General Division of the High Court · Decided 11 January 2024
Liew Michael Marcus v Public Prosecutor and other appeals
Feedback & support[2024] SGHC 4 · Case no. Magistrate’s Appeal No 9024 of 2020
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Grounds of decision
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Introduction
- [1]
[1] In a case where there was a series of physical assaults involving a number of perpetrators and a number of victims, but not all the perpetrators were involved in assaulting each victim, what is the evidence required before a finding can be made that there was a common object among the perpetrators to voluntarily cause hurt to all the victims? This was the key question I had to consider in the present case.
- [2]
[2] The five appellants met at a bar on the evening of 30 April 2017. The four victims were also at the same bar then. Following an evening of drinking, the five appellants and the four victims left the bar separately in the early hours of 1 May 2017.
- [3]
[3] Subsequently, at an open carpark near the bar, three incidents of violence took place. None of these incidents involved an attack by all five appellants on all four victims. Rather, as I set out at [18]–[30] below, each victim was attacked at a different point of time and each victim was not attacked by all the appellants.
- [4]
[4] Despite the above, the Prosecution preferred a charge under s 147 of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed) (the “Penal Code”) against each appellant for being a member of an unlawful assembly whose common object was to cause hurt to all four victims.
- [5]
[5] The appellants claimed trial to their corresponding charge under s 147 of the Penal Code in the court below. At the conclusion of the trial, the appellants were each found guilty and convicted of a charge under s 147 of the Penal Code. Thereafter, the District Judge (the “DJ”) sentenced the appellants to imprisonment terms ranging between 12 months and 18 months. The appellants filed appeals challenging their convictions and sentences.
- [6]
[6] While various arguments had been canvassed in the course of the appeal, one argument, in my view, was critical in deciding this appeal. Given the manner in which the Prosecution had framed the charge against the appellants, the Prosecution needed to show that the appellants possessed a common object to voluntarily cause hurt to all four victims. The appellants argued that the Prosecution had failed to adduce sufficient evidence to satisfy its burden of proving such a common object beyond reasonable doubt. The Prosecution, on the other hand, submitted that sufficient evidence had been adduced in the court below to show that the three incidents of violence were closely linked and that the appellants had possessed a common object.
- [7]
[7] Having considered the parties’ submissions, I allowed the appellants’ appeal against conviction in relation to each of their charges under s 147 of the Penal Code. The appellants’ convictions and sentences in relation to the charge under s 147 of the Penal Code were set aside, and the appellants were acquitted of their respective charge under s 147 of the Penal Code.
- [8]
[8] I then invited the parties to submit on whether altered charges could be framed against the appellants based on the facts proven in the court below, as allowed for under s 390(4) of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (2020 Rev Ed) (the “CPC”). Having considered the parties’ submissions on this point, I framed altered charges under s 323 of the Penal Code and s 323 read with s 34 of the Penal Code against the appellants based on their respective involvement in the hurt caused to the four victims. The specific charges which I framed against each appellant can be found at [114]–[127] below. I then invited the parties to submit on the appropriate sentences to be imposed in relation to the altered charges. The appellants sought fines, while the Prosecution sought short custodial sentences. Ultimately, I decided that fines were appropriate given the minor nature of the injuries sustained by the victims.
- [9]
[9] For completeness, two of the appellants also appealed against the custodial sentences imposed on charges which they had pleaded guilty to in the court below. I dismissed these appeals as the sentences were not manifestly excessive.
- [10]
[10] I set out the detailed grounds of my decision below, incorporating the oral remarks which I delivered at the hearings for this appeal.
Facts
The parties
- [11]
[11] The five appellants (collectively, the “Appellants”) were:
- [12]
[12] Michael, Lye Choon, Meng Chong and Wan Seng were friends from school. Regina was Wan Seng’s girlfriend at the material time. The Appellants met at a bar at Tebing Lane, Frienzie Bar and Bistro (the “Bar”), for drinks on the evening of 30 April 2017.
- [13]
[13] The victims (collectively, the “Victims”) were:
- [14]
[14] On the evening of 30 April 2017, the Victims were also at the Bar for a meal and to watch a televised football match.
The charge under s 147 of the Penal Code preferred against each Appellant
- [15]
[15] I set out below the charge under s 147 of the Penal Code preferred against Michael:
- [16]
[16] A similar charge was preferred against the other Appellants, with reference made to the co-Appellants. I refer to each of the Appellants’ charge under s 147 of the Penal Code as the “Rioting Charge”.
- [17]
[17] I next summarise the parties’ cases at trial on the events of 1 May 2017.
The Prosecution’s case in the court below
Michael’s kicked George’s car and started a riot involving a series of assaults by the Appellants against the Victims
- [18]
[18] When the Bar closed sometime in the early hours of 1 May 2017, the Victims left the Bar and proceeded to George’s car (the “Car”) which was parked at parking lot number (“Lot”) 42 of an open carpark near the Bar (the “Carpark”). Upon arriving at Lot 42, the Victims sat in the Car. George was seated in the driver’s seat, Maureen was seated in the front passenger seat, Daniel was in the rear passenger seat behind George, and Sreelatha was in the rear passenger seat behind Maureen.
- [19]
[19] George started the engine of the Car and turned on the headlights. At around this time, Michael walked past the front of the Car, supported by two persons. He kicked the headlights of the Car a few times, first on the left, and then on the right of the Car.
- [20]
[20] According to the Prosecution, this led to a riot involving a series of assaults by the Appellants against the Victims as detailed below.
Hurt was caused to Daniel near Lot 42
- [21]
[21] In response to Michael kicking the headlights of the Car, Daniel alighted from the Car, told Michael to stop kicking the Car and asked Michael why he had kicked the Car. Michael then removed his arms from the shoulders of the two persons who were supporting him and kicked Daniel twice. The second kick by Michael caused Daniel to fall to the ground. Daniel was then assaulted by a few unknown persons before he managed to get up from the ground.
- [22]
[22] Maureen, George and Sreelatha alighted from the Car to find out what was happening. Daniel asked Maureen to call the police. Maureen retrieved her mobile phone from the Car and called the police.
Hurt was caused to George near Lot 55
- [23]
[23] Whilst Maureen was calling the police, George proceeded to walk to various persons scattered around the Carpark. In the course of doing so, the following occurred:
(a) George first walked past Regina, who was standing near Lot 41.
(b) George then walked towards Meng Chong, who was standing near Lot 59. George asked Meng Chong to calm down.
(c) George noticed that Lye Choon was at the Carpark but chose not to approach him.
(d) George observed Wan Seng retrieving a black baton (“the baton”) from a blue van (the “Van”) parked at Lot 55. Wan Seng then stood near the Van, tapping the baton on his hand.
- [24]
[24] George then noticed that Michael was also standing near the Van. George proceeded towards Michael and tried to speak to him. However, as he did so, George was kicked from the back on his left shoulder, causing him to fall forward on top of Michael.
- [25]
[25] As George lay face-down on the ground, Wan Seng, Lye Choon and Meng Chong surrounded him. Wan Seng hit George on his back with the baton, whilst Lye Choon and Meng Chong beat George using their bare hands.
- [26]
[26] As George was being assaulted, Michael managed to get up from the ground. Michael then joined Wan Seng, Lye Choon and Meng Chong and assaulted George.
Hurt was caused to Maureen and Sreelatha near Lot 57 and Lot 58
- [27]
[27] Maureen noticed that George was being assaulted and ran towards him. However, as she ran past Lot 57 and Lot 58, Regina pulled Maureen back by her hair. This caused Maureen to fall to the ground.
- [28]
[28] While Maureen lay on the ground and facing upwards, Regina hit and kicked Maureen’s head.
- [29]
[29] Daniel noticed that Maureen and George were being assaulted. Daniel asked his wife, Sreelatha, to help Maureen while he proceeded towards where George was being assaulted.
- [30]
[30] Sreelatha proceeded towards Maureen near Lot 57 and Lot 58. As she tried to help Maureen stand up, Regina slapped and punched Sreelatha on her face.
The events which occurred after the riot and the injuries sustained by the Victims
- [31]
[31] As the assaults were taking place, two unknown men in plain clothes approached the group and asked everyone to stop. The two unknown men claimed that they were police officers. The Appellants stopped assaulting the Victims.
- [32]
[32] Wan Seng proceeded to place the baton in the Van. Wan Seng and Regina then went into the Van with the intention of driving out of the Carpark. Maureen, however, stood in front of the Van to prevent them from doing so.
- [33]
[33] Uniformed police officers arrived subsequently. Maureen and George were conveyed to Changi General Hospital (“CGH”). The injuries sustained by Maureen and George were documented in medical reports prepared by CGH. Meanwhile, Daniel felt pain in his lower abdomen and Sreelatha suffered injury to her eye and a cut on her lip.
The Appellants possessed a common object to cause hurt to the Victims by their participation in the unlawful assembly
- [34]
[34] The Prosecution contended in the court below that the Appellants had participated in an unlawful assembly by hitting and kicking one or more of the Victims:
(a) Michael instigated the violence by kicking Daniel near Lot 42. Thereafter, Michael was a participant in assaulting George when George was being assaulted by Wan Seng, Lye Choon and Meng Chong near Lot 55.
(b) Upon seeing Michael assaulting Daniel, Wan Seng armed himself with the baton and participated in the unlawful assembly by assaulting George with the baton.
(c) Regina actively participated in the unlawful assembly by: (i) assaulting Maureen, who was trying to stop the assault on George by Wan Seng, Lye Choon, Meng Chong and Michael; and (ii) hitting Sreelatha, who was trying to help Maureen. Regina did the above near Lot 57 and Lot 58. In doing so, she shared the common object of the Appellants to use violence on the Victims.
(d) Lye Choon participated in the unlawful assembly by assaulting George near Lot 55. He was also present at the Carpark during the altercation between Michael and Daniel. He would have been aware of the common object of the Appellants to use violence on the Victims.
(e) Finally, Meng Chong participated in the unlawful assembly by assaulting George near Lot 55. He was aware of the altercation between Michael and Daniel, given that he had been approached by George near Lot 59 shortly before George was assaulted (see [23(b)] above). He would have been aware of the common object of the Appellants to use violence on the Victims.
The Appellants’ cases in the court below
- [35]
[35] The Appellants were jointly represented by a single counsel in the court below. The Appellants disagreed with the Prosecution’s characterisation of the events of 1 May 2017.
- [36]
[36] Instead, the Appellants argued that the following occurred on 1 May 2017:
(a) When the Appellants left the Bar, Michael made his way to the Carpark first. As he was walking towards his vehicle, he was confronted by the Victims and assaulted by them. As Michael had consumed a significant amount of alcohol, he was unable to recall what had happened at the Carpark.
(b) Wan Seng and Regina arrived at the Carpark and saw Michael being assaulted by the Victims. Wan Seng took the baton and proceeded towards Michael to assist him. However, Regina pulled Wan Seng away and prevented him from going towards Michael. She also snatched the baton from Wan Seng and put it in the Van.
(c) Meng Chong and Lye Choon, together with one Mr Chua Kok Meng Benny (“Benny”), arrived at the Carpark shortly after and tried to separate the parties. As Lye Choon had consumed a significant amount of alcohol, he was unable to recall what had happened at the Carpark.
(d) In relation to the incident between Regina, Maureen and Sreelatha, Regina denied assaulting Maureen and Sreelatha. According to Regina, Maureen pulled her hair and hit her. Acting in self-defence, Regina pushed Maureen.
The DJ’s decision
The DJ’s decision to convict the Appellants of their respective Rioting Charge
- [37]
[37] The DJ convicted the Appellants of their respective Rioting Charges. The DJ’s grounds of decision are set out in Public Prosecutor v Michael Marcus Liew and others [2020] SGDC 104 (the “DJ’s GD”).
- [38]
[38] In finding that the Appellants were guilty of the Rioting Charge, the DJ considered that the key issue for determination was a factual one. It related to whether the collective testimony given by the Victims was credible and proved the Prosecution’s case of the occurrence of the riot beyond a reasonable doubt, or was undermined by the testimonies of the Appellants, as well as the Appellants’ witness, Benny.
- [39]
[39] The DJ found that the evidence of the Victims was credible. I summarise the key reasons for his finding below:
(a) The DJ found that the testimonies of the Victims were materially consistent. While they were each able to describe the events that took place at the Carpark to varying degrees, this did not affect their credibility and the reliability of their testimonies as: (i) there were many persons at the Carpark at the material time and the Victims would not have been able to witness everything that took place; and (ii) the discrepancies in the Victims’ testimonies were minor and could be attributed to memory lapses due to the passage of time.
(b) The key discrepancy in the Victims’ account related to whether Michael had been supported by two persons when he had walked past the Car at Lot 42. The DJ found that this was not a major discrepancy as: (i) the Victims were all able to identify that Michael had kicked the Car; (ii) the Victims consistently testified that Michael had been accompanied by other persons when he kicked the Car; and (iii) George’s account that Michael had not been supported by two persons could have been simply because George had failed to observe whether Michael was being supported at all. Ultimately, the discrepancy did not affect their evidence that Michael had kicked the Car before kicking Daniel when Daniel exited the Car.
(c) The Appellants were identified by the Victims based on distinctive physical traits.
(d) The injuries sustained by Maureen and George as set out in the medical reports were consistent with their accounts of how they had been assaulted.
- [40]
[40] The DJ found that the defence of each Appellant was not credible. I summarise the key reasons for his finding below:
(a) Michael’s defence was that he had been intoxicated and was therefore unable to remember anything. This was not credible, given that the Victims had identified Michael as the individual who had kicked Daniel twice and had been involved in assaulting George. Michael’s intoxication was self-induced and did not amount to a valid defence at law. Further, Michael had not made any convincing argument that the defence of intoxication applied on the facts.
(b) Wan Seng’s defence was that he had proceeded to Lot 55 to assist Michael, who had been surrounded by four to five persons. Further, while he took the baton from the Van, he intended to use the baton only in self-defence and not to actually hit anyone with the baton. This was not credible as:
(i) Wan Seng’s testimony that Michael had been surrounded by four to five persons at Lot 55 was materially inconsistent with his investigative statement to the police; there, he had only said that Michael and an “Indian man” had been fighting. Wan Seng’s explanation of this inconsistency was that the statement recorder had failed to record what Wan Seng had said about four to five people surrounding Michael. This was, however, refuted by the statement recorder, Station Inspector Mohamed Rashid (“SI Rashid”). The DJ found SI Rashid to be a truthful witness.
(ii) Wan Seng’s claim that he had not used the baton was untrue. George saw Wan Seng taking the baton from the Van and tapping the baton on his hand. Further, Maureen and Daniel saw Wan Seng hitting George with the baton.
(c) Regina’s defence in relation to her conduct towards Maureen was that she had acted in self-defence when she was assaulted by Maureen. However, this was unbelievable as: (i) there was no corroborative evidence to support Regina’s claim that she had been assaulted by Maureen; and (ii) she was inconsistent about how she had responded to Maureen’s purported assault, wavering between pushing Maureen and swinging her arm to block Maureen. In relation to Sreelatha, Regina claimed that she had not assaulted Sreelatha. However, Regina was not a truthful witness.
(d) Lye Choon’s defence was that he had been so intoxicated that he had been unaware of what had happened. This was not credible, given that both Meng Chong and Regina had stated in their investigative statements that Lye Choon had walked or rushed forward “towards the commotion”. Further, Maureen positively identified Lye Choon as one of the individuals who had assaulted George near Lot 55. In any case, Lye Choon’s intoxication was self-induced and did not amount to a valid defence at law.
(e) Meng Chong’s defence was that he had not been involved in the events at the Carpark as he had been taking care of Lye Choon together with Benny. However, he was positively identified by Maureen as one of the individuals who had assaulted George near Lot 55. He was identified on the basis of his lack of neck tattoos and Maureen’s description as the “taller guy”. Maureen’s clear testimony meant that Meng Chong’s defence was not believable.
(f) The evidence provided by the Appellants’ witness, Benny, during the trial was that there had been a confrontation between Wan Seng, Regina and “two male Indians and a Filipina” (ie, George, Daniel and Maureen). In relation to Regina and Maureen, Benny’s evidence was that Regina and Maureen had a heated argument. In the course of this argument, Maureen “laid hands first”, and Regina retaliated. In relation to the incident involving Wan Seng, Wan Seng had been assaulted by an Indian man, following which Michael kicked the Indian man. Meanwhile, Benny and Meng Chong were taking care of Lye Choon. Benny was not a credible witness as: (i) his testimony that some of the Victims had initiated the fight was inconsistent with his investigative statement; there, he had stated that he had been unaware of who initiated the fight; and (ii) his testimony that he and Meng Chong had been uninvolved in the fight because they had been taking care of Lye Choon was inconsistent with his investigative statement, where he had stated that he had intervened by trying to separate the group involved in the fight.
- [41]
[41] Ultimately, the DJ found that the Appellants had been the aggressors in the events at the Carpark. The DJ found that the incident had commenced with Michael kicking the Car. Thereafter, Michael kicked Daniel, which was the start of the riot. This was followed by Wan Seng, Lye Choon, Meng Chong and Michael assaulting George in the vicinity of Lot 55. Regina then “joined in the group’s violence” by assaulting Maureen who was rushing towards George. Regina also assaulted Sreelatha who came to help Maureen. Therefore, the DJ found that the Appellants had participated in the unlawful assembly as a result of their individual actions of assaulting at least one of the Victims.
The plea of guilt entered by Michael and Wan Seng with respect to their remaining charges
- [42]
[42] Following the DJ’s decision to convict the Appellants of their respective Rioting Charges, Michael and Wan Seng each pleaded guilty to a separate charge as follows:
(b) Wan Seng pleaded guilty to a charge under s 22(1)(a) of the MOA (the “Offensive Weapon Charge”) for being armed with the baton, an offensive instrument, without lawful authority or a lawful purpose.
The DJ’s decision on sentence
- [43]
[43] The DJ considered that the sentencing principles of deterrence and retribution were engaged.
- [44]
[44] After considering the parties’ submissions as well as the precedents cited therein, the DJ imposed the following sentences on the Appellants:
(c) With respect to Lye Choon, the DJ imposed a sentence of 15 months’ imprisonment for the Rioting Charge.
(d) With respect to Regina, the DJ imposed a sentence of 15 months’ imprisonment for the Rioting Charge.
(e) With respect to Meng Chong, the DJ found that his culpability was lower than the co-Appellants. Therefore, the DJ imposed a sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment for the Rioting Charge.
- [45]
[45] The Appellants were dissatisfied with their convictions and sentences and they each filed a notice of appeal. Thereafter, two of the Appellants, Michael and Lye Choon, applied to adduce fresh evidence on appeal by way of criminal motions. Before considering the parties’ cases on appeal, I briefly summarise the criminal motions filed by Michael and Lye Choon and the outcomes of the criminal motions.
The criminal motions filed by Michael and Lye Choon in the course of this appeal
Summary of the criminal motions
- [46]
[46] Michael sought leave to adduce fresh evidence on appeal by way of two criminal motions as follows:
(a) In Criminal Motion No 61 of 2021 (“CM 61”), Michael sought leave under s 392 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) (the “2012 CPC”) to adduce a psychiatric report prepared by one Dr Tan Sheng Neng (“Dr Tan”) of Promises Healthcare Pte Ltd dated 16 February 2021 (“Dr Tan’s Psychiatric Report for Michael”).
(b) In Criminal Motion No 67 of 2021 (“CM 67”), Michael sought leave under s 392 of the 2012 CPC to adduce a report prepared by one Mr Low Xuankai Alex, an analyst from the Analytical Toxicology Laboratory of the Health Sciences Authority (the “HSA”), dated 15 May 2017 (the “HSA Report for Michael”).
- [47]
[47] Separately, Lye Choon sought leave under s 392 of the 2012 CPC to adduce a psychiatric report prepared by Dr Tan dated 28 March 2021 (“Dr Tan’s Psychiatric Report for Lye Choon”). This was done by way of Criminal Motion No 62 of 2021 (“CM 62”).
- [48]
[48] Michael and Lye Choon sought to adduce the psychiatric reports as fresh evidence in support of their defence of intoxication. This was because Dr Tan opined in the two psychiatric reports that Michael and Lye Choon had suffered from alcohol intoxication at the material time such that they had not been capable of forming any requisite criminal intention. Dr Tan’s Psychiatric Report for Michael and Lye Choon were procured by Michael and Lye Choon after the release of the DJ’s GD and after the two of them had been advised by newly appointed counsel.
- [49]
[49] Further, Michael sought to adduce a report by the HSA as this was referred to in Dr Tan’s Psychiatric Report for Michael. Although the HSA Report for Michael was in Michael’s possession at the time of the trial, it was not adduced then.
- [51]
[51] Counsel for Michael and Lye Choon submitted that the two psychiatric reports were reliable and relevant. However, both Michael and Lye Choon accepted that the first of the three Ladd v Marshall conditions was not satisfied in their respective cases, since the psychiatric reports could have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at the trial, and the HSA Report for Michael was already in Michael’s possession during the trial. However, they submitted that this ought not to be fatal to their applications, given the nature of criminal proceedings and its serious consequences.
- [52]
[52] The Prosecution, however, took the position that the two psychiatric reports did not satisfy the Ladd v Marshall conditions. The Prosecution submitted, in particular, that the psychiatric reports were not reliable and did not meet the minimum requirements of an expert report as set out in Public Prosecutor v Chia Kee Chen [2018] 2 SLR 249 (at [125]–[131]). In relation to the HSA Report for Michael, the Prosecution’s position was that Michael had decided at the trial not to adduce the report, and that his blood alcohol level was in any case not relevant to the issue of whether an offender was intoxicated.
My decision on the criminal motions
- [53]
[53] I granted the applications in CM 61, CM 62 and CM 67 and set out my reasons for allowing the three applications by way of oral remarks then. For completeness, I briefly summarise the reasons which underpinned that decision:
(a) Section 392 of the 2012 CPC allowed for fresh evidence to be adduced on appeal subject to the Ladd v Marshall conditions being satisfied. However, in Iskandar bin Rahmat v Public Prosecutor and other matters [2017] 1 SLR 505 (“Iskandar”) (at [72], citing Soh Meiyun v Public Prosecutor [2014] 3 SLR 299 at [16]), the Court of Appeal endorsed a less restrictive approach to be adopted in criminal cases: ie, while the three Ladd v Marshall conditions of “non-availability”, “relevance” and “reliability” applied in criminal cases, the first condition of “non-availability” was less paramount than the other two conditions.
(b) It was clear that the condition of non-availability was not satisfied. The two psychiatric reports assessed the mental state of Michael and Lye Choon at the time of the offences, which necessarily meant that such evidence could have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at the trial. Further, Michael and Lye Choon were advised and represented by counsel in the court below, albeit different from the counsel representing them at the appeal. I also noted that counsel in the court below had advanced an argument that Michael and Lye Choon had been intoxicated, though no expert evidence had been adduced to substantiate this argument. Notwithstanding that they had been represented at trial, I accepted that Michael and Lye Choon may not have appreciated the full significance of their mental state and the need to adduce evidence which would have substantiated their claims that they had been intoxicated.
(c) The two psychiatric reports by Dr Tan were prima facie relevant as they went towards establishing the defences of intoxication which were relevant to determining part of Michael’s and Lye Choon’s arguments on appeal.
(d) In assessing whether the condition of reliability was satisfied, I was mindful of the Court of Appeal’s reminder in Iskandar (at [74]) that, when assessing whether to grant leave to adduce additional evidence, the court needed to only assess the reliability of the psychiatric reports, and not the merits of the psychiatric reports. In other words, I only had to consider whether the psychiatric reports were apparently credible. I took the view that the psychiatric reports were not completely devoid of credibility. However, I expressed significant reservations over the contents of the psychiatric reports for two reasons: (i) whether Michael and Lye Choon had been intoxicated to the extent that they would not have had the necessary mens rea was an ultimate issue for the court to determine, and not an issue for Dr Tan to determine by way of the two psychiatric reports; and (ii) the psychiatric reports asserted that Michael and Lye Choon had blood alcohol concentration levels which were significantly higher than the levels determined by the HSA. While Dr Tan’s conclusion on the blood alcohol concentration levels were based on a backward extrapolation, there was no mention in the two psychiatric reports of the specific method used by Dr Tan to perform a backward extrapolation, and it appeared that Dr Tan based his conclusions only on the accounts provided by Michael and Lye Choon of the amount of alcohol they had consumed before the events at the Carpark.
(e) Ultimately, however, given the Court of Appeal’s reminder in Iskandar (at [74]), I granted the applications in CM 61 and CM 62. This was subject to the Prosecution being allowed to cross-examine Dr Tan on the two psychiatric reports. I also granted leave to the Prosecution to adduce a medical report from the Institute of Mental Health (the “IMH”) if they thought it necessary.
(f) Since CM 76 was ancillary to CM 61, and I granted the application in CM 61 for Dr Tan’s Psychiatric Report for Michael to be adduced as fresh evidence, I similarly granted the application in CM 76 for the HSA Report for Michael to be adduced as fresh evidence.
- [54]
[54] As a consequence of my decision, the case was remitted to the court below.
The remittal hearing in the court below
- [55]
[55] At the remittal hearing, Michael and Lye Choon relied on Dr Tan’s evidence. I summarise Dr Tan’s evidence below.
Dr Tan’s evidence in relation to Michael
- [56]
[56] Dr Tan stated that Michael exhibited the following symptoms, based on the account provided to him by Michael:
(a) First, Michael exhibited an altered perception of the environment. This was evidenced by the fact that Michael remembered walking to his car alone and unassisted, despite the objective facts showing otherwise, and the fact that he remembered a “fat Malay lady” cursing that she was in pain. Further, Michael recalled being in a police lock-up for two to three nights despite contrary evidence. Finally, Michael recalled that a blood test had taken place but was unable to recall the reason for the blood test.
(b) Second, Michael exhibited ataxia and a lack of coordination, which was demonstrated by his manner of walking and inability to balance, as well as the fact that he had stumbled to his car and needed to be physically supported by someone.
(c) Third, Michael exhibited impaired judgment. According to Dr Tan, this was demonstrated by Michael’s refusal to take a taxi or a lift from a friend, and inability to consent to a blood test until about ten hours later.
(d) Fourth, Michael exhibited behavioural changes, as demonstrated by the fact that he was otherwise untraced for criminal offences and had not been involved in fights before.
(e) Fifth, Michael suffered from alcohol-induced amnesia at the material time, given his inability to clearly recall what had occurred.
- [57]
[57] Dr Tan stated that he adopted a symptoms-based approach to estimate Michael’s blood alcohol concentration level at the material time by backward extrapolation. According to Dr Tan, this approach was supported by scientific literature. Using this approach, Dr Tan estimated that Michael’s blood alcohol concentration level would have been near 200mg/100ml.
- [58]
[58] As a result of Michael’s alcohol intoxication, Dr Tan concluded that Michael was not capable of forming the requisite criminal intention for the Rioting Charge. In particular, Dr Tan stated that Michael’s symptoms meant that his ability to perceive and receive information had been badly impaired. Thus, he was not aware of what was happening around him even if it was a few metres away. Therefore, according to Dr Tan, it would have been quite difficult or impossible for Michael to have been aware of what was happening eight metres away, ie, the incident involving Regina, Maureen and Sreelatha. Therefore, the possibility of Michael being aware that he had been part of a wider assembly or what the remaining Appellants were doing at the material time was low.
Dr Tan’s evidence in relation to Lye Choon
- [59]
[59] Dr Tan stated that Lye Choon exhibited the following symptoms based on the account provided to him by Lye Choon:
(a) First, Lye Choon exhibited an altered perception of the environment. This was evidenced by the fact that Lye Choon had been unaware of what was discussed at the gathering with his friends. Further, Lye Choon remembered that the police had asked him to accompany them to the police station on foot, and that he had made this journey on foot while being assisted by Benny and Meng Chong. However, he was unsure if he had walked on the pavement or the roadside, and how long the trip took.
(b) Second, Lye Choon exhibited ataxia and a lack of coordination, which was demonstrated by the fact that he had to be assisted by Benny and Meng Chong while making walking to the police station.
(c) Third, Lye Choon suffered from alcohol-induced amnesia at the material time given that there were significant gaps in his memory.
- [60]
[60] As was done in Michael’s case, Dr Tan adopted a symptoms-based approach to estimate Lye Choon’s blood alcohol concentration level at the material time by backward extrapolation. Dr Tan estimated that Lye Choon’s blood alcohol concentration level would have been well beyond 200mg/100ml.
- [61]
[61] As a result of Lye Choon’s alcohol intoxication, Dr Tan concluded that Lye Choon was not capable of forming the requisite criminal intention for the Rioting Charge. In particular, Dr Tan stated that Lye Choon’s symptoms would have meant that his awareness of the environment seemed to have stopped at the time he had been drinking at the Bar. Lye Choon would not have been aware of what the co-Appellants were doing at the material time at the Carpark about eight metres away. Neither would Lye Choon have been aware that he was part of a wider assembly of at least five people.
The position of Michael and Lye Choon at the remittal hearing based on the evidence of Dr Tan
- [62]
[62] Relying on Dr Tan’s evidence, both Michael and Lye Choon argued that their intoxication meant they would not have been aware of anything about the incident involving Regina, Maureen, and Sreelatha since that took place about eight metres away from where Michael and Lye Choon were. Further, they submitted that they would not have been aware that they were part of an assembly of at least five persons and would not have possessed a common object with the co-Appellants to cause hurt to the Victims.
Rebuttal evidence by the Prosecution
- [63]
[63] The Prosecution adduced the following psychiatric reports to rebut the evidence of Dr Tan in his psychiatric reports:
(a) a psychiatric report in relation to Michael’s condition which was prepared by one Dr Charles Mak Chia Meng (“Dr Mak”), a Consultant Psychiatrist at the IMH, dated 6 February 2022 (“Dr Mak’s Psychiatric Report for Michael”);
(b) a psychiatric report which was prepared by Dr Mak dated 21 May 2021 providing his opinion on Dr Tan’s approach to estimate blood alcohol concentration levels by backward extrapolation; and
(c) a psychiatric report in relation to Lye Choon’s condition which was prepared by one Dr Guo Song (“Dr Guo”), a Senior Consultant Psychiatrist at the IMH, dated 31 January 2022 (“Dr Guo’s Psychiatric Report for Lye Choon”).
- [64]
[64] Dr Mak’s evidence in relation to Michael’s condition was as follows:
(a) Dr Mak assessed that Michael was in a state of acute alcohol intoxication at the material time.
(b) While Michael’s acute alcohol intoxication may have contributed to his offences in the sense that his judgment and decision-making may have been impaired, this did not amount to a direct causal link to his offences for the following reasons:
(i) First, Michael retained awareness of his actions, although Michael probably did not have complete awareness of his surroundings. Examples of Michael’s conduct which demonstrated that he retained awareness included the fact that he could navigate to where he had parked his car in the Carpark and was able to draw a sketch plan when his statement was recorded, which marked out where his car was parked, as well as the buildings around him and where the commotion at the Carpark occurred.
(ii) Second, Michael was able to control his actions. This was demonstrated by the fact that he had been able to de-escalate the level of violence. This was evident from Michael’s ability to avoid exhibiting any violence towards the police officers when he had behaved in a disorderly manner (an offence which he pleaded guilty to – see [42(a)] above). Michael’s ability to refrain from committing violence when the police officers arrived also demonstrated that Michael understood the difference between right and wrong.
(c) While there was some impairment to Michael’s coordination abilities, this was not significant since Michael was able to stand unassisted and deliver a forceful kick which caused Daniel to fall (see [21] above). Further, while there was some impairment to Michael’s ability to control his actions due to the alcohol that he had consumed, it was not significant.
(d) The fact that Michael had difficulty recalling events which had transpired did not mean that Michael lacked awareness or an understanding of the difference between right and wrong.
- [65]
[65] Dr Guo’s evidence in relation to Lye Choon’s condition was as follows:
(a) Lye Choon was in a state of alcohol intoxication at the material time.
(b) Further, Lye Choon was in a state of alcohol-induced amnesia at the material time. However, while he was unable to remember what he had done at the material time, he would still have been conscious of his behaviours, and would have been able to understand his actions, been aware of the happenings around him, and been able to respond relevantly. However, his decision-making might have been imprudent and so he could have behaved irresponsibly due to the disinhibitory effects of alcohol.
(c) In relation to what was happening about eight meres away from him (ie, the incident involving Regina, Maureen, and Sreelatha), Dr Guo stated that Lye Choon should have been aware of that incident as he was conscious. However, Dr Guo stated that it was possible that Lye Choon’s focus had been on the person he had directly been involved in an altercation with, and he may have, therefore, neglected what was happening eight metres away from him.
The DJ’s decision following the remittal hearing
- [66]
[66] Having considered the fresh evidence adduced at the remittal hearing, the DJ found that the fresh evidence had no effect on his earlier verdict. In other words, Michael and Lye Choon each remained guilty of the Rioting Charge. The DJ’s grounds of decision in relation to the remittal hearing are set out in Public Prosecutor v Michael Marcus Liew and others [2023] SGDC 6 (“the DJ’s Remittal GD”).
- [67]
[67] The reasons for the DJ’s decision are briefly set out below:
(a) The DJ found that Dr Tan’s evidence was not cogent for the following reasons:
(i) Dr Tan’s evidence was based almost entirely on the accounts provided by Michael and Lye Choon more than three years after the incident at the Carpark. The DJ noted that the Court of Appeal had stated in Teo Ghim Heng v Public Prosecutor [2022] 1 SLR 1240 (at [39]) that an accused person may not always be the best source of information about his own physical and mental state.
(ii) Dr Tan also failed to compare the accounts provided by Michael and Lye Choon with independent and objective evidence which could have shed more light on their conditions. While Dr Tan stated that he had reviewed other materials, he was unable to say with certainty which materials he had considered in making his assessment and he also made no reference to any specific material in his reports.
(iii) There were clearly deficiencies in the accounts provided by Michael and Lye Choon. For example, Dr Tan stated that Michael had issues remembering events from the point he had departed from the Bar. However, Michael’s investigative statement which was recorded on the day of the incident showed that Michael remembered walking back to his car. Dr Tan conceded that he would have been able to prepare a better report if he had more evidence which showed what Michael had been able to remember about the incident.
(iv) Dr Tan gave no explanation for his calculation of the estimated blood alcohol concentration levels of Michael and Lye Choon based on their self-reported symptoms and how he arrived at the conclusion that they had both been incapable of forming any requisite criminal intention.
(v) Dr Tan’s assessment of the symptoms exhibited by Michael and Lye Choon were inconsistent with the objective evidence. In the case of Michael, Dr Tan conceded during cross-examination that Michael had situational awareness, control over his actions and rational thought as demonstrated by his ability to voluntarily de-escalate the level of violence after the arrival of the police officers. Therefore, it could not be said that Michael had no capacity at all to form the requisite criminal intent. In the case of Lye Choon, Dr Tan conceded during cross-examination that the objective evidence and findings of fact made at the end of trial pointed to a conclusion that Lye Choon should have had a certain level of awareness and intention when he had engaged in violence. Dr Tan’s final position was only that Lye Choon had not been capable of forming the full requisite criminal intent.
(vi) Dr Tan appeared to have misconstrued his role as an expert witness, given that he came across as being somewhat partisan and lacking in objectivity.
(b) In contrast, the DJ preferred the evidence of Dr Mak and Dr Guo as he found their evidence to be cogent, based on objective evidence and based on sound analytical processes:
(i) Dr Mak and Dr Guo did not rely only on the accounts provided by Michael and Lye Choon. Rather, they took into account objective facts which had been proven and established at trial. In the case of Michael, Dr Mak considered other sources of evidence, including the DJ’s GD and the Statement of Facts for the Disorderly Behaviour Charge to which Michael had pleaded guilty. This was primarily because Michael’s account was that he could not recall in detail the events that had occurred. In the case of Lye Choon, Dr Guo adopted a similar approach, considering the findings of fact made by the DJ in the DJ’s GD, given that Lye Choon had stated that he could not remember the exact details of the events at the Carpark.
(ii) The evidence of Dr Mak and Dr Guo were also cogent. Dr Mak’s analysis of whether Michael’s condition affected his ability to form a criminal intention was based on a clear set of criteria. Dr Mak also referred to the key pieces of evidence which supported his analysis. Similarly, Dr Guo’s view that Lye Choon had been conscious of what he had done and would have had clear intentions was supported by academic authority.
(c) Ultimately, based on the evidence adduced at the remittal hearing, the DJ found that Michael and Lye Choon had not been so intoxicated that they could not have formed the necessary criminal intent. The evidence supported the DJ’s finding made following the trial that the Appellants had shared a common object to hurt the Victims, and each one of them had been an active participant in causing hurt to one or more of the Victims.
(d) The DJ also rejected the argument advanced by Michael and Lye Choon at the remittal hearing that they had been unaware of what Regina had done. The DJ noted that this was not the defence advanced by Michael and Lye Choon at trial. This new defence was clearly an afterthought. The evidence adduced at trial also showed that Michael and Lye Choon had been aware of what had been happening at the Carpark at the time they had gotten involved.
The parties’ cases on appeal
- [68]
[68] I next set out briefly the parties’ cases on appeal. As a result of my decision to allow the Appellants’ appeals against conviction (see [7] above), their appeals against sentence in relation to the Rioting Charge did not have to be considered. Accordingly, I do not find it necessary to set out the Appellants’ arguments in relation to their appeals against sentence with respect to the Rioting Charge.
- [69]
[69] However, as Michael appealed against the sentence imposed for the Disorderly Behaviour Charge to which he had pleaded guilty, and Wan Seng appealed against the sentence imposed for the Offensive Weapon Charge to which he had pleaded guilty, it is necessary for me to also set out their arguments in relation to their appeals against the sentences imposed for those charges.
Michael and Lye Choon’s case
- [70]
[70] Michael and Lye Choon, who were both represented by the same set of counsel on appeal, raised the following arguments in relation to their appeals against conviction:
(b) Second, in relation to the DJ’s decision following the remittal hearing, Michael and Lye Choon argued that the DJ had erred in preferring the expert evidence adduced by the Prosecution (ie, the evidence of Dr Mak and Dr Guo) over the evidence of Dr Tan.
(c) Third, Michael and Lye Choon submitted that the DJ had erred by failing to consider the totality of the expert evidence, which would have led to the conclusion that, on a balance of probabilities, both Michael and Lye Choon had been unaware of the incident involving Regina, Maureen and Sreelatha. In the alternative, they argued that there remained reasonable doubt over whether Michael and Lye Choon had been aware of the incident involving Regina, Maureen, and Sreelatha. Therefore, in both situations, there could not have been a common object among the Appellants to cause hurt to the Victims.
- [71]
[71] In relation to Michael’s appeal against the sentence imposed for the Disorderly Behaviour Charge, Michael argued that the sentence of two weeks’ imprisonment was manifestly excessive in light of sentencing precedents.
Meng Chong’s case
- [72]
[72] Meng Chong made the following arguments in relation to his appeal against conviction:
(a) First, the DJ erred in preferring the Victims’ evidence over the Appellants’, and in finding that Meng Chong had been identified as one of the assailants beyond a reasonable doubt.
(b) Second, the DJ erred by failing to direct his mind to the issue of whether the Appellants shared a common object to cause hurt to the Victims. According to Meng Chong, the assault on George was distinct from the assaults against the remaining Victims. Seen in this light, it could not be said that there were at least five persons who shared a common object to cause hurt to the Victims.
Wan Seng’s case
- [73]
[73] Wan Seng made the following arguments in relation to his appeal against conviction:
(a) First, the DJ erred in preferring the Victims’ evidence over the Appellants’. Instead, Wan Seng submitted that he had not kicked George or used the baton to hit George.
(b) Second, the DJ erred in finding that the elements of the Rioting Charge were satisfied. In particular, Wan Seng argued that Meng Chong and Wan Seng had not been part of an unlawful assembly of five or more persons. Further, there was no common object among the Appellants to cause hurt to the Victims. Wan Seng also did not use any force or violence.
- [74]
[74] In relation to Wan Seng’s appeal against the sentence imposed for the Offensive Weapon Charge, Wan Seng argued that the sentence of three months’ imprisonment was manifestly excessive, and an imprisonment term not exceeding one month ought to have been imposed.
Regina’s case
- [75]
[75] Regina made the following arguments in relation to her appeal against conviction:
(a) First, the DJ erred in preferring the Victims’ evidence over the Appellants’. Instead, Regina submitted that she had not initiated the assault on Maureen. Rather, she acted in self-defence after Maureen pulled her hair. Further, Regina did not cause hurt to Sreelatha.
(b) Second, the DJ erred in finding that the elements of the Rioting Charge were satisfied. In particular, Regina submitted that the DJ’s GD was silent on how the DJ had arrived at his decision that the Appellants had constituted an unlawful assembly with a common object to cause hurt to the Victims. Further, there was no evidence relating to the Appellants forming a common object. Rather, the evidence suggested that the fight in the present case comprised separate incidents at the Carpark which had arisen spontaneously, without the Appellants possessing a common object.
The Prosecution’s case
- [76]
[76] In its written submissions, the Prosecution argued the following:
(a) The DJ made no error in his treatment of the evidence of the Victims and the Appellants in the court below. The DJ correctly found the Victims’ collective evidence to be consistent and credible. In contrast, the evidence of the Appellants and the Appellants’ witness, Benny, was not credible.
(b) In relation to the findings made following the remittal hearing, the DJ rightly preferred the expert opinions of Dr Mak and Dr Guo. The DJ made no error, therefore, in finding that the additional evidence at the remittal hearing had no effect on the DJ’s earlier verdict to convict Michael and Lye Choon of their respective Rioting Charges.
- [77]
[77] However, the Prosecution failed to address a key aspect of the Appellants’ arguments on appeal in its written submissions – whether the DJ had applied his mind to the issue of whether there had been a common object among the Appellants to cause hurt to the Victims and, if so, whether the DJ had correctly found that the evidence supported the finding of a common object. In view of this, I directed the parties ahead of the hearing on 19 July 2023 to prepare oral submissions on this issue. At the hearing, the Prosecution made the following submissions in support of its position that there was a common object among the Appellants to cause hurt to the Victims:
(a) The evidence showed that the Appellants had been aware of the incident between Michael and Daniel near Lot 42.
(b) While the Appellants took the position that the events which had occurred at the Carpark on 1 May 2017 were three separate incidents, this was not an accurate characterisation of what had occurred. According to the Prosecution, Michael initiated the violence by kicking the Car at Lot 42. This led to a domino effect: (i) first, Daniel alighted from the Car, told Michael to stop kicking the Car and was then assaulted by Michael and, later, various unknown persons; (ii) second, when George alighted from the Car to speak to Michael near Lot 55, he was assaulted by Wan Seng, Lye Choon, Meng Chong and Michael; and (iii) third, when Maureen ran towards George as she saw him being assaulted, Regina assaulted Maureen and, subsequently, Sreelatha. Therefore, these were not three separate incidents. Rather, the evidence showed that the violence commenced with Michael’s kicking of the Car and progressed with the Appellants behaving aggressively.
(c) The Appellants did not dissociate themselves from Michael’s violence towards Daniel at Lot 42. Rather, they actively participated in the violence. The reasonable inference from this was that they were aware that George was part of Daniel’s group and wanted to be associated with Michael’s violence towards Daniel.
(d) The post-offence conduct of the Appellants showed that they had wanted to escape, further pointing to their guilt.
(e) For an offence under s 147 of the Penal Code, there was no requirement to find a common intention among the Appellants. All that was required was a common object. This meant that there was no requirement of a prior meeting of the minds before the formation of the assembly. An unlawful common object could have developed suddenly and on the spot, after the Appellants gathered at the incident location. Accordingly, an assembly which was lawful at its inception could still convert into an unlawful assembly as a result of the actions of its members. On the facts, there was enough evidence to support a finding that there had been a common object among the Appellants to cause hurt to the Victims.
(f) Even if this Court disagreed with the Prosecution’s position that the incidents which had taken place near Lot 55 (ie, the incident where hurt was caused to George by Wan Seng, Lye Choon, Meng Chong and Michael) and Lots 57 and 58 (ie, the incident where hurt was caused to Maureen and Sreelatha by Regina) were a continuation of the initial assault of Daniel by Michael near Lot 42, the Prosecution alternatively suggested that the Rioting Charge would still have been made out against the Appellants simply by focusing just on the incidents which took place near Lot 55 and Lot 57 and Lot 58. These two incidents occurred concurrently and involved all the Appellants causing hurt to three of the Victims. This would still have amounted to an unlawful assembly involving all the Appellants with a common object to cause hurt to three of the Victims.
Issues which arose for determination
- [78]
[78] The following issues arose for determination in light of the Appellants’ cases on appeal:
(a) Issue 1: Whether the DJ had erred in preferring the Victims’ evidence over the Appellants’ evidence. As part of my analysis, I considered the arguments by the Appellants in relation to specific findings of fact made by the DJ on the events which occurred at the Carpark.
(b) Issue 2: Whether the DJ had erred in finding that the Appellants had been members of an unlawful assembly whose common object had been to voluntarily cause hurt to the Victims.
(c) Issue 3: Whether the DJ had erred in his treatment of the expert evidence at the remittal hearing, and whether the DJ therefore erred in finding that Michael and Lye Choon had not been so intoxicated that they could not have formed the necessary criminal intent.
(d) Issue 4: In the event this Court agreed with the Appellants that the DJ had had erred in finding that the Rioting Charge had been made out against each Appellant, whether this Court should frame altered charges against the Appellants based on the facts proven in the court below and the appropriate sentences if altered charges are framed against the Appellants.
(e) Issue 5: Whether the sentences imposed for the Disorderly Behaviour Charge and the Offensive Weapon Charge were manifestly excessive.
My decision
Issue 1: Whether the DJ had erred in preferring the Victims’ evidence over the Appellants’ evidence
- [79]
[79] I first considered whether the DJ had erred in preferring the Victims’ evidence over the Appellants’ evidence. A summary of the DJ’s reasons for finding that the evidence of the Victims was materially consistent and credible is set out at [39] above, while a summary of the DJ’s reasons for finding that the evidence of the Appellants was not credible is set out at [40] above.
- [80]
[80] From the record, it was clear that the DJ had carefully analysed the evidence and the testimonies of the Victims as well as the Appellants and their witness, Benny. It was clear to me that the findings made by the DJ were not plainly wrong or against the weight of the evidence so as to warrant appellate intervention: see Public Prosecutor v Mohammed Liton Mohammed Syed Mallik [2008] 1 SLR(R) 601 at [32]. Therefore, I saw no reason to disturb the findings of fact made by the DJ in relation to how the events had unfolded at the Carpark on 1 May 2017 and how the Appellants had been involved in the incidents of violence against the Victims.
- [81]
[81] I make a few observations in response to some of the Appellants’ contentions which I rejected:
(a) First, it was clear to me that the Victims had been able to clearly identify each of the Appellants and their involvement in the events at the Carpark to the extent that they had observed what had occurred. Here, I emphasise that the Victims were candid in stating that they had not observed certain events at the Carpark. For example, George was unaware of who assaulted him near Lot 55 after he fell down as he felt giddy and was unable to get up. This showed that the Victims had been frank and forthcoming and were not seeking to falsely implicate the Appellants.
(b) Second, while there were inconsistencies in the testimonies of the Victims, these were either minor or immaterial. As was clear from the DJ’s GD, the DJ was alive to the inconsistencies in the Victims’ testimonies. He considered, however, that these inconsistencies could be attributed to memory lapses or were, ultimately, immaterial. I fully agreed with his analysis in this regard.
(c) Third, a number of the Appellants argued that the DJ had erred, in particular, in finding that Meng Chong had been identified as one of the assailants beyond a reasonable doubt. I saw no merit in this argument. It was undisputed that Maureen was the main witness who identified Meng Chong as being involved in the assault on George near Lot 55. The Appellants pointed to the fact that George himself had been unable to identify who had assaulted him near Lot 55. The Appellants also pointed to the fact that Maureen had identified Meng Chong as the “taller guy” when, in fact, Lye Choon was taller than Meng Chong. This conveniently ignored the fact, however, that Maureen’s identification of Meng Chong was not based solely on his height. Rather, the record clearly showed that Maureen’s identification of the individuals who had assaulted George near Lot 55 was based on the tattoos which they had or did not have – Wan Seng had a tattoo on the left side of his neck, and Lye Choon had a tattoo on the right side of his neck. While Maureen remembered Meng Chong as the “taller guy”, she also remembered him as the individual without tattoos on his neck. She explained how she was able to witness the assault clearly, given that there was a lamppost where the assault occurred. While Maureen’s evidence may not have been corroborated by the other Victims, her evidence was not inconsistent with theirs. George stated that there had been at least two people assaulting him. Sreelatha was aware that George was being assaulted but could not see who was assaulting him. Daniel only stated that that he did not notice if anyone was hitting George. None of the other Victims’ evidence contradicted the evidence of Maureen.
(d) Fourth, Wan Seng argued that the DJ had erred in finding that he had used the baton to hit George. Wan Seng asserted at the appeal that it was George’s own evidence that Wan Seng had not used the baton on George. Rather, according to Wan Seng, George’s evidence was that he had only observed Wan Seng holding the baton and tapping the baton on his own hand. In my view, this was a mischaracterisation of George’s evidence. While George had indeed given evidence on Wan Seng’s conduct (of tapping the baton on his own hand), this evidence related to Wan Seng’s conduct when George had initially walked past Wan Seng while proceeding towards Lot 55. In relation to the assault near Lot 55, however, the record clearly showed that George was unaware of who had assaulted him. Therefore, George had given no evidence on whether the baton had been used to hit him. Rather, it was Maureen who gave clear, consistent evidence that Wan Seng had used the baton to hit George. While Wan Seng claimed that Maureen had embellished her evidence, in my view, he did not substantiate this claim in any way. Therefore, I rejected this contention by Wan Seng.
(e) Fifth, the DJ made no error in finding that the evidence of the Appellants lacked credibility:
(i) In the case of Michael, his defence at the trial was simply a bare denial on the basis that he had been too drunk to remember the events at the Carpark. This was incredible, given that he was able to remember in specific detail what had occurred shortly before he had arrived at the Carpark, including that he had settled the bill and asked for his credit card to be returned. Further, his investigative statement recorded on the day of his arrest showed that he had remembered much more than he claimed to remember at trial. In the circumstances, the DJ did not err in rejecting Michael’s defence.
(ii) In the case of Lye Choon, his defence at the trial was also simply a bare denial on the basis that he had been too drunk to remember the events at the Carpark. This was similarly incredible, since the evidence of the other Appellants, including Wan Seng and Regina, showed that Lye Choon had been fully conscious and aware of what was going on shortly before the events at the Carpark. He was able to point to where he had parked his e-scooter and was able to ask Wan Seng to retrieve his e-scooter for him. He was also able to somehow remember events which had occurred after the events at the Carpark, including that he had walked to a police station and asked the police officers to allow him to leave so he could go to work the next day. Finally, the evidence of the co-Appellants showed that Lye Choon had proceeded towards the commotion at the Carpark. In the circumstances, the DJ did not err in rejecting Lye Choon’s defence.
(iii) In the case of Meng Chong, his defence at trial was that he had not been involved in the violence at the Carpark as he, together with Benny, was taking care of Lye Choon. However, he was positively identified by Maureen as one of the individuals who had assaulted George near Lot 55. Further, as was pointed out by the Prosecution in its written submissions, Meng Chong’s defence was contradicted by his own and Benny’s investigative statements. In his investigative statement, Meng Chong stated that he and Benny had accompanied Lye Choon as Lye Choon walked towards the commotion. Benny also stated in his investigative statement that he and Meng Chong had tried to separate Wan Seng, Regina, and Michael. In the circumstances, the DJ did not err in rejecting Meng Chong’s defence.
(iv) In the case of Wan Seng, his defence at trial was that he had held the baton for self-defence, and that he had not assaulted the Victims. Rather, he tried to stop the fight. However, his evidence at trial that four or five persons surrounded Michael was inconsistent with his investigative statement where he had stated that Michael had fought with just one individual. When confronted with this at trial, he alleged that the statement recorder had deliberately chosen not to write down about those four or five persons who had surrounded Michael. This was, however, contradicted by the evidence of the statement recorder who had no reason to lie. In the circumstances, the DJ did not err in rejecting Wan Seng’s defence.
(v) In the case of Regina, I was of the view that the DJ had not erred in rejecting Regina’s defence that she had acted in self-defence. Her testimony that Maureen had hit her first was contradicted by the testimony of the statement recorder. The statement recorder clearly stated that Regina had not informed him that she had sustained any injuries as a result of the events at the Carpark. Further, her account of her actions in self-defence shifted from touching or pushing Maureen to swinging her arm to block Maureen. This pointed to the conclusion that Regina’s defence was not truthful. In the circumstances, the DJ did not err in rejecting Regina’s defence.
- [82]
[82] Given the above, I saw no reason to disturb the findings of fact made by the DJ on the events at the Carpark on 1 May 2017 as well as how the Appellants had each been involved in the incidents of violence at the Carpark.
Issue 2: Whether the DJ had erred in finding that the Appellants had been members of an unlawful assembly whose common object had been to voluntarily cause hurt to the Victims
- [83]
[83] I next considered whether the DJ had erred in finding that there had been a common object among the Appellants to voluntarily cause hurt to the Victims.
The law on common object
- [84]
[84] I first summarise the key principles relating to the finding of a common object. These were set out by Yong Pung How CJ (as he then was) in Lim Thiam Hor and another v Public Prosecutor [1996] 1 SLR(R) 758 (at [13]) and were restated in Pannirselvam s/o Anthonisamy v Public Prosecutor [2005] 1 SLR(R) 784 (at [35]):
(a) The existence of a common object is a question of fact which must be deduced from the facts and circumstances of each case.
(b) Such an inference may be made based on a consideration of the nature of the assembly, the weapons used by the accused persons and the behaviour of the assembly at or before the scene of occurrence.
(c) While the mere presence in an assembly of persons does not render an accused a member of the unlawful assembly, there is no need to prove an overt act against the accused so long as there is direct or circumstantial evidence to show that the accused shared the common object of the assembly. In every case, the issue of whether an accused was innocently present at the place of occurrence or whether he was actually a member of the unlawful assembly is a question of fact.
(d) It is essential that the object should be common to the persons who constitute the assembly, and they should be aware of it and concur in it.
The DJ failed to consider whether there had been a common object among the Appellants to cause hurt to the Victims
- [85]
[85] Before considering the issue of whether the evidence supported a finding that there had been a common object among the Appellants to cause hurt to the Victims, I noted that the DJ had failed to even consider the issue of whether there had been a common object among the Appellants to cause hurt to the Victims. Rather, the DJ proceeded on the basis that there was only one issue to be determined:
- [86]
[86] Further, in its submissions in the court below, the Prosecution merely asserted that each of the Appellants had shared a common object to cause hurt to the Victims, without properly addressing whether the evidence supported such a finding of fact.
- [87]
[87] This was regrettable. Whether there was a common object among the Appellants to cause hurt to the Victims was clearly fundamental to the Rioting Charge. Therefore, close attention should have been paid to this issue in assessing whether the Rioting Charge was made out against each Appellant.
- [88]
[88] This was especially crucial given that this was not a case where the Appellants had collectively assaulted one victim. Rather, as I have set out at [21] to [30] above, the events which occurred at the Carpark on 1 May 2017 involved three incidents of violence at different areas of the Carpark, with each act of violence involving only a few of the Appellants and just one or two of the Victims. In other words: (a) all five of the Appellants did not collectively cause hurt to any one of the Victims; and (b) each Appellant did not cause hurt to all four of the Victims. Further, this was also not a case where the Victims had all been assaulted at once, with one of the Appellants commencing the assault and the co-Appellants participating in the assault thereafter. Rather, the assault on the Victims took place at different points of time in different areas of the Carpark.
- [89]
[89] However, because of the framing of each Rioting Charge, the Prosecution sought to hold each Appellant liable for the hurt caused to all four of the Victims. The reason for such framing was obvious – for there to be an unlawful assembly, there must have been five persons involved. However, for liability to be imputed to the Appellants for the hurt caused to all four Victims, it should have been plainly obvious that a finding must first have been made as to whether there was even a common object among all the Appellants to cause hurt to all the Victims.
The evidence did not support a finding that there had been a common object among the Appellants to cause hurt to the Victims
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