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Grounds publishedDecided 15 Mar 2024

General Division of the High Court

Manoj Dharmadas Kalwani v Bharat Dharmadas Kalwani

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[2024] SGHC 70Case no. Suit No 1123 of 2020

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] This is a suit involving a dispute between two brothers. For many years, these brothers have worked together to grow the family business, which has flourished. Unfortunately, the success of the business did not mirror the state of their interpersonal relationship. Litigation ensued. One brother claims that he had loaned dividends to the other; the other claims that the loan was in fact a gift. Ancillary claims involving allegations of unpaid wine that one brother had allegedly bought on behalf of the other, and allegedly unpaid car number plates that one brother had transferred to the other, have also been injected into the fray. Ultimately, the fact that this dispute involves brothers in a family business context means that the documentary evidence is somewhat lacking. The court’s task is to parse through the informal dealings as between the parties to discern the true underlying transactions.

  3. Facts

  4. The parties

  5. [2] The plaintiff (“Mr Manoj”) and the defendant (“Mr Mike”) are brothers from the Kalwani family. The Kalwani family is the family behind the Novelty group of companies (“Novelty Group”), a family-owned business involved in, among other things, the construction, development, and sale of residential properties. The persons involved, at some point or another, in the Novelty Group include the late Mr Kalwani Kishinchand Ghanshamdas (the grandfather of Mr Manoj and Mr Mike), Mr Dharmadas Kishinchand Kalwani (the father of Mr Manoj and Mr Mike), the late Mdm Sheela Dharmadas Kalwani (the mother of Mr Manoj and Mr Mike), Ms Kamni Dharmadas Kalwani (a sister of Mr Manoj and Mr Mike), Ms Geetu Dharmadas Kalwani (a sister of Mr Manoj and Mr Mike), Mr Manoj and Mr Mike. The family business was started by Mr Kalwani Kishinchand Ghanshamdas in the 1950s. The business took on the name of “Novelty Dept Store” in the 1960s–1970s when Mr Dharmadas Kishinchand Kalwani (“Mr Dharmadas”) joined the business. On 27 September 1995, the business was incorporated as Novelty Dept Store Pte Ltd (“Novelty Dept Store”), with the founding directors and shareholders being Mr Dharmadas, Mr Mike, Ms Geetu Dharmadas Kalwani (“Ms Geena”) and Ms Kamni Dharmadas Kalwani (“Ms Kamni”). Over time, the family business evolved from selling novelty items and trinkets, to selling electronic products, to property development. In the course of the Novelty Group’s business, Novelty Dept Store also came to incorporate various subsidiaries with Novelty Dept Store as the parent company of the Novelty Group.

  6. [3] Mr Manoj is the youngest sibling of the Kalwani family. Mr Manoj claims that he started working part-time in Novelty Dept Store in the 1980s when he was in secondary school. It is not disputed that Mr Manoj was formally employed in Novelty Dept Store after he completed his national service in the 1990s. Mr Manoj was appointed as a director of Novelty Dept Store on 24 May 2002. On 27 July 2007, Mr Manoj became a shareholder of Novelty Dept Store when Mr Dharmadas transferred a 20% shareholding in Novelty Dept Store to Mr Manoj by way of a gift. Mr Manoj commenced a minority oppression action in HC/S 248/2020 on 17 March 2020, which was settled in 2022. Mr Manoj’s shares in Novelty Dept Store were bought out as part of the settlement. Mr Manoj is no longer a director of the Novelty Group entities.

  7. [4] Mr Mike is the eldest sibling of the Kalwani family. He is presently the group president and chief executive officer of the Novelty Group. He claims to have been the first amongst his siblings to start helping out with the family business, and dropped out of school at around age 13 to work full-time in the family business. In the early 2000s, Mr Mike appointed Ms Geena as the chief financial officer of the Novelty Group to manage the Novelty Group’s accounts, finances and general administrative matters. In the present suit, Ms Geena and Ms Kamni testified in support of Mr Mike’s case.

  8. Background to the dispute

  9. The S$2.8m transfer

  10. [5] The primary dispute in this suit involves a transfer of a total sum of S$2,837,481.55 (the “S$2.8m transfer”) from Mr Manoj to Mr Mike. Mr Manoj alleges that this sum is a loan he gave to Mr Mike on Mr Mike’s request which needs to be repaid. Mr Mike’s primary defence is that the S$2.8m transfer is a gift from Mr Manoj. Secondarily, Mr Mike also argues that Mr Manoj is estopped from claiming the S$2.8m from Mr Mike.

  11. [6] The S$2.8m transfer is a transfer of dividends that Mr Manoj received from Novelty Builders Pte Ltd (“Novelty Builders”). Novelty Builders is a company that carries out construction works for residential and commercial properties. Novelty Builders was incorporated on 5 January 2006 under its previous name “Novelty Milliard Engineering Pte Ltd”. At the time of its incorporation, the four shareholders and directors were Mr Manoj, Mr Mike and two other individuals. The two other individuals were bought out by Mr Manoj and Mr Mike in July 2006. Since then, Mr Manoj and Mr Mike were each 50% shareholders in Novelty Builders. The chief financial officer of Novelty Builders is Ms Geena. Parties are generally agreed that Novelty Builders was set up to carry out construction projects for Novelty Group to support its property development efforts.

  12. [7] Aside from Novelty Group’s commercial endeavours, Novelty Builders was also involved in the construction of Mr Manoj’s and Mr Mike’s family homes. Mr Manoj had gotten engaged in 2011 and was looking for a family home around then. In 2012, Mr Manoj bought a property (the “Clacton Property”) from a subsidiary in the Novelty Group. The Clacton Property is intended as Mr Manoj’s family home. The Clacton Property was built by Novelty Builders. Relatedly, sometime before 2011, Mr Mike and Mdm Sheela Dharmadas Kalwani bought a property (the “Wilkinson Property”) from Novelty Dept Store. The Wilkinson Property is intended as the family home for Mr Mike, Ms Geena, Ms Kamni and their parents. The Wilkinson Property was also built by Novelty Builders.

  13. (a) For the Clacton Property:

  14. (i) tax invoice CONSOCT13/DCL065 dated 31 October 2013 for the sum of S$1,426,138.18 issued to Mr Manoj;

  15. (b) For the Wilkinson Property:

  16. (i) tax invoice CONSDEC12/DWR086 dated 31 December 2012 for the sum of S$3,862,700 issued to Mr Mike; and

  17. (ii) tax invoice CONSNOV13/DWR068 dated 30 November 2014 for the sum of S$6,519,562.52 issued to Mr Mike.

  18. [9] It was decided that Novelty Builders would issue dividends to Mr Manoj and Mr Mike. The dividends would be applied to pay down the debt owed by Mr Manoj and Mr Mike to Novelty Builders in respect of the Clacton Property and the Wilkinson Property. Thus, Novelty Builders declared dividends in two tranches as follows:

  19. (a) by a directors’ resolution dated 30 December 2014, Novelty Builders declared dividends totalling S$6,500,000, with S$3,250,000 payable to each of Mr Manoj and Mr Mike for the financial year ending 31 December 2014; and

  20. (b) by a directors’ resolution dated 30 December 2015, Novelty Builders declared dividends totalling S$2,000,000, with S$1,000,000 payable to each of Mr Manoj and Mr Mike for the financial year ending 31 December 2015.

  21. [10] Ms Geena then arranged for a series of credits and debits in relation to the accounts Mr Manoj and Mr Mike maintained with Novelty Builders to pay off their debt in respect of the Clacton Property and the Wilkinson Property.

  22. [12] Secondly, Ms Geena arranged for the dividends issued by Novelty Builders to Mr Manoj and Mr Mike to be applied towards paying down their debts in respect of the Clacton Property and the Wilkinson Property. Thus, around November 2015, Ms Geena arranged for the dividends of S$3,250,000 received by Mr Mike for the financial year ending 31 December 2014 (see [9(a)] above) to be paid to Novelty Builders as part payment of Mr Mike’s debt in respect of the Wilkinson Property. Around November 2015, Ms Geena arranged for the dividends of S$3,250,000 received by Mr Manoj for the financial year ending 31 December 2014 (see [9(a)] above) to be paid to Novelty Builders as full payment of Mr Manoj’s debt of S$1,412,518.45 in respect of the Clacton Property. The remainder of the dividends due to Mr Manoj, amounting to S$1,837,481.55, was credited to Mr Manoj’s account with Novelty Builders on 31 December 2014. Thereafter, this sum of S$1,837,481.55 was debited from Mr Manoj’s account with Novelty Builders and credited to Mr Mike’s account as reflected in a credit entry dated 31 December 2015.

  23. [13] In relation to the dividends of S$1,000,000 each received by Mr Manoj and Mr Mike for the financial year ending 31 December 2015 (see [9(b)] above), Ms Geena arranged to be recorded in Novelty Builders’ ledger for Mr Manoj and Mr Mike a credit entry of S$1,000,000 each. Thereafter, Mr Manoj’s dividends of S$1,000,000 were debited from his account and credited to Mr Mike’s account as reflected in ledger entries dated 31 December 2015.

  24. [15] Mr Manoj’s key claim is that the S$1,837,481.55 debited from his account with Novelty Builders and credited to Mr Mike’s account as reflected in a credit entry dated 31 December 2015 (see [12] above) and the S$1,000,000 debited from Mr Manoj’s account and credited to Mr Mike’s account as reflected in ledger entries dated 31 December 2015 (see [13] above), totalling S$2,837,418.55, constitute loans from Mr Manoj to Mr Mike. In contrast, Mr Mike claims that these sums were gifts from Mr Manoj.

  25. The Edulis wines

  26. [17] There is in evidence two undisputed invoices from the wine supplier Edulis SA (“Edulis”) issued to Mr Mike, bearing the following details:

  27. (a) invoice no. 63028 for the amount of €7,605 dated 3 May 2016; and

  28. (b) invoice no. 63155 for the amount of €21,456 dated 9 May 2016.

  29. [18] On 2 June 2016, Mr Mike had forwarded to Mr Manoj an e-mail enclosing the two Edulis invoices. Thereafter, on 3 June 2016, Mr Manoj’s personal secretary effected payment for invoice no. 63155 for the amount of €21,456 from Mr Manoj’s personal bank account. On 8 June 2016, Mr Mike made payment of €7,605 for invoice no. 63028.

  30. (a) On 4 May 2016 at 8.35pm, Edulis had e-mailed Mr Mike with an advertisement for a “Vega Sicilia ‘Valbuena’ 2010” wine.

  31. (b) On 4 May 2016 at 9.38pm, Mr Mike forwarded Edulis’ e-mail to Mr Manoj, with the following message:

  32. (c) On 5 May 2016 at 8.44am, Mr Manoj replied to Mr Mike’s e-mail with the following:

  33. The Number Plates

  34. [20] Mr Mike brings a counterclaim in this suit concerning two car number plates – SGJ1L and SGS1P (collectively, the “Number Plates”) – which he transferred to Mr Manoj, allegedly in exchange for a promise by Mr Manoj to pay an aggregate sum of S$300,000 (the “Number Plates debt”), which sum Mr Manoj has not paid. Mr Manoj’s defence is that the Number Plates were not owned by Mr Mike, and were instead owned by Novelty Dept Store, and that Mr Manoj had made the necessary payment for the Number Plates by transferring his funds in Novelty International Pte Ltd to Mr Dharmadas’ account in Novelty Dept Store. Mr Manoj also claims that Mr Mike’s claim for the S$300,000 in relation to the Number Plates is time-barred as this alleged debt, which dates back to the 2000s, was only raised on 28 December 2020 in Mr Mike’s defence and counterclaim of the same date.

  35. [21] Both parties adduced records from the Land Transport Authority (“LTA”) to support their respective cases.

  36. [22] In respect of the number plate SGJ1L, the records from the LTA show:

  37. [23] In respect of the number plate SGS1P, the records from the LTA show:

  38. [24] According to Mr Mike, sometime in the late 2000s, Mr Manoj wanted vehicle number plates with nice numbers for his cars. Mr Mike’s evidence is that he and Mr Manoj agreed that Mr Mike would transfer to Mr Manoj the Number Plates for S$150,000 each, and Mr Manoj insisted on paying for the Number Plates. Mr Mike asserts that he had originally purchased the Number Plates via bidding using his own money, and had registered the number plates under his name.

  39. [25] According to Mr Manoj, “[i]n all likelihood”, SGJ1L was owned or paid for by Novelty Dept Store. Mr Manoj’s account is that in late 2007, Mr Manoj told Ms Geena and Mr Mike that Mr Manoj would pay for, amongst other things, the SGJ1L number plate. Mr Manoj’s case is that he had told Ms Geena, as Novelty Group’s chief financial officer, to make the necessary deductions from Mr Manoj’s ledgers with Novelty Dept Store. Ms Geena allegedly affirmed on a few occasions thereafter that she had made the necessary deductions. According to Mr Manoj, this is evidenced by entries made in Mr Dharmadas’ ledger with Novelty Dept Store showing that Ms Geena had credited S$750,000 in dividends issued to Mr Manoj by Novelty International Pte Ltd to Mr Dharmadas on 31 December 2007. The payment was made to Mr Dharmadas because Novelty Dept Store had earlier administratively recorded a disposal of cars and car number plates owned by Novelty Dept Store to Mr Dharmadas. Mr Manoj says that this is evidenced by an entry on Mr Dharmadas’ ledger with Novelty Dept Store dated 31 December 2004.

  40. [26] As for SGS1P, Mr Manoj’s evidence is that he had bid for this car number plate in his personal capacity when it was first launched in January 2007. Mr Manoj asserts that he had successfully acquired the car number plate, but had thereafter transferred it to Mr Mike in February 2007 so that Mr Mike could hold it for Mr Manoj. Mr Mike allegedly then returned the car number plate to Mr Manoj on 22 May 2008.

  41. [27] Ms Geena gave evidence that sometime in 2017, Mr Mike, Mr Manoj and herself met at the Novelty Group’s offices for a discussion. During this discussion, Mr Manoj instructed Ms Geena to pay Mr Mike for the Number Plates by transferring credit in Mr Manoj’s account with Novelty Dept Store to Mr Mike’s account. According to Ms Geena, she was never able to make these adjustments because Mr Manoj never told her how much to transfer out of his account with Novelty Dept Store. Ms Geena was also occupied with visiting her late mother, who was ill then, in hospital. It is also in evidence that on 22 December 2017, Mr Manoj had sent a WhatsApp message to Ms Geena, stating the following:

  42. Issues to be determined

  43. [28] There were three broad claims in the present suit, which will be analysed in turn:

  44. (a) Mr Manoj’s claim for the return of a sum of S$2,837,418.55 from Mr Mike, on the basis that this sum allegedly constitutes Mr Manoj’s share of dividends issued by Novelty Builders which Mr Manoj had loaned to Mr Mike.

  45. (b) Mr Manoj’s claim for repayment of a sum of S$33,000 from Mr Mike, on the basis that Mr Manoj had allegedly paid first for wine from Edulis on Mr Mike’s behalf.

  46. (c) Mr Mike’s counterclaim against Mr Manoj for an aggregate sum of S$300,000, on the basis that Mr Mike had allegedly transferred Number Plates to Mr Manoj in exchange for a promise by Mr Manoj to pay for said Number Plates.

  47. Preliminary issue one: sufficiency of Mr Manoj’s pleadings

  48. [29] Before going into the meat of the parties’ dispute, I will say a few words about the sufficiency of Mr Manoj’s pleadings and the impact thereon for the evidence he has sought to adduce in this suit. In particular, I will focus on the summons taken out by Mr Manoj in HC/SUM 3578/2023 on 22 November 2023 to amend his pleadings on the S$2.8m transfer. Mr Mike objected fiercely at the hearing of the summons given the centrality of the S$2.8m transfer to the present action. However, the broader principles on sufficiency of pleadings analysed in this section is applicable as well to my analysis of the rest of the pleadings and evidence in this suit.

  49. [30] On 22 November 2023, Mr Manoj took out HC/SUM 3578/2023 to amend his Reply and Defence to Counterclaim and sought to add the following words (the “22 Nov Amendment”) at paragraph 3(a):

  50. [31] Mr Manoj explained that he wanted to make the amendment to prevent unnecessary technical objections from distracting the trial. Mr Manoj argued that the amendment would not take Mr Mike by surprise or prejudice his defence as, according to Mr Manoj, Mr Mike knew that the parties’ relationship was strained.

  51. [32] Mr Mike objected to the application. Mr Mike’s complaints fell into two broad categories:

  52. (a) Mr Manoj’s pleadings, with the proposed amendment, are insufficiently particularised; and

  53. (b) Mr Manoj’s pleadings are sought to be amended too late, such that Mr Mike has insufficient opportunity to bring up evidence in response.

  54. [33] On 27 November 2023, I allowed the amendment.

  55. [34] As the complaints raised by Mr Mike may have an impact on the weight to be given to the evidence that Mr Manoj has given in this suit, I will briefly address Mr Mike’s complaints.

  56. [35] In my judgment, Mr Manoj’s pleadings, as amended, are sufficiently particularised, with sufficient notice given to Mr Mike, such that full weight can be given to Mr Manoj’s evidence given for this trial.

  57. Law on pleadings

  58. [36] The law on pleadings had been examined in detail by the Court of Appeal in V Nithia (co-administratrix of the estate of Ponnusamy Sivapakiam, deceased) v Buthmanaban s/o Vaithilingam and another [2015] 5 SLR 1422 (“V Nithia”) at [34]–[41].

  59. [37] In SIC College of Business and Technology Pte Ltd v Yeo Poh Siah and others [2016] 2 SLR 118 at [46], the Court of Appeal summarised the key holding of V Nithia in the following manner:

  60. [38] In essence, the process of pleadings seeks to ensure that the opposing party knows the nature and substance of the case that the pleading party seeks to run. The underlying consideration of the law of pleadings is to prevent surprises arising at trial, and courts should not adopt an overly formalistic or rule-bound approach. I note that the rule in O 18 r 8 of the Rules of Court (2014 Rev Ed) on matters which must be specifically pleaded serves this very same purpose of ensuring that adequate notice is given to all parties as to the case they must meet at trial: Jeffrey Pinsler, Singapore Court Practice (LexisNexis, 2023) at para 18/8/4.

  61. [39] The specific fact pattern and dicta in the Court of Appeal case of Liberty Sky Investments Ltd v Aesthetic Medical Partners Pte Ltd and other appeals and another matter [2020] 1 SLR 606 (“Liberty Sky”) is germane. In Liberty Sky, the appellant investment vehicle had sued the respondent medical practice for fraudulent misrepresentation in relation to the sale of shares in the respondent medical practice to the appellant investment vehicle. The High Court and the Court of Appeal held that the fraudulent misrepresentation claim succeeded. The issue that vexed the courts was the remedy to be awarded, and the issue of whether the remedies were adequately pleaded was discussed by the Court of Appeal at [14]–[17]. The appellant investment vehicle argued that at law, the burden was on the representor (ie, the respondent medical practice) to plead bars to rescission (Liberty Sky at [14]). The appellant investment vehicle argued that given that the respondent medical practice had not pleaded any bars to rescission, the High Court judge below had erred in refusing recission on the basis of the impossibility of restitutio in integrum (because the bulk of the shares purchased by the appellant investment vehicle on the basis of the misrepresentations had been on-sold to third parties).

  62. [40] The Court of Appeal considered that it was open to the respondent medical practice to argue that bars to recission had barred the ordering of recission in the suit. The Court of Appeal reasoned as follows:

  63. [41] In essence, the Court of Appeal considered that the appellant investment vehicle was not taken by surprise by the respondent medical practice’s failure to plead bars to rescission. The appellant investment vehicle had notice of the argument that rescission was barred by the intervention of third-party rights and could have requested leave to make further submissions or adduce further evidence if it wished to do so.

  64. Mr Manoj’s pleadings are sufficiently particularised

  65. [42] It is my judgment that the 22 Nov Amendment is specific and detailed. The crux of the pleading is Mr Manoj’s averment that he and Mr Mike did not have the type of relationship where Mr Manoj would give Mr Mike almost S$3m. This directly clashes with Mr Mike’s defence of gift in relation to the S$2.8m transfer. Mr Manoj follows on by explaining why the parties did not have such a relationship – this is due to the strained relationship due to, among other things, “personality clashes, unhappiness about items that the Defendant claims to have gifted the Plaintiff, and differences in their views on their contributions to the family business”. As for the statement “at all material times”, the most obvious and reasonable interpretation of what times are material would be the time period when the dividends were declared from Novelty Builders and when the alleged loan/gift was made.

  66. [43] In relation to the timing of the amendment, it is my judgment that the amendment was not too late. It is well-established that a court has a wide power to allow amendments to pleadings at any stage of the proceedings, including on appeal: Sheagar s/o T M Veloo v Belfield International (Hong Kong) Ltd [2014] 3 SLR 524 at [117]–[119]. In deciding whether to allow an amendment, there are two primary considerations which tend to pull in different directions. The first is whether the amendment sought would allow the real issues in the proceedings to be determined, thereby ensuring that the ends of substantive justice are met. The second requires that procedural fairness to the opposing party is maintained. When an application for amendment is made late in the day, especially after the trial of the matter has concluded, it is usually the case that the prejudice to the other party would be greater. Furthermore, in such cases, courts also have to ensure that the party seeking to amend is not given a second bite of the cherry.

  67. [44] Relative to the cases where amendments to the pleadings have been sought at the appeal stage, the present amendments were made at a relatively early time, before trial has commenced. Mr Manoj’s latest affidavit of evidence-in-chief (“AEIC”) (ie, his supplemental AEIC dated 16 November 2023) was filed with a bit more than a week left before trial commenced on 28 November 2023. By this time, Mr Manoj’s claims and the full extent of his evidence would have been made known to Mr Mike. If Mr Mike wished to do so, he could have put in an application for further evidence in rebuttal. Indeed, in Hua Khian Co (Pte) Ltd v Lee Eng Kiat [1996] 2 SLR(R) 562, the Court of Appeal at [18]–[22] had disagreed with the High Court judge’s decision to expunge certain paragraphs from a witness’s AEIC. The Court of Appeal had noted that the respondent would not suffer any prejudice by the presence of the offending paragraphs in the AEIC and the respondent could have simply applied at trial to adduce evidence to rebut the allegations. Similarly, in the Liberty Sky case canvassed above, the Court of Appeal had observed two points. Firstly, whether restitutio in integrum was possible was a fact within the appellant investment vehicle’s exclusive knowledge. Secondly, the appellant investment vehicle had chosen, notwithstanding the fact that it had full notice of the argument that rescission was barred by the intervention of third-party rights at least by the time of the respondent medical practice’s closing submissions, not to adduce any evidence that would have supported its claim to rescission.

  68. [45] In the present case, in Mr Mike’s affidavit dated 24 November 2023, he had in fact highlighted at paragraphs 70 to 73 the sorts of evidence he could adduce to rebut Mr Manoj’s allegation that the parties did not have the sort of relationship where Mr Manoj would give large gifts to Mr Mike. These pieces of evidence include, allegedly, gifts of whiskey, club memberships, and WhatsApp messages and e-mails evidencing the gifts. It would have been open to Mr Mike to adduce such evidence. This evidence pertains to matters within Mr Mike’s exclusive knowledge. It does not appear at all onerous for Mr Mike to adduce at least some of such evidence in rebuttal.

  69. [46] In summary, therefore, Mr Manoj’s pleadings are sufficiently particularised on the issue of whether the parties had the type of relationship where Mr Manoj would give Mr Mike a gift of S$2.8m so as to put Mr Mike on notice of the case he has to meet. The amendments to the pleadings did not come at a time when irreparable prejudice would be done to Mr Mike. It was open to Mr Mike to apply to adduce further evidence to rebut any new material that had been raised by Mr Manoj. I therefore give full weight to the evidence adduced by Mr Manoj in this suit.

  70. Preliminary issue two: the rule in Browne v Dunn

  71. [47] At various portions of Mr Mike’s closing submissions, he submits that certain points were not suggested or put to the witnesses called to support his case. In Mr Mike’s view, Mr Manoj is precluded from asserting anything to the contrary in respect of the witnesses’ evidence as far as the points not put or not suggested are concerned.

  72. [48] I make two points at this juncture.

  73. [49] Firstly, the operation of the rule in Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67 (“Browne v Dunn”) in modern litigation has been summarised by the court in Hong Leong Singapore Finance Ltd v United Overseas Bank Ltd [2007] 1 SLR(R) 292 (“Hong Leong Singapore Finance”). The Browne v Dunn rule provides that where a submission is going to be made about a witness or the evidence given by the witness which is of such a nature and of such importance that it ought fairly to have been put to the witness to give him the opportunity to meet that submission, to counter it or to explain himself, then if it has not been so put, the party concerned will not be allowed to make that submission. However, it has been repeatedly emphasised that this rule is not a rigid or technical rule. As noted by the court in Hong Leong Singapore Finance at [42], citing Lo Sook Ling Adela v Au Mei Yin Christina and another [2002] 1 SLR(R) 326 at [40], “the rule is not rigid and does not require every point to be put to the witness but this would generally be required where the submission was ‘at the very heart of the matter’”.

  74. [50] Secondly, it should be noted that parties were given the following direction as part of the directions for trial issued by the court for the present action:

  75. [51] I thus approach the evidence given in this suit and the submissions in this case in a manner that prioritises fairness to the witnesses and emphasises substance over rigidity or technicality.

  76. Preliminary issue three: alleged changes in the parties’ cases across time

  77. [52] Mr Mike in his closing submissions also submitted that there have been many changes made to Mr Manoj’s case across time, which renders Mr Manoj’s testimony not credible. Mr Manoj also made similar allegations that Mr Mike’s defence had shifted and changed.

  78. [53] In my treatment of the evidence adduced in this suit, I bear in mind the guidance of the Court of Appeal in Sandz Solutions (Singapore) Pte Ltd and others v Strategic Worldwide Assets Ltd and others [2014] 3 SLR 562 at [56] on the need to consider the totality of the evidence (including contemporaneous objective documentary evidence) in determining the veracity, reliability and credibility of a particular witness’ evidence. The court should be alive to the possibility that there may be good reasons for gaps in the testimony of witnesses, such as because of gaps in memory especially where a long period of time has passed since the occurrence of the events in question. I also bear in mind the guidance given by the court in Hon Chi Wan Colman v Public Prosecutor [2002] 2 SLR(R) 821 at [71]–[74], where the court noted that a court can decide to accept one part of a witness’ testimony while rejecting another. In that case, the court observed at [71] that there were material discrepancies in evidence given by a witness relating to other incidents in the sequence of events leading to the subject transaction in that case. However, other aspects of the witness’ evidence were found to be reliable and the trial judge had been entitled to rely on those parts of the evidence which were reliable (at [72] and [74]).

  79. [54] Thus, in my assessment of the various pieces of evidence tendered, and in particular the testimony of the various witnesses, I bear in mind my duty to consider the totality of the evidence and I apply my mind specifically to each issue raised to assess if the evidence on each particular issue should be accepted or rejected.

  80. The S$2.8m transfer

  81. Parties’ cases

  82. Mr Manoj’s case

  83. [56] Mr Manoj argues that Mr Mike needed the S$2.8m transfer because Mr Mike had other debts and was unable to pay Novelty Builders in relation to the outstanding invoices for the Wilkinson Property. Mr Manoj contends that given that he and Mr Mike had a strained relationship, it was unlikely for Mr Manoj to be willing to carry out the S$2.8m transfer without a promise of repayment. Mr Manoj also submits that he had lent sums larger than S$2.8m to Mr Mike through oral agreements. It was thus plausible for the S$2.8m transfer to similarly be done pursuant to an oral agreement for a loan. Mr Manoj further notes the parties’ practice of mutually settling accounts, contending that he did not have a practice of making gifts or advancing significant sums of money to Mr Mike without expectation of repayment.

  84. [57] In rebuttal to Mr Mike’s defence that the S$2.8m transfer was a gift, Mr Manoj contends that Mr Mike’s defence contains elements that were belatedly raised on the cusp of trial. Mr Manoj also submits that Mr Mike’s case that Novelty Builders’ dividends were meant to be received by the shareholders of Novelty Dept Store in proportion to their shareholding in Novelty Dept Store is untenable. The agreement on this arrangement was, on Mr Mike’s case, reached more than one-and-a-half years before Mr Manoj became a shareholder of Novelty Dept Store. Given Mr Manoj’s grievances at not being a shareholder of Novelty Dept Store, Mr Manoj submits that it is not likely that he would have agreed to incorporate and work for Novelty Builders if Novelty Builders’ dividends were reserved only for Novelty Dept Store’s shareholders. In addition, Mr Manoj states that Mr Mike’s argument that there was also an agreement for Novelty Builders’ dividends to be used to pay off the parties’ debt in respect of the Clacton Property and the Wilkinson Property without parties’ being indebted to each other or to any member of the family is not supported by sufficient evidence.

  85. [58] Mr Manoj also argued that he is not estopped from claiming repayment of the S$2.8m transfer as Mr Mike has not pleaded or proved any of the constituent elements of estoppel.

  86. Mr Mike’s case

  87. [59] Mr Mike’s case is that there was an understanding and intention among Mr Manoj, Mr Mike and the shareholders of Novelty Dept Store that Novelty Builders would be operated and managed for the benefit of the Novelty Group. Furthermore, Mr Mike’s case is that this understanding included the understanding that Novelty Builder’s dividends would be distributed within the family according to the family members’ shareholding in Novelty Dept Store. As for Mr Manoj’s point that he was not a shareholder of Novelty Dept Store when Novelty Builders was incorporated, Mr Mike’s rebuttal is that Mr Mike had already agreed to transfer 20% of Novelty Dept Store’s shares to Mr Manoj at that point in time, and the family already regarded Mr Manoj as a 20% shareholder in Novelty Dept Store.

  88. [61] Mr Mike further argues that there is no evidence that Mr Mike asked Mr Manoj for a loan of S$2.8m, let alone any agreement by Mr Mike to repay Mr Manoj such a sum on demand.

  89. [62] Mr Mike states that he had no reason to ask for a loan from Mr Manoj given Mr Mike’s wealth. In rebuttal to Mr Manoj’s attempt to raise examples of previous loans granted by Mr Manoj to Mr Mike under informal oral agreements, Mr Mike argues that one of the loans was unpleaded, and that the lack of documentation for the alleged S$2.8m loan went against Mr Manoj’s evidence that he was becoming fastidious about settling his accounts with Mr Mike. In that regard, the other alleged loans were supported by documentary evidence and the loans were swiftly repaid.

  90. [63] Even if the evidence canvassed above does not support his case that there was an oral agreement between all family members that Novelty Builders would issue dividends to pay for the variation works to the Clacton Property and the Wilkinson Property without Mr Mike being indebted to Mr Manoj for the dividends, Mr Mike’s case is that the evidence canvassed above is also consistent with Mr Mike’s alternative case that Mr Manoj had made a gift of S$2.8m to Mr Mike.

  91. [64] Finally, Mr Mike takes the position that Mr Manoj is estopped from claiming the S$2.8m from Mr Mike. On Mr Mike’s case, Mr Manoj clearly and unequivocally promised Mr Mike that Mr Manoj would not enforce Mr Manoj’s legal right to the dividends, and pursuant to this promise, Novelty Builders declared dividends for the financial years of 2014 and 2015 to pay down the parties’ debts in respect of the Clacton Property and the Wilkinson Property.

  92. Law on oral agreements

  93. [65] It is trite that the substantive requirements of an oral agreement are no different from those in relation to a written contract – there needs to be (a) offer and acceptance; (b) intention to create legal relations; (c) certainty of terms; and (d) consideration: Chan Tam Hoi (alias Paul Chan) v Wang Jian and other matters [2022] SGHC 192 (“Chan Tam Hoi”) at [64]–[65], citing Tan Swee Wan and another v Johnny Lian Tian Yong [2018] SGHC 169 at [222]. The court in Chan Tam Hoi further highlighted at [38] that the burden of proof always remains on the plaintiff to prove its positive case. The court also observed that being clear about which party bears the burden of proof “is especially important in cases involving oral agreements, where there will be gaps in the evidence precisely because there is no direct evidence that points to a written agreement”. Crucially, the court noted that “it is important not to confer an unintended advantage to the plaintiff where the defendant’s defence is unsustainable”.

  94. [66] The court’s remarks in Chan Tam Hoi is an instantiation of the broader principle explained by the Court of Appeal in Loo Chay Sit v Estate of Loo Chay Loo, deceased [2010] 1 SLR 286 (“Loo Chay Sit”) at [16]–[23] that the law of evidence allows for three possibilities in so far as the concept of proof is concerned – a fact can be said to be “proved”, “disproved” or “not proved”. As explained by the Court of Appeal at [21] of Loo Chay Sit, after a party seeking to prove the existence of a particular fact has adduced evidence in support of it, the opposing party may be able to adduce some evidence as to the non-existence of that fact. Such evidence may not be sufficient on its own for the court to conclude that, on a balance of probabilities, the fact does not exist so as to be “disproved”. Such evidence may, nevertheless, sufficiently undermine the case of the party asserting the fact so as to cause doubt as to its existence with the result that the party is unable to discharge his burden of proving the fact. As I will go on to explain later, while I do not completely accept Mr Mike’s defence in relation to the S$2.8m transfer, I nonetheless find that Mr Manoj has not proven his affirmative case on the alleged loan agreement.

  95. [67] As for the principles involved in determining the existence of an oral agreement, the court in ARS v ART and another [2015] SGHC 78 at [53]–[54] summarised the relevant principles as distilled from the case law, as follows:

  96. Analysis

  97. [68] The crux of the issue for this claim is whether there was an oral agreement between Mr Manoj and Mr Mike for Mr Manoj to loan S$2.8m to Mr Mike. However, to arrive at a decision on this point, it will be necessary to address some of the issues raised by the parties in the long lead-up to the moment when this oral agreement is alleged to have been concluded.

  98. No agreement for Novelty Builders’ dividends to be divided according to Novelty Dept Store shareholding

  99. [69] The first issue to be decided is whether Mr Manoj was beneficially entitled to the 50% share of the dividends issued by Novelty Builders that was credited to his account. If Mr Mike is right in saying that the parties and the rest of the Novelty Dept Store shareholders had come together to enter into an oral agreement that Novelty Builder’s dividends would be distributed within the family according to the family members’ shareholding in Novelty Dept Store, then Mr Manoj’s entitlement to Novelty Builders’ dividends would be much diminished. It bears mentioning as well that this alleged agreement was not recorded in writing, so the law above on proving the existence of oral contracts apply similarly to this alleged agreement on how Novelty Builders’ dividends would be distributed.

  100. [70] In my judgment, this alleged agreement that Novelty Builders’ dividends would be distributed according to the shareholding in Novelty Dept Store did not exist. The evidence given by Mr Mike and Ms Geena is that the alleged agreement for Novelty Builders’ dividends to be proportionally distributed to Novelty Dept Store’s shareholders was entered into around the time of Novelty Builders’ incorporation. However, such an agreement is inconsistent with the parties’ expectation as to the future role of Novelty Builders at the time of its incorporation.

  101. [72] Furthermore, Mr Mike’s pleaded case, up until his amendment to his defence on 6 November 2023, was that “the intention and understanding amongst the shareholders of [Novelty Dept Store] was for [Novelty Builders] to be operated and managed for the benefit of the Novelty Group”. The further pleading about the alleged agreement that Novelty Builders’ dividends would be distributed according to the shareholding in Novelty Dept Store was added via the amendment to the defence on 6 November 2023, which was three weeks before trial commenced and after Mr Manoj’s AEIC was filed on 31 October 2023. While I do not discount Mr Mike’s case purely because his case was changed, I also note that his prior pleaded defence that there was a common understanding that Novelty Builders was to be operated and managed for the benefit of the Novelty Group is consistent with Mr Manoj’s account of the role of Novelty Builders as an entity that broadly benefitted Novelty Group. Such statements are broad and vague and point to a general understanding that Novelty Builders benefitted Novelty Dept Store by taking the construction burden from Novelty Dept Store. However, there is no clear expectation between the parties that Novelty Builders was meant to contribute profit upwards into Novelty Dept Store, and to the shareholders of Novelty Dept Store. Indeed, there is also no evidence that Novelty Builders had ever contributed profits upwards to Novelty Dept Store, which lends support to this conclusion.

  102. [73] Given the relative lateness of Mr Mike’s pleading about the alleged agreement that Novelty Builders’ dividends would be distributed according to the shareholding in Novelty Dept Store, Mr Manoj sought and was granted permission to file a supplementary AEIC addressing Mr Mike’s new pleadings. Mr Manoj’s AEIC goes some way towards debunking Mr Mike’s case on the alleged agreement on the proportional distribution of Novelty Builders’ dividends. Mr Manoj provided evidence that when Novelty Builders was incorporated with Mr Manoj, Mr Mike and two other individuals as founding shareholders, each founding shareholder contributed S$12,500 to its paid-up capital. Importantly, Mr Manoj gave evidence that his capital injection of S$12,500 was drawn from his own account with Novelty Dept Store. Mr Manoj also gave evidence that he later further injected S$125,000 into Novelty Builders by drawing this sum from his account with Novelty Dept Store. These drawings and capital injections are supported by entries in Novelty Dept Store’s ledger, with detailed narrations associating these debits with Novelty Builders. In my judgment, the fact that Mr Manoj injected his own money into Novelty Builders supports his case that Novelty Builders was a venture between him and Mr Mike, and that they were the ones entitled to any residual profits generated by Novelty Builders.

  103. [74] Moreover, whereas Novelty Builders was incorporated on 5 January 2006, Mr Manoj only became a shareholder of Novelty Dept Store on 27 July 2007. Mr Mike’s evidence is that around 2007, he decided to speak to Mr Manoj about Mr Manoj’s longstanding request to be given shares in Novelty Dept Store. Thereafter, Mr Mike discussed this request with Mr Dharmadas. Mr Mike and Mr Dharmadas decided to accede to Mr Manoj’s request and to give Mr Manoj 20% of the shares in Novelty Dept Store. Based on Mr Mike’s own chronology in the evidence he gave, Mr Manoj would not have had any concrete assurance of being a shareholder of Novelty Dept Store when Novelty Builders was incorporated early in 2006. Mr Mike’s evidence is that Mr Manoj was annoyed over – in Mr Manoj’s view – the belated allocation to him of shares in Novelty Dept Store. In this context, it would have been unlikely for Mr Manoj to have been a party to an agreement, made around the time of Novelty Builders’ incorporation in early 2006, that Novelty Builders’ dividends should be distributed proportionately in accordance with Novelty Dept Store’s shareholding.

  104. [75] It is also commercially plausible that Novelty Builders has a different shareholding structure as compared to Novelty Dept Store because Novelty Builders was first incorporated with third party shareholders, and the family had taken legal advice as to why Novelty Dept Store should not be a shareholder of Novelty Builders. There was therefore logic in Mr Manoj and Mr Mike being the co-venturers in this regard.

  105. [76] This being the case, I do not find that there had been a legally enforceable agreement that Novelty Builders’ dividends would be divided up in proportion to the shareholdings in Novelty Dept Store. The context surrounding the set-up of Novelty Builders is inconsistent with the parties having made such an agreement. Indeed, Mr Mike’s pleadings were never entirely clear as to the elements of such an agreement ie, where was the offer and acceptance, consideration, and intention to create legal relations evinced. The only understanding that I can discern from the evidence is that Novelty Builders, as part of the wider family business, benefitted Novelty Dept Store in the broad sense. Following on from this, Mr Manoj as 50% shareholder in Novelty Builders is beneficially entitled to 50% of Novelty Builders’ dividends.

  106. No oral agreement between Mr Manoj and Mr Mike for Mr Manoj to loan S$2.8m to Mr Mike

  107. [78] This is where the crux of this claim arises for decision. In my judgment, Mr Manoj has not proved his affirmative case that there was an oral agreement between Mr Manoj and Mr Mike for Mr Manoj to loan S$2.8m to Mr Mike, with an accompanying obligation on the part of Mr Mike to repay the loan on demand.

  108. [79] It bears remembering that, as explained above at [65], Mr Manoj as the plaintiff bears the burden of proving the substantive requirements of an oral agreement. Mr Manoj did not manage to adduce any documentary record evidencing the alleged oral agreement for the S$2.8m loan, nor is there any witness (other than Mr Manoj himself) who testified in support of the existence of this loan agreement. Given this state of the evidence, Mr Manoj has an uphill battle to fight in proving his positive case.

  109. [80] Mr Manoj pleaded that his relationship with Mr Mike was strained at all material times, such that the parties did not have the type of relationship where Mr Manoj would give Mr Mike almost S$3m.

  110. [81] I disagree.

  111. [84] I note also that Mr Manoj had included in the list of examples of him settling accounts with Mr Mike an instance where, in 2011, Mr Manoj asked Mr Mike to help Mr Manoj with purchasing jewellery for Mdm Sheela and Mr Manoj’s wife, with Mr Manoj reimbursing Mr Mike for the purchase. While this example is far from conclusive of the parties’ relationships with each member of the family, I note that this example provides an instance of Mr Manoj giving a gift to his mother. The broader point here is that Mr Manoj’s pleading of his strained relationship with Mr Mike still leaves unanswered questions as to whether this strained relationship extended to the rest of the Kalwani family, who would ultimately benefit from the Wilkinson Property.

  112. [85] I note that Mr Manoj had provided evidence of loans (a US$9m loan in 2013 and a US$6m loan in 2014) that Mr Manoj had previously given to Mr Mike via oral agreements. Yet, these were different from, and not dispositive of, the issue of the S$2.8m loan. The examples raised by Mr Manoj were short-term loans returned within a matter of weeks. The US$9m loan was documented, albeit through text message evidence. Moreover, Mr Mike was asked on the stand about whether he agreed that the US$6m loan was concluded pursuant to an oral agreement between Mr Manoj and Mr Mike. Mr Mike’s evidence is that he and Mr Manoj wanted to let their mother, Mdm Sheela, take advantage of higher interest rates being offered in India, and thus money was borrowed from Mr Manoj to be deposited into Mr Mike’s and Mdm Sheela’s joint account for the India investment. Thereafter, money was borrowed in Singapore against the India investment, which allowed the money loaned from Mr Manoj to be returned to him. I observe that Mr Mike’s evidence on this loan arrangement was believable and consistent with the short-term nature of the loan. In short, the evidence of previous loans is not a precedent for this current loan. In fact, the pattern of behaviour that this evidence shows is contrary to Mr Manoj’s case because it shows that Mr Mike returned previous loans quickly.

  113. [86] The documentary evidence does not assist Mr Manoj’s case. There is no documentary evidence at all (not even text messages) referring to the alleged S$2.8m loan. This is incongruous with the existence of the S$2.8m loan.

  114. (a) Mr Manoj was able to raise a litany of examples of him and Mr Mike purportedly engaging in a practice of mutually settling accounts for sums owed to each other, with accompanying documentary evidence demonstrating that there was a loan or money was owed. This goes to the point about how Mr Manoj was, by his own evidence, more fastidious in accounting with Mr Mike for any further purchases parties made for each other after 2011. It is inconsistent with Mr Manoj’s fastidiousness to make no mention of the S$2.8m loan, even in text messages, over the years.

  115. (b) Novelty Builders’ ledger does not reflect the S$2.8m transfer as a “loan” from Mr Manoj to Mr Mike. The ledger simply reflected, for Mr Manoj’s account, “…TRANSFER CR BAL FM DIRECTOR-MDK TO DIRECTOR-BDK…” for both of the transfers totalling up to S$2.8m, with similar ledger entries made for Mr Mike’s account. I note at this juncture that Novelty Builders’ ledger does contain numerous entries that are explicitly reflected as loans, such as an entry dated 19 September 2014 bearing the narrative “INTER-CO LOAN REC’D FROM NDSPL -SDRY” for the sum of S$1,144,500.00. There are numerous similar entries recording loans in Novelty Builders’ ledger. If the S$2.8m loan was indeed a loan, it would be reasonable to expect it to be contemporaneously reflected as such in the ledger.

  116. [87] There is corroborating evidence from both Ms Kamni and Ms Geena that the S$2.8m transfer was not a loan. While I keep in mind the possibility that both Ms Kamni and Ms Geena might have a closer relationship to Mr Mike than Mr Manoj, it is not clear to me why Ms Kamni’s evidence in particular (where she deposed that she had never heard of a loan being in place) was not challenged.

  117. [88] Mr Manoj made much about Mr Mike’s alleged liquidity issues, in view of his debts to Novelty Dept Store and his alleged gambling problem. While I agree with Mr Manoj that Mr Mike’s net worth based on the valuation of Novelty Dept Store does not equate to free liquidity, this is not conclusive about whether the parties entered into a loan agreement for the S$2.8m transfer. Mr Mike’s alleged need for cash is also consistent with a gift of the S$2.8m. Mr Manoj’s allegations concerning Mr Mike’s cashflow issues also do not explain why Mr Mike had to approach Mr Manoj for a loan, and not approach the rest of the Kalwani family. It bears remembering that the Wilkinson Property was the subject of the debt that the S$2.8m was meant to repay. Logically, it can be said that there would be a moral imperative for the rest of the Kalwani family members to pitch in. Mr Manoj did not put any questions to Ms Geena and Ms Kamni in this regard when they took the stand. I am unable to draw any firm conclusions, and can only say that Mr Mike’s alleged liquidity issues do not prove that there was a loan agreement behind the S$2.8m transfer.

  118. [89] Finally, there is Mr Mike’s oral evidence that himself, Ms Geena and Mr Manoj entered into a so-called “addendum” agreement. It was allegedly agreed that Novelty Builders’ dividends would first be used to pay off invoices associated with both the Clacton Property and the Wilkinson Property, before being distributed in proportion to the shareholding in Novelty Dept Store. Mr Mike caveated his evidence by saying that everything “was done on an informal basis”. This “addendum” is not part of Mr Mike’s pleaded defence. It is not part of Mr Mike’s AEIC nor Ms Geena’s AEIC. As this “addendum” was only raised in Mr Mike’s cross-examination, Mr Manoj did not have an opportunity to address it when giving evidence. Even so, Mr Manoj in his closing submissions has managed to raise questions about the existence of this “addendum”, by pointing out that (a) the sum of S$1,837,481.55 left over after Mr Manoj’s dividends were used to pay down the Clacton Property debts sat in Mr Manoj’s account for some time before being transferred to Mr Mike’s account to settle the debts associated with the Wilkinson Property (see [12] above); and (b) Ms Geena transferred S$13,619.73 extra from Mr Manoj’s account to Mr Mike’s account, over and above Mr Manoj’s share of the Novelty Builders dividends. Mr Manoj contends that these two discrepancies show that there was no “addendum” agreement for Novelty Builders’ dividends to be applied towards the debts associated with the Clacton Property and the Wilkinson Property in priority. With the state of the evidence before me, I do not have sufficient material to hold that Mr Mike has proven the existence of this “addendum”. Yet, as noted above at [65], the unsustainability of this aspect of Mr Mike’s case cannot patch the deficiencies in Mr Manoj’s affirmative case. This is because Mr Manoj’s rebuttal of Mr Mike’s evidence on the “addendum” cannot prove Mr Manoj’s affirmative case that all the elements of an oral loan contract for the S$2.8m transfer have been made out.

  119. [90] Ultimately, when a broad view is taken of this case, the parties are trying to fit a definitive legal context into a matrix of informal dealings carried out in a family-owned business. These informal dealings were carried out at a time when litigation was not yet contemplated. Both Mr Manoj and Mr Mike gave evidence that the affairs of the Novelty Group were conducted in an informal manner. What emerged ultimately from my analysis of the evidence is the conclusion that Mr Manoj has failed to fit the informal dealings between the parties into the legal requirements of an oral agreement for a loan.

  120. [91] I end this section by observing that this outcome in relation to the claim concerning the S$2.8m transfer bears some resemblance to the court’s conclusion at [67] of Thong Soon Seng v Magnus Energy Group Ltd [2023] SGHC 5 (“Thong Soon Seng”). In Thong Soon Seng, the court found that the plaintiff had failed to prove his pleaded case that he made a loan of $4m to the defendant, which resulted in the failure of his claim in debt. The court also found that the plaintiff had failed to plead and prove an unjust factor, which rendered his alternative claim in unjust enrichment a failure as well. Importantly, the court observed at [60] that the court’s decision meant that the defendant was entitled to keep the $4m even though it readily accepted that the payment was not a gift, and even if its positive case on the reason for the payment cannot be proven or is actually false. Such an outcome is reflective of the common law’s approach which holds that the absence of basis for the defendant’s enrichment is not sufficient for restitution to follow (Thong Soon Seng at [62]–[63]). The conclusion that I have reached is similar. Mr Manoj has failed to prove his pleaded case that he made a loan of S$2.8m to Mr Mike. I am left with doubts as to Mr Mike’s positive case because I have found that there was no agreement for Novelty Builders’ dividends to be divided proportionately amongst Novelty Dept Store’s shareholders and I have found that the “addendum” agreement was not proven. Yet, the absence of a proven basis for Mr Mike’s enrichment is not sufficient for a remedy to follow for Mr Manoj. Mr Manoj’s claim that Mr Mike has been unjustly enriched in the sum of S$2,837,418.55 fails as well.

  121. [92] Mr Manoj’s case for the repayment of the S$2.8m transfer fails. The issue of whether Mr Manoj’s claim is barred by estoppel therefore also falls away.

  122. The Edulis wines

  123. Parties’ cases

  124. Mr Manoj’s case

  125. [93] Mr Manoj’s case is that he had paid a sum of €21,456.00 to Edulis for wines on Mr Mike’s behalf in 2016, on the basis that Mr Manoj would be repaid on demand. Mr Manoj’s case is that the agreement was reached orally on the telephone.

  126. Mr Mike’s case

  127. [96] Mr Mike also argues that Mr Manoj’s failure to bring his claims within a reasonable time despite having knowledge of the facts on which his claims are based constitutes a bar by laches or a case of acquiescence which prevents Mr Manoj from acting upon the claim now.

  128. [97] Mr Mike states that Mr Manoj’s claim in unjust enrichment in relation to the Edulis wine claim is a non-starter given that Mr Manoj cannot make out the basis on which he paid the €21,456 (ie, the alleged oral agreement between Mr Mike and Mr Manoj for Mr Manoj to pay for Mr Mike’s wines on Mr Mike’s behalf).

  129. Mr Manoj did not pay for the Edulis wines on Mr Mike’s behalf

  130. [98] In my judgment, Mr Manoj’s claim for S$33,000 for wine that he allegedly paid for on Mr Mike’s behalf fails.

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