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Grounds publishedDecided 5 Mar 2024
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General Division of the High Court

Riady Tjandra v Cheng Yi Han

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[2024] SGHC 59Case no. Suit No 557 of 2021

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] The opportunity to acquire a sizeable stake in a new bank does not come often. The plaintiff (“Tjandra”) leapt at that chance but did not look first. He invested US$4m and got nothing in return. The defendant (“Cheng”) personally received US$1.36m of Tjandra’s funds and has repaid most of it. Tjandra brings this action to recover the balance of US$500,000 from Cheng.

  3. Background to the dispute

  4. [2] Tjandra is an Indonesian businessman resident in Singapore. Cheng is a Singaporean with a medical practice in Australia.

  5. [3] In or about early 2018, Cheng and two associates, Andrew Ling (“Ling”) and Then Feng (“Feng”), decided to purchase an offshore, cryptocurrency-friendly bank (“Royal Eastern Bank”). Ling was a businessman with a finance and investing background, and Feng was a lawyer. Cheng’s primary responsibility was to establish the back-end of the contemplated banking operations, while Ling was to handle the financial aspects of the business, and Feng, the legal matters.

  6. [4] The three of them (collectively, the “Original Shareholders”), held their respective interests in Royal Eastern Bank through special purpose vehicles incorporated in the British Virgin Islands (“BVI”):

  7. (a) Ling and Cheng were each 50% shareholders of Blue Summit Investments Limited (“Blue Summit”);

  8. (b) Feng wholly owned Gestalt Group Limited (“Gestalt”);

  9. (c) Blue Summit and Gestalt were in turn shareholders of Star Dust Developments Limited (“Star Dust”), holding 85% and 15% of its shares respectively; and

  10. (d) Star Dust in turn (beneficially) owned Royal Eastern Bank, its sole asset.

  11. For ease of reference, a diagram of the corporate structure is set out below:

  12. [5] In November 2018, Feng spoke with Tjandra about investing in Royal Eastern Bank. This was followed by several meetings and discussions between the Original Shareholders and Tjandra, the details of which are disputed. What is not disputed is that sometime in February 2019, an agreement was reached for Tjandra to purchase 10,000 shares (amounting to a 20% shareholding) in Star Dust (the “Star Dust Shares”) for US$4m. It was agreed that payment would be made in two tranches of US$3.2m and US$800,000.

  13. [6] It is also not disputed that between 25 to 27 February 2019, Tjandra paid the first tranche of US$3.2m directly to the Original Shareholders as follows:

  14. (a) US$1.36m to Cheng;

  15. (b) US$1.36m to Ling; and

  16. (c) US$480,000 to Feng.

  17. [7] Cheng claimed that sometime in June 2019, he received disturbing information about the Royal Eastern Bank investment, in particular, that investment funds had been misappropriated, and warned Tjandra not to make the second tranche of payment. Tjandra asked Cheng to repay the US$1.36m he had received. From 30 June to 1 July 2019, Cheng made payments to Tjandra (in cash and in kind) amounting to US$860,000. In this action, Cheng disputes his liability to repay the balance sum of US$500,000.

  18. Summary of the parties’ cases

  19. [8] Tjandra claims that the Star Dust Shares were never transferred to him, and brings three alternative claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and fraudulent misrepresentation. Broadly speaking, Cheng’s defence is that Tjandra has failed to prove that the Star Dust Shares were not transferred to him; further and in any event, that Tjandra’s agreement for the Star Dust Shares was with Blue Summit and Gestalt, and not him. He also maintains that the representations pleaded by Tjandra were not false and were not made by him.

  20. Contractual claim

  21. [9] Tjandra pleads that he entered a contract with Cheng on or around 13 February 2019 for the purchase of 4,250 shares in Star Dust (which reflects the portion of the Star Dust Shares ultimately owned by Cheng) at a price of US$1.36m. On the other hand, Cheng pleads that any contract would have been between Tjandra and Blue Summit, and in any event, was concluded by Ling and/or Feng without his authority.

  22. Issues to be determined

  23. [10] The relevant issues are:

  24. (a) was there was a contract between Tjandra and Cheng?

  25. (b) if so, was Cheng in breach of that contract?

  26. (c) if so, what damages is Tjandra is entitled to?

  27. Was there a contract between Tjandra and Cheng?

  28. [11] There is no doubt that an agreement was reached for Tjandra to pay US$4m for a 20% stake in Royal Eastern Bank (ie. the Star Dust Shares) and a seat on its board of directors.

  29. [12] On 17 December 2018, Cheng, Ling, and Feng met with Tjandra at his office in Oxley Tower (“17 December 2018 Meeting”). The discussions were substantive – amongst other things, Tjandra offered to buy a 15% stake in Royal Eastern Bank with a seat on its board. Cheng confirmed this to Feng in a WhatsApp message, as Feng had to leave the 17 December 2018 Meeting early.

  30. [13] On 23 January 2019, Tjandra, Feng, and Ling met in Jakarta. Although Cheng was not present, the exchange between the Original Shareholders in their WhatsApp chat group titled “Royal Eastern Bank Board” (“REBB WhatsApp Chat”) shows that Cheng was aware of the meeting, and that it was intended to “finalise [Tjandra’s] involvement in [Royal Eastern Bank] and [that Tjandra] will make his contribution after [they] have it all sorted”. At this meeting, Tjandra increased his offer to a 20% stake in Royal Eastern Bank. Cheng was informed of this through the REBB WhatsApp Chat, and the Original Shareholders discussed the new shareholding structure of Star Dust if Tjandra was sold the Star Dust Shares (see [30] below).

  31. [14] On 25 January 2019, Tjandra was added to the REBB WhatsApp Chat, and welcomed to the “Royal Eastern Bank board” and described as a “partner”:

  32. On the same day, the Original Shareholders created a separate WhatsApp chat without Tjandra titled “Original REB (YH, FT, AL)” (the “Original REBB WhatsApp Chat”).

  33. [15] On 2 February 2019, Feng and Ling met Tjandra at his office, to sign share transfer forms in the presence of a notary public (the “2 February 2019 Meeting”):

  34. (a) for the transfer of 1,500 shares in Star Dust from Gestalt to Tjandra for US$600,000 – signed by Feng on behalf of Gestalt (the “Gestalt Share Transfer Form”); and

  35. (b) for the transfer of 8,500 shares in Star Dust from Blue Summit to Tjandra for US$3.4m – signed by Ling on behalf of Blue Summit (the “Blue Summit Share Transfer Form”).

  36. These forms (collectively, the “Share Transfer Forms”) were drafted by Feng and left undated. According to Feng, they were not dated because there were still ongoing discussions on when and how Tjandra was going to effect the payments, but that “they were all supposed to be dated [by] 13 February 201[9]”. No evidence was adduced to show that the Share Transfer Forms were ever dated and the copies adduced in evidence were undated.

  37. [16] On 13 February 2019, Tjandra met with Ling and Feng in his office (the “13 February 2019 Meeting”). Following this meeting, Ling sent the following email to Tjandra, Cheng, and Feng “to conclude” the transaction (“Ling’s 13 February 2019 Email”):

  38. [17] From 25 to 27 February 2019, Tjandra paid US$1.36m to Ling, US$1.36m to Cheng and US$480,000 to Feng.

  39. [18] It is evident from the foregoing that there was an agreement for Tjandra to pay US$4m for a 20% stake in the Royal Eastern Bank (together with a board seat), pursuant to which Tjandra paid the three Original Shareholders the first tranche of US$3.2m.

  40. [19] Indeed, that this was the content of the agreement was accepted by both Cheng and Feng at trial. Cheng accepted that by 25 January 2019 (when Tjandra was added to the REBB WhatsApp Chat and described as a “board partner”), the Original Shareholders had agreed to sell the Star Dust Shares to Tjandra for a specific price:

  41. [20] This was confirmed by Feng’s testimony in court:

  42. [21] In the circumstances, I find that a contract was concluded no later than 13 February 2019 for Tjandra to purchase the Star Dust Shares, along with a board seat in Royal Eastern Bank, for US$4m, with payment to be made to each of the Original Shareholders as set out in Ling’s 13 February 2019 Email (the “Agreement”).

  43. Tjandra contracted with the Original Shareholders

  44. [22] Cheng insists that any contract would only have been between Tjandra and Blue Summit (and Gestalt), and not with him personally. To support this argument, Cheng relies on the Blue Summit Share Transfer Form, which identifies Blue Summit as the party (and not himself or Ling), and which expressly provides that “[t]his instrument constitutes the entire agreement between the parties with respect to the subject matter hereof…”.

  45. [23] I reject this argument. It is clear from the evidence that the Agreement was concluded between Tjandra and the Original Shareholders personally and its terms are not governed by, or contained exclusively in, the Share Transfer Forms. The Share Transfer Forms were executed to effect the transfer of the Star Dust Shares to Tjandra in performance of the Agreement.

  46. (1) The Share Transfer Forms do not constitute the entire agreement

  47. [24] First, and crucially, Cheng acknowledged in his own pleadings that the Share Transfer Forms do not contain all the terms of the agreement for the sale of the Star Dust Shares – he pleaded that “[p]ursuant to the terms of the Shares Transfer Agreement, [Tjandra] was required to pay the consideration sum of SG$1.36m to [Cheng]”. But the Share Transfer Forms do not state such an obligation – that is evidenced only in Ling’s 13 February 2019 Email.

  48. [25] Second, the Share Transfer Forms lack crucial details. They are silent on key issues such as Tjandra’s seat on the board of Royal Eastern Bank, the payment structure, and the recipients of the payments. Some of these terms are evidenced only in the contemporaneous WhatsApp conversations (the board seat), and Ling’s 13 February 2019 Email (which explicitly provides for payments to be made directly to the Original Shareholders, and the timing for the payments). Further, Ling’s 13 February 2019 Email also provides that Tjandra only had to pay the sum of US$3.2m upfront, with the balance of US$800,000 to be made available for an equity call likely before the end of June 2019.

  49. [26] Thirdly, as Feng testified, the Share Transfer Forms were not dated because there were still ongoing discussions on the terms of the sale of the Star Dust Shares (see [15] above). It is also evident that the Share Transfer Forms were hastily and carelessly put together by Feng. In this regard, counsel for Tjandra pointed out at least three errors or inaccuracies in the Share Transfer Forms:

  50. (a) the year reflected at the top should have been “2019” and not “2018”;

  51. (b) the Share Transfer Forms state that consideration was “received”, when that was not the case at the time they were signed; and

  52. (c) the Share Transfer Forms state “do hereby transfer to the Transferor”, when they should have stated “Transferee”.

  53. [27] The entire agreement clause is not relevant as it only applies to “the parties” to the Blue Summit Share Transfer Form (viz. Tjandra and Blue Summit). It does not preclude Tjandra from bringing a claim against Cheng personally.

  54. [28] To support his argument that the Share Transfer Forms contained the entire agreement between the parties, Cheng highlights that they were circulated in advance by Feng to all the parties (including Tjandra), and that Feng had confirmed there were no comments from Tjandra. In the first place, there is nothing to support this assertion. The evidence suggests that the draft Share Transfer Forms were only circulated via the Original REBB WhatsApp Chat – which did not include Tjandra. The drafts were not circulated on the REBB WhatsApp Chat. In any event, the fact that Tjandra may have seen a draft of the Share Transfer Forms, and did not have any comments, does not mean, much less prove, that it contained the entire agreement between Tjandra and the Original Shareholders.

  55. (2) Blue Summit and Gestalt were just convenient vehicles of the Original Shareholders

  56. [29] The evidence is clear that the Original Shareholders always considered themselves the parties to the sale of the Star Dust Shares to Tjandra – they referred to selling Tjandra their shares in Royal Eastern Bank.

  57. [30] For instance, after the 23 January 2019 meeting in Jakarta, Ling had asked Cheng to consider Tjandra’s offer to purchase 20% of Royal Eastern Bank which would lead to a shareholding in the following proportions:

  58. The share structure was noticeably reflected as against the individuals and not the companies which held the legal title to the Star Dust Shares. Under cross-examination, Cheng accepted that “this was because the three of [them] considered [themselves] as shareholders of the bank”.

  59. [31] This was because Blue Summit and Gestalt were merely shell companies which sole purpose was to hold the Original Shareholder’s shares in Star Dust. They held no other assets, did not conduct any business, or even have a bank account. Indeed, Cheng’s own evidence is that Blue Summit was “a shelf company, incorporated in the BVI, to hold [his and Ling’s] share in the target bank”. This is further supported by an earlier conversation between Ling and Feng on 24 June 2018, when parties were discussing how they would go about acquiring Royal Eastern Bank:

  60. [32] It is also telling that other than in the Share Transfer Forms, there was no mention of Gestalt or Blue Summit in Ling’s 13 February 2019 Email or other relevant documents. This underscores the legal irrelevance of these shell vehicles. Instead, Ling’s 13 February 2019 Email expressly referred to the first tranche of US$3.2m being “paid to the shareholders” – which referred to the Original Shareholders, and not Blue Summit and Gestalt.

  61. [33] Cheng argues that Tjandra was aware of the corporate structure of Star Dust and Blue Summit and their relationship with Royal Eastern Bank before he made his investment. That is not surprising as he was to receive the Star Dust Shares from Blue Summit and Gestalt. But that does not mean that he was contracting only with them.

  62. (3) The Original Shareholders received payment for the Star Dust Shares

  63. [34] The Original Shareholders received Tjandra’s payment for the Star Dust Shares in their personal bank accounts. Cheng treated the monies as his own and dealt with them as he saw fit. This is strong evidence of who the true parties to the Agreement were. While Cheng argues that consideration can move to a third party, that is no answer. Cheng, along with Ling and Feng, were contracting with Tjandra for their own personal gain, and not for the benefit of Gestalt or Blue Summit.

  64. (4) The Original Shareholders referred to themselves and Tjandra as “partners”

  65. [35] Significantly, the parties themselves referred to each other as “partners” (see [14] above).

  66. [36] Further, Ling’s 13 February 2019 Email begins by saying:

  67. Under cross-examination, Cheng accepted that “our new partnership” refers to a partnership between the four individuals: Ling, Tjandra, Feng and himself, and that “existing shareholders” refers to the Original Shareholders. Notably, there was no mention of Blue Summit or Gestalt. This was plainly a deal between the four individuals.

  68. (5) Tjandra did not acknowledge that he contracted exclusively with Blue Summit

  69. [37] Cheng asserts that Tjandra acknowledged under cross-examination that the contract was between himself and Blue Summit. But this is an unfortunate mischaracterisation of Tjandra’s evidence:

  70. [38] Clearly, Cheng’s counsel was asking if Tjandra knew that the parties to the Blue Summit Transfer Form were Blue Summit and himself. Tjandra understandably and correctly admitted to this, as the 8,500 shares in Star Dust were legally held by Blue Summit. However, this does not amount to an admission that Tjandra only contracted with Blue Summit.

  71. (6) Ling was not acting exclusively as a director of Blue Summit

  72. [39] Finally, Cheng points out that Ling was at the centre of the entire deal – he discussed and agreed to the terms of the Agreement, and was the one who executed the Blue Summit Share Transfer Form. Given that Ling did all of this without the participation of Cheng, Cheng argues that Ling was acting as a director of Blue Summit. According to him, this shows that Blue Summit was the party to the Agreement and not Cheng.

  73. [40] I reject this argument. The fact that Ling took charge of the negotiations and the execution of the Blue Summit Share Transfer Form does not assist Cheng. The evidence shows that Ling was always acting on behalf of himself as well as Cheng and Feng – I elaborate on this in the next section. With respect to the Blue Summit Share Transfer Form, it was only necessary for one of either Ling or Cheng (as directors) to sign the same. In fact, Cheng testified that he expected Ling to take the necessary steps to effect the transfer of the shares in Star Dust. The fact that Ling signed the Blue Summit Share Transfer Form as a director does not assist Cheng.

  74. Ling and Feng had the authority to bind Cheng

  75. [41] It is undisputed that the terms of the Agreement were finalised at meetings between Tjandra, Ling, and Feng, and that Cheng was not present. Cheng relies on this to argue that Ling or Feng did not have the authority to bind him. In this regard, Cheng insists that he “has neither authorised [Ling] nor Feng to enter into any contract”. He alleges that Ling and Feng agreed on all the commercial terms and signed the Share Transfer Forms “without any [of his] involvement”, and even that Ling could bind Blue Summit and sell his (Cheng’s) interest in the Star Dust Shares without his agreement.

  76. [42] I find Cheng’s attempts to downplay his involvement in the negotiations, and his claim that the Agreement was entered without his authority, wholly unconvincing and dishonest. Not only did Cheng clearly authorise Ling and Feng to negotiate and enter into the Agreement, he was also aware of its terms and had agreed to them.

  77. [43] First, Cheng was personally involved in substantive discussions on the deal at the 17 December 2018 Meeting. I reject Cheng’s evidence that there were “minimal discussions” and that this occasion “was essentially a meet and greet”. Substantive terms were discussed, and it was Cheng himself who updated Feng on these discussions:

  78. [44] Second, although Cheng was not present at the 23 January 2019 meeting in Jakarta, he was kept apprised of the discussions through the REBB WhatsApp Chat:

  79. [45] Cheng’s claim that he did not play any part at all in the negotiation of the terms of the Agreement and was not involved in the discussion to increase Tjandra’s stake from 15% to 20% and the purchase price is not true. It is clear from the above exchange that Cheng was kept informed of, and consulted on, Tjandra’s request to increase his shareholding in Star Dust from 15% to 20%, as well as the new share structure involving the four of them. This shows that Cheng’s input and agreement were necessary for the sale to occur. After all, his interest in Royal Eastern Bank was being sold to Tjandra.

  80. [46] Two days later, Tjandra was added to the Original REBB WhatsApp Chat, where he was welcomed by the Original Shareholders to the board of Royal Easter Bank and referred to as a “partner” (see [14] above). The clear inference is that Cheng had agreed to the terms of Tjandra’s offer. Further, the drafts of the Shares Transfer Forms were sent to Cheng on 28 January 2019, and the signed copies of the same were sent to him on 2 February 2019. Cheng admitted to being aware of this:

  81. [47] Cheng therefore knew of the sale consideration of US$4m, as well as the allocation of the Star Dust Shares between Gestalt and Blue Summit, which is consistent with the Original Shareholders’ earlier discussions.

  82. [48] Third, and most importantly, a draft of Ling’s 13 February 2019 Email was circulated by Ling to Cheng and Feng at around 7am for their approval, before Ling sent the actual email to Tjandra around 5pm. As set out above at [16], Ling’s 13 February 2019 Email sets out the important terms of the Agreement, including the payment of US$1.36m to Cheng. Cheng accepted that he received Ling’s email attaching the draft but claimed not to have read it. Even if that is true – which I doubt – he received Ling’s 13 February 2019 Email as well as the payment of US$1.36m from Tjandra on 27 February 2019. He did not protest or question the payment. It is therefore entirely spurious for Cheng to assert that he was unaware of the Agreement or that it had been entered without his authority.

  83. [49] I therefore find that there was a contract between Tjandra and the Original Shareholders for Tjandra to receive a 20% stake in the Royal Eastern Bank along with a board seat, for a consideration of US$4m. This was entered into by the Original Shareholders jointly and not severally. This is because the evidence is clear that Tjandra was purchasing a 20% interest and nothing less, and the Original Shareholders had collectively agreed to sell the same to him. How the Original Shareholders decided to apportion or allocate the Star Dust Shares from their own shares was an internal matter which did not involve, or concern, Tjandra. Further, the board seat to Tjandra was a term agreed to by all the Original Shareholders. This is different from the contract pleaded by Tjandra, that there was an agreement between him and Cheng for 4,250 of the shares in Star Dust for the sum of US$1.36m. I deal with the consequences of this below.

  84. Issues arising from my finding of the Agreement

  85. [50] For completeness, I deal with three issues arising from my finding of the Agreement:

  86. (a) the relevance of the corporate veil;

  87. (b) the nonjoinder of Ling and Feng in this Suit; and

  88. (c) the consequences, if any, of the Agreement being different from the contract pleaded by Tjandra.

  89. [51] As regards the first issue, Cheng spent a substantial portion of his closing submissions arguing that the present case does not fall into the limited situations where the corporate veil should be pierced. That issue only arises if I find that the contract was between Tjandra and Blue Summit, and not Cheng. Given my finding, Cheng’s submission is irrelevant.

  90. [53] As regards the third issue, the general rule is that parties are bound by their pleadings and the court is precluded from deciding on a matter that the parties themselves have decided not to put into issue (V Nithia (co-administratrix of the estate of Ponnusamy Sivapakiam, deceased) v Buthmanaban s/o Vaithilingam and another [2015] 5 SLR 1422 (“V Nithia”) at [38]). However, the law permits a departure from the general rule in limited circumstances, where no prejudice is caused to the other party in the trial or where it would be clearly unjust for the court not to do so (V Nithia at [40]). This was precisely what was done in iVenture Card Ltd and others v Big Bus Singapore City Sightseeing Pte Ltd and others [2022] 1 SLR 302. In that case, the plaintiffs did not even identify the correct parties to the agreement. However, the Court of Appeal granted relief as the defendant was not prejudiced (at [37]–[42]).

  91. [54] Similarly, Cheng is not prejudiced by my finding of the Agreement which is different to that pleaded by Tjandra. Both Tjandra and Cheng are parties to the Agreement. My finding is premised on the same factual matrix pleaded and adduced in evidence by Tjandra, and Cheng had every opportunity to, and did, respond to the same. Further, the terms of the contract pleaded by Tjandra are effectively a component of, and not inconsistent with, the terms of the Agreement. Likewise, Tjandra’s case for breach is the same – the non-transfer of the Star Dust Shares. In the circumstances, I exercise my discretion in allowing Tjandra to maintain his claim for damages under the Agreement.

  92. Was the Agreement breached?

  93. The Original Shareholders’ obligations under the Agreement

  94. [55] Under the Agreement, the Original Shareholders, inter alia, sold the Star Dust Shares to Tjandra. The Original Shareholders were therefore obliged to transfer, or procure the transfer, of the Star Dust Shares to Tjandra.

  95. [56] In this regard, the mere signing of the Share Transfer Forms does not discharge that obligation. Neither is it Cheng’s case that this is sufficient. He accepted that for the Star Dust Shares to be validly transferred, a board resolution had to be passed. The Original Shareholders also acknowledged that the Share Transfer Forms would have to be dated and submitted – in Ling’s 13 February 2019 Email, it was stated: “we have executed and will date & submit the share transfer forms as of today”.

  96. [57] Since I have found that the Agreement was with all the Original Shareholders, the presumption is that all three of them are jointly responsible for effecting or procuring the transfer of the Star Dust Shares to Tjandra (see Edwin Peel, Treitel on the Law of Contract (Sweet & Maxwell, 15th Ed, 2020) at para 13-003). In other words, Cheng cannot simply shrug off his obligation by suggesting – as he did – that he had left it to Ling to effect the transfer. If there was no transfer, the Agreement is breached.

  97. The Star Dust Shares were not transferred to Tjandra

  98. [58] Cheng’s case is that Tjandra has failed to discharge his burden of proving that the Star Dust Shares were not transferred to him. He relies on the following evidence:

  99. (a) in a WhatsApp exchange on 30 June 2019, Tjandra allegedly told Cheng that he had received the Star Dust Shares;

  100. (b) Tjandra initially pleaded that he had received the Star Dust Shares, and only amended his Statement of Claim on 17 September 2021 to deny his receipt of them;

  101. (c) Tjandra’s solicitors had written to the court on 15 June 2021, stating that Tjandra was a shareholder of Star Dust; and

  102. (d) Tjandra would have enquired or complained if the Star Dust Shares were still not transferred to him after making payment on 27 February 2019, but did not do so.

  103. [59] Tjandra, on the other hand, testified that he did not receive the Star Dust Shares. He points out that there is no objective evidence of the Star Dust Shares being transferred to him, and refers to email correspondence with Star Dust’s corporate secretary, Vistra (BVI) Limited (“Vistra”), which suggest that Tjandra was not registered as a member on Star Dust’s share register.

  104. [60] On balance, I find that the Star Dust Shares were not transferred to Tjandra.

  105. (1) No evidence of steps taken to effect the transfer

  106. [61] First, the transfer of the Star Dust Shares was the obligation, and entirely in the control, of the Original Shareholders. However, no evidence was led by Cheng that any of them had done anything to effect the transfer. Indeed, there was no evidence that the Share Transfer Forms were ever dated or submitted. Nor was it Cheng’s evidence that the board resolution to approve the transfer, which he accepted was a necessary step for the transfer, was passed. I note that Cheng pleaded in his Defence that “[Tjandra] himself procured the necessary director’s authorisations from Feng and [Ling]” but led no evidence to support this. Cheng admitted during the trial that he did not take any steps to effect the transfer, that he had left the matter entirely to Ling and was unsure if Ling had done so. But he did not call Ling to give evidence and no explanation was given for his failure to do so. I deal with this separately below at [68]–[72].

  107. [62] Second, while Ling had informed Tjandra in Ling’s 13 February 2019 Email that the Share Transfer Forms would be dated and submitted “as of today”, Feng had separately and privately informed Cheng and Ling in the Original REBB WhatsApp Chat on 28 January 2019 that “Board resolutions to approve the transfer will be signed and dated after $4m received”. Feng repeated this on 1 February 2019 in the same private chat: “Once payment is made, share transfer forms are dated. Board resolutions passed. Register of directors and register of members updated”. Neither Ling nor Cheng questioned this. The inference is that the Original Shareholders had between themselves decided or determined that the transfer would only be effected after full payment for the Star Dust Shares was received.

  108. [63] Third, although the above WhatsApp exchanges suggested that Feng was in charge of, or dealing with, the necessary steps and documentation to effect the transfer of the Star Dust Shares to Tjandra, Feng claimed that he was also not aware of what steps had in fact been taken to effect the transfer. Like Cheng, he claimed that he had left it to Ling to deal with the matter .

  109. [64] Fourth, Feng explained that to preserve his own 15% shareholding in Star Dust (through Gestalt), Blue Summit was first supposed to transfer 1,500 Star Dust shares to Gestalt, before he would (through Gestalt) transfer 1,500 Star Dust shares to Tjandra. In other words, the Gestalt Share Transfer Form would not be effective until Gestalt first received 1,500 Star Dust shares from Blue Summit. Significantly, Feng testified that he did not know if the 1,500 Star Dust shares had been transferred by Blue Summit to Gestalt and that he was “never provided the share certificates”. This suggests that Gestalt did not receive the 1,500 Star Dust shares, which in turn suggests that the transfer to Tjandra would not have taken place.

  110. [65] Fifth, both the REBB WhatsApp Chat and the Original REBB WhatsApp Chat continued to remain active with business discussions until early June 2019. Yet, there was nothing in these chats to suggest that the Original Shareholders had transferred the Star Dust Shares to Tjandra. If the transfer had been completed, one would expect an update to have been provided to Tjandra.

  111. [66] Finally, Cheng's own evidence was that the monies invested for the acquisition of Royal Eastern Bank had been misappropriated, his subsequent investigations had exposed the “fraud” and that Tjandra had been “scammed”. This suggests that no steps were intended to be, or were, taken to transfer the Star Dust Shares to Tjandra.

  112. [67] For completeness, I note that in its response to Tjandra’s solicitor’s request for Star Dust’s shareholding on 3 August 2022, Vistra, stated that Star Dust had been struck off the BVI registry on 1 November 2019, as a result of non-payment of its annual licence fees. Tjandra relies particularly on Vistra’s email to Tjandra’s solicitors dated 7 June 2023 stating that “Mr Tjandra does not [have] any particular relationship with [Star Dust]” arguing that this must mean that Tjandra was never registered as a member. I do not place any weight on this given that it is hearsay and the language employed by Vistra is vague.

  113. (2) Cheng’s failure to call Ling

  114. [68] The court’s ability to draw an adverse inference from a party’s failure to call a witness is grounded in section 116(g) of the Evidence Act 1893 (2020 Rev Ed) which provides:

  115. [69] In Sudha Natrajan v The Bank of East Asia Ltd [2017] 1 SLR 141 (“Sudha Natrajan”), the Court of Appeal summarised the relevant principles as follows (at [20]):

  116. (a) In certain circumstances the court may be entitled to draw adverse inferences from the absence or silence of a witness who might be expected to have material evidence to give on an issue in the matter before it.

  117. (b) If the court is willing to draw such inferences, these may go to strengthen the evidence adduced on that issue by the other party or to weaken the evidence, if any, adduced by the party who might reasonably have been expected to call the witness.

  118. (c) There must, however, have been some evidence, even if weak, which was adduced by the party seeking to draw the inference, on the issue in question, before the court would be entitled to draw the desired inference: in other words, there must be a case to answer on that issue which is then strengthened by the drawing of the inference.

  119. (d) If the reason for the witness’s absence or silence can be explained to the satisfaction of the court, then no adverse inference may be drawn. If, on the other hand, a reasonable and credible explanation is given, even if it is not wholly satisfactory, the potentially detrimental effect of his/her absence or silence may be reduced or annulled.

  120. [71] I find that Cheng was the party who was reasonably expected to call Ling as a witness. Tjandra does not rely on Ling in any way to prove that the Star Dust Shares were not transferred to him. On the other hand, it was the Original Shareholders’ obligation to transfer the Star Dust Shares to Tjandra and Cheng had left it to Ling to effect the transfer. Cheng should therefore have called Ling to give evidence on what steps had been taken. No reasons were offered for his failure to do so – I note that Ling is a Singaporean and was a party to a related dispute (see below at [118]) where Cheng was a co-defendant. Instead, Ling called Feng as a witness – although Feng likewise testified that he had also left the transfer to Ling. In these circumstances, Cheng’s failure to call Ling as a witness warrants the drawing of an inference that Ling’s evidence would have been unhelpful to Cheng. I also observe that Cheng chose to call Feng despite his evidence that he had been informed that it was Feng who had misappropriated the investment monies, and that he has accused both Ling and Feng of defrauding Tjandra. Clearly, Cheng accusing Ling of fraud was not an impediment to calling him.

  121. [72] I reiterate that Cheng has no personal knowledge of whether the Star Dust Shares had been transferred to Tjandra and took no steps to find out although he could have done so. The evidence he relies on is to invite an inference that the transfer had taken place. For the reasons below, I reject that submission.

  122. (3) The WhatsApp exchange on 30 June 2019 does not assist Cheng

  123. [73] In the aftermath of the investment unravelling, the following exchange took place between Cheng and Tjandra:

  124. [74] In reliance on this WhatsApp exchange, Cheng makes two arguments. First, he claims that Tjandra “not only confirmed that the [Star Dust] shares have been transferred to him but that he has even received the hard copies of the [Star Dust] shares which were kept at his office”. Second, he adds that Tjandra has confessed to the Star Dust Shares “all being held under his nominee”, which suggests that the shares had been transferred. I find these arguments unconvincing.

  125. [75] First, I accept Tjandra’s explanation that the “hard copies” he was referring to are the Share Transfer Forms, and not the share certificates. It is undisputed that Tjandra was given one set of the Share Transfer Forms. It is also relevant that he states “[t]here is hard copy with me” less than 30 seconds after he sends the soft copies of the Share Transfer Forms to Cheng, and then asks “is this the correct one?” immediately after saying he had hard copies with him. Tjandra and Cheng were exchanging messages within seconds of each other, which suggests some may have crossed. That Cheng himself recognised Tjandra was referring to the Share Transfer Forms, is confirmed by his attempt to clarify in the two messages he sent subsequently: “this one only you committed to buy … but the actual shares you got receive?”. Tjandra replies within eight seconds: “[y]es at office” and continues to refer to “[t]he tt slips n so on” – a reference to the payment made for the shares. I do not accept it safe to conclude that Tjandra was referring to holding the share certificates in this exchange and it is certainly insufficient to displace the evidence against Cheng’s position referred to above.

  126. [76] Second, I also accept that Tjandra’s reference to a “nominee” was a mistake. There was no evidence of any nominee being involved throughout the negotiation process and in the corresponding WhatsApp conversations. Indeed, the Share Transfer Forms explicitly provide that the Star Dust Shares were to be transferred to Tjandra in his own name. I therefore find that the intention at all material times was for the Star Dust Shares to be transferred to Tjandra personally. His mention of a “nominee” should also be understood in the context of an anxious and hasty conversation where he had just discovered he had been defrauded.

  127. (4) Tjandra’s amended pleadings and his solicitor’s earlier reference to him as a shareholder in Star Dust are not contrary to his case

  128. [77] At trial, Tjandra explained that when the action was first commenced on 24 June 2021, he was unaware that the Star Dust Shares had not been transferred to him. This was because he erroneously assumed that by having a signed and notarised share transfer form, he would receive the shares. He candidly admitted that he only discovered the Star Dust Shares had not been transferred subsequently, after receiving legal advice.

  129. [78] In light of Tjandra’s late discovery, it explains why his original statement of claim filed on 24 June 2021 stated that “[the Star Dust Shares] were duly transferred to [him]”. It also explains why Tjandra’s solicitors initially referred to Tjandra as “a shareholder in Star Dust” in a request to inspect the case file for a related action (SIC/S 5/2020) filed on 15 June 2021 (see [119] below). This is consistent with the explanation given by Tjandra in court.

  130. (5) Tjandra’s failure to enquire about the transfer of the Star Dust Shares is equivocal

  131. [79] Finally, I am unconvinced by Cheng’s argument that Tjandra would have made enquiries or complained if the Star Dust Shares were not transferred to him after his payment on 27 February 2019. The registration of Tjandra’s name in Star Dust’s register of members and the issuance of share certificates, were matters for the Original Shareholders to take care of. Tjandra was not asked in cross-examination when he expected the process to be completed. He also explained that he was busy and that he trusted the Original Shareholders to take the necessary steps. I accept that explanation.

  132. [80] Further, from the time Tjandra made payment until he was informed by Cheng of the fraud on 18 June 2019, Tjandra had no reason to suspect anything was amiss, nor was it put to him that he had such reason.

  133. [81] Therefore, I find on the balance of probabilities that the Star Dust Shares were not transferred to Tjandra, and that Cheng is in breach of the Agreement.

  134. What damages is Tjandra is entitled to?

  135. [82] Tjandra is entitled to damages for the breach of the Agreement. In this regard, it is undisputed that Tjandra paid the sum of US$3.2m to the Original Shareholders, of which a sum of US$1.36m was paid to Cheng.

  136. [83] Parties agree that Cheng had made part-payments to Tjandra amounting to US$860,000, in the following manner:

  137. (a) a bank transfer of US$660,000 on 30 June 2019;

  138. (b) a bank transfer of SG$136,000 on 30 June 2019, which parties agree was equivalent to US$100,000; and

  139. (c) the delivery of two paintings on 1 July 2019, which parties agree were worth US$100,000 collectively.

  140. [84] The discussion in relation to these part-payments appears to have occurred on 29 June 2019, when Cheng and Tjandra met at Grand Hyatt, as evidenced by the message sent by Tjandra to Cheng after the meeting:

  141. [85] The repayment plan was for the return of the entire sum of US$1.36m paid to Cheng. Cheng did not respond to, object, or dispute Tjandra’s recapitulation of the plan. In fact, Cheng complied with it over the next two days. On 30 June 2019, he made two bank transfers for US$660,000, and SG$136,000. The day after, on 1 July 2019, he handed over to Tjandra the two paintings (collectively worth US$100,000).

  142. [86] Cheng did not, at the material time, qualify these payments in any way. However, in these proceedings, he claims that he made them “not as an admission of either responsibility or liability but because [he] felt that the surplus funds [Tjandra] transferred were not [his] to keep … At the time [he] felt bad that both of [them] had been duped by people [they] both had trusted”. I also note that Tjandra did not plead that these part-payments are an admission of Cheng’s liability to him. Nonetheless, they evidence Cheng’s acceptance that Tjandra did not receive anything in return for his investment of US$4m and that he (Cheng) believed he was not entitled to retain any of the US$1.36m he had received.

  143. [87] For completeness, I note that Cheng and Tjandra extensively discussed Cheng’s repayment of the balance of US$500,000. There were suggestions that Cheng would: (a) sell his Audi R8 car to satisfy US$100,000; and (b) transfer his investment in a venture capital fund to Tjandra to satisfy an additional US$120,000. If these two transfers were made, it would leave a balance of US$280,000. This was the context in which the following exchange took place:

  144. [88] It is clear from this exchange that Cheng wanted to pay the balance US$500,000 but needed time to do so. This is further buttressed by the following statements by Cheng in early August on repaying the outstanding US$500,000:

  145. [89] US$860,000 is no small sum, and it is unlikely that Cheng would deplete his cash, sell off all his assets, and offer to pay the balance over 5 years, just because he “felt bad”. I find that he did so because he knew and accepted that Tjandra had been deceived and received nothing for his investment, and that the monies he received should be repaid to Tjandra.

  146. [90] Although Tjandra had paid out a sum of US$3.2m under the Agreement, he is entitled to limit his claim against Cheng. I therefore find that Tjandra is entitled to damages in the sum of US$500,000 against Cheng as claimed by him.

  147. Unjust enrichment claim

  148. [91] I also find Cheng liable to pay US$500,000 to Tjandra based on Cheng’s unjust enrichment. This applies even if I accept Cheng’s argument that Tjandra’s contract was not with him but with Blue Summit.

  149. The law on unjust enrichment

  150. [92] Under the principle of subsidiarity, the courts generally do not permit an unjust enrichment claim where there is a subsisting contract which has not been set aside at law or in equity (Alwie Handoyo v Tjong Very Sumito [2013] 4 SLR 308 (“Alwie Handoyo”) at [104]).

  151. [93] If this preliminary hurdle is crossed, the plaintiff will have to establish the following four elements to make out a claim in unjust enrichment (Wee Chiaw Sek Anna v Ng Li-Ann Genevieve (sole executrix of the estate of Ng Hock Seng, deceased) and another [2013] 3 SLR 801 (“Wee Chiaw Sek”) at [98]-[99]): (a) the defendant has benefitted or been enriched; (b) the enrichment was at the expense of the plaintiff; (c) the enrichment was unjust; and (d) there are no defences. In the present case, I am only concerned with the third and fourth elements (viz. elements (c) and (d)), as the first two elements are clearly established (see Zaiton bte Adom v Nafsiah bte Wagiman and another [2023] 3 SLR 53321 at [193]).

  152. Issues to be determined

  153. [94] Accordingly, the issues to be determined for the unjust enrichment claim are:

  154. (a) whether the claim is permitted in light of the subsidiarity principle?

  155. (b) whether the enrichment Cheng received was unjust?

  156. (c) whether Cheng can rely on any defences?

  157. Does the subsidiarity principle prohibit the unjust enrichment claim?

  158. [95] Generally, the principle of subsidiarity dictates that “the law of restitution should not be allowed to disturb unrescinded contracts and transactions which have not been set aside at law or in equity” (Info-communications Development Authority of Singapore v Singapore Telecommunications Ltd [2002] 2 SLRI 136 at [89]). “The courts are unwilling to permit a plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim in these cases as to do so would undermine the contract and the contractual allocation of risk between the [parties]” (Alwie Handoyo at [104]).

  159. [96] Cheng relies on this principle to argue that Tjandra had contracted to pay US$1.36m to Cheng, and therefore this court should not undermine the contractual allocation of risk in permitting a claim for unjust enrichment. In support of this, Cheng attempts to analogise this case to that in Alwie Handoyo. This argument fails for two reasons.

  160. [97] First, this case is distinguishable from Alwie Handoyo. That case involved the sale of shares in an Indonesian company for US$18m. Although Tjong Very Sumito (“Tjong”) was the seller of those shares, the share purchase agreement (“SPA”) provided that a portion of the US$18m was to be paid to two BVI companies. Specifically, US$6m was to be paid directly to Tjong; US$10m to Aventi Holdings Limited (“Aventi”); and US$2m to Overseas Alliance Financial Limited (“OAFL”) (at [10]). Neither Aventi nor OAFL was owned or controlled by Tjong. The sale was subsequently completed, and the buyer of the shares paid out the three amounts in accordance with the SPA. Tjong subsequently brought an action in unjust enrichment to recover the sums paid to OAFL. The Court of Appeal rejected the claim in unjust enrichment on the basis that the payments were made in accordance with a valid and subsisting contract. In Rajah JA’s words, to allow such a claim “would be to undermine the contractual bargain under the SPA which the [parties] agreed on” (at [104]). The key difference in the present case is that the sale and purchase of the Star Dust Shares was never completed. As I found above (at [58]–[81]), the Star Dust Shares were not transferred to Tjandra as promised.

  161. [98] Second, and relatedly, the present case falls within an exception to the subsidiarity principle. One recognized exception to the subsidiarity principle, is where there is total failure of consideration (Max Media FZ LLC v Nimbus Media Pte Ltd [2010] 2 SLR 677 at [24]). According to Andrew Ang J:

  162. [99] This exception was recently endorsed by the Appellate Division of the High Court in Carlsberg South Asia Pte Ltd v Pawan Kumar Jagetia [2023] SGHC(A) 29 at [83].

  163. [100] For reasons I explain below, I find that there was a total failure of consideration. Therefore, the subsidiarity principle does not pose an issue in this case.

  164. Was the enrichment unjust?

  165. The law on total failure of basis

  166. [101] The unjust factor Tjandra relies on in this case is a total failure of consideration. The inquiry for this has two parts (Benzline Auto Pte Ltd v Supercars Lorinser Pte Ltd and another [2018] 1 SLR 239 (“Benzline”) at [46]): first, what was the basis for the transfer in respect of which restitution is sought; and second, did that basis fail?

  167. [102] The courts adopt the following objective approach in determining what the basis of a transfer is (Simpson Marine (SEA) Pte Ltd v Jiacipto Jiaravanon [2019] 1 SLR 696 (“Simpson”) at [49]):

  168. [103] In recent decisions, the Court of Appeal made clear that the “basis” or “consideration” can refer to one of two things (Benzline at [48]–[50]; and Simpson at [49]):

  169. (a) first, in the promissory sense, it can refer to the performance of a counter-promise to be distinguished from the counter-promise itself; and

  170. (b) second, it may refer to a non-promissory contingent condition, ie, an expected event or state of affairs which neither party is responsible for bringing about.

  171. Although the test refers to “the” basis for the plaintiff’s transfer, Prakash JA made clear that a transfer may have more than one basis (Benzline at [52]).

  172. [104] After identifying the basis of the transfer, the next step is to determine whether that basis has failed. Here, there must be a total (and not merely partial) failure of the basis (Benzline at [53]–[54]).

  173. [105] In this case, there are at least two separate and distinct bases for Tjandra’s transfer of US$1.36m to Cheng – both of which have totally failed.

  174. First basis: the transfer of the Star Dust Shares

  175. [106] The first and most obvious basis for Tjandra’s transfer of US$1.36m is his receiving a 20% interest in Royal Eastern Bank and a seat on its board of directors. This promissory basis closely resembles the case of Just Gems Limited v Shirley Ooi Ching Ling and another [2002] SGHC 19 (“Just Gems (HC)”), a decision upheld on appeal in Ooi Ching Ling v Just Gems Inc [2003] 1 SLR(R) 14 (“Just Gems (CA)”). The parties there entered a share purchase agreement, where the defendant promised to procure the transfer of a 22% shareholding in Pacific Rim to the plaintiff for the price of US$500,000. The plaintiff made full payment of the US$500,000, but the defendant failed to procure the transfer of the shares. Instead, the shares were transferred to one Jamilah, the plaintiff’s sole shareholder and controller. The court nonetheless held that there was a total failure of consideration, as the shares were not transferred to the rightful entity as promised (Just Gems (HC) at [124]. The decision was upheld on appeal in Just Gems (CA) at [53]–[58]).

  176. [107] Although this finding of a total failure of consideration was made in the context of a “claim for money had and received” (see Just Gems (HC) at [120]), the Court of Appeal has since clarified that “the underlying basis for the action for money had and received is now embraced under the rubric of unjust enrichment” (Alwie Handoyo at [125]).

  177. [108] The facts here present a stronger case. After Tjandra paid US$4m (including US$1.36m to Cheng) he did not receive a single Star Dust share (as well as the board seat he was promised) (see [61]–[82] above). I therefore find that there was a total failure of consideration.

  178. Second basis: Royal Eastern Bank would be a licensed and operational bank

  179. [109] As mentioned earlier (at [103(b)] above), the “basis” in the context of an unjust enrichment claim can also be a non-promissory contingent condition, ie, an expected event or state of affairs which neither party is responsible for bringing about.

  180. [110] Tjandra had contracted with the Original Shareholders to invest in what he was told was, or would be, a licensed, operational, cryptocurrency-friendly, offshore bank. The establishment of such an enterprise as a going concern was therefore the fundamental basis of the transaction.

  181. [111] However, as the evidence suggests, there was a total failure of this basis.

  182. [112] Cheng accepts that Tjandra’s investment in Royal Eastern Bank was brought about by fraud. Cheng pleads and refers to Ling and Feng’s “fraudulent and/or dishonest commercial conduct in their dealings with [Tjandra] (“the Feng/Andrew Dishonest Conduct”)”. Indeed, in his attempt to explain his repayments to Tjandra (see above at [83]–[89]), Cheng pleads that “the payments and the transfer of the Artwork were made in good faith by [him] immediately on his realisation of the Feng/Andrew Dishonest Conduct towards [Tjandra] in securing the Investment” [emphasis added].

  183. [113] Cheng’s evidence is that he was informed by a business associate of Feng and Ling that “Feng had misappropriated funds that had been raised for the purposes of purchasing Royal Eastern Bank”, and that his own enquiries had exposed “[Ling’s] participation in [the] fraud”.

  184. [114] Further, in Cheng’s discussion for working out a repayment plan with Tjandra in August 2019, Cheng candidly stated the following:

  185. [115] On Cheng’s own case, the deal was, or became, a scam. Royal Eastern Bank never became operational. I also note that Star Dust (which was supposed to serve as the vehicle to hold the Original Shareholders’ stake in Royal Eastern Bank) was struck off the BVI registry because of non-payment of its annual licence fees.

  186. [117] Nonetheless, Cheng continued to defend the US$8.5m figure on the basis that the Original Shareholders intended to acquire a Swiss banking licence in lieu of the Curacao licence. He said he “believe[s] that Feng’s business associate, Fred [Gaillard], had put a EUR 2 million deposit on that Swiss bank licence, with a total payment of EUR 23.8 million to be paid in February”. No documentary or credible evidence was produced in support of this assertion. Cheng later clarified that the Swiss banking licence was never acquired.

  187. [119] Taken as a whole, the evidence strongly suggests that the entire investment was plagued with difficulties and deception, and that there was no, or was never going to be, a licenced operational bank.

  188. [120] I make no finding as to who was responsible for this state of affairs. What is relevant is that Tjandra was not going to – and did not – get what he was purchasing viz. a stake in a licensed, cryptocurrency-friendly offshore bank. This was the substratum of the entire transaction and without it, there is a total failure of the basis for Tjandra’s payment to Cheng.

  189. Are there defences to the unjust enrichment claim?

  190. [121] I turn to consider if there are any defences. In this regard Cheng relies on the defence of change of position.

  191. The law on the change of position defence

  192. [122] The four elements to make out the defence of change of position are (Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No 473 v De Beers Jewellery Pte Ltd [2002] 1 SLR(R) 418 at [35]; Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (Publ), Singapore Branch v Asia Pacific Breweries (Singapore) Pte Ltd and another and another appeal [2011] 3 SLR 540 (“Skandinaviska”) at [140]–[142]):

  193. (a) the payee has changed his position;

  194. (b) there is a causal link between the change of position and the enrichment received;

  195. (c) the change is bona fide; and

  196. (d) it would be inequitable to require him to make restitution or to make restitution in full.

  197. [123] In relation to element (b), the defendant must show that he would not have changed his position, “but for” the enrichment received (Skandinaviska at [140]).

  198. [124] In relation to element (c), the defendant’s knowledge of the facts entitling the plaintiff to restitution would bring the defendant’s bona fides into question and disentitle him from relying on this defence (Seagate Technology Pte Ltd and another v Goh Han Kim [1994] 3 SLR(R) 836 at [32]). Knowledge, in this regard, connotes: (a) actual knowledge; (b) wilfully shutting one’s eyes to the obvious; and (c) wilfully and recklessly failing to make such inquiries as an honest and reasonable man would make (Id, at [34]).

  199. Cheng’s case on change of position

  200. [125] Cheng claims that he changed his position in three respects:

  201. (a) he terminated his work as a medical practitioner thereby foregoing future income, which he estimates to be SG$250,000;

  202. (b) he borrowed SG$50,000 from his family to meet the wages of the employees of the Royal Eastern Bank; and

  203. (c) he applied US$300,000 of the monies he received from Tjandra to meet the expenses associated with establishing and promoting the operations and anticipated operations of Royal Eastern Bank.

  204. [126] I dismiss all of them.

  205. (1) Cheng’s allegedly foregone income of SG$250,000

  206. [127] Cheng did not provide any evidence of this alleged income. Indeed, he did not even specify when he left his job as a doctor. He vaguely asserts in his affidavit that “[b]etween 2018 and 2019, [he] also gave up [his] career as a practising medical doctor to focus on the [acquisition of Royal Eastern Bank]”. Although he asserts that “[he] was earning approximately AUD$250,000 per annum”, he adduced no evidence of the same. In the circumstances, I dismiss this claim as it is completely unsubstantiated and bereft of details.

  207. [128] Further, even if there was evidence of Cheng’s foregone income, there is no causal link between Tjandra’s investment and Cheng terminating his work as a medical practitioner. In his further and better particulars filed on 16 March 2022, Cheng pleaded that he commenced winding down his practice in or around April 2018, and effectively ceased practising medicine as a main source of income “in mid 2018”. But this was well before Tjandra’s investment in February 2019.

  208. (2) The alleged SG$50,000 loan

  209. [129] The loan Cheng allegedly took from his family is also not evidentially supported. While I appreciate that a loan from family members may not always be reduced to writing, this claim was completely bereft of details. While Cheng gave particulars that the loan was given on 2 July 2019 by one Cheng Theng How (“Theng How”), he gave no such evidence in his AEIC or in the stand. Neither did he call Theng How. There was also no documentary or other evidence of his receipt of the funds.

  210. [130] Further, on his own pleaded case, Cheng took the loan on 2 July 2019 – but this was after he had discovered the fraud surrounding Royal Eastern Bank and, more importantly, after he had agreed (or at least discussed) returning the monies to Tjandra (see above at [84]). It is wrong, and plainly absurd, for Cheng to claim that he had bona fide changed his position by taking the loan and it would be inequitable to make him pay this sum to Tjandra when he took the loan after becoming aware of the fraud and acknowledging that Tjandra should be repaid his investment. He also did not explain why he was personally bearing the expenses of Royal Eastern Bank. Even if he had used the proceeds of the loan (if any) to meet the expenses of the Royal Eastern Bank, this was done voluntarily by Cheng and should not be borne by Tjandra.

  211. [131] I further note that there is no evidence that Cheng used the proceeds of the loan (if any) to meet the (alleged) wages of employees of the Royal Eastern Bank.

  212. (3) The US$300,000 of expenses Cheng allegedly incurred

  213. [132] Cheng asserts that he had spent US$300,000 out of the US$1.36m he received from Tjandra on the operations of Royal Eastern Bank. He breaks down these expenses into the following four broad categories:

  214. (a) expenses related to securing a lease and thereafter redesigning, renovating and re-furnishing the office for Royal Eastern Bank;

  215. (b) expenses related to finding and paying eight members of Royal Eastern Bank’s staff;

  216. (c) expenses related to purchasing and establishing the computer systems, internet banking, cryptocurrency platforms for Royal Eastern Bank; and

  217. (d) expenses related to the marketing and promotion of Royal Eastern Bank.

  218. [133] Cheng testified that these expenses are recorded in a spreadsheet which he created at the time of establishing Royal Eastern Bank. This spreadsheet consists of two tables: one setting out the alleged expenses in US$ (the “US$ Spreadsheet”) and another in SG$ (the “SG$ Spreadsheet”). I note that the total amount of expenses reflected in the Spreadsheets is about US$250,000, which is lower than the US$300,000 Cheng claimed he spent, and he made no attempt to explain or reconcile the difference. In any event, the Spreadsheets do not assist Cheng.

  219. [134] First, the Spreadsheets were created by Cheng himself. The entries therein were not supported by any underlying documentation such as receipts and invoices. In other words, there is no evidence that the expenses were even incurred, much less paid.

  220. [135] Second, none of the expenses in the Spreadsheets were dated. This makes it difficult to ascertain the veracity of those transactions and more importantly, whether they were incurred after Tjandra’s payment to Cheng. Cheng adduced a print-out from his computer which appears to show that the Spreadsheets were created only on 21 March 2019. Even if reliable, it does not mean that the expenses were incurred and paid after that date.

  221. [136] Third, the description of the expenses in the Spreadsheet were general or vague, and it is not clear that they were all incurred for the operations of the Royal Eastern Bank.

  222. [137] In a belated attempt to resolve these evidential issues, while under cross-examination, Cheng adduced two HSBC bank statements: the first for the period of 9 February 2019 to 9 March 2019; and the second for the period of 9 March 2019 to 9 April 2019. Both of these statements recorded Cheng’s transactions in his SG$ account (the “SG$ Transactions”) and his US$ account (the “US$ Transactions”).

  223. [138] Preliminarily, I note that Tjandra objected to the admission of these statements because of their lateness. In response, Cheng, through his counsel, claimed that this was because he was not represented at the time discovery was given in this action. However, this reason was false. Cheng’s list of documents was filed on 29 April 2022 by his previous solicitors, Timothy Ong Lim & Partners, who only discharged themselves on 20 March 2023. Nonetheless, I admitted the statements as they were unquestionably authentic and material – the US$ Statement, in particular, reflected the receipt of the sum of US$1.36m from Tjandra – and Tjandra was not prejudiced by their admission.

  224. [139] The two bank statements not only do not assist Cheng, they undermine his defence.

  225. [140] First, most of the alleged expenses recorded in the Spreadsheets are not reflected in either of the two bank statements.

  226. (a) As regards the US$ Transactions, only expenses amounting to US$40,276.08 out of the alleged US$64,296.08 are reflected.

  227. (b) As regards the SG$ Transactions, only expenses amounting to SG$5,185.40 out of the alleged SG$252,089.80 are reflected.

  228. In total, this amounts to about US$43,000 out of the alleged sums claimed in the Spreadsheets.

  229. [141] Second, and more crucially, there was already a sum of US$60,711.76 in the HSBC US$ account before Tjandra’s monies were received on 27 February 2019. Thereafter, from 27 February 2019 to 25 March 2019, only US$40,250.59 was paid out of the HSBC US$ account. Contrary to what Cheng claims in his closing submissions, this means that Tjandra’s funds were not used to pay the (alleged) expenses. Indeed, on 25 March 2019, a sum of US$1,398,066.42 – which is more than what Tjandra paid in – was transferred out of the HSBC US$ account, leaving nothing in the account. Cheng claimed that this sum was transferred to a UOB account but did not produce any statements. There was no explanation for why the funds were paid out of the HSBC account or what happened to them.

  230. [142] Finally, Cheng did not lead any evidence that he would not have incurred the expenses but for his receipt of the funds from Tjandra. Indeed, Cheng testified that Ling would reimburse him for the expenses he incurred on behalf of Royal Eastern Bank. In this regard, Cheng’s submission that he could only incur the expenses with Tjandra’s monies “as funds from Ling were no longer available” is self-serving. It is not his evidence that he knew Ling’s funds would no longer be forthcoming at the time he incurred the alleged expenses or that Ling would stop reimbursing him after Tjandra’s monies came in.

  231. [143] I therefore find that Cheng was unjustly enriched in the sum of US$1.36m at Tjandra’s expense and has failed to make out, even partially, a defence of change of position. Cheng has made part-payment of US$860,000 to Tjandra (see [83] above), which leaves the amount of US$500,000 outstanding. I therefore find Cheng liable to pay Tjandra the sum of US$500,000.

  232. Misrepresentation claim

  233. [144] Tjandra pleads that the Original Shareholders (whether individually or collectively) made the following representations to him in or around February 2019:

  234. (a) by purchasing the Star Dust Shares, Tjandra would be entering into a joint venture exclusively with Cheng, Ling, and Feng in relation to the business and operations of Royal Eastern Bank (“Exclusivity Representation”); and

  235. (b) Star Dust had a par valuation of US$20m – which Tjandra understood to mean that Royal Eastern Bank (which was Star Dust’s sole asset) was worth US$20m (“Valuation Representation”).

  236. [145] Tjandra further pleads that these representations were false and made fraudulently.

  237. The law on fraudulent misrepresentation

  238. [146] The courts have consistently adopted a “relatively high standard of proof” which must be satisfied before a fraudulent misrepresentation can be established (Wee Chiaw Sek at [30]–[31]; Government of the City of Buenos Aires v HN Singapore Pte Ltd and another [2023] SGHC 139 at [116]; Yong Khong Yoong Mark and others v Ting Choon Meng and another [2021] SGHC 246 at [306]).

  239. [147] The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the following elements of fraudulent misrepresentation (Broadley Construction Pte Ltd v Alacran Design Pte Ltd [2018] 2 SLR 110 (“Broadley Construction”) at [26]; Fuji Xerox Singapore Pte Ltd v Mazzy Creations Pte Ltd and others [2021] SGHC 193 at [50]):

  240. (a) there must be a representation of fact by words or conduct;

  241. (b) the representation must be made with the intention that it should be acted on by the plaintiff;

  242. (c) the plaintiff had acted upon the false statement;

  243. (d) the plaintiff suffered damage by so doing; and

  244. (e) the representation must be made with the knowledge that it is false; it must be wilfully false, or at least made in the absence of any genuine belief that it is true.

  245. The entire agreement clause does not prohibit the misrepresentation claims

  246. [148] Preliminarily, Cheng pleads that Tjandra is precluded from making any misrepresentation claim, on the basis of the following clause found in the Share Transfer Forms (the “Entire Agreement Clause”):

  247. [149] However, as I found above (at [24]–[28]), the Share Transfer Forms do not constitute the agreement between the parties. More importantly, the Entire Agreement Clause merely provides “that in entering into this instrument [each party] does not rely on any statement representation or warranty”. However, Tjandra is not suing on “this instrument”, but for misrepresentations which induced him into entering the Agreement.

  248. [150] In any event, the applicability of the Entire Agreement Clause ultimately does not matter as I dismiss Tjandra’s fraudulent misrepresentation claim for the reasons below.

  249. The Exclusivity Representation claim

  250. Was the Exclusivity Representation made?

  251. [151] The Exclusivity Representation fails on the very first element, as Tjandra has not proven that it was made. In particular, Tjandra has failed to prove when the Exclusivity Representation was made, what was said and by whom.

  252. [152] Tjandra’s pleadings underscores that he cannot recall, or is unable to say, who made the Exclusivity Representation. In his original Statement of Claim filed on 24 June 2021, Tjandra states that the “representations were made by [Cheng] to [Tjandra]”. This remained the case for more than two years until Tjandra made his third amendment to his Statement of Claim on 19 December 2023, where he changed his case to the “representations were made by the [Original Shareholders] (including [Cheng]), whether individually or collectively”.

  253. [153] In Tjandra’s AEIC, he alleges that the Exclusivity Representation was made by the Original Shareholders “at meetings and/or telephone calls with all 3 men [viz. Cheng, Ling, and Feng]”, without providing particulars on the same.

  254. [154] At trial, Tjandra’s testimony cast even further doubt on the particulars, and therefore the existence, of the Exclusivity Representation. He began by saying he was sure that Ling and Feng had discussed with him the exclusive nature of the venture at the 13 February 2019 Meeting. When asked what exactly was discussed, Tjandra made vague allusions to discussions on the “shareholder structure”, without specifying who said what. Subsequently, Tjandra confessed that he could not remember when he asked about the shareholding structure, and who was at that meeting.

  255. [155] Further, there is nothing in the contemporaneous records which evidences that the Exclusivity Representation was made. Tjandra merely alleges that the Exclusivity Representation is reinforced by the fact that there were only four members (including him) in the REBB WhatsApp Chat. This is not enough to evidence the representation. It does not suggest that they were intended to be the only investors in Royal Eastern Bank, and much less that it was so represented to Tjandra.

  256. Was the Exclusivity Representation false?

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