after December 2011. According to the first defendant, instead of banking in the cash takings, he kept it and used it to pay salaries, suppliers and the like.
- [77]
[77] With respect, this is not the strong defence that the first defendant thinks it is. It is clear that, by January 2012, the first defendant had ultimate control of the cash receivables of Station 33. This proves one obvious point: by this point of time, the first defendant had effectively frozen the other investor out of the office, such that he, and only he, had access to the cash that was coming into the business. One can only surmise that this was, in all likelihood, a large sum of money every month. Given that reality, it would be inconceivable that Mr Chua would not have wanted the first defendant to account for such moneys and that Mr Chua would have been happy to allow the first defendant to use such moneys as he deemed fit, if Mr Chua had a choice. It would be even more improbable, if Mr Chua did have access to the cash register in the Premises, for him to allow the first defendant to singlehandedly decide, almost by fiat, that the latter would be the sole decision-maker on how the moneys would be spent each month, and that not a single cent was put in for six years, with no need to provide any form of meaningful account as to where the money went. By all accounts, this must have been an extremely large sum of money. Taking December 2011’s cash takings of $23,798.37 as a barometer (and I stress that this would likely be a conservative barometer), the unaccounted composite sum of cash takings from January 2012 to September 2017 (ie, the last full month Station 33 was in business) would have been in excess of $1.6m.
- [78]
[78] The first defendant suggests that he had no other choice but to retain the cash takings because to do otherwise would mean that he had no meaningful way to pay workers, suppliers and facilitate the purchase of goods and services. However, that argument simply does not pass muster. To be clear, I accept that the first defendant probably made payment for many of Station 33’s outgoing expenses using such cash receipts. This, however, is beside the point. If, as the first defendant repeatedly asserts, Mr Chua and his Team were in charge of the administrative and accounting matters, then such business expenses are obviously for them to take care of and that can be drawn down from the bank account against the cash receipts put into the account. There is no logical reason for the first defendant to effectively run one aspect of the business unsupervised and unaccounted for in the cloak of darkness, unless the aim was to shield away from view and to take a fairly sizeable chunk of such cash receipts for his own use. I would add that, if indeed the first defendant felt that that Mr Chua was making the former fend for himself in this manner, it is curious that the first defendant has not produced any correspondence in which he bitterly complains to Mr Chua about how he has been left to fend for himself, and his need to then use the cash receipts to pay off the necessary expenses of the business. In my view, the dearth of such correspondence strongly hints to the version of events being peddled by the first defendant being false.
(2) The Subletting Agreement
- [79]
[79] It speaks volumes that the sudden divergence of all cash receipts coincided with numerous other shenanigans on the part of the first defendant that sought to further fatten his pockets and simultaneously hollowed out Station 33’s. One key example is the Subletting Agreement that commenced in February 2012 (see above at [12]). The first defendant claims this was done with Mr Chua’s agreement, but the entirety of the circumstances strongly suggests that the first defendant’s actions were designed to divert funds away from the claimant. As an obvious marker of this, the contract was signed in the first defendant’s personal capacity (even though the Premises were, strictly speaking, rented by Station 33 and the lease was under the claimant’s name). The first defendant claims this was because he was conscious that subletting was disallowed under the lease agreement with SMRT. With respect, this is a plainly disingenuous argument, especially when one takes cognisance of the following:
(a) If SMRT caught wind of the act of sub-leasing, then whether the Subletting Agreement was signed by the first defendant (in his personal name) or otherwise would be completely beside the point. The repercussions would flow to the claimant either way, whatever these might be, as there would be no plausible deniability available in those circumstances given that the first defendant was one of the two directors in charge of a very small corporate outfit and the Subletting Agreement specifically would be for the premises that SMRT leased out to the claimant.
(b) Even if the aim of drafting such an agreement in his personal name allowed for plausible deniability on the part of Station 33 if SMRT caught wind of the arrangement, this did not even begin to explain why most of the rental moneys had been put in the first defendant’s personal account, as opposed to the Station 33 Bank Account (see above at [13]). It certainly did not explain why or how he could do so without Mr Chua’s permission or acceptance (and there is no evidence that he brought to the court to suggest that he had obtained approval for this).
(c) The first defendant has a habit of portraying himself as being entirely in the dark about the significance of legal documents when it suited his purposes (see, for example, [62(d)] above), only to have an eye for legal technicalities when it suited him (as is the case here). The first defendant cannot have his cake and eat it: either he is a savvy operator who knew full well what he was doing when signing documents, or as he put it, he is someone who is “uneducated” and “barely literate” with no knowledge of business matters. More precisely, in this context, he cannot claim to have a nuanced understanding of the separate legal personality in deciding how to shield the corporate entity from liability when it suited him, only to then claim to be a babe in the woods who is completely lost in understanding the niceties of contracts when other contractual documents prove inconvenient for him.
- [80]
[80] In any event, there is documentary evidence to suggest that the subletting had been done without the claimant’s (and Mr Chua’s) knowledge. In the March 2015 Letter, which lists numerous concerns about the first defendant’s conduct over the years, the claimant noted that such subletting had been done without its (and Mr Chua’s) knowledge. I note that the first defendant conveniently claims that the various letters sent by the claimant was not received by him – this is a matter I will deal with at greater length later on (see [106] below). Suffice it to say, I disbelieve such a convenient attempt to disavow receipt.
(3) Dismantling of security cameras in Station 33
- [81]
[81] A further and obvious marker that provides an insidious gloss to the above series of events is the all-too-coincidental dismantling of the original security cameras at Station 33 that would have allowed one to remotely assess the front desk, and more significantly, the cash register area of the Premises, at around the same time the first defendant started diverting moneys away from the Station 33 Bank Account. Significantly, Mr Chua was able to access the original security cameras but was unable to do so after the cameras were replaced. The first defendant suggests that he had replaced the previous cameras because they had broken down. However, this reason is at odds with the contents of the March 2015 Letter, in which the claimant specifically highlights that the reason given by the first defendant for the dismantling of the security cameras was that “customers do not like to be captured/monitored on CCTV when making payment”. I would add that such a reason seems perverse and incredible, given that it is common practice for most businesses to install CCTV cameras at payment stations in retail shops to ensure that moneys received can be accounted for – in that sense, it is precisely to monitor payment that such CCTV cameras are installed.
(4) Mr Peter Chong’s employment
- [82]
[82] At about the same time, the first defendant introduced Mr Peter Chong to replace Mdm Lim in Station 33 as the accountant of the company. Such a recommendation was puzzling to say the least since it is self-evident from his application form (that has been produced in evidence) that he was entirely unsuited for the role, having never done any accounting work in his professional life or having any educational qualifications to allow him to effectively discharge the role. As alluded to earlier, the first defendant and Mr Chua proffered vastly different accounts of how Mdm Lim departed from her role and how Mr Peter Chong ended up replacing Mdm Lim. Mr Chua suggests that the first defendant was insistent on Mr Peter Chong’s employment, and the first defendant in turn suggests that this was because Mr Chua decided, “for reasons unknown” to him, that his wife would no longer assist on the accounts, though both parties agree that it was the first defendant who provided his contact as a “friend”. It is clear that the much more cogent explanation was that offered by Mr Chua. It makes no sense for Mr Chua to have withdrawn Mdm Lim’s services from an investment he had just procured, and for which, on the first defendant’s account, Mdm Lim was being decently remunerated for (see above at [15]). Similarly, there would be no reason for the first defendant to recommend a patently unsuitable candidate for such a role of preparing the accounts, unless these actions were part of a broader agenda to benefit his contacts and/or populate the business with “friendly” faces.
- [83]
[83] I would stress that each of the discrete pieces of evidence I have discussed in the preceding paragraphs (see above at [76]–[82]) cannot and must not be seen in isolation. Indeed, I accept that each of these developments, if they had occurred by themselves, may have a benign explanation. Individual jigsaw puzzle pieces by their nature can never give one a full picture. However, their significance becomes amplified when the discrete pieces are put together and one starts to see the bigger picture. When one puts the various pieces together and realises that almost all of these events conveniently happened in the space of a month at or around December 2011 to January 2012, or at the very least in the first half of 2012, the composite picture that emerges is clear: the first defendant was, at the time, taking multiple concurrent steps as part of a broader co-ordinated campaign to take control of the accounts and to take over the cash finances of Station 33.
(5) The first defendant’s remuneration
- [84]
[84] Even on the first defendant’s own account, it would appear that, by 2012, he had started to take significant liberties on how he could deal with Station 33 finances and was effectively re-writing, interpreting, and fashioning remuneration policies in his favour. It is not in dispute that there was an agreement between the claimant and the first defendant on how he ought to be paid. The agreement dated 23 October 2011 (the “October 2011 Agreement”), to the extent it relates to the first defendant’s remuneration package, states, very simply as follows:
- [85]
[85] The agreement goes on to state various other clauses including the basic salary for workers, overtime rates, and commission payments, but prefaces such a discussion with a statement that expressly notes that such “remuneration not applicable to An[d]y Ong”. The nett effect of the October 2011 agreement on its face is self-evident: if the business is good, the first defendant gets $5,000; and if business is bad, he gets $2,000. That the upside is capped even in a good month is to be expected, since as an equity investor, in theory, all additional profits would still eventually accrue to him proportionately qua investor.
- [86]
[86] Despite the above, the available records (which are admittedly patchy) suggests that the first defendant paid himself elevated sums by way of remuneration, which were entirely out of sync with the October 2011 Agreement. I take a couple of examples to illustrate the point:
(a) In June 2012, he paid himself a composite sum of $8,091.20, before CPF deductions (comprising an apparent basic pay of $3,000, overtime of $700 and commissions of $4,391.20).
(b) In December 2012, he paid himself a composite pay of $6,160.75, before CPF deductions (comprising an apparent basic pay of $3,000 and commissions of $3,160.75).
It is immediately apparent that the sums that the first defendant paid himself was much higher than had been contractually agreed in the October 2011 Agreement.
- [88]
[88] In coming up with such a bizarre explanation, an even more tangled and complex web forms. Taking the examples set out at [86] above, neither payment voucher provides any indication that the first defendant was paid either the $2,000 or $5,000 components that would have been due to him under the October 2011 Agreement. Of course, this is above and beyond the obvious point that it is inexplicable that Mr Chua and the first defendant would have some sort of implicit understanding that neither side wanted to concretise in writing in the October 2011 Agreement. What benefit would having an oral agreement of even more remuneration components above and beyond a written agreement bring? All of this is then at odds with the fact that the October 2011 Agreement explicitly disallows the payments of commissions and overtime to the first defendant, and yet, he provided himself those compensation sums. Seen in the round, the explanation proffered by the first defendant does not actually explain anything. The obvious inference is that the first defendant’s pay package has no connection to the October 2011 Agreement because he was simply making up his remuneration package as it went along. The above only serves to reinforce the point that the first defendant was liberally using the cash receivables of the claimant as his own personal piggy bank to dip into as and when he pleased.
(6) Mr Chua did not abandon Station 33
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